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Journal articles on the topic 'North Korean Regime'
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1
Song, Wonjun, and Joseph Wright. "THE NORTH KOREAN AUTOCRACY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE." Journal of East Asian Studies 18, no. 2 (May 22, 2018): 157–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jea.2018.8.
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The North Korean regime is unique among dictatorships because it is both long-lasting and highly personalized. We argue that initial factionalization of the regime, coupled with the presence of multiple foreign backers early in the regime, allowed the first leader to personalize the regime by first wresting power from the military and then subsequently curbing the autonomous power of the Korean Worker's Party. Using a measure of personalism constructed from historical data, we trace the consolidation of personal power in the North Korean regime and compare it to other communist regimes in the region to show how the evolution of personalist rule in these cases differed. We then explain this sequence of personalization in North Korea by showing how regime imposition by one foreign power, the Soviet Union, combined with military backing from a second foreign power, China, incentivized Kim Il-sung to consolidate personal control over the military and internal security apparatus by reducing the threat of military backlash.
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Howell, Edward. "The juche H-bomb? North Korea, nuclear weapons and regime-state survival." International Affairs 96, no. 4 (July 1, 2020): 1051–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz253.
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Abstract Existing scholarship on North Korea's nuclear programme remains overwhelmingly centred around questions of containment or engagement with the North Korean regime-state, amid international calls for denuclearization. Yet, scholarship has rarely interrogated the precise value of nuclear weapons to the regime-state. This article develops a new theoretical framework of nuclear ideology to explore the puzzle of the survival of North Korea. This framework aims to show how the North Korean nuclear programme is deeply entrenched within the state ideology of juche, as one device for continued regime-state survival. Through interviews with elite North Korean defectors and textual analysis of North Korean and international sources, I show that North Korea's nuclear ideology has been constructed according to different frames of meaning, targeting referent actors of international ‘enemy’ powers and domestic audiences. This article concludes that nuclear ideology functions primarily as a tool to arouse domestic legitimacy for the North Korean regime-state, by targeting elite actors within the highly stratified domestic population. From an international perspective, perception of North Korea's survival remains tied largely to the regime-state's physical possession of nuclear weapons. This article has extremely timely theoretical and policy implications given the current ‘dialogue’ between US and North Korean leaders. First, it opens up fruitful avenues of inquiry surrounding questions of the legitimacy of rogue states within international relations. Secondly, this article calls for a more robust understanding of the domestic-level politics of North Korea, in order to understand the regime-state's foreign policy decisions vis-à-vis its nuclear programme.
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Kim, Seok-Hyang. "The North Korean Economy: Current Situation, Crisis, and Possible Scenarios." International Studies Review 7, no. 1 (October 8, 2006): 29–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2667078x-00701002.
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For more than a half century, the international community largely ignored North Korea. Since 1990, however, the situation has changed dramatically and North Korea has begun to attract increasing international attention. Throughout the 1990s, scenarios of a North Korean collapse were in vogue. Yet, these estimations were proved to be wrong. It is now widely accepted that North Korea is relatively stable in the sense that it seems to have little trouble keeping its political system intact and functioning. By now, the most striking aspect of the North Korean political system is its extraordinary resilience. Why then has the North not yet collapsed, despite the chronic shortages of food, energy, and foreign currency? In this paper, I would like to raise two main questions. The first question is: “How serious are the difficulties of the North Korean economy?” And the second is: “What actions has the North Korean regime taken to resolve these difficulties and how effective those actions have been?” The North Korean regime has been striving to readjust and improve its economic strucrure since the 1970s. The regime has sought foreign capital and technology. However, the regime has been attempting to reformulate its economic structure within the strict framework of the existing political system whose survival was its paramount concern, and therefore it has failed to link the domestic economy with the world economy. What the regime has been doing is, on the one hand, to map out policy measures designed to open up its doors, while on the other hand escalating its ideological and political campaigns to prevent the people from being “contaminated” by a capiralist culture which it anticipated would develop as a result of such measures. It is no wonder that, under these conditions, all attempts at reforming met with only limited success at best. The North Korean regime, however, has negotiated with its people the expansion of its second economy, despite its reluctance to do so. In fact, the regime explicitly defined farmers' markets as remnants of “backward” capitalism which would become extinct as socialism reached a higher stage of development. It is expected that the ruling hierarchy in North Korea will be able to survive for a considerable period of time, despite the threatening economic crisis. So far in North Korea, the need to safeguard the existing political regime has been given far greater priority than the need to bring about reform. However, the North Korean regime, if it intends to survive, will be compelled to carry out full-scale reforms sooner or later.
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McEachern, Patrick. "Comparative authoritarian institutionalism, regime evolution, and stability in North Korea." Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 3, no. 4 (February 26, 2018): 367–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2057891118760403.
