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Kovatcheva, Nevena G. "Account and method in Aristotle's Nicomachean ethics." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp01/MQ49572.pdf.
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Feldman, Noah Raam. "Reading the Nicomachean Ethics with Ibn Rushd." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.386422.
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Berry, Matthew. "Law, Justice, and Equity in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics." Thesis, Boston College, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:107190.
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Thesis advisor: Robert C. BartlettAt the beginning of the fifth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle tells us that, according to common opinion, justice is lawful and fair. He concludes his examination of justice with a discussion of equity, which proves to be neither strictly lawful nor strictly fair—and yet Aristotle tells us that equity is, in a certain sense, the highest form of justice. This dissertation explains how Aristotle reaches this startling conclusion. I begin with an exploration of the careful taxonomy of justice that Aristotle lays out in the first half of book five. But Aristotle abruptly abandons this taxonomy midway through the book when he turns from the simply just to the politically just. For this reason and others, I argue that the second half of the book is not, as some have asserted, the application of the universal principles of justice to a political situation, but a new beginning and a fresh attempt to articulate the virtue of justice, free from the flaws we discover through a careful study of the first half of the book. Aristotle’s political justice takes its bearings from the health of a republican government, that is, a government of free and equal citizens. And yet political justice, like political courage, remains on the level of politics. Aristotle’s discussion of equity at the end of the book presents the virtuous form of justice, which corrects the flaws of justice as lawfulness and justice as fairness and permits justice to take its place in the economy of a noble human life
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2016
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Political Science
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Subasi, Necati. "Friendship In The Nicomachean Ethics And Its Contemporary Perspectives." Master's thesis, METU, 2011. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12613941/index.pdf.
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This thesis analyzes the concept of Friendship in Aristotle&rsquos Nicomachean Ethics with its main aspects. Book VIII and Book IX of the Nicomachean Ethics are devoted specifically to the concept of Friendship to explore the moral and political aspects of it. Friendship has been one of the prominent topics for moral philosophers and hence contemporary discussions lead the Nicomachean account of friendship come to the fore. Thus, the main features of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics as well as contemporary perspectives and discussions on that topic will be analyzed and explored in depth.
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Pascarella, John Antonio. "Friendship, Politics, and the Good in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics." Thesis, University of North Texas, 2015. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc801900/.
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In Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Books VIII and IX provide A philosophic examination of friendship. While these Books initially appear to be non sequiturs in the inquiry, a closer examination of the questions raised by the preceding Books and consideration of the discussion of friendship's position between two accounts of pleasure in Books VII and X indicate friendship's central role in the Ethics. In friendship, Aristotle finds a uniquely human capacity that helps readers understand the good is distinct from pleasure by leading them to think seriously about what they can hold in common with their friends throughout their lives without changing who they are. What emerges from Aristotle's account of friendship is a nuanced portrait of human nature that recognizes the authoritative place of the intellect in human beings and how its ability to think about an end and hold its thinking in relation to that end depends upon whether it orders or is ordered by pleasures and pains. Aristotle lays the groundwork for this conclusion throughout the Ethics by gradually disclosing pleasures and pains are not caused solely by things we feel through the senses, but by reasoned arguments and ideas as well. Through this insight, we can begin to understand how Aristotle's Ethics is a work of political philosophy; to fully appreciate the significance of his approach, however, we must contrast his work with that of Thomas Hobbes, his harshest Modern critic. Unlike Aristotle, Hobbes is nearly silent on friendship in his political philosophy, and examining his political works especially Leviathan reveals the absence of friendship is part of his deliberate attempt to advance a politics founded on the moral teaching that pleasure is the good. Aristotle's political philosophy, by way of contrast, aims to preserve the good, and through friendship, he not only disentangles the good from pleasure, but shows a level of human community more suitable for preserving the good than political regimes because these communities have more natural bonds than any regime can hope to create between its citizens.
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Wong, Kin Keung. "Comparison of Nicomachean ethics and the ethics of Confucius : appropriateness of moral decisions /." View abstract or full-text, 2009. http://library.ust.hk/cgi/db/thesis.pl?HUMA%202009%20WONG.
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SILVA, ROGER MICHAEL MILLER. "ENDS AND MEANS: A DISCUSSION CONCERNING PHRONESIS IN THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2005. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=6269@1.
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COORDENAÇÃO DE APERFEIÇOAMENTO DO PESSOAL DE ENSINO SUPERIORO presente trabalho visa a apresentar a discussão sobre a natureza e o objeto da phronesis na Ética Nicomaquéia de Aristóteles, tomando como ponto de partida o célebre debate ocorrido na França há cerca de quarenta anos: nas ações humanas, a phronesis é essencialmente conhecimento dos meios para realizar os fins desejados, ou, ao contrário, é essencialmente o conhecimento destes fins? Primeiramente, apresentam-se os antecedentes deste debate, nas discussões a respeito da phronesis entre aristotélicos e neokantianos na Alemanha do final do século XIX e suas influências na interpretação de Jaeger. Em seguida, no capítulo central, apresenta-se o debate entre autores franceses. Para ilustrar os pontos de vista opostos, tomam-se, respectivamente, as posturas de Pierre Aubenque, para quem a phronesis é conhecimento somente dos meios, e do Pe. René-Antoine Gauthier, para quem ela é sobretudo conhecimento dos fins. Posteriormente, partindo da constatação de que a questão ainda permanece aberta após este célebre debate, são apresentados seus desdobramentos posteriores, a fim de oferecer o estado atual da questão, apresentando algumas soluções propostas nas duas últimas décadas, na linha de uma superação das oposições.
The following work strives to ponder on the nature and object of phronesis in Aristotle`s Nicomachean Ethics, using as a starting point the renowned debate staged in France around forty years ago: in human actions, phronesis is essentially the knowledge of the means necessary to attain the desired end, or is it on the other hand the knowledge of these ends? In first place the antecedents of this discussion are presented, concerning the debate on the concept of phronesis between Aristotelians and Neokantians in Germany towards the end of the XIXth century and its influences on the interpretations of Jaeger. Following that, in the second chapter, the debate among the French authors is presented. In order to illustrate opposing viewpoints, two exemplary postures are taken into consideration, those of Pierre Aubenque, for whom phronesis is essentially the knowledge of means, and that of Fr. René-Antoine Gauthier, for whom it is essentially the knowledge of the ends. Finally, taking into consideration that the debate is still open even after all arguments are presented, a follow-up is done taking into consideration some of the main proposals of the recent decades in order to have an idea of how the debate has evolved to its present state and with the intention of solving oppositions.
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Rabinoff, Sharon Eve. "Perception in Aristotle's Ethics." Thesis, Boston College, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/3323.
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Thesis advisor: Marina McCoyIn Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, the project of developing virtue and of being virtuous is always realized in one's immediate, particular circumstances. Given that perception is the faculty that gains access to the particular, Aristotle seems to afford perception a central role in ethical life. Yet Aristotle does not provide an account of ethical perception: he does not explain how the perceptual faculty is able grasp ethically relevant facts and how the perceptual capacity can do so well, nor does he explain the manner in which perception influences ethical decisions and actions. It is the project of this dissertation to provide such accounts. There are two main difficulties in the notion of ethical perception in Aristotle's thought: first, perception appears ill-suited to ethical life because the objects of perception are always perceived with respect to the individual's subjective condition--her desires, fears, etc. The information relayed by perception is always relative to the perceiver, i.e. merely the apparent good. Second, virtue is the excellence of the rational soul, while perception is a faculty shared by non-rational animals. It appears, then, that perception must be limited to playing an instrumental role in ethical reasoning and action. This dissertation addresses these difficulties by developing an account of uniquely human perception that is influenced and informed by the intellectual element of the soul. I argue that the project of ethical development, for Aristotle, is the project of integrating one's perceptual faculty with the intellectual capacity, such that one's perception transcends the natural relativity to the perceiver and gains access to the true good as it emerges in one's particular situation
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2013
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Philosophy
9
Rosler, Andres. "The authority of the state and the political obligation of the citizen in Aristotle." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.313581.
