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Robert, Aurélien. "Essentialisme et nominalisme chez Guillaume d'Ockham /." Thèse, Trois-Rivières : Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, 2001. http://www.uqtr.ca/biblio/notice/tablemat/03-2232586TM.html.
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Robert, Aurélien. "Essentialisme et nominalisme chez Guillaume d'Ockham." Thèse, Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, 2001. http://depot-e.uqtr.ca/2608/1/000693501.pdf.
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Huglo, Pierre-André. "Approche nominaliste de Saussure /." Paris ; Budapest ; Torino : l'Harmattan, 2002. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb38900939j.
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Huglo, Pierre-André. "Essai d'une lecture nominaliste de la linguistique saussurienne." Paris 10, 1999. http://www.theses.fr/1999PA100054.
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Cette enquete a pour but de confronter la linguistique saussurienne a une tradition nominaliste et empiriste concernant la signification des signes linguistiques, afin de determiner la pertinence d'une lecture nominaliste de la theorie saussurienne. Dans ce but, on utilise la theorie lockienne des mots comme mediateur. Dans une premiere partie, on confronte la theorie lockienne des mots a la linguistique saussurienne et on montre en quoi la notion saussurienne d'arbitraire radical est irreductible a l'arbitraire conventionnel lockien. Dans une seconde partie, on met en evidence les principes directeurs qui definissent l'unite d'une tradition nominaliste, d'ockham a berkeley et hume. On analyse la relation de la philosophie lockienne a cette tradition. Dans une troisieme partie, on confronte la theorie saussurienne aux principes nominalistes et empiristes ainsi degages, et on montre que ces principes sont operatoires dans le texte saussurien. Dans une derniere partie et en guise de conclusion, on analyse en quoi une linguistique d'inspiration saussurienne, qui se fonde sur des principes nominalistes et empiristes, est incompatible avec une linguistique d'inspiration chomskyenne, enparticulier avec l'hypothese d'un langage de la pensee, emise par j. Fodor ; on montre en quoi il existe une affinite profonde entre la theorie saussurienne et les analyses de n. Goodman concernant signes et symboles.
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Barrau, Aurélien. "Anomies : une déconstruction de la dialectique de l’un et de l’ordre, entre Jacques Derrida et Nelson Goodman." Thesis, Paris 4, 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016PA040002.
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Notre hypothèse est la suivante : pour des raisons différentes et avec des méthodes différentes, Derrida et Goodman ont, chacun, ébranlé l’un des deux piliers qui sous-tendent l’essentiel de la tradition philosophique. Derrida, par le jeu subtil de la différance, a fait vaciller la vaste entreprise de mise en ordre. Goodman, par la profusion de mondes construits et irréductibles les uns aux autres, remet en cause l’aspiration à l’unité. Nous avons tenté d’établir que la métaphysique s’est développée dans une dialectique de l’un et de l’ordre, se rétablissant sur l’un de ses pilastres quand l’autre faiblissait. Si donc les soubassements de l’histoire philosophique devaient être revisités – peut-être révisés – il serait fructueux d’user simultanément des propositions derridiennes et goodmaniennes. C’est l’originalité de ce projet. Il s’agit, pour neutraliser la récupération dialectique par l’autre pilier (par l’unité quand l’ordre faillit ou par la mise en ordre dans la multitude s’immisce) d’interroger la tradition suivant le double impératif de la déconstruction et du nominalisme, suivant le double prisme du dés-ordre de Derrida et du multiple de Goodman. Nous avons tenté d’établir que l’efficace d’une remise en cause du « mythe de l’un » ne peut se faire sans ébranler le « mythe de l’ordre ». Considérer conjointement les systèmes (ou des dé-systématisations) de Derrida et Goodman serait donc, suivant ce dessein, non seulement utile mais presque indispensable. Chacun d’eux permet d’éviter la récupération dialectique du schème de l’autre. L’étude est menée à partir d’un inconfort partagé face au concept de vérité<br>Our hypothesis is the following : for different reasons and with different methods, Derrida and Goodman have both deconstructed one of the pillars of the Western philosophical tradition. Derrida, using the subtleties of the differance concept, has shaken the general entreprise of « organisation ». On the other hand, Goodman, by considering numerous constructed worlds that cannot be reduced one to the other, questions the desire of unity. We have tried to establish that metaphysics has developed in a dialectic articulation of order and unity, using one when the other fails. If the groundings of the history of philosophy were then to be revisited, it would be useful — if not necessary — to use simultaneously the derridean and goodmanian views. This the originality of this project. To break the dialectic mechanics using order to cure multiplicity, or the other way round, we have reconsidered the tradition using both deconstruction and nominalism, Derrida’s disorder and Goodman’s diversity. We have tried to show that the efficiency of the questioning of the « unity myth » depends on how far the « order myth » has been revised. Considering simultaneously both Derrida’s and Goodman’s systems allows to avoid the dialectic neutralisation of the proposal. The study is performed through the question of truth
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Michon, Cyrille. "Nominalisme. La theorie de la signification et le terminisme de guillaume d'occam." Paris 4, 1992. http://www.theses.fr/1992PA040003.
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La question posee est celle de la nature de la signification et de ses implications noetiques et ontologiques. Elle est posee a propos du nominalism de guillaume d'occam dont ce travail veut exposer et evaluer les arguments. La premiere partie s'attache a la theorie de la connaissance et met en evidence la conception linguistique de la pensee (penser c'est parler). Ce faisant elle examine la question du scepticisme et celle du materialisme, compatibles avec la semantique d'occam. La deuxieme partie expose cette semantique proprement dite et souligne le primat de la relation de monstration (parler c'est montrer). Elle expose dans le detail la theorie de la supposition, et critique l'interpretation nominalisme de la predication (theorie des deux noms). La troisieme partie envisage les implications ontologiques du nominalisme : engagement aux individus substantiels et qualitatifs actuels, mais aussi possibles; desengagement par rapport aux categories ( theorie de la connotation), et aux universaux. L'ontologie est ainsi presentee comme une conclusion et non comme une premisse de l'argumentation occamiste. On met en evidence une circularite de celle-ci est conclue a une petition de principe du nominalisme<br>The topic is the nature of signification and meaning and its noetical and ontological implications. This work considers william ockham's so-called nominalism, and tries to expose and evaluate his main arguments. First part deals with theory of knowledge and underlines the linguistic conception of thought (thinking is speaking). It considers the possibility of both skepticism and materialism, compatible with ockham's semantics. This semantics is the subject of second part, which points out the primacy of monstration (speaking is showing). Theory of supposition is fully detailed and a criticsm is made of the nominalistic interpretation of predication (two names theory). Third part focuses on the ontological implications of nominalism. Ontological commitment to individuals, subatances and qualities, not only actual but also possible. Uncommitment with respect to categories (connotation theory) and to universals. Ontology is thus presented as a conclusion and not as a premiss of ockham's argumentation which is criticized as circular. As a conclusio, nominalism is convinced to beg the question
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Michel, Bruno. "Abelard, lecteur de Boèce : entre réalisme et nominalisme, la critique du logicisme boécien dans les oeuvres logiques de Pierre Abélard." Thesis, Tours, 2009. http://www.theses.fr/2009TOUR2037/document.
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Boèce prétend avoir apporté une solution définitive aux deux grandes apories du corpus logique aristotélicien, l'aporie de l'universel et l'aporie des futurs contingents. Nous montrons qu'Abélard, à travers sa critique des reales, met en question ces deux solutions et leur substitue deux distinctions voulues comme aporétiques - entre res et status d'un côté et entre res et dictum propositionis de l'autre - qui naissent de la reconnaissance par Abélard du caractère fictif des solutions boéciennes aux grandes apories du corpus logique aristotélicien. Ces deux distinctions organisent une réflexion philosophique profondément novatrice que nous nous efforçons de décrire<br>Boethius claims to have definitively solved the two great aporias of the corpus of Aristotelian Iogic, the universal aporia and the aporia of contingent futures. l demonstrate that Abelard,Through his critique of reales calls into question these two solutions and substitutes two distinctions that he wanted to he aporetique - between res and status on the one band andand dictum propositionis on the other hand - born of Abelard's recognition of the fictional character of the two Boetian solutions to the great aporias of the Aristotelician logical corpus. The two. distinctions pave the way for a profoundly new kind of philosophical reasoning,which this text mtends to describe
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Bastit, Michel. "La notion de loi de st thomas a suarez, ou les origines scolastiques de la loi moderne." Rennes 1, 1986. http://www.theses.fr/1986REN11003.
