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1

Culyer, A. J. The normative economics of health care finance and provision. York: University of York, 1989.

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2

Queering health: Critical challenges to normative health and healthcare. Ross-on-Wye [England]: PCCS Books, 2014.

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3

Ukraine. Okhorona zdorov'i︠a︡ v Ukraïni: Normatyvna baza. 2nd ed. Kyïv: KNT, 2006.

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Tomassini, Antonio, and Carlo Signorelli. La terza riforma sanitaria: Il decreto bindi e le normative collegate. Roma: SEU, 1999.

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5

(Federation), Russia. Pervichnai͡a︡ mediko-sanitarnai͡a︡ pomoshchʹ: Normativno-pravovoe obespechenie. Moskva: MT͡S︡FĖR, 2004.

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6

Islam, Sardar M. N. Normative health economics: A new pragmatic approach to cost benefit analysis, mathematical models and applications. Basingstoke [England]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

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7

La otra cara de la justicia: Desestructuración normativa y sentido de lo justo en la sociedad peruana. Lima, Perú: Asamblea Nacional de Rectores, 2008.

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Raptopoulou, Kyriaki-Korina. EU law and healthcare services: Normative approaches to public health systems. Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2015.

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9

Nudo, Raffaele, ed. Lezioni dai terremoti: fonti di vulnerabilità, nuove strategie progettuali, sviluppi normativi. Florence: Firenze University Press, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.36253/978-88-6655-072-3.

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This book is a collection of the academic contributions presented at the conference entitled "Lessons from earthquakes: sources of vulnerability, new design strategies and regulatory developments" which was held at Chianciano Terme on 8 October 2010. The issues addressed are central to Seismic Engineering and comprise a wide range of arguments on both consolidated subjects and innovative aspects in the sector. Among these, appropriate attention is devoted to: analysis of the structural instability revealed on the occasion of seismic events and the lessons that can be drawn from the same; the procedures of assessment of the existing buildings, starting from the phase of monitoring and diagnostics through to the definition of the most opportune intervention techniques; the use of composite materials and alternative methods of seismic protection; non-linear field modelling relating to regular and non-regular structures; and finally, the development of the methods of calculation that have characterised the evolution of the regulatory codes.
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10

Rivas, Roberto Cantero. El reintegro de gastos sanitarios causados en instituciones sanitarias ajenas a la Seguridad Social: Regulación normativa y doctrina jurisprudencial. [Granada]: Editorial Comares, 1998.

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11

Gonano, Enzo. La riforma della riforma sanitaria: Schede-guida per singolo articolo e compresi i riferimenti normativi generali del Decreto legislativo 30.12.1992, n. 502 (Riordino della disciplina in materia sanitaria). Milano: OEMF, 1995.

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12

Monnier, Sophie. Les comités d'éthique et le droit: Eléments d'analyse sur le système normatif de la bioéthique. Paris: Harmattan, 2005.

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13

Bertrand, Guillaume Michel. Acquisition et exercice du pouvoir de gouvernement ou de juridiction selon le code de 1983: Can. 129-124, problématique, normative et prospective. Romae: Pontificia Universitas Urbaniana, Facultas Iuris Canonici, 1988.

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14

Gladii, Tudor. Garda financiară și dreptul: Culegere de acte normative și norme juridice care reglementează drepturile și activitatea gărzii financiare = Finansovai︠a︡ gvardii︠a︡ i pravo : sbornik normativnykh aktov i i︠u︡ridicheskikh norm reglamentirui︠u︡shchie prava i dei︠a︡telʹnostʹ finansovoĭ gvardii. Chișinău: Epigraf, 2001.

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15

Cullity, Garrett. Normative Derivations. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198807841.003.0005.

