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Journal articles on the topic 'Non zero-sum game'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 14 February 2022

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1

You, Jung S. "Random Actions in Experimental Zero-Sum Games." Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies 13, no. 1(J) (2021): 69–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.22610/jebs.v13i1(j).3150.

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A mixed strategy, a strategy of unpredictable actions, is applicable to business, politics, and sports. Playing mixed strategies, however, poses a challenge, as the game theory involves calculating probabilities and executing random actions. I test i.i.d. hypotheses of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium with the simplest experiments in which student participants play zero-sum games in multiple iterations and possibly figure out the optimal mixed strategy (equilibrium) through the games. My results confirm that most players behave differently from the Nash equilibrium prediction for the simple

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2

Fox, William P. "Teaching the applications of optimisation in game theory's zero sum and non-zero sum games." International Journal of Data Analysis Techniques and Strategies 2, no. 3 (2010): 258. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijdats.2010.034059.

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3

Geiger, Gebhard. "Is Life a Non-Zero-Sum Game?" Politics and the Life Sciences 4, no. 1 (1985): 80–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0730938400020839.

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4

GANIKHODJAEV, NASIR N., RASUL N. GANIKHODJAEV, and U. U. JAMILOV. "Quadratic stochastic operators and zero-sum game dynamics." Ergodic Theory and Dynamical Systems 35, no. 5 (2014): 1443–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/etds.2013.109.

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In this paper we consider the set of all extremal Volterra quadratic stochastic operators defined on a unit simplex $S^{4}$ and show that such operators can be reinterpreted in terms of zero-sum games. We show that an extremal Volterra operator is non-ergodic and an appropriate zero-sum game is a rock-paper-scissors game if either the Volterra operator is a uniform operator or for a non-uniform Volterra operator $V$ there exists a subset $I\subset \{1,2,3,4,5\}$ with $|I|\leq 2$ such that $\sum _{i\in I}(V^{n}\mathbf{x})_{i}\rightarrow 0,$ and the restriction of $V$ on an invariant face ${\rm\

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5

Kupriyanov, A. "India and China: the Non-Zero-Sum Game." World Economy and International Relations 64, no. 6 (2020): 133–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2020-64-6-133-141.

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6

Pun, Chi Seng, and Hoi Ying Wong. "Robust non-zero-sum stochastic differential reinsurance game." Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 68 (May 2016): 169–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.insmatheco.2016.02.007.

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7

SAIFUDDIN, AHMAD, NI KETUT TARI TASTRAWATI, and KARTIKA SARI. "PENERAPAN KONSEP TEORI PERMAINAN (GAME THEORY) DALAM PEMILIHAN STRATEGI KAMPANYE POLITIK (Studi Kasus : Strategi Pemenangan Pemilukada DKI Jakarta Tahun 201." E-Jurnal Matematika 7, no. 2 (2018): 173. http://dx.doi.org/10.24843/mtk.2018.v07.i02.p200.

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In Game Theory, generally discusses the zero sum games and non-zero sum games. Both of these studies applied in solving problems predicting the chosen decision based capabilities (pay off). In a case study of the preparation and delivery of the election in Jakarta through the application of the concept of the non-zero sum game obtained by the conclutions that AHY – SM and AB – SU has five same optimum strategies: capture East Jakarta voters, women voters, 20 -29 years old voters, graduated from high school voters, and the Javaness community. While BTP – DSH only different in maximizing strateg

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8

Medeiros, Bruno C. "Non-zero-sum game of transfusions: EOL in leukemia." Blood 132, no. 7 (2018): 676–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1182/blood-2018-06-856336.

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9

Sorin, S. "Asymptotic properties of a non-zero sum stochastic game." International Journal of Game Theory 15, no. 2 (1986): 101–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01770978.

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10

Sakaguchi, Minoru, and Vladimir V. Mazalov. "A non-zero-sum no-information best-choice game." Mathematical Methods of Operational Research 60, no. 3 (2004): 437–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001860400366.

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11

PERETS, HOVAV, and DORON SONSINO. "ON PRE-PLAY NEGOTIATIONS AND ZERO-SUM BETTING." International Game Theory Review 01, no. 02 (1999): 193–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198999000141.