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L'origine des desequilibres de la loi moderne doit etre recherchee dans les transformations philosophiques qui ont affecte le concept de loi, elles-memes devant etre saisies dans la lumiere de l'ontologie. Des indices, tres nets chez hobbes, suggerent de situer ces evolutions au cours de la periode de l'abandon progressif de l'aristotelisme medieval au profit du nominalisme. La mutation philosophique qui s'opere alors co nsiste en un oubli de la relativisation de la loi par les choses qui laisse le champ libre au deploiement anrachique de la volonte de la rai son et des faits bruts. Ce qui masque d'abord les choses est l'intellibilite scotiste qui impose au monde le jeu dissolvant de ses formes separees. La se pratique la reduction des choses et la naissance d'un pre mier rationalisme juridique en est la consequence, immediatement accompagn ee d'une surevaluation de la volonte. L'equilibre rompu laisse place a un retour empirique a la chose, mais une chose desormais reduite a la matiere, incapable donc de s'opposer au developpement de la volonte. Cel le-ci oscille a son tour entre une construction rationaliste et un pur arbitraire. La rupture ainsi consommee par occam sera irreversible. Il est possible de faire l'histoire de la transmission des ces acquis a travers la tradition nominaliste et au dela d'elle, jusque chez ses adve rsaires avoues. Au seuil de l'age moderne la vaste synthese suarezienne se nourrit surtout de scot et d'occam. Loin de tenter de revenir vers les choses elle s'edifie sur les bases mal assurees de la rationalite conquerante et de la volonte desordonnee, liees par une metaphysique du concept d'etre. Une conception de la loi tres nouvelle par rapport au point de depart- le texte de st thomas- accede alors a la definiti on; elle ne sera plus jamais remise en cause, c'est pourquoi elle nous est si familiere<br>The origin of defects in themodern statute-law must be searched in the philosophical changes which have affected the concept of law, themselves must be understood in the light of ontology. Clear signs of that may be noted in hobbes' works. This means that the changes of concept of law is a consequence of the new nominalism born with duns scot and william of ockham. These authors have lost the reality of things and then, they could no more conceive the statute-law in relation with them. Having destroyed the things by separated rorms or by empiriscism they cannot impeach that the statute-law becomes a pure will or reason. Suarez, the great spanish scolastic author, delivers these medieval concepts to our modern age; we are in the inheritance of them
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Declos, Alexandre. "La métaphysique de Nelson Goodman." Thesis, Université de Lorraine, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017LORR0238/document.
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Cette thèse de doctorat est consacrée à la pensée du philosophe américain Nelson Goodman (1906-1998). Nous y défendons, à l’encontre de la plus grande partie de la critique, une lecture métaphysicienne de son œuvre. Il est démontré que Goodman, dans tous ses travaux, développe une métaphysique technique et méconnue, dont les piliers sont le nominalisme, le pluralisme, le perdurantisme, l’actualisme, et l’universalisme méréologique. Cette lecture permet de réévaluer l’ensemble de la pensée goodmanienne. Elle établit aussi ses liens insoupçonnés avec la métaphysique analytique contemporaine<br>This PhD dissertation is dedicated to the philosophy of Nelson Goodman (1906-1998). We defend, against most critics, a metaphysical interpretation of Goodman’s works. It will be shown that the latter developed a technical and often overlooked metaphysics, whose pillars are nominalism, pluralism, perdurantism, actualism, and mereological universalism. This reading allows for a critical reevaluation of Goodman’s views. It also brings to light his unexpected links with contemporary analytic metaphysics
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Bermon, Pascale. "L' assentiment et son objet dans le Commentaires des Sentences de Gégoire de Rimini (1300-1358) : Précédé d'une étude sur la formation logique, philosophique et théologique du "Docteur Authentique"." Paris, EPHE, 2000. http://www.theses.fr/2000EPHEA009.
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Mlika, Hamdi. "Le platonisme de Quine et sa critique dans la philosophie contemporaine des mathématiques." Paris 4, 2000. http://www.theses.fr/2000PA040057.
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J'essaie dans cette recherche de mettre au clair les traits spécifiques du platonisme holistique de Quine, et pointer vers les questions sur lesquelles il reste ouvert aux objections de l'antiplatonisme. Je présente le platonisme de Quine comme étant appuyé par quatre types d'arguments qui sont des arguments réalistes au sens du réalisme philosophique : les arguments d'indispensabilité, les arguments métascientifiques, les arguments logiques et les arguments ontologiques. Par opposition à ce platonisme, Field, Hellman, et Chihara acceptent le dilemme dit de Benacerraf, et cherchent à donner des réponses aux problèmes qu'il soulève en mettant directement en doute l'image platoniste en philosophie des mathématiques. En guise de conclusion, j'essaie d'organiser les diverses questions sur lesquelles, tour à tour, le platonisme pragmatique de Quine et ses critiques sont sujets à des difficultés importantes.
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Svennerlind, Christer. "Moderate nominalism and moderate realism /." Göteborg : Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 2008. http://opac.nebis.ch/cgi-bin/showAbstract.pl?u20=9789173466189.
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Rodriguez, Pereyra Gonzalo Jose. "Resemblance nominalism : a development." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.625017.
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Silva, Luiz Carlos Santos da 1975. "O homem por trás do Leviatã : ciência e política na filosofia do Poder de Thomas Hobbes." [s.n.], 2014. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/281295.
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Previous issue date: 2014<br>Resumo: No presente trabalho procuro apresentar como o método resolutivo-compositivo ou geométrico estabelece uma relação fundamental entre filosofia natural e política nas bases do pensamento hobbesiano mais sistemático. Nesse registro, busco mostrar como Hobbes entende que as definições geométricas não seriam apenas descritivas ou especulativas, mas também prescritivas e práticas. Por isso, as definições da geometria euclidiana não apenas descreveriam a forma de uma figura estática, mas também prescreveriam um possível modo de geração ou de construção desses objetos. Da perspectiva hobbesiana os axiomas fundamentais da geometria euclidiana podem ser demonstrados, por isso estes postulados devem ser entendidos como princípios de construção ou de autoridade, mais do que de conhecimento. Desse prisma, a geometria euclidiana poderia ser entendida como uma ciência capaz de orientar tanto o entendimento quanto as ações humanas. Com base nisso, procuro mostrar como a filosofia natural e política de Hobbes se funda sobre uma aplicação desse método a uma mesma matéria: os homens e suas paixões. É nesse registro que, no decorrer de todo o presente trabalho, procuro elucidar como as paixões humanas (matéria tanto da filosofia natural quanto da política) são vistas por Hobbes sob a ótica do mesmo método geométrico, mas ora como efeito (do movimento externo que afeta os sentidos humanos) e ora como causa (do movimento voluntário dos homens no mundo). Sob esta perspectiva, procuro evidenciar de que modo o caráter convencional do método hobbesiano se aplica aos termos do contrato social constitutivo de um Estado civil soberano, presente nas bases de uma filosofia que entende as ciências e o próprio conhecimento como sinônimos de poder<br>Abstract: In this thesis I try to present as the resolutive-compositive or geometric method establishes a fundamental relationship between natural philosophy and policy on the fundamental principle of hobbesian thought. In this sense, I try to show how Hobbes believes that the geometric definitions would not only descriptive or speculative, but also prescriptive and practices. Therefore, the geometry definitions describe not only the form of a static picture but also prescribe a possible way of generation or building these objects. For the Hobbesian perspective the fundamental axioms of Euclidean geometry can be demonstrated, so these postulates must be understood as principles of construction or authority rather than knowledge. From this angle, Euclidean geometry could be understood as a science capable of guiding both the understanding and human actions. These actions regarded both as a knowledge and authority. Based on this, I seek to show how natural philosophy and policy is based on an application of this method to the same matter: men and their passions. In this way, throughout this work I try to elucidate how human passions (matter of natural philosophy and politics) are seen by Hobbes from the perspective of the same geometric method, but sometimes as the effect (of the external movement affects the human senses) and sometimes as cause (the voluntary human movement in the world). From this perspective, I try to show how the conventional character of the Hobbesian method applies to the terms of the constitutive social contract of a sovereign civil State that are present on the basis of a philosophy that understands the science and knowledge itself as power synonymous<br>Doutorado<br>Filosofia<br>Doutor em Filosofia
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Brito, Marcéu gautama Soterorudá. "Supositio, conotatio e signicatio: A crítica do nominalismo ockhamiano ao realismo." Universidade Federal da Paraíba, 2011. http://tede.biblioteca.ufpb.br:8080/handle/tede/8315.
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Previous issue date: 2011-11-04<br>This study aims to investigate how is the critique of nominalist system ockhamiano front of realistic theories developed in the Middle Ages. For this research takes place we choose to trace an investigative path that begins with the elucidation of what the 'Quarrel of the Universal' in the Middle Ages and the establishment of typologies that bring together the theories of the period. Later we work with the contextualization of the logical system developed by William of Ockham setting the bases of your system and pointing out some of the realistic writers who are criticized by the author. So that the logic of the author system became clear we seek to elucidate the logic of the terms of their time, which means the author's nominalism and what are the logical tools that he used to implement his critique of realism, namely: the supposition, the connotation and the signification. Finally we seek to discuss and demonstrate what the nominalist response of the author face the realistic theoretical models, placing the universal only with mental existence, exerting a semantic function, and devoid of ontology and a reality that is outside the human mind, shifting the axis the discussion of the problem to the field of logic to the detriment of the ontological field.<br>O presente trabalho tem como objetivo investigar de que forma ocorre a crítica do sistema nominalista ockhamiano frente às teorias realistas desenvolvidas no medievo. Para que a presente pesquisa se realize optamos por traçar um caminho investigativo que se inicia com a elucidação do que seja a ‘Querela dos Universais’ no medievo e o estabelecimento das tipologias que congregam as teorias do período. Posteriormente trabalhamos com a contextualização do sistema lógico desenvolvido por Guilherme de Ockham fixando as bases de seu sistema e apontando alguns dos autores realistas que são criticados pelo autor. Para que o sistema lógico do autor se tornasse claro buscamos elucidar a Lógica dos Termos de seu tempo, o que significa o nominalismo do autor e quais são as ferramentas lógicas por ele usadas para implementar sua crítica ao realismo, a saber: a suposição, a conotação e a significação. Por fim buscamos discorrer e demonstrar qual é a resposta nominalista do autor frente aos modelos teóricos realistas, colocando os universais somente com existência mental, exercendo uma função semântica, e desprovidos de ontologia e de uma realidade que esteja fora da mente humana, deslocando o eixo da discussão do problema para o campo da lógica em detrimento do campo ontológico.
