Relevant bibliographies by topics / Normative Ethics and Metaethics

Contents

  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
  6. Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'Normative Ethics and Metaethics'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 3 June 2025
Last updated: 6 July 2025

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Journal articles on the topic "Normative Ethics and Metaethics"

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Jezierski, Romuald. "Metaethics as Methodology of Normative Ethics." Dialectics and Humanism 13, no. 2 (1986): 97–107. https://doi.org/10.5840/dialecticshumanism1986132/331.

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Meawad, Stephen. "“Unethical” Ethics." Exchange 54, no. 1 (2025): 56–70. https://doi.org/10.1163/1572543x-05401001.

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Abstract This article accomplishes three tasks simultaneously: 1) It provides an analysis of the relationship between Coptic Orthodox Christianity and contemporary Western moral philosophy; 2) It assesses this relationship within the scope of metaethics and normative ethics, providing brief appraisals of deontology, consequentialism, and virtue ethics; and 3) It provides a more detailed analysis of Coptic Orthodoxy’s relationship to deontological ethics, suggesting that Copts sometimes risk exhibiting a pseudo-deontology: adherence to prescribed actions in emulation of moral exemplars but in a spirit distinct from those exemplars. Copts, in their singular, struggle-laden, and grace-filled pursuit of unity with God, are to be lauded for, and ought to continue, bypassing metaethics and normative ethics altogether. However, acknowledging their occasional acquiescence to pseudo-deontology will allow them both to refocus on this pursuit of God and to feel no pressure to subscribe to Western ethical currents.
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Forcehimes, Andrew T. "On L. W. Sumner’s “Normative Ethics and Metaethics”." Ethics 125, no. 4 (2015): 1142–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/680881.

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Protopapadakis, Evangelos D. "“Ethical Minefields” and the Voice of Common Sense: A Discussion with Julian Savulescu." Conatus 4, no. 1 (2019): 125. http://dx.doi.org/10.12681/cjp.19712.

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Theoretical ethics includes both metaethics (the meaning of moral terms) and normative ethics (ethical theories and principles). Practical ethics involves making decisions about every day real ethical problems, like decisions about euthanasia, what we should eat, climate change, treatment of animals, and how we should live. It utilizes ethical theories, like utilitarianism and Kantianism, and principles, but more broadly a process of reflective equilibrium and consistency to decide how to act and be.
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Protopapadakis, Evangelos D., and Julian Savulescu. "Ethical Minefields and the Voice of Common Sense: A Discussion with Julian Savulescu." Conatus - Journal of Philosophy 4, no. 1 (2019): 125–33. https://doi.org/10.12681/cjp.19712.

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Theoretical ethics includes both metaethics (the meaning of moral terms) and normative ethics (ethical theories and principles). Practical ethics involves making decisions about every day real ethical problems, like decisions about euthanasia, what we should eat, climate change, treatment of animals, and how we should live. It utilizes ethical theories, like utilitarianism and Kantianism, and principles, but more broadly a process of reflective equilibrium and consistency to decide how to act and be.
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Schaab, Janis David. "Kantian Constructivism and the Sources of Normativity." Kant Yearbook 14, no. 1 (2022): 97–120. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kantyb-2022-0005.

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Abstract While it is uncontroversial that Kantian constructivism has implications for normative ethics, its status as a metaethical view has been contested. In this article, I provide a characterisation of metaethical Kantian constructivism that withstands these criticisms. I start by offering a partial defence of Sharon Street’s practical standpoint characterisation. However, I argue that this characterisation, as presented by Street, is ultimately incomplete because it fails to demonstrate that the claims of Kantian constructivism constitute a distinctive contribution to metaethics. I then try to complete the practical standpoint characterisation by elaborating on Christine Korsgaard’s suggestion that metaethical Kantian constructivism takes up a position on the source of morality’s normativity.
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Byron, Michael. "Right-Making, Reference, and Reduction." Disputatio 6, no. 39 (2014): 139–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2014-0010.

