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1
Raffournier, Bernard. Les normes comptables internationales: IFRS-IAS. 3rd ed. Paris: Economica, 2006.
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3
Colasse, Bernard. Comptabilité générale (PCG 1999 et IAS). 7th ed. Paris: Economica, 2001.
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4
Obert, Robert. Pratique des normes IAS/IFRS: 40 cas d'application. Paris: Dunod, 2005.
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5
Onana, Benoît Atangana. Vers les normes mondiales: Comparaison OHADA et IAS/IFRS. Yaoundé: Presses de l'UCAC, 2007.
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6
Madagascar. Conseil supérieur de la comptabilité. Plan comptable général 2005 cohérent avec les normes comptables internationales (IAS/IFRS): Guide sectoriel "télécommunications.". Antananarivo, Madagascar: Jurid'ika, 2007.
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7
Madagascar. Ministère de l'économie, des finances et du budget. Plan comptable des opérations publiques (PCOP 2006): Cohérent avec les normes comptables internationales IAS/IFRS. Antananarivo]: Jurid'ika, 2006.
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8
Madagascar. Conseil supérieur de la comptabilité. Plan comptable général 2005 cohérent avec les normes comptables internationales (IAS/IFRS): Guide sectoriel "transports". Antananarivo, Madagascar: Jurid'ika, 2008.
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9
Madagascar. Conseil supérieur de la comptabilité. Plan comptable général 2005 cohérent avec les normes comptables internationales (IAS/IFRS): Guide comptable "environnement". Antananarivo, Madagascar: Jurid'ika, 2008.
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10
Avhadeev, V., L. Bitkova, C. Bogolyubov, I. Bondarchuk, A. Vinokurov, E. Galinovskaya, D. Gorohov, et al. Implementation of the Law on Responsible Treatment of Animals: from the quality of norms to effective law enforcement. ru: INFRA-M Academic Publishing LLC., 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/1410760.
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The collection contains articles on the quality of the conceptual apparatus and terminology of Federal Law No. 498-FZ of December 27, 2018 "On Responsible Treatment of Animals and on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation", the subject of its legal regulation, the effectiveness of the mechanism for its implementation laid down in the law, state supervision and public control in the field of animal treatment. The problems of organizing the activities of animal shelters without owners, protecting animals from abuse and responsibility for such offenses, directions and ways to improve Federal Law No. 498-FZ and the practice of its application are also highlighted. Attention is paid not only to modern, but also to historical, international and foreign experience of legal regulation of the considered social relations, norms-requirements, restrictions and prohibitions in the field of keeping and using animals, moral and ethical aspects of interaction between people and animals, which emphasizes the complex and interdisciplinary nature of the presented research.
The publication is addressed to lawyers-scientists and practitioners, subjects of the law of legislative initiative, employees of state authorities and local self-government bodies directly involved in the application of the norms of Federal Law No. 498-FZ, employees of various organizations engaged in the maintenance, use and protection of animals, animal rights activists, students and postgraduates of law schools, as well as a wide range of readers interested in this issue.
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Collette, Christine, and Jacques Richard. Les systèmes comptables français et anglo-saxons : Normes IAS. Dunod, 2002.
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12
Madagascar. Conseil supérieur de la comptabilité., Ordre des experts comptables et financiers de Madagascar., and Institut national de la statistique (Madagascar), eds. Plan comptable général 2005: Cohérent avec les normes comptables internationales (IAS/IFRS). Antananarivo: Jurid'ika, 2004.
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13
Dufils, P., C. Lopater, L. Sijelmassi, and S. Cren. Comptes solides : Règles françaises et comparaison avec les normes IAS, 3e édition. Editions Francis Lefebvre, 2002.
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14
Dahib, Mohamed. L’évaluation de la Centrale Laitière: L'allocation des actifs intangibles selon les normes IAS/IFRS. Éditions universitaires européennes, 2016.
