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Journal articles on the topic 'Normative Ethics and Metaethics'

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1

Jezierski, Romuald. "Metaethics as Methodology of Normative Ethics." Dialectics and Humanism 13, no. 2 (1986): 97–107. https://doi.org/10.5840/dialecticshumanism1986132/331.

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2

Meawad, Stephen. "“Unethical” Ethics." Exchange 54, no. 1 (2025): 56–70. https://doi.org/10.1163/1572543x-05401001.

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Abstract This article accomplishes three tasks simultaneously: 1) It provides an analysis of the relationship between Coptic Orthodox Christianity and contemporary Western moral philosophy; 2) It assesses this relationship within the scope of metaethics and normative ethics, providing brief appraisals of deontology, consequentialism, and virtue ethics; and 3) It provides a more detailed analysis of Coptic Orthodoxy’s relationship to deontological ethics, suggesting that Copts sometimes risk exhibiting a pseudo-deontology: adherence to prescribed actions in emulation of moral exemplars but in a spirit distinct from those exemplars. Copts, in their singular, struggle-laden, and grace-filled pursuit of unity with God, are to be lauded for, and ought to continue, bypassing metaethics and normative ethics altogether. However, acknowledging their occasional acquiescence to pseudo-deontology will allow them both to refocus on this pursuit of God and to feel no pressure to subscribe to Western ethical currents.
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3

Forcehimes, Andrew T. "On L. W. Sumner’s “Normative Ethics and Metaethics”." Ethics 125, no. 4 (2015): 1142–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/680881.

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4

Protopapadakis, Evangelos D. "“Ethical Minefields” and the Voice of Common Sense: A Discussion with Julian Savulescu." Conatus 4, no. 1 (2019): 125. http://dx.doi.org/10.12681/cjp.19712.

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Theoretical ethics includes both metaethics (the meaning of moral terms) and normative ethics (ethical theories and principles). Practical ethics involves making decisions about every day real ethical problems, like decisions about euthanasia, what we should eat, climate change, treatment of animals, and how we should live. It utilizes ethical theories, like utilitarianism and Kantianism, and principles, but more broadly a process of reflective equilibrium and consistency to decide how to act and be.
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5

Protopapadakis, Evangelos D., and Julian Savulescu. "Ethical Minefields and the Voice of Common Sense: A Discussion with Julian Savulescu." Conatus - Journal of Philosophy 4, no. 1 (2019): 125–33. https://doi.org/10.12681/cjp.19712.

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Theoretical ethics includes both metaethics (the meaning of moral terms) and normative ethics (ethical theories and principles). Practical ethics involves making decisions about every day real ethical problems, like decisions about euthanasia, what we should eat, climate change, treatment of animals, and how we should live. It utilizes ethical theories, like utilitarianism and Kantianism, and principles, but more broadly a process of reflective equilibrium and consistency to decide how to act and be.
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6

Schaab, Janis David. "Kantian Constructivism and the Sources of Normativity." Kant Yearbook 14, no. 1 (2022): 97–120. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kantyb-2022-0005.

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Abstract While it is uncontroversial that Kantian constructivism has implications for normative ethics, its status as a metaethical view has been contested. In this article, I provide a characterisation of metaethical Kantian constructivism that withstands these criticisms. I start by offering a partial defence of Sharon Street’s practical standpoint characterisation. However, I argue that this characterisation, as presented by Street, is ultimately incomplete because it fails to demonstrate that the claims of Kantian constructivism constitute a distinctive contribution to metaethics. I then try to complete the practical standpoint characterisation by elaborating on Christine Korsgaard’s suggestion that metaethical Kantian constructivism takes up a position on the source of morality’s normativity.
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7

Byron, Michael. "Right-Making, Reference, and Reduction." Disputatio 6, no. 39 (2014): 139–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2014-0010.

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Abstract The causal theory of reference (CTR) provides a well-articulated and widely-accepted account of the reference relation. On CTR the reference of a term is fixed by whatever property causally regulates the competent use of that term. CTR poses a metaethical challenge to realists by demanding an account of the properties that regulate the competent use of normative predicates. CTR might pose a challenge to ethical theorists as well. Long (2012) argues that CTR entails the falsity of any normative ethical theory. First-order theory attempts to specify what purely descriptive property is a fundamental right-making property (FRM). Long contends that the notion that the FRM causally regulates competent use of the predicate ‘right’ leads to a reductio. The failure of this argument is nevertheless instructive concerning a point at which ethics and metaethics overlap.
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8

Hart, Jr., Noah. "A Common Ethical Foundation for Gobalization: Metaethics, Normative Ethics and Applied Ethics." International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences: Annual Review 3, no. 11 (2009): 49–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.18848/1833-1882/cgp/v03i11/51793.

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9

Sergeeva, T. "Transparency, meta-ethics, normative ethics and applied ethics as elements in the management of the organization." Bulletin of Science and Practice 4, no. 8 (2018): 257–61. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1345292.

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In this article transparency merits and demerits are considered, concepts of metaethics, standard ethics, applied ethics reveal, their role in the management of the modern organization is considered. In conclusion, it is concluded that successful implementation of the strategy of a balance between “transparency” and information about the activities of the organization is necessary. This is one way to build the trust of employees, existing and potential customers, partners and even competitors. Transparency is not directly related to better corporate governance.
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10

Silverstein, Matthew. "Inescapability and Normativity." Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6, no. 3 (2017): 1–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v6i3.67.

