Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Normative ethics'

This thesis is an attempt to answer the following question: Do our moral commitments commit us to constraints on what meta-ethical theories we find attractive? In order to answer this question, I first demonstrate that meta-ethical theories can be criticised on moral grounds. I then argue that correctness conditions for moral claims imply the thesis of explanatory moral realism. I do not claim that this is an argument for the truth of explanatory moral realism. Rather, I claim that this is an argument that moral realism is a moral commitment. I then look at two objections to the claim that moral claims can have built in commitments to a meta-ethical theory that takes a stand on the issue of moral realism. The first of these is a set of arguments that Simon Blackburn gives for quasi-realism. The second objection is a set of arguments given by Ronald Dworkin that attack the presuppositions of debates about realism in meta-ethics.

This study explores the contemporary practice of Ethical and Socially Responsible Investment and concludes that it is based on an ad hoc construct of empirically derived principles, driven mainly by the commercial self-interest of large financial institutions and fund managers. It explores the relationship between investment and morality, to posit a background theory of investment ethics. The study then proposes a move away from the narrow focus of ethical investment to a broader concern for investment ethics. The study introduces the discipline of investment ethics and examines the criteria that form the basis of morality in investment decisions. The resultant theory is intended to be of practical significance in the business and investment domains and to assist potential investors to evaluate investment opportunities in the context of a consistent set of substantive normative ethical principles.

This study explores the contemporary practice of Ethical and Socially Responsible Investment and concludes that it is based on an ad hoc construct of empirically derived principles, driven mainly by the commercial self-interest of large financial institutions and fund managers. It explores the relationship between investment and morality, to posit a background theory of investment ethics. The study then proposes a move away from the narrow focus of ethical investment to a broader concern for investment ethics. The study introduces the discipline of investment ethics and examines the criteria that form the basis of morality in investment decisions. The resultant theory is intended to be of practical significance in the business and investment domains and to assist potential investors to evaluate investment opportunities in the context of a consistent set of substantive normative ethical principles.

Very often, we are unsure about what we ought to do. Under what conditions should we help to improve the lives of distant strangers rather than those of our family members? At what point does an embryo or foetus become a person, with all the rights that that entails? Is it ever permissible to raise and kill non-human animals in order to use their meat for food? Sometimes, this uncertainty arises out of empirical uncertainty: we might not know to what extent non-human animals feel pain, or how much we are really able to improve the lives of distant strangers compared to our family members. But this uncertainty can also arise out of fundamental normative uncertainty: out of not knowing, for example, what moral weight the wellbeing of distant strangers has compared to the wellbeing of our family; or whether non-human animals are worthy of moral concern even given knowledge of all the facts about their biology and psychology. In fact, for even moderately reflective agents, decision-making under normative uncertainty is ubiquitous. Given this, one might have expected philosophers to have devoted considerable research time to the question of how one ought to take one’s normative uncertainty into account in one’s decisions. But the issue has been largely neglected. This thesis attempts to begin to fill this gap. It addresses the question: what ought one to do when one is uncertain about what one ought to do? It develops a view that I call metanormativism: the view that there are second-order norms that govern action that are relative to a decision-maker’s uncertainty about first-order normative claims. In consists of two distinct parts. The first part (Chapters 1-4) develops a general metanormative theory. I argue in favour of the view that decision-makers should maximise expected choice-worthiness, treating normative uncertainty analogously with how they treat empirical uncertainty. I defend this view at length in response to two key problems, which I call the problems of merely ordinal theories and the problem of intertheoretic comparisons. The second part (Chapters 5-7) explores the implications of metanormativism for other philosophical issues. I suggest that it has important implications for the theory of rational action in the face of incomparable values, for the causal/evidential debate in decision-theory, and for the value we should ascribe to research into moral philosophy.

This thesis explores the normative propriety of immigration detention in liberal states. In the first part of the thesis, I explore the development, current practice, and popular justifications for immigration detention in the United Kingdom. I argue that a crucial but unacknowledged role for immigration detention is to function as a political spectacle of the centralisation of power in liberal states. I find that the key motivation for detaining non-citizens is that they could abscond before their removals. I conclude that this basis for detention is normatively acceptable in only very limited cases and, even then, alternatives are often available and ethically preferable. Based on the fact that there is a normatively acceptable rationale, albeit circumscribed, for detention practices, I then propose a framework of minimum standards of treatment in detention that I advise all liberal states to follow. After outlining my proposal, I turn in the second part of the thesis to an examination of the normative theories of immigration control and how they take account of detention. Normative theorists differ in how they balance their commitments to individual and state rights, yet I find the majority concedes the need for some degree of immigration admissions control. Such theories face a moral dilemma: there can be no immigration control without detention, and so detention becomes an implicit assumption for these normative theories to be coherent. A potential solution for combating the practical problems associated with the growing, worsening detention estates as well as the moral dilemma of incarcerating a non-citizen based on fear of absconding would be to open borders and eliminate immigration control. Given the reality of the sovereign right to control immigration, however, I argue that the more feasible normative answer is lobby liberal states to adopt my framework of minimum standards of treatment while simultaneously pressing for open borders as the long-term ethical goal.