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Abstract The causal theory of reference (CTR) provides a well-articulated and widely-accepted account of the reference relation. On CTR the reference of a term is fixed by whatever property causally regulates the competent use of that term. CTR poses a metaethical challenge to realists by demanding an account of the properties that regulate the competent use of normative predicates. CTR might pose a challenge to ethical theorists as well. Long (2012) argues that CTR entails the falsity of any normative ethical theory. First-order theory attempts to specify what purely descriptive property is a fundamental right-making property (FRM). Long contends that the notion that the FRM causally regulates competent use of the predicate ‘right’ leads to a reductio. The failure of this argument is nevertheless instructive concerning a point at which ethics and metaethics overlap.
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Hart, Jr., Noah. "A Common Ethical Foundation for Gobalization: Metaethics, Normative Ethics and Applied Ethics." International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences: Annual Review 3, no. 11 (2009): 49–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.18848/1833-1882/cgp/v03i11/51793.

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Sergeeva, T. "Transparency, meta-ethics, normative ethics and applied ethics as elements in the management of the organization." Bulletin of Science and Practice 4, no. 8 (2018): 257–61. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1345292.

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In this article transparency merits and demerits are considered, concepts of metaethics, standard ethics, applied ethics reveal, their role in the management of the modern organization is considered. In conclusion, it is concluded that successful implementation of the strategy of a balance between “transparency” and information about the activities of the organization is necessary. This is one way to build the trust of employees, existing and potential customers, partners and even competitors. Transparency is not directly related to better corporate governance.
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Silverstein, Matthew. "Inescapability and Normativity." Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6, no. 3 (2017): 1–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v6i3.67.

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When we make ethical claims, we invoke a kind of objective authority. A familiar worry about our ethical practices is that this invocation of authority involves a mistake. This worry was perhaps best captured by John Mackie, who argued that the fabric of the world contains nothing so queer as objective authority and thus that all our ethical claims are false. Kantians such as Christine Korsgaard and David Velleman offer accounts of the objectivity of ethics that do without the controversial realist assumptions which gives rise to Mackie’s skepticism. They contend that our ethical claims correctly invoke objective authority not by corresponding to some normative pocket of the fabric of reality, but rather by expressing commitments that are inescapable. This Kantian strategy is often advertised as an alternative to traditional but “boring” metaethics. Its proponents promise to vindicate our ethical practices without entangling us in familiar metanormative disputes about the metaphysics, epistemology and semantics of ethics. In this paper, I argue that the Kantian strategy cannot make good on this promise. Considered as an attempt to sidestep traditional metaethics, it lacks the resources to produce the desired normative conclusions. The outlook for the Kantian strategy becomes more promising, though, if we pair it with one of two familiar metanormative theories: expressivism or reductionism. The resulting metaethically-loaded versions of the Kantian strategy can deliver the promised conclusions, but only by plunging straight into the quagmire of traditional metaethics. And there all of the familiar objections to expressivism and reductionism await.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Normative Ethics and Metaethics"

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Faraci, David N. S. "How to Be (and How Not to Be) a Normative Realist." Bowling Green State University / OhioLINK, 2012. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1344441342.

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Di, Nicola Alessandro. "Evolutionary theory and normative realism in epistemology." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:cf5de343-77b1-461f-9940-eeba1dd8b76b.

