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Journal articles on the topic 'Nonconceptual content'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 27 April 2022

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1

Toribio, Josefa. "Nonconceptual Content." Philosophy Compass 2, no. 3 (May 2007): 445–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00075.x.

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2

Peacocke, Christopher, and John McDowell. "Nonconceptual Content Defended." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58, no. 2 (June 1998): 381. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2653518.

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3

Laurier, Daniel. "Nonconceptual Contents vs Nonconceptual States." Grazer Philosophische Studien 68, no. 1 (January 1, 2005): 23–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-068001002.

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The question to be discussed is whether the distinction between the conceptual and the nonconceptual is best understood as pertaining primarily to intentional contents or to intentional states or attitudes. Some authors have suggested that it must be understood in the second way, in order to make the claim that experiences are nonconceptual compatible with the idea that one can also believe what one experiences. I argue that there is no need to do so, and that a conceptual content can be understood as being simply one which is composed of concepts, without compromising this intuitive view of the relation between beliefs and experiences.
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4

Hanna, Robert. "Kant and Nonconceptual Content." European Journal of Philosophy 13, no. 2 (August 2005): 247–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0966-8373.2005.00229.x.

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5

PEACOCKE, CHRISTOPHER. "Phenomenology and Nonconceptual Content." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62, no. 3 (May 2001): 609–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00077.x.

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6

Levine, Steven. "Sellars and Nonconceptual Content." European Journal of Philosophy 24, no. 4 (January 15, 2016): 855–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12127.

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7

Sedivy, Sonia. "Must Conceptually Informed Perceptual Experience Involve Non-Conceptual Content?" Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26, no. 3 (September 1996): 413–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1996.10717460.

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The idea of nonconceptual contents proposes that there are mental contents at the level of the experiencing person that are individuated independently of ‘anything to do with the mind.’ Such contents are posited to meet a variety of theoretical and explanatory needs concerning concepts and conceptual mental contents which are individuated in terms having to do with the mind. So to examine the idea of nonconceptual content we need to examine whether we really need to posit such content and whether there is a coherent, viable way of doing so. I will examine the idea of nonconceptual contents by considering Christopher Peacocke's attempt, in his Study of Concepts, to posit such contents.Three principal kinds of considerations motivate positing non-conceptual content: epistemological, phenomenological, and explanatory-psychological. A theory of knowledge might posit nonconceptual content in order to show that our experience contains the justificatory base for empirical thought as its own proper part. Non-conceptual content might also be posited in order to account for the finely detailed or determinate phenomenological character of perceptual experience.
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8

Brinck, Ingar. "Nonconceptual content and the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22, no. 5 (October 1999): 760–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x99282180.

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The notion of nonconceptual content in Dienes & Perner's theory is examined. A subject may be in a state with nonconceptual content without having the concepts that would be used to describe the state. Nonconceptual content does not seem to be a clear-cut case of either implicit or explicit knowledge. It underlies a kind of practical knowledge, which is not reducible to procedural knowledge, but is accessible to the subject and under voluntary control.
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9

Inkpin, Andrew. "The Nonconceptual Content of Paintings." Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics 48, no. 1 (May 15, 2011): 29. http://dx.doi.org/10.33134/eeja.75.

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10

Stalnaker, Robert. "What Might Nonconceptual Content Be?" Philosophical Issues 9 (1998): 339. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1522983.

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11

Musholt, Kristina. "Self-consciousness and nonconceptual content." Philosophical Studies 163, no. 3 (December 1, 2011): 649–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9837-8.

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12

Peacocke, Christopher. "Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content?" Journal of Philosophy 98, no. 5 (May 2001): 239. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2678383.

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13

Bermúdez, José Luis. "Cognitive impenetrability, phenomenology, and nonconceptual content." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22, no. 3 (June 1999): 367–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x99232025.

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This commentary discusses Pylyshyn's model of perceptual processing in the light of the philosophical distinction between the conceptual and the nonconceptual content of perception. Pylyshyn's processing distinction maps onto an important distinction in the phenomenology of visual perception.
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14

ROSKIES, ADINA L. "A New Argument for Nonconceptual Content." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76, no. 3 (May 2008): 633–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00160.x.