The normative moral code is considered to be such that it applies universally to all or at least to all who can understand and govern their behavior by it. All or almost all common folk think of and use their own moral codes as them being normative in that for example there simply seem to them to exist “oughts” that apply to all and that there simply, straightforwardly are “things” that are right and wrong, good and bad. Gert Bernard and Gert Joshua have written an article on the topic of defining morality, with the title of “The Definition of Morality”. The authors suggest that the terms ‘normative morality’ refer to a code of conduct that, given some specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational persons. The authors take this formulation as entailing true and important definitional features of what normative morality is, although the authors think of this basic definition, conception as not being complete and that some additional feature hence is lacking but that any such candidate addendum to the definitional basic schema that they surveyed within the article seemed to be controversial, contested. Normative morality seems apt to investigate by creating thought-experiments wherein the participants are for example, envisioned choosing to endorse, put forward or act in accordance with a moral code. Within this large investigative project into normative morality with the help of thought-experiments it seemed to me that there was an under-representation of thought-experiments exhibiting some worthwhile and relevant features and I felt that it was a warranted project to create a thought-experiment which concurrently exhibited these features. Such an experiment could be thought of as an unusual “puzzle-piece” which could be valuable in contributing to furthering the completion of the “puzzle”, i.e. what normative morality is and its moral code. These three features were: i) a high degree of aptness for investigating a major part of or the complete normative moral code and ii) a high degree of freedom pertaining to the participants, e.g. their actions, thoughts etc., as well as iii) a high degree of confidence or warrant concerning what the participants would do, think, feel etc. within the thought-experiment. A thought-experiment, the Normative Moral Codes Workshop (NMCW) was hence created, which was aimed at investigating normative morality and its code and which exhibited these features. It is a thought-experiment mimicking an actual empirical study wherein the participants are given the task to together put forward the moral code for them, that would apply to them and that would cover a major or complete part of what they consider their moral codes to entail. The participants employed within my run of the NMCW thought-experiment were all currently living adult persons who I knew well. The core or main aim of this essay was to investigate whether it would or would not be the case that most or all participants within my run of the thought-experiment the NMCW would decide to put forward the code together with the chosen formulation of the thesis being, that it would not be the case that most or all participants would put forward the code within my run of the NMCW thought-experiment. Part of the core aim was also to elucidate why the thesis was supported or not supported as well as how strong the support was for the outcome of the experiment, i.e. the outcome of a code being put forward or not. The essay also has some minor aims which radiate out from the core aim (see below). As the thought-experimenter, I then reported on the events that I envisioned as happening within my run the NMCW thought-experiment as my selected participants grappled with the task and their decision to put or not put forward the code together that would apply to them. The finding was that the thesis was supported and that the support was robust in that I could identify several reasons the participants had against putting forward the code and I found very little in terms of reasons among the participants for putting forward the code. The essay also had some minor aims to selectively discuss a few further relevant and interesting issues radiating out from the core aim. These minor aims revolved around discussing some selected salient features of the NMCW including how they could relate to the outcome. One such selected salient feature was the feature of the employed participant sample of my run of the NMCW. I for example, discussed the potential extension of it not being the case that most or all participants would decide to put forward the code, if the participant sample would have been modified but still employed currently living5adults and I ended up being of the opinion that pertaining to most potential samples a similar outcome as the one envisioned within my run of the NMCW would be expected. I also wanted to discuss some further selected salient features of the NMCW within the context of addressing whether the NMCW, given its features ought to be considered an unsound, inapt experiment for investigating normative morality, given Gert’s and Gert’s conception of normative morality, since if this was the case the outcome of the experiment ought to be disregarded, given no weight. Although, I did find potential targets for criticism of the NMCW experimental design I did not find any reasons strong enough to disqualify the NMCW experiment as an experiment inapt, unsound for investigating normative morality, given the features of normative morality entailed within the suggested basic definition provided by Gert and Gert. Finally, I also aimed to selectively discuss some aspects of what it could mean pertaining to the conception of normative morality, according to Gert and Gert, that the thesis was supported. For example, given one interpretation the outcome could be taken to provide support for the non-existence of a normative moral code, but given another be taken to mean that addenda has to be identified and added to the basic conception of normative morality and that such addenda would be such that they would disqualify the NMCW (and its outcome) as a sound and apt thought-experiment to be employed in investigating normative morality. I also attempted to briefly illustrate how the NMCW thought-experiment could be used as a substratum facilitating the identification and clarification of such potential addenda to the basic conception of normative morality, suggested by Gert and Gert, and I also suggest some potential candidate features of the NMCW that further potential specifications added to the basic conception of morality ought to be able to disqualify, exclude as acceptable features of experiments aimed at investigating normative morality. In this way, an unusual, under-represented kind of thought-experiment, “puzzle-piece” when it comes to the large investigative project of employing experiments in order to acquire further insight into normative morality, i.e. “the puzzle”, can regardless of whether it seems to fit or does not seem to fit the “puzzle”, still be employed in such a way as to potentially provide further insight into “the puzzle”. This since even when a “puzzle-piece” does not seem to fit the “puzzle”, “seeing” and understanding how and why could provide us with information about the “puzzle”.
Den normativa moraliska koden anses vara sådan att den gäller universellt för alla eller åtminstone för alla som kan förstå den och reglera sitt beteende i enlighet med den. Alla eller nästan alla vanliga människor tänker och använder sig av sina moraliska koder som om dessa koder vore normativa, normerande genom att det t. ex. för dem helt enkelt verkar finnas ”måsten” som gäller alla och att det ”rakt upp och ner” verkar finnas ”saker” som helt enkelt är rätt och fel, gott och ont. Gert Bernard och Gert Joshua har skrivit en artikel kring ämnet hur man kan definiera moralen med titeln “The Definition of Morality” (sv. ”Moralens Definition”). Författarna föreslår att termen ’normativ moral’ (eller den ’normativa moralen’ i bestämd form) gäller en kod som reglerar hur man bör uppföra sig som givet vissa specificerade förhållanden är sådan att alla rationella personer skulle omfamna och förespråka den. Författarna anser att denna formulering innehåller viktiga och sanna egenskaper hos definitionen kring vad normativ moral är, även om författarna anser att denna basala, grundläggande definition, konception inte är fullständig och att därför vissa ytterligare definitions egenskaper, specifikationer saknas men att alla granskade kandidat-tillägg till denna basala definition som undersöktes inom artikeln verkade vara kontroversiella, enligt författarna. Normativ moral verkar lämplig för att undersökas genom att skapa tankeexperiment inom vilka deltagarna tex kan föreställas stödja, lägga fram eller agera i enlighet med en moralisk kod. Inom detta stora undersökande projekt av normativ moral med hjälp av tankeexperiment så verkade det enligt mig som om det fanns en under-representation av tankeexperiment som uppvisade vissa värdefulla och relevanta egenskaper och jag ansåg att det var ett rättfärdigat projekt att skapa ett tankeexperiment som uppvisade dessa värdefulla och relevanta egenskaper. Ett dylikt experiment kunde anses vara en ovanlig ”pusselbit” som kunde vara ett värdefullt bidrag till slutförandet av ”pusslet”, dvs vad normativ moral är och dess kod. De tre under-representerade egenskaperna var i) en hög grad av lämplighet för att undersöka en stor del av den normativa moraliska koden6eller den kompletta koden och ii) en hög grad av deltagarfrihet, exempelvis avseende deltagarnas handlingar, tankar osv samt iii) en hög grad av förtroende eller rättfärdigande avseende vad deltagarna skulle göra, tänka, känna osv inom tankeexperimentet. Tankeexperimentet, den Normativa Moraliska Kods Workshoppen (NMKW) skapades därför med målsättningen att undersöka den normativa moralen, dess kod samt att experimentet då skulle uppvisa de ovan nämnda egenskaperna. Det är ett tankeexperiment som liknar, ”speglar” en riktig empirisk studie inom vilka deltagarna ges uppgiften att tillsammans stödja och lägga fram den moraliska kod som skulle gälla för dem, reglera deras uppförande och som till en stor del eller fullständigt skulle täcka, innehålla det som de ansåg att deras moraliska koder innehöll. Deltagarna som användes inom min körning av tankeexperimentet var alla nu levande vuxna person som jag ansåg att jag kände väl. Kärn- eller huvudmålsättningen med uppsatsen var att undersöka huruvida det skulle eller inte skulle vara fallet att de flesta eller alla deltagare inom min körning av NMKW tankeexperimentet skulle bestämma sig för att tillsammans lägga fram och stödja en kod, med den valda formuleringen för tesen enligt, det skulle inte vara fallet att de flesta eller alla deltagare skulle lägga fram och stödja koden inom min körning av NMKW experimentet. Som en del av kärnmålsättningen var det att utreda varför tesen var eller inte var stödd samt utreda hur starkt stödet var för utfallet av experimentet, dvs utfallet att en kod lades fram eller inte lades fram. Uppsatsen har även mindre eller bi-målsättningar som strålar ut från uppsatsens huvudmålsättning (se nedan). I min roll som tanke-experimenteraren så rapporterade jag sedan kring vilka händelser som jag föreställde mig, som jag ”såg” uppträda inom tanke-experimentet NMKW då mina valda deltagare tog sig an uppgiften som de ombads att utföra, dvs att tillsammans lägga fram och stödja den kod som skulle komma att gälla dom själva, att appliceras på dom själva. Fyndet var att tesen stöddes och att detta stöd var robust eftersom jag kunde identifiera flera skäl hos deltagarna mot att lägga fram koden medan jag fann mycket litet i form av skäl hos deltagarna för att lägga fram koden. Uppsatsen hade även en del mindre målsättningar att selektivt diskutera några ytterligare relevanta och intressanta spörsmål som strålade ut från uppsatsens huvud-målsättning. Dessa mindre målsättningar kretsade kring att diskutera vissa valda tydliga, centrala egenskaper hos NMKW experimentet samt hur dessa kunde tänkas vara relaterade till experimentets utfall. En sådan egenskap vara den specifika deltagargruppen som användes vid min körning av experimentet. Jag diskuterade till exempel, den potentiella extensionen av utfallet att det inte var fallet att de flesta eller alla deltagare valde att lägga fram koden, ifall deltagargruppen modifierades men fortfarande bestod enbart av nu levande vuxna människor och min värdering var att ett liknande utfall, som vid min körningen av NMKW, verkade troligt för de flesta potentiella grupper av deltagare. Jag ville också diskutera vissa valda tydliga, centrala egenskaper hos NMKW experimentet inom kontexten kring huruvida NMKW experimentet givet dessa egenskaper, borde anses vara ett osunt, olämpligt experiment för att undersöka den normativa moralen, givet Gerts och Gerts konception av denna. Detta, eftersom om detta vore fallet så borde utfallet av experimentet förkastas och inte ges någon vikt. Trots att jag hittade potentiella saker att kritisera hos den experimentella designen hos NMKW så hittade jag inte några tillräckligt starka skäl för att diskvalificera NMKW experimentet som ett olämpligt, osunt experiment för att undersöka den normativa moralen, givet den normativa moralens egenskaper beskrivna, täckta inom Gerts och Gerts föreslagna basala, grundläggande definition av denna. Slutligen så ville jag även selektivt diskutera vissa aspekter kring vad det kunde betyda för konceptionen av den normativa moralen, enligt Gert och Gert, att tesen stöddes. Exempelvis, så givet en tolkning så kunde utfallet ses som ett stöd för icke-existensen hos den normativa moraliska koden, medan givet en annan tolkning så kunde utfallet anses betyda att ytterligare addenda till den basala definitionen av den normativa moralen måste identifieras och adderas till definitionen och att dylika addenda skulle komma att vara sådana att de skulle diskvalificera NMKW experimentet och dess utfall som ett sunt och lämpligt experiment att användas för att studera den normativa moralen, nu med dess extenderade specifikation. Jag försökte sedan att illustrera hur NMKW tankeexperimentet kunde användas som ett substrat för att underlätta identifieringen och förtydligandet av dylika potentiella tillägg till den basala konceptionen av den normativa moralen enligt Gerts och Gerts förslag, och jag föreslog även vissa potentiella kandidat egenskaper hos NMKW experimentet som dylika ytterligare tillägg till den basala konceptionen borde kunna diskvalificera, exkludera som acceptabla egenskaper hos experiment designade för att undersöka den7normativa moralen. På detta sätt så kan en ovanlig, underrepresenterad typ av tankeexperiment, ”pusselbit” när det gäller det stora undersökningsprojektet som använder sig av experiment för att erhålla ytterligare insikter inom den normative moralen, dvs ”pusslet”, oberoende om det verkar passa eller inte passa in i ”pusslet”, ändå användas på ett sådant sätt så att det potentiellt kan leda till ytterligare insikter kring ”pusslet”. Detta eftersom även när en ”pusselbit” inte verkar passa in i ”pusslet” så kan ”seendet”, förtydligandet och förståelsen kring hur och varför, ändå potentiellt förse oss med information om ”pusslet”.