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Sebenius and Geanakoplos (1983) have proven the "impossibility of zero-sum betting" in a simple non-strategic model. We study a dynamic game of incomplete information that extends the Sebenius and Geanakoplos framework, and show that the no-betting result carries over to the extended game.

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12

Ohtsubo, Yoshio. "On a discrete-time non-zero-sum Dynkin problem with monotonicity." Journal of Applied Probability 28, no. 2 (1991): 466–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3214881.

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We consider a monotone case of the non-zero-sum stopping game with discrete time parameter which is called the Dynkin problem. Marner (1987) has investigated a stopping game with general monotone reward structures, but his monotonicity is too strong to apply our problem. We establish that there exists an explicit equilibrium point in our monotone case. We also give a simple example applicable to a duopolistic exit game.

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13

Ohtsubo, Yoshio. "On a discrete-time non-zero-sum Dynkin problem with monotonicity." Journal of Applied Probability 28, no. 02 (1991): 466–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021900200039838.

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We consider a monotone case of the non-zero-sum stopping game with discrete time parameter which is called the Dynkin problem. Marner (1987) has investigated a stopping game with general monotone reward structures, but his monotonicity is too strong to apply our problem. We establish that there exists an explicit equilibrium point in our monotone case. We also give a simple example applicable to a duopolistic exit game.

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14

Balogh, Tamás László, and János Kormos. "A computational model of outguessing in two-player non-cooperative games." Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, Informatica 6, no. 1 (2014): 71–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/ausi-2014-0019.

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Abstract Several behavioral game theory models aim at explaining why “smarter“ people win more frequently in simultaneous zero-sum games, a phanomenon, which is not explained by the Nash equilibrium concept. We use a computational model and a numerical simulation based on Markov chains to describe player behavior and predict payoffs.

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15

Wang, Ning, Nan Zhang, Zhuo Jin, and Linyi Qian. "Robust non-zero-sum investment and reinsurance game with default risk." Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 84 (January 2019): 115–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.insmatheco.2018.09.009.

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16

Ferreira, M., D. Pinheiro, and S. Pinheiro. "Two-player zero-sum stochastic differential games with random horizon." Advances in Applied Probability 51, no. 4 (2019): 1209–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apr.2019.47.

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AbstractWe consider a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game with a random planning horizon and diffusive state variable dynamics. The random planning horizon is a function of a non-negative continuous random variable, which is assumed to be independent of the Brownian motion driving the state variable dynamics. We study this game using a combination of dynamic programming and viscosity solution techniques. Under some mild assumptions, we prove that the value of the game exists and is the unique viscosity solution of a certain nonlinear partial differential equation of Hamilton–Jacob

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17

Li, Yao. "A Zero-Sum Game? Repression and Protest in China." Government and Opposition 54, no. 2 (2017): 309–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2017.24.

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Most scholarship on contentious politics in authoritarian regimes focuses on severe repression and transgressive protest (e.g. revolt), suggesting a zero-sum game played by the state and challengers. However, a burgeoning literature suggests that less brutal forms of authoritarian states have emerged in recent decades and that protesters in these countries tend to limit their challenges, avoiding direct confrontation with the authorities. If so, can the notion of the zero-sum game truly capture the nuances and complexities of contentious politics in authoritarian regimes? Taking the case of Ch

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18

SHIMAMURA, JUNICHI, ŞAHIN KAYA ÖZDEMIR, FUMIAKI MORIKOSHI, and NOBUYUKI IMOTO. "QUANTUM AND CLASSICAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PLAYERS IN GAME THEORY." International Journal of Quantum Information 02, no. 01 (2004): 79–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219749904000092.

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Effects of quantum and classical correlations on game theory are studied to clarify the new aspects brought into game theory by the quantum mechanical toolbox. In this study, we compare quantum correlation represented by a maximally entangled state and classical correlation that is generated through phase damping processes on the maximally entangled state. Thus, this also sheds light on the behavior of games under the influence of noisy sources. It is observed that the quantum correlation can always resolve the dilemmas in non-zero sum games and attain the maximum sum of both players' payoffs,

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19

Lee Jaeyoung. "The Province-Managing-County Reform and the Further Popularized Decentralization: The Macro-Level Non-Zero-Sum Game and the Micro-Level Zero-Sum Game." Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies 23, no. 2 (2016): 207–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.18107/japs.2016.23.2.007.