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15

Raftopoulos, Athanassios. "Cognitive Penetration Lite and Nonconceptual Content." Erkenntnis 82, no. 5 (December 16, 2016): 1097–122. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-016-9861-3.

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16

Wright, Wayne. "McDowell, demonstrative concepts, and nonconceptual representational content." Disputatio 1, no. 14 (May 1, 2003): 38–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2003-0003.

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17

Jr., Richard G. Heck. "Nonconceptual Content and the "Space of Reasons"." Philosophical Review 109, no. 4 (October 2000): 483. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2693622.

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18

Heck, R. G. "Nonconceptual Content and the "Space of Reasons"." Philosophical Review 109, no. 4 (October 1, 2000): 483–523. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-4-483.

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19

Burstein, Matthew. "Epistemological Behaviorism, Nonconceptual Content, and the Given." Contemporary Pragmatism 7, no. 1 (April 21, 2010): 165–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-90000161.

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20

Heidemann, Dietmar H. "Introduction: Kant and Nonconceptual Content – Preliminary Remarks." International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19, no. 3 (July 2011): 319–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2011.595186.

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21

Speaks, J. "Is There a Problem about Nonconceptual Content?" Philosophical Review 114, no. 3 (July 1, 2005): 359–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-114-3-359.

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22

Chadha, Monima. "An independent, empirical route to nonconceptual content." Consciousness and Cognition 18, no. 2 (June 2009): 439–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2009.02.008.

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23

Pacherie, Elisabeth. "Nonconceptual Representations for Action and the Limits of Intentional Control." Social Psychology 42, no. 1 (January 2011): 67–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335/a000044.

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In this paper I argue that, to make intentional actions fully intelligible, we need to posit representations of action the content of which is nonconceptual. I further argue that an analysis of the properties of these nonconceptual representations, and of their relationships to action representations at higher levels, sheds light on the limits of intentional control. On the one hand, the capacity to form nonconceptual representations of goal-directed movements underscores the capacity to acquire executable concepts of these movements, thus allowing them to come under intentional control. On the other hand, the degree of autonomy these nonconceptual representations enjoy, and the specific temporal constraints stemming from their role in motor control, set limits on intentional control over action execution.
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24

Gomez-Torrente, Mario. "Report of an Unsuccessful Search for Nonconceptual Content." Philosophical Issues 9 (1998): 369. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1522986.

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25

Raftopoulos, Athanassios. "Can nonconceptual content be stored in visual memory?" Philosophical Psychology 23, no. 5 (October 2010): 639–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2010.514571.

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26

CUSSINS, ADRIAN. "Nonconceptual Content and the Elimination of Misconceived Composites!" Mind & Language 8, no. 2 (June 1993): 234–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1993.tb00283.x.

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27

Ponomarev, A. I. "Tye’s Theory of the Unconceptual Content of the Perceptual Mental States." Discourse 5, no. 4 (October 29, 2019): 18–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.32603/2412-8562-2019-5-4-18-25.

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Introduction. In modern philosophy of perception, the issue of the content of perceptual mental states is actively discussed, in particular the possibility of nonconceptual content is one of the most significant problem. Usually conceptual activity is attributed to thinking, and perception is intended to be non-conceptual. Such an approach may deprive perception of opportunity to serve as a basis for judgment. The paper analyzes Tye’s theory of non-conceptual content of perceptual mental states, which does not deprive the perception of its epistemological function.Methodology and sources. Methodologically, the research work is based on philosophical analysis of modern theories of perception and results of cognitive research.Results and discussion. In accepted terminology, the content of perceptual mental states can be of three types: conceptual, non-conceptual detailed (fine-grained) and nonconceptual coarse (coarse-grained). Tye's position is that perceptual mental states have only the third kind of content. This approach faces a number of objections that are presented in this paper. The analysis of objections shows their surmount ability, thus, it can be concluded that the Tye’s position of nonconceptual content can be considered as reasonable. The main result of the presented research is the presentation of additional grounds for the theory of non-conceptual content of perceptual mental states.Conclusion. The problem of the content of perceptual mental states is crucial for understanding the epistemological role of perception. The theory of non-conceptual content of perceptual mental states provides new insights into perception.
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28

BERMÚDEZ, JOSÉ LUIS. "Peacocke's Argument Against the Autonomy of Nonconceptual Representational Content." Mind & Language 9, no. 4 (December 1994): 402–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1994.tb00315.x.