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15
Dahib, Mohamed. L’évaluation de la Centrale Laitière: L'allocation des actifs intangibles selon les normes IAS/IFRS. Éditions universitaires européennes, 2016.
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16
International Accounting Standards: From UK standards to IAS, an accelerated route to understanding the key principles of international accounting rules. CIMA Publishing, 2007.
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17
IASC: Vers la convergence des normes comptables nationales ? = IASC, toward convergence of national accounting standard. Mazars Guerard, 1997.
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18
Labonte, Melissa. R2P’s Status as a Norm. Edited by Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198753841.013.8.
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The shifting nature of the ‘wicked problems’ that the responsibility to protect (R2P) was formulated to address requires close examination its normative elements, including assessing its status as a norm and exploring whether and to what degree it may be new. Some of the norms expressed through R2P are well established and enjoy widespread acceptance and strong compliance pull, whereas others are new, which sets the scene for norm contestation, and ambiguous and selective implementation that often characterize a norm’s journey across and within its theoretical ‘life cycle’. Moreover, the constitutive and regulative effects R2P norms have had on policy outcomes and actor behaviour remain uneven and thus deserving of further analysis. The international community’s will and ability to deliver on the promise of civilian protection in mass atrocity cases through R2P continues to face considerable challenges even as some of its component norms experience greater acceptance, institutionalization, and consolidation.
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Ullmann-Margalit, Edna. Revision of Norms. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198802433.003.0007.
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Social norms sometimes break down. In the process, they often shift from conclusive to presumptive—as when, for example, there is an across-the-board taboo against choosing abortion, which is revised to a taboo that can be overcome in specified cases (as, for example, when the mother’s health is at stake). Sometimes the presumption actually reverses, as in the case of smoking in public places. There is a distinction between “norm change (evolutionary, spontaneous) and norm revision (initiated), but the distinction is not dichotomous. Sometimes a gradual and ‘evolutionary’ process of change in societal attitudes and values eventually gets the official cachet on the level, mostly, of institutional policy revision.
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Thomasson, Amie L. Norms and Necessity. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190098193.001.0001.
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This book develops a new approach to understanding our claims about what is metaphysically necessary or possible: modal normativism. While claims about what is metaphysically necessary or possible have long played a central role in metaphysics and other areas of philosophy, such claims are traditionally thought of as aiming to describe a special kind of modal fact or property, or perhaps facts about other possible worlds. But that assumption leads to difficult ontological, epistemological, and methodological puzzles. Should we accept that there are modal facts or properties, or other possible worlds? If so, what could these things be? How could we come to know what the modal facts or properties are? How can we resolve philosophical debates about what is necessary or possible? The normativist rejects the assumption that modal claims aim to describe modal features or possible worlds, arguing instead that they serve as useful ways of conveying, reasoning with, and renegotiating semantic rules and their consequences. By dropping the descriptivist assumption, the normativist is able to unravel the notorious ontological problems of modality, and provide a clear and plausible story about how we can come to know what is metaphysically necessary or possible. Most importantly, this approach helps demystify philosophical methodology. For we are able to see that resolving metaphysical modal questions does not require a special form of philosophical insight or intuition. Instead, it requires nothing more mysterious than empirical knowledge, conceptual mastery, and an ability to explicitly convey and renegotiate semantic rules.
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Saussy, Haun. Norns and Norms. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198812531.003.0002.
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We often hear that certain words or texts are “untranslatable.” At the root of this judgment lies an exaggerated respect for the native language, which must not be altered by contact with other languages. Against this superstition, it is here argued that translation is one of the great movers of change in language, and accomplishes this precisely through the rendering of difficult and unidiomatic texts. At another level, a purported ethics of translation urges that translations should be “foreignizing” rather than domesticating: this too evidences a normative idea of the integrity of the language and culture of the foreign text. Against such defences of purity, a sense of both language and translation as inherently hybrid, and literary language in particular as macaronic, should open to examination the historical individuality of encounters that every translation records. Examples from Western European languages indicate how this hybridity is to be understood.