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The cross-national comparative politics literature on authoritarian regimes has advanced rapidly in recent years, providing fresh insights into regime longevity, potential for successful democratization, and derivative policy choices. The study of North Korea’s politics has likewise advanced, albeit largely without reference to this budding literature. Given the paucity of data on North Korea, this article reviews and leverages the budding comparative literature to bring new perspectives on perennial debates on North Korean regime stability. The article argues the comparative literature fails to capture evolution in authoritarian regimes, including North Korea, suggesting areas for theoretical improvement. It documents political evolution in Kim Jong Un’s North Korea and draws upon cross-national findings to show how and why the one-party political structure, personalist elements, and hereditary succession identified in this analysis are stabilizing elements for the regime.
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Denisov, Valeriy. "Prospects for North Korean Regime and the Interests of Russia." Journal of International Analytics, no. 1-2 (March 28, 2019): 16–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.46272/2587-8476-2019-0-1-2-16-26.
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The paper deals with the dynamics of home and foreign policy of North Korea under Kim Jong-un leadership, especially in last several years. Analyzed are new trends in and prospects for the development of the situation on the Korean Peninsula in the context of North Korea transformation into a full-fledged nuclear state. The author considers the return to party-centered political system (instead of total militarization under Kim Jong-il) as well as cautious economic reforms including introduction of some market mechanisms and attempts aimed at formation of basics of innovative economics. Factors hampering the development of the country, in particular, various economic sanctions, are also discussed, as well as prospects for diplomatic dialogue of North Korea with countries on North-East Asia. Contact between the leaders of North Korea and the USA are touched upon. The problem of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is critically considered. In conclusion, possible directions of cooperation between Russia and North Korea are outlined.
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Davies, Graeme A. M. "Coercion or Engagement? A Quantitative Test of the Effect of Regional Actors on North Korean Behaviour 1990–2000." British Journal of Politics and International Relations 9, no. 3 (August 2007): 477–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856x.2006.00257.x.
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The Korean peninsula is one of the most dangerous places on the planet. Decisions relating to the peninsula are for high stakes, and one small error can potentially result in an enormously destructive war. This article seeks to assess whether strategies of engagement or coercion can improve the chances of North Korea co-operating with either the US or South Korea. Using Vector Autoregression (VAR) techniques I assess the behavioural patterns of the North Korean regime in response to the actions of the states involved in the six-party talks between 1990 and 2000. The article finds that there were dramatic differences between the negotiating strategies employed by both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il in their dealings with both the US and South Korea. The results suggest that, in being able to manipulate US foreign policy, the North Koreans are punching well above their weight and that the chances of a meaningful settlement with the regime of Kim Jong Il are very small.
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Chung, Ku Youn. "Political Awareness of North Korean Refugees and Regime Stability of North Korea." Journal of Social Science 59, no. 1 (June 30, 2020): 113–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.22418/jss.2020.6.59.1.113.
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Roehrig, Terence. "North Korea and Reunification." Asian Survey 60, no. 5 (September 2020): 859–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2020.60.5.859.
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Efforts to denuclearize North Korea continue, but it is highly doubtful whether this goal will be reached. An often-expressed fear of a nuclear-armed North Korea is that it might use this capability to coerce reunification with the South on its terms. Though its leaders often speak of the desire for reunification, North Korea will not and could not pursue a successful nuclear coercion strategy because it carries an inordinate amount of risk, even for Pyongyang, which raises serious doubts about the credibility of its nuclear threats, the possibility of success, and the likelihood of pursuing such a strategy in the first place. And even if North Korea were to succeed, its efforts to integrate the South Korean economy would be a disaster, leading to the end of the North Korean regime.
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Lee, Hyunok. "Gendered Migration in a Changing Care Regime: A Case of Korean Chinese Migrants in South Korea." Social Policy and Society 17, no. 3 (June 5, 2017): 393–407. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1474746417000161.
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The feminisation of international migration for care labour has gained prominence in the last three decades. It has been theorised mainly in the context of the changing care regime in the Global North; the changes in other parts of the world have been largely neglected. This article explores the dynamics between changing care regimes, labour markets and international migration in the East Asian context through the case of Korean Chinese migrants to South Korea. Korean Chinese came to South Korea through various legal channels beginning in the late 1980s and occupy the largest share of both male and female migrants in South Korea. Korean Chinese women have engaged in service sector jobs, including domestic work and caregiving, since their influx, yet such work was only legalised during the 2000s in response to demographic changes and the care deficit. This article sheds light on the female Korean Chinese migrants’ engagement in care work in the ambiguous legal space of migration and the care labour market, and their changing roles in the process of development of the care labour market. Based on interviews with Korean Chinese migrants in South Korea, immigration statistics, and the Foreign Employment Survey in 2013, this study explores how the care regime intersects with migration in the process of the care regimes development.