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29

BERMÚDEZ, JOSÉ LUIS. "Nonconceptual Content: From Perceptual Experience to Subpersonal Computational States." Mind & Language 10, no. 4 (December 1995): 333–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00019.x.

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30

Cahen, Arnon, and Kristina Musholt. "Perception, nonconceptual content, and immunity to error through misidentification." Inquiry 60, no. 7 (February 5, 2016): 703–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2015.1122548.

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31

Youngjin Kiem. "Crane and Heck on Nonconceptual Content : A Critical Exposition." PHILOSOPHY·THOUGHT·CULTURE ll, no. 9 (January 2010): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.33639/ptc.2010..9.001.

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32

Forgione, Luca. "Kant on the Reflecting Power of Judgment and Nonconceptual Content." Philosophical Inquiry 41, no. 4 (2017): 35–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philinquiry201741422.

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33

Bermúdez, José Luis. "WHAT IS AT STAKE IN THE DEBATE ON NONCONCEPTUAL CONTENT?" Philosophical Perspectives 21, no. 1 (December 6, 2007): 55–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00120.x.

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34

Humphreys, Paul. "Network Epistemology." Episteme 6, no. 2 (June 2009): 221–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/e1742360009000653.

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ABSTRACTA comparison is made between some epistemological issues arising in computer networks and standard features of social epistemology. A definition of knowledge for computational devices is provided and the topics of nonconceptual content and testimony are discussed.
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35

Toribio, Josefa. "Opacity, Know-How States, and their Content." Disputatio 7, no. 40 (May 1, 2015): 61–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2015-0004.

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Abstract The main goal of this paper is to defend the thesis that the content of know-how states is an accuracy assessable type of nonconceptual content. My argument proceeds in two stages. I argue, first, that the intellectualist distinction between types of ways of grasping the same kind of content is uninformative unless it is tied in with a distinction between kinds of contents. Second, I consider and reject the objection that, if the content of know-how states is non-conceptual, it will be mysterious why attributions of knowing how create opaque contexts. I show that the objection conflates two distinct issues: the nature of the content of know-how states and the semantic evaluability of know-how ascriptions.
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36

Hurley, S. L. "Perspective, reflection, transparent explanation, and other minds." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18, no. 4 (December 1995): 684–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00040498.

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AbstractPerspective and reflection (whether involving conceptual or nonconceptual content) have each been considered in some way basic to phenomenal consciousness. Each has possible evolutionary value, though neither seems sufficient for consciousness. Consider an account of consciousness in terms of the combination of perspective and reflection, its relationship to the problem of other minds, and its capacity to inherit evolutionary explanation from its components.
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37

Rodríguez, Sebastián Sanhueza. "Nonconceptualism and content independence." Trans/Form/Ação 44, no. 2 (June 2021): 325–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2021.v44n2.22.p325.

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Abstract: State Nonconceptualism is the view that perceptual states (not perceptual content) are different in kind from cognitive states (not cognitive content), insofar as a subject could be in perceptual states even if she lacked the concepts necessary to describe those states. Although this position has recently met serious criticism, this piece aims to argue on its behalf. A point I specifically want to highlight is that, thanks to State Nonconceptualism, it is possible to characterize perceptual experiences as nonconceptual or concept-independent without relying on the notion of perceptual content - a feature I term here the content independence of State Nonconceptualism. I think one should welcome this result: for, although a nonconceptualist characterization of perceptual experience is quite plausible, nonrepresentationalist approaches to perception have persuasively challenged the thought that perceptual experiences have representational content. This brief piece is divided into three parts: (i) I introduce two versions of Perceptual Nonconceptualism, namely, Content and State Nonconceptualism; (ii) I go on to stress State Nonconceptualism’s content independence; and (iii), I briefly address three prominent objections against the state nonconceptualist.
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38

Raftopoulos, Athanassios. "Nonconceptual content: A reply to Toribio's “Nonconceptualism and the cognitive impenetrability of early vision”." Philosophical Psychology 27, no. 5 (July 10, 2014): 643–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2014.926441.