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From the foundational norms of morality, other moral norms can be derived. In one kind of derivation, recognized by Ross, a derived norm is subsumed under a more fundamental one. This chapter describes and illustrates two further derivation relations, which it labels ‘enabling’ and ‘responsive’, to be added to the subsumptive ones. Each of these three types of derivation is divided into further subtypes, and it is shown how derivations of these different kinds can be combined. The chapter concludes with an account of the role of rights and justice in morality, according to which their moral importance derives in all of these ways from all of the foundations of morality.
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16

Eklund, Matti. Normative Concepts. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198717829.003.0004.

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What is it for a concept to be normative? Some possible answers are explored and rejected, among them that a concept is normative if it ascribes a normative property. The positive answer defended is that a concept is normative if it is in the right way associated with a normative use. Among issues discussed along the way are the nature of analyticity, and there being a notion of analyticity—what I call semantic analyticity—such that a statement can be analytic in this sense while failing to be true. Considerations regarding thick concepts and slurs are brought to bear on the issues that come up.
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17

Eklund, Matti. Normative Properties. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198717829.003.0005.

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What is it for a property to be normative? Some possible answers are explored and rejected in this chapter, among them that a property is normative if it is ascribed by some normative concept. A positive claim defended is that a property is normative if and only if it is ascribed by some concept whose reference is determined by normative role. Along the way, the supposed connection between normativity and motivation is addressed. Theoretically important distinctions are drawn relating to the idea of normative role determining reference. Normative role can determine reference either fully or partially. Also, the possibility of reference magnetism complicates how one should think about some of these things.
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18

Wedgwood, Ralph. Is Rationality Normative? Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198802693.003.0002.

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In its original meaning, the word ‘rational’ referred to the faculty of reason—the capacity for reasoning. It is undeniable that the word later came also to express a normative concept—the concept of the proper use of this faculty. Does it express a normative concept when it is used in formal theories of rational belief or rational choice? Reasons are given for concluding that it does express a normative concept in these contexts. But this conclusion seems to imply that we ought always to think rationally. Four objections can be raised. (1) What about cases where thinking rationally has disastrous consequences? (2) What about cases where we have rational false beliefs about what we ought to do? (3) ‘Ought’ implies ‘can’—but is it true that we can always think rationally? (4) Rationality requires nothing more than coherence—but why does coherence matter?
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19

Valencia (Spain : Region). Conselleria de Sanidad y Consumo. Unidad de Seguimiento y Control. and Valencia (Spain : Region). Conselleria de Sanidad y Consumo. Secretaría General., eds. Normativa de la inspección de servicios sanitarios. [Valencia?]: Generalitat Valenciana, Conselleria de Sanitat i Consum, 1990.

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20

de Bruyn, Theodore. Normative Christian Discourse. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199687886.003.0002.

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This chapter surveys the normative stance of Christian authorities against the use of incantations and amulets, conveyed in treatises, sermons, saints’ lives, and ecclesiastical canons. In condemning or critiquing the use of incantations and amulets, Christian writers and bishops sought to differentiate what they considered to be ‘true’ Christians from ‘false’ or ‘lax’ Christians, pagans, and Jews. Nevertheless, the scenarios they created in their discourse reveal a slippage between what authorities urged and what Christians did. By studying amulets that have survived from Late Antiquity, one can arrive at a more nuanced understanding of how the production of amulets in an increasingly Christian context both continued and altered pre-existing practices.
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21

McPherson, Tristram. Authoritatively Normative Concepts. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198823841.003.0012.

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This chapter offers an analysis of the authoritatively normative concept PRACTICAL OUGHT that appeals to the constitutive norms for the activity of non-arbitrary selection. It argues that this analysis permits an attractive and substantive explanation of what the distinctive normative authority of this concept amounts to, while also explaining why a clear statement of what such authority amounts to has been so elusive in the recent literature. The account given is contrasted with more familiar constitutivist theories, and briefly shows how it answers “schmagency”-style objections to constitutivist explanations of normativity. Finally, the chapter explains how the account offered here can help realists, error theorist, and fictionalists address central challenges to their views.
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22

Eklund, Matti. Choosing Normative Concepts. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198717829.001.0001.