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When we make ethical claims, we invoke a kind of objective authority. A familiar worry about our ethical practices is that this invocation of authority involves a mistake. This worry was perhaps best captured by John Mackie, who argued that the fabric of the world contains nothing so queer as objective authority and thus that all our ethical claims are false. Kantians such as Christine Korsgaard and David Velleman offer accounts of the objectivity of ethics that do without the controversial realist assumptions which gives rise to Mackie’s skepticism. They contend that our ethical claims correctly invoke objective authority not by corresponding to some normative pocket of the fabric of reality, but rather by expressing commitments that are inescapable. This Kantian strategy is often advertised as an alternative to traditional but “boring” metaethics. Its proponents promise to vindicate our ethical practices without entangling us in familiar metanormative disputes about the metaphysics, epistemology and semantics of ethics. In this paper, I argue that the Kantian strategy cannot make good on this promise. Considered as an attempt to sidestep traditional metaethics, it lacks the resources to produce the desired normative conclusions. The outlook for the Kantian strategy becomes more promising, though, if we pair it with one of two familiar metanormative theories: expressivism or reductionism. The resulting metaethically-loaded versions of the Kantian strategy can deliver the promised conclusions, but only by plunging straight into the quagmire of traditional metaethics. And there all of the familiar objections to expressivism and reductionism await.
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11

Couture, Jocelyne, and Kai Nielsen. "Afterword: Whither Moral Philosophy?" Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 21 (1995): 273–337. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1995.10717441.

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Most of the essays collected here are essays in metaethics seeking in exacting and interesting ways to resolve problems raised by the familiar options in metaethics we outlined in our Introduction. Richard Brandt, for example, forcefully argues, going much against the at least modestly holistic grain of our time, for a foundationalism (noncognitivist though it be) which would be foundational in both metaethics and normative ethics. R.M. Hare makes a brief but systematic defense, which is both spirited and clear, of his prescriptivism (a species of what we, following tradition, have called ‘noncognitivism,’ but which he argues should instead be called ‘nondescriptivism’). His arguments here for his position - call it nondescriptivism or noncognitivism- are directed forcefully against ethical naturalism (descriptivism) and specifically against the naturalism of Philippa Foot. Nicholas Sturgeon and David Copp contribute elaborate and rigorously argued defenses of ethical naturalism, or, as they might prefer to call it, ‘moral realism.’
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12

Malik, Mohammad Manzoor. "Heritage of Islamic Ethics and Contemporary Issues A Call for Relevantization." Journal of Islam in Asia (E-ISSN: 2289-8077) 8 (February 2, 2012): 295–313. http://dx.doi.org/10.31436/jia.v8i0.238.

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This study addresses the subject of Islamic ethics from definitional and disciplinary perspectives. It highlights the need for relevantization of Islamic ethics to contemporary issues in a systematic manner which, in turn, calls for development of Islamic ethics as a complete discipline with ability to meet all types of challenges: conceptual, practical, normative, applicative, etc. Regarding the definitional issue, different from and more expansive than the traditional understanding of al-ākhlāq, the researcher argues that a proper definition of ethics should include ethically relevant habits, character, and behavior in its subject matter. As an academic discipline of paramount, practical significance, Islamic ethics should adequately address metaethical, normative, and applicative aspects of the subject. In terms of metaethics, Islamic ethics is derived from revealed knowledge; whereas, principles of Islamic jurisprudence (usËl al-fīqh)offers the best available methodology for the discipline in meeting demands of normativity and application. Regarding the nature of the subject of Islamic ethics, the researcher argues that understanding Islamic ethics as virtue ethics is unjustifiable reduction because a careful study of the subject from its sources would prove that Islamic ethics is rather an integrated field comprising of virtues ethics, divine command theory, duty-based ethics, etc. Therefore, Islamic ethics should be developed, taught, and learned as a whole composite of above-mentioned elements.
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13

Kosiewicz, Jerzy. "The Ethical Context of Justifying Anti-Doping Attitudes: Critical Reflections." Physical Culture and Sport. Studies and Research 53, no. 1 (2011): 76–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/v10141-011-0024-6.

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The Ethical Context of Justifying Anti-Doping Attitudes: Critical ReflectionsThe reflections presented in the paper are not normative (in general, it can be said, that they do not create moral values and demands). The presented reflections particularly stress the sense, essence, meaning, and identity of sport in the context of moral demands. A disquisition pointing out that sports and sport-related doping can be situated beyond the moral good and evil must be considered precisely as metaethical, and leads in a consciously controversial way to fully defining the identity of sport in general, as well as the identity of particular sports disciplines.These reflections also refer to the issue concerning the identity of sports philosophy, i.e. general deliberations and specific issues concerning, for example, the factual and cognitive status of normative ethics in sport.It is impossible to overestimate the role and meaning of metaethical reflection in the context of substantiating moral demands in sports as well as in the context of practical results of expectations. This metaethical reflection not only extends self-knowledge, but also contributes to the metaphilosophy of sports. The degree of the development of self-knowledge – both the metaethics of sports and the metaphilosophy of sports – is also a very important declaration, and a sign of general maturity of the philosophy of sports (Kosiewicz 2008/2009, pp. 5-38).
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14

Baylis, Françoise. "Rebuttal: Expert Ethics Testimony." Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 28, no. 3 (2000): 240–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-720x.2000.tb00666.x.

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According to Giles Scofield, ethicists can provide expert testimony in descriptive ethics and metaethics, but not normative ethics. Lawrence Schneiderman appears to disagree with this view, and presumably believes that it is appropriate for an expert witness in ethics to provide ethics testimony in all three areas. I draw this conclusion from several claims made in his commentary which aim to show that we would be contending experts if both invited to testify on a case involving claims about futile medical treatment. This disagreement aside, taken together both commentaries suggest that my testimony in the case of Andrew Sawatzky is wanting.In the response that follows I do not engage in a debate about the content of my testimony.
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15

Perilla, Julian. "Rethinking Nietzschean Constitutivism: An Ethics of Value." Journal of Nietzsche Studies 56, no. 1 (2025): 21–48. https://doi.org/10.5325/jnietstud.56.1.0021.