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39

Raftopoulos, Athanassios. "The cognitive impenetrability of the content of early vision is a necessary and sufficient condition for purely nonconceptual content." Philosophical Psychology 27, no. 5 (January 16, 2013): 601–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2012.729486.

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40

Musholt, Kristina. "From Non-Self-Representationalism to the Social Structure of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness." ProtoSociology 36 (2019): 243–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/protosociology2019369.

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Why should we think that there is such a thing as pre-reflective self-awareness? And how is this kind of self-awareness to be characterized? This paper traces a theoretical and a phenomenological line of argument in favor of the notion of pre-reflective self-consciousness and explores how this notion can be further illuminated by appealing to recent work in the analytical philosophy of language and mind. In particular, it argues that the self is not represented in the (nonconceptual) content of experience, but is rather implicit in the mode. Further, it argues that pre-reflective self-consciousness is best understood as a form of knowledge-how. Finally, it will be argued that our sense of self is thoroughly social, even at the basic, pre-reflective level.
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41

Coates, Paul. "Wilfrid Sellars, Perceptual Consciousness and Theories of Attention." Essays in Philosophy 5, no. 1 (2004): 12–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eip20045111.

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The problem of the richness of visual experience is that of finding principled grounds for claims about how much of the world a person actually sees at any given moment. It is argued that there are suggestive parallels between the two-component analysis of experience defended by Wilfrid Sellars, and certain recently advanced information processing accounts of visual perception. Sellars' later account of experience is examined in detail, and it is argued that there are good reasons in support of the claim that the sensory nonconceptual content of experience can vary independently of conceptual awareness. It is argued that the Sellarsian analysis is not undermined by recent work on change blindness and related phenomena; a model of visual experience developed by Ronald Rensink is shown to be in essential harmony with the framework provided by Sellars, and provides a satisfactory answer to the problem of the richness of visual experience.
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42

Perner, Josef, and Zoltan Dienes. "Deconstructing RTK: How to explicate a theory of implicit knowledge." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22, no. 5 (October 1999): 790–801. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x99612183.

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In this response, we start from first principles, building up our theory to show more precisely what assumptions we do and do not make about the representational nature of implicit and explicit knowledge (in contrast to the target article, where we started our exposition with a description of a fully fledged representational theory of knowledge (RTK). Along the way, we indicate how our analysis does not rely on linguistic representations but it implies that implicit knowledge is causally efficacious; we discuss the relationship between property structure implicitness and conceptual and nonconceptual content; then we consider the factual, fictional, and functional uses of representations and how we go from there to consciousness. Having shown how the basic theory deals with foundational criticisms, we indicate how the theory can elucidate issues that commentators raised in the particular application areas of explicitation, voluntary control, visual perception, memory, development (with discussion on infancy, theory of mind [TOM] and executive control, gestures), and finally models of learning.
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43

VOGT, Lars M. "Signs and terminology: Science caught between language and perception." Bionomina 4, no. 1 (December 21, 2011): 1–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.11646/bionomina.4.1.1.

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After briefly discussing various problems that can result from linguistic ambiguities, I attempt to provide an introduction and overview of various aspects and theories that are relevant to scientific terminology. These include a general semiotics (i.e., theory of signs), the distinction of semantic conceptual content and aesthetic nonconceptual content and their relationship to each other, a discussion of different types of scientific concepts (e.g., essentialistic and cluster classes, natural kinds, type approach), and the importance of specifying epistemological recognition criteria for empirical concepts in addition to their ontological theoretical definitions and the specification of contexts in which the concepts are used and on which theories they depend upon. I then provide a distinction of raw data, data, metadata, information and knowledge, and discuss the relation between images and data and how efforts to standardize data and metadata can affect scientific terminology. I briefly introduce new methods and techniques for increasing semantic transparency and communicability in science, which include the organization and the management of scientific terms within taxonomies, and their formal representation in ontologies. The usefulness of terminological standardization and its possible negative effects on scientific progress is then discussed, and finally the question is addressed of whether one can distinguish types of terminologies that benefit from standardization from those that could suffer from it.
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44

Laurier, Daniel. "Reasons, contents and experiences." Disputatio 1, no. 17 (November 1, 2004): 21–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2004-0009.