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Elangovan, Arvind. Norms and Politics. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199491445.001.0001.
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During the twilight of British rule in India, a little known civil servant, Sir Benegal Narsing Rau (1887–1953) was sought after by the ruling elites—both British and Indian—for his immense knowledge of the nature and working of the constitutions of the world as well as his reputation for being just and impartial between competing political interests. Yet, Rau’s ideas and his voice have largely been forgotten today. By examining Rau’s constitutional ideas and following their trajectory in late colonial Indian politics, this book shows how the process of the making of the Indian constitution was actually never separated from the politics of conflict that dominated this period. This book demonstrates that it is only by foregrounding this political history that we can simultaneously remember Rau’s critical contributions as well as understand why he was forgotten in the first place.
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DeSombre, Elizabeth R. Attitudes and Norms. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190636272.003.0006.
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Many people care about the environment and are in favor of protecting it, but these concerns are imperfect determinants of behavior. There are good reasons for this “value-action gap”: incentives are frequently aligned against environmentally preferable action, and we each face so many daily environmentally relevant decisions that efforts to do the right thing consistently are daunting. These approaches can even backfire, as people dislike feeling judged, or may tire of constant efforts to behave and may backslide on good intentions. A more promising option for explaining or encouraging environmental behavior is invoking social norms. People modify their behavior to fit social expectations, so community decisions that work against environmental behavior can discourage beneficial behavior. Framing information in a way that demonstrates the environmentally beneficial choices of neighbors or group members increases willingness to make environmentally positive choices.
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Berger, Tobias. Norms in Translations. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198807865.003.0002.
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This chapter develops a novel theoretical account of norm translation that is located in-between theories of norm diffusion and norm localization. Translations do not follow linear trajectories from ‘the global’ to ‘the local’. Instead, they unfold in a recursive back and forth movement between different actors located in different contexts. As norms are translated, two interrelated changes occur. Firstly, the meaning of norms changes in ways that make sense to people inhabiting a specific context. Secondly, the social and political dynamics of this context change as well. Both changes depend on the ardent work of translators who, as Walter Benjamin has argued, cannot simply transfer meaning but must recreate it anew. Norm translations therefore need to be investigated through analytical frameworks that capture this creativity and do not simply reduce translations to pathological deviations from seemingly uncontestable originals. This chapter develops such a framework for ‘the rule of law’.
25
Arnold, Dan. Ethics without Norms? Edited by Daniel Cozort and James Mark Shields. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198746140.013.3.
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While Buddhist philosophers were emphatically not physicalists, they share with cognitive-scientifically inclined contemporary philosophers a lot of the problems that have been identified with respect to the project of ‘naturalizing’ the mental—difficulties, in particular, with giving exhaustively causal explanations of human activity while yet making sense of ethical and other intuitions that arguably presuppose human responsiveness to reasons, or normativity. Some classical Buddhist philosophers were indeed committed to views to the effect that the liberating transformation effected by the Buddhist path must consist in simply being caused to act ethically, without any conceptual resources for characterizing the consequent activity as ‘ethical’. There is, however, an alternative trajectory of Buddhist thought—the Madhyamaka tradition—that was predicated on resistance to causal realism. Having scouted one Buddhist philosophical project that effectively denies responsiveness to reasons, the chapter concludes by suggesting that Madhyamaka may represent a way to recover this.
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Het Nederlandse sociale zekerheidsrecht en de minimum-normen van de IAO en de Raad van Europa. Deventer: Kluwer, 1992.
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27
Lie, Einar. Norges Bank 1816-2016. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198860013.001.0001.
