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Journal articles on the topic 'Normative pluralism'
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Salazar, Mónica Gómez. "Normative Pluralism." Contemporary Pragmatism 13, no. 4 (December 1, 2016): 382–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-01304003.
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This article suggests that an epistemological and ontological pluralist perspective may enable human beings to cooperate each other and live with less injustice. Intercultural cooperation may help for a reformulation of the Human rights in order to consider aspects of different ways of life like the variations of moral, political and judicial norms. I expound that Liberal pluralism does not respond adequately to present day multiculturalism. Additionally, I explain that Human rights are not inclusive norms for all ways of life. I definitely sustain that some communities do not have to agree to live in the same moral world as others, but, that it is indeed necessary to know each other’s differences so as to be able to respect them.
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Backenköhler Casajús, Christian J. "Transplante jurídico = Legal trasplant." EUNOMÍA. Revista en Cultura de la Legalidad, no. 17 (September 27, 2019): 262. http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/eunomia.2019.5032.
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Resumen: El trasplante jurídico es una metáfora del derecho comparado creada para señalar el traspaso normativo que se produce entre diferentes ordenamientos jurídicos. En un primer momento, el trasplante jurídico sirvió para demostrar que, desde hace tiempo, el traspaso normativo fue un mecanismo frecuentemente utilizado para crear nuevos sistemas jurídicos o para la adaptación o renovación de muchos de ellos. Pero, con el tiempo, se ha ido configurando como un concepto que, aparte de describir el traslado de una norma de un sistema jurídico a otro, trata también de explicar las posibles consecuencias que puede sufrir el ordenamiento jurídico receptor. En la actualidad, el trasplante jurídico está sirviendo para explicar la transferencia normativa entre diferentes ordenamientos jurídicos en el contexto de la globalización y también como indicador de la existencia de un pluralismo jurídico en el espacio jurídico actual.Palabras clave: Trasplante jurídico, pluralismo jurídico, derecho comparado, préstamo jurídico, pluralismo cultural.Abstract: The legal transplant is a comparative law metaphor created to indicate the normative transfer that occurs between different legal systems. At first, the legal transplant served to demonstrate that, for a long time, the normative transfer was a mechanism frequently used to create new legal systems or, also, for the adaptation or renewal of many of them. Over time, however, it has developed into a concept which, apart from describing the transfer of a rule from one legal system to another, also seeks to explain the possible consequences that the receiving legal system may suffer. At present, legal transplant is serving to explain the normative transfer between different legal systems in the context of globalization and, also, as an indicator of the existence of legal pluralism in the current legal space.Keywords: Legal trasplant, legal pluralism, comparative law, legal borrowing, cultural pluralism.
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ISIKSEL, TURKULER. "Global legal pluralism as fact and norm." Global Constitutionalism 2, no. 2 (June 28, 2013): 160–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2045381713000130.
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AbstractThis article interrogates the intellectual foundations of global legal pluralism as a descriptive and normative position, and assesses its core claims with reference to the changing status of individuals in the postnational realm. In order to uncover the normative core of the pluralist position, the article turns to the rich tradition of value pluralism in political philosophy, particularly as articulated by Isaiah Berlin. It argues that as a normative position, pluralism – whether applied to the abstract sphere of values or the concrete realm of legal regimes – is normatively underdetermined, offering too little guidance as to how the conflicts endemic to a pluralistic world ought to be resolved. Unless it is supplemented by other, more substantive principles of political legitimacy such as democracy, freedom, equality, or justice, the principle of pluralism applied to the global legal realm is poised to reproduce, even exacerbate, existing inequalities of power and resources among those whom it affects.
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Tiffany, Evan. "Deflationary Normative Pluralism." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 33 (2007): 231–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.0.0076.
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Let us give voice to this new demand: we need a critique of moral values, the value of these values should itself, for once, be examined. - Friedrich NietzscheAnyone who, stimulated by education, has come to feel the force of the various obligations in life, at some time or other comes to feel the irksomeness of carrying them out, and to recognize the sacrifice of interest involved; and, if thoughtful, he inevitably puts to himself the question: “Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act? … Should I not really be justified in simply trying to have a good time?” - H.A. Prichard
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Case, Spencer. "Normative Pluralism Worthy of the Name is False." Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 11, no. 1 (June 7, 2017): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v11i1.107.
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Normative pluralism is the view that practical reason consists in an irreducible plurality of normative domains, that these domains sometimes issue conflicting recommendations and that, when this happens, there is never any one thing that one ought simpliciter to do. Here I argue against this view, noting that normative pluralism must be either unrestricted or restricted. Unrestricted pluralism maintains that all coherent standards are reason-generating normative domains, whereas restricted pluralism maintains that only some are. Unrestricted pluralism, depending on how it is cashed out, is either nihilism about practical reason or else it is subjectivism. Neither view is consistent with normative pluralism; hence, pluralism must be restricted. Restricted pluralism, however, faces two problems. The first stems from the question: “Why is it that some standards are normative domains while others are not?” The question seems to demand an answer, but it is hard to give any answer without appealing to considerations that imply facts about what we ought simpliciter to do. Second, restricted pluralism has difficulty accounting for our intuitions about cases in which one option is optimal in all domains, but not better than each alternative in any one domain. The unique option that is optimal in every domain seems better than its competitors, though it isn’t better within any domain. This is different than the widely discussed argument from notable-nominal comparisons. So I conclude that we have good reason to reject restricted pluralism, the only form of normative pluralism really worthy of that name.
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Avbelj, Matej. "Constitutional and Administrative Pluralism in the EU System of Banking Supervision." German Law Journal 17, no. 5 (October 1, 2016): 779–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2071832200021465.
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This Article examines the relationship between the developing European Union (EU) system of banking supervision and the theories of constitutional pluralism. It questions the remaining epistemic, explanatory, and normative value of these theories with regard to the EU system of banking supervision. The argument is broken down into three parts. First, the Article briefly describes the system of banking supervision in the European Union and the pluralist challenges that it spurs. Second, it schematically maps out the leading theories of constitutional pluralism to test, by way of their application to the field of EU banking supervision, their epistemic, explanatory, and normative value. Finally, to the extent that this value has diminished, the Article offers another pluralist theory, not a constitutional one, which could supplement the identified epistemic, explanatory, and normative gaps. This is a theory of administrative pluralism.
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Macdonald, Terry, and Kate Macdonald. "Towards a ‘pluralist’ world order: creative agency and legitimacy in global institutions." European Journal of International Relations 26, no. 2 (September 25, 2019): 518–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354066119873134.