This licentiate thesis is comprised of a “kappa” and two articles. The kappa includes an account of personal autonomy and informed consent, an explanation of how the concepts and articles relate to each other, and a summary in Swedish. Article 1 treats one problem with the argument that a patient’s consent to treatment is valid only if it is authentic, i.e., if it is “genuine,” “truly her own,” “not out of character,” or similar. As interventions with a patient’s life and liberties must be justified, the argument presupposes that the authenticity of desires can be reliably determined. If the status of a desire in terms of authenticity cannot be reliably determined, discarding the desire-holder’s treatment decision on the basis that it is inauthentic is morally unjustified. In the article, I argue that no theory of authenticity that is present in the relevant literature can render reliably observable consequences. Therefore, the concept of authenticity, as it is understood in those theories, should not be part of informed consent practices. Article 2 discusses the problem of what it is to consent or refuse voluntarily. In it, I argue that voluntariness should be more narrowly understood than what is common. My main point is that a conceptualization of voluntariness should be agent-centered, i.e., take into account the agent’s view of her actions. Among other things, I argue that an action is non-voluntary only if the agent thinks of it as such when being coerced. This notion, which at first look may seem uncontroversial, entails the counterintuitive conclusion that an action can be voluntary although the agent has been manipulated or coerced into doing it. In defense of the notion, I argue that if the agent’s point of view is not considered accordingly, describing her actions as non-voluntary can be alien to how she leads her life. There are other moral concepts available to describe what is wrong with manipulation and coercion, i.e., to make sense of the counterintuitive conclusion. Voluntariness should be reserved to fewer cases than what is commonly assumed.

QC 20170821

In this dissertation, I identify the normative grounds of exile involvement in homeland politics to determine whether and when exile activism is morally permissible, required, and legitimate. I draw on case studies throughout the thesis, and especially from the fo Iowing three exile communities: Iranians, Sri Lankan Tamils, and Tibetans. In Part I, I argue that exiles may be entitled to participate in and influence homeland politics. I consider two grounds: first, that exiles are stakeholders whose interests are affected by political developments in the homeland, and who are therefore entitled to some say in those developments; and second, that exiles are the representatives of silenced or otherwise marginalized groups in the homeland. I identify the conditions under which exiles can legitimately claim each of these grounds and the challenges they face in satisfying these conditions. In Part Il, I turn to the question of whether exiles are subject to special responsibilities to remain involved in homeland politics. I identify four bases for exile responsibilities: capability to assist; shared identity; shared oppression; and complicity in collective wrongdoing. I conclude that exiles' special capabilities to provide assistance impose a minimum duty of publicity. Exiles' activism that goes beyond this duty may be accounted for by their reasons from identity, oppression, or complicity.

The fact-value distinction has structured and still structures ongoing debates in metaethics, and all of the major positions in the field (expressivism, cognitivist realism, and moral error theory) subscribe to it. In contrast, I claim that the fact-value distinction is a contingent product of our intellectual history and a prime object for questioning. The most forceful reason for rejecting the distinction is that it presupposes a problematic understanding of the subject-object divide whereby one tends to view humans as the sole source of normativity in the world. My dissertation aims to disclose the background against which human ethical praxis is widely seen as a unique and special phenomenon among other phenomena. I show that ethical norms, as delimited by utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics, etc., derive from an originary proto-ethical normativity at the heart of the real itself. Every object, human and nonhuman, presents itself as a bottomless series of cues or conditions of appropriateness that determine adequate and inadequate ways of relating to it. That is, objects demand something from other objects if they are to be related to; they condition other objects by soliciting a change in disposition, perception, or sense, and for this reason are sources of normativity in and unto themselves. Ethical norms, or values, are the human expression of the adequacy conditions with which all objects show themselves. In the post-Kantian landscape it is widely thought that human finitude constitutes the origin of ethical norms. Consequently, the world is divided up into morally relevant agents (humans) on one side, and everything else on the other. Adopting a deflationary view of agency, I argue that human-human and human-world relations differ from other relations in degree rather than kind. Thus, instead of a fact-value distinction, value is inextricably bound up with the factual itself. The critical upshot of my project is that traditional subject-oriented ethical theories have served to conceal the real demands of non-human objects (such as animals, plants, microorganisms, and artificially intelligent machines) in favor of specifically human interests. Such theories have also been leveraged frequently in exclusionary practices with respect to different groups within the human community (e.g. women and those of non-European descent) based on arbitrary criteria or principles.

