Log in

Relevant bibliographies by topics / Nonconceptual content / Books

To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Nonconceptual content.

Books on the topic 'Nonconceptual content'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 27 April 2022

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the top 18 books for your research on the topic 'Nonconceptual content.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Browse books on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.

1

Thinking about oneself: From nonconceptual content to the concept of a self. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2015.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Wright, Wayne. Nonconceptual Content. Oxford University Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.013.003.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

Gunther, York H. Essays on Nonconceptual Content. The MIT Press, 2003.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Gunther, York. Essays on Nonconceptual Content. MIT Press, 2003.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

Kant And Nonconceptual Content. Routledge, 2013.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

6

H, Gunther York, ed. Essays on nonconceptual content. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2003.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

7

Gunther, York. Essays on Nonconceptual Content. MIT Press, 2003.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

8

Gunther, York H. Essays on Nonconceptual Content. The MIT Press, 2003.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

9

Gunther, York, ed. Essays on Nonconceptual Content. The MIT Press, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/2827.001.0001.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

10

The structure of nonconceptual content. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications, 2007.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

11

Bermúdez, José Luis. The Distinction Between Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content. Oxford University Press, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0028.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

12

(Editor), Christine van Geen, and Frederique de Vignemont (Editor), eds. European Review of Philosophy, 6: The Structure of Nonconceptual Content. Center for the Study of Language and Inf, 2006.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

13

Maloney, J. Christopher. Intentionalism and Troubling Peculiar Perceptual Content. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190854751.003.0004.

Full text

Abstract:

Defending intentionalism, some argue that perceptual content is idiosyncratically nonconceptual: conceptually innocent; defiant of verbalization; or too richly fine-grained for subsumption under concepts carrying ratiocination. No: perception is conceptual in a manner that fits the cognitive capacities of perceivers generally. If perception is subservient to attention, a speaker's perceptual content admits of relatively simple reports implying rudimentary conceptualization. Perception's content is neither too rich nor fine-grained for expression or conceptualization. Intentionalism's temptation towards the contrary be may be urged by memory’s misguided tendency towards constructive confabulation. So, perceptual content may be neither so rich, dense, nor determinate as post-perceptual consideration and testimony may suggest. Finally, Sperling’s early important empirical work on perceptual memory cuts against intentionalism's conjecture of perception's nonconceptual content. Sperling discovered that perceptual memory can completely rehearse its recollected content. Accordingly, but contrary to intentionalism, memory might echo perception's content yet shed its phenomenal character.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

14

Musholt, Kristina. Thinking about Oneself: From Nonconceptual Content to the Concept of a Self. MIT Press, 2015.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

15

Musholt, Kristina. Thinking about Oneself: From Nonconceptual Content to the Concept of a Self. MIT Press, 2015.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

16

Musholt, Kristina. Thinking about Oneself: From Nonconceptual Content to the Concept of a Self. MIT Press, 2015.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

17

Laurence, Stephen, and Eric Margolis. The Scope of the Conceptual. Edited by Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels, and Stephen P. Stich. Oxford University Press, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195309799.013.0013.

Full text

Abstract:

This article explains different views on concepts, which are among the most fundamental constructs in cognitive science. Michael Dummett argues that nonhuman animals are not capable of full-fledged conceptual thought but only a diminished form of thought, which he calls, proto-thought. Human beings can remove themselves from the moment and can rise above the confined world of current perceptions because of their linguistic abilities. Donald Davidson, a contemporary philosopher, denies that animals are capable of conceptual thought and claim that conceptual content requires a rich inferential network. Donald Davidson made an argument against animals having conceptual thought. Davidson's original formulation of the argument begins with the claim that having a belief requires having the concept of a belief but adds that having the concept of belief requires possession of a natural language. It follows, then, that to have a belief requires facility with natural language. The characterization of the conceptual/nonconceptual distinction that is implicit in Davidson's metacognitive argument is a complex one involving a capacity for belief about beliefs, a concept of belief, and concepts of truth and falsity. Both Robert Brandom and John McDowell argued that conceptual thought requires more than a capacity for detection. They claim that conceptual thought requires the ability to appreciate the reasons that would justify a given concept's application and use, and this, in turn, is inherently a social practice that is dependent on natural language

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

18

Carruthers, Peter. Human and Animal Minds. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198843702.001.0001.

Full text

Abstract:

The book offers solutions to two related puzzles. One is about the place of phenomenal—or felt—consciousness in the natural order. Consciousness is shown to comprise fine-grained nonconceptual contents that are “globally broadcast” to a wide range of cognitive systems for reasoning, decision making, and verbal report. Moreover, the so-called “hard” problem of consciousness results merely from the distinctive first-person concepts we can use when thinking about such contents. No special non-physical properties—no qualia—need to be introduced. The second puzzle concerns the distribution of phenomenal consciousness across the animal kingdom. Here the book shows that there is, in fact, no fact of the matter. This is because thinking about phenomenal consciousness in other creatures requires us to project our first-person concepts into the mind of another; but such projections fail to result in determinate truth-conditions when the mind of the other is significantly unlike our own. This upshot, however, doesn’t matter. It doesn’t matter for science, because no additional property enters the world as one transitions from creatures that are definitely incapable of phenomenal consciousness to those that definitely are (namely, ourselves). And on many views it doesn’t matter for ethics, either, since concern for animals can be grounded in sympathy, which requires only third-person understanding of the desires and emotions of the animal in question, rather than in first-person empathy

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!