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Elsey, Timothy Alan. "Deliberation and the Role of the Practical Syllogism." Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2011. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1302455557.
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Sher, Gavin. "The artistic path to virtue." Thesis, Rhodes University, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1004370.
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Most people share a strong intuition that there is much to be learned from great literature and other forms of narrative art. This intuition is, however, philosophically contentious. Plato was the first to argue against the possibility of learning anything from narrative art, but he founded a tradition that persists to the present day. I will engage in this debate in order to examine the role narratives might be able to play in acquiring virtue on Aristotle's ethical account, as it is presented in Nicomachean Ethics. I will claim that narratives have so long seemed a problematic source of learning because philosophers have traditionally approached the issue in the wrong way. They have typically tried to show how we might acquire propositional knowledge through our engagement with art, but this approach has failed because of insoluble problems involved in satisfying the justification criterion. Fictions may be rescued from their problematic status by realising that what we truly get from them is, instead, a type of knowledge-how. I will argue that Aristotelian virtue is itself a kind of knowledge-how and so the type of learning that takes place in engaging with narratives has a role to play in its acquisition and exercise. Virtue depends on types of reasoning that are themselves kinds of knowledge-how and which are employed and improved in engaging with narrative art. These types of reasoning will be described as conceptual, emotional and imaginative understanding. I will show how each is important in relation to virtue and how each is a kind of knowledge-how that may be improved through exposure to narrative art.
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Stervinou, Louis. "A Critical Interpretation of Aristotle's Ethics." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2019. https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/2027.
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This essay is a critical interpretation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, as it attempts to reconcile the tension between moral virtue and intellectual virtue, the two virtues which Aristotle deems characteristic of man. This paper looks to include both moral and intellectual virtue in Aristotle’s conception of the happy life, through the summarization and analyzation of David Keyt, J.L Ackrill, John Cooper and Daniel Devereux’s modern interpretations of the ethics.
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Kim, Bradford Jean-Hyuk. "Aristotle on the value of friends." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2018. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:7a7d2d16-2514-457c-a217-968af1111a60.
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In this dissertation, I argue that Aristotle's account of friendship is egoistic. Focusing on the Nicomachean Ethics, I begin with VIII.2. Here Aristotle claims that in all friendships, friends love only because of the lovable (φιλητóv), which divides into the useful, pleasant, and good. I argue that "because of (διὰ)" refers to at least the final cause and that "the lovable" refers to what appears to contribute one's own happiness (εuδαιμoνία); therefore Aristotle claims that in all friendships, friends love only for the sake of their own happiness. This result may seem incompatible with some types of concern Aristotle principally attributes to his normative paradigm of complete friendship: wishing goods for the sake of the other and loving the other for himself. One might argue that these types of concern are altruistic, and so it cannot be the case that in all friendships, friends love only for the sake of their own happiness. I argue that these types of concern ultimately hinge on one's own happiness. The object is the lovable (what appears to contribute to one's own happiness), specifically the good instantiated by the other's virtue; further, what a virtuous person takes as valuable about another's virtue is how it facilitates her own virtuous activity, that is, her own happiness. From here I turn to Aristotle's notion of 'another self'. One popular interpretation of other selfhood defies the altruism/egoism divide. Here the essential feature of other selfhood is virtue, which allows for no prioritization among virtuous people; there is no prioritization of the other over oneself (as in altruism) nor of oneself over the other (as in egoism), since the relevant parties are equal in moral standing (they are virtuous). Assessing the instances of 'another self' in the Nicomachean Ethics VIII.12, IX.4, and IX.9, I argue for an egoistic interpretation of other selfhood; the essential feature of other selfhood is involvement in one's own actualization. That is, what makes other selves valuable is how they facilitate one's own virtuous activity, one's own happiness. Finally, I address the doctrine of self-love in the Nicomachean Ethics IX.8. Again, some interpreters derive non-prioritization from the text; Aristotle claims that all virtuous people identify with the understanding (voũç), so, the non-prioritization interpretation goes, there can be no prioritization among virtuous agents, as they are identical in the relevant way. I argue for an egoistic interpretation of IX.8; Aristotle endorses praiseworthy self-love, which involves maximizing the superlatively valuable fine (καλòν) for oneself over others. Moreover, such self-prioritization occurs precisely by gratifying the understanding, that which was supposed to ground non-prioritization.
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Shinde, Jaysinha Shamrao. "MEASURING CPA SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AT THE BUSINESS OWNER LEVEL: INSTRUMENT DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION." OpenSIUC, 2010. https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/dissertations/148.
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From an accounting standpoint, the concept of social responsibility has gained a lot of momentum with both academicians and practitioners. Many of the top public accounting firms' offer social responsibility reporting services. Also, many CPA firms, most of which tend to be private partnerships and sole proprietorships, are engaged in social responsibility initiatives. CPA Social Responsibility at the level of a business owner is a concept that is largely unexplored in the academic literature. The overwhelming majority of academic papers have looked at social responsibility from the standpoint of a corporation, that is, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). The lack of adequate development of social responsibility at the level of a business owner has led to a gap in the research in terms of methodology and of the causal relationships that social responsibility may have on variety of outcomes. This study conducts a thorough literature review on the concept of social responsibility, and then in conjunction with a qualitative analysis consisting of interviews with CPAs (who own their business - that is, sole proprietors and partners), this paper defines social responsibility. Using the definitions generated by the literature review and the expert panel, this paper uses the grounding of Nicomachean Ethics to derive the definitions and elucidate the underlying dimensions of CPA Social Responsibility. Further, the study uses power analysis, factor analysis, scree plots, multidimensional scaling, perceptual maps, and a sequential process to develop and validate an instrument to measure the concept of CPA Social Responsibility at the level of a business owner.
15
Leeflang, Arne Karl. "An intra-textual study of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics Book VI and the role of the five states of the rational soul." Diss., University of Pretoria, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/26442.
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In Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle makes the assumption that there are five states of the soul through which we interact with truth. He continues Book VI with a discussion of his intended meaning of each of these states of the soul. In this study the relevant discussions on each state are extracted from the text to enable a clearer understanding of these states, as Aristotle presents them. Subsequently, the role of each state is studied in the context of the entire Nicomachean Ethics. The primary focus is directed at a clearer understanding of Aristotle’s proposed intellectual virtues, and on their respective roles in the ethical life. Simultaneously, the ethical life that Aristotle presents, and its ultimate end eudaimonia, or happiness, are approached from this perspective. Aristotle argues that reason is the distinguishing feature of humans, and that man’s excellence must include the excellent use of this capacity. This study investigates how Aristotle proposes that the rational intellect should reach its completion, and comes to the conclusion that true mastery of the intellect can only result from the cooperation of the five states of the rational soul. It becomes evident that each state of the soul has a different nature and function, and that through directed cooperation they do not compete with one another, but are mutually enhanced. However, Aristotle repeatedly emphasises the importance of extending thought into action. This makes Aristotle’s ethical theory so attractive: he manages to consolidate his theorizing with the value of experienced reality. This is his essential key to happiness, which is experienced both in perception and in action. By approaching the Nicomachean Ethics from the perspective of the five states of the rational soul, an appreciation is acquired for the fine balance by which action and reason may combine to result in man’s fulfilment of his highest potential. It is in this balance that one finds the secret to eudaimonia.Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 2011.