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Theorists working on metaethics and the nature of normativity typically study goodness, rightness, what ought to be done, etc. In their investigations they employ and consider our actual normative concepts. But the actual concepts of goodness, rightness, and what ought to be done are only some of the possible normative concepts. There are other possible concepts, ascribing different properties. In this book, the consequences of this are explored, for example for the debate over normative realism and for the debate over what it is for concepts and properties to be normative. In recent years, conceptual engineering—the project of considering how our concepts can be replaced by better ones—has become a central topic in philosophy. The present work applies this proposed methodology to central normative concepts and discusses the special complications that arise in this case. For example, how should we, in the context, understand talk of a concept being better than another?
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23

Ginsborg, Hannah. Empiricism and Normative Constraint. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809630.003.0006.

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McDowell holds that our thinking, in order to have intentional content, must stand in a normative relation to empirical reality. He thinks that this condition can be satisfied only if we adopt “minimal empiricism”: the view that beliefs and judgements stand in rational relations to perceptual experiences, conceived as passive. I raise two complementary difficulties for minimal empiricism, one challenging McDowell’s view that experiences, conceived as passive, can be reasons for belief, the other challenging his view of experience as presupposing conceptual capacities. I go on to argue that minimal empiricism is not necessary for satisfying the condition that thinking be normatively related to the empirical world. There is another way of understanding the relation between thought and reality which construes it as normative without being rational: we can understand it as the world’s normative constraint on the activity through which empirical concepts, and hence empirical thinking, become possible.
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24

Silk, Alex. Normative Language in Context. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198805076.003.0009.

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This chapter develops a contextualist account of normative language, focusing on broadly normative readings of modal verbs. The account draws on a more general framework for implementing a contextualist semantics and pragmatics, Discourse Contextualism. The aim of Discourse Contextualism is to derive the discourse properties of normative language from a contextualist interpretation of an independently motivated formal semantics, along with principles of interpretation and conversation. In using normative language, interlocutors can exploit their grammatical and world knowledge, and general pragmatic reasoning skills, to manage an evolving system of norms. Discourse Contextualism provides a perspicuous framework for further philosophical theorizing about the nature of normativity, normative language, and normative judgment. Delineating these issues can help refine our understanding of the space of overall theories and motivate more fruitful ways the dialectics may proceed. Discourse Contextualism provides a linguistic basis for a more comprehensive theory of normativity and normative discourse and practice.
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25

Thompson, Kevin. Systematicity and Normative Justification. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198778165.003.0003.

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This chapter examines systematicity as a form of normative justification. Thompson’s contention is that the Hegelian commitment to fundamental presuppositionlessness and hence to methodological immanence, from which his distinctive conception of systematicity flows, is at the core of the unique form of normative justification that he employs in his political philosophy and that this is the only form of such justification that can successfully meet the skeptic’s challenge. Central to Thompson’s account is the distinction between systematicity and representation and the way in which this frames Hegel’s relationship to the traditional forms of justification and the creation of his own distinctive kind of normative argumentation.
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26

Werner, Sesselmeier, and Schulz-Nieswandt Frank 1958-, eds. Konstruktion von Sozialpolitik im Wandel: Implizite normative Elemente. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2008.

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27

Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. Risk and Rationality: Can Normative and Descriptive Analysis Be Reconciled? Inst for Philosophy&Public Pol, 1988.

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28

Ana, Martín Boado, ed. Legislación sobre acogimiento familiar y adopción: Normativa internacional, estatal y autonómica. Madrid: Tecnos, 2004.

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29

Parfit, Derek. Jackson’s Non-Empirical Normative Truths. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198778608.003.0008.