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Abstract I propose what seems a plausible interpretation of the suggestion that the fact that someone has or lacks the capacity to make inferences of certain kinds should be taken as evidence that the contents of the states involved in these inferences are conceptual/nonconceptual. I then argue that there is no obvious way in which this line of thought could be exploited to help draw the line separating conceptual from nonconceptual contents. This will lead me to clarify in what sense perceptual experiences can be taken as providing reasons for beliefs.
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45

Brink, Nicholas E., Giuseppe Lo Dico, S. Amenta, and Nicholas E. Brink. "Book Reviews: The Tao of Physics: An Exploration of the Parallels between Modern Physics, and Eastern Mysticism, Natural Minds, Essays on Nonconceptual Content, Group Dreaming: Dreams to the Tenth Power." Imagination, Cognition and Personality 28, no. 1 (September 2008): 93–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.2190/ic.28.1.g.

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46

Pérez, Diana I. "The Nonconceptual Contents of our Minds." ProtoSociology 22 (2006): 78–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/protosociology20062222.

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47

Van Cleve, James. "DEFINING AND DEFENDING NONCONCEPTUAL CONTENTS AND STATES." Philosophical Perspectives 26, no. 1 (December 2012): 411–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12010.

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48

Márquez Sosa, Carlos Mario. "Mediational Fields and Dynamic Situated Senses." Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Philosophia 65, no. 3 (December 10, 2020): 51–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.24193/subbphil.2020.3.03.

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"The purpose of this paper is to introduce the notions of mediational fields and dynamic situated senses as a way to identify the structure of experiences, thoughts and their relations. To reach this purpose I draw some lessons from the debate between Dreyfus and McDowell about the structure of experience, from Cussins’s conception of mediational contents, and from Evans’s account of singular senses. I notice firstly that McDowell’s answer to Dreyfus consists in developing a practical and demonstrative notion of the products of our conceptual capacities. A conception that entails that human experience is not entirely characterised in terms of an abstract specification of truth-conditions. McDowell and Cussins endorse Evans’s conception of singular senses. A specification that takes into account the dynamic and situated abilities involved in making reference. Whereas the first argues in favour of a conceptual conception of experience, the second one argues in favour of a nonconceptual conception. I introduce the notions of mediational fields and dynamic situated senses to argue that both converge in conceiving the contents of experience as mediational and not reducible to an abstract specification of truth-conditions. My proposal is to define a bidimensional space orthogonal to the conceptual/ nonconceptual, experience/thought, know-how/know-that dichotomies. Cognitive contents are ways to disclose the world both as mediational fields and as referential structures. The degree in which those elements are presented determine different varieties of cognition. I use the previous notions to develop the sketch of an account of singular, objective and contextual ways of cognition, and to argue that it is better to begin an enquiry about cognition with notions that do not presuppose a distinction between practical and intellectual capacities. Keywords: Mediational Contents, Nonconceptual contents, Dynamic Thoughts, Singular Reference, Context-Sensitivity."
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49

Tsur, Reuven. "The place of nonconceptual information in university education with special reference to teaching literature." Pragmatics and Cognition 17, no. 2 (August 18, 2009): 309–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/pc.17.2.05tsu.

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This paper assumes that crucial mental activities involved in scientific discovery and literary reponse are nonconceptual. Some of the greatest scientific discoveries were made in states of extreme mental passivity induced in “the Bus, the Bath, or the Bed”(Köhler 1972: 163). Universities usually teach techniques and conceptual systems required for scientific research, but have no courses in achieving moments of extreme mental passivity, that is, taking a hot bath or dozing off on a rocking bus. I have adopted from the psychology of perception-and-personality the notion of “delayed closure” (here applied as “delayed categorization”). Delayed closure is an essential condition for adequate adjustment to reality in everyday life, as well as in scientific research and literary response. Some people display intolerance of delayed closure, whereas rapid closure may involve loss of important precategorial information. The problems of “teaching” delayed closure are explored in the context of teaching literature in a university setting.
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50

Skrzypulec, Błażej. "Nonconceptual Content, Causal Theory, and Realism." Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 9, no. 1 (December 4, 2014). http://dx.doi.org/10.4148/1944-3676.1090.

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