Ancient Languages
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Karlsson, Lennart. "Aristoteles och cyberspace : Kunskaper, färdigheter och insikter i hypertextens föränderliga värld." Thesis, Karlstads universitet, Estetisk-filosofiska fakulteten, 2011. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kau:diva-7103.
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The purpose of this thesis is to deepen the understanding of our contemporary description of digital literacy using the perspective on knowledge from the Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle. I have chosen to deal with the problem using a hermeneutic approach. The method of inquiry is based on close reading of the selected literature. The selection itself has been made after a strategic selection regarding perspective on knowledge and digital literacy. It appears in the thesis that there are substantial differences but also similarities between our contemporary description of digital literacy from Recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 on key competences for lifelong learning and the perspective on knowledge from the Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle.Still, the result has been possible to use for the purpose of the thesis since the problem has an answer and a deepened impression of the understandings of digital literacy.
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Alvarez, Alejandro Montiel. "As relações entre ética, política e direito em Aristóteles." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/14262.
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O presente trabalho pretende estudar as relações entre a ética, a política e o direito em Aristóteles. Primeiramente, tentar-se-á dar uma ordem interna a cada tema, conforme a teoria das causas, isto é, as quatro causas aristotélicas. Depois de identificadas as causas da ética, da política e do direito, através da análise das causas de seus objetos, seguir-se-á, ao tempo da conclusão, a análise se há identidade de causas, parcial ou total, perfeita ou imperfeita. Ainda, buscar-se-á quais os elementos estudados por Aristóteles em uma das obras que são condições necessárias à outra. Por fim, investigar-se-á se as orientações para a ação de uma estão presentes na outra, isto é, se a atividade política básica é operada por um tipo de razão apresentada pela ética e se as orientações para a ação ética, ou seja, a ação humana conforme a virtude, é operada por um tipo de razão apresentada pela política. Finalmente, dar-se-á uma apresentação geral de como o direito se situa e se organiza nessa relação.This dissertation intends to study the relations between ethics, politics and law, in aristotelian philosophy. First of all, it atempts to give an internal order to each of those themes, according to the four aristotelian causes; Aristotle’s theory of causes. After identifying the causes of ethics, politics and law, through analysis of its object’s causes, in conclusion it will be verified if there is any identity between them - partial or total, perfect or imperfect. Furthermore, elements studied by Aristotle in one of them which are necessary conditions to the others will be investigated. The next question to be answered will be whether the orientation to action are given by ethics, that is, whether the basic political action is performed by a type of reason presented by ethics, and wheter the orientation to ethical action, the human action according to virtue, is performed by a type of reason presented by politics. Finally, a general approach about how law is situated and organized in the context of the referred relation.
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Cruz, Arthur Piranema da. "Ethica Nicomachea: uma leitura particularista." Universidade Federal de Pelotas, 2010. http://repositorio.ufpel.edu.br/handle/ri/1020.
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Previous issue date: 2010-07-15This work seeks to sustain the particularistic view of Aristotle‟s Nicomachean Ethics as opposed to universal readings. The analysis of the passages on the method of practical philosophy, about virtue as mean and about prudence as perceptive ability of the virtuous man will show that Aristotle‟s Ethics is actually particularistic. Although you can not defend an extreme particularism, because the record of universalizations and generalizations also find shelter, yet there is a distinct particularistic base that gives priority to the perception of what is relevant in every situation.
Este trabalho busca sustentar a visão particularista da Ethica Nicomachea de Aristóteles em contraposição às leituras universalistas. A análise das passagens sobre o método da filosofia prática, sobre a virtude como mediedade e sobre a prudência como capacidade perceptiva do homem virtuoso mostrará que a ética de Aristóteles é efetivamente particularista. Embora não seja possível defender um particularismo extremo, pois o registro das universalizações e generalizações também encontram guarida, ainda assim se verifica a nítida base particularista que dá prioridade à percepção do que é relevante em cada situação.
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Silva, Rosely de Fatima. "Do ato heroico à construção da noção de responsabilidade do agente moral, paralelos entre a Ética Nicomaqueia e a Poética de Aristóteles." Universidade de São Paulo, 2014. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-15042014-095541/.
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O objetivo deste trabalho é investigar a teoria da ação humana presente na Ética Nicomaqueia de Aristóteles e, em particular, os elementos que constituem os critérios para a determinação da noção de responsabilidade do agente moral e identificar se tais critérios se encontram presentes na teoria sobre a imitação da ação humana na tragédia grega, apresentada na Poética. Para ilustrar essa possível relação, utilizar-se-á o mito de Édipo, paradigma da discussão sobre a virtude na ação heroica, presente na tragédia de Sófocles, Édipo-Rei.The aim of this master degree dissertation is to investigate the theory of human action available in Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics. The aim is particularly to investigate the elements that constitute the criteria to determining the notion of responsibility of the agent and to identify if these criteria can be found in the theory about the imitation of human action in Greek tragedy available in Aristotles Poetics. In order to ilustrate this possible relation, it will be used Oedipus myth, as a paradigm of the discussion about virtue in heroic action, available in Sophocles tragedy, Oedipus-Rex.
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Barrling, Hermansson Katarina. "Partikulturer : Kollektiva självbilder och normer i Sveriges riksdag." Doctoral thesis, Uppsala University, Department of Government, 2004. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-4089.
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This dissertation addresses party-culture in political parties represented in the Swedish parliament. Party-culture is investigated by studying collective self-images and norms in Swedish parliamentary party-groups (PPG). The aim of this investigation is to contribute to understanding of the conditions under which parliamentary work is carried out. In order to expand our understanding of these conditions this dissertation looks beyond the formal processes by which party-groups deliver their political message and make decisions, and instead highlights the cultural aspects of these party organizations in the parliament.
The method of analysis is qualitative and the material for the study consists of 53 interviews with members of parliament from all represented parties. The parties studied are thus the Social Democratic, Moderate, Liberal, Christian Democrats, Left, Centre, and Green. In addition, some participant observation for the 1998-2002 mandate period in used.
The empirical investigation shows that party-culture is revealed via four basic themes: political ability, feelings of political responsibility, the importance social fellowship, and the party’s strength in relation to individual party members.
The party’s culture based on the four themes noted above provides a theoretical structure for interpretation that combines an Aristotelian idea about basic knowledge types, sophia and phronesis, with cultural theorists Mary Douglas’ grid-group-analysis. Based on this interpretation method it is shown that party-cultures distinguish themselves from each other in a way that diverges from the left-right spectrum that dominates Swedish politics. At the same time as the parties demonstrate differences in party-culture, there are also some similarities between the parties, and these similarities suggest that the parties have adjusted themselves to a more general culture within the parliament, most visibly the focus on factual knowledge and a certain requirement for modesty from party members.
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Semmelmann, Cristina Casagrande de Figueiredo. "Em boa companhia: a amizade em O senhor dos Anéis." Universidade de São Paulo, 2017. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8156/tde-17042017-105219/.
