Relevant bibliographies by topics / Nonconceptual content

Contents

  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters

Academic literature on the topic 'Nonconceptual content'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 27 April 2022

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the lists of relevant articles, books, theses, conference reports, and other scholarly sources on the topic 'Nonconceptual content.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Journal articles on the topic "Nonconceptual content"

1

Toribio, Josefa. "Nonconceptual Content." Philosophy Compass 2, no. 3 (May 2007): 445–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00075.x.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Peacocke, Christopher, and John McDowell. "Nonconceptual Content Defended." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58, no. 2 (June 1998): 381. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2653518.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Laurier, Daniel. "Nonconceptual Contents vs Nonconceptual States." Grazer Philosophische Studien 68, no. 1 (January 1, 2005): 23–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-068001002.

Full text
Abstract:
The question to be discussed is whether the distinction between the conceptual and the nonconceptual is best understood as pertaining primarily to intentional contents or to intentional states or attitudes. Some authors have suggested that it must be understood in the second way, in order to make the claim that experiences are nonconceptual compatible with the idea that one can also believe what one experiences. I argue that there is no need to do so, and that a conceptual content can be understood as being simply one which is composed of concepts, without compromising this intuitive view of the relation between beliefs and experiences.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Hanna, Robert. "Kant and Nonconceptual Content." European Journal of Philosophy 13, no. 2 (August 2005): 247–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0966-8373.2005.00229.x.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

PEACOCKE, CHRISTOPHER. "Phenomenology and Nonconceptual Content." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62, no. 3 (May 2001): 609–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00077.x.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Levine, Steven. "Sellars and Nonconceptual Content." European Journal of Philosophy 24, no. 4 (January 15, 2016): 855–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12127.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Sedivy, Sonia. "Must Conceptually Informed Perceptual Experience Involve Non-Conceptual Content?" Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26, no. 3 (September 1996): 413–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1996.10717460.

Full text
Abstract:
The idea of nonconceptual contents proposes that there are mental contents at the level of the experiencing person that are individuated independently of ‘anything to do with the mind.’ Such contents are posited to meet a variety of theoretical and explanatory needs concerning concepts and conceptual mental contents which are individuated in terms having to do with the mind. So to examine the idea of nonconceptual content we need to examine whether we really need to posit such content and whether there is a coherent, viable way of doing so. I will examine the idea of nonconceptual contents by considering Christopher Peacocke's attempt, in his Study of Concepts, to posit such contents.Three principal kinds of considerations motivate positing non-conceptual content: epistemological, phenomenological, and explanatory-psychological. A theory of knowledge might posit nonconceptual content in order to show that our experience contains the justificatory base for empirical thought as its own proper part. Non-conceptual content might also be posited in order to account for the finely detailed or determinate phenomenological character of perceptual experience.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Brinck, Ingar. "Nonconceptual content and the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22, no. 5 (October 1999): 760–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x99282180.

Full text
Abstract:
The notion of nonconceptual content in Dienes & Perner's theory is examined. A subject may be in a state with nonconceptual content without having the concepts that would be used to describe the state. Nonconceptual content does not seem to be a clear-cut case of either implicit or explicit knowledge. It underlies a kind of practical knowledge, which is not reducible to procedural knowledge, but is accessible to the subject and under voluntary control.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Inkpin, Andrew. "The Nonconceptual Content of Paintings." Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics 48, no. 1 (May 15, 2011): 29. http://dx.doi.org/10.33134/eeja.75.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Stalnaker, Robert. "What Might Nonconceptual Content Be?" Philosophical Issues 9 (1998): 339. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1522983.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
More sources

Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Nonconceptual content"

1

Crowther, Thomas Michael. "Reflecting on experience : nonconceptual content in the theory of perception." Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.251956.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Arikan, Sandikcioglu Pakize. "Perception With And Without Concepts: Searching For A Nonconceptualist Account Of Perception." Phd thesis, METU, 2013. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12615614/index.pdf.

Full text
Abstract:
It is agreed upon by many philosophers that perception represents the world to be in a certain way. However, there is disagreement among those philosophers about whether perceptual content is conceptual or not. The aim of this thesis is to provide a clear presentation of the debate and to propose an account of nonconceptual perceptual content that can tackle many philosophical problems related to the issue. Conceptualism about perceptual content is the view that perceptual content is wholly conceptual. Proponents of this view claim that a subject cannot be in a contentful perceptual state without possessing concepts that fully characterize the content of his experience. The main motivation behind conceptualism is the justificatory role perception is supposed to play in forming perceptual beliefs. It is claimed that if perceptual content provides rational ground or reason for forming perceptual beliefs, it has to be conceptual just like the belief it is a reason for. However, there are several philosophical problems that arise from such an understanding of perceptual content. Most of them mainly derive from the implausibility of the claim that a subject needs to possess every concept that figures in the characterization of the content of his perceptual state. So, nonconceptualism is based on the assumption that a contentful perceptual state can occur albeit the absence of all or some concepts that characterize the content. Therefore, in this thesis I aim to provide a notion of nonconceptual perceptual content that is epistemically relevant, i.e. that can ground perceptual beliefs in spite of its nonconceptual character.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Cano, Stefan John. "Development and validation of patient-based measures of outcome in plastic surgery : nonconceptual content in the theory of perception." Thesis, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (University of London), 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.251958.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Lobo, Carla Nogueira. "O problema da gênese da autoconsciência." Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, 2010. http://www.bdtd.uerj.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=1614.