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This book traces the 200-year history of Norges Bank, which was established in 1816 with a dual purpose: to bring order and stability to the chaotic monetary system following the Napoleonic wars and provide Norway with a bank. The present Norges Bank is a modern well-functioning central bank, with strong likenesses to similar institutions in other countries. This book is particularly concerned with the relations between the bank and the political institutions. The bank’s role has been shaped and reshaped by perceptions of what kind of financial services Norway needed, how economic policy was coordinated, and how discretionary power was distributed between the elected bodies, the executive branch, and underlying institutions with a defined mandate. The central aim of this book is to trace and explain these changes over the past two centuries. It is also, to some extent, a contribution to the relatively broad literature on the history of national central banks.
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Besson, Corine. Norms, Reasons, and Reasoning. Edited by Daniel Star. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.23.
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This chapter concerns the connection between knowledge of a logical principle, such as Modus Ponens, and actions of reasoning with it. Contemporary discussions of this issue typically mention Lewis Carroll’s regress. There is widespread agreement that the regress shows something important about the connection between knowing logical principles and reasoning with them—and, more generally, between knowing epistemic or practical principles and actions involving them. My first aim is to address key interpretations of Carroll’s regress in order to assess its relevance to the question of how knowing logical principles connects to reasoning with them, and, more generally, of how knowing epistemic or practical principles might be action-guiding. My second aim is to show that the regress fails to establish anything of substance about such connections unless substantive, contentious, and typically undefended assumptions are made.
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Cullity, Garrett. Norms, Reasons, and Fit. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198807841.003.0003.
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What kind of elements provide the foundations of morality? The answer defended in this chapter is ‘norms of presumptive fitness’. This is explained and defended by contrasting it with Ross’s more familiar answer: ‘prima facie duties’. ‘Fitness’ is a name for the relation that desire bears to the desirable and praise to the praiseworthy. Presumptive fitness is the relation of being fit-unless-undermined. The case for grounding morality on norms of this kind is that it offers to rectify the ways in which Ross’s view is too self-contained, too narrow, too shallow, too unqualified, and too simple. In the course of explaining this, the chapter provides an account of the relationship between wrongness, reasons, value, and importance.
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Massin, Olivier. Desires, Values and Norms. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199370962.003.0007.
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The thesis defended in this essay, the “guise of the ought,” is that the formal objects of desires are norms (oughts-to-be or oughts-to-do) rather than values (as the “guise of the good” thesis has it). It is impossible, in virtue of the nature of desire, to desire something without it being presented as something that ought to be or that one ought to do. This view is defended by pointing to a key distinction between values and norms: positive and negative norms (obligation and interdiction) are interdefinable through negation; positive and negative values aren’t. This contrast between norms and values, it is argued, is mirrored within the psychological realm by the contrast between desires and emotions. Positive and negative desires are interdefinable through negation, but positive and negative emotions aren’t. The overall, Meinongian picture suggested is that norms are to desires what values are to emotions.
31
Richardson, Henry. Introducing New Moral Norms. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190247744.003.0006.
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This chapter characterizes the convergence stage, the second stage of the process of introducing new moral norms and addresses some general objections to the possibility of doing so. This involves a de facto, but not illegitimately reached, convergence whereby some candidate norm that has arisen via the Input Stage becomes, globally, a social norm. The objection that no one has special moral expertise is defused by pointing out that the account does not rely on that assumption. The objection that the idea of moral authority is incompatible with honoring individual autonomy is defused by arguing that the account does not require anyone to accept anything simply on another’s say-so. The objection that newly specified norms are not really “new” is met by explaining that they make a general difference to people’s rights, duties, and permissions and cannot be derived from the first-order moral norms earlier in force.
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Alarie, Benjamin, and Andrew J. Green. Norms, Leadership, and Consensus. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199397594.003.0008.
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This chapter examines how judges are influenced not only by formal rules of how the court is to arrive at decisions, but also by norms of decision-making. It discusses the existence and strength of norms of consensus on different courts. Courts vary to a surprising extent in the size and causes of disagreement amongst judges. The two most extreme cases in our sample are the US Supreme Court, with over half of the cases having at least one dissent, and the Indian Supreme Court where only about 5 percent of cases involve a dissent. We find evidence that, depending on the country, a judge is influenced in whether she dissents by policy differences with other judges and her own workload. However, a judge’s decision to dissent also appears related to the background norms of whether it is acceptable to dissent, and the leadership of the chief justice or president of the court.