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Abstract This article attempts a reconstruction of Nietzsche’s metaethics through a constitutivist lens. It examines the relationship between life’s meaningfulness and our distinctive way of valuing to offer a value-based version of constitutivism—a value constitutivism, as called in this article. For Nietzsche, valuing has a characteristic function or aim, namely, to give life meaning; good values are simply those that perform that function well. This version of Nietzschean constitutivism has both interpretive and substantive upshots. Mainly, it clarifies the general normative structure of Nietzsche’s axiological theory and helps vindicate the kind of revaluation of values he envisioned—with power playing a central normative role. In sum, constitutivism remains a promising approach to Nietzsche, and Nietzsche’s writings continue to offer rich insights into the source and nature of normativity.
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16

Kosiewicz, Jerzy. "The Ethical and Legal Context of Justifying Anti-Doping Attitudes." Physical Culture and Sport. Studies and Research 62, no. 1 (2014): 47–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/pcssr-2014-0011.

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Abstract The reflections presented in the paper are not normative (in general, it can be said, that they do not create moral values and demands). The presented reflections particularly stress the sense, essence, meaning, and identity of sport in the context of moral demands. A disquisition pointing out that sports and sport-related doping can be situated beyond the moral good and evil must be considered precisely as metaethical, and leads in a consciously controversial way to fully defining the identity of sport in general, as well as the identity of particular sports disciplines. These reflections also refer to the issue concerning the identity of sports philosophy, i.e. general deliberations and specific issues concerning, for example, the factual and cognitive status of normative ethics in sport. It is impossible to overestimate the role and meaning of metaethical reflection in the context of substantiating moral demands in sports as well as in the context of practical results of expectations. This metaethical reflection not only extends self-knowledge, but also contributes to the metaphilosophy of sports. The degree of the development of self-knowledge - both the metaethics of sports and the metaphilosophy of sports - is also a very important declaration, and a sign of general maturity of the philosophy of sports (Kosiewicz 2008/2009, pp. 5-38)
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17

Halbig, Christoph. "'Can a Philosophical Justification of Ethics Be Autonomous While Acknowledging the Role of God in Grounding Moral Facts?'." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 8, no. 3 (2016): 93–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v8i3.1688.

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Autonomy and ethics are related to each other in complex ways. The paper starts by distinguishing and characterizing three basic dimensions of this relation. It proceeds by arguing for the compatibility of moral realism with a due respect for human autonomy. Nevertheless, supernaturalist moral realism seems to pose a special challenge for the autonomy of ethics as a self-standing normative realm. The paper ends with some considerations on the role of divine authority both in metaethics and in the general theory of value.
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18

Zadroga, Adam. "Business Ethics in Poland: A metatheoretical analysis." Annales. Etyka w Życiu Gospodarczym 20, no. 8 (2017): 19–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/1899-2226.20.8.02.

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From the beginning of the 1990s, a considerable interest in business ethics has been observed in Poland. It seems that the legacy of Polish researchers concerned with this academic discipline is already rich enough, and at the same time so diverse, that it is worth making an attempt to systematise it, exploring and appropriately naming the basic approaches to deal with business ethics in Poland. The carried-out analyses allowed to determine the following leading methods in the formal aspect: firstly, metaethics of business ethics; secondly, business ethics practised in the framework of various modifications of normative ethics (mostly deontology, utilitarianism, virtue ethics and ethics of responsibility; on the other hand, it has been observed that there is a complete lack of clear references to personalistic ethics); thirdly, business ethics practised as descriptive ethics in economic life.
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19

Cekic, Nenad. "Naturalistic fallacy and open question argument: One century of debate." Theoria, Beograd 51, no. 3 (2008): 29–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo0803029c.

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Maybe the most famous and used notion in relatively short history of metaethics is so called 'naturalistic fallacy'. This term was for the first time used by G. E. Moore in his Prinicipia Ethica. Idea of 'naturalistic fallacy' is based upon 'open-question argument'. Discussion of the scope and real results obtained by this argument is open even in metaethics at the beginning of the 21st Century. Today it is clear that open question is not a proof of invalidity of naturalism or any kind of cognitivism. Still, open-question argument is a very useful tool both in metaethics and in normative theories. In this article reader can find direction of the contemporary debate about naturalistic fallacy, naturalism and some modified versions of classical open-question argument.
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20

Darwall, Stephen. "Sentiment, care, and respect." Theory and Research in Education 8, no. 2 (2010): 153–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1477878510368618.

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Michael Slote proposes a rethinking of moral education from the perspective of a normative ethics of care combined with his distinctive sentimentalist metaethics. I raise questions concerning the role of empathy in Slote’s picture and argue that empathy is related to respect and sentiments through which we hold ourselves and one another accountable. Care in the sense of benevolent concern is a fundamentally different attitude from (recognition) respect: whereas the former is focused on its object’s well-being, the latter responds to a person’s dignity and authority to make claims and demands of us.
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21

Bertolini, Simona. "Roman Ingarden: Phenomenology, Responsibility and the Ontological Foundations of Morality." Miscellanea Anthropologica et Sociologica 20, no. 1 (2019): 82–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.26881/maes.2019.1.04.

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Even if Roman Ingarden did not develop an ethics stricto sensu, and although his philosophy cannot be immediately associated with a “practical turn” in phenomenology, his investigation of the essence of the real world brought him to consider the nature of man and the ontological conditions of possibility of his morally oriented actions. Without expressing normative prescriptions, and maintaining his observations in the field of eidetic description, the author felt the need to provide a foundation for ethics, inasmuch as he strived to both highlight ethical phenomenon evidence in material ontology contexts, as well as demonstrate the structural presuppositions of this phenomenon within the context of formal ontology. It is exactly this priority of ontological investigation that represents one of the most original contributions of the Polish philosopher on practical topics. The aim of this paper is to illustrate the way in which such a particular phenomenologicalontological metaethics takes shape through the theses expressed in Ingarden’s articles on human nature and responsibility.
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22

Pedersen, Johnnie R. R. "Normative Ethics: an Armchair Discipline?" Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 56, no. 2 (2019): 151–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps201956235.