In The Sources of Normativity, Christine Korsgaard argues that in order to avoid the threat of moral skepticism, our moral theories must show how the claims they make about the nature of our actions obligate us to act morally. A theory that can justify the normativity of morality in this way answers what Korsgaard calls “the normative question.” Although Korsgaard claims that only Kantian theories of morality, such as her own, can answer the normative question, I argue that Adam Smith’s sentimentalist moral theory, as presented in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, can answer the normative question as well. As a result, it is possible to respond to the moral skeptic in the way Korsgaard outlines without accepting some of the theoretical drawbacks of Korsgaard’s own moral theory.

This is a normative ethical analysis of school discipline policies. The overarching objective of this work is to inform school practices that directly benefit students. Chapter one examines the current state and practices of student discipline within schools. It focuses upon the pervasive use of suspensions to deal with non-violent student offenses and the adverse consequences that result from the applications of suspensions. Chapter two analyses three theoretical frameworks as they inform the developmental of a threshold for the ethical application of punishment. Developmental liberalism informs the understanding of the role that schools have in exhausting educative measures before the use of force, Self-Determination theory provides the foundation for psychologically nurturing school environments as necessary for the curtailing of adverse student behaviors, and School Community theory acknowledges the essential aspects of curriculum in engaging students. Chapter three sets forth a model for making ethical decisions within schools, and provides an analysis of principles and educational aims that directly inform this process. Chapter four explores the "crime and punishment" phenomenon within school discipline and provides the theoretical rationale that is offered to support such arguments. The chapter concludes with a discussion of when, if ever, it is appropriate to suspend students from school. Chapter five examines existing approaches to student discipline that align with the requirements of the threshold for ethical application of discipline and a well-informed ethical decision making process.

Many accept that there are some acts that are ‘supererogatory’ or ‘beyond the call of duty’. Risking one’s life to save others or dedicating one’s life to helping the needy are often thought to be examples of such acts. Accepting the possibility of acts of this sort raises interesting problems for moral philosophy, as many moral theories appear to leave no room for the supererogatory. While these problems are increasingly recognized in moral philosophy, there remain a number of debates that have failed to pay sufficient attention to the existence of acts of this sort. In this thesis I investigate the implications of accepting the possibility of supererogation for three of these debates. The first issue I investigate is the relationship between morality and self-interest. One popular view is that supererogatory acts are those that demand too much sacrifice from those who could perform them. However, I argue that looking at self-reported accounts and empirical psychological studies of moral exemplars gives us good reason to reject this view, as it has the implausible implication that those with less developed moral consciences are excused from obligations that apply to those with more developed moral sensibilities. We should accept, then, that performing an act of supererogation may be in line with an agent's self-interest. The next debate I examine concerns the connection between moral judgements and motivation. Motivational judgement internalists claim that there is a necessary connection between moral judgements and motivation. However, it is often unclear which moral judgements this view is supposed to cover. The claim is made about judgements of 'moral goodness', 'moral rightness' and 'moral requirement'. I argue that internalists need to restrict their claim to moral obligation judgements. I then examine how to give an account of the relationship between moral obligations and reasons for action. It is often claimed that moral reasons are overriding. A related view is moral rationalism, which holds that agents have most reason to act in line with their moral requirements. I start by examining the differences between these two views before looking at what form of either view it is plausible to hold if we accept the existence of supererogation. I finish by looking at whether accepting the existence of supererogatory acts goes far enough or whether there is a need to make room for additional deontic categories, such as suberogation, quasi-supererogation or forced supererogation. I will argue that none of the arguments put forward in defence of these claims show that there is a need to make room for these additional categories.

Classical utilitarianism faces significant problems: it ignores moral rights; it cannot take account of all free rational agents; and its focus on happiness means that it dismisses the other things that people value for their own sake. These problems lead to conflicts with autonomy, personal integrity and inconsistencies with the way in which utilitarianism justifies the value of happiness. This thesis seeks to solve these problems by introducing the protection of freedom as a new measure of utility.

On the assumption that there are no objective normative facts, what is the best theory of normative language? I try to answer this question. Chapter 1 argues for a presumption against noncognitivism and explains why error-theories are of limited interest: they concern adverbs and adjectives like ‘moral’, but not words like ‘ought’, ‘good’ and ‘reason’. This narrows down the options: the best subjectivist theory of normative language is a truth conditional, non-error-theoretic account. Chapter 2 argues for contextualism about normative statements. Contextualists hold that their truth conditions (can) vary with the context of utterance. Chapter 3 starts the assessment of contextualist theories. It looks into Humean accounts. Problems are revealed with both Harman’s and Schroeder’s versions. Chapter 4 develops a form of indexical relativism according to which the truth of normative statements depends on contextually salient rules. I present imperative-based analyses of ‘ought’ and ‘reason’ and show how they can explain why ‘A ought to X’ entails that the balance of reasons favours that A X-es. Chapter 5 further develops the theory of chapter 4 and applies it to the words ‘good’ and ‘must’. It turns out to be hard to analyse ‘good’. It also emerges that ‘must’ and ‘ought’ cannot be given different truth conditions. Chapter 6 explains Stephen Finlay’s end-relational theory. On this account, normative statements concern the relation in which acts or objects stand to contextually salient ends. In the case of ‘ought’ and ‘good’, this relation is one of probability raising. Chapter 7 discusses and answers some familiar objections to Finlay’s view. Chapter 8 raises some new problems, related to the fact that normative judgments are often made in the light of several ends. Chapter 9 explains why the end-relational theory is nonetheless the best subjectivist theory of normative language.

This dissertation examines the extent to which individual-level and social network-level factors explain disparities in living donor kidney transplantation (LDKT) and considers the moral implications. Paper One examines whether patient characteristics explain racial disparities in the rate of donor presentation and LDKT in a sample of 752 potential kidney recipients and 654 potential kidney donors. Propensity score matching and subclassification were used to balance the patient characteristics. Survival models revealed that only 24% of blacks compared to 39% of whites would have at least one potential donor evaluated within the first year, even after accounting for differences in the distribution of patient characteristics. Thus, lower rates of donor presentation among black recipients cannot be explained by differences in individual-level characteristics. Paper Two examines whether differences in social networks contribute to disparities in LDKT. Using interview and medical record data from a representative sample of 389 dialysis patients in Greater Boston and a subsample of 302 alters, we found that social network characteristics, especially network size, were strongly predictive of pursuing LDKT. Significant racial disparities in health and medical distrust among social networks of black patients present compelling evidence for network effects. Fewer network members of black patients may be eligible for donation owing to compositional health differences, and those eligible may be less willing to donate due to greater distrust or poor socioeconomic position. Paper Three argues that society ought to be concerned with previously neglected disparities in LDKT, specifically the fraction stemming from disparities in social networks because networks provide one pathway by which inequalities can be perpetuated throughout society and over time. Insofar as social networks are influenced by an unjust distribution of social forces, and social networks influence life chances by restricting (or enhancing) one’s ability to obtain a LDKT, then life chances of dialysis patients are unjustly determined by social networks. Potential policies aimed at providing compensatory damages to patients whose networks have been adversely affected by the unjust influence of social determinants are examined.