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This article addresses the question of how we should understand the normative grounds of legitimacy in global governance institutions, given the social and organizational pluralism of the contemporary global political order. We argue that established normative accounts of legitimacy, underpinning both internationalist and cosmopolitan institutional models, are incompatible with real-world global social and organizational pluralism, insofar as they are articulated within the parameters of a ‘statist’ world order imaginary: this sees legitimacy as grounded in rational forms of political agency, exercised within ‘closed’ communities constituted by settled common interests and identities. To advance beyond these statist ideational constraints, we elaborate an alternative ‘pluralist’ world order imaginary: this sees legitimacy as partially grounded in creative forms of political agency, exercised in the constitution and ongoing transformation of a plurality of ‘open’ communities, with diverse and fluid interests and identities. Drawing on a case study analysis of political controversies surrounding the global governance of business and human rights, we argue that the pluralist imaginary illuminates how normative legitimacy in world politics can be strengthened by opening institutional mandates to contestation by multiple distinct collectives, even though doing so is incompatible with achieving a fully rationalized global institutional scheme.
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Karpovich, Valentin N., and Alexander A. Shevchenko. "Normative Pluralism and Multinormativity." Siberian Journal of Philosophy 18, no. 3 (February 25, 2021): 37–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.25205/2541-7517-2020-18-3-37-48.
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The paper deals with the phenomenon of normative pluralism - that of several normative orders coexisting in various spheres of our life - law, morality, politics, etc. It shows the root causes of normative pluralism and the causes of its development and proliferation - both internal (overcoming legal and moral syncretism) and external (globalization and the related growth in the number of regulatory subjects). The authors offer a way of understanding and reconciling norms by building out of potentially conflicting norms a non-contradictory system without any normative collisions.
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LAWRENCE, Jessica C. "Constitutional Pluralism's Unspoken Normative Core." Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 21 (November 4, 2019): 24–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cel.2019.12.
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AbstractThis article argues that discourses of constitutional pluralism contain a strong normative core which is made up of a series of largely unacknowledged implicit claims about legitimacy and community. This argument is illustrated by reference to various constitutional pluralist responses to the Hungarian Constitutional Court's ruling concerning the protection of constitutional identity in the context of EU asylum and refugee protection law and policy, demonstrating that whether this decision falls ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ constitutional pluralist tolerance depends on how the observer defines the minimum amount of shared substantive or procedural content that is fundamental to the EU order.
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Donlan, Seán Patrick. "Emmanuel Melissaris, Ubiquitous Law: Legal Theory and the Space for Legal Pluralism (2009) (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2009) [ISBN 978-0-7546-2542-1] [Ubiquitous Law]. All page references in parenthesis are to this book." Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 25, no. 1 (January 2012): 177–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0841820900005361.
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A broad assortment of contemporary approaches to legal and normative complexity have challenged state law’s claim of dominance and exclusivity. In Ubiquitous law: Legal Theory and the Space for Legal Pluralism (2009), Emmanuel Melissaris similarly seeks to ground the ‘legal’ in what he calls ‘shared normative commitments’. As with much ‘legal pluralism’, his focus on normativity rejects long-established conventional concepts of law. Indeed, for Melissaris, state law may not even properly qualify as ‘law’. But understood as a descriptive theory of normativity, the dynamic legal-normative web he outlines has much to recommend it. It is certainly superior to the continuing narrow concentration of jurisprudes on state law and law-like regimes. Less convincing is Melissaris’ prescriptive suggestion, with ‘critical legal pluralists’, that illustrating the degree to which legal-normative reform occurs beyond the state and its laws promises liberation. Shared normative commitments do not necessarily result in popular control as existing social structures and power relationships remain. We may be ensnared rather than emancipated. On the whole, however, Melissaris has made a sophisticated and substantial contribution to our understanding of legal and normative plurality. His book deserves to be widely read.
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Lima, Adriano Sousa. "Reino de Deus e missão no contexto do pluralismo religioso." REFLEXUS - Revista Semestral de Teologia e Ciências das Religiões 8, no. 12 (May 13, 2015): 271. http://dx.doi.org/10.20890/reflexus.v8i12.246.
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Resumo: O presente trabalho tem como objetivo refletir sobre os possíveis desafios para a prática missionária no contexto do pluralismo religioso. Ele procura identificar aproximações entre uma cristologia no pluralismo religioso, sem desvalorizar ou apagar a singularidade da perspectiva interna da fé cristã, segundo a qual Jesus Cristo permanece normativo para “o encontro com a realidade última”. Em termos epistemológicos, a teologia sofre deslocamentos em sua própria estrutura, é desconstruída e reconstruída no diálogo com seu tempo e lugar cultural. Se, por um lado, as teologias foram questionadas pelo pensamento contemporâneo, por outro lado (no momento atual) elas se confrontam com uma questão mais radical: o caráter central de Cristo, expressão primeira da fé salvadora, questionada pela pluralidade cultural e religiosa. Como anunciar o Deus de Jesus no mundo pluralista? O autor defende que o cristianismo atual é convidado a repensar seus paradigmas missionários a partir do pluralismo religioso contemporâneo. A metodologia utilizada é basicamente a pesquisa bibliográfica, em vista da elaboração de um estudo analítico-sintético. Palavras-chave: Missão. Cristologia. Reino de Deus. Pluralismo Religioso. Abstract: The aim of this paper is to reflect on the possible challenges to missionary practice in the context of religious pluralism. It seeks to identify similarities between christologies in the religious pluralism, without disparaging or effacing the uniqueness of the singularity of the Christian faith, according to which Jesus Christ remains normative for “the encounter with ultimate reality”. In epistemological terms, the structure of Theology has changed, and it has been deconstructed and reconstructed in its dialogue with their time and cultural place. Theologies have been questioned by contemporary thought and are also faced now with a more radical question: the central character of Christ, the primary expression of saving faith, questioned by cultural and religious plurality. How to announce the God of Jesus in a pluralistic world? The author argues that current Christianity is invited to rethink their missionary paradigms in the light of contemporary religious pluralism. The methodology used is basically bibliographic research so as to prepare an analytic-synthetic study. Keywords: Mission. Christology. Kingdom of God. Religious Pluralism.
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Botting, David. "Why Modal Pluralism Does Not Require Normative Pluralism." Argumentation and Advocacy 50, no. 3 (January 2014): 168–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00028533.2014.11821817.