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In this thesis I discuss one way in which evolutionary theory has been brought to bear on the evaluation of competing meta-normative views in epistemology. More specifically, I investigate whether normative realism in epistemology (epistemic realism) is compatible with the view that we are justified in holding many of the epistemic beliefs we hold, on the assumption that those beliefs can be explained in evolutionary terms. In Part I I discuss normativity in epistemology and meta-epistemology. I begin by drawing attention to the fact that there are very different ways of understanding which concepts in epistemology are normative and what their normativity consists in. I focus on the concept of an epistemic reason to illustrate this point. I then discuss, in some detail, how different interpretations of epistemic-normativity will affect the form which normative-realist views in epistemology can take. I conclude by drawing a taxonomy of epistemic-realist views which is mindful of the different interpretations of epistemic normativity which I distinguished. In Part II I turn to discuss the topic of Darwinian arguments against normative-realist views in epistemology. I begin by considering the form which Darwinian arguments have taken in recent metaethical literature. I argue that Darwinian arguments of a kind which is meant to raise a distinctively epistemological challenge for normative-realist views – I call those 'Darwinian-epistemological' arguments – represent a more interesting object of philosophical investigation than Darwinian arguments of a different 'metaphysical' kind. I then formulate a Darwinian-epistemological argument which targets normative-realist views in epistemology (DEA), explain how it works, and spend some time discussing its key premises. In Part III I engage with the Darwinian-epistemological challenge against realism about epistemic normativity that Sharon Street presents in her paper 'Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons' (2009). I argue that Street’s epistemological challenge is best viewed as an instance of a Darwinian-epistemological argument of the kind I formulated (DEA). I then go on to reply to Street’s argument on behalf of the epistemic realist. I conclude that arguments with the form of DEA do not represent a serious threat for normative realist views in epistemology.
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Burkette, Jerry W. Jr. "What Does Theism Add to Ethical Naturalism?" Thesis, Virginia Tech, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/83836.

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Recent literature seems to have opened up space for naturalistic theistic metaethics in a contemporary context, as proponents of divine command theories have tended to be restricted to either supernatural or theistic non-natural theories within existing taxonomies of normative theory. While perhaps encouraging for theists, would theism add anything substantive to theories of ethical naturalism? In this paper, I examine this question. I argue that theistic naturalism appears to incur certain objections as well as provide a plausible and explanatory constraint on content for theories of ethical naturalism. As a result, a corresponding challenge to non-theistic variants is raised.<br>Master of Arts<br>Realists, roughly summarized, are those metaethicists who believe that some moral propositions have truth values, that some (or at least one) of those propositions turn out to be true, and that if rational agents disagree on the truth value of a particular moral proposition, only one of them has the possibility of being correct. Broadly construed, moral realists tend to fall under one of two “tents”, preferring either naturalism (for which moral properties turn out to be wholly natural in constitution) or non-naturalism (which posits that at least some moral properties have, even if only partly, non-natural constituents as part of their make-up. Theists, who base their theories of morality on some facet of the nature or essence (or commands) of God, have tended to either be relegated in philosophical debate to a characterization of “supernaturalism” or to some seldom visited corner of the non-natural “tent” of moral realism. The former tends to limit theistic engagement in contemporary metaethical dialogue such that it can seem (at times) as if theists and non-theists are talking about two different subjects entirely. On the other hand, a non-naturalistic theory of theistic moral realism saddles the view with some fairly difficult metaphysical and epistemological baggage in the form of powerful objections levied against non-naturalistic theories in general. This paper explores another option for theism in light of very recent work by Gideon Rosen, namely his article examining the metaphysical implications of varieties of moral realism, particularly naturalistic ones. This article has already garnered a general characterization (within metaethical research, writ large) as being a “taxonomy” of naturalistic (and non-naturalistic, for that matter) theories. Specifically for my purposes here, Rosen suggests that divine command theory (and theistic metaethics in general) should be understood as being naturalistic in formulation. This would seem to be advantageous to theists, in that their metaethical theories might avoid either the bounded characterization of supernaturalism or the difficult challenges of non-naturalism. However, the theist, should she avail herself of naturalism in this regard, will need to tread carefully. Given that Rosen has couched his 'taxonomy' in terms of metaphysical grounding, I examine some resultant challenges for naturalistic theistic metaethics, concluding they can be overcome, as well as a related objection to non-theistic naturalism that arise as a result of the same grounding discussion coupled with the resources theists can leverage in a naturalistic context.
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PEFFER, RODNEY GENE. "MARXISM, METAETHICS, AND MORALITY (ETHICS, SOCIALISM)." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1985. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/188008.

