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Academic literature on the topic 'Non-God-thesis'
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Journal articles on the topic "Non-God-thesis"
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ThankGodBekweri, Amadi, and Zabbeh Alawa Peter. "DEATH VERSUS NON-EXISTENCE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF GOD IN NIETZSCHE AND SARTRE." International Journal of Integrative Humanism 11, no. 1 (2019): 118–27. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3252126.
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<strong>Abstract</strong> This paper examines in a comparative manner the death of God in Friedrich Nietzsche and the non-existence of God in Jean-Paul Sartre. As an undertone, it attempts to address man’s self-denials, alienation and failure to assert his freedom and independence which was occasioned by his over-reliance on the God-thesis; a situation where every human problem is being interpreted in terms of a divine determinist who had predestined every human experience. Nietzsche found in the Athenian and German cultures the Dionysian spirit required to restore the freedom of Dasein, while Sartre adopted the French revolutionary consciousness and spirit of freedom to address this problem. The death of God in Nietzsche means the death of belief in the God-thesis, the rejection of determinism or fixed principles and the birth of, freedom or superman. On the other hand, Sartre’s non-existence of God is a demonstration of the absolute freedom of for-itself and the absence of a creative God who creates essences. Our analysis shows that though there are some cosmetic and structural differences in terms of terminology and logical structure of their arguments, the content and intent of their works as it relates to the subject of discourse are essentially the same; hence they are grouped together as atheistic existentialists. Our work adopts the content cum textual- analytic methods of study.
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Johansen, Niels Mattsson, and Mads Peter Karlsen. "Kan magten fornuftbestemme religionen?" Dansk Teologisk Tidsskrift 74, no. 4 (2011): 319–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.7146/dtt.v74i4.106400.
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This review presents a short introduction to the main problem addressed in Lars Albinus’ doctoral thesis Religion, Power and Communication ensued by a critical discussion of the following three central issues at stake in the thesis. First, the thesis’ ambitious attempt to produce a dialectical reading of Foucault’s analytics of power and Habermas’s theory of communicative action is evaluated. Then, after a compressed outline of the solution that the thesis proposes to its main problem, this solution is discussed. And last, the notion of a post-metaphysical non-authoritative God indicated in the thesis is briefly considered.
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Doherty, David A. "Does Luke Replace “Son of God” with Non-filial Language?" Bible Translator 75, no. 1 (2024): 37–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/20516770241235550.
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In 2005 missiologist Rick Brown argued on the basis of Synoptic parallels that, in a few cases, Luke translates Son of God language with non-filial language, especially the term “Christ.” The argument supported the practice of using non-filial renderings of Son of God language in Bible translations made for Muslims, the stated intent being to convey the meaning of the text more clearly and to avoid offense and misunderstanding. This article tests Brown’s claim, mainly by considering the literary relationships between the Synoptic Gospels and by examining every Lukan parallel of Markan and/or Matthean Son of God language used with reference to Jesus. The results of the investigation contradict Brown’s thesis, showing that the relevant Lukan texts do not provide direct support for the rendering of Son of God language with non-filial language.
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OSBORNE, THOMAS M. "Ockham as a divine-command theorist." Religious Studies 41, no. 1 (2005): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412504007218.
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Although this thesis is denied by much recent scholarship, Ockham holds that the ultimate ground of a moral judgement's truth is a divine command, rather than natural or non-natural properties. God could assign a different moral value not only to every exterior act, but also to loving God. Ockham does allow that someone who has not had access to revelation can make correct moral judgements. Although her right reason dictates what God in fact commands, she need not know that God so commands. Ockham's divine-command theory plays an important role in the shift away from a nature-based ethics, and it anticipates contemporary problems concerning truth in meta-ethics.
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Imaguire, Guido. "Ordem Lógica e Distributividade." Analytica - Revista de Filosofia 15, no. 1 (2013): 61–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.35920/arf.v15i1.618.
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Neste artigo defendo a tese de que "Deus" é um conceito não distributivo de segunda ordem. Mais precisamente: respondo às críticas que E. Marques levanta contra tal tese. Essa resposta consiste basicamente no esclarecimento das noções de ordem lógica e não distributividade. Quanto à primeira noção defenderei que existência não deixa de ser predicável a Deus, desde que se aceite que existência é um conceito de qualquer ordem igual ou superior a dois. Quanto à segunda noção, defenderei que propriedades não distributivas não são fracionáveis. Abstract:In this paper I defend the thesis that "God" is a non-distributive second order concept. More exactly, I answer to some objections proposed by E. Marques against this thesis. My answer consists basically in some clarifications of the notions of logical order and non-distributivity. Concerning the first notion, I will argue that existence can be attributed to God as far as we accept that existence is a concept of any order equal or higher than two. Concerning the later notion, I will argue that non-distributive properties cannot be split.
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Herreros Besa, Alfonso. "Augustine on pagan knowledge of God and the Trinity." Studium. Filosofía y Teología 19, no. 38 (2017): 245–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.53439/stdfyt38.19.2016.245-260.