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Möllers, Christoph. The Possibility of Norms. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198827399.001.0001.
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This book elaborates on a concept of the normative. It aims to explicate what is meant when norms are spoken of as such. Hence, this book is only concerned with developing a concept of the normative; it seeks to crystallize that which makes a norm a norm. In doing so, the focus is limited to a concept of social norms, of norms that have arisen out of a social context. Questions with which every practice of social norms sees itself confronted are compared and contrasted with philosophical theories of the morally appropriate. What implication does it have for the value and accuracy of philosophical theories of morally right action that social norms need a location, a time, and a form of illustration, that one has to be able to perceive them? Along such a line of inquiry, moral norms represent an important reference, though frequently they are only used as a contrast. Social norms such as religious commandments, legal prescriptions, or rules of etiquette operate quite differently from norms that are typically debated in practical philosophy. The commonalities of social norms are thus the object of this book.
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Carbonara, Emanuela. Law and Social Norms. Edited by Francesco Parisi. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199684267.013.032.
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Legal norms are often seen as a means to regulate behaviour when neither self-interest nor social norms produce the desired behaviour in individuals. This suggests, on the one hand, that the law should regulate those areas in which social norms do not exist and provide support and extra enforcement in those areas where social norms exist. It also suggests on the other hand that there seems to be no questioning of the intrinsic efficiency and fairness of existing social norms. This article first looks at the genesis of social norms and the mechanism of their enforcement. This allows a closer inspection of the efficiency and fairness concepts. It then considers the impact that introducing legal norms has in contexts in which social norms already exist and in those that social interaction left unregulated. The main issue here is that the social norms prevailing at some historical moment may be just an equilibrium among multiple equilibriums. Given many possible equilibriums, we need to explain why and how one equilibrium is selected and others are rejected. The scholarship on social norms emphasizes that expressive acts in law can select the equilibrium. Legal norms seemingly reinforce existing social norms, bending them towards the law when discrepancy exists and favouring their creation where social norms do not exist. However, legal regulation can also destroy existing social norms (crowding out) or it can be defeated by them (legal backlash and countervailing effects).
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Gerken, Mikkel. The Epistemic Norms of Action. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198803454.003.0007.
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Chapter 6 concerns the normative relationship between action and knowledge ascriptions. Arguments are provided against a Knowledge Norm of Action (KNAC) and in favor of the Warrant-Action norm (WA). According to WA, S must be adequately warranted in believing that p relative to her deliberative context to meet the epistemic requirements for acting on p. WA is developed by specifying the deliberative context and by arguing that its explanatory power exceeds that of knowledge norms. A general conclusion is that the knowledge norm is an important example of a folk epistemological principle that does not pass muster as an epistemological principle. More generally, Chapter 6 introduces the debates about epistemic normativity and develops a specific epistemic norm of action.
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Herzog, Lisa. Moral Norms in Social Contexts. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198830405.003.0003.
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This chapter sets out the normative foundations on which the book is based. It starts by defending the case for the ‘pervasiveness’ of morality: no social sphere is ‘beyond’ morality, even if there is some degree of institutional ‘division of labour’. Next, it states and explains the moral norms this study is based on: the norm to respect all individuals as moral equals, and norms about the avoidance of individual harm, and about avoiding contributing to collective harm. These norms lie within an ‘overlapping consensus’ of different moral theories and worldviews. In pluralist societies, we should focus on such a consensus—even if it may sometimes be hard to delineate—when reflecting on the moral dimensions of organizations.
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Gerken, Mikkel. The Epistemic Norms of Assertion. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198803454.003.0008.