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Hamzah, Ekawati. "Religious Pluralism (Perspective of Islamic Normativity and History)." Journal of Islam and Science 7, no. 2 (December 31, 2020): 110. http://dx.doi.org/10.24252/jis.v7i2.16373.
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This paper discusses "Normative and Historical Perspective Religious Pluralism, which includes two main problems, namely: First, how is religious pluralism in a historical perspective. Second, how is religious pluralism with a normative perspective. Religious pluralism in the perspective of revelation (Normative) is not only part of a humanitarian task but also a dimension of the Muslim’s level, devotion and a religious duty which is the value of worship in the sight of Allah SWT. Whereas historically, the religious attitude in the midst of a plural society was exemplified by the Prophet in the early days of Islam, so that in its development it became the religion that most respected the values of plurality. Therefore, in its development, Muslims do not need to feel a dilemma if in their life they have to intersect with other religions, instead they must be used as life partners in facing the benefit of the people.
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Setiawan, Andry. "Apologetika Prasuposisional Triperspektivalisme John M. Frame dan Aplikasinya terhadap Pemikiran Kristen Pluralis tentang Pluralisme Agama di Indonesia." Veritas : Jurnal Teologi dan Pelayanan 17, no. 1 (June 1, 2018): 61–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.36421/veritas.v17i1.306.
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Pluralisme menjadi kesadaran baru yang menganggap bahwa semua keyakinan memiliki kesamaan secara umum satu dengan yang lain. Implikasinya, tidak ada satu pun agama yang boleh mengklaim bahwa ia adalah satu-satunya keyakinan yang paling benar di antara agama-agama lainnya. Indonesia sebagai negara pluralis juga menghadapi problematika pluralisme agama. Dalam menghadapi ini, muncul pemikiran Kristen pluralis yang menekankan persamaan di antara agama-agama sehingga meniadakan keunikan kekristenan: Kristus dan karya keselamatan-Nya benar sedangkan agama lainnya salah. Tulisan ini akan mengenalkan model berapologetika yang membela keunikan iman Kristen di tengah tantangan pemikiran Kristen yang pluralis tentang pluralisme agama di Indonesia: apologetika prasuposisional triperspektivalisme John M. Frame yang diuraikan melalui apologetika konstruktif (normatif), defensif (eksistensial), dan ofensif (situasional).
Kata-kata kunci: Apologetika, Prasuposisional, Triperspektivalisme, John M. Frame, Aplikasi, Pluralisme Agama
Pluralism exhibits a new awareness that assumes that all beliefs have general similarity when compared one with another. As a result, there is no religion that can claim that it has the claim to ultimate truth when compared with a host of other options. Indonesia, as a pluralistic nation, exhibits the challenges of religious pluralism. Because of that reality, there are frameworks of Christian thought that have arisen that emphasize the similarity of several religions which erodes and ultimately eliminates the uniqueness of Christianity. However, Jesus Christ and his work of salvation is absolutely true and the other religions are false. This article will introduce an apologetic model that can be used to defend the uniqueness of the Christian faith among the challenges of religious pluralistic thought in Indonesia. John M. Frame’s triperspectivalism presuppositional apologetics is proferred and developed through constructive apologetics (normative), defensive apologetics (existential), and offensive apologetics (situational).
Keywords: Apologetics, Presuppositional, Triperspectivalism, John M. Frame, Application, Religious Pluralism
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Avbelj, Matej. "Constitutional Pluralism and Authoritarianism." German Law Journal 21, no. 5 (July 2020): 1023–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/glj.2020.56.
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AbstractThis article examines the relationship between constitutional pluralism and authoritarianism. It does so since the Weiss decision of the FCC spurred unusual attacks on constitutional pluralism. This particular theoretical vision of European integration has been described as inherently dangerous and its abandonment has been called for out of chiefly instrumentalist reasons, in order to prevent constitutional pluralism turning into an autocrats’ refuge. The article argues this critique of constitutional pluralism does not succeed. Due to its truncated, exclusively positivist understanding of constitutional pluralism, it has failed to take into account pluralism’s normative core. The latter presents itself an antipode to authoritarianism, which means that the autocratic regimes simply cannot credibly avail themselves of the theory of constitutional pluralism to justify their authoritarian actions.
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Baiasu, Sorin. "Debate: The Normative Pluralism of Desert*." Journal of Political Philosophy 14, no. 2 (June 2006): 226–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2006.00248.x.
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Kellen, Nathan. "The normative problem for logical pluralism." Inquiry 63, no. 3-4 (December 27, 2018): 258–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2018.1548375.
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Ereshefsky, Marc. "Pluralism, Normative Naturalism, and Biological Taxonomy." PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994, no. 2 (January 1994): 382–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192949.
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KUYPER, JONATHAN W. "The democratic potential of systemic pluralism." Global Constitutionalism 3, no. 2 (July 2014): 170–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2045381714000021.
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AbstractThis article analyses how, and under what conditions, a systemically-pluralist structure of international law provides a springboard for global democratization. I argue that contestation and deliberation – core values of democracy – can and do arise within systemic pluralism. Specifically, I contend that institutional heterarchy between legal orders and forum shopping by different actors provide a means to engender these democratic values. I maintain that democratization can be sought on both horizontal and vertical planes: the former being the sphere of multilateral negotiations; the latter being governance which links individuals directly to sites of public power. In making this argument, I analyse recent developments within global intellectual property law, establishing and treating the multiple jurisdictions in this issue-space as an instantiation of systemic pluralism. This article thus provides a normative strategy for ongoing democratization of international law. Systemic pluralism must still prove its merits in terms of stability, the rule of law, and other values. However, I provide a method to advance transnational democracy that takes seriously empirical realities and competing normative visions.
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Kleinhans, Martha-Marie, and Roderick A. Macdonald. "What is a Critical Legal Pluralism?" Canadian journal of law and society 12, no. 02 (1997): 25–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0829320100005342.