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This chapter presents some arguments on non-empirical normative truths. It considers the assumption that, if there were any non-natural normative truths, these truths would be about ontologically weighty non-natural properties. Given what we have learnt about our world, we know that there are no such properties and truths. But the chapter argues that these normative truths are not about such ontologically weighty non-natural properties. It is implied that metaphysical Nnturalists can consistently believe that there are some non-empirical truths, such as logical, mathematical, and modal truths, and some fundamental normative truths. These truths do not add anything mysterious to a Naturalist's ontology, however.
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30

Leary, Stephanie. Non-naturalism and Normative Necessities. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198805076.003.0004.

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This chapter argues that the best way for a non-naturalist to explain why the normative supervenes on the natural is to claim that, while there are some sui generis normative properties whose essences cannot be fully specified in non-normative terms and do not specify any non-normative sufficient conditions for their instantiation, there are certain hybrid normative properties whose essences specify both naturalistic sufficient conditions for their own instantiation and sufficient conditions for the instantiation of certain sui generis normative properties. This is the only metaphysical explanation for supervenience on offer, the chapter argues, that can both clearly maintain the pre-theoretical commitments of non-naturalism, and provide a metaphysical explanation not just for supervenience, but for all metaphysical necessities involving natural and normative properties.
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31

Mevorach, Irit. A Normative Framework for Promoting Compliance. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198782896.003.0005.

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This chapter completes the proposed normative framework for cross-border insolvency. It considers the problem of compliance with a cross-border insolvency system by countries and implementing institutions. The previous chapters have shown how the choice and use of certain international legal sources, such as customary international law (CIL), can strengthen the system, close gaps, and address biases that may otherwise impede the choices of optimal solutions. Yet, notwithstanding the pervasiveness and behavioural force of CIL, the observance of the norms is not guaranteed. Written instruments, even if precise and comprehensive, and designed effectively, do not assure compliance either. Even where so-called soft law is in fact hard in important ways, countries might still underperform. This chapter suggests how compliance can be induced, and discusses which measures can be more, or less effective in that regard, including in view of decision-making constraints.
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32

Raju, K. N. M., 1945- and Institute for Social and Economic Change., eds. Normative and actual provision of antenatal health care services in Karnataka. Bangalore: Institute for Social and Economic Change, 2004.

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33

Gond, Jean-Pascal, Christiane Demers, and Valérie Michaud. Managing Normative Tensions within and across Organizations. Edited by Wendy K. Smith, Marianne W. Lewis, Paula Jarzabkowski, and Ann Langley. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198754428.013.13.

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What can the Economies of Worth (EW) and paradox frameworks learn from each other? Organizational paradoxes often present a moral dimension that has rarely been accounted for empirically or theorized by paradox scholars. The EW scholars, on the other hand, have developed a sophisticated analysis to explain how ordinary actors engage with multiple moral dimensions yet have barely theorized the full set of responses that actors can mobilize to deal with such tensions. This chapter addresses this double blind spot by cross-fertilizing paradox thinking and the EW framework with the aim of discussing the normative dimensions of paradox management and providing a conceptualization of how organizational actors can deal with tensions involving moral values. The EW framework is introduced, its assumptions with paradox approaches clarified and compared and then what each framework can learn from the other is analyzed. A research agenda is offered based on a new integrative framework.
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34

Henning, Tim. Parentheticalism, Normative Reasons, and Error Cases. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198797036.003.0005.

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This chapter discusses another crucial use of parenthetical sentences in normative reasons-discourse. Due to their feature of subject-orientation, they enable us to cite known falsehoods as normative reasons without violating the factivity requirements of reasons-discourse. This is important, because it allows us to deal with error cases in a way that does not entail that putatively rational agents systematically misidentify their reasons. Ontological and linguistic objections to the idea that falsehoods can be full-blooded normative reasons for agents are discussed and rejected. A notion of quasi-factivity is introduced to characterize the requirements of reasons-discourse. Parentheticalism is shown to enable a unified account of normative reasons-discourse, avoiding divergences between veridical and error cases.
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35

Kettemann, Matthias C. The Normative Order of the Internet. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198865995.001.0001.