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Chapter 7 extends the discussion of epistemic norms to the linguistic realm. Again, it is argued that a Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNAS) is inadequate and should be replaced with a Warrant-Assertive Speech Act norm (WASA). According to WASA, S must be adequately warranted in believing that p relative to her conversational context in order to meet the epistemic requirements for asserting that p. This epistemic norm is developed and extended to assertive speech acts that carry implicatures or illocutionary forces. Particular attention is given to the development of a species of WASA that accounts for assertive speech acts having a directive force, such as a recommendation. Thus, Chapter 7 contributes to the debates concerning epistemic norms of assertions.
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Richardson, Henry. Ratification of New Moral Norms. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190247744.003.0008.
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Arguing that it is a mistake to understand the moral community’s ratification of new moral norms along the lines of a political community’s adoption of legal norms, this chapter characterizes the ratification stage as involving a broad, inclusive awareness among living persons of the fact of global convergence on what is by hypothesis a new candidate moral norm and of each other’s reflective acceptance of this norm; and a broad and inclusive acceptance of the process whereby a new norm reasonably arose at all three stages (input, convergence, and ratification) and in how they interconnect. Limiting the participants needed for ratification to those presently alive is appropriate in light of the facts that living people anyway do more to influence future generations by establishing mere conventions than by creating new moral norms, and that future generations would have the power to rescind any new moral norm.
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Anjum, Rani Lill, and Stephen Mumford. Conclusion: New Norms of Science. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198733669.003.0029.
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Nine new norms of science are proposed, having been supported by the arguments of the book. They are the metaphysics norm, the causal norm, the norm of involvement, the tendency norm, the norm of deep understanding, the norm of negative results, the symptoms norm, the fallible norm, and the contextual norm. We began by listing some candidate default norms of science but noted that they remain contested. We have said some things that explain why this is so. Not only have we shown that some of the existing perceived norms of science lacked the support we might have thought they had, but we have also developed new arguments and conclusions. It is from these that our new norms have emerged.
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Medie, Peace A. Global Norms and Local Action. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190922962.001.0001.
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When and why do states implement international women’s rights norms? Global Norms and Local Action is an examination of states’ responses to violence against women (VAW) in Africa and their implementation of the international women’s justice norm. Despite the presence of laws on various forms of VAW in most African countries, most victims face barriers to accessing justice through the criminal justice system. This problem is particularly acute in post-conflict countries. International organizations such as the United Nations and women’s rights advocates have, therefore, promoted the international women’s justice norm, which emphasizes the establishment of specialized mechanisms within the criminal justice sector to address VAW. With a focus on the response of the police to rape and intimate partner violence in post-conflict Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia, this book theorizes the United Nations’ and women’s movements’ influence on the implementation of the international women’s justice norm. It draws on over 300 interviews in both countries to demonstrate that high international and domestic pressures, combined with favorable political and institutional conditions, are key to the rapid establishment of specialized mechanisms within the police force and to how police officers respond to rape and intimate partner violence cases. It argues that despite significant weaknesses, specialized mechanisms have improved women’s access to justice. The book concludes with a discussion of why a holistic approach to addressing VAW is needed.
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Hartley, Christie. Social Norms, Choice, and Work. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190683023.003.0009.
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In modern liberal democracies, the gendered division of labor is partially the result of men and women making different choices about work and family life, even if such choices stem from social norms about gender. The choices that women make relative to men’s disadvantage them in various ways: such choices lead them to earn less, enjoy less power and prestige in the labor market, be less able to participate in the political sphere on an equal basis, make them to some degree financially dependent on others, and leave them at a bargaining disadvantage and vulnerable in certain personal relationships. This chapter considers if and when the state should intervene to address women’s disadvantage and inequalities that are the result of gender specialization. It is argued that political liberals can and sometimes must intervene in the gendered division of labor when persons’ interests as free and equal citizens are frustrated.
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Shah, Dhavan V., Kjerstin Thorson, Chris Wells, Nam-jin Lee, and Jack McLeod. Civic Norms and Communication Competence. Edited by Kate Kenski and Kathleen Hall Jamieson. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199793471.013.008.