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20

ma, P. He, and V. Vino ba. "Detection of False Node in WSN using Non Cooperative Non-Zero Sum Game Theory." International Journal of Mathematics Trends and Technology 52, no. 3 (2017): 183–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.14445/22315373/ijmtt-v52p526.

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21

Pramanta, Rio Akbar, Roihanatul Maziyah, Dela Karisma, et al. "Kemitraan Strategis Non-Zero Sum Game: Hubungan ASEAN-Australia dalam Konteks Geopolitik." Indonesian Perspective 3, no. 2 (2019): 111. http://dx.doi.org/10.14710/ip.v3i2.22347.

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ASEAN and Australia has a long history of mutual partnership. It is a strategic foreign policy for both parties. ASEAN needs to maintain its power and influence with their neighboring countries to maintain the political stability in the Southeast Asian region. On the other hand, Australia needs Southeast Asia because it serves as a strategic and crucial pivot of numerous benefits and interests for them, including but not limited to security and economics. However, ASEAN-Australia relations is not separated from the geopolitical implications. The geopolitical factors determine the strategic par

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22

Zhou, Zhongbao, Yanfei Bai, Helu Xiao, and Xu Chen. "A non-zero-sum reinsurance-investment game with delay and asymmetric information." Journal of Industrial & Management Optimization 13, no. 5 (2017): 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.3934/jimo.2020004.

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23

AKIAN, MARIANNE, STÉPHANE GAUBERT, and ALEXANDER GUTERMAN. "TROPICAL POLYHEDRA ARE EQUIVALENT TO MEAN PAYOFF GAMES." International Journal of Algebra and Computation 22, no. 01 (2012): 1250001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218196711006674.

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We show that several decision problems originating from max-plus or tropical convexity are equivalent to zero-sum two player game problems. In particular, we set up an equivalence between the external representation of tropical convex sets and zero-sum stochastic games, in which tropical polyhedra correspond to deterministic games with finite action spaces. Then, we show that the winning initial positions can be determined from the associated tropical polyhedron. We obtain as a corollary a game theoretical proof of the fact that the tropical rank of a matrix, defined as the maximal size of a s

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24

Mamer, John W. "Monotone stopping games." Journal of Applied Probability 24, no. 2 (1987): 386–401. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3214263.

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We consider the extension of optimal stopping problems to non-zero-sum strategic settings called stopping games. By imposing a monotone structure on the pay-offs of the game we establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium in non-randomized stopping times. As a corollary, we identify a class of games for which there are Nash equilibria in myopic stopping times. These games satisfy the strategic equivalent of the classical ‘monotone case' assumptions of the optimal stopping problem.

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25

Mamer, John W. "Monotone stopping games." Journal of Applied Probability 24, no. 02 (1987): 386–401. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s002190020003103x.

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We consider the extension of optimal stopping problems to non-zero-sum strategic settings called stopping games. By imposing a monotone structure on the pay-offs of the game we establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium in non-randomized stopping times. As a corollary, we identify a class of games for which there are Nash equilibria in myopic stopping times. These games satisfy the strategic equivalent of the classical ‘monotone case' assumptions of the optimal stopping problem.

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26

CHEN, Yongqiang, Yu FU, and Xiaoping WU. "Active defense strategy selection based on non-zero-sum attack-defense game model." Journal of Computer Applications 33, no. 5 (2013): 1347–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.3724/sp.j.1087.2013.01347.

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27

Wang, Jun, and Yiyi Wang. "A SPECIAL COALITION: BASED ON A TWO-PLAYER NON-ZERO-SUM DIFFERENTIAL GAME." Far East Journal of Mathematical Sciences (FJMS) 120, no. 2 (2019): 161–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.17654/ms120020161.

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28

Woo, Tae Ho. "Game theory based complex analysis for nuclear security using non-zero sum algorithm." Annals of Nuclear Energy 125 (March 2019): 12–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anucene.2018.10.041.

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29

Meng, Xiang Hong, and Xiao Li Wang. "Game Theory and Information Security." Applied Mechanics and Materials 446-447 (November 2013): 1625–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.446-447.1625.