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AbstractLegal pluralism is a contemporary image of law that has been advanced by sociolegal scholars in response to the dominant monist image of law as derivative of the political state and its progeny. The pluralistic image redirects law and society research toward the myriad normative orders outside the circle of “the Law.” This essay considers the epistemological foundations of both legal pluralism and the legal monist image of law against which its proponents are reacting. It argues that contemporary pluralistic imaginations rest on the same impoverished view of law and its subjects that sustains the traditional claim that law comprises only the processes and institutions emanating from the modern political state. The authors propose an alternative image of law in an effort to redirect the sociolegal studies research agenda.Challenging the traditional social-scientific legal pluralism of reified cultures and communities, the idea of critical legal pluralism presented in this essay rests on the insight that it is knowledge that maintains and creates realities: a critical legal pluralism imagines legal subjects as “law inventing” and not merely “law abiding.” The authors argue that, once the constructive, creative capacities of legal subjects are recognized alongside the plurality of these same subjects, the relationship between laws and selves reveals its complexity. They acknowledge that their approach is only one of many possible critical legal pluralist approaches; but they maintain that any reconception of law within a framework of critical legal pluralism is a form of emancipatory prescription. As definitions of law are revised and rejected, new vistas are opened for sociolegal scholarship.
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Alaeinejad, Hamid, and Morteza Hajhosseini. "The Collapse Argument Reconsidered." Logos & Episteme 11, no. 4 (2020): 413–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202011432.
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According to Beall and Restall’s logical pluralism, classical logic, relevant logic, and intuitionistic logic are all correct. On this version of logical pluralism, logic is considered to be normative, in the sense that someone who accepts the truth of the premises of a valid argument, is bound to accept the conclusion. So-called collapse arguments are designed to show the incompatibility of the simultaneous acceptance of logical pluralism and the normativity of logic. Caret, however, by proposing logical contextualism, and Blake-Turner and Russell by proposing telic pluralism, have sought to nullify the collapse problem. In the present article, after setting out these two approaches to the collapse problem, we argue that by using the concept of the ‘rationality of beliefs’ in order to frame the canonical purpose of logic, it can be demonstrated that if logical contextualism and telic pluralism are considered as philosophically significant logical pluralisms, a refined version of the collapse argument is still a threat for both of these kinds of logical pluralism.
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CHOUDHURY, Nafay. "RevisitingCriticalLegal Pluralism: Normative Contestations in the Afghan Courtroom." Asian Journal of Law and Society 4, no. 1 (March 6, 2017): 229–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/als.2017.2.
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AbstractThis paper revisits the concept ofcriticallegal pluralism, which treats the individual as a site of normativity with the capacity to create legal knowledge. To help operationalize the usage of critical legal pluralism, I propose a methodological approach that places the individual’s ability to makes choices along a continuum. On one side of continuum, legal pluralism can be viewed as facilitating fully discrete choices that ascribe to one legal order or another. On the other side, the ability to make individual choices is curtailed because of the presence of a hegemonic legal order. This simple continuum helps to shed light on the complex considerations that affect individual choices, which in turn affect how various legal orders are legitimated. The paper then considers how critical legal pluralism can enrich the discussion on the legal system of Afghanistan, focusing on interviews with two Afghan justice actors: a former judge and an active defence lawyer.
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Pierdominici, Leonardo. "The Theory of EU Constitutional Pluralism: A Crisis in a Crisis?" Perspectives on Federalism 9, no. 2 (November 1, 2017): E—119—E—153. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/pof-2017-0012.
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Abstract The paper deals with the validity of constitutional pluralism as a constitutional theory for the European Union and a paradigm for the understanding of EU law in the current times of crisis. It reconstructs the way in which constitutional pluralism came to the fore, the different ways in which the theory was presented, and considers historical criticism it has faced. It then looks at the anomalies that, allegedly, cannot be explained today by constitutional pluralism as a paradigm, linked to the current economic and political crises in the Union. The reconstruction of the debate is complemented with reflections on both the descriptive and normative validity of EU constitutional pluralism’s claims.
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TRAN, Thi Quang Hong. "The Choice of Norms in Courtroom Adjudication in Vietnam: In Search of Legitimacy in a Socialist Regulatory Context." Asian Journal of Law and Society 6, no. 01 (January 16, 2019): 159–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/als.2018.44.
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AbstractNotwithstanding its defining feature of normative pluralism, the socialist state of Vietnam basically adopts a legal centralist approach to regulation. The judiciary is arguably the most illustrative of this approach, since it is the main forum where legal centralism encounters normative pluralism. Our research examines the choice of norms in judicial adjudication in Vietnam to check the effectiveness of its legal centralist approach. It finds that, despite lacking institutional support, judges managed to apply customary norms at their discretion against the state’s emphasis on top-down legal rules. A legitimacy-based analysis explains this phenomenon. It points out that judges conceptualized their legitimacy under the influence of both legal and extra-legal rules, thus making it apart from the legality. Judges attempt to bridge the gap between legitimacy and legality enabled de factor normative pluralism. In looking at the influence of customary norms over judicial adjudication, the article aims to make both theoretical and practical contributions. Theoretically, it enriches the scholarship of normative pluralism by showing how legitimacy-building keeps normative pluralism effective, irrespective of the dominating legal centralism. Practically, it proffers insightful implications for the ongoing court reforms in Vietnam based upon the findings.
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Canihac, Hugo. "Is Constitutional Pluralism (Il)liberal? On the Political Theory of European Legal Integration in Times of Crisis." German Law Journal 22, no. 4 (June 2021): 491–505. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/glj.2021.22.
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AbstractThis Article uncovers the normative political theory underlying the legal doctrine of constitutional pluralism, as it is used in the EU today. Constitutional pluralism, once described as a semi-official legal doctrine in the EU, is now being used by some member states to challenge its authority and rules. By reconstructing the political thought of one of its founders, N. MacCormick, this Article takes issue with two most common interpretations of constitutional pluralism: On the one hand, it has been claimed that the normative political content of constitutional pluralism is virtually identical, or at least compatible, with that of Kantian rights-based cosmopolitanism; on the other, it has been contended, especially with regard to its uses in Hungary and Poland, that it was an inherently dangerous, illiberal, normative theory. This Article offers to move away from current legal debates to go back to the origins of constitutional pluralism. It argues that constitutional pluralism is not a purely liberal theory indeed. But neither is it inherently illiberal. Rather, both liberal and illiberal readings are possible, but partial, interpretations of MacCormickian constitutional pluralism. A more systematic interpretation shows that constitutional pluralism opens a path to move beyond this somewhat archetypical divide.
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Galston, William A. "PLURALIST CONSTITUTIONALISM." Social Philosophy and Policy 28, no. 1 (November 30, 2010): 228–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052510000117.