Full text
Abstract:
Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior
São duas as motivações centrais para a suposição da existência de formas não-conceituais, primitivas de autoconsciência. No campo da pesquisa psicológica, a existência de uma forma não-conceitual autoconsciência emerge como uma consequência natural da rejeição da visão tradicional de Piaget e de Freud da primeira infância como um ambiente Indiferenciado do Eu/não-Eu; enquanto no campo da atividade filosófica tal suposição se sustenta como uma possível solução para o suposto problema da circularidade/regresso na estrutura da auto-referência reflexiva. Esta tese pretente submeter essa suposição amplamente difundida a um extenso escrutínio. A primeira parte do trabalho destina-se a uma avaliação filosófica da própria ideia de uma forma primitiva, não-conceitual de autoconsciência. A crítica geral aqui pode ser formulada nos seguintes termos: as alegadas formas primitivas não-conceituais de autoconsciência não satisfazem absolutamente as duas condições - amplamente aceitas acerca da autoconsciência. A primeira estabelece que a característica semântica comum a qualquer forma de autoconsciência (independentemente de sua complexidade) é a auto-referência consciente. A segunda estabelece que a característica semântica das formas mais básicas de autoconsciência é a chamada imunidade ao erro por identificação. A segunda parte da tese está consagrada à avaliação dos resultados empíricos da nova abordagem psicológica de autoconsciência. A crítica geral assume a seguinte forma: guiado pelo termo ambíguo "self" ou "selfhood", psicólogos contemporâneos incorrem em um non-sequitur ao tentar inferir formas primitivas de autoconsciência da simples existência de um sujeito na primeira infância. Baseado no princípio da melhor explicação, mostraremos que as alegadas formas primitivas de autoconsciência são melhor compreendidas como estágios de desenvolvimento cognitivo do sujeito. Em suma, a idéia de uma forma primitiva, não-conceitual de autoconsciência não passa de um equívoco
The postulation of non-conceptual, primitive forms of self-consciousness has two main motivations. In the field of the psychological empirical research, the existence of a non-conceptual self-awareness seems to be the natural consequence of the rejection of Piagets and Freuds traditional view of the early infancy as a self/non-self undifferentiated environment, and in the field of philosophical activity such postulation seems to be the solution to the alleged circle/regress in the structure of reflexive self-reference. The present thesis is an assessment of this widespread claim. The first part of the work is addressed to a philosophical assessment of the very idea of a primitive, non-conceptual form of self-consciousness. The general criticism takes the following form: the alleged primitive, non-conceptual forms of self-consciousness fail completely to meet the two widely accepted constraints on any reasonable account of self-consciousness. The first constraint states that the distinctive semantic feature of any form of self-consciousness (irrespective of its complexity) is the knowingly self-reference, while the second states that the distinctive semantic feature of the most basic forms of self-consciousness is the so-called immunity to error through misidentification. The second part of the thesis is devoted to the assessment of the empirical findings of the new psychological approach to self-consciousness. The general criticism takes here the following form: guided by the ambiguous term self or selfhood, and of ambiguous phrases like sense of self or self-notion, contemporary psychologists incur into a non-sequitur: they attempt to infer the existence of primitive forms of self-consciousness from the simple existence of a subject in the early infancy. Based on the principle to the best inference, I show that the alleged primitive forms of self-consciousness are better understood as different stages of cognitive development of the subject. The upshot is that the very idea of a primitive, non-conceptual self-conscious is a serious misunderstanding
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

劉時寧. "Does percetual experience have a nonconceptual content?" Thesis, 2003. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/65390285838424402116.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Books on the topic "Nonconceptual content"

1

Thinking about oneself: From nonconceptual content to the concept of a self. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2015.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Wright, Wayne. Nonconceptual Content. Oxford University Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.013.003.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Gunther, York H. Essays on Nonconceptual Content. The MIT Press, 2003.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Gunther, York. Essays on Nonconceptual Content. MIT Press, 2003.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Kant And Nonconceptual Content. Routledge, 2013.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

H, Gunther York, ed. Essays on nonconceptual content. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2003.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Gunther, York. Essays on Nonconceptual Content. MIT Press, 2003.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Gunther, York H. Essays on Nonconceptual Content. The MIT Press, 2003.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Gunther, York, ed. Essays on Nonconceptual Content. The MIT Press, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/2827.001.0001.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

The structure of nonconceptual content. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications, 2007.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
More sources

Book chapters on the topic "Nonconceptual content"

1

Schmidt, Eva. "Nonconceptual Content." In Modest Nonconceptualism, 31–72. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-18902-4_3.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Cahen, Arnon. "Concepts and Nonconceptual Content." In Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience, 214–28. New York: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003241898-16.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Onof, Christian. "Is There Room for Nonconceptual Content in Kant’s Critical Philosophy?" In Kantian Nonconceptualism, 199–226. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-53517-7_9.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

"Nonconceptual Content." In Essays on Nonconceptual Content. The MIT Press, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/2827.003.0013.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

"Nonconceptual Content." In Thinking about Oneself. The MIT Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/10282.003.0004.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Musholt, Kristina. "Nonconceptual Content." In Thinking about Oneself, 25–44. The MIT Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262029209.003.0002.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

"Nonconceptual Content (1994)." In Essays on Nonconceptual Content. The MIT Press, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/2827.003.0007.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

"Content, Conceptual Content, and Nonconceptual Content (1990)." In Essays on Nonconceptual Content. The MIT Press, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/2827.003.0011.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

"General Introduction." In Essays on Nonconceptual Content. The MIT Press, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/2827.003.0003.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

"Sensation and Perception (1981)." In Essays on Nonconceptual Content. The MIT Press, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/2827.003.0005.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
You might also be interested in the extended bibliographies on the topic 'Nonconceptual content' for particular source types:
Journal articles Books
We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!

To the bibliography