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Tricard, Julien. "Les quantités dans la nature : les conditions ontologiques de l’applicabilité des mathématiques." Thesis, Sorbonne université, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019SORUL132.
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Si nos théories physiques peuvent décrire les traits les plus généraux de la réalité, on sait aussi que pour le faire, elles utilisent le langage des mathématiques. On peut alors légitimement se demander si notre capacité à décrire, sinon la nature intime des objets et phénomènes physiques, du moins les relations et structures qu’ils instancient, ne vient pas de cette application des mathématiques. Dans cette thèse, nous soutenons que les mathématiques sont si efficacement applicables en physique tout simplement parce que la réalité décrite par les physiciens est de nature quantitative. Pour cela, nous proposons d’abord une ontologie des quantités, puis des lois de la nature, qui s’inscrit dans les débats contemporains sur la nature des propriétés (théorie des universaux, théorie des tropes, ou nominalisme), et des lois (régularités, ou relations entre universaux). Ensuite, nous examinons deux sortes d’application des mathématiques : la mathématisation des phénomènes par la mesure, puis la formulation mathématique des équations reliant des grandeurs physiques. Nous montrons alors que les propriétés et les lois doivent être comme notre ontologie les décrit, pour que les mathématiques soient légitimement, et si efficacement, applicables. L’intérêt de ce travail est d’articuler des discussions purement ontologiques (et très anciennes, comme la querelle des universaux) avec des exigences épistémologiques rigoureuses qui émanent de la physique actuelle. Cette articulation est conçue de manière transcendantale, car la nature quantitative de la réalité (des propriétés et des lois) y est défendue comme condition d’applicabilité des mathématiques en physique<br>Assuming that our best physical theories succeed in describing the most general features of reality, one can only be struck by the effectiveness of mathematics in physics, and wonder whether our ability to describe, if not the very nature of physical entities, at least their relations and the fundamental structures they enter, does not result from applying mathematics. In this dissertation, we claim that mathematical theories are so effectively applicable in physics merely because physical reality is of quantitative nature. We begin by displaying and supporting an ontology of quantities and laws of nature, in the context of current philosophical debates on the nature of properties (universals, classes of tropes, or even nominalistic resemblance classes) and of laws (as mere regularities or as relations among universals). Then we consider two main ways mathematics are applied: first, the way measurement mathematizes physical phenomena, second, the way mathematical concepts are used to formulate equations linking physical quantities. Our reasoning has eventually a transcendental flavor: properties and laws of nature must be as described by the ontology we first support with purely a priori arguments, if mathematical theories are to be legitimately and so effectively applied in measurements and equations. What could make this work valuable is its attempt to link purely ontological (and often very ancient) discussions with rigorous epistemological requirements of modern and contemporary physics. The quantitative nature of being (properties and laws) is thus supported on a transcendental basis: as a necessary condition for mathematics to be legitimately applicable in physics
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Stival, Monica Loyola. "Foucault entre a crítica e o nominalismo." Universidade de São Paulo, 2013. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-24062013-132203/.
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Foucault analisa o liberalismo a fim de tornar inteligíveis as relações concretas de poder. Isso porque o liberalismo moderno põe em jogo um determinado regime de verdade, o que significa que seria possível, a partir dele, destacar o sentido que unifica esse período como época moderna. O procedimento adotado por Foucault consiste em delimitar condições de existência, fazendo a metodologia arqueológica prolongar-se na dimensão macrofísica do poder. Todavia, esse procedimento crítico de busca por condições impede a realização de uma história nominalista, única concepção de história que poderia atender aos pressupostos do projeto genealógico. Afinal, o nominalismo em história está em jogo desde que Foucault procura acentuar a contingência e singularidade de todo acontecimento, incluindo aí o nascimento do sujeito moderno. Mas não há conciliação possível entre o acento no método crítico e o acento no pressuposto da diferença, próprio ao nominalismo, o que leva Foucault a uma leitura incomum da modernidade e do sujeito. Essa leitura traz à tona duas consequências incômodas, pois nela toma corpo certo primado do discurso e a criação, como signo da atividade (política) do sujeito, parece não ter lugar. A fim de iluminar essa duplicidade inconciliável e suas consequências, procuro analisar como se define, em Foucault, o sujeito do liberalismo, o sujeito na história e, por fim, o sujeito moral, considerando especialmente seu trabalho posterior a 1976.<br>Foucault examines liberalism in order to make intelligible the concrete relations of power. That is because the modern liberalism puts into play a certain regime of truth, which means that it would be possible to deprehend, out of it, the meaning which unifies this period as a modern era. The procedure adopted by Foucault consists in delimiting conditions of existence, causing the archeological methodology to extend into the macrophysical dimension of power. Nevertheless, this critical procedure of searching conditions prevents the accomplishment of a nominalistic history, the only conception of history which might comply with the assumptions of the genealogical project. After all, nominalism in history is at play since Foucault endeavours to emphasize the contingency and singularity of every occurrence, including the birth of the modern subject. But there is not a possible conciliation between the emphasis on the critical method and the emphasis on the assumption of difference, proper to nominalism, which leads Foucault to an uncommon reading of modernity and the subject. This reading reveals two disquieting consequences, because a certain primacy of the discourse arises from it, and creation, as a sign of the (political) activity of the subject, seems not to have room. In order to clarify this incompatible duplicity and its consequences, I try to analyse how it is defined, in Foucault, the subject of liberalism, the subject in history and, lastly, the moral subject, considering particularly his writings done after 1976.
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Liggins, David Edward. "Nominalist accounts of mathematics." Thesis, University of Sheffield, 2005. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.421157.
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Malbouisson, Iara Velasco e. Cruz 1986. "Filosofia e ciência no século XIV = o caso de Nicole Oresme." [s.n.], 2011. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/281943.
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Orientador: Fátima Regina Rodrigues Évora<br>Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas<br>Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-19T03:35:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
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Previous issue date: 2011<br>Resumo: Essa dissertação tem por objetivo geral investigar as noções de ciência e conhecimento científico de Nicole Oresme (1323?-1382). Mais precisamente, procura-se situar o projeto filosófico de Oresme no contexto do século XIV e de seu progressivo afastamento da concepção aristotélica de ciência enquanto um saber demonstrativo, necessário e evidente. Desse modo, procura-se investigar de que maneira e por quais razões Oresme fala em causas prováveis, bem como qual o papel que a matemática ocupa em sua epistemologia probabilista. Para tanto, empreende-se a análise de algumas passagens do comentário de Oresme ao De anima de Aristóteles, e procura-se sobretudo apresentar e explicar a ciência de figurar qualidades e movimentos que Oresme formula, em seu Tractatus de configurationibus qualitatum e motuum, com o intuito de assinalar as causas prováveis de diversos fenômenos naturais<br>Abstract: The objective of this thesis is to investigate Nicole Oresme's notions of science and scientific knowledge. More specifically, we attempt to place Oresme's philosophical project in the context of fourteenth-century natural philosophy, with its progressive departure from an Aristotelic conception of science as an evident, necessary and demonstrative knowledge. Hence, we investigate how and for which reasons Oresme speaks of \probable causes" and \probable explanations", and try to determine the role that mathematics plays in his probabilistic epistemology. For this effect, we analyse some passages of Oresme's commentary on Aristotle's De anima and seek, above all, to present and explain the science of figuring qualities and movements formulated by Oresme in his Tractatus de configurationibus qualitatum e motuum for the pourpose of assigning probable causes to various natural phenomena<br>Mestrado<br>Filosofia<br>Mestre em Filosofia
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Richard, Christine. "Bertrand Russell et la métaphysique analytique." Thesis, Nancy 2, 2010. http://www.theses.fr/2010NAN21002/document.
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Nous étudions la récurrence et la postérité dans la métaphysique analytique contemporaine d’un certain nombre d’arguments élaborés par Bertrand Russell afin de répondre à une question d’ontologie fondamentale : comment les éléments de l’être sont-ils reliés ? Comment peut-on répondre à cette question sans tomber sous le coup d’une régression bradleyenne ? Interroger le statut des régressions bradleyennes (régressions vicieuses ou régressions inoffensives ?), déterminer la nature des relations (particuliers ou universels ? ; relations internes ou relations externes ?), ou bien encore adopter une perspective plus épistémologique, celle des vérifacteurs, sont ici les voies explorées. Nous étudions plus particulièrement le réalisme immanent de D. Armstrong, la théorie des tropes de K. Campbell, le nominalisme de la ressemblance de G. Rodriguez-Pereyra et le réalisme modéré de D. W. Mertz<br>The broad objective of this study is to examine the recurrence and the posterity of some arguments drawn up by Bertrand Russell to answer one of the main ontological question: How the elements of the being are related ? How can we answer this question without raising a bradleyan endless regress? Several strategies are assessed here: answering these questions by questioning the status of the bradleyan regresses (vicious or harmless regresses?), defining the nature of the relations (particulars or universals?, internal or external relations?) or using the epistemological perspective of the truthmakers. This study is focused on D. Armstrong’s Immanent Realism, K. Campbell’s Theory of Tropes, G. Rodriguez-Pereyra’s Resemblance Nominalism, and D. W. Mertz’s Moderate Realism
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Collin, Denis. "La théorie de la connaissance chez Marx." Paris 10, 1995. http://www.theses.fr/1995PA100067.