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The chapter examines the extant literature on political socialization, focusing on the role of communication in this process. Reviewing a wide range of approaches to socialization—from those stressing the role the institutions that teach young people civic values and practices to those emphasizing the role of dispositions that encourage political development and learning—we highlight communication’s influence in establishing civic norms and competencies. Increasingly, digital, social, and mobile media are implicated in these dynamics. We first define core concepts such as civic norms and the various sources from which they are acquired, communication competence and the challenges of navigating an increasingly complex media environment, socialization and attention to this ongoing process into adulthood, and citizenship and its changing styles and expanding boundaries. These core concepts provide the basis for considering the major points of development and dispute over political socialization.
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Berger, Tobias. Global Norms and Local Courts. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198807865.001.0001.
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What happens to transnational norms when they travel from one place to another? How do norms change when they move; and how do they affect the place where they arrive? This book develops a novel theoretical account of norm translation that is located in-between theories of norm diffusion and norm localization. It shows how such translations do not follow linear trajectories from ‘the global’ to ‘the local’. Instead, they unfold in a recursive back and forth movement between different actors located in different contexts. As norms are translated, their meaning changes; and only if their meaning changes in ways that are intelligible to people within a specific context, the social and political dynamics of this context change as well. This book analyses translations of ‘the rule of law’. It focuses on contemporary donor-driven projects with non-state courts in rural Bangladesh and shows how in these projects, global norms change local courts—but only if they are translated, often in unexpected ways from the perspective of international actors. Based on extensive fieldwork, this book reveals how grassroots-level employees of local non-governmental organizations significantly alter the meaning of global norms—for example when they translate secular notions of the rule of law into the language of Islam and Islamic Law—and only thereby also enhance participatory spaces for marginalized people. Such translations that change both global norms and local courts have been largely neglected by scholars and policy makers alike; they are the central theme of this book.
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Schneider, Nadja-Christina, and Fritzi-Marie Titzmann, eds. Family Norms and Images in Transition. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/9783845294056.
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In an ever-changing world, the family continues to simultaneously symbolise persistence and transformation. This book looks at various shifts, ruptures and continuities in representations of contemporary Indian families. How the media conveys family norms and images as well as the nature of romantic relationships constitutes the book’s central approach, which connects the different discussions in it. Its chapters analyse documentary and feature films, promotional material, such as television commercials, and the usage of new media technologies in communication. The authors look at visualisations of familial change, ranging from split motherhood, new fatherhood and dysfunctional families to intergenerational relationships, including the pre-marriage stage of life. Aimed at an interdisciplinary readership interested in South Asian, gender and media studies, this book thus contributes to our understanding of the current—ideological and ‘lived’—reality of an Indian family. With contributions by Parul Bhandari, Nadja-Christina Schneider, Stefanie Strulik, Fritzi-Marie Titzmann
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Helm, Bennett W. Responsibility, Authority, and the Bindingness of Norms. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198801863.003.0005.
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In having reactive attitudes, we hold each other responsible to the norms of a community. Doing so appropriately presupposes both that one has the requisite authority and that the other is bound by that norm. We can understand this by turning to communities of respect and the patterns of reactive attitudes discussed in Chapter 3. As a member of a community of respect, one is party to a joint commitment, constituted by interpersonal rational patterns of reactive attitudes, to the import of that community and thereby to the import of its members and norms. This joint commitment binds one to those norms and makes one be responsible to them. Likewise, to have authority is to have dignity as a member of such a community and so be a fit object of recognition respect by others who thereby normally ought to respond to the “call” of one’s reactive attitudes.
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Mallon, Ron. Racial Identity, Racial Ontology, and Racial Norms. Edited by Naomi Zack. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190236953.013.26.