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This work first exposits and analyzes Marx's implicit moral theory and then examines various objections to the thesis that Marxism and morality are genuinely compatible. Chapter 2 ("Marx's Moral Perspective") traces the development of Marx's moral views and argues that his implicit moral theory is based on the values of freedom (as self-determination), human community and self-realization. Chapter 3 ("Morality and Marx's Theory of Exploitation") argues that Marx's concept of exploitation is, in part, evaluative and involves the violation of the freedom of the exploited due to undemocratic social institutions. In Chapters 4 ("Utilitarian Interpretations of Marx") and 5 ("Freedom, Equality, and Human Dignity in Marx") I argue that Marx is not a utilitarian nor, strictly speaking, a consequentialist of any sort: he does not demand the maximization of a nonmoral good but, rather, a maximum system of equal freedoms, both positive and negative. Chapter 6 ("Marxism, Morality, and Self-Interest") argues (1) that Marx's form of practical reasoning is not purely prudential nor, for any other reason, non-moral in nature and (2) that, in reality, Marx sees moral concerns as well as self-interest as part of revolutionary motivation. Chapter 7 ("Marxism and Moral Historicism") argues against the view that Marx is a "moral historicist," as well as against the thesis that morality is irrelevant from a Marxist point of view because socialism is (purportedly) inevitable. Chapter 8 ("Morality and Ideology") analyzes the Marxist concept of ideology and argues that once we become clear about both this concept and that of morality, we see that morality is not, as a whole, ideological. Chapter 9 ("Marxism, Moral Relativism, and Moral Objectivity") argues that Marxism is not committed to any pernicious form of ethical relativism and then brings to bear hypothetical choice theories and the ideal of unanimous intersubjective agreement. Finally, Chapter 10 ("Marx's Critique of Justice and Rights") takes up Marx's objections to these concepts and argues (1) that they either apply only to certain 'bourgeois' theories or are based on misconceptions and (2) an adequate Marxist moral and social theory must be grounded on theories of justice and human rights.
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Surgener, Kirk. "Neo-Kantian constructivism and metaethics." Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2012. http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/3298/.

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Christine Korsgaard has attempted to defend a distinct approach to metaethics – Neo-Kantian Constructivism. Not only does she present a positive case for her own view, she also attacks existing metaethical positions and even the disctinctions that metaethics has traditionally relied on. This thesis is a sustained examination of this position. I consider whether Korsgaard can legitimately claim to be offering a metaethical position at all, providing her with some defence against the scepticism of some metaethicists. I also examine her attacks on traditional metaethical positions (in particular moral realism and expressivism). I argue that her attack on moral realism can be avoided if the realism on offer takes a particular form. In the case of expressivism I claim that Korsgaard’s attack, though not fully developed in her work, motivates an examination of contemporary hybrid-expressivist theories. I argue that these are, as of yet, no advance over their non-hybrid cousins. Finally I examine Korsgaard’s own position, attempting to make it clearer by combining her claims with a framework developed by Crispin Wright for judgement-dependent qualities. This gives Korsgaard her best chance of a distinctive metaethical position. Ultimately, though, the Neo-Kantian approach to morality fails.
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Scorzo, Greg. "The meta-ethics of normative ethics." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2011. http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/12091/.

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This thesis is an attempt to answer the following question: Do our moral commitments commit us to constraints on what meta-ethical theories we find attractive? In order to answer this question, I first demonstrate that meta-ethical theories can be criticised on moral grounds. I then argue that correctness conditions for moral claims imply the thesis of explanatory moral realism. I do not claim that this is an argument for the truth of explanatory moral realism. Rather, I claim that this is an argument that moral realism is a moral commitment. I then look at two objections to the claim that moral claims can have built in commitments to a meta-ethical theory that takes a stand on the issue of moral realism. The first of these is a set of arguments that Simon Blackburn gives for quasi-realism. The second objection is a set of arguments given by Ronald Dworkin that attack the presuppositions of debates about realism in meta-ethics.
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Fischer, Robert W. "Metaethics and the Trinity." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN) Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN) Access this title online, 2006. http://www.tren.com.

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Bauer, Jacob N. "The Normative Ethics of Gandhian Nonviolence." Wright State University / OhioLINK, 2013. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1386789526.