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Il s'agit d'éclairer les rapports entre les thèses philosophiques qui fondent la pensée de Marx et sa recherche d'une science du développement de la société. On doit donc d'abord réexaminer les liens de Marx avec la tradition philosophique occidentale, les grecs anciens et les philosophes anglais et français des lumières compris, ce qui conduit à souligner 1) l'importance de la méthode analytique et 2) la supposition d'une ontologie nominaliste de l'individu singulier vivant. Ainsi le rapport de Marx à Hegel doit être conçu comme rupture. La dialectique n'est pas une méthode d'investigation mais l'exposition, par sa forme, du contenu conflictuel des rapports de classes. Contre l'individualisme méthodologique, Marx souligne l'articulation entre la subjectivité de l'individu vivant dans des relations sociales, et les conditions objectives de son activité. Ainsi peuvent être comprises à la fois la genèse des rapports sociaux et celle des idées, illusions et savoirs scientifiques, produits dans un seul et même mouvement, celui de la vie et de la production pour les besoins. Ainsi les analyses de la notion d'idéologie prennent toute leur place : pour déterminer les conditions de la science, il faut comprendre la genèse des illusions et leur efficacité sociale propre. La critique de l'économie politique apparait ainsi sous un triple aspect : 1) une autoréflexion de la science sociale. 2) elle comporte une dimension axiologique essentielle. 3) elle contient donc une philosophie. Les objets d'étude des sciences sociales sont compris comme produits objectives de l'activité personnelle des individus. Ils sont objectifs parce qu'ils apparaissent comme des puissances étrangères imposant leur propre puissance contre la puissance des individus. Ce qui détermine la fin poursuivie : libérer les potentialités des individus, faire qu'il ne soit plus soumis à la puissance des créations objectives de l'histoire humaine. La théorie marxienne de la connaissance conduit à penser les principes d'une politique<br>We have to enlighten the connection between philosophical statements which constitute the ground of Marx’s thinking and pursuit of science of social development. Links between Marx and the western philosophical tradition - including Greeks and English and French philosophers of enlightenment - have to be examined again. That emphasizes, first, importance of analytical method and, secondly, assumption of a nominalist ontology of singular living individual. So that the relation between Marx and Hegel has to be conceived as breaking off. Dialectics is not an investigation method but only, by its own form, exposition of conflicting content of class relations. Against methodological individualism, Marx emphasis articulation between subjectivity of individual, living in determined social relations, and objective conditions of his activity. Therefore, we can understand genesis of social relations and genesis of ideas, illusions, and scientific knowing that are produced in one movement, the movement of life and production for needs. Thus, analysis of ideology take all its place: determining the conditions of science implies understanding the genesis of illusions and their own efficacy. So, critics of political economics appear under three aspects: first, it's a self-reflection of social science; secondly, it has an essential ethical dimension; thirdly it includes a philosophy. Objects of research of social science are understood as objectified products of personal activity of individuals. They are objective because they appear as a strange power, imposing their own power against individual power. Therefore, the aim which has to be searched is: liberating individuals so that they are no longer subjugated to power of objective creations of human history. Therefore, Marx’s theory of knowledge leads to think basis of politics
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Médina, Joseph. "Théorie et pratique de la science dans les Éléments de la philosophie de Thomas Hobbes." Thesis, Lyon, École normale supérieure, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014ENSL0949.
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Thomas Hobbes est sans doute mieux connu comme philosophe politique que comme homme de science et ses longues querelles avec John Wallis en mathématiques et Robert Boyle en physique n’ont guère encouragé les historiens des sciences à prêter attention à son œuvre scientifique. Pourtant, Hobbes conçut la philosophie comme une science et se considérait comme le fondateur non seulement d’une science nouvelle : la philosophie civile, mais aussi de la science de l’optique - récemment renouvelée à la faveur de la découverte du télescope - et même des mathématiques. Mais à quoi Hobbes pense-t-il quand il parle de science ? Aux mathématiques qu’il admire tant ? A la philosophie naturelle de Galilée ? Ou à la médecine de Harvey ? En quel sens la philosophie civile est-elle une science et quel est le statut des mathématiques ? Telles sont les questions que nous abordons à partir d’une analyse du De Corpore et des dix premiers chapitres du De Homine traduits du latin. L’interprétation proposée ici consiste à réaffirmer l’unité du système des Éléments de la philosophie et à souligner la dimension matérialiste et réaliste de la science hobbesienne. Bien que Noel Malcolm ait définitivement établi que Hobbes n’est pas l’auteur du Short Tract on first principles, nous montrons que le tournant scientifique de Hobbes est profondément marqué par son intérêt pour l’optique qu’il renouvela sur la base d’une ontologie matérialiste et des principes du mécanisme hérités de Galilée<br>Thomas Hobbes is perhaps best known as a political philosopher than as a scientist and his too long quarrels with John Wallis in mathematics and Robert Boyle in physics did little to encourage historians of science to pay attention to his scientific work. Yet Hobbes conceived of philosophy as a science and considered himself the founder not only of a new science: civil philosophy, but also the science of optics - recently renewed thanks to the discovery of the telescope - even mathematics. But what Hobbes has in mind when he talks about science? Mathematics he so admires? Galileo’s natural philosophy? Or Harvey’s medicine? In what sense civil philosophy is a science and what is the status of mathematics? These are the issues we discuss from an analysis of De Corpore and the first ten chapters of De Homine translated from Latin. The interpretation proposed here is to underline the unity of the system of the Elements of philosophy and emphasize the materialistic and realistic nature of Hobbesian science. Although Noel Malcolm has definitively established that Hobbes is not the author of Short Tract on First Principles, we show that Hobbes’s shift to science was deeply marked by his interest in the science of optics he renewed on the basis of a materialist ontology and principles inherited from Galilee mechanism
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Pouivet, Roger. "Esthetique et logique, esquisse d'une theorie nominaliste de la representation esthetique." Rennes 1, 1992. http://www.theses.fr/1992REN10123.
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Contestant la distinction kantienne entre esthetique et logique, la these entend montrer que l'experience esthetique est une experience cognitive, en developpant une logique de la symbolisation esthetique. Le chapitre i propose une definition de la representation esthetique en terme d'isomorphie extensionnelle (goodman). L'analyse de l'isomorphie n'aboutit, comme chez wittgenstein, a la these de l'inexprimabilite de l'esthetique mais au contraire a sa constitution comme element d'une theorie des systemes symboliques. Les chapitres ii et iii affirmant le caractere cognitif et logique de l'experience esthetique contre l'empirisme (russel et carnap), l'inneisme (chomsky) et l'apriorisme kantien. Les chapitres iv et v constituent deux exemples d'analyse du fonctionnement des symboles esthetiques en proposant une construction logique des phenomenes de la fiction esthetique et de l'expression esthetique. Cette construction peut se satisfaire d'une semantique extensionnelle et se situer meme dans un cadre nominaliste et inscriptionnaliste (scheffler). L'ensemble du travail vise a fournir les bases d'une methode analytique et logique en esthetique
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Quero, Fabrice. "Juan Martínez Silíceo (1486 ?-1557) : une figure de la spiritualité « héroïque » de l’Espagne pré-tridentine." Montpellier 3, 2006. http://www.theses.fr/2006MON30046.
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Les biographies consacrées à Juan Martínez Silíceo (1486 ?-1557) à l’époque moderne dévoilent une personnalité que l’historiographie contemporaine a oblitérée en grande partie. D’inspiration autobiographique, l’exemplarité du personnage y repose sur l’humilité et la charité, mises en tension autour de la vertu du travail. Cette dernière, la principale, est fortement liée à la période de formation du brillant nominaliste que fut Silíceo. Les qualités originelles et l’excellence dans le monde du savoir sont le levier de sa prodigieuse ascension sociale. Ces deux facteurs fondamentaux conditionnent également la doctrine spirituelle de l’archevêque de Tolède. Elle se caractérise par un puissant intellectualisme qui regarde vers l’affermissement de la volonté du chrétien. Aussi le De divino nomine Iesus semble-t-il tourner le dos aux grandes innovations intellectuelles de l’humanisme et aux aspirations diverses au renouveau spirituel à l’aube des Temps modernes. Ses développements sur les noms divins témoignent de la vigueur de la tradition médiévale chez son auteur, et les réserves qu’il formule à l’égard de l’expérience mystique, de son attachement à la spiritualité ascétique. La spiritualité « héroïque », dans laquelle la doctrine de Silíceo s’inscrit, est ainsi une mouvance religieuse intransigeante qui accompagne la fermeture et le repli sur soi de la monarchie catholique au tournant du XVIe siècle. L’étude de certains épisodes de son ministère, à la lumière de ce système spirituel, suggère les grandes orientations autour desquelles la pensée de l’archevêque de Tolède participe de l’idéologie à la base de la construction de l’État confessionnel<br>In the modern period the biographies devoted to Juan Martínez Silíceo (1486 ?-1557) revealed a personality then much obliterated by contemporary historiography. In these studies the examplary nature of the character derives from autobiographical sources and is based on humility and charity, both hinging on the virtue of work. This important dimension is strongly linked to the education of the brilliant nominalist that Silíceo was to become. Such original qualities and excellence in the world of knowledge represent the lever of Silíceo’s prodigious social rise. These two fundamental factors also influence the spiritual doctrine developed by the Archbishop of Toledo, which is characterized by a potent form of intellectualism aiming at strengthening the willpower of the Christian individual. Therefore the De divino nomine Iesus seems to turn its back on the great intellectual innovations in humanism as well as on the various aspirations for a spiritual revival at the dawn of modern Times. Its developments on the subject of the divine names indicate the strength of medieval tradition for Silíceo, and its reservations about mystic experience evoke the author’s attachment to ascetic spirituality. The “heroic” spirituality, within the scope of which Silíceo’s doctrine falls, constitutes an uncompromising religious movement that follows the withdrawal and autarchic evolution of the Catholic monarchy at the turn of the 16th century. A study of some episodes from Silíceo’s ministry informed by this spiritual system suggests the main directions in which the thought of the Archbishop of Toledo partakes of the ideology at the root of the notion of a religious State
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Mélès, Baptiste. "Les classifications des systèmes philosophiques d'Emmanuel Kant à Jules Vuillemin. Étude architectonique, logique et mathématique." Phd thesis, Université Blaise Pascal - Clermont-Ferrand II, 2011. http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00845390.