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Augustine narrates in Confessions, VII, ix, 13-15 his encounter with the Platonist books, which permitted him to grasp the immateriality of God and surprisingly the Christian Trinity too, a thesis that seems confirmed in the psychological arguments he puts forward in The Trinity, among other texts. However, a more fine-grained analysis shows that Augustine sets strict limits to the pagan, non-revealed knowledge of God, meaning that he doesn´t think the Neoplatonics professed the Trinity in the sense of the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed.
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Vuijsje, Herman. "Old images never die." Religie & Samenleving 3, no. 3 (2008): 159–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.54195/rs.13151.
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The author ventures to undertake a ‘sociology of the sociology of religion’ with regard to Western Europe. Developments in this part of the world seem to contradict the general validity of the desecularization thesis. At the other hand, it is also questionable whether secularization proceeds. In this part of the world, spiritual and supernatural beliefs have become so individualized and so blurred that it is hardly possible to make unambiguous statements about them. The author suggests that, rather than a secularization or a desecularization thesis, a ‘blurring thesis’ could yield insight. Traditional, well-defined religious beliefs give way to diffuse and flexible images, while at the same time many people without formal religious affiliation feel ‘there must be something more between heaven and earth’. The author offers the hypothesis that these developments will result in a convergence of various world views, till the point where the difference between religious and nonreligious views, between God and non-God, loses its meaning and its significance. In Western Europe, the author suggests, God is like an old soldier: he doesn’t die but fades away. If this is true, sociologists of religion have a problem: how can they mark out their area of investigation if it is losing its well-defined boundaries? The author discusses and criticizes various attempts to draw new boundaries and confesses he cannot offer a feasible solution himself either.
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Daly, Chris. "Moral Error Theory and the Problem of Evil." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1, no. 2 (2009): 89–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v1i2.342.
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Moral error theory claims that no moral sentence is (non-vacuously) true. Atheism claims that the existence of evil in the world is incompatible with, or makes improbable, the existence of God. Is moral error theory compatible with atheism? This paper defends the thesis that it is compatible against criticisms by Nicholas Sturgeon.
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HIMMA, KENNETH EINAR. "The free-will defence: evil and the moral value of free will." Religious Studies 45, no. 4 (2009): 395–415. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412509990023.
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AbstractOne version of the free-will argument relies on the claim that, other things being equal, a world in which free beings exist is morally preferable to a world in which free beings do not exist (the ‘value thesis’). I argue that this version of the free-will argument cannot support a theodicy that should alleviate the doubts about God's existence to which the problems of evil give rise. In particular, I argue that the value thesis has no foundation in common intuitions about morality. Without some sort of intuitive support, the value thesis lacks the resources to serve as the foundation for a theodicy that addresses the powerful intuition, which affects believers and non-believers alike, that a perfect God would not allow so much evil.
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Emberger, Gary. "The Nonviolent Character of God, Evolution, and the Fall of Satan." Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 74, no. 4 (2022): 224–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.56315/pscf12-22emberger.
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The evolutionary creation model of origins best matches the scientific evidence for evolution with common descent. However, the violence and harm associated with the evolutionary history of life may be viewed as incompatible with religious traditions such as Anabaptist that understand God to be nonviolent as revealed in the life and teaching of Jesus. This article argues that malevolent wills such as fallen angels opposed God's will in the evolutionary process and that explanations for natural evils that do not recognize the corrupting activities of fallen spirit-beings make God culpable for evil and non-Christlike in moral character. In this light, the rejection of the angelic-fall thesis by many writers is surprising. Consequently, a number of common objections to the thesis are examined. The angelic-fall approach to natural evil has biblical support, a long history in the church, support of some current-day theologians, the ability to resist objections, and many useful outcomes.
Book chapters on the topic "Non-God-thesis"
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Prusak, Bernard G. "Religious Non-Affiliation and Objections of Conscience." In Empty Churches. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197529317.003.0010.
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This chapter is concerned with the implications of growing religious non-affiliation for objections of conscience, which have proliferated lately in the culture wars of Western democracies. Through the eighteenth century, when the U.S. Constitution was framed, the concept of conscience was tightly bound to religion. This chapter’s leading question is: what force do claims of conscientious objection have in the context of growing religious non-affiliation? Underlying this question is a subtler one: what else might we lose when we lose religion? The chapter’s thesis is twofold. First, the public conception of conscience has changed under the pressure of both growing religious non-affiliation and growing religious pluralism. Second, the appeal to conscience is now much less powerful than it was when God figured more prominently in the picture. The buffer between citizen and state has become thinner, and the reasons to accommodate objections of conscience have become weaker.
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Hoffman, Paul. "Cartesian Passions and Cartesian Dualism." In Essays on Descartes. Oxford University PressNew York, NY, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195321104.003.0009.