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This paper discusses a challenge to normative ethics motivated by experimental philosophy. Experimental philosophers object to the perceived “armchair” or a priori nature of philosophy, claiming it should rather be empirical or naturalistic. The paper investigates the application of this claim to normative ethics. Dubbing the application of the experimental philosophers’ contention to normative ethics “the Armchair Claim,” I distinguish descriptive and normative versions of this challenge, and consider their merits as comments on the method of normative ethics (descriptive versions), and as comments on how normative ethics should be done (normative versions). Characterizing normative ethics as essentially involving the use of the method of reflective equilibrium, I show how the versions of the Armchair Claim that I distinguish either misconstrue normative ethics, or are committed to metaethical views that are controversial. To bring home the latter point, I contrast two meta-ethical positions, and show how, on one such view, naturalism, the descriptive version could be correct, whereas on another, intuitionism, it would be false. The normative version, in turn, is consistent with naturalism, but begs the question against the intuitionist since she argues that normative ethics cannot be empirical. The upshot is that a conclusive assessment of the Armchair Claim will have to await the resolution of disputed issues in meta-ethics. However, normative ethicists can get on with their work since reflective equilibrium is unaffected by such debates.
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23

Kocarev, Ljupco, and Jasna Koteska. "Digital Me Ontology and Ethics." Futures of Education, Culture and Nature - Learning to Become 1 (January 21, 2022): 15–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.7146/fecun.v1i.130229.

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This paper addresses ontology and ethics of an AI agent called digital me. We define digital me as an autonomous, decision-making, and learning agent, representing an individual and having practically immortal life. It is assumed that digital me is equipped with the big-five personality model, ensuring that it provides a model of some aspects of a strong AI: consciousness, free will, and intentionality. As computer-based personality judgments are more accurate than those made by humans, digital me can judge the personality of the individual represented by the digital me, other individuals’ personalities, and other digital me-s. We describe seven ontological qualities of digital me: a) double-layer status of Digital Being versus digital me, b) digital me versus real me, c) mind-digital me and body-digital me, d) digital me versus doppelganger (shadow digital me), e) non-human time concept, f) social quality, g) practical immortality. We argue that with the advancement of AI’s sciences and technologies, there exist two digital me thresholds. The first threshold defines digital me having some (rudimentary) form of consciousness, free will, and intentionality. The second threshold assumes that digital me is equipped with moral learning capabilities, implying that, in principle, digital me-s could develop their own ethics which significantly differs from human’s understanding of ethics. Finally, we discuss the implications of digital me metaethics, normative and applied ethics, the implementation of the Golden Rule in digital me-s, and we suggest two sets of normative principles for digital me: consequentialist and duty based digital me principles.
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24

Daryono, Daryono, and Suparman Syukur. "The Moral Philosophy of Capitalism In the View of the Javanese Islamic Trade Ethos." Jurnal THEOLOGIA 31, no. 2 (2021): 165–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.21580/teo.2020.31.2.6862.

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The results of this paper were based on library research which aimed to understand capitalism in terms of Javanese Muslim trade ethos based on the work of experts. On the one hand, there was a mismatch between the economic system of capitalism and the ethos for the objectification of Islam in commerce and the results were suitable for world views and cultural life. Java was in a postcolonial state on the other hand. The method of analyzing its understanding was through historical and normative social as well as normative ethics and metaethics. The analysis resulted in three characteristics of the theoretical construction of Javanese Muslim trade ethos as a way of being kind, namely respect and care for anything, respect and harmony or care for anyone and in accordance with the culture and religious experience of Javanese Muslims at that time. These three characteristics had been proven during the Mangkunegara IV period, capable of creating human progress in various fields of life, especially the Mangkunegaran kingdom, for example, it was called Kala Sumbaga (a prosperous period). Therefore, this theoretical construction was expected to be an alternative to ethical thinking and vision in trade at the regional or national level.
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ARRUDA, CAROLINE T. "Why Moral Status Matters for Metaethics." Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4, no. 4 (2018): 471–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2018.15.

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AbstractI show that an overlooked feature of our moral life—moral status—provides a route to vindicating naturalist moral realism in much the same way that the Humean theory of motivation and judgment internalism are used to undermine it. Moral status presents two explanatory burdens for metaethical views. First, a given view must provide an ecumenical explanation of moral status, which does not depend on the truth of its metaethical claims (say, that there are mind-independent facts about moral status). Second, its explanation must be consistent with persistent normative ethical disagreement about what constitutes moral status. I conclude that naturalist moral realism succeeds, while quasi-realism fails because it cannot meet the latter requirement. This argument has three results: we have a new route for metaethical vindication more generally and for naturalist moral realism in particular; quasi-realism's plausibility is undermined by an inability to explain disagreement, but not for the familiar reasons.
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Allegri, Francesco. "Pluralism and Relativism in Ethics Starting from W. K. Frankena." Kultura i Wartości 38 (December 31, 2024): 77–88. https://doi.org/10.17951/kw.2024.38.77-88.

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This article connects pluralism and relativism in ethics through the path of a classic scholar of 20th century moral philosophy: W. K. Frankena. In normative ethics Frankena defends a pluralist perspective, because in his theory of obligation there is a plurality of basic moral principles (exactly two) that may conflict with one another and there is no strict order of priority for resolving conflicts between them. His attitude towards ethical relativism is, however, negative, because in his view all three version of relativism in the moral sphere (descriptive, metaethical, and normative) are questionable. The author explains the reasons for the plausibility of a pluralist model in normative ethics, but he shows more openness to relativism than Frankena. In particular, the author defends a moderate version of descriptive and metaethical relativism, allowing that conflicting moral evaluations of certain issues may be equally justified. Such a form of relativism, far from constituting a “bogeyman”, simply expresses the idea that the correct use of reason does not necessarily lead to a single outcome, but can yield a plurality of results (without thereby allowing every result).
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Lederman, Zohar, and Benjamin Capps. "One health ethics: a response to pragmatism." Journal of Medical Ethics 46, no. 9 (2020): 632–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2019-105859.