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Online anarchy? Far from it: as this study convincingly shows, norms matter online. In a tour de force, internet law expert Matthias C. Kettemann analyses the genesis, ontology, and legitimation of rule and rules on the internet. Innovatively, the study establishes the emergence of a normative order of the internet, an order that integrates norms materially and normatively connected to the use and development of the internet at three different levels (regional, national, international), of two types (privately and publicly authored), and of different character (from ius cogens to technical standards). Centrifugal forces contribute to normative redundancies (“normative froth”), real conflicts of norms between regulatory layers and geographically bounded normative spheres (“normative friction”), substantial structural problems (“normative fractures”), and political, commercial, and technological fragmentation of the internet. But these forces of normative disorder can be countered. As the study impressively shows, a normative turn has taken place on the internet. The rules on rule-making that have developed within the normative order of the internet explain, predict, and legitimize the creation of new norms through processes of self-learning normativity. These norms are then assessed for their internal coherence, consonance with other order norms, and consistency with the order’s finality. The normative order of the internet is based on and produces a liquefied system characterized by self-learning normativity. Thus a theory of normativity (“of the law”) that goes back to Kant needs to be fundamentally rethought: with norm-based self-organization as the principle of life that enables the transcendental constitution of normativityon the internet.
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36

Normative Health Economics: A New Approach to Cost Benefit Analysis, Mathematical Models and Applications. Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

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37

Ackerly, Brooke A. Feminist Grounded Normative Methods for Just Responsibility. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190662936.003.0006.

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One of the core challenges of grounded normative theory is to deploy a methodology for theorizing that guides us to seek insight from lived experience even though our knowledge of that experience can be only partial, incomplete, even flawed. Grounded normative theory is a broad methodological approach that requires specific methods for developing the empirical basis appropriate to each normative inquiry. Chapter 5 describes the specific methods I used to develop the theory of just responsibility. It provides an argument for drawing on the strategic initiatives of human rights activists and describes the research–activist partnership from which the normative theory presented here derives.
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38

Gregory, Alex. Might Desires Be Beliefs about Normative Reasons for Action? Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199370962.003.0008.

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This paper examines the view that desires are beliefs about normative reasons for action. It describes the view, and briefly sketches three arguments for it. But the focus of the paper is defending the view from objections. The paper argues that the view is consistent with the distinction between the direction of fit of beliefs and desires, that it is consistent with the existence of appetites such as hunger, that it can account for counterexamples that aim to show that beliefs about reasons are not sufficient for desire, such as weakness of will, and that it can account for counterexamples that aim to show that beliefs about reasons are not necessary for desire, such as addiction. The paper also shows how it is superior to the view that desires are appearances of the good.
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39

Clausen, Andrea. How Can Conceptual Content Be Social and Normative, and, at the Same Time, Be Objective? De Gruyter, Inc., 2008.

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40

Clausen, Andrea. How Can Conceptual Content Be Social and Normative, and at the Same Time, Be Objective? Ontos Verlag, 2005.

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41

Clausen, Andrea. How Can Conceptual Content Be Social and Normative, and, at the Same Time, Be Objective? De Gruyter, Inc., 2008.

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42

Diamond, James A. The Narrative Hell and Normative Bliss of Biblical Love. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198805694.003.0006.

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This chapter addresses the question of how to understand a concept as amorphous and abstract as love of an infinite, omniscient, all-knowing God? The answer to that question emerges from a detailed exploration of the biblical perspective on human love, with all of its concrete manifestations and messy complications. The numerous stories of human love misplaced, withheld, or gone awry teach us something about the proper relationship with God, and, by extension, with each other. What emerges is that passionate, unrestrained love, when directed toward other human beings, is fraught with danger. The Bible seems to say that only by making God the supreme object of our desire can we ensure that love will serve as the positive, life-affirming force it was meant to be.
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43

(Editor), Margaret Rees, and Louis G. Keith (Editor), eds. Medical Problems in Women over 70: When Normative Treatment Plans Do Not Apply. Informa Healthcare, 2007.