The purpose of this study is to illustrate where the boundary between being professional and being private in the line of work as a personal assistant lie, this study will focus on the perspective of the unit manager. This to clarify the ethical approach in the assistance matters for the unit manager. To answer the study's purpose and questions, six individual semi-structured interviews have been held with unit managers responsible for personal assistance in municipal activities. During the interviews, the unit managers shared their own experiences about the subject of the study. The empirical material has been analyzed with the help of normative ethics theories of duty and sense ethics. The result of the study shows that unit managers find it difficult to take a stand as where the boundary between being professional and being private in personal assistance lies. There are many different factors to take into consideration when discussion where the boundary lies for each individual. Having good municipal guidelines regarding the work of the assistance is something the unit managers see as a good tool for taking a position on questions about the work of the assistants. The empirical material also highlights that there is a lot of ethical dilemmas in the matter of personal assistance, and how the unit managers handle these.

This dissertation focuses on the concept of authenticity and its implications for our projects of self-creation, particularly those involving the use of "enhancement technologies" (such as stimulant drugs, "mood brighteners", or brain stimulation). After an introduction to the concept of authenticity and the enhancement debate in the first part of the thesis, part 2 considers the main analyses of authenticity in the contemporary philosophical literature. It begins with those emphasizing self-creation, and shows that, despite their merits, such views cannot adequately deal with certain types of cases, which require a third option, “true self” accounts, emphasizing self-discovery. However, it is argued that in their existing versions, accounts of this third sort are also unsatisfactory. Part 3 of the thesis proposes a new account of the "true self" sort, intended to improve upon existing ones. Common problematic assumptions about the concept of the true self are critiqued, after which a new analysis of that concept is presented, based on seven different conditions. Two specific definitions of authenticity, respectively emphasizing self-expression and the preservation of one's true self, are provided, and its relation to various associated notions, such as integrity or sincerity, are examined. Finally, part 4 looks at the implications of the previous parts for the enhancement debate. In particular, it discusses the prospect of technologically enhancing our personality and mood dispositions. Do such interventions always threaten our authenticity, as some worry? A negative answer is provided to that question. Various potential pitfalls hinted at by the inauthenticity worry are discussed and acknowledged. It is, however, argued that such enhancements could still in principle be used in a fully authentic manner, and that they have the potential to bring about genuine improvements in our mood but also to our moral capacities and our affective rationality more generally.

Can we ever be fully practically justified in acting contrary to moral demands? My contention is that the answer is 'no'. I argue that by adopting a 'buck-passing' account of wrongness we can provide a philosophically satisfying answer to the familiar 'why should I be moral?'. In working my way toward the buck-passing account of wrongness, I outline (and, to some degree, defend) the metaethical and 'metanormative' assumptions on which my theory stands. I also consider and reject the 'internalist' (or as it can also be described, the neo-Humean) answer to 'why should I be moral?'. The account I end up with is decidedly non-consequentialist and it is consistent with common-sense morality. It also provides a way of showing why moral considerations (in competition with non-moral considerations) are overridingly normative in a way that is consistent with our best current understanding of what practical reason requires of us.

Thesis: S.M. in Technology and Policy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Engineering Systems Division, 2014.
This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.
Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 50-52).
Climate change generates a conflict between generations: while it is in the interest of the current generation to continue to exploit inexpensive carbon-based fuel to drive economic growth, it is in the interest of future generations that we reduce our carbon emissions by making these fuels more expensive. This raises the following question: what moral framework should we use to adjudicate between the interests of different generations? In this work, I argue that the commonly used framework of "cost-benefit analysis"-the analytic framework for public policy that developed out of the field of welfare economics-fails as a normative framework for intergenerational policy. For one, by aggregating costs and benefits across all generations, it ignores that what matters is each generation. For another, by reducing all value into a unitary objective function, it ignores important distinctions between different categories of moral claims. Third, by attempting to optimize a function across all time, it reflects a false sense of knowledge about the distant future. For all these reasons-and more-I conclude that this approach cannot offer a reasonable normative framework for intergenerational public policy. In its stead, I propose an "intergenerational threshold" principle which avoids aggregating generations together, gives space for different categories of value, and, I will argue, is more robust to the epistemic limitations of intergenerational policy analysis.
by Nathan R. Lee.
S.M. in Technology and Policy

In this thesis I discuss one way in which evolutionary theory has been brought to bear on the evaluation of competing meta-normative views in epistemology. More specifically, I investigate whether normative realism in epistemology (epistemic realism) is compatible with the view that we are justified in holding many of the epistemic beliefs we hold, on the assumption that those beliefs can be explained in evolutionary terms. In Part I I discuss normativity in epistemology and meta-epistemology. I begin by drawing attention to the fact that there are very different ways of understanding which concepts in epistemology are normative and what their normativity consists in. I focus on the concept of an epistemic reason to illustrate this point. I then discuss, in some detail, how different interpretations of epistemic-normativity will affect the form which normative-realist views in epistemology can take. I conclude by drawing a taxonomy of epistemic-realist views which is mindful of the different interpretations of epistemic normativity which I distinguished. In Part II I turn to discuss the topic of Darwinian arguments against normative-realist views in epistemology. I begin by considering the form which Darwinian arguments have taken in recent metaethical literature. I argue that Darwinian arguments of a kind which is meant to raise a distinctively epistemological challenge for normative-realist views – I call those 'Darwinian-epistemological' arguments – represent a more interesting object of philosophical investigation than Darwinian arguments of a different 'metaphysical' kind. I then formulate a Darwinian-epistemological argument which targets normative-realist views in epistemology (DEA), explain how it works, and spend some time discussing its key premises. In Part III I engage with the Darwinian-epistemological challenge against realism about epistemic normativity that Sharon Street presents in her paper 'Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons' (2009). I argue that Street’s epistemological challenge is best viewed as an instance of a Darwinian-epistemological argument of the kind I formulated (DEA). I then go on to reply to Street’s argument on behalf of the epistemic realist. I conclude that arguments with the form of DEA do not represent a serious threat for normative realist views in epistemology.

Mestrado em Gestão e Estratégia Industrial
A complexidade do tema ética empresarial, na abordagem organizacional, tem acompanhado os debates atuais. Consequentemente, é cada vez mais importante que a liderança esteja refletida na implementação de estratégias de integridade e que as mesmas conduzam a um impacto positivo na formação do clima ético de uma empresa. A presente investigação tem como objetivo compreender e analisar a cultura organizacional, por forma a entender quais as características subjacentes à estratégia empresarial adotadas que garantem a gestão ética interna e externamente, bem como a motivação estratégica que alimenta o binómio ético. Para isso, foi efetuada uma revisão de literatura referente à problemática da investigação, passando pelas definições de: ética, ética empresarial e fatores de influência como: clima, cultura e liderança ética, normativos, códigos e conduta ética e compliance. A metodologia utilizada foi de natureza qualitativa, com a realização de um estudo de caso referente a uma empresa que se apresenta como líder no tema, com a aplicação de entrevistas semiestruturadas e a respetiva análise das respostas. Os resultados apurados indicam que a gestão aufere mais valias se tiver por base fatores éticos, e é mais facilmente alcançável através de uma atuação de integridade, paralelamente à utilização de diversos mecanismos, que auxiliam à tomada das melhores práticas de gestão.
The complexity of the business ethics theme in the organizational approach has accompanied the current debates. Consequently, it is increasingly important that leadership is reflected in the implementation of integrity strategies and that they lead to a positive impact on the formation of a company's ethical climate. This research aims to understand and analyze the organizational culture in order to understand which are the characteristics underlying the adopted business strategy that guarantee the ethical management internally and externally, as well as the strategic motivation, which feeds the ethical binomial. For this, a literature review was carried out, referring to the research problem, going through the definitions of: ethics, business ethics and influencing factors such as climate, culture and ethical leadership, norms, codes and ethical conduct and compliance. The methodology used was qualitative, with a case study of a company that presents itself as leader in the theme, with the application of semi-structured interviews and the respective analysis of the answers. The results indicate that the management gains value based on ethical factors, and is more easily achieved through integrity, in parallel with the use of various mechanisms, which help to take the best management practices.
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