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Bistagnino, G. "POLITICAL JUSTIFICATION AND THE NORMATIVE FACT OF DISAGREEMENT." Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/2434/227340.

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This dissertation is about disagreement. In particular, it focuses on the problem of how disagreement is to be dealt within the context of liberal democratic societies. The perspective from which this issue is tackled is that of normative political philosophy and it regards both how disagreement should be conceptualized in such context, but also how citizens should behave in the discussion of norms and policies upon which they deeply disagree. In particular, this work focuses on disagreements about ethical issues, which are widespread and pervasive in contemporary democracies. Since such disagreements represent an important portion of political debates and may sometimes constitute inception for collisions and violent episodes, the scope of this work is relevant with regards to the reality of current debates in democratic societies. However, understanding the problem of political philosophy is important also at the level of theoretical research. Indeed, that of disagreement among citizens who are to live together in the same society represents one of the most long-standing issues in political philosophy, having its roots in those social contract theories defended by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. Moreover, starting with the publication of John Rawls’s Political Liberalism, this issue has gained new and tremendous interest in contemporary debates of normative political philosophy. In particular, among liberal political theorists, the mainstream position has at its core the concept of public justification, namely the idea that political authority can be considered legitimate only insofar as the reasons given for political action can be reasonably accepted by those subjected to it. In this work, I seek to critically evaluate the public justification approach and to highlight some tensions within its theoretical project, which I find unsatisfying in its lack of attention with respect to the phenomenon of disagreement. I strenuously believe that in order to address the questions of how disagreement should be treated within the political context of a democratic society, a deep inquiry into the nature of disagreement itself is necessary. Only when it is clear what a disagreement is, it is possible to find means to deal with it. In this sense, I do not provide answers to particular disputes, or settle some disagreements by favouring certain positions over others. Rather, I attempt to provide theoretical tools to comprehend and treat those very disputes in the political context. The hypothesis from which this work begins is the idea that the dominant, mainstream theories of justificatory liberalism are unsatisfying and should be rejected because of their detrimental treatment of disagreement. In particular, I argue that their method in tackling the issue of how individuals holding different views and beliefs can live together in a stable and harmonious society is unpersuasive. Seeking a practical solution and rejecting a philosophical approach to the problem, justificatory liberals simply miss the point about disagreement. From this hypothesis, I draw the thesis that in order to treat disagreements in democratic societies, it is necessary to understand what a disagreement fundamentally consists in. Only with a convincing account of the phenomenon of disagreement, it is possible to identify its normative implications. Finally, to achieve these results, I propose a methodological approach defending metaethics as a workable tool apt to explain and account for certain normative phenomena. Chapters 1-3 are methodological and are concerned with metaphilosophical questions about how the problem of disagreement should be tackled from the perspective of political philosophy. In the first two chapters, I critically evaluate the two most prominent accounts of justificatory liberalism and reject them. In chapter three, I present and defend my methodological approach by showing the importance of metaethical understanding for normative political philosophy. Chapter 4, is devoted to clarify what a disagreement actually is and explain its nature. Chapters 5-6 are the normative ones and focus on how citizens should respond to disagreement in the context of democratic societies and what principles of deliberation they should abide to.
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Simmons, Scott M. "Nihilism and Argumentation: a Weakly Pragmatic Defense of Authoritatively Normative Reasons." Bowling Green State University / OhioLINK, 2020. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1589996802190052.

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Books on the topic "Normative Ethics and Metaethics"

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James, Fieser, ed. Metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics: Historical and contemporary readings. Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2000.

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Ernest, Sosa, and Villanueva Enrique, eds. Metaethics. Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 2009.

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Ernest, Sosa, and Villanueva Enrique, eds. Metaethics. Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 2009.

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Ernest, Sosa, and Villanueva Enrique, eds. Metaethics. Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 2009.

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Ernest, Sosa, and Villanueva Enrique, eds. Metaethics. Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 2009.

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Russ, Shafer-Landau, ed. Metaethics. Routledge, 2008.