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À la suite d'Agrippa, maint sceptique a argué de la pluralité des systèmes pour ruiner toute ambition de vérité philosophique : des systèmes contradictoires ne pouvant être vrais simultanément, leurs prétentions respectives s'annulent. L'argument n'a pourtant de valeur que si la pluralité des systèmes est elle-même irrationnelle. Or plusieurs philosophes ont rationalisé la diversité des systèmes philosophiques, suggérant par là que la raison puisse s'approprier sa propre limite ; notamment Kant, dans l'" Histoire de la raison pure " qui conclut la Critique de la raison pure (1781) ; Hegel, dans les Leçons sur l'histoire de la philosophie (1805-1830) ; Victor Cousin, dans Du Vrai, du beau et du bien (1828) et l'Histoire générale de la philosophie (1863) ; Charles Renouvier, dans l'Esquisse d'une classification systématique des doctrines philosophiques (1885-1886) ; et Jules Vuillemin, dans Nécessité ou contingence (1984).Étudier de manière interne chacune de ces entreprises permet de déterminer quels en sont les critères fondamentaux, la forme mathématique générale, et le but philosophique. L'histoire kantienne de la raison pure, injustement dédaignée, repose sur les concepts fondamentaux du criticisme, structure maint chapitre des trois Critiques, et annonce la paix philosophique perpétuelle dont est porteur le criticisme. Les Leçons de Hegel ne sont ni un résumé empirique ni une histoire biaisée de la philosophie : fondées sur la Logique et la Phénoménologie, elles mettent au jour la dialectique interne des systèmes. La classification de Renouvier n'est pas, comme on le dit parfois, a posteriori, mais repose au contraire sur le jeu a priori d'une table des catégories et d'une théorie de la contradiction. Enfin, la classification vuilleminienne des systèmes, qui s'appuie sur une classification des formes de prédication, généralise la classification kantienne. Seule la classification de Victor Cousin s'avère finalement a posteriori.Ancrées dans les concepts fondamentaux de chacune de ces doctrines, ces classifications montrent qu'un système peut construire l'image des autres et de leurs relations aussi rigoureusement qu'il décrit le monde : les relations entre systèmes ne sont pas moins structurales que les systèmes eux-mêmes.
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Shim, Jaiwon. "Michel Foucault : liberté, pouvoir et leur histoire : introduction thématique à son anthropologie nominaliste." Paris 10, 2006. http://www.theses.fr/2006PA100086.
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Cette thèse se compose de quatre parties : I. Archéologie et généalogie, II. Micropouvoir et gouvernement, III. Liberté et le souci de soi, IV. Naissance de l'anthropologie nominaliste. Dans I, l'archéologie évolue vers une méthode critico-rationnelle, tandis que la généalogie s'applique à la position polémique contre les visions du monde théorético-spéculatives. Avec II, il s'agit du micropouvoir que Foucault fait émerger avec la " discipline " comme total socio-contrôle individualisateur. Le micropouvoir se révèle alors comme rapports de force physico-moraux qui rendent possible cette " discipline ". Pourtant, il intègre la conception nominaliste du pouvoir comme relation stratégique d'entre agents sociaux. Et c'est sur ce contexte que nous trouvons l'avant-coureur de la conception " gouvernement ". Vu que le pouvoir consiste ainsi dans le " gouvernement ", c'est-à-dire relation conductrice d'entre individus libres, il ne s'oppose plus à la liberté individuelle comme pratique de la volonté soi-subjectivatrice. Cette conception de la liberté traitée dans III, nous la tirons des histoires du " souci de soi ". Foucault problématise ce souci de soi avec les " techniques de soi " qui l'accompagnent comme matrice pratique. En fait, il les repositionne dans le contexte du souci de soi avec " la grandeur d'âme ". Eu égard au nominalisme qui est traité dans IV, Foucault affirme que l'histoire s'intéresse aux vérités factuelles des événements spécifiques. Ainsi, le nominalisme se joint à l'anthropologie de Foucault comme son ultime horizon retrouvé. Cette tendance renouvelée veut dire en effet le retour nominaliste à l'anthropologie<br>This thesis consists of four parts: I. Archaeology and genealogy, II. Micropower and government, III. Liberty and care of self, IV. Birth of nominalist anthropology. In part I, archaeology evolves toward a critical-rational method, while genealogy applies to the polemical position against the theoretical-speculative visions of the world. Part II deals with the micropower Foucault reveals with “discipline” as total individualising socio-control. Then the micropower reveals itself as physical-moral relations of power which enable this “discipline” to exist. Nevertheless, it integrates the nominalist conception of power as strategic relation between social agents. And it is in this context that we find the forerunner of the conception of “government”. As power consists in “government” (a conducting relation between free individuals), it is no longer opposed to individual liberty as practice of the self-subjectifying will. This conception of liberty treated in part III is drawn from the histories of the “care of self”. Foucault problematizes this care of self with the “techniques of self” which accompany it as practical matrix. In fact, he repositions them in the context of the care of self with “the greatness of mind”. Concerning nominalism (which is treated in part IV), Foucault asserts that history takes an interest in the factual truths of specific events. Thus nominalism joins Foucault's anthropology as his found-again ultimate horizon. This renewed tendency means there is a nominalist return to anthropology
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Green, Gerhardus Jakobus. "Die teologiese oorsprong van Ateisme." Diss., University of Pretoria, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/66357.
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Navorsing oor veranderende konsepte van God toon aan dat die oorsprong van ateïsme na die skolastici van die laat-middeleeue teruggevoer kan word. Hierdie ondersoek poog om die verhouding tussen Johannes Duns Scotus se eenduidige konseptualisering van God en die verwerping van God deur moderne ateïste aan te toon. Die verandering van Thomas Aquinas se analogiese teologie na Johannes Duns Scotus se eenduidige ontologiese konseptualisering van God het `n groot invloed op nominalistiese teologie en die moderne realiteitsverstaan gehad. Nominaliste soos William van Occam het hierdie eenduidige konsep van God later kombineer en verder ontwikkel met die gevolg dat God later nie meer ontologiese voorkeur geniet het nie. Waar Aquinas die klem op God se transendensie gelê het, was daar ‘n toenemende neiging om God al hoe meer immanent te verstaan. ʼn God wat op dieselfde wyse as die mens bestaan, word dus ʼn “wese”, ʼn “getemde God”. Scotus en latere nominaliste het God se kwantitatiewe andersheid bo sy kwalitatiewe andersheid beklemtoon. Binne `n akademiese ruimte waarin die waarheid van die Christelike geloof en die outoriteit van die Rooms Katolieke Kerk nie bevraagteken is nie, was die invloed van hierdie teologiese veranderinge klein. Die Reformasie het dit egter verander, en alhoewel dit nie die bedoeling was nie, was die gevolg dat hierdie eenduidige konseptualisering van God deel van moderne teïsme geword het. Duns Scotus se invloed was so groot dat daar ook na hom as die stigter van moderniteit verwys kan word. Na die Reformasie het Descartes se cogito ergo sum daartoe gelei dat die rede alleen as bron van betekenis gegeld het. Hierdie ontwikkeling het voorkeur aan epistemologie bo ontologie gegee. Binne hierdie moderne realiteitsverstaan is daar nie plek vir ʼn eenduidige konseptualisering van God nie. Omdat ateïste juis hierdie konsep van God verwerp, is daar waarde in die bestudering van ateïsme.
Sleutelwoorde: ateïsme, Thomas Aquinas, Johannes Duns Scotus, William van Occam, analogie van syn, eenduidige syn, Descartes, die Reformasie, Amos Funkenstein, Gavin Hyman, Brad Gregory, epistemologie, ontologie, skolastici, nominalisme, moderniteit, moderne teïsme.<br>Dissertation (MTh)--University of Pretoria, 2017.<br>Dogmatics and Christian Ethics<br>MTh<br>Unrestricted
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Johnston, Spencer C. "Essentialism, nominalism, and modality : the modal theories of Robert Kilwardby & John Buridan." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/7820.
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In the last 30 years there has been growing interest in and a greater appreciation of the unique contributions that medieval authors have made to the history of logic. In this thesis, we compare and contrast the modal logics of Robert Kilwardby and John Buridan and explore how their two conceptions of modality relate to and differ from modern notions of modal logic. We develop formal reconstructions of both authors' logics, making use of a number of different formal techniques. In the case of Robert Kilwardby we show that using his distinction between per se and per accidens modalities, he is able to provide a consistent interpretation of the apodictic fragment of Aristotle's modal syllogism and that, by generalising this distinction to hypothetical construction, he can develop an account of connexive logic. In the case of John Buridan we show that his modal logic is a natural extension of the usual Kripke-style possible worlds semantics, and that this modal logic can be shown to be sound and complete relative to a proof-theoretic formalisation of Buridan's treatment of the expository syllogism.