Over the last two decades, the international community has taken on the task of rebuilding societies in the aftermath of mass-atrocities. Through a combination of trial and error and vigorous academic research, a relatively clear (and semi-malleable) blueprint of post-atrocity peacebuilding has developed. This includes setting up a temporary international transitional authority, establishing democracy, facilitating economic development, and holding war crime trials. Though there are volumes of studies which address the pragmatic strengths and weaknesses of these key elements of peacebuilding, to date political theorists have not critically analyzed the moral legitimacy of these policies. My thesis aims to fill this gap. The overarching question of this thesis is this: What moral duties does the international community have to post-atrocity societies? To answer this question, I critically examine the normative issues involved in the four key aspects of peacebuilding (identified above). Using the framework of just war theory and a cosmopolitan theory of fundamental human rights, I argue that, in most post-atrocity cases, the international community has duties to remove atrocity-committing regimes from power, occupy the target-state and act as a transitional authority, help facilitate the creation of democracy and economic development, and hold war crimes trials. These duties, of course, are extremely complicated and limited and these qualifications are examined and developed throughout. Running through the construction of my theory of post-atrocity duties is a clear message: we – the international community – have obligations to the victims and survivors of atrocities. In other words, providing assistance in the wake of mass-atrocities is not a supererogatory act of charity, rather, it is a duty which we owe to the victims of these horrible crimes.

Cette thèse est un recueil de cinq chapitres qui abordent et visent à résoudre divers problèmes méthodologiques et théoriques associés à l’économie comportementale normative. Le premier chapitre propose une reconstruction historique de l’économie comportementale normative. Il est montré que les fondateurs de la prospect theory s’intéressaient déjà aux implications normatives de leur théorie, ce qui a eu une influence substantielle sur la méthodologie de l’économie comportementale du bien-être. Le deuxième chapitre est une évaluation philosophique de la théorie de la mesure d’utilité expérimentée. Après avoir montré que le critère d’utilité expérimentée souffre de nombreux problèmes méthodologiques et théoriques, je propose une approche alternative du bonheur objectif mieux alignée avec la portée des politiques publiques et avec la manière dont les individus perçoivent réellement la notion de bonheur objectif. Le troisième chapitre propose une revue de la littérature du « problème de réconciliation » entre économie normative et économie comportementale. Je suggère un consensus sur la meilleure façon de traiter le « problème de réconciliation » en proposant un cadre simple sur lequel les économistes pourraient s’entendre sur ce qu’est un « bon » critère normatif. Le résultat est qu’aucun des principaux critères normatifs proposés dans la littérature ne satisfait cependant à toutes les exigences du cadre proposé. Dans le quatrième chapitre, nous proposons une forme alternative d’économie normative qui tient compte des préférences dépendantes du contexte. Notre approche diffère des autres approches proposées dans la littérature dans la mesure où elle se concentre sur le processus par lequel les moi multiples de l’individu commencent par des préférences conflictuelles et aboutissent à leurs propres préférences (une approche que nous appelons « vue de beaucoup d’endroits »). Dans le cinquième et dernier chapitre, nous introduisons le cadre ontologique de la persistance personnelle en économie normative afin de discuter certains problèmes éthiques de préférences incohérentes dans le temps. Le résultat général de cette thèse est que malgré la prolifération rapide de l’économie comportementale normative dans le domaine de la politique publique, l’économie comportementale normative doit encore pallier un nombre conséquent de problèmes méthodologies et théoriques avant de pouvoir s’affirmer en tant que champ prometteur dans la décision publique. Ce champ de recherche doit notamment faire face à deux problèmes importants qui résultent de ceux déjà étudiés dans la présente thèse. Premièrement, les problèmes éthiques liés aux changements de préférences dans le temps requièrent d’améliorer la compréhension ontologique de l’identité individuelle. Secondement, les problèmes théoriques de l’économie comportementale normative nécessitent d’être évalués par les outils du choix social : un cadre rigoureux qui nous permettrait de clarifier dans un langage formel plusieurs objections théoriques répertoriées dans la littérature critique
This thesis is a collection of five chapters which tackle and aim to solve various methodological and theoretical issues associated with normative behavioural economics. The first chapter proposes a historical reconstruction of normative behavioural economics. It is shown that the founders of prospect theory already had an early interest in the normative implications of their theory, which had a substantial influence on the methodology of behavioural welfare economics. The second chapter is a philosophical assessment of the theory of experienced utility measurement. After showing that the experienced utility criterion suffers from many methodological and theoretical problems, I suggest an alternative approach of objective happiness that aligns better with the scope of public policy and with the way individuals actually perceive the notion of objective happiness. The third chapter proposes a literature review of the ‘problem of reconciling’ normative and behavioural economics. I suggest a consensus on how the ‘reconciliation problem’ can be best tackled by proposing a simple framework by which economists could consensually agree about what a ‘good’ normative criterion is. The result is however that none of the main normative criteria offered in the literature satisfy all requirements of the proposed framework. In the fourth chapter, we propose an alternative form of normative economics that accounts for context-dependent preferences. Our approach differs from other approaches offered in the literature in the sense that it focuses on the process by which individuals’ multiple selves start with conflicting preferences and end up with their own preferences (an approach we label ‘view from manywhere’). In the fifth and last chapter, we introduce the ontological framework of personal persistence in normative economics in order to discuss some ethical concerns of time-inconsistent preferences. The overall result of the present thesis is that albeit normative behavioural economics rapidly flourished over the last few years in public policy, this domain of research still needs to address a consequent number of methodological and theoretical issues before it can be considered as a promising field to be applied in public decision-making. Normative behavioural economics must specially face two important problems, which result from those already studied in this thesis. First, the ethical issues related to time-inconsistent preferences require the improvement of our ontological understanding of individual identity. Second, the theoretical problems of normative behavioural economics require to be assessed by the tools of social choice: a rigorous framework that would allow us to clarify in formal language several theoretical objections listed in the critical literature

Human rights are commonly taken to include both behavioral freedoms, such as a right to express opinions, and safeguards against the behaviors of others, such as a right not to be tortured. I examine the claim by Allen Buchanan and others that democracy should be considered a human right. I discuss what human rights are, what they do, and what they obligate moral agents to do, comparing this framework to attributes of democracy. I conclude that while democracy itself is both too nebulous and too specific to be the subject of a human right, it may be proper to speak of a human right to state self-determination.