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Russ, Shafer-Landau, ed. Metaethics. Routledge, 2008.

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Zhaohui. Buddhist normative ethics. Dharma-Dhatu Publication, 2014.

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Fieser, James. Metaethics, Normative Ethics, and Applied Ethics: Contemporary and Historical Readings. Wadsworth Publishing, 1999.

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Principles of New Ethics II: Normative Ethics I. Taylor & Francis Group, 2020.

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Book chapters on the topic "Normative Ethics and Metaethics"

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Schroeder, Mark. "Normative Ethics and Metaethics." In The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315213217-44.

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FitzPatrick, William J. "Ethical Non-Naturalism and Normative Properties." In New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230294899_2.

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Fremstedal, Roe. "Kierkegaard's Views on Normative Ethics, Moral Agency, and Metaethics." In A Companion to Kierkegaard. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118783795.ch7.

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Ghaly, Mohammed. "Introduction." In Islamic Ethics and Incidental Findings. Springer International Publishing, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-59405-2_1.

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AbstractThis introductory chapter situates the study within the broader context of the genomic revolution catalyzed by the Human Genome Project (HGP). It examines the HGP’s profound impact across three pivotal dimensions: its contribution to biomedical sciences by elucidating the human genotype, its facilitation of precision and personalized medicine through extensive genome mapping, and its intersection with ethical inquiries surrounding human nature and morality. The chapter then explores the allure of genomics within the Muslim world, spurred by scientific enthusiasm, the necessity for inclusivity in precision medicine, and the interest in reviving the Islamic civilization’s golden age of science. However, it highlights a glaring gap: while Islamic ethical deliberations initially focused on the permissibility of participating in the genomic revolution, practical “how” questions arising from the establishment of national genome projects and biobanks in Muslim-majority countries since 2013 have largely remained unaddressed, particularly regarding the ethical management of incidental findings (IFs). The chapter outlines the study’s aim to bridge this gap by constructing a comprehensive Islamic ethical framework for managing IFs, thereby contributing to both secular and Islamic bioethical discourses. It advocates for critical engagement between these discourses, rejecting oversimplified stereotypes and dogmatism, and promoting intercultural dialogue. Furthermore, the chapter delineates the study’s structure, comprising two main chapters: the first focuses on constructing a robust moral framework grounded in Islamic metaethics and normative ethics, while the second delves into the ethical evaluation of disclosing various categories of IFs. Appendices include a systematic overview of ethical judgments on IFs and a draft national policy document on Islamic ethics and genomics commissioned by the Qatar Ministry of Public Health, underscoring the study’s relevance to healthcare policymaking in Muslim-majority countries.
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Chakraborti, Chhanda. "Metaethics I." In Introduction to Ethics. Springer Nature Singapore, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0707-6_3.

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Chakraborti, Chhanda. "Metaethics II." In Introduction to Ethics. Springer Nature Singapore, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0707-6_4.

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Bunge, Mario. "Metaethics." In Ethics: The Good and the Right. Springer Netherlands, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3587-2_10.

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Schroeder, Mark. "The Problems of Metaethics." In Noncognitivism in Ethics, 2nd ed. Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003079842-1.

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Zaidi, Shabih H. "Ethical Theories and Metaethics." In Ethics in Medicine. Springer International Publishing, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01044-1_2.

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Gustafson, Andrew B. "Normative Ethics." In Encyclopedia of Business and Professional Ethics. Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23514-1_1222-1.

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Conference papers on the topic "Normative Ethics and Metaethics"

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Siapka, Anastasia. "Towards a Feminist Metaethics of AI." In AIES '22: AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society. ACM, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3514094.3534197.

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Mouton, F., M. M. Malan, and H. S. Venter. "Social engineering from a normative ethics perspective." In 2013 Information Security for South Africa. IEEE, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/issa.2013.6641064.

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Fang, Xi, and Juanjuan Wang. "A Review of the Controversy between Virtue Ethics and Normative Ethics." In 2018 International Seminar on Education Research and Social Science (ISERSS 2018). Atlantis Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/iserss-18.2018.27.