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AbstractThis essay explores the ways in which a broadly pluralist outlook can help illuminate longstanding issues of constitutional theory and practice. It begins with a common-sense understanding of pluralism as the diversity of observed practices within a general category (section 2). It turns out that many assumptions Americans and others often make about constitutional essentials are valid only locally but not generically. The essay then turns to pluralism in a more technical and philosophical sense—specifically, the account of value pluralism adumbrated by Isaiah Berlin and developed by his followers. Section 3 sketches this version of pluralism, and section 4 brings it to bear on a range of familiar constitutional issues. In the process, a distinction emerges between, on the one hand, areas of variation among constitutions and, on the other, some general truths about political life that define core constitutional functions. The essay concludes (section 5) with some brief reflections on the normative thrust of pluralist constitutional theory—in particular, a presumption in favor of the maximum accommodation of individual and group differences consistent with the maintenance of constitutional unity and civic order.
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OKLOPCIC, ZORAN. "Beyond Empty, Conservative, and Ethereal: Pluralist Self-Determination and a Peripheral Political Imaginary." Leiden Journal of International Law 26, no. 3 (July 31, 2013): 509–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0922156513000216.
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AbstractOver the last couple of years, a stream of pluralist theories of international legal order has developed at the intersection of international law and political theory, having immediate implications for conceptualizing self-determination. The understanding of self-determination under the framework ofbounded,constitutional, andradicalpluralism markedly departs from the previous wave of normative theories in the 1990s: self-determination is now evacuated from the field of national pluralism and struggles over territory.This article does not question the thrust of pluralists’ recent work, but complements their critical attunement to global disparities of power, and complicates their neglect of nationalism and rejection of territorial reconfigurations as self-determination's core meaning. In doing so, it unearths two visions that come from the (semi-)periphery of the international political order. The first belongs to Edvard Kardelj, pre-eminent Yugoslav theorist of socialist self-management and the Non-Aligned Movement. The second belongs to Leopold Sédar Senghor, the poet and politician, advocate ofnégritude, a proponent of French West African integration, and a constitutional advocate for the reconfiguration – not abolition – of the French Union, the heir to the French Empire. While they are suspicious of extensive territorial reconstruction, like contemporary pluralists, unlike them they have seen a role for territorial reconfigurations in the name of national plurality.
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Bengoetxea, Joxerramon. "An Existential Crisis? Freedom, Tolerance, Solidarity, Peace; Or, Why Europe is Valuable." Cuadernos Europeos de Deusto, no. 59 (October 31, 2018): 115–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.18543/ced-59-2018pp115-137.
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This paper addresses Europe’s existential crisis. It does so by suggesting that, notwithstanding the relevance of the institutional design, the essence of the project of European integration is persons and peoples rather than states. It then discusses two speeches of important personalities speaking about Europe’s existential crisis. Next, it deals with the question of diversity since the motto of the failed constitutional treaty was precisely “united in diversity”. But this requires explaining the centrality of the individual in practical reason, and the importance of normative systems. The centrality of the individual, related to the value of freedom, is then placed in the context of plurality and diversity, directly addressing the theme of backlash forces in Europe through a map of such plurality in Europe; the socalled multiculturalism or ethno-religious pluralism. The paper concludes by suggesting a version of cosmopolitanism, hermeneutic pluralism, as the normative position to address the balance between individual freedom and solidarity or between “persons” and “peoples”.Received: 15 January 2018 Accepted: 9 May 2018 Published online: 31 October 2018
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Martin, Ron. "Putting the case for a pluralistic economic geography." Journal of Economic Geography 21, no. 1 (January 1, 2021): 1–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbaa025.
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Abstract Over the past decade or so, concern has grown in economic geography over whether the discipline has become too pluralised, characterised by the proliferation of conceptual schemas, theoretical approaches and local narratives, between which there is often little communication or coherence, thereby militating against the identification of a clear and generally agreed disciplinary identity and ‘core’ research agenda. In response, some economic geographers have argued that what is now needed is an ‘integrative turn’, in order to arrest and reverse this process of pluralisation. This article explores the complex issue of pluralism and argues there are convincing arguments in support of pluralism, on pragmatic grounds, as a purposive–strategic endeavour, and on normative–melioristic grounds. At the same time, the article explores in some detail the ideas of ‘integrative pluralism’ and ‘boundary objects’ as ways of achieving communication between different perspectives while preserving the advantages of pluralism.
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Pradhani, Sartika Intaning. "Pendekatan Pluralisme Hukum dalam Studi Hukum Adat: Interaksi Hukum Adat dengan Hukum Nasional dan Internasional." Undang: Jurnal Hukum 4, no. 1 (June 5, 2021): 81–124. http://dx.doi.org/10.22437/ujh.4.1.81-124.
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Scientific study on adat law starts from empirical research, which finds that adat law does not stand alone but works together with other legal orders. This paper is written based on normative legal research by collecting secondary data to answer (1) how legal pluralism explains adat law and adat law community; and (2) how the application of legal pluralism approach in adat law study. The legal pluralism approach explains adat law not as an isolated/marginalized legal order but as a dynamic legal order which interacts with national and international law. From the perspective of legal pluralism, the adat law community is a semi-autonomous social field that produces rules from the interplay between the adat law community and other legal communities/institutions. Categorization of legal pluralism approach application are as follow: first, weak legal pluralism where state law recognizes adat law either by law and regulation or court decision; second, strong legal pluralism which describes through the semi-autonomous social field, shopping forum, and forum shopping concept; third, legal pluralism multi-sited which explain the relationship between legal phenomena in local, national, and international level; and elaborate the role of information, communication, and technology which bridges legal phenomenon from one to another.
Abstrak
Kajian ilmiah terhadap hukum adat berangkat dari penelitian lapangan yang menemukan bahwa hukum adat tidak pernah berdiri sendiri dan selalu berinteraksi dengan tertib hukum yang lain. Artikel ini ditulis berdasarkan penelitian hukum normatif dengan mengumpulkan data sekunder berupa laporan-laporan penelitian dan artikel jurnal untuk untuk menjawab (1) bagaimana pendekatan pluralisme hukum menjelaskan hukum adat dan masyarakat hukum adat; dan (2) bagaiamana pendekatan pluralisme hukum digunakan dalam studi hukum adat hari ini. Pendekatan pluralisme hukum memahami hukum adat tidak sebagai suatu ketertiban hukum yang terpisah atau termarginalisasi dari ketertiban hukum yang lain, tetapi secara dinamis terus berinteraksi dengan hukum nasional maupun internasional. Dari perspektif pluralisme hukum, masyarakat hukum adat merupakan suatu wilayah sosial semi otonom yang melahirkan hukum berdasarkan hubungan saling memengaruhi dengan masyarakat hukum lain. Penerapan pendekatan pluralisme hukum dalam studi hukum adat dapat dikelompokkan dalam tiga kategori. Pertama, pluralisme hukum lemah di mana negara mengakui hukum adat baik melalui peraturan perundang-undangan maupun putusan pengadilan. Kedua, pluralisme hukum kuat yang dideskripsikan melalui konsep wilayah sosial semi-otonom, forum shopping, dan shopping forum. Terakhir, pluralisme hukum multi-sited yang digunakan untuk menjelaskan hubungan berbagai fenomena hukum antara hukum adat (lokal), nasional, dan internasional serta peran teknologi informasi dan komunikasi dalam menjembatani hubungan tersebut.