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Chama a atenção o fato de uma obra como O Senhor dos Anéis, de J. R. R. Tolkien, envolver não apenas um herói, mas muitos personagens com um objetivo comum: a destruição do Anel do Poder. Eles criam laços e revelam sentimentos que nós encontramos no dia a dia, na jornada de nossa vida: se tornam amigos. Este projeto busca analisar como a amizade na obra tolkieniana colabora para o desenvolvimento de seus personagens, bem como contribui para o sucesso de seu objetivo final. Para tanto, tomaremos como base teórica o livro Ética a Nicômaco de Aristóteles, obra que se propõe essencialmente a estudar a felicidade, ou seja, o bem último do homem (eudaimonía). Ao aniquilarem o Anel, os heróis da saga tolkieniana realizam seu grande desejo, e ocorre então o que Tolkien chama de eucatástrofe, o final feliz, essencial nas histórias de fada. Ainda no pensamento aristotélico, a amizade seria tanto um sintoma da felicidade do ser humano quanto uma necessidade para que ele alcance essa realização plena. Por conta de Tolkien ter o seu entendimento de imaginário baseado, entre outras questões, no pensamento religioso, buscaremos também apoio na teologia, especialmente na Suma Teológica de São Tomás de Aquino, enxergando, na amizade, uma relação direta com a caridade cristã. Por entendermos que, na contemporaneidade, a centralidade do livro dá espaço para outras produções artísticas, nos apoiaremos também nas adaptações fílmicas de O Senhor dos Anéis, dirigidas pelo neozelandês Peter Jackson. Tal análise comparativa visa trazer mais elementos para o estudo sobre a amizade na narrativa de Tolkien, visto que o homem contemporâneo, especialmente o jovem, se mostra, cada vez mais, apoiado no universo do audiovisual, muitas vezes partindo dele para o da literatura. Acreditamos que nosso projeto chega em boa hora, visto que tanto o livro quanto o filme em questão envolvem e fascinam seu público leitor e espectador, contribuindo para a formação de seu pensamento ético e de seu caráter, servindo de referência a muitas obras do gênero fantasia, em diversas plataformas.It draws our attention the fact that a work like The Lord of The Rings, by J. R. R. Tolkien, involves not only a single hero, but many characters with a common goal: the destruction of the Ring of Power. They connect with each other and reveal feelings we find day by day in our lives journey: they become friends. This project aims, therefore, to analyze how friendship in the Tolkienian work collaborates for the characters development, as well as it contributes for the success of their final goal. To achieve this, we will take as theoretical basis the book Nicomachean Ethics, by Aristotle, a work that essentially proposes to study happiness, in other words, the ultimate purpose of man (eudaimonia). By annihilating the Ring, the Tolkienian saga heroes achieve their great desire, and what happens then is what Tolkien calls the happy ending, which is essential to fairy stories. Still within the Aristotelian line of thought, friendship would be both a symptom of a human beings happiness and a requirement to reach this full achievement. Since Tolkiens imaginary understanding is based on, among other issues, the religious mindset, we will take theology as support, especially Summa Theologica, by Thomas Aquinas, by seeing, in friendship, a direct association with the Christian charity. Since we understand that, in our present days, the centrality of the book allows other artistic productions, we will also base this study on The Lord of The Rings movie adaptations, directed by the New Zealander filmmaker Peter Jackson. Such comparative analysis aims to bring more elements to the study of friendship in Tolkiens narrative, since the contemporary man, especially the young one, shows an increasing interest in the audiovisual universe, often starting with it and then moving on to literature. We believe that this is a timely project, since both the book and the movies in question involve and fascinate their readers and spectators, contributing to the development of their ethical thinking and character, acting as a reference to many fantasy gender works, in many platforms.
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Perito, Mateus. "A philia na Ética a Nicômaco de Aristóteles: entre a autossuficiência e o outro eu." Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2014. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/11666.
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The concept of philia occupies much of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and generates several problems with the rest of the work. This research aims to resolve the inconsistency between the concepts of friendship and self-sufficiency and to carry out this task, this research is devoted to an exposition of the concepts of friendship and self-sufficiency in the first two chapters, and finally in the third, passes to the resolution of the inconsistency. From a reading of the notion of allos autos (another self), is intended to show that not only the concept of friendship does not contradict with the concept of autarkéia (self-sufficiency), but also that the concept of philia (friendship) acts as a stabilizing agent of human happiness against contingency multiplicity
O conceito de philia ocupa boa parte da Ética a Nicômaco de Aristóteles e gera diversos problemas em relação ao restante da obra. A presente investigação tem como objetivo solucionar a inconsistência entre os conceitos de amizade e autossuficiência e, para levar a cabo esta tarefa, dedica-se, nos dois primeiros capítulos, a uma exposição dos conceitos de amizade e autossuficiência para finalmente no terceiro passar à resolução dessa inconsistência. A partir de uma leitura da noção de allos autos (outro eu), pretende-se mostrar que não somente o conceito de amizade não se contradiz com o de autarkéia (autossuficiência), mas que o conceito de philia (amizade) age como um agente estabilizador da felicidade humana frente à multiplicidade da contingência
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McDonald, Matthew William McDonald. "The Good, the Bad, and the Grouch: A Comparison of Characterization in Menander and the Ancient Philosophers." Ohio University Honors Tutorial College / OhioLINK, 2016. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ouhonors1461335881.
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Farina, Flavia. "Gli eph'hemin e l'involontario nell'Etica Eudemia : gli aspetti giuridici e sociali della responsabilità morale in Aristotele." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Paris 1, 2020. http://www.theses.fr/2020PA01H217.
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Dans l'Éthique à Eudème, Aristote conduit une analyse des notions des eph'hemin, du volontaire et de l'involontaire, en déterminant les conditions d'imputabilité d'une action et de la responsabilité morale. Dans cette analyse, la responsabilité morale est liée par Aristote à pratiques d'appréciation sociale et à pratiques juridiques. Le but de la thèse est double. En premier lieu, puisque le discours sur les eph'hemin est encadré par Aristote dans une théorie causale de l'action (EE II 6) qui vise à distinguer la causalité spécifiquement humaine d'autres types de causalité, après avoir reconstitué certains des aspects fondamentaux liés à la notion de ce qui dépend de nous, la thèse abordera directement le thème du volontaire. Je me propose de montrer que le traitement du volontaire, considéré à partir d'une perspective communautaire, comme l'attestent les nombreuses références au blâme montre que l'éthique aristotélicienne peut bénéficier d'une perspective mettant en lumière l'aspect et la portée communautaire du discours éthique d'Aristote. En deuxième lieu, en considérant ce dernier aspect, on prendra en considération la classification des dommages proposée par Aristote en Éthique à Nicomaque V, afin de mettre en évidence les éléments de convergence entre cette classification et le discours sur le volontaire en EE II 8-9. En offrant une reconstruction des lignes interprétatives du droit grec contemporain à Aristote, les éléments de divergence entre la classification des dommages aristotélicienne et celle du droit grec seront mis en évidence, ce qui permettra d'apprécier les nouvelles distinctions qu'Aristote se propose d'introduire au bénéfice des législateursIn the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle offers a detailed analysis of the eph'hemin, of the voluntary and involuntary, determining the conditions of moral responsibility. Furthermore, moral responsibility is connected by Aristotle with moral appreciation practices, praise and blame, and with juridical practices, punishment and retribution. The aim of this thesis is thus twofold. On one side, it deals directly with the account of voluntary and involuntary action, aiming at reconstructing the account of voluntariness Aristotle offers in the Eudemian Ethics. After having taken into account some of the most fondamental aspects of the eph'hemin, because Aristotle frames the notion of that which depends on us inside a causal theory of action (EE II 6), the specifically human causality is distinguished from other kinds of causalities. I argue that Aristotle's account of voluntariness is to be understood from a perspective that considers the moral agent as a member of the social community, thus showing the social and juridical aspects of Aristotle's ethical theory. Secondly, I argue that the classification of errors Aristotle offers in Nicomachean Ethics book V and the account of voluntariness in EE II 8-9 are compatible and show significant elements of similarity. Finally, after having taken into account some of the most relevant interpretations of the ancient Greek law, I will argue that Aristotle, also by linking his own account of involuntary actions and moral responsibility to juridical practices such as punishment, has introduced new distinctions and specifications that can be useful to the legislators
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Costa, Iacopo Radulphus. "Le questiones di Radulfo Brito sull' "Etica Nicomachea" /." Turnhout : Brepols, 2008. http://opac.nebis.ch/cgi-bin/showAbstract.pl?u20=9782503529165.