Older people should have a life with a sense of value and should feel confident. These ethical values, which are expressed in normative ethics, are expected to prevail in empirical ethics. Central components of nursing are the ethical issues of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and the principles of justice. The general aim of this thesis is to identify and describe the ethical values that are apparent in the caring encounter and their influence on the people involved. This is done from the perspective of the older person in study (I), next of kin in study (II) and nurses in study (III). In study (IV) the aim was to synthesize the concepts from empirical studies (I- III) and analyze, compare and interrelate them with normative ethics. Studies (I, III) were empirical observational studies including follow-up interviews. Twenty-two older people participated voluntarily in study (I), and in study (III) 20 nurses participated voluntarily. In study (II) fourteen next of kin were interviewed. In studies (I- III) constant comparative analysis, the core foundation of grounded theory, was used. Five concepts were used in the analysis in study (IV); three from the grounded theory studies (I- III) and two from the theoretical framework on normative ethics i.e. the ICN code and SFS law. Five categories; being addressed, receiving respect, desiring to participate, increasing self-determination and gaining self-confidence formed the basis for the core category ‚Approaching‛ in study (I). ‘Approaching’ indicates the ethical values that guide nurses in their caring encounters with older people. These ethical values are noted by the older people and are greatly appreciated by them, and also lead to improved quality of care. Four categories were identified in study (II): Receiving, showing respect, facilitating participation and showing professionalism. These categories formed the basis of the core category ‚Being amenable‛, a concept identified in the next of kin’s description of the ethical values that they and the older patients perceive in the caring encounter. In study (III), three categories were identified: showing consideration, connecting, and caring for. These categories formed the basis of the core category ‚Corroborating‛. Corroborating deals with support and interaction. Empirical ethics and normative ethics are intertwined, according to the findings of this study (IV). Normative ethics influence the nurse’s practical performance and could have a greater influence in supporting nurses as professionals. Criteria of good ethical care according to this thesis are: showing respect, invitation to participation, allowing self-determination, and providing safe and secure care. These criteria are elements of the concept of being professional. Professionalism of nurses is shown by: the approach nurses adapt to the performance of their duties, and their competence and knowledge, but also how they apply laws and professional codes

Cette thèse propose d’analyser la laïcité à l’école dans le cadre d’une sociologie des croyances et des valeurs. A partir d’une méthode qualitative et compréhensive croisant le recueil des discours d’acteurs scolaires et l’observation de situations quotidiennes, il s’agit d’interroger la dimension microsociologique et pratique du phénomène. En considérant la laïcité comme une croyance normative composée de valeurs relatives à la liberté, à l’égalité, à la citoyenneté, à la République, au vivre ensemble, etc., ce travail s’attache à mettre en évidence les contenus sémantiques et axiologiques des différentes formes de laïcité, et à faire apparaître les modèles philosophiques et politiques de société dans lesquelles elles trouvent leur ancrage. La prise en compte des rapports de rationalité que les acteurs scolaires entretiennent avec leurs croyances, en termes d’éthique de responsabilité et de conviction, fournissent des clés d’explication et de compréhension des pratiques sociales de mise en application de la laïcité, dans la mesure où ils se révèlent constituer des guides de l’action quotidienne
This thesis proposes to analyze the secularism in the school within the framework of a sociology of the values and beliefs. From a qualitative method and comprehensive crossing the compendium of speech of school agents and the observation of everyday situations, it is to interrogate the micro dimension and practice of the phenomenon. In considering the secularism as a normative belief consisting of values relating to freedom, equality, citizenship, to the Republic, to live together, etc. , this work is committed to highlight the semantic content and axiological of different forms of secularism, and to show the philosophical models and policies of society in which they find their anchor. The taking into account of the reports of rationality that school agents maintain with their beliefs, in terms of ethics of responsibility and conviction, provide the keys of explanation and understanding of the social practices of implementation of secularism, to the extent where they reveal constitute guides of the daily action

Skolverket menar att populärkultur, däribland dataspel, är användbara verktyg för att nå elevernas livsvärldar i religionskunskapsundervisningen. Den här uppsatsen undersöker den religionsdidaktiska potentialen hos Mass Effect-spelen i gymnasieskolan utifrån följande frågeställningar: Får rätt och fel handling något utrymme i Mass Effect? På vilket sätt? Vad är rätt och fel i spelkontexten? Kan Mass Effect fungera som stödstruktur för att arbeta med stoff och förmågor som är en del av religionskunskapens etikundervisning och i sådana fall på vilket sätt? Spelkontexten utforskas genom en analys av hur spelens Paragon/Renegade-system bedömer olika handlingar. Systemet jämförs med plikt-, konsekvens- och dygdetiska förhållningssätt; dessa är etiska modeller som tas upp av styrdokumenten. En av spelens beslutssituationer granskas också utifrån en beslutsmodell och styrdokumentens etiska modeller bidrar här med teoretisk och kursplanemässig förankring. Undersökningen visar att flera av de områden som ska ingå i gymnasieskolans etikundervisning kan beröras genom att låta olika element i Mass Effect-spelen möta ämnets stoff. Processen verkar ur ett didaktiskt perspektiv både berikande för spelkontexten och illustrerar komplexiteten hos etiska modeller och fattandet av etiska beslut. Resultatet är i linje med varför styrdokumenten rekommenderar användandet av populärkultur och arbetssättet förespråkas även utifrån tidigare forskning.
According to the Swedish National Agency for Education, popular culture, in which computer games are included, is a useful tool for connecting with the students and their worlds when teaching the subject of religion. This essay explores the potential of the Mass Effect-games to serve as an instrument when teaching the subject of religion, aiming to answer the following questions: Does right and wrong play a part in Mass Effect? How? What is right and wrong in the context of the game? Can Mass Effect be used as a framework when teaching the ethical content of the religious subject and if so, how? The context of the games is explored through an analysis of how their reputation system, here called the Paragon/Renegade-system, judges different actions, and through a breakdown of one of the decisions in the games, using a model designed for analyzing ethical issues. This context is then compared with ethical models appearing in the syllabus for the subject of religion and the knowledge and abilities that the subject should offer the students opportunities to develop. The research shows that much of the core content of ethical studies can be addressed using the various elements of the Mass Effect-games. On the basis of other studies, this kind of work is also encouraged.

Acting ethically is a core facet of the counseling profession's identity, safeguarding clients from undue harm (ACA, 2005). Through an increased understanding of both detrimental and positive factors that can influence counselors' perceptions of ethical behaviors, the counseling profession can intervene accordingly; this knowledge may assist in managing the problem related to unethical infractions. However, ethical behavior is a multifaceted and complex phenomenon, leaving many factors to be explored and examined. Workplace aggression, exposure to normative unethical behaviors, and an integrated modal of morality constitute some of these factors that warrant further investigation. A dearth of research currently exists within the counseling profession that examines the effects of workplace aggression and exposure to normative unethical behavior on counselors' perceptions of ethicality. Additionally, mediating variables in the context of acting ethically have scantly been researched within the counseling profession, including moral development and the moral foundations of care, fairness, and justice (integrated modal of morality). The present study investigated these various variables and the subsequent affects/relationships that ensued on counselors' perceptions of ethicality. Two phases of research were conducted: a pilot study (n = 166) that assisted in the development a Perceived Ethical Perceptions Instrument and a main study (n = 76) that assessed perceived ethicality contingent on the variables of workplace aggression, normative unethical behaviors, and the integrated modal of morality. Results from this study substantiated the complexity inherent within perceptions of ethicality, indicating that certain contextual factors may affect facets of perceived ethicality differently. of particular interest, the current study indicated that workplace aggression and the occurrence of unethical infractions by work supervisors/bosses and peers necessitated further investigation.;Keywords: ethical perceptions, workplace aggression, integrative modal of morality.