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Phillips, Anne. "Equality, Pluralism, Universality: Current Concerns in Normative Theory." British Journal of Politics and International Relations 2, no. 2 (June 2000): 237–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-856x.00035.
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This article reviews recent debates in normative theory. It argues that work on equality has bifurcated in a disturbing way, with much of the work on economic equality focusing on the principles that should regulate the distribution of goods between individuals, and much of the work on social equality dealing with patterns of oppression that affect the relationship between marginal and dominant groups. The first literature has been relatively indifferent to the group nature of contemporary inequality, while the second mirrors this failing by its lack of interest in the distribution of economic resources. The implications of cultural pluralism have also contributed to debates about the status of normative theory and the basis for making universal normative claims.
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Momin, Abdur-Rahman. "Pluralism and Multiculturalism." American Journal of Islam and Society 18, no. 2 (April 1, 2001): 115–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v18i2.2024.
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This article attempts to reconceptualize the theories of pluralism,ethnicity and multiculturalism by analyzing the present predicament ofMuslims and their mode of organization. However, this cannot be donein isolation from the normative theory, which is grounded in the Islamicsources and worldview. It provides an analytical insight into the interfaceof unity and diversity and limitation of achieving a haixnoniousrelationship between them in the modem western societies. Ideals of thewestem social theory are critiqued through the Islamic ideals toconceptualize alternative way of socio-political organization.
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MANTENA, KARUNA. "ON GANDHI'S CRITIQUE OF THE STATE: SOURCES, CONTEXTS, CONJUNCTURES." Modern Intellectual History 9, no. 3 (November 2012): 535–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1479244312000194.
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Gandhi's critique of the modern state was central to his political thinking. It served as a pivotal hinge between Gandhi's anticolonialism and his theory of politics and was given striking institutional form in his vision of decentralized peasant democracy. This essay explores the origins and implications of Gandhian antistatism by situating it within a genealogy of early twentieth-century political pluralism, specifically British and Indian pluralist criticism of state sovereignty and centralization. This essay traces that critique from the imperial sociology of Henry Sumner Maine, through the political theory of Harold Laski and G. D. H. Cole, to Radhakamal Mukerjee's reworking of these strands into a normative–universal model of Eastern pluralism. The essay concludes with a consideration of Gandhi's ideal of a stateless, nonviolent polity as a culmination and overturning of the pluralist tradition and as integral to his distinctive understanding of political freedom, rule, and action.
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Levine, Daniel J., and David M. McCourt. "Why Does Pluralism Matter When We Study Politics? A View from Contemporary International Relations." Perspectives on Politics 16, no. 1 (February 7, 2018): 92–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592717002201.
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Pluralism has become a buzzword in International Relations. It has emerged in a number of linked literatures and has drawn the support of an unusual coalition of scholars: advocates of greater methodological diversity; those who feel that IR has degenerated into a clash of paradigmatic “-isms”; those who favor a closer relationship between academics and policy-makers; and those who wish to see greater reflexivity within the field. Perhaps unsurprisingly, no single vision of pluralism unites these scholars; they appear to be using the term in divergent ways. Accordingly, our aim is threefold. First, we wish to highlight this odd state of affairs, by placing it in disciplinary and intellectual context. Second, we distinguish between plurality—the de facto recognition that IR has become a more diverse field—and pluralism—a normative position which values that diversity, given the public vocation of social science. Finally, we lay out a more consistent understanding and defense of pluralism in those latter terms. We argue that, properly understood, pluralism entails a position of epistemological skepticism: the straightforward claim that no single knowledge system, discipline, theory, or method can claim singular access to truth.
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Lenczewska, Olga. "Becoming Pluralists: Kant on the Normative Features of Pluralistic Thinking." Kant Yearbook 13, no. 1 (September 6, 2021): 107–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kantyb-2021-0005.
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Abstract Kant’s essays in the philosophy of history, such as Universal History and Conjectural Beginning, offer a speculative account of the gradual development of reason in our species and of the way the mature use of reason can be attained. Such mature use of reason, as Kant explains a few years later in the published Anthropology, is characterized by abandoning the standpoint of “practical egoism” and learning how to exercise the psychological disposition to “pluralism”. To be a pluralist, he claims, means to be capable of seeing things from other people’s standpoints, of giving deliberative weight to the needs of others, and of taking part in universally valid judgments. But Kant is never explicit about what is required in order to become a pluralist, nor does he explain what it means to be a pluralist beyond a brief remark in the Anthropology. My paper takes a detailed look at this under-studied notion and offers a novel account of this notion. I explicate the features of pluralistic thinking and I connect this notion to the public use of reason, the three maxims of common human understanding, and the role played by interpersonal communication in advancing the progress of our rational capacities. I also explain the key role of education in reason’s development and the conceptual relationship between the enlightenment of an individual and the enlightenment of the human species.
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Engström, Viljam. "Regulating the Baltic Sea – A Showcase of Normative Pluralism." Volume 61 · 2018 61, no. 1 (June 20, 2019): 347–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.3790/gyil.61.1.347.
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The Baltic Sea Region (BSR) faces several challenges, not the least in respect of the poor state of the sea itself. The regulatory framework governing the BSR is complex, displaying a multi-layered structure with up to five regulatory levels. The regulatory scene is also characterised by many features that could be assumed under the umbrella of post-national rulemaking. This article discusses features of the pluralisation of BSR regulation. The BSR regulatory framework is on the one hand rich with regulatory initiatives at the fringes of both ‘actorness’ and ‘ruleness’. On the other hand, the framework is characterised by cross-fertilisation between regulatory layers. Such interaction can add to the regulatory impact of normatively soft acts, but can also come with drawbacks. In any case, the article claims, a complete picture of BSR regulation can only be attained through an appreciation of normative pluralism. Keywords: Baltic Sea, Post-National Rulemaking, European Union, Soft-Law, Framework Instruments, Pluralism, Helcom
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Coutu, Michel, and Pierre Guibentif. "Introduction: The Disenchantment of Critical Legal Thought?" Canadian journal of law and society 26, no. 2 (August 2011): 227–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/cjls.26.2.227.