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Abstract Descartes’s most famous and important metaphysical thesis is mind-body dualism. Mind and body are distinct substances having different natures or essences. The essence of mind is the attribute thought, and the essence of body is the attribute extension. All the non-essential properties of a created substance, or at least those in virtue of which it is modiHed or affected, have a special relation to the essential attribute of that substance. They are modes of that attribute. For example, doubting that God exists, which is a non-essential property of a mind, is a mode or way of thinking. Similarly, being square, which is a non-essential property of a body such as a piece of wax, is a mode of extension or a way of being extended. Since mind and body are the only two kinds of created substances, all the properties that modify created substances are thus either ways of thinking or ways of being extended.
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Jackson, Sherman A. "Secular, Religious, Islamic." In The Islamic Secular. Oxford University PressNew York, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197661789.003.0002.
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Abstract This chapter lays out the meanings and deployments of “secular,” “religious,” and “Islamic,” as they emerge out of the Western discourse on religion, including, ultimately, Islam, and how these are deployed in the present thesis. It establishes two modes of the secular—the macro-mode, which essentially removes God from the cosmos, and the micro-mode, which does not remove God but simply circumscribes the authority of what God says, that is, via revelation. On the micro-mode, religion retains its authority, but that authority is limited and cordoned off from certain pursuits, primarily the state, the economy, and science. The chapter describes the Islamic Secular as a micro-mode of the secular. But while “secular” in the West separates the religious from the non-religious, the Islamic Secular simply separates that which is adjudicated on the basis of what God says, that is, sharī‘ah and its sources, from that which is not—both of these realms, however, remaining religious, that is, within the scope of the divine gaze of the God of Islam. The chapter then deals with “religion” as a construct, noting the difference between religion-as-concrete-doctrine and practice and religion-as-psycho-dynamic orientation. It argues that while these two notions of religion separated in the West, where they now compete with each other, Islam, and thus the Islamic Secular, joins them together. Finally, the chapter lays out the Islamic Secular’s understanding of “Islamic” and places this in conversation with leading theories on this topic.
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Brodie, Thomas L. "The Thesis." In The Quest For The Origin Of John ‘s Gospel. Oxford University PressNew York, NY, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195075885.003.0006.
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Abstract The fourth evangelist was a wide-ranging writer, in some ways encyclopedic, who sought to produce a new theological synthesis, and who in doing so used a diverse range of sources-some non-canonical material, the OT, at least one epistle (Ephesians), and, above all, the synoptics, especially Mark. The claim that John is an encyclopedic snythesis requires qualification. The fourth evangelist did not set out to integrate every detail and disputed question. Major events and central themes are never mentioned explicitly. The words “church” and “prayer,” for instance, never occur. And there is no reference to the Sermon on the Mount or the transfiguration. Yet it is a complete synthesis insofar as it probes the entire range of both the divine and the human-the divine plan in its full duration and depth, even from the beginning within God, and the human reality in its essential fullness from the years of facile optimism (1:1-2:22), to the time of struggling realism (2:23-chap. 6), to the final phase of seeking God even in the face of death (chaps. 7-21; see Brodie, 1992, chapter 4 of the introduction). Thus, it is a theology which is applied, a vision of God ‘s Christ-centered providence which is written in such a way that, however high-flown at one level, at another is thoroughly down-to earth, thoroughly related to the passage of human life. Here more than ever the Word becomes flesh.
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Ganson, Dorit. "Pragmatic Encroachment." In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780415249126-p079-1.
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When Pascal entreats us to ‘Wager, then, without hesitation that He is’ upon consideration of the potential gains (all) and losses (nothing) of such a wager, we recognise that he is offering a pragmatic defence of belief in God. Similarly, when Linus inquires of Lucy, ‘Why should I believe you?’ and she responds ‘I’ll give you five good reasons’ while folding each of her fingers into a fist, we understand that she is providing a decidedly practical, non-epistemic reason for Linus to believe her. While our practical interests and circumstances are potentially relevant to the practical rationality of our doxastic attitudes, it is harder to see how such concerns could bear on the distinctively epistemic evaluation of our beliefs. According to the stance of epistemic purism (also intellectualism), practical considerations cannot make a difference when it comes to whether or not an agent’s belief that p is epistemically rational, epistemically justified, or involves her knowing that p. According to the thesis of pragmatic encroachment (a term coined by Jonathan Kvanvig), the pragmatic ‘encroaches’ on the epistemic: practical considerations such as the potential costs of acting on p if p is false or the benefits of acting on p if p is true can make a genuine epistemic difference. Two subjects in different practical circumstances can differ with respect to whether they are epistemically justified in believing that p even though they are the same with respect to all truth-relevant, intellectual factors, such as the quantity and quality of their evidence for and against p, the reliability of the methods they rely on in forming their attitudes towards p, etc. Sometimes more evidence is needed to know or to be epistemically justified in believing as the stakes get higher and the odds longer. On the face of it, such a thesis seems quite counterintuitive. We are not inclined to think that a sudden loss of a comfortable fortune or conversion to a devil-may-care attitude will immediately undermine or enhance our ability to know. Knowledge is supposed to be ‘tied down’ to the truth − not the sort of thing that might come and go over time or across worlds with mere changes in practical interests and circumstances. A number of compelling considerations help to counter these misgivings.