The purpose of this study is to seek to an answer to the question of what constitutes a tenable model for global ethics. This is done in part by a critical engagement with four different models of global ethics; two proposals from political philosophy and two contributions from theological ethics. The models analyzed in the study are: (1) the capabilities approach as developed by Martha Nussbaum, (2) Seyla Benhabib’s discourse ethics and model of cosmopolitan federalism, (3) David Hollenbach’s model of the common good and human rights, and (4) the model for responsibility ethics and theological humanism as developed by William Schweiker. These models contain different understandings of global justice, human rights, and sustainable development. The study works with six primary problems: (1) Which are the main moral problems associated with different processes of globalization? (2) What should be the response to these problems, in the form of a normative ethical model? (3) What is the relation between global ethics and universalism? (4) What kind of institutional vision for the international arena does a tenable global ethic promote? (5) Given the human diversity and global pluralism, what would be a reasonable view of the human being included in a global ethic? (6) What kind of ethical theory is sustainable for global ethical reflection? These questions also form the basis for the analysis of the models. The study uses a set of criteria in order to assess the answers that the models offer for these questions. These criteria also constitute the framework within which the author’s contribution to the discussion of global ethics is phrased. The criteria are founded on an idea of what characterizes global ethical reflection. The contention is that a tenable global ethic should be relevant, and it should also be related to a reasonable view of human beings and a plausible ethical theory. Together these support the criterion of communicability, which argues that a global ethic should above all be communicable, i.e. capable of enabling cross-cultural communication. A central argument which this study makes is that a kind of ethical contextualism is more reasonable than an epistemological universalism.

The thesis defends a critical theological engagement with rights and autonomy as the basis for protecting children. It was prompted by child protection cases encountered as a lawyer involving families from minority religious communities. The cases raised questions about cross-cultural norms for child protection. The need for such norms, emphasised in the Laming report into Victoria Climbie's death through exorcism, is further highlighted by phenomena like forced marriage and 'honour' killing. Government documents and judicial decisions assume that such norms are found in children's rights and welfare. Yet welfare is indeterminate and in some circles rights are seen as incompatible with religion, unrealistic in their universal aspirations and criticised for liberal assumptions about autonomy and reason. The problems are examined through contextual illustrations from contemporary debates about forced marriage, religious dress, 'honour' killings and sexuality, corporal punishment, faith-based education and adoption. The introductory chapter sets out the problematic, methodology, legal and religious sources and paradigms and the limits of the research. The second chapter considers earlier explorations of cross-cultural bases for child protection norms and identifies their limitations; in particular assumptions of agreement over what constitutes harm are challenged. Chapter three examines specific illustrations of secular or liberal concern which highlight differing understandings about what is harmful for children. In chapter four the worldviews, epistemology and theology underlying such differences are examined in greater depth, identifying divergent views about autonomy as a key factor in the differences. Chapter five considers the concept of autonomy from the perspective of Christian theology, particularly that of Karl Barth and Christian arguments concerning rights. This process enables the construction of a theological defence of autonomy and rights in which autonomy is understood not as libertarian freedom but as the graced uniqueness of cognitive, affective and bodily integrity and identity inherent in all human beings from birth. Such autonomy is the gift of personhood in 'what is least fathomable and controllable in the human subject' that human rights are designed to protect. Graced autonomy can only be lived in relationship with family, community and God but recognises that without respect for each person's integrity and worth right relationship is impossible. Rights are defended as necessary in addressing distortions of power even exploitation which subordinates the interests of some to more powerful others, both individuals and communities. Rights based on graced autonomy also provide more substance to what constitutes worth in terms of the material, social and participative. The sixth chapter assesses the compatibility of the paradigm of graced autonomy with Islam and Judaism whilst the seventh and final chapter considers the implications of the paradigm for various areas of public and legal debate concerning children and adults. In addition further areas of research and exploration of the paradigm are considered for example implications for theological literacy in frontline social work, further testing in other faith traditions and application to adults' rights.

This study explores the extent and depth of moral obligations in international relations, and how our collective understanding of these obligations has changed in the post-Cold War era. The genocides in Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica (1995) raised questions about the moral legitimacy of states ravaged by human rights violations, and about the responsibility of outside states to protect innocent civilians from being massacred across political and cultural boundaries. In this context, the concept of humanitarian intervention as an expression of international moral responsibility emerged as one of the most controversial foreign policy issues of our time. The formal and unanimous adoption of the doctrine known as the Responsibility to Protect (ICISS, 2001) by the United Nations General Assembly (2005), and the subsequent ratification by the U.N. Security Council, reiterated our collective responsibility when faced with situations of grave human rights violations. Nevertheless, the international community repeatedly fails to respond adequately to atrocities. By comparing the nature of, and moral justifications for, the U.S. response to the atrocities in Rwanda (1994), Darfur (2003-2007), and Libya (2011), this study reveals that, despite inconsistencies in policy, the solidarist values reflected in Responsibility to Protect are evolving along Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) “norm life cycle.” Yet, it also cautions against the reliance on the “humanitarian impulses” of world leaders in internalizing this expanded notion of moral responsibility in international relations. Beyond the transitory nature of political will, this dependence fails to address the underlying assumptions generating inconsistencies in international moral decision-making. This study suggests that in order to ameliorate the problem of inconsistent responses to situations of mass atrocities, deeper issues related to realist assumptions upon which the international system is based may be involved, demanding attention and reassessment.

Ce travail a pour but de montrer quelles logiques de la finalité sont en jeu dans le travail du manager. Nous avons distingué deux façons d’aborder la finalité. La première, proche des notions d’objectif, d’intérêt, d’utilité, constitue le soubassement des façons d’aborder classiquement le travail du manager. Nous avons fait émerger, en nous appuyant sur la pensée d’Aristote, Thomas d’Aquin, et Spaemann, une conception alternative de la finalité, qui diffère de l’objectif et de l’intérêt en ce qu’elle n’est pas construite. Ce concept de finalité permet de voir autrement trois dimensions essentielles du travail du manager : le management par objectif, le faisceau d’exigences contradictoires dont le manager est le point focal, et le dilemme qui se pose à lui entre éthique et efficacité. Enfin, une enquête de terrain permet de montrer que cette logique alternative de la finalité, rattachée à l’éthique des vertus, trouve une certaine place dans le discours des managers de la FDJ, aux côtés du conséquentialisme, qui consacre l’acception utilitaire de la finalité, et du déontologisme qui évacue le recours à la finalité
This thesis aim is to show which notion of purpose is at stake in the manager’s work. It differentiates two ways to address the concept of purpose. The first one, close to the notions of objective, interest, utility, forms the foundations of a classical vision of the manager’s work. However, a second one, based on Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Spaemann’s philosophies, arose. This alternative conception differs from objective and interest as it is not elaborated by the subject. It allows a different view on three essential dimensions of the manager’s work: the management by objectives, the body of contradictory requirements that built up on the manager and the dilemma between ethics and efficiency. Finally, a field survey showed that this alternative conception of purpose, linked to virtue-based ethics, has a certain place in the FDJ’s managers’ message, together with consequentialism, which expresses the utilitarian conception of purpose, and deontological ethics, which evacuates any purpose