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The topic of legal pluralism has puzzled the sociology of law since its origins. To quote an early example, the aim of Eugen Ehrlich was to grasp the “colourful diversity of living law.” Max Weber, too, made a distinction between law beyond the state, on the one hand, and state law, on the other, the latter being the formal object of normative legal science. The concept of legal pluralism, later formulated in order to capture this diversity, gave rise, as is well known, to a specific line of inquiry in the domain of law and society; it has found concrete expression particularly in the Journal of Legal Pluralism, published under this title since 1981, and has triggered energetic debates. Jean-Guy Belley has made a crucial contribution to these debates, in particular by writing the entry on “pluralisme juridique” for the Dictionnaire encyclopédique de théorie et de sociologie du droit, published 1988. Years before, he had begun an ambitious research undertaking centred on legal pluralism as a fundamental paradigm for jurisprudence, first with a doctoral dissertation under the supervision of Jean Carbonnier and later as a professor in contract law and sociology of law at McGill University. This scholarly relationship to legal pluralism developed first in the domain of sociology of law, through a comprehensive approach that culminated in 1998 with the publication of Le contrat entre droit, économie et société.
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Macdonald, Roderick A. "Custom Made—For a Non-chirographic Critical Legal Pluralism." Canadian journal of law and society 26, no. 2 (August 2011): 301–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/cjls.26.2.301.
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AbstractContemporary shifts in legal pluralism theory (from weak, intra-state pluralism to strong, extra-state pluralism and from socio-scientific to critical legal pluralism) have raised important new questions about law as a normative phenomenon. This article argues for the significance of implicit and inferential legal norms. It begins by considering a movement of thought—evangelicalism—that subordinates the implicit and informal to the explicit and authorized. The essay then outlines the principal features of a non-chirographic legal pluralism and explores how regimes of written rules are consistently made over by those whose conduct they are presumptively meant to govern.
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Engler, Steven. "Religious Studies in Canada and Brazil: Pro-pluralism and anti-theology in context." Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 35, no. 3-4 (September 2006): 447–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/000842980603500306.
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Religious Studies can be more effective if it is critical of its normative allegiances. To support this claim, this paper explores two value-stances that have shaped the Canadian field: anti-theology (reflecting American church-state relations) and pro-pluralism (reflecting post- Charter concerns over religious freedom in Canada) . It suggests that highlighting possible contributions of Religious Studies to the nation, a self-positioning of scholars of religion as experts in pluralism, would be an appropriate successor to the American influences that shaped the growth of the field. The study of religion in Brazil provides an example largely free from anti-theology and pro-pluralism. As such, it prompts us to reflect on how past circumstances have evoked these normative stances in the Canadian field, and whether they should continue here.
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Baggini, Julian. "The populist threat to pluralism." Philosophy & Social Criticism 41, no. 4-5 (December 29, 2014): 403–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453714564460.
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Although political pluralism can have an ethical justification, it does not need one. Political pluralism can be justified on the basis of an epistemological argument about what we can claim to know, one which has a normative conclusion about how strongly we ought to believe. This is important because for pluralism to command wide assent, it needs something other than an ethical justification, since many simply will not accept that justification. Thus understood, we can see that current threats to pluralism come not just from authoritarian movements but from populism, which has already infected mainstream politics.
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DeMoor, Michael J. "EMBEDDEDNESS AND SOCIAL PLURALISM." Philosophia Reformata 78, no. 2 (November 17, 2013): 144–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22116117-90000549.
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This article examines Karl Polanyi’s “double-movement thesis” and, in particular, his claim that modern economies are characterized by a dis-embedding of the economy from society. I examine two significant lines of criticism of this thesis: first, that the concept of “embeddedness” is incoherent in that it implies that economies both can and cannot become “dis-embedded” from society; second, that, though conceptually coherent, the concept does not supply adequate normative guidance for those seeking to address the economic and social problems that emerge from a “dis-embedded” economy. I argue that re-articulating the double-movement thesis in the terms of Reformational social philosophy can show how these problems can be resolved.
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Zucca, Lorenzo. "Montesquieu, Methodological Pluralism and Comparative Constitutional Law." European Constitutional Law Review 5, no. 3 (October 2009): 481–500. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1574019609004817.
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Montesquieu's lessons for modern comparative constitutional law – The Spirit of the Laws – The textual bias of normative constitutionalism – The utility of other disciplines to comparative constitutional law – Constitutions as more than mere texts
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Mahmood, Tahir, Sajjad Ali Khan, and Shahab Sarwar. "Integrated Justice in Pakistan: From Legal Pluralism to Normative Convergence." Lex localis - Journal of Local Self-Government 16, no. 4 (October 23, 2018): 805–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.4335/16.4.805-820(2018).
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Legal pluralism, throughout most of developing countries, has been extant since the onset of colonial era. Manifested in a variety of forms, legal pluralism is inherently characterized by both promises as well as limitations. In Pakistan, legal pluralism is epitomized by the prevalence and functioning of parallel systems of justice such as formal courts and Alternate Dispute Resolution Mechanism (ADRM), such as “Jirga. Poor coordination and tenuous enforcement mechanisms, however, render the formal justice system in Pakistan one of poorest performers in terms of judicial efficacy world-wide. This article seeks to explore the possibility of a convergence between traditional and modern models of dispute resolution, i.e. Jirga and court system and the resultant efficacy thereof through devising a conceptual framework. The framework reveals that both formal courts and Jirga demonstrate marked discrepancies concerning their efficacy with respect to the provision of justice and dispute resolution. Findings from the field, however, evince that Jirga stand out to be a relatively more effective mechanism of dispute resolution than formal courts. The conceptual framework, however, implies that by converging both systems it is possible to cope with the limitations of each of the two systems such that while courts could provide legal legitimacy to the Jirga by improving its decency and accountability through regulations, Jirga could enhance the legitimacy of courts by improving its accessibility and transparency through feedback mechanisms. The article concludes by way of arguing that instead of parting ways with each other, both courts and jirga shall seek to go hand in hand in order avoid delays in the provision of justice.
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Reis, Róbson Ramos dos. "Ways of being and expressivity." Estudios de Filosofía, no. 61 (February 4, 2020): 11–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n61a03.