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Johnson and Degeling have recently enquired whether one health (OH) requires a comprehensive normative framework, concluding that such a framework, while not necessary, may be helpful. In this commentary, we provide a context for this debate, and describe how pragmatism has been predominant in the OH literature. We nevertheless argue that articulating a comprehensive normative theory to ground OH practice might clear existing vagueness and provide stronger guidance in relevant health dilemmas. A comprehensive theory will also be needed eventually to ground notions such as universal good. We, thus, call for the systematic articulation of a comprehensive, metaethical theory, concomitantly with already ongoing normative work.
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Omarova, Almira. "THE NATURE OF NORMATIVE MORAL JUDGMENTS." Adam alemi 4, no. 86 (2020): 129–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.48010/2020.4/1999-5849.14.

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Moral judgements have been a crucial subject-matter of a discussion in the domain of normativity. Many thinkers argue moral judgments are necessarily action-guiding, which prescribe what one ought to do and what ought to be the case. The moral statement “killing is wrong” is prescriptive and locates in the purview of first-order ethical questions. Moral realists widely accept that moral judgments represent propositions, therefore they are subject to truth and false conditions. Thus, moral conclusions can be derived logically from valid premises. How to derive the conclusion “killing is wrong”? How to justify the statement? What does “wrong” mean in this context? This kind of philosophical issue has been labeled as the second-order questions, which is in the purview of metaethics. This article is devoted to the subject of normativity and the nature of moral judgments advocated by metaethicists David Copp and Ralph Wedgwood. The purpose of this article is to outline the current debate on the nature of normative moral judgments. In conclusion, I shall agree with both Copp and Wedgwoodon two points. One, normative moral judgment can be subject to cognition. Two, there are true and false beliefs about particular moral facts which constitute the significant part of the reality we live in.
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Klenk, Michael. "Charting Moral Psychology’s Significance for Bioethics: Routes to Bioethical Progress, its Limits, and Lessons from Moral Philosophy." Diametros 17, no. 64 (2020): 36–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.33392/diam.1520.

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Empirical moral psychology is sometimes dismissed as normatively insignificant because it plays no decisive role in settling ethical disputes. But that conclusion, even if it is valid for normative ethics, does not extend to bioethics. First, in contrast to normative ethics, bioethics can legitimately proceed from a presupposed moral framework. Within that framework, moral psychology can be shown to play four significant roles: it can improve bioethicists’ understanding of (1) the decision situation, (2) the origin and legitimacy of their moral concepts, (3) efficient options for implementing (legitimate) decisions, and (4) how to change and improve some parts of their moral framework. Second, metaethical considerations suggest that moral psychology may lead to the radical revision of entire moral frameworks and thus prompt the radical revision of entire moral frameworks in bioethics. However, I show that bioethics must either relinquish these radical implications of moral psychology and accept that there are limits to progress in bioethics based on moral psychology or establish an epistemic framework that guides radical revision.
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Champagne, Marc. "Axiomatizing umwelt normativity." Sign Systems Studies 39, no. 1 (2011): 9–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/sss.2011.39.1.01.

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Prompted by the thesis that an organism’s umwelt possesses not just a descriptive dimension, but a normative one as well, some have sought to annex semiotics with ethics. Yet the pronouncements made in this vein have consisted mainly in rehearsing accepted moral intuitions, and have failed to concretely further our knowledge of why or how a creature comes to order objects in its environment in accordance with axiological charges of value or disvalue. For want of a more explicit account, theorists writing on the topic have relied almost exclusively on semiotic insights about perception originally designed as part of a sophisticated refutation of idealism. The end result, which has been a form of direct givenness, has thus been far from convincing. In an effort to bring substance to the right-headed suggestion that values are rooted in the biological and conform to species-specific requirements, we present a novel conception that strives to make explicit the elemental structure underlying umwelt normativity. Building and expanding on the seminal work of Ayn Rand in metaethics, we describe values as an intertwined lattice which takes a creature’s own embodied life as its ultimate standard; and endeavour to show how, from this, all subsequent valuations can in principle be determined.
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31

Majumder, Mary Anderlik. "The Roles of Ethicists in Managed Care Litigation." Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 33, no. 2 (2005): 264–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-720x.2005.tb00492.x.

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In the lead article in this symposium issue, Edward Imwinkelried follows other scholars in distinguishing among three types of tasks for ethicists serving as expert witnesses: (1) descriptive (e.g., addressing the existence and content of relevant codes of ethics or guidelines, or the correspondence, or lack of correspondence, between relevant codes or guidelines and the parties’ practices); (2) metaethical (e.g., clarifying concepts, critiquing the logic of a particular argument or position); and (3) normative (e.g., addressing what the standard or practice should be). He finds agreement that the admissibility of descriptive or metaethical evidence rests upon the usual criteria of helpfulness and reliability. He breaks new ground in arguing that normative evidence typically relates to the judge's legislative rather than adjudicative function and therefore need not satisfy the usual standards for admissibility in order to be considered.
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32

Ball, Stephen W. "Economic Equality: Rawls versus Utilitarianism." Economics and Philosophy 2, no. 2 (1986): 225–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1478061500002644.

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Perhaps the most salient feature of Rawls's theory of justice (Rawls, 1971) which at once attracts supporters and repels critics is its apparent egalitarian conclusion as to how economic goods are to be distributed. Indeed, many of Rawls's sympathizers may find this result intuitively appealing, and regard it as Rawls's enduring contribution to the topic of economic justice, despite technical deficiencies in Rawls's contractarian, decision-theoretic argument for it (see, e.g., Nagel, 1973, p. 234) which occupy the bulk of the critical literature. Rawls himself, having proposed a “coherence” theory of justification in metaethics, must regard the claim that his distributive criterion “is a strongly egalitarian conception” (Rawls, 1971, p. 76) as independently a part of the overarching moral argument. The alleged egalitarian impact of Rawls's theory is crucial again in normative ethics where Rawls is thought to have developed a major counter-theory to utilitarianism (cf. Braybrooke, 1975, p. 304), one of the most popular criticisms of which has been its alleged inadequacy in handling questions of distributive justice. Utilitarians can argue, however, as Brandt recently has, that the diminishing marginal utility of money, along with ignorance of income-welfare curves, would require a utility-maximizing distribution to be substantially egalitarian (Brandt, 1979, pp. 311f., 315f.; cf. Brandt, 1983, p. 102f.). The challenge is therefore for Rawls to show that his theory yields an ethically preferable degree of equality.
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33

Kasavin, Ilya T. "Virtue Epistemology: on the 40th Anniversary of the Turn in Analytical Philosophy." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 56, no. 3 (2019): 6–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps201956341.