Full textAbstract:
Racial norms—norms that prescribe or proscribe behaviors based on racial identity—are common, but controversial. While they explicitly refer to racial identity, it is not clear how race, understood as a kind of person, could justify such norms. The existence of racial identity presupposes the existence of race, and certain understandings of what racial identity amounts to presuppose much more. In light of this discussion, we can consider whether any racial norms are justified and, if so, how. Racial norms, if they are to be justified by appeal to racial identity, require strong communal accounts of what race is. But these communal forms of racial identity require demanding social arrangements among members of a racial identity that are not in place for prototypical national racial categories in the contemporary United States. It follows that racial norms cannot be justified by appeal to racial identity.
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Meacham, Christopher J. G. Can All-Accuracy Accounts Justify Evidential Norms? Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198779681.003.0008.
Full textAbstract:
Meacham takes aim at the epistemic utility theory picture of epistemic norms where epistemic utility functions measure the value of degrees of belief and where the norms encode ways of adopting non-dominated degrees of belief. He focuses on a particularly popular subclass of such views where epistemic utility is determined solely by the accuracy of degrees of belief. Meacham argues that these types of epistemic utility arguments for norms are (i) not compatible with each other (so not all can be correct), (ii) do not solely rely on accuracy considerations, and (iii) are not able to capture intuitive norms about how we ought to respond to evidence.
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Wall, David. Desiderative Inconsistency, Moore’s Paradox, and Norms of Desire. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199370962.003.0011.
Full textAbstract:
What is wrong with desiderative inconsistency, having essentially conflicting desires that cannot possibly be satisfied at the same time? It was recently argued that attempts to explain this in terms of logical inconsistency, preventing action, or a failure of rationality are unsuccessful and having such desires is no worse than having desires that merely contingently conflict, if it is bad at all. But in fact having either essentially or contingently conflicting desires involves violating norms of desire, particularly, a norm of avoiding frustration. Appealing to a counterpart of Moore’s Paradox for desire shows this is a genuine norm, and violating it is a mistake of sorts. Furthermore, having essentially conflicting desires violates this norm, makes this mistake, necessarily. This helps explain why having essentially conflicting desires is especially bad, and explaining it in terms of the norms of desire helps us understand the nature of that type of mental state.
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Okeke, Edward Chukwuemeke. Competing or Conflicting Norms, and Related but Different Doctrine. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190611231.003.0005.
Full textAbstract:
This chapter addresses competing or conflicting norms, as well as the related but different doctrine of Act of State. It examines the various approaches courts employ in dealing with the very contentious issue of whether human rights and jus cogens norms trump the rule of State immunity. The chapter discusses the nature of the Act of State doctrine, including its jurisprudence, applicability and rationale, and exceptions or limitations. The Act of State doctrine, which is sometimes confused with State immunity, is a matter of justiciability, not jurisdiction. The chapter concludes by discussing an analogy between the rule of State immunity and the Act of State doctrine.
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James A, Green. Part III The Limitations and Role of the Persistent Objector Rule, 7 Peremptory Norms and Persistent Objection. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198704218.003.0008.
Full textAbstract:
This chapter opens the third part of this book. The text here turns to the limitations and role of the persistent objector rule. This chapter begins by examining the commonly advanced contention that the ‘escape hatch’ provided by the persistent objector rule cannot be ‘opened’ in relation to jus cogens norms. A significant majority of scholars have expressed the view that a state cannot exempt itself from a peremptory norm through persistent objection, even when the usual criteria for the rule's operation. The chapter assesses the majority view. Section I sets out what peremptory norms are how they come into being. The chapter then briefly clarifies that the question is not whether a state can gain exemption to a jus cogens norm but whether its pre-existing exempt status ‘decays’, or is superseded by the norm to which it had been a persistent objector becoming peremptory. The chapter then turns to the rationale underpinning the majority claim. It considers the two regularly referenced examples from state practice relating to persistent objection and jus cogens norms: the policy of apartheid in South Africa and Rhodesia and the objections of the United States to the juvenile death penalty. Towards the end, the chapter considers the possibility of persistent objection to the very concept of peremptory norms.