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Aufderheide, Joachim. "The value of pleasure in Plato's Philebus and Aristotle's Ethics." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2105.
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This thesis is a study of the theories of pleasure as proposed in Plato’s Philebus, Aristotle’s EN VII.11-14 and EN X.1-5, with particular emphasis on the value of pleasure. Focusing on the Philebus in Chapters 1 and 2, I argue that the account of pleasure as restorative process of a harmonious state in the soul is in tension with Plato’s claim that some pleasures are good in their own right. I show that there are in fact two ways in which pleasure (and other processes of the soul) can have value in the Philebus. The tension in Plato’s position arises because he focuses exclusively on only one way in which pleasure can have value. Chapter 3 deals with Aristotle’s response to Plato in EN VII.11-14. According to the standard interpretation only complete activities (such as thinking and seeing) can be pleasures in their own right, but not incomplete activities (such as eating and drinking). Since this interpretation attributes to Aristotle both an implausible view and a bad response to Plato, I offer a novel interpretation of EN VII.12 according to which the central contrast is not between complete and incomplete activities, but between states and their use. This interpretation is more faithful to Aristotle’s text and gives him a better response to Plato. In Chapter 4 I turn to the central claim of EN X.4-5 that pleasure perfects an activity. I argue that we cannot understand how pleasure functions unless we take into account the state whose activation is perfected by pleasure. In particular, the agent’s disposition of being a lover of a certain activity (an attitude which belongs to the activated state) is crucial for explaining why the agent takes pleasure in it. The focus on the agent’s attitude highlights that the value of pleasure does not depend solely on the value of the activity (as many interpreters assume). I suggest instead that pleasure is valuable when and because it is an appropriate response to a given situation.
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BARBOSA, CLAUDIA MARIA. "IS IT POSSIBLE TO MAKE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN WTHICS AND MORAL IN ARISTOTLE S ETHICA NICOMACHEA?" PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2011. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=34788@1.
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PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIROEste trabalho visa investigar se, em Aristóteles, e, sobretudo na Ethica Nicomachea (EN), é possível encontrar elementos para a fundamentação dos conceitos atribuídos posteriormente à ética e à moral. Embora a virtude ética seja descrita de uma única forma em grego - êthikê aretê -, buscaremos trazer indicações de que já havia na EN diferentes manifestações de sua aplicação prática. Uma primeira manifestação seria a ação em consonância às leis gerais e aos costumes, que poderíamos relacionar à atual moral. Já a êthikê, em uma segunda manifestação, seria identificada a casos particulares, em que a lei não se aplica facilmente, mas o homem virtuoso é capaz de agir conforme a justa medida (mesotes). Esta idéia se apóia na cidade almejada por Aristóteles, em que caberá à Política orquestrar esta complexa êthikê.
This paper aims at investigating if it is possible to find in Aristotle s work, especially in the Ethica Nicomachea (EN), elements to substantiate the concepts that were later attributed to ethics and to moral. Although ethical virtue is uniquely described in Greek - êthikê aretê - we will seek to find evidence that different demonstrations of its practical application could already be found in the EN. The first demonstration would be acting in consonance with the general laws and customs, which could be related to today’s moral. In a second demonstration, êthikê would be found in particular cases where the law could not be easily applied, but in which the virtuous person is capable of acting accordingly to the mean state (mesotes). This idea is supported by the city envisioned by Aristotle, where Politics would be responsible for orchestrating this complex êthikê.
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Leite, Danilo Costa Nunes Andrade. "A definição de emoção em Aristóteles: estudo dos livros I e II da \"Rhetorica\" e da \"Ethica Nicomachea\"." Universidade de São Paulo, 2013. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-29082013-103253/.
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Esta dissertação tem por escopo a questão das emoções - ?à ???? - na obra de Aristóteles, principalmente nos livros I e II da Retórica e da Ética Nicomaquéia. A definição aristotélica de como ????? \'emoção\' foi compreendida de diversas formas, porém sempre a partir dos seguintes elementos: como integrante da porção não-racional da alma, habituável à tutela da razão, como manifestação psicofísica, como causada por cognições. O problema é, portanto, reencontrar e reunir todos esses elementos na obra do Estagirita.This thesis aims at the question of emotions - ?à ???? - in the works of Aristotle, mainly in the first and second books of Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics. The Aristotelian definition of ????? as \'emotion\' was understood in different ways, but always from the following elements: as part of the nonrational portion of the soul; as something that can grow accustomed to reason; as a psychophysic manifestation; as caused by cognitions. The problem is to find and gather all these elements from the works of Aristotle.
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Pereira, Eduardo Wolf. "Filosofia moral e busca definicional na Ethica Nicomachea de Aristóteles : uma leitura de EN I.1-7 à luz dos Segundos Analíticos." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/56371.
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Wagner, Thaiani Rafaela. "A definição de virtude moral na Ética Nicomaquéia de Aristóteles." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/156943.
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O tema central da Ética Nicomaquéia é a investigação do sumo bem humano, a eudaimonia ou boa vida. Aristóteles define a eudaimonia em EN I.7 1098a1719 como “atividade da alma [racional] segundo a virtude ( arete ), e se houver mais de uma virtude ( aretai) , segundo a melhor e mais perfeita (t eleiotanton )”. A virtude ( arete ) de algo é aquilo que permite a este algo realizar corretamente sua função própria. A função do homem consiste em uma atividade em acordo com a razão, logo a atividade humana virtuosa será aquela atividade (ou mesmo um conjunto delas) na qual o homem expresse um uso excelente da razão. A concepção de arete, portanto, tem um papel fundamental na definição de eudaimonia. Se o filósofo deseja investigar adequadamente o fim último dos seres humanos, ele precisa incluir nessa investigação o estudo das virtudes. No presente trabalho, nos dedicamos a esclarecer e definir a virtude da parte desiderativa da alma (que não é racional, mas pode ouvir e obedecer a razão): a virtude moral. Para isso, analisamos os principais pontos apresentados pelo Estagirita com relação à aquisição e caracterização dessa virtude. Ao longo do trabalho, mostramos que a virtude de caráter é uma disposição para escolher aquilo que é correto e bom nas ações e paixões (aquilo que é intermediário em relação a nós) conforme determinado pela razão prudencial.The main subject in the Nicomachean Ethics is the inquiry on the highest human good, eudaimonia or good life. Aristotle defines eudaimonia in EN I.7 1098a1719 as “activity of [racional] soul in conformity with excellence ( arete ), and if there are more than one excellence ( aretai) , in conformity with the best and most perfect (t eleiotaton) ”. The virtue ( arete ) of something is what allows it to properly accomplish its own function. The function of man consists in an activity in accordance with reason, thus virtuous human activity is that (or those) in which a man shows excellent use of reason.The notion of arete, therefore, has a fundamental role on the definition of eudaimonia. If Aristotle wants to properly investigate the final end of human beings, he should include in this inquiry the study of virtue. In this work we are devoted on making clear and defining the desiderative part of the soul (which isn’t rational, but can listen to and obey reason): moral virtue. For that, we analyzed the main points presented by Aristotle related to the acquirement and description of this virtue. Throughout this work, we show that character virtue is a tendency for chosing what is right and good in our actions and passions (that which is intermediary regarding ourselves) according to what is established by prudential reason.