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The article summarizes the main developments in virtue epistemology and reacts to the challenges faced by the discipline. This new trend in analytic epistemology emerges as a synthesis of a number of directions (metaethics, social epistemology, metaphilosophy and experimental philosophy). On the one hand, it attempts to overcome some weaknesses of classical epistemology and, on the other hand, it performs this on the same basis, retaining the classical understanding of knowledge as justified true belief. It was dubbed “virtue epistemology” since it focuses on restoration of the normative approach and on the opposition to Quine’s naturalism. It explores intellectual virtues like epistemology explores knowledge claims though emphasizing their subject-dependent nature. It is the cognitive agent who provides a foundation for intellectual virtues no matter whether they are understood as cognitive ability or mental traits. However, the most researchers take epistemic virtues as individual mental states available through introspection, and the entire analysis in fact boils down to the articulation of virtue intuitions in the cognitive process. For those intuitions, thought experiments serve as a test simulating everyday cognitive situations. Still, in the context of virtue epistemology some alternative approaches arise, contributing significant revisions to the subject matter and the methods of analytical epistemology. A collective agent replaces an individual one, and knowledge engages in an integral subject-object and subject-subject context. Normativism mitigates its opposition to naturalism, enabling the utilization of the empirical data from the social sciences and humanities. As a result, a dialogue of virtue epistemology with the philosophy and ethics of science gets the chance.
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34

Tafani, Daniela. "Kant, l'assassino alla porta e il giudizio morale comune." Salesianum 86, no. 4 (2024): 688–714. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14589401.

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In 1797, Kant asserted a thesis that Benjamin Constant had polemically attributed to a German philosopher: we are not allowed to lie, not even to a murderer who asks us whether a friend of ours who is being pursued by him has taken refuge in our house. Kant's answer to the dilemma of the murderer at the door, which rules out the possibility of any exceptions to the duty of truthfulness, seems counterintuitive and difficult to reconcile with Kant's thesis that common moral judgement is reliable. For Kant, the task of the moral philosopher is a conceptual analysis of existing morality, and philosophy has nothing to say about normative ethics other than, or in addition to, what the common man already knows. The paper traces the real subject of the discussion between Kant and Constant and presents the conception that leads Kant to reject the dilemma of the murderer at the door as unrealistic. Kant believes that the course of the world and the choices of moral subjects cannot be objects of calculation, prediction and control and therefore, like his contemporaries, assumes two dimensions, as constitutive of moral life, of which the overriding one imposes prohibitions whose observance is always in the power of everyone.
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35

Prokofiev, Andrei V. "On the Role of Scientific Evidence in Normative Ethics (the Case of the Debunking of Deontological Principles)." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 61, no. 2 (2024): 157–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps202461231.

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The paper deals with the questions of whether naturalization of ethical theory is possible and how radical it should be. The answer to these questions depends largely on the scientific explanations of the process of moral evaluation. The author concentrates on a moderate version of naturalization, which involves merely correcting the conclusions of normative ethics by appealing to scientific evidence. A good example of moderate naturalization is the project of debunking deontological moral principles of J. Green. From J. Green’s point of view, the most important of such principles (“it is impermissible to harm other people as a means of achieving a utilitarian goal, but it is permissible to cause such harm as a side-effect of its achievement”) reflects the functioning of the emotional alarm system, which in the early ages of human history protected small groups from internal violence using contact means of harm. The means of harm have since expanded, but the inflexible emotional part of our psyche still dictates the limits of permissibility. This dictate has no reasonable grounds, and the abovementioned principle cannot claim to be objective and universal. The author shows that the data used by J. Green is different from the results of studies by Yu.I. Aleksandrov and K.R. Arutyunova on the impact of alcohol intoxication on making deontological and utilitarian moral evaluations. These results indicate that both the deontological and the utilitarian principles are partly based on the emotional subsystem. Accordingly, a normative ethicist is forced to choose as the scientific basis of his or her research some of the opposing scientific models that explain the process of making moral evaluations. Some of the models are consistent with the moderate naturalization project, others are not. The choice between models depends exclusively on already taken metaethical and normative preferences.
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36

Akabayashi, Akira, Eisuke Nakazawa, and Nancy S. Jecker. "What are considered ‘good facts’?" Journal of Medical Ethics 45, no. 7 (2019): 473–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2018-105333.

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In the January edition of the Journal of Medical Ethics, Fujita and Tabuchi (hereafter, Authors) responded that we misunderstood the ‘facts’ in our previous article. Our article’s method was twofold. First, it appealed to normative analysis and publicly accessible materials, and second, it targeted a policy-making approach to public funding. We specifically did not focus on the Center for iPS Cell Research and Application or induced pluripotent stem stock projects. The Authors raised five criticisms, including transparency of our interpretation of public funding policy. We reply to these criticisms by clarifying facts, and demonstrating new data (facts), and asking the Authors what qualifies as a ‘good fact’ in medical ethics. We note that in some cases, it might be possible to examine to what extent facts are ‘true’, while in other cases, ‘facts’ are laden with ‘values’, which cannot be confirmed or falsified with observation alone. The level of ‘good’ implicit in a fact is a challenging issue that goes well beyond science and makes metaethical assumptions about the relationships between facts and values more broadly.
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37

Beauchamp, Tom L. "David Hume’s Universalism of Moral Precepts." Dialogue and Universalism 32, no. 1 (2022): 33–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/du20223213.