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Grastien, Alban, Claire Benn, and Sylvie Thiébaux. "Computing Plans that Signal Normative Compliance." In AIES '21: AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society. ACM, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3461702.3462607.

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Lin, Athena, and Justin Hess. "Developing a Method to Distinguish Between Normative and Ethical Behaviors in Engineering." In 2023 IEEE International Symposium on Ethics in Engineering, Science, and Technology (ETHICS). IEEE, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ethics57328.2023.10154956.

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Canavotto, Ilaria, and John Horty. "Piecemeal Knowledge Acquisition for Computational Normative Reasoning." In AIES '22: AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society. ACM, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3514094.3534182.

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Leben, Derek. "Normative Principles for Evaluating Fairness in Machine Learning." In AIES '20: AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society. ACM, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3375627.3375808.

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Li, Huao, Stephanie Milani, Vigneshram Krishnamoorthy, Michael Lewis, and Katia Sycara. "Perceptions of Domestic Robots' Normative Behavior Across Cultures." In AIES '19: AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society. ACM, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3306618.3314251.

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Pinto, Fernando, and Ana Cristina Garcia. "Facing constitutive and normative aspects of different philosophical currents when approaching AI Ethics." In Conferência Latino-Americana de Ética em Inteligência Artificial. Sociedade Brasileira de Computação - SBC, 2024. https://doi.org/10.5753/laai-ethics.2024.32470.

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Integrating artificial intelligence (AI), particularly machine learning, into legal decision-making is gaining prominence across various jurisdictions. While AI systems can offer efficiency and support in legal decisions, they also raise significant ethical concerns. This paper explores how AI systems, designed with underlying philosophical frameworks such as deontology and utilitarianism, can lead to conflicting outcomes when applied to legal judgments. The paper argues for a multidimensional ethical approach to AI in law that aligns with the legal philosophy of the respective jurisdiction while ensuring transparency, auditability, and fairness in decision-making processes.
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Bessa, A. "20. Unveiling the normative dimension of food sustainability: synergies and clashes of law." In 13th Congress of the European Society for Agricultural and Food Ethics. Wageningen Academic Publishers, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.3920/978-90-8686-834-6_20.

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Reports on the topic "Normative Ethics and Metaethics"

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Readiness assessment methodology. A tool of the Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. UNESCO, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.54678/yhaa4429.

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The Readiness assessment methodology (RAM) is a macro level instrument that will help countries understand where they stand on the scale of preparedness to implement AI ethically and responsibly for all their citizens, in so doing highlighting what institutional and regulatory changes are needed. The outputs of the RAM will help UNESCO tailor the capacity building efforts to the needs of specific countries. Capacity here refers to the ability to assess AI systems in line with the Recommendation, the presence of requisite and appropriate human capital, and infrastructure, policies, and regulations to address the challenges brought about by AI technologies and ensure that people and their interests are always at the center of AI development. In November 2021, the 193 Member States of UNESCO signed the Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, the first global normative instrument in its domain. The Recommendation serves as a comprehensive and actionable framework for the ethical development and use of AI, encompassing the full spectrum of human rights. It does so by maintaining focus on all stages of the AI system lifecycle. Beyond elaborating the values and principles that should guide the ethical design, development and use of AI, the Recommendation lays out the actions required from Member States to ensure the upholding of such values and principles, through advocating for effective regulation and providing recommendations in various essential policy areas, such as gender, the environment, and communication and information. The Recommendation mandated the development of two key tools, the Readiness Assessment Methodology (RAM) and the Ethical Impact Assessment (EIA), which form the core pillars of the implementation. These tools both aim to assess and promote the resilience of existing laws, policies and institutions to AI implementation in the country, as well as the alignment of AI systems with the values and principles set out in the Recommendation. The goal of this document is to provide more information on the Readiness Assessment Methodology, lay out its various dimensions, and detail the work plan for the implementing countries, including the type of entities that need to be involved, responsibilities of each entity, and the split of work between UNESCO and the implementing country. UNESCO Catno: 0000385198
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