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Glenfield, Samuel Ferran. "Church going : an empirical approach to nominalism among Anglicans in the Republic of Ireland." Thesis, University of Warwick, 2015. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/77124/.
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This thesis adds a new contribution to the field of empirical theology pertaining to nominalism. The thesis explores the belonging, beliefs and practice of nominal Irish Anglicans. It seeks to unearth the reasons they give for their identification with the Church of Ireland. The method used in the exploration is primarily quantitative with a brief qualitative element. The instrument employed is a questionnaire, based on the template employed by Richter and Francis and Francis and Richter on church-leaving. The thesis opens by introducing the Church of Ireland in the religious context of Ireland. The frame is widened to Europe, before examining the literature surrounding the debate on nominalism. A method is outlined to locate nominal Irish Anglicans in order to obtain and analyse their views as to their belonging, belief and practice. There follows an empirical analysis to explore the beliefs of nominal Irish Anglicans and the reasons they give for reducing their church attendance. The analysis is thematic, following the pattern used by and the earlier work of Richter and Francis (1998), Francis, Robbins and Astley (2005) and Francis and Richter (2007). This thesis concludes by offering a summary of the findings before providing an explanation as to why nominal Irish Anglicans continue their identification with the Church of Ireland. It suggests how some of the discoveries may shape future research. The thesis ends by considering the implication of the results for the Church of Ireland.
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Lins, Cynthia de Carvalho. "An investigation of Raymond Boudon's paradigm of social action." Thesis, University of Sussex, 1997. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.388674.
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Bacha, Maria de Lourdes. "Peirce crítico de Mill: sobre os contextos realista e nominalista da indução." Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 1999. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/5280.
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Previous issue date: 1999-03-29<br>Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior<br>Esta tese tem como objetivo analisar o diálogo de Peirce com Mil com respeito ao fundamento e à validade da indução. Inicialmente apresentamos um resumo do percurso histórico sobre o conceito da indução, passando por algumas idéias de Aristóteles (que desenvolveu a doutrina dos silogismos e também criou o termo apagoge, cuja tradução latina é indução e para quem a indução diz respeito a todos aqueles casos de argumentos não demonstrativos nos quais a verdade das premissas não requer a verdade da conclusão), por Bacon (que foi o primeiro filósofo a formular uma teoria da indução apropriada para ser usadas nas ciências naturais), por Hume (que formula a grade questão da indução, isto é, como se justificam as inferências indutivas? Qual o fundamento de nossas conclusões a partir da experiência?) e por Mill, que é o grande interlocutor de Peirce na questão da indução e cuja teoria da indução tem fundamento no principio da uniformidade da natureza. A seguir trazemos o percurso evolucionário das ideais peircianas sobre indução como correlatas do realismo, para finalmente, discutirmos críticas e argumentos que Peirce dirige a Mill, cuja ênfase está na questão na uniformidade da natureza e na lei da causalidade
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Souza, Laiza Rodrigues de. "O problema dos universais no medievo: o nominalismo de Ockham e a passagem da ontologia à lógica." Universidade Federal da Paraíba, 2015. http://tede.biblioteca.ufpb.br:8080/handle/tede/8323.
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Previous issue date: 2015-11-03<br>This work intends to present an overview of the medieval Quarrel of Universal. The
debate about the status of universals has its conceptual basis in the thought of the
ancient philosophers and traditionally opens with the formulation of Porphyry. During
the Middle Ages there were several hypotheses about what state of universal, among
which we highlight the realism of Duns Scotus and Bonaventure, the extreme
nominalism of Roscellinus and the anti-realism of Peter Abelard. Finally, we present
the William of Ockham’s solution to the problem of universals. With a nominalist
position, which is against the existence of any universal entity out of mind, Ockham
develops an theory of supposition in which universals are taken as mentally that
according to a semantic function, take the place of individuals referred to in a
propositional context. Thus, we try to show how Ockham's perspective brings the
problem of universal from the ontological scope for the logical.<br>Este trabalho pretende apresentar um panorama geral da Querela dos Universais do
medievo. O debate acerca do estado dos universais tem suas bases conceituais no
pensamento dos filósofos antigos e se inaugura tradicionalmente com a formulação
de Porfírio de Tiro. Durante a Idade Média surgiram várias hipóteses acerca de qual
estado dos universais, dentre as quais destacamos o realismo de Duns Scotus e
Boaventura, o nominalismo extremo de Roscelino e o anti-realismo de Pedro
Abelardo. Finalmente, apresentamos a solução de Guilherme de Ockham ao
problema dos universais. Com um posicionamento nominalista, que é contrário a
existência de qualquer entidade universal fora da mente, Ockham desenvolve uma
teoria da suposição na qual os universais são tomados como termos mentais que,
de acordo com uma função semântica, ocupam o lugar dos particulares a que se
referem num contexto proposicional. Deste modo, procuramos mostrar como a
perspectiva de Ockham traz o problema dos universais do âmbito ontológico para o
lógico.
33
Yangali, Oscar. "Escepticismo y suspensión del juicio en la teoría nominalista del conocimiento de Francisco Suárez." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2016. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/119541.
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The aim of this study is to offer a reflection on the theory of knowledge ofFrancisco Suárez and his nominalism in the light of Sextus Empiricus’ sceptical thought in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism. It is Sextus who allows us to compare the epistemology of Suárez with a dynamic system of knowledge. With this in view, in the first place, I examine Sextus’s scepticism and Suárez’s nominalist ontology. In the second place, I analyse the mental representation as conceived by Sextus in analogy with the formal and objective concepts of Suárez, and I also discuss the concept of relation in both authors. Finally, I proceed to examine the concept of belief inasmuch as certain restrictions in the configuration of our judgements are manifest and recognized.<br>El objetivo del presente trabajo es ofrecer una reflexión acerca de la teoría del conocimiento de Francisco Suárez y su nominalismo a la luz del pensamientoescéptico de los Esbozos Pirrónicos de Sexto Empírico. Es Sexto quien nos permitecomparar la epistemología de Suárez con un sistema dinámico del conocimiento. Para esto, en primer lugar, examino el escepticismo de Sexto y la ontología nominalista de Suárez. En segundo lugar, analizo la representación mental concebida por Sexto análogamente a los conceptos formal y objetivo de Suárez, procediendo también a un análisis en torno al concepto de relación en ambos autores. Finalmente, procedo a desarrollar un examen acerca del concepto de creencia en cuanto son patentes y reconocidas ciertas restricciones en la configuración de nuestros juicios.
34
Rocha, Renato Mendes. "Mundos possíveis, propriedades naturais e mereologia." reponame:Repositório Institucional da UFSC, 2017. https://repositorio.ufsc.br/xmlui/handle/123456789/177777.
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Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, Florianópolis, 2017.<br>Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-25T04:10:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
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Previous issue date: 2017<br>Nesta tese defendo que as propriedades naturais desempenham um papel central no realismo modal de David Lewis. Para argumentar em favor desta tese apresento: uma explicação bottom-up da metafísica top-down de mundos possíveis; uma proposta de uma nova definição de um; e, a fusão natural, uma nova operação mereológica. Para cumprir esses objetivos, no primeiro capítulo eu contextualizo a discussão; no segundo capítulo apresento a retomada da discussão sobre universais na filosofia contemporânea e argumento que, considerando as diversas formulações do problema, o nominalismo de semelhanças associado ao realismo modal pode ser visto como uma boa resposta ao problema. Ademais, discuto a alternativa apresentada por Devitt na qual defende que o alegado problema dos universais é na verdade um pseudoproblema. No terceiro capítulo, apresento uma ontologia mínima de propriedades, discuto as definições existentes de propriedades naturais e apresento uma proposta de uma nova definição, além de, uma discussão sobre teorias da similaridade. Ainda neste capítulo, apresento os papéis da racionalidade e da fundamentação, usados para classificar a utilidade teórica das propriedades naturais. A respeito do primeiro papel, mostro como as propriedades naturais beneficiam a definição dos termos do pacote nomológico, e no que diz respeito ao segundo papel, apresentou possíveis aplicações a conhecidos da filosofia analítica da segunda metade do século XX, como o problema da indeterminação da tradução, o novo enigma da indução e o problema de Kripkestein. No capítulo quarto, apresento algumas variedades do realismo filosófico, considero as vantagens teóricas de se assumir o realismo científico como pano de fundo e discuto uma utilidade teórica adicional das propriedades naturais, a saber: a solução para o problema da elegibilidade da referência ou, o paradoxo de Putnam. No capítulo quinto, abordo a mereologia e mostro como essa teoria é importante para conectar diversos aspectos do realismo modal de Lewis. Para tal, discuto a relação entre as teses da composição como análoga à identidade, a inocência ontológica da mereologia e o argumento da vagueza em favor do universalismo mereológico. Apresento uma nova operação de fusão natural, que pode ser utilizada para minimizar os problemas da composição irrestrita.<br><br>Abstract : I argue in this dissertation that natural properties play a central role in David Lewis' modal realism. To argue in favor of this thesis I present: a bottom-up explanation of a top-down possible world metaphysics; a new definition of natural properties and natural fusion, a new mereological operation. To achieve these aims, in the first chapter, I contextualize the discussion, in the second I resume the discussion about universals in contemporary philosophy and argue that, considering the distinct formulations of the problem, class nominalism combined with modal realism might be the best solution. Furthermore, I discuss Devitt's solution in which he defends that the problem about universals is, in fact, a pseudo problem. In the third chapter, I introduce a minimal ontology of properties, regarding natural properties, I discuss the existing definitions, present a new one and discuss some theories of similarity, a notion that is in the core of the definition I propose. Besides, I present how natural properties benefit the definition of terms of nomological package, linked to its fundamentality role. I also present some applications related to the rationality role that encompass some well-known philosophical problems of the second half of 20th century. In the fourth chapter, I present some varieties of philosophical realism, I consider the theoretical advantages of taking scientific realism as background and I discuss one more utility of natural properties, the solution to the problem of eligibility of reference or, the Putnam's paradox. In the fifth chapter, I discuss how mereology is important to link several aspects of Lewis' modal realism. For such, I discuss the relation between composition as identity and ontological innocence of mereology and I present the natural fusion mereology, a new mereological operation that aims to minimize the problems of unrestricted composition.