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This article presents an original interpretation of David Hume’s eighteenth-century writings in moral philosophy as universalistic and normative, and not as merely psychological, metaethical, empirical, and the like, which has been common in many interpretations of Hume. Whether his views should or should not be regarded as a type of general moral theory such as utilitarianism is not considered, although I argue that Hume is deeply committed to a form of virtue ethics. I also argue that Hume sees the fundamentals of morality as a human phenomenon that is universally applicable to, and universally shared across, cultures and geographical regions. In this way Hume relies heavily on his conception of a universally shared common morality, which he refers to as the morality present “in common life.” This morality is a major foundation of his moral philosophy.
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38

WONG, Wai-ying. "生命倫理之方法論的考察". International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 3, № 4 (2001): 5–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.31409.

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LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.在後設倫理學以至生命倫理學上,一直存在著脉絡主義與原則倫理之爭辧。脉絡主義者解決道德問題的方式,是首先審視個別事件發生的脉絡細節,作出道德判斷後再將之用於其他相類事件;原則倫理者卻試圖將一般的道德原則應用於特殊事件上。前者可視為一種「自下而上」的方式,後者則可名為「自上而下」。很多道德哲學家都指出這兩種進路各有利弊。R.M. Hare藉著引介兩層道德思維結構,來論證上述二者其實並不矛盾,相反地,它們在不同的道德思維層面,分別扮演重要角色。在本文中,我嘗試檢視Hare的論証是否成立,又是否會在實踐上引生另外的問題。最後,我將指出,中國的儒家倫理中的「經」、「權」觀念,如何可以幫助解決詠絡主義與原則倫理的問題。There has been controversy between particularism and generalism in metaethics in general and bioethics in particular. Particularists (e.g. contextualists) attempt to solve moral problems by firstly working with particular cases in all of their contextual details and then by applying these results to other similar cases, whereas generalists (principled ethicists) try to apply the general normative principles to particular cases. The former approach can be viewed as a "bottom-up" and the latter "top-down" way. As indicated by many moral philosophers, both of these approaches have shortcomings. Principled ethics have been challenged for their impotence in providing guidance in a moral decision. The challenge is in twofold: Firstly, there is scepticism that one can reach a moral judgment by reasoning deductively from general ethical principles; secondly, these theories are insensitive to and thus do not give due weight to the contextual variabilities in a specific situation. By contrast, contextualism emphasizes the relative importance of inductive method in moral reasoning. However, how to resolve moral issues by employing the inductive method remains a problem. Therefore, while it accuses principled ethics of its inability to guide moral decision, contextualism itself cannot provide any guidance.With respect to the rival views of principled ethics and contextualism, R.M. Hare thinks that both theories have grasped the truth, but only part of it. For instance, contextualism has caught hold of an important truth, that one has to judge each situation on its own merit. But if contextualism persists in asserting that in morals one cannot appeal to general principles, then it is mistaken. This is a mistaken view in that it ignores another obvious truth that some situations are similar in some morally relevant respects, and also in that it holds that these two truths are incompatible. Hare conceives that this mistake arises from confusing the concepts of universality and generality and also from failing to make the distinction between the two levels of moral thinking. By introducing the intuitive level and critical level of moral thinking, Hare argues that the two kinds of metaethical theories are not in real conflict. Contrarily, they both play important roles in our moral thinking, though at different levels. In this paper, I am going to examine to what extent, if ever, Hare's attempt is successful, and furthermore, what are the steps that should be taken to remedy the deficiency, if any. Finally, I try to show that the ideas of "jing" and "quan" in Confucian ethics operate in the two levels of moral thinking in Hare's structure, and hope that these two ideas may help to solve the issue discussed in this paper.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 23 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.
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39

Moberger, Victor. "Hume’s Dictum and Metaethics." Philosophical Quarterly 70, no. 279 (2019): 328–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqz058.

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Abstract This paper explores the metaethical ramifications of a coarse-grained criterion of property identity, sometimes referred to as Hume's dictum. According to Hume's dictum, properties are identical if and only if they are necessarily co-extensive. Assuming the supervenience of the normative on the natural, this criterion threatens the non-naturalist view that there are instantiable normative properties which are distinct from natural properties. In response, non-naturalists typically point to various counterintuitive implications of Hume's dictum. The paper clarifies this strategy and defends it against objections by Bart Streumer and Ralf Bader. In addition, it is argued that proponents of naturalist and supernaturalist views, along with proponents of a certain kind of nihilism, should also reject Hume's dictum. This shows that non-naturalists can also attack the criterion indirectly, by pointing to partners in guilt. Also, it shows that not just any opponent of non-naturalism can appeal to Hume's dictum. Only certain nihilists can.
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40

BONELLA, ALCINO EDUARDO. "Divine Command Theory and Metaethics." Revista Brasileira de Filosofia da Religião 2, no. 1 (2018): 162–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.26512/2358-82842015e17383.

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I will outline an application of metaethics to the debate about Euthyphro's dilemma and divine command theory (DCT). Metaethics elucidates how we should understand what are objective moral judgments and moral truths. I argue that the normative content of morality does not depend on God’s approval/command. This is so because moral objectivity does not depend on any approval and command, what I try to show by the nature and the logic of evaluative/normative concepts (good, bad, right, wrong, ought to etc.). Other aspects related to DCT and morality are briefly debated.
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41

Street, Sharon. "What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics?" Philosophy Compass 5, no. 5 (2010): 363–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00280.x.

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42

Kratt, Dale. "The Secular Moral Project and the Moral Argument for God: A Brief Synopsis History." Religions 14, no. 8 (2023): 982. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel14080982.