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Chen, Ziang. "Justice and Prudence : Political Virtues in Gerald Odonis's Expositio cum quaestionibus super libros Ethicorum." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Paris, EHESS, 2020. http://www.theses.fr/2020EHES0077.
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Cette thèse doctorale étudie la question de la valeur morale de l'individu et de son existence relative au cadre sociétal et institutionnel, sur la base del'Expositio super libros ethicorum de Guiral Ot. Écrit pendant la première moitié des années 1320, il s’agit du premier commentaire complet écrit par un théologien franciscain sur l’Éthique à Nicomaque d’Aristote. Le commentaire offre un point de vue sur le paysage intellectuel du XIVe siècle, sur l'état des savoirs et de l'éducation, sur la réception d'Aristote, et sur les pensées morales et politiques. Cette œuvre illustre les traditions intellectuelles des frères mineurs et des commentateurs aristotéliciens dont hérite Guiral ainsi que son originalité vis-à-vis de celles ci. Cette thèse explore les circonstances intellectuelles et politiques entourant la composition du commentaire de Guiral et elle tente d’ancrer ce commentaire philosophique dans son propre contexte historique. Cette thèse porte principalement sur les questions discutées dans les livres V et VI, relatifs aux vertus de la justice et de la prudence, ainsi que sur les questions trouvées dans le prologue concernant le sujet, la structure et la fin de la science morale. Dans le schéma médiéval de la philosophie morale, la justice et la prudence constituent les deux piliers des vertus cardinales. La justice est conçue comme une vertu de la volonté et joue un rôle central dans la tradition franciscaine du volontarisme moral; c'est aussi une vertu inexorablement liée au droit et au légalisme, et par conséquent à l'administration gouvernementale et au système judiciaire, thèmes que Guiral a particulièrement approfondis dans son oeuvre. Selon Guiral, la prudence représente bien plus qu'une simple notion propositionnelle issue d'un raisonnement syllogistique; elle est la raison et la liberté intellectuelle qui sous-tendent fondamentalement l'indépendance morale et volontaire de l'individu par rapport aux raisons institutionnelles. Guiral situe l'individu au cœur de toutes les considérations morales et politiques. Il dérive ainsi les principes et la structure de l’éthique de l'expérience de l’individu dans sa société. Dans son commentaire, Guiral démontre une compréhension profonde du volontarisme et du subjectivisme individuel: la liberté volontaire du sujet moral et l'humanité de la personne dépassent toujours la raison institutionnelle et l'être collectivisteThe present thesis aims to address the questions on the moral worth of the individual and his existence within a societal and institutional setting by examining Gerald Odonis’s Expositio super libros Ethicorum. Written in the early 1320s, it is the first full-length commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics produced by a Franciscan theologian. It provides a prism into the intellectual landscape of the fourteenth century, on the state of scholarship and education, on the reception of Aristotle, and on the currents of moral and political philosophy. Odonis’s Ethics commentary bears witness to both our author’s originality and the intellectual traditions that he has inherited from both the Minorites and the Aristotelian commentators. The present thesis explores the intellectual and political circumstances surrounding the composition of Odonis’s commentary text, and attempts to anchor the philosophical commentary to its proper historical context. The thesis focuses primarily on Odonis’s question commentary on Books V and VI on the virtues of justice and prudence, as well as questions raised in the prologue concerning the subject, structure, and purpose of moral science. In the medieval scheme of moral philosophy, justice and prudence constitute two pillars of the cardinal virtues. Justice is accepted as a virtue of the will, and plays a central part in the Franciscan tradition of moral voluntarism; it is also a virtue inexorably linked with law and legality, and hence to government administration and the judicial system. All these are reflected in Odonis's writing. For Odonis, prudence represents far more than mere propositional knowledge derived from simple syllogistic reasoning; instead, it is the reason and intellectual freedom that fundamentally underpins the moral and voluntary independence of the individual against reasons of the institution. Odonis places the individual at the core of every moral and political consideration, and understands the scheme and structure of the moral science through the perspective of an individual’s moral experience in society. In his commentary, Odonis displays a profound sense of voluntarism and individual subjectivism: the voluntary freedom of the moral subject and the humanity of the person always surpass the reason and being of the collectivised institutions
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Silveira, Aline da. "Eudaimonia, sophia e theoretike energeia : uma análise da contemplação na Ética Nicomaqueia de Aristóteles." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/172917.
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A atividade realizada pelo filósofo configura uma das maiores incógnitas entre os estudiosos da ética de Aristóteles. Na Ética Nicomaqueia (EN), seu tratado moral de maior relevância, pouco é dito sobre tal atividade até as conclusões apresentadas no fim da obra, quando se afirma que a contemplação (theoretike energeia) é a melhor das ocupações humanas no que diz respeito à busca pela autorrealização (eudaimonia). Mas no que consiste, afinal, essa ocupação? Qual a razão de, dentre a ampla gama de atividades exequíveis pelo homem, o exercício dessa se identificar com o melhor tipo de vida? Há como compreendê-la satisfatoriamente apesar da quantidade limitada de passagens da EN que se referem ao seu exercício? Tendo em vista o caráter sistemático de Aristóteles e suas considerações acerca da exatidão necessária em cada assunto, buscar-se-á compreender a contemplação a partir daquilo que é exposto na EN. Ainda que o número de informações explícitas sobre ela seja pequeno, propor-se-á uma exegese dos trechos referentes à tal atividade e sua virtude, a sophia, bem como a análise de sua relação com outros momentos da obra. Ao esgotar as informações referentes à contemplação na EN, será possível concluir se seu conteúdo é suficientemente informativo ou não para os propósitos da obra e sua compreensão. Ademais, estabelecer no que consiste a atividade contemplativa é indispensável para entender aquilo que Aristóteles definiu como a vida própria do filósofo (bios theoretikos), da qual ele partilhou e à qual incitou outros a participar em diversos momentos do corpus. Apreender a contemplação do modo como Aristóteles a expôs revela um modo de vida teorizado e praticado por algumas das mentes mais brilhantes da história da filosofia, que não mediram esforços para tentar compreender e realizar sua humanidade da melhor maneira possível.The philosophical activity configures one of the biggest incognitos among scholars researching Aristotle’s ethics. The Nicomachean Ethics (his most relevant ethical treatise) contains little information about such activity until the conclusions presented at the end of the work, when it is stated that contemplation (theoretike energeia) is the best of human occupations regarding the search for self-realization (eudaimonia). But, after all, how to understand such activity? What is the reason to identify it with the best way of living, given the variety of other activities able to be executed by men? Is it possible to understand it satisfactorily despite the limited number of passages referring to its exercise in the ethical treatise? In view of the systematic character of Aristotle and his considerations concerning the exactitude proper to each subject, contemplation will try to be understood only by what is exposed in the Nicomachean Ethics. Although the number of explicit informations about it is few, it will be proposed an exegesis of the excerpts referring to such activity and its virtue, sophia, as well as the analysis of its relation with other moments of the work. By exhausting information regarding contemplation in the Nicomachean Ethics, it will be possible to conclude whether its content is informative enough or not for the purposes of the work and its understanding. Moreover, establishing what contemplative activity consists in is essential to understand what Aristotle defined as the philosophical life (bios theoretikos), which he shared himself and also encouraged others to participate in several moments of the corpus. Apprehending contemplation in the way Aristotle exposed it reveals a way of life theorized and practiced by some of the most brilliant minds in the history of philosophy, who went to great lengths to try to comprehend and flourish their humanity in the best possible way.