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In this paper, I present a hermeneutic version of ontological pluralism, addressing the question of the discursive articulation of ways of being. The first section presents the notion of a pluralism of ways of being as a restriction of an ontological monism. The second section puts forward a criticism of Kris McDaniel’s proposal of understanding ways of being as kinds of quantifiers. The third section analyses the notion of way of being as a modal concept, explaining ways of being as internal possibilities endowed with a normative force regarding the identity-conditions of entities. The fourth one is a statement about the need of developing a pluralist account of the propositional reference to entities based on ontological pluralism. The fifth section deals with the issue of the discursive articulation of ways of being. The two last sections present a hypothesis concerning a semantic condition for an adequate articulation of ways of being. I argue for a kind of finitude-sensitivity in the semantics of the discursive articulation of internal possibilities, which implies the requirement of developing a hermeneutic notion of silence that may properly work in the discursive articulation of ways of being.
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RAHBARI, Siavash. "From Normative Pluralism to a Unified Legal System in Afghanistan?" Asian Journal of Law and Society 5, no. 2 (October 2, 2018): 289–314. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/als.2018.30.
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AbstractThis paper suggests that Afghanistan’s fractured plural legal system is beginning to show some signs of cohesion and coherence. I briefly describe the aspiration set out in the Constitution of Afghanistan and its mandate to legislators and jurists to harmonize Islamic jurisprudence, the principles of justice, customary norms, and international treaty obligations. I then discuss some of the setbacks, obstacles, and more recent progress that have shaped the journey towards that aspiration. The paper specifically addresses the role of lawyers as they learn to navigate the more coherent landscape and the development and impact of a nascent adversarial system. Finally, the paper addresses the role of customary dispute resolution and the bifurcated legal-education system, and their impact on the development of a more unified legal system.
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Taramundi, Dolores Morondo. "Legal Pluralism and Reasonable Accommodation of Religious Diversity." International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 24, no. 4 (November 3, 2017): 467–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15718115-02404005.
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This article aims to address a number of distinct characteristics of the European debate on legal pluralism as a means for accommodating religious diversity and religious normative orders. In contrast with the us and Canada, where there is a long-standing and varied tradition in jurisprudence that underpins theoretical debates and proposals, European case law is characterised by the prominent role of private international law. Public discussion has also been highly influenced by the uk controversy surrounding the application of Sharia law in arbitration. This article explores how this background shapes the space for religious normative orders, their potential as a means of accommodating religious diversity and the reasons and challenges ahead in the move from private international law to constitutional law for pluralistic arrangements.
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AUGENSTEIN, DANIEL. "Normative fault-lines of trans-national human rights jurisprudence: National pride and religious prejudice in the European legal space." Global Constitutionalism 2, no. 3 (September 17, 2013): 469–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2045381713000154.
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AbstractThe article explores the relationship between religious pluralism and national-majoritarian models of social cohesion in European human rights jurisprudence. Comparing the German, French and British interpretation of the ‘social cohesion limitation’ of freedom of religion it contends that, at the national level, concerns for social cohesion are fuelled by attitudes towards religious diversity that range from indifference to intolerance and that are difficult to reconcile with the normative premises of religious pluralism in a democratic society. The second section of the article traces the relationship between religious pluralism and social cohesion in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The analysis suggests that the diversity of national-majoritarian approaches to social cohesion in Europe prevents the Court from ensuring an effective trans-national protection of religious pluralism. The third section turns to the controversial Lautsi judgments of the European Court of Human Rights to place the Court’s approach to religious minority protection in the context of trans-national judicial politics in the European legal space. The concluding section suggests an alternative approach to religious pluralism and social cohesion that vindicates religious diversity and does justice to the counter-majoritarian telos of human rights protection.
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Zuidervaart, Lambert. "Holistic Alethic Pluralism: A Reformational Research Program." Philosophia Reformata 81, no. 2 (October 4, 2016): 156–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/23528230-08102002.
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This essay lays out a reformational research program on the idea of truth. First it describes challenges to the idea of truth in contemporary philosophy and gives reasons why a robust conception of truth is needed. Next it presents two overriding concerns – ontological and axiological – that such a conception should address. In addressing these concerns, a contemporary reformational approach will take up three sets of issues: relations between propositional truth and the discursive justification of truth claims; distinctions and connections between propositional and nonpropositional truth; and the sorts of cultural practices and social institutions within which truth occurs. My detailed response to these issues, as sketched in the last section of the essay, is to propose a holistic, normative, and structurally pluralist conception of truth, one that I call holistic alethic pluralism. Propositional truth is important but not all-important, and reformational philosophy needs to show why that is so.
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Danz, Christian. "CHRISTIANITY AND THE ENCOUNTER OF WORLD RELIGIONS. CONSIDERATIONS TO A CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY OF RELIGION." Correlatio 15, no. 2 (February 18, 2017): 9. http://dx.doi.org/10.15603/1677-2644/correlatio.v15n2p9-26.
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A basic problem of the contemporary religious-theological discussion may consist in the task of connecting a methodically sensitive cultural-hermeneutical theory of religion with a normative perspective. This task cannot be fairly developed either from theologies of religion oriented by the religious-theological triadic pattern of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism, or from the conceptions of comparative theologies. In my essay, I take up this question and try to show further aspects for the present religious-theological discussion by means of Tillich’s lectures on Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions. His contribution is a threefold one: (1.) Through the methodic assimilation of the concept of religion, the pluralism of religions becomes, in principle, recognized. (2.) The foundation of the history of religions leads to a differentiated perception of the complex interreligious exchange processes. (3.) Tillich’s theology of religion involves not only the recognition of religious pluralism, but also a methodological justification for a normative criterion for the evaluation of religions. In the form of six theses, I would like to answer the question of the consequences of what has been said so far for the reflection and treatment of religious pluralism within theology.
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VAN COTT, DONNA LEE. "A Political Analysis of Legal Pluralism in Bolivia and Colombia." Journal of Latin American Studies 32, no. 1 (February 2000): 207–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022216x99005519.
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In this article the author compares recent efforts in Bolivia and Colombia to implement constitutionally mandated regimes of legal pluralism, and identifies the most important factors affecting the practical realisation of legal pluralism: the capacity of the political system, the legal tradition and society to tolerate normative diversity; the geographic isolation and cultural alienation of indigenous communities; the degree of internal division within indigenous communities and movements regarding legal pluralism in general, and in specific cases, that have arisen, and the availability of effective legal mechanisms to indigenous communities seeking to protect this right.