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The interactions between attackers and network administrator are modeled as a non-zero-sum dynamic game with incomplete information. Strategies taken by offenders and defenders are dynamic game processes which are mutually dependable and constantly repeated. This paper uses game theory to analyze the model and process of offense and defense counterwork, and suggests that information security problems can be studied from game theory's point of view.

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30

Nowak, A. S., and T. E. S. Raghavan. "A finite step algorithm via a bimatrix game to a single controller non-zero sum stochastic game." Mathematical Programming 59, no. 1-3 (1993): 249–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01581246.

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31

Parilina, Elena, and Leon Petrosyan. "On a Simplified Method of Defining Characteristic Function in Stochastic Games." Mathematics 8, no. 7 (2020): 1135. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/math8071135.

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In the paper, we propose a new method of constructing cooperative stochastic game in the form of characteristic function when initially non-cooperative stochastic game is given. The set of states and the set of actions for any player is finite. The construction of the characteristic function is based on a calculation of the maximin values of zero-sum games between a coalition and its anti-coalition for each state of the game. The proposed characteristic function has some advantages in comparison with previously defined characteristic functions for stochastic games. In particular, the advantage

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32

Shen, Shigen, Haiping Ma, En Fan, et al. "A non-cooperative non-zero-sum game-based dependability assessment of heterogeneous WSNs with malware diffusion." Journal of Network and Computer Applications 91 (August 2017): 26–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jnca.2017.05.003.

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33

Nazin, A. V. "Search for a saddle point of a convex-concave stochastic game by the adaptive method of mirror descent." Transaction Kola Science Centre 11, no. 8-2020 (2020): 182–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.37614/2307-5252.2020.8.11.025.

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A stochastic game problem of 2 persons with a zero sum is considered, leading to the search for a saddle point of the game function based on the gradient approach. We study mirror descent algorithms, both adaptive and non-adaptive. The main results are proved. An illustrative example is discussed.

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34

Alsaba, Yamen, Chee Yen Leow, and Sharul Kamal Abdul Rahim. "A Zero-Sum Game Approach for Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access Systems: Legitimate Eavesdropper Case." IEEE Access 6 (2018): 58764–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/access.2018.2874215.

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35

Helil, Nurmamat, Azhar Halik, and Kaysar Rahman. "Non-zero-sum cooperative access control game model with user trust and permission risk." Applied Mathematics and Computation 307 (August 2017): 299–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2017.03.006.

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36

Zhao, Chenyu, Qing Wang, Xiaofeng Liu, Chun Li, and Lidong Shi. "Reinforcement learning based a non-zero-sum game for secure transmission against smart jamming." Digital Signal Processing 112 (May 2021): 103002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dsp.2021.103002.

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37

Raghavan, T. E. S. "Legal Disputes Resolved via Game Theoretic Methods." International Game Theory Review 17, no. 02 (2015): 1540015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198915400150.

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Mathematical foundations of conflict resolutions are deeply rooted in the theory of cooperative and non-cooperative games. While many elementary models of conflicts are formalized, one often raises the question whether game theory and its mathematically developed tools are applicable to actual legal disputes in practice. We choose an example from union management conflict on hourly wage dispute and how zero sum two person game theory can be used by a judge to bring about the need for realistic compromises between the two parties. We choose another example from the 2000-year old Babylonian Talm

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38

Zhang, Yi-xuan, Jing-sha He, and Ruo-hong Liu. "An Access Control Model for Mobile Networks based on the Non-zero-sum Game Theory." International Journal of u- and e-Service, Science and Technology 8, no. 4 (2015): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.14257/ijunesst.2015.8.4.01.

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39

Yang, Ni, Jiang-Wen Xiao, Li Xiao, and Yan-Wu Wang. "Non-zero sum differential graphical game: cluster synchronisation for multi-agents with partially unknown dynamics." International Journal of Control 92, no. 10 (2018): 2408–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00207179.2018.1441550.

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40

Odekunle, Adedapo, Weinan Gao, Masoud Davari, and Zhong-Ping Jiang. "Reinforcement learning and non-zero-sum game output regulation for multi-player linear uncertain systems." Automatica 112 (February 2020): 108672. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.automatica.2019.108672.