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Grossi, Joseph Luke. "The name of the Risus : nominalism, the carnivalesque and the pursuit of truths in Chaucer's the Wife of Bath's prologue and Tale and the Clerk's tale." Connect to resource, 1994. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1144849554.
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Penn, Stephen. "Truth, time and sacred text : responses to medieval nominalism in John Wyclif's Summa de Ente and De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae." Thesis, University of York, 1998. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/16328/.
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Williams, Anthony George. "The impact of Ockham's nominalism on his understanding of human nature and the imago dei in man, in comparison with aquinas, bonaventure and scotus." Thesis, Open University, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.530501.
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Stockamp, David A. "Nurture and discipleship of new converts a specialized training program for pastors of the Evangelical Community of the Ubangi-Mongala of Zaire /." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 1994. http://www.tren.com.
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Kohne, Jens. "Drei Betrachtungen zum Problem der Eigenschaften dargestellt anhand der Lehren von H. H. Price, G. F. Stout und N. Kemp Smith /." [S.l. : s.n.], 2003. http://www.bsz-bw.de/cgi-bin/xvms.cgi?SWB10806357.
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Cruz, Maria Teresa Pimentel Peito. "Designação dos limites : o trabalho do nome na constituição da obra de arte moderna." Master's thesis, Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 1989. http://hdl.handle.net/10362/11981.
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Dissertação de Mestrado em Comunicação Social<br>Há mais de um século atrás, há mais de 150 anos, um
primeiro vaticíno de morte recaiu sobre a arte e, desde então,
a reflexão sobre ela não pode mais pensar sem essa sombra,
confirmando-a, aceitando-a, ou renegando-a. Esse vaticínio foi
o de Hegel, nas Aesthetischen Lehren, (redigidas entre 1815 e
1829), curiosamente, no momento culminante, e pelo sistema mais
acabado do idealismo ocidental. A arte é dita algo de passado
(ein Vergangenes), o que equivale antes de mais a postular a
sua natureza intrinsecamente histórica. Um século depois, outro
grande pensador, Martin Heidegger, aceitando ainda reflectir
sobre a arte, fá-lo porém no ensombramento das palavras de
Hegel. Pensamento de compromisso, porque continuam a existir
obras de arte, mas que poderão não ser mais do que o corpo em
degradação da arte, uma vez que esta, como sugere Heidegger,
poderá levar séculos a perecer. Corpo abandonado por um
Espírito, por uma Ideia, por uma Verdade, que deixaram de
irradiar nele uma presença. Corpo, sem ser, portanto. Carpe de
um ontologia agora insustentável - a da obra de arte.
41
Collin, James Henry. "Nominalist's credo." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/7997.
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Introduction: I lay out the broad contours of my thesis: a defence of mathematical nominalism, and nominalism more generally. I discuss the possibility of metaphysics, and the relationship of nominalism to naturalism and pragmatism. Chapter 2: I delineate an account of abstractness. I then provide counter-arguments to claims that mathematical objects make a di erence to the concrete world, and claim that mathematical objects are abstract in the sense delineated. Chapter 3: I argue that the epistemological problem with abstract objects is not best understood as an incompatibility with a causal theory of knowledge, or as an inability to explain the reliability of our mathematical beliefs, but resides in the epistemic luck that would infect any belief about abstract objects. To this end, I develop an account of epistemic luck that can account for cases of belief in necessary truths and apply it to the mathematical case. Chapter 4: I consider objections, based on (meta)metaphysical considerations and linguistic data, to the view that the existential quantifier expresses existence. I argue that these considerations can be accommodated by an existentially committing quantifier when the pragmatics of quantified sentences are properly understood. I develop a semi-formal framework within which we can define a notion of nominalistic adequacy. I show how our notion of nominalistic adequacy can show why it is legitimate for the nominalist to make use of platonistic “assumptions” in inference-making. Chapter 5: I turn to the application of mathematics in science, including explanatory applications, and its relation to a number of indispensability arguments. I consider also issues of realism and anti-realism, and their relation to these arguments. I argue that abstraction away from pragmatic considerations has acted to skew the debate, and has obscured possibilities for a nominalistic understanding of mathematical practices. I end by explaining the notion of a pragmatic meta-vocabulary, and argue that this notion can be used to carve out a new way of locating our ontological commitments. Chapter 6: I show how the apparatus developed in earlier chapters can be utilised to roll out the nominalist project to other domains of discourse. In particular, I consider propositions and types. I claim that a unified account of nominalism across these domains is available. Conclusion: I recapitulate the claims of my thesis. I suggest that the goal of mathematical enquiry is not descriptive knowledge, but understanding.
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Burton, Simon James Gowan. "Hallowing of logic : the Trinitarian method of Richard Baxter's Methodus Theologiae." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/7821.
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While Richard Baxter (1615-91) is well known and rightly held in high esteem for his practical divinity and his evangelistic zeal, he has hitherto been conspicuously neglected as a theologian. In particular there have been no major studies of him with respect to the renewed paradigm of Protestant Scholasticism and none at all of his Methodus Theologiae (1681), which represents the fruit of a lifetime of theological reflection and study and which is arguably, in both scope and vision, one of the last great Summas of English scholastic divinity. This thesis focuses on the Methodus and on Baxter‟s theological method, which he took, though imperfect, to be the closest to the true Scripture method of theology that anyone had yet come. Baxter believed that every level of (active) created reality reflected the impress of God‟s Triune being in metaphysical composition, structure and activity. This he described, following the Italian metaphysicist Tommaso Campanella, in terms of the divine primalities or principles of Power, Wisdom and Love. In the Methodus these insights are systematised into a kind of Trinitarian logic. Baxter held that human reason should be sanctified in order to conform to the Trinitarian structure of created reality, and therefore espoused a method of trichotomising organised according to these same divine principles, derivative of both Ramist and Lullist method. This thesis argues that the whole of Baxter‟s mature thought is structured in a Trinitarian fashion according to his own „hallowed logic‟ and that two themes, often interlinked, are the key to interpreting his thought: the metaphysics of the divine principles and the Christian‟s baptismal covenant with the Triune God. Furthermore it examines Baxter‟s analogical ascent from the general vestigia Trinitatis present in the whole created order through the special vestigium of man‟s soul fashioned in the image of God and finally to the Trinity itself. This detailed exposition provides the basis, in the concluding chapter, for an examination of the whole of the Methodus and a demonstration that this represents a methodological unfolding of the covenant between the believer and God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit in the threefold Kingdom of Nature, Grace and Glory. In this way the Methodus may be seen as having taken its inspiration from the Theo-Politica (1659) of Baxter‟s friend George Lawson. Finally this thesis concludes that Baxter‟s thought has pronounced Scotist and Nominalist accents. His Scotism in particular runs deep and has strong ties with his Trinitarian thought, which is especially significant in light of the recent increasingly vocal discussions of the Scotist character of Protestant Scholasticism. Overall therefore it is suggested that Baxter is a neglected figure who deserves to be rediscovered and whose mature theology represents a fascinating reconstrual of biblical ideas according to a Trinitarian and scholastic paradigm.
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Eyim, Ahmet. "A Reconsideration Of The Porblem Of Universals: A Contemporary Perspective." Phd thesis, METU, 2012. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12614495/index.pdf.
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This study aims at investigating the problem of universals, which is one of the most venerable issues in the history of philosophy. The problem of universals emerges from the ontological status of properties and relations<br>i.e., the existence and nature of properties and relations. It can be defined as the problem of how two or more different objects can have the same property or how a property can be a part of different things.
The problem of universals consists of not a single problem but rather a network of problems. The aim of this study is to reconsider the problem of universals which involves the three interrelated problems: ontological problem of predication, the linguistic problem of predication and the problem of abstract reference. Any adequate account for the problem of universals must deal with these problems. Nominalism, Trope theory, and Realism are three major theories that have proposed solutions to the problem of universals. In this study, these accounts have been discussed and it has been tried to reveal whether any of these accounts can deal with these problems.
As a conclusion, this study proposes that among the theories that try to deal with the problem of ontological predication and the problem of abstract reference, only Object-Trope theory and Armstrong&rsquo<br>s Realism have been successful. However, Object-Trope theory is found to be a bit more superior to Armstrong&rsquo<br>s Realism when Ockham&rsquo<br>s razor is appealed to.