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This article provides an overview of the history of what is termed the secular moral project by providing a synopsis of the history of the moral argument for God’s existence and the various historical processes that have contributed to the secularization of ethics. I argue that three key thinkers propel the secular moral project forward from the middle of the 19th century into the 20th century: John Stuart Mill, whose ethical thinking in Utilitarianism serves as the background to all late 19th century secular ethical thinking, Henry Sidgwick, who, in the Methods, indisputably establishes the secular autonomy of ethics as a distinctive discipline (metaethics), and finally, G.E. Moore, whose work, the Principia Ethica, stands at the forefront of virtually all secular metaethical debates concerning naturalism and non-naturalism in the first half of the 20th century. Although secular metaethics continues to be the dominant ethical view of the academy, it is shown that theistic metaethics is a strong reemerging position in the early 21st century.
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43

Goldin, Owen. "Environmental Education And Metaethics." Worldviews: Global Religions, Culture, and Ecology 8, no. 2-3 (2004): 185–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1568535042690844.

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AbstractContrā Dale Jamieson, the study of the metaethical foundations of environmental ethics may well lead students to a more environmentally responsible way of life. For although metaethics is rarely decisive in decision making and action, there are two kinds of circumstances in which it can play a crucial role in our practical decisions. First, decisions that have unusual features do not summon habitual ethical reactions, and hence invite the application of ethical precepts that the study of metaethics and ethical theory isolate and clarify. Second, there are times in which the good of others (including organisms and systems in the natural world) may well be given greater weight in one's ethical deliberations if theory has made clear that the good to be promoted is ontologically independent of one's own good.
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44

Ambrozy, Marian. "Regarding the intersection of metaethics and applied ethics." XLinguae 13, no. 3 (2020): 255–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.18355/xl.2020.13.03.21.

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45

Light, Andrew. "Contemporary Environmental Ethics From Metaethics to Public Philosophy." Metaphilosophy 33, no. 4 (2002): 426–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9973.00238.

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46

Seddon, Fred. "Rejoinder to Michael Huemer, "On Behalf of Ethical Intuitionism" (Fall 2007): Neglecting Rand's Metaethics." Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 9, no. 1 (2007): 185–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/41560354.

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Abstract Fred Seddon answers Michael Huemer's reply, focusing on two central issues in ethics: foundationalism and relativism. On the latter, he argues that Huemer neglects Rand's metaethics and her relational notion of the good.
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47

Seddon, Fred. "Rejoinder to Michael Huemer, "On Behalf of Ethical Intuitionism" (Fall 2007): Neglecting Rand's Metaethics." Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 9, no. 1 (2007): 185–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/jaynrandstud.9.1.0185.

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Abstract Fred Seddon answers Michael Huemer's reply, focusing on two central issues in ethics: foundationalism and relativism. On the latter, he argues that Huemer neglects Rand's metaethics and her relational notion of the good.
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48

Suikkanen, Jussi. "Metaethics and the Nature of Properties." Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 98, no. 1 (2024): 113–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akae007.

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Abstract This paper explores the connection between two philosophical debates concerning the nature of properties. The first, metaethical debate is about whether normative properties are ordinary natural properties or some unique kind of non-natural properties. The second, metaphysical debate is about whether properties are sets of objects, transcendent or immanent universals, or sets of tropes. I argue that nominalism, transcendent realism and immanent realism are not neutral frameworks for the metaethical debate but instead lead to either metaethical naturalism or non-naturalism. We can therefore investigate the metaethical question on its own terms only within the framework of trope theory.
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49

ÇOBANOĞLU, SACİDE. "THE ETHICAL VALUES OF BEING GENEROUS AND STEALING IN THE COMMENTARY OF BASMALAH BY HACI BEKTAŞ VELİ WITH METAETHIC THEORY OF FOLKLORE." Türk Kültürü ve HACI BEKTAŞ VELİ Araştırma Dergisi 105 (March 29, 2023): 97–127. http://dx.doi.org/10.34189/hbv.105.005.

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Developing technology in our age has opened the doors of a virtual-digital world to humanity. However, the negative effects of this development were seen in a short time. Tradition has been moved away and ethical values have begun to be lost. In order to bring the lost ethical values in Turkish society to new generations with a folkloric point of view, we have introduced Folklogical Metaethics Theory with an interdisciplinary approach in the fields of folklore, ethics and metaethics, and we have developed the method of Folklore Grounding Metaethics Analysis. The works of Hacı Bektaş Veli are very rich in that they contain cultural products that will be useful in updating our ethical values in Turkish folk philosophy, where our ethical understanding shaped by religious tradition is reflected in ethical codes in accordance with our cultural ergonomics. In this study, Hacı Bektaş Veli’s Basmalah Commentary was chosen in order to look at our cultural richness from a different perspective. The subject of the study is to reveal the place of the ethical values of generosity and stealing in the narrative of the Basmalah Commentary of Hacı Bektaş Veli, which is in the category of religious traditions of the theory in folk philosophy. It is aimed to make an exemplary study on the application of Folklogical Metaethics Theory to the works of Hacı Bektaş Veli by revealing the folk ideas in the folklore sense and the propositions in the metaethics sense of the storytelling. Keywords: Folklore, Theory, Metaethics, Basmalah Commentary, Hacı Bektaş Veli.
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50

Wood, Allen W. "Attacking Morality: A Metaethical Project." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 21 (1995): 221–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1995.10717439.

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Metaethics is the philosophical study of what morality is. It differs from ethical theory, which attempts to systematize (and possibly ground) moral judgments, and also from practical or applied ethics, which reflects on particular moral issues or problems. As it has been done in this century, metaethics has usually involved three interrelated projects: ametaphysicalinvestigation into the nature of moral facts and properties, asemanticinquiry into the meaning of moral assertions, and anepistemologicalaccount of the nature of moral knowledge. In all three areas, the questions raised by twentieth-century metaethics have apparently been radical, and the dominant position was even openly nihilistic. In metaphysics it was antirealist, maintaining that there are no moral facts, in epistemology noncognitivist, denying that there is moral knowledge, and in semantics emotivist or prescriptivist, holding that moral assertions aren't assertions at all, but are speech acts utterly devoid of truth conditions.
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