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41

Wang, Guangchen, and Zhiyong Yu. "A partial information non-zero sum differential game of backward stochastic differential equations with applications." Automatica 48, no. 2 (2012): 342–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.automatica.2011.11.010.

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42

Perevozchikov, A. G. "Arrow ? hurwitz method for approximate computation of equilibria in ann-person non-zero-sum game." Computational Mathematics and Modeling 5, no. 4 (1994): 308–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01130316.

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43

Li, Min, and Zhen Wu. "Linear-quadratic non-zero sum differential game for mean-field stochastic systems with asymmetric information." Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications 504, no. 1 (2021): 125315. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmaa.2021.125315.

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44

Khan, Faisal Shah, and Simon J. D. Phoenix. "Gaming the quantum." Quantum Information and Computation 13, no. 3&4 (2013): 231–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.26421/qic13.3-4-5.

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In the time since the merger of quantum mechanics and game theory was proposed formally in 1999, the two distinct perspectives apparent in this merger of applying quantum mechanics to game theory, referred to henceforth as the theory of ``quantized games'', and of applying game theory to quantum mechanics, referred to henceforth as ``gaming the quantum'', have become synonymous under the single ill-defined term ``quantum game''. Here, these two perspectives are delineated and a game-theoretically proper description of what makes a multiplayer, non-cooperative game quantum mechanical, is given.

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45

Sandomirskaia, Marina. "Repeated Bidding Games with Incomplete Information and Bounded Values: On the Exponential Speed of Convergence." International Game Theory Review 19, no. 01 (2017): 1650017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198916500171.

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We consider the repeated zero-sum bidding game with incomplete information on one side with non-normalized total payoff. De Meyer and Marino [(2005) Continuous versus discrete market game, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 1535] and Domansky and Kreps [(2005) Repeated games with asymmetric information and random price fluctuations at finance markets, Proc. Appl. Ind. Math. 12(4), 950–952 (in Russian)] investigated a game [Formula: see text] modeling multistage bidding with asymmetrically informed agents and proved that for this game [Formula: see text] converges to a finite limit [Formula: se

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46

Horák, Karel, and Branislav Bošanský. "Solving Partially Observable Stochastic Games with Public Observations." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 33 (July 17, 2019): 2029–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33012029.

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In many real-world problems, there is a dynamic interaction between competitive agents. Partially observable stochastic games (POSGs) are among the most general formal models that capture such dynamic scenarios. The model captures stochastic events, partial information of players about the environment, and the scenario does not have a fixed horizon. Solving POSGs in the most general setting is intractable.Therefore, the research has been focused on subclasses of POSGs that have a value of the game and admit designing (approximate) optimal algorithms. We propose such a subclass for two-player z

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47

Abdalzaher, Mohamed S., Lotfy Samy, and Osamu Muta. "Non-zero-sum game-based trust model to enhance wireless sensor networks security for IoT applications." IET Wireless Sensor Systems 9, no. 4 (2019): 218–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/iet-wss.2018.5114.

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48

Tseng, Fan Hsun, Hsin Hung Cho, Li Der Chou, Timothy K. Shih, and Han Chieh Chao. "An efficient power conservation scheme in non-zero-sum duty-cycle game for wireless sensor networks." International Journal of Sensor Networks 21, no. 4 (2016): 242. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijsnet.2016.079174.

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49

Zhu, Jiaqi, Guohui Guan, and Shenghong Li. "Time-consistent non-zero-sum stochastic differential reinsurance and investment game under default and volatility risks." Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics 374 (August 2020): 112737. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cam.2020.112737.

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50

Chen, Shumin, Hailiang Yang, and Yan Zeng. "STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES BETWEEN TWO INSURERS WITH GENERALIZED MEAN-VARIANCE PREMIUM PRINCIPLE." ASTIN Bulletin 48, no. 1 (2018): 413–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/asb.2017.35.

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AbstractWe study a stochastic differential game problem between two insurers, who invest in a financial market and adopt reinsurance to manage their claim risks. Supposing that their reinsurance premium rates are calculated according to the generalized mean-variance principle, we consider the competition between the two insurers as a non-zero sum stochastic differential game. Using dynamic programming technique, we derive a system of coupled Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equations and show the existence of equilibrium strategies. For an exponential utility maximizing game and a probability maximizin

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