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Woong Lee, Won. "Politics of Human Rights in North Korea." Journal of Asian and African Studies 42, no. 3-4 (June 2007): 233–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0021909607076702.
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The international community is now paying more attention to `the systemic, widespread and grave violations of international human rights norms' (United Nations ECOSOC Resolution 1503, (1970) See Burgental (1995)) in North Korea due to its chronic famine and nuclear ambition. The issues and engagement politics regarding human rights in North Korea constitute hot political debates. There are three key factors to improve human rights status in North Korea: the consistent international censure; enlarging engagement and people contact through inter-Korean relations; and economic reform in North Korea. These factors are interrelated and affect each other. The crucial point is to press and induce the North Korean regime to a compromise path.
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Schmid, Andre. "Historicizing North Korea: State Socialism, Population Mobility, and Cold War Historiography." American Historical Review 123, no. 2 (April 1, 2018): 439–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ahr/rhy001.
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Abstract The Cold War is far from over on the Korean Peninsula. Korean history—especially for the northern half—remains deeply shaped by the legacies of transnational anti-communism even as historians who study socialism in other settings have shed many of the Cold War–era assumptions about the extensive power of the state. By putting North Korea in a comparative perspective with other socialist countries such as the USSR, the People’s Republic of China, and the German Democratic Republic, this article suggests ways of integrating the constitutive power of social forces beyond the state into our histories of North Korea, as seen through an examination of population movement. Beginning with the dissolution of the Japanese Empire, the mobility of people has always been a politicized issue between the two Koreas. Historians have taken up this issue, yet dependence on sources produced by the North Korean state has led many narratives—however harshly critical of the regime—to reproduce within their own analytical frameworks key assumptions originally produced in Pyongyang in support of the personality cult. The result has been a cartoonish depiction of the North Korean state. By using a diverse set of public media as sources, this article shows that due to conflicting interests of migrants, factory managers, and central economic planners, many North Koreans moved into the cities despite administrative injunctions and the admonishments of Kim Ilsung. Asking questions about the limits of the state, rather than assuming its totalitarian capacity, becomes one way of escaping the historiographical legacies of the Cold War even as the politics of division continue to rage on the peninsula.
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Kyu, Nam Kwang. "The Moon Jae-in administration’s North Korea policy and Korea–US relations." Asian Education and Development Studies 8, no. 1 (January 7, 2019): 59–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/aeds-12-2017-0131.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to present the North Korea policy pursued by the Moon Jae-in administration and discuss the possibility of a weakened alliance between South Korea and the USA. Design/methodology/approach This paper compares the North Korean policies and the ROK–US alliance under the Moon administration, analyzing the recent inter-Korean and North Korea–US summits, with a focus on the issues of denuclearization and establishing a peace regime. Findings This paper reveals that the approach taken by the Moon administration regarding North Korea is similar to that of North Korea and China, and that the ROK–US alliance is likely to weaken should there be any change concerning the North Korean nuclear issue. Originality/value Denuclearization takes place in accordance with the agreement between North Korea and the USA, there is a high likelihood of the ROK–US alliance weakening.
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오경섭. "The Condition of North Korean Regime Transition." National Strategy 21, no. 3 (August 2015): 63–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.35390/sejong.21.3.201509.003.
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LEE, Choonkyu. "DIALECTS AT THE BORDER BETWEEN KOREA AND CHINA." International Journal of Korean Humanities and Social Sciences 2 (November 1, 2016): 157–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/kr.2016.02.08.
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In this paper, we seek a closer comparative dialectological study of the dialects of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Korean dialects of the ethnically Korean Chinese near the Korea-China border. Accessible resources published in English and other languages besides Korean are particularly necessary in these times of increasing instability in the North Korean regime and foreseeable cases of asylum seekers. Speech samples are discussed to illustrate the relative difficulty of distinguishing between North Korean and Korean-Chinese speakers, compared to distinguishing between North Korean and South Korean speakers. Based on an over-view of previous literature, some guidelines are developed for identifying some distinguishing characteristics of these speech communities. Continuing dialectological research with refugees and field research making direct comparisons between these communities are necessary for further and up-to-date insight.
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Ahn, Mun Suk. "The sources of North Korean conduct: Is Pyongyang really going non-nuclear?" International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis 75, no. 2 (June 2020): 237–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0020702020930744.
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The Kim Jong Un regime recently shifted from an emphasis on military power to an ‘economy first’ policy. The shift was driven by a pragmatic calculation, on the part of the North Korean leader, recognizing that the stability of the regime depends on economic development. Kim hopes that a shift from nuclear confrontation to diplomacy will result in the lifting of Western sanctions. It is important that the United States interprets Kim’s intentions correctly, and tries to strike a deal with North Korea.