44
Brown, Scott Andrew. "Essays on Modality and Instantiation." The Ohio State University, 2017. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1483479401220297.
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Knowles, Robert Frazer. "Towards a fictionalist philosophy of mathematics." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2015. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/towards-a-fictionalist-philosophy-of-mathematics(e078d675-7f4c-45e7-a1a0-baf8d899940d).html.
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In this thesis, I aim to motivate a particular philosophy of mathematics characterised by the following three claims. First, mathematical sentences are generally speaking false because mathematical objects do not exist. Second, people typically use mathematical sentences to communicate content the truth of which does not require mathematical objects to exist. Finally, in using mathematical language in this way, speakers are not doing anything out of the ordinary: they are performing straightforward assertions. In Part I, I argue that the role played by mathematics in our scientific explanations is a purely expressive one, merely allowing us to say more than we otherwise would be able to about, or yielding a greater understanding of, the physical world. Mathematical objects to not need to exist for mathematical language to play this role. This proposal puts a normative constraint on our use of mathematical language: we ought to use mathematically presented theories to express belief only in the consequences they have for non-mathematical things. In Part II, I will argue that what the normative proposal recommends is in fact what people generally do in both pure and applied mathematical contexts. I motivate this claim by showing that it is predicted by our best general means of analysing natural language. I provide a semantic theory of applied arithmetical sentences and show that they do not purport to refer to numbers, as well as a pragmatic theory for pure mathematical language use which shows that pure mathematical utterances do not typically communicate content that implies the existence of mathematical objects. In conclusion, I show the hermeneutic fictionalist position that emerges is preferable to any alternative which interprets mathematical discourse as aimed at describing a domain of independently existing abstract mathematical objects.
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Silva, Lucas Trindade da. "A teoria da formação conceitual weberiana: uma análise através d’a ética protestante e o espírito do capitalismo." Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, 2014. https://repositorio.ufpe.br/handle/123456789/11733.
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Previous issue date: 2014<br>Diante da defesa contemporânea da atualidade do programa de investigação weberiano (Kalberg, Ringer, Schluchter), o presente trabalho realiza um retorno a Weber, investigando sistematicamente a relação entre os seus textos de elaboração metodológica e a aplicação desta metodologia na formação conceitual substantiva n’A Ética Protestante e o “Espírito” do Capitalismo (EPEC). A partir dos resultados desta estratégia comparativa buscamos refletir sobre os limites e potencialidades da metodologia weberiana para a investigação nas ciências sociais. Podemos dizer que a metodologia weberiana é formada por uma base epistemológica – seus pressupostos mais gerais – sobre a qual se desenvolve um método – a proposição de instrumentos de observação/seleção/verificação a serem seguidos na investigação empírica científico-social. Aquela base é constituída por uma teoria nominalista do conceito e por uma teoria da relação com valores. O método formado sobre tal base encontra sua síntese na noção de tipo ideal que salienta: o caráter irreal dos conceitos científico-sociais; a necessidade da elaboração de conceitos puros (livres de contradição); a finalidade genética/singular da investigação social; e propõe uma abordagem da ação social como resultado do desenvolvimento e/ou concatenação de ações individuais orientadas por um sentido (individualismo metodológico), melhor investigáveis se tomadas, num primeiro momento, como se seguissem um devir estritamente racional (racionalismo heurístico). A análise da formação conceitual substantiva na EPEC demonstra que a aplicação coerente da orientação individualista/racionalista do método weberiano possibilita uma análise sofisticada da gênese da conduta tipicamente capitalista nas fontes ético-doutrinárias protestantes. No entanto, a sua concepção explicitamente purista da formação típico-ideal, ao mesmo tempo em que permite uma maior clareza na definição da “ética protestante” e do “espírito do capitalismo”, impede, ao não demonstrar qualquer tensão com a realidade empírica investigada (hipostasiamento tendencial), a abordagem de outras características importantes do fenômeno tratado. Dimensões estruturais, como os processos de expropriação e exploração capitalistas, tornam-se inapreensíveis precisamente por transcenderem uma imagem individualista da ação social. Isto é particularmente explícito no tipo ideal “espírito do capitalismo” que, por ser definido exclusivamente em termos de racionalismo econômico e investimento de capital privado, impede a reflexão sobre as formas predatórias de acumulação capitalista e sobre a umbilical relação entre reprodução do capital e intervenção estatal. De um ponto de vista mais amplo, identificamos a antinomia entre uma metodologia cautelosa e uma explicação ousada, pois o conceito de “espírito do capitalismo” não se mostra como apenas mais uma elaboração lógica possível de uma problemática particular, mas como expressão conceitual unívoca do fenômeno investigado, como o fator crucial para a ascensão do capitalismo moderno, que une e dá coerência a um conjunto de condições formais dadas antes ou depois do calvinismo.
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Mendes, Fábio C. Ribeiro. "O imaterialismo de George Berkeley : o realismo no "esse é percipi"." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/10792.
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Melanson, William Jason. "Justified existential belief an investigation of the justifiability of believing in the existence of abstract mathematical objects /." Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2006. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1140465070.
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Tutuncu, Koray. "Problematic Story Of Negative Freedom." Phd thesis, METU, 2007. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/3/12608319/index.pdf.
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In his defense of negative freedom, Isaiah Berlin&rsquo<br>s main target is the political voluntarism of enlightenment rationalism which has paved way to totalitarian and authoritarian political regimes of the 20th century which brought the sacrifice of individual freedom. For Berlin, in contrast to Platonic realism of enlightenment rationalism in which there is a substantial belief in reason&rsquo<br>s capacity for giving us the knowledge of the supreme good, the nominalist foundations of negative freedom can provide us a secure grounding in the justification of the rights over the goods. By declaring the inviolable rights and relying on the principle of neutrality, negative freedom eliminates the risk of political voluntarism stemming from enlightenment rationalism or scientism. Since the 1980s, in Turkey, political and social oppositions to Rousseauian enlightenment of the Turkish state have deployed the epistemic and political tools of negative freedom. This appeal has aimed to open a legitimate space for the language of freedom as non-intervention under which each individual chooses his personal values without the fear of state intervention. In contrast to the interventionist claims of state, negative freedom, it has been believed that, has provided a secure grounding for the rights of individuals. Besides, the meta-ethical thesis of the incommensurability of human goods has also been employed for delegitimizing the substantial belief in the monism of the republican regime which relied on the assumption presenting the republican way of life as the supreme good. This missionary zeal for the re-construction of the republic on the premises of negative freedom has not, however, gone unchallenged. Against such identification of democracy with free-market and value pluralism, the republican front defends the restoration of the foundational ideals of the republic by returning to the substantial understanding of national sovereignty under the formulation of &lsquo<br>militant democracy&rsquo<br>. In this study, even though I agree with the nominalist epistemology of negative freedom which manifests a skeptic and agnostic attitude toward the power of reason and the insistence of negative freedom on the necessity of the priority of right, I have demonstrated the reasons behind the failure of negative freedom in justifying the priority of the right over the goods. Actually, my analysis has already displayed that concerning the radical consequences of the thesis of incommensurability, it is doubtful whether negative freedom can provide political conditions even for the cause of peace without the presence of absolute sovereign as suggested in Hobbes&rsquo<br>s political theory. At this point, I have argued that we should take into consideration the achievements of the ideal of autonomy in grounding the priority of the right over the good. Contrary to Berlin&rsquo<br>s distorted representation of autonomy, I believe that the critical rationalism of autonomy and its understanding of law will protect us not only from the metaphysics of enlightenment rationalism and scientism, but also from the metaphysics of historicism envisaged by Berlin&rsquo<br>s version of negative freedom.
50
Båve, Arvid. "Deflationism : A Use-Theoretic Analysis of the Truth-Predicate." Doctoral thesis, Stockholms universitet, Filosofiska institutionen, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-999.
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I here develop a specific version of the deflationary theory of truth. I adopt a terminology on which deflationism holds that an exhaustive account of truth is given by the equivalence between truth-ascriptions and de-nominalised (or disquoted) sentences. An adequate truth-theory, it is argued, must be finite, non-circular, and give a unified account of all occurrences of “true”. I also argue that it must descriptively capture the ordinary meaning of “true”, which is plausibly taken to be unambiguous. Ch. 2 is a critical historical survey of deflationary theories, where notably disquotationalism is found untenable as a descriptive theory of “true”. In Ch. 3, I aim to show that deflationism cannot be finitely and non-circularly formulated by using “true”, and so must only mention it. Hence, it must be a theory specifically about the word “true” (and its foreign counterparts). To capture the ordinary notion, the theory must thus be an empirical, use-theoretic, semantic account of “true”. The task of explaining facts about truth now becomes that of showing that various sentences containing “true” are (unconditionally) assertible. In Ch. 4, I defend the claim (D) that every sentence of the form “That p is true” and the corresponding “p” are intersubstitutable (in a use-theoretic sense), and show how this claim provides a unified and simple account of a wide variety of occurrences of “true”. Disquotationalism then only has the advantage of avoiding propositions. But in Ch. 5, I note that (D) is not committed to propositions. Use-theoretic semantics is then argued to serve nominalism better than truth-theoretic ditto. In particular, it can avoid propositions while sustaining a natural syntactic treatment of “that”-clauses as singular terms and of “Everything he says is true”, as any other quantification. Finally, Horwich’s problem of deriving universal truth-claims is given a solution by recourse to an assertibilist semantics of the universal quantifier.