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44

Rees, Margaret, and Louis Keith. Medical Problems in Women Over 70: When Normative Treatment Plans Do Not Apply. Taylor & Francis Group, 2007.

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45

Margaret, Rees, and Keith Louis G, eds. Medical problems in women over 70: When normative treatment plans do not apply. Abingdon, Oxon [England]: Informa Healthcare, 2007.

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46

Rees, Margaret, and Louis Keith. Medical Problems in Women Over 70: When Normative Treatment Plans Do Not Apply. Taylor & Francis Group, 2007.

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47

Hel, Virginia. The Ethics of Care. Edited by Serena Olsaretti. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199645121.013.12.

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The focus of normative political theory in recent decades has been overwhelmingly on distributive justice. Developed for institutions within national societies, questions of justice and fairness have also dominated consideration of the global problems that morality ought to address. For matters of war and peace, just war theory has been central; for other issues, distributive justice. This “justice-dominated discourse,” greatly influenced by the work of John Rawls, is now being challenged by the alternative outlook of the ethics of care. Care ethics began to be developed in the last quarter of the twentieth century by feminist moral and political theorists, and its development continues. This chapter looks at this alternative view and some of its implications.
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48

Alexandrova, Anna. Can the Science of Well-Being Be Objective? Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199300518.003.0004.

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As an object of science, well-being is unusual in that its study relies on a normative standard. Even when the requisite theory justifying this standard is available, deep disagreements about values can surface. These disagreements seem to undermine the claim of this science to objectivity. This is one reason why philosophers of science have traditionally advocated value freedom. This chapter proposes the notion of a ‘mixed claim’ to denote scientific hypotheses that rely on both factual and normative categories. It argues against the advocates of value freedom, that mixed claims should not be eliminated from science. Rather, we need principles that when followed can secure procedural objectivity for mixed claims. These principles include making values explicit, testing for presence of disagreement, and subjecting the controversial value presuppositions to a public deliberation that includes experts on well-being as well as the public whose well-being is in question.
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49

Wedgwood, Ralph. The Unity of Normativity. Edited by Daniel Star. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.2.

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What is normativity? It is argued here that normativity is best understood as a property of certain concepts: normative thoughts are those involving these normative concepts; normative statements are statements that express normative thoughts; and normative facts are the facts (if such there be) that make such normative thoughts true. Many philosophers propose that there is a single basic normative concept—perhaps the concept of a reason for an action or attitude—in terms of which all other normative concepts can be defined. It is argued here that this proposal faces grave difficulties. According to a better proposal, what these normative concepts have in common is that they have a distinctive sort of conceptual role—a reasoning-guiding conceptual role. This proposal is illustrated by a number of examples: different normative concepts differ from each other in virtue of their having different conceptual roles of this reasoning-guiding kind.
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50

Wedgwood, Ralph. The Pitfalls of ‘Reasons’. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198802693.003.0005.

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Many philosophers working on normative issues follow the ‘Reasons First’ program. According to this program, the concept of a ‘normative reason’ for an action or an attitude is the most fundamental normative concept, and all other normative and evaluative concepts can be defined in terms of this fundamental concept. This paper criticizes the foundational assumptions of this program. In fact, there are many different concepts that can be expressed by the term ‘reason’ in English. The best explanation of the data relating to these concepts is that they can all be defined in terms of explanatory concepts and other normative or evaluative notions: for example, in one sense, a ‘reason’ for you to go is a fact that helps to explain why you ought to go, or why it is good for you to go. This implies that none of the concepts expressed by ‘reason’ is fundamental.
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