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Oliveira, Filipe Klein de. "As capacidades da alma e a Acrasia em Aristóteles." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/184681.
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No capítulo 3 do livro VII da Ética Nicomaquéia, Aristóteles explica a acrasia atribuindo ao acrático um erro cognitivo que consiste na não atualização da premissa particular do silogismo prático. A premissa particular do silogismo prático está vinculada à percepção sensível. Mas o que Aristóteles tem em mente ao fazer referência à percepção sensível? Ele deve ter em mente outra capacidade além dos cinco sentidos, ele deve ter em mente também a phantasia. Isto fica claro a partir do método utilizado para tratar das faculdades da alma. Segundo o método em questão, as faculdades da alma devem ser investigadas de acordo com a sua atividade própria e, antes disto, de acordo com o seu objeto correlato. Este método parece adequado para individualizar os cinco sentidos. As cores servem para individualizar a visão, os sons, a audição, os odores, o olfato, etc... Este método, contudo, tem as suas limitações, não é apenas quando sou estimulado por objetos externos que eu faço uso dos sentidos, é possível pensar em cores de olhos fechados, por exemplo. O objeto, portanto, não é o bastante para definir cada sentido, é necessário fazer referência à experiência que temos ao utilizar os sentidos. Esta experiência mental que está envolvida no uso dos sentidos corresponde a atividade da phantasia. A minha posição fica mais clara ainda a partir da discussão entre literalistas e espiritualistas. Essas duas tendênciaas interpretativas compreendem a afirmação de Aristóteles segundo a qual perceber é receber a forma sensível sem a matéria de formas distintas. Segundo o espiritualismo, receber a forma sensível sem a matéria significa alterar-se formalmente sem sofrer alteração material, isto é, perceber a cor branca, por exemplo, sem ser branqueado. Enquanto que, para o literalista, receber a forma sensível sem a matéria significa receber a forma sensível por transmissão. Temos assim uma fisiologia da percepção. O princípio da transmissão, contudo, não pode esgotar a explicação da percepção, é necessário pressupor um princípio formal irredutível que é a consciência sensível. A consciência sensível, por sua vez, é a phantasia. Uma evidência de que a phantasia é a consciência para Aristóteles é o fato de ela estar envolvida em todas as capacidades da alma que envolvem consciência: as capacidades sensíveis, a capacidade de desejar e de inteligir. É impossível tratar a percepção sem fazer referência à phantasia. Isto tudo que foi dito é vantajoso para análise da acrasia, uma vez que Aristóteles atribui duas características à phantasia. A phantasia depende da nossa vontade e pode ser influenciada pelos nossos desejos e emoções. Sendo assim, é possível encontrar uma espécie de conflito moral no caso da falha cognitiva de EN 7.3.In chapter 3 of book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle explains acrasia atributing to the acratic a cognitive failure which consists in the non-actualization of the particular premise of the practical syllogism. The particular premise of the practical syllogism is linked to sense perception. But what does Aristotle have in mind when he makes reference to sense perception? He must have in mind another capacity beyond the five senses, he must have in mind also phantasia. This is clear from the method used to deal with the faculties of the soul. According to the method in question, the faculties of the soul must be investigated according to their proper activity and, before that, according to their correlate object. This method seems appropriate to individualize the five senses. Colors serve to individualize sight, sounds, hearing, odors, smell, etc... This method, however, has its limitations, it is not only when I am stimulated by external objects that I make use of the senses, it is possible to think of colors with closed eyes, for example. The object, therefore, is not enough to define each sense, it is necessary to make reference to the experience that we have when using the senses. This mental experience that is involved in the use of the senses corresponds to the activity of phantasia. My position gets even clearer from the discussion between literalists and spiritualists. These two interpretative tendencies understand Aristotle's assertion that to perceive is to receive the sensible form without matter in distinct ways. According to spiritualism, to receive the sensible form without matter means to change formally without suffering material change, that is, to perceive the white color, for example, without being whitened. Whereas, for the literalist, receiving the sensible form without matter means receiving the sensible form by transmission. Thus we have a physiology of perception. The principle of transmission, however, can not exhaust the explanation of perception, it is necessary to presuppose an irreducible formal principle which is the sensitive consciousness. Sensitive consciousness, in turn, is phantasia. One evidence that phantasia is Aristotle's consciousness is that it is involved in all the capacities of the soul that involve consciousness: sensitive capacities, the capacity to desire and to understand. It is impossible to treat perception without reference to phantasia. All that has been said is advantageous for the analysis of acrasia, since Aristotle attributes two characteristics to phantasia. Phantasia depends on our will and can be influenced by our desires and emotions. Thus, it is possible to find a kind of moral conflict in the case of cognitive failure of EN 7.3.
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Spinelli, Priscilla Tesch. "A prudência na Ética Nicomaquéia de Aristóteles." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/6840.
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Capra, Pedro Konzen. "Conhecimento prático e lei natural em Tomás de Aquino." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/132288.
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A presente dissertação tem por objetivo analisar a origem do conhecimento dos preceitos da lei natural para Tomás de Aquino. Entre as hipóteses na literatura, encontram-se intepretações de que o conhecimento dos preceitos depende das sensações de dor e prazer, de que os preceitos são valores autoevidentes e de que o conhecimento dos preceitos depende do conhecimento intelectual das inclinações naturais. Assim, serão analisadas algumas passagens do comentário da Ética a Nicômaco de Aristóteles e da Suma de Teologia em que Tomás desenvolve a noção de apetite natural ou inclinação natural. Além disso, será tratada a distinção entre diferentes tipos de conhecimento prático. A partir dessas noções, serão apontados alguns indícios para a hipótese de que o conhecimento dos preceitos da lei natural depende da apreensão intelectual das inclinações naturais.The present dissertation aims to analyse the origin of knowledge of precepts of natural law for Thomas Aquinas. Between the hypotheses in literature, there are interpretations that knowledge of precepts depends on sensations of pain and pleasure, that precepts are self-evident values and that knowledge of precepts depends on intellectual knowledge of natural inclinations. Therefore, it will be analysed some passages of the commentary on Aristotle‟s Nicomachean Ethics and of Summa Theologica were Thomas develops the notion of natural appetite or natural inclination. Further, it will be treated the distinction between different kinds of practical knowledge. Thereby, it will be pointed some indications for the hypothesis that knowledge of precepts of natural law depends on intellectual apprehension of natural inclinations.
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Nunes, Clarisse Goulart. "Eudaimonia e contemplação na Ética Nicomaquéia de Aristóteles." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/56576.
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Spinelli, Priscilla Tesch. "Conhecer, legislar e educar : a filosofia das coisas humanas na Ética Nicomaquéia de Aristóteles." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/26907.
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Hwang, Wen Ming, and 黃文明. "Friendship, Virtue and Happiness in Nicomachean Ethics." Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/71994904999477353681.
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何有良. "The concept of happiness in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics." Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/nvttp3.
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Lin, Fang-huey, and 林芳蕙. "The Investigation on Aristotle''s "theoria" in Nicomachean Ethics." Thesis, 1995. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/18156784696674502604.
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Shih, Yu-Chuan, and 施鈺娟. "On the implied notion of will in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics." Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/78730590653925847307.
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Van, Cleemput Geert. "Aristotle on happiness in the Nicomachean ethics and the Politics /." 1999. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:9951846.
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Hsieh, Hsiao-chu, and 謝曉筑. "The two excellences of mankind: virtue theory in Nicomachean Ethics." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/97035600266201933918.
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碩士國立中央大學
哲學研究所
98
Aristotle said if eudaimonia is activity in accordance with virtue, then it is activity in accordance with the best virtue. According to his statement on the virtues, there are two kinds of eudaimonia, contemplation is the perfect and the more self-sufficiency, and moral virtues – is counted as eudaimonia of an inferior kind. Moral virtues mean the irrational parts of the soul, like desire or emotion, which obey the rational parts of the soul. Aristotle thought most people should be used to get through the moral virtues, but there is one question: a philosopher, who lived in contemplation, could he get the moral virtues at the same time? Certainly, Aristotle said we can see someone, who has intellectual virtues and moral virtues in middle-aged. But in researches, there are different views. The essay discusses what is eudaimonia, contemplation, moral action, and to find intrinsic values of those. According to Robert Heinemann’s view the word “teleion” had different means that was why he thought the perfect eudaimonia was contemplation alone. However, the question never concerned with what’s life that Aristotle to choose; and my conclusion is appealing to David Ross’s view to talk about Aristotle’s life.
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FAN, WEN-HUA, and 范雯華. "On Fundamental of Self-Value: from Nicomachean Ethics to C.I.S.A." Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/7576j2.
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碩士輔仁大學
哲學系
107
From the perspective of human being, this paper discusses the fundamental of self-value. We first summarize the parts of self through the discussion of the soul by Aristotle, then enter the ethics section to discuss the issue of value, and finally combine with C.I.S.A. to construct the self-value towards happiness.
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Kushner, Jeremy Christopher. "Aristotle and Plato on Law : the Nicomachean Ethics and the Minos." Thesis, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2011-08-4344.
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In this paper, I examine the treatments of law contained within Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Plato’s Minos. I find that both offer powerful and complementary critiques of law, while recognizing law’s power and promise in shaping the character and opinions of each citizen. The Minos, though, goes further than the Ethics in describing and examining the possibility of divine law that transcends the limitations of merely human laws.text
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Yi-lin, Chen, and 陳伊琳. "Emotion, morality, and moral education:A philosophical examination on Aristotle’s 〈Nicomachean Ethics〉." Thesis, 2004. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/48878719428732078019.
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碩士國立臺灣師範大學
教育研究所
92
The purpose of this thesis aims at exploring the relation between emotions and morality, and providing revision for the deviation of modern moral education─the lack of emotions. For this sake, the researcher chooses to make a philosophical examination on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in which Aristotle offered many insightful opinions. Conceptual analysis and hermeneutics are used. The procedures start from clarifying the concept of emotions, and differentiating related concepts in terms of a philosophical angle. Secondly, the researcher makes brief and concise explanations of virtue ethics and Aristotle’s ethics to understand the characteristic way of thinking of virtue ethics on moral issues. Thirdly, the researcher explores Aristotle’s perspective on emotions, and the relation between emotions and morality. Finally, according to the findings above, the research draws out some significance on modern moral education. The findings of this research are as follows: First of all, the concept of emotions is very complex, and it includes at least two important characteristics, cognition and evaluation. In other words, emotions are cognitive evaluations of the moral agent toward the external moral situations. If so, it indicates that emotions can provide for important information about the moral situations, and direct the moral agent to take care of subtle or conspicuous moral features. In sum, emotions play an important role providing moral knowledge. Secondly, in addition to moral cognitions and moral actions, the proper way of feeling and expressing emotions is also the essential segment of moral education. Accordingly, moral education should attach importance to the education of emotions. Thirdly, Aristotle thought that emotions are by themselves neither good nor bad, and the key point depends on how to feel and express emotions in a proper way, and for this, Aristotle proposed the doctrine of mean as guidance. Fourthly, shame is beneficial for the moral agent to be alert to prevention from recurrence of wrong moral actions, and proper friendship is helpful to enhancing self-understanding, and stimulating two parties to develop moral virtues altogether. Fifthly, the proceedings of moral education should be in accordance with the serial development, and Aristotle proposed habits prior to rationality. However, the first phase of habituation (acquirement of habits) is not condition, contrary to that, it is a critical practice, and it actually implies rational introspection. Finally, the natural emotional attachments in the family play a critical role in the moral development of children, so Aristotle especially emphasized the family as the starting point of moral education, and then assisted with the educational functions of schooling and the whole society.
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Wang, Wen-Kuan, and 王文觀. "The Pursuit of Excellence---The Ethical foundation of character education in elementary school based on Virtue Ethics of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/86031932577878864130.
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Hui-Ya, Wang, and 王薈雅. "The Concept of Friendship in "Nicomachean Ethics" and its Implications on Education." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/98840576478443712252.
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碩士東海大學
教育研究所
102
This study aims to explore and interpret the concept of friendship of the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle’s by studying his "Nicomachean Ethics", and find its implication on education. The research method is to use the concept as an ideological tool of contemporary hermeneutics to understand the text, mainly by Jia Dama (Gadamer) language hermeneutics, text-based point of view by the researchers to reproduce the significance of the new paper. This study will present the significance of and the conditions on Aristotle’s friendship, the relationship between love and self-love, and the relationship of friendship, happiness, and virtue. Then, the aforementioned comprehensive study will reflect on the relationship between Aristotle’s concept of friendship and personality development, and thus use Aristotle's concept of friendship as the basis of the implications for education.
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金浩瑜. "A Comparative Study between De in the Analects and Arete in the Nicomachean Ethics." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/56694246416401216945.
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Halim, Ian. "Aristotle's Explanation for the Value of the External Goods." Thesis, 2012. https://doi.org/10.7916/D8WM1MHV.
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An interpretation of how Aristotle explains the value of worldly goods within the terms of his ethical theory in the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle claims that to live in a worthwhile and subjectively satisfying way--that is, to achieve eudaimonia--one needs such things as honor, wealth, friends, and political power. He groups these things together as the external goods, since they are all external in a spatial sense from the perspective of any given person. It is clear that people almost always attach value to such things, but it is less clear why Aristotle should. My aim is to explain why Aristotle regards these things as important, and--in a more formal sense--how far his definition of eudaimonia explains their value. On Aristotle's formal theory, the external goods ought to gain value through some relation to excellent rational activity, but fleshing out the details of this relation raises problems. Chapter 2 assesses Aristotle's formal argument for the value of such goods at NE I.1099a31-b8, chapter 1 develops an account of Aristotle's method in order to support this assessment, and chapter 3 considers the kinds of explanations for the value of the external goods available to Aristotle in terms of his account of action. Chapter 4 draws on the results of the earlier chapters to assess Aristotle's position on moral luck--that is, how Aristotle regards his various categories of value as depending upon factors outside of the agent's control. My aim throughout is to consider how successfully Aristotle draws on his formal theory in order to explain the value of the external goods as well as external things in the broadest sense.