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Cagney, Brendon, and Ernest Wong. "System Dynamics as a Foreign Policy Tool to Resolve the North Korean Dilemma." Industrial and Systems Engineering Review 5, no. 2 (December 18, 2017): 145–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.37266/iser.2017v5i2.pp145-152.
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Since its establishment as a nation-state after World War II, North Korea has undermined regional stability and has increased the threat to global security. The North Korean regime has shown time and time again that it will stop at nothing to maintain its power and portray itself as a strong and prosperous nation. Today the worry over North Korea extends well beyond its substantial conventional firepower—its asymmetric gains in chemical, biological, nuclear, and cyber warfare capabilities have given rise to a new set of complexities that frustrate international accord. Kim Jong-Un, North Korea’s current Supreme Leader, has pressed vehemently against the challenges he perceives from adversaries, both foreign as well as domestic, in order to promote his nation’s self-interest. As a consequence, the international community typically responds in kind with political and economic sanctions intended to curb further North Korean provocations. However, history has repeatedly shown how such sanctions serve as merely temporary measures that postpone continued advances in North Korea’s military effectiveness. In this paper, the authors leverage system dynamics to better characterize the current situation in North Korea and attempt to provide useful insights into understanding why the Kim Jong-Un regime behaves in the way that it does. By doing so, the authors encourage policy makers to employ system dynamics as a foreign policy tool to come up with more effective ideas and solutions for dealing with today’s North Korean dilemma.
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Yoon, Jeongran. "“Victory over Communism: South Korean Protestants’ Ideas about Democracy, Development, and Dictatorship, 1953–1961”." Journal of American-East Asian Relations 24, no. 2-3 (September 12, 2017): 233–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18765610-02402016.
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This article complicates the traditional narrative of anti-Communist Christians in Korea, examining the history of anti-communism among them in light of their claims to support democracy and development. Changes in Christian thinking in Korea followed the end of formal fighting in the Korean War. The conflict transformed Korea’s post-colonial history into a developmental struggle, pitting communism versus capitalism in a deadly battle. From the mid-1950s, South Korean Protestants saw the struggle as a competition between two systems, not simply one to eradicate the North Korean regime. From this new perspective, they began condemning political injustice and corruption under President Syngman Rhee. The contradictions in the ideas of Christians were partly embodied in their support for the civil uprising that would topple the Rhee regime, but also in their endorsement of Park Chung-hee’s military takeover in 1961. South Korean Protestants assisted the coup’s central leadership and helped a totalitarian regime come to power. This paradoxical aspect within Korean Protestant history is closely tied to the unique characteristics of its anti-communism and how it evolved after the Korean War.
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Dukalskis, Alexander, and Zachary Hooker. "Legitimating totalitarianism: Melodrama and mass politics in North Korean film." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 44, no. 1 (February 19, 2011): 53–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2011.01.006.
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This article attempts to analyze the construction and maintenance of political legitimacy in North Korea through the lens of its state-produced films. After classifying North Korea’s regime as totalitarian, we then discuss the strategies of legitimation available given this classification, and highlight the importance of ideology therein. Next, we demonstrate the importance of film within North Korea’s ideological apparatus and thematically analyze six North Korean films dating from 1948–2006. From this analysis, we situate the social role of film in contemporary North Korea and argue that it will remain a crucial force amongst the country’s various attempts to maintain legitimacy.
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Zafar Khan. "North Korean Nuclear Issue: Regime Collapsism or Negotiation?" International Journal of Korean Unification Studies 25, no. 2 (December 2016): 105–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.33728/ijkus.2016.25.2.005.
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Green, Michael. "North Korean Regime Crisis: US Perspectives and Responses." Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 9, no. 2 (December 1997): 7–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10163279709464368.
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Green, Michael. "North Korean Regime Crisis: US Perspectives and Responses." Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 9, no. 2 (December 1997): 209–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10163279709464377.
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Won, Tae Joon. "To Be or Not to Be? The North Korean Challenge to British Foreign Policy, 1971–1976." Britain and the World 7, no. 2 (September 2014): 212–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/brw.2014.0149.
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This article seeks to explore the arguments that occurred mainly within the British Foreign Office and in its discussions with other government ministries in the early 1970s concerning the matter of affording diplomatic recognition to North Korea. Legal experts within the Foreign Office were concerned that London's non-recognition of Pyongyang could render Britain's position hypocritical and even illegal vis-à-vis its potential recognition of North Vietnam. British diplomats in Seoul however were adamant that North Korea should be not recognized for fear of angering both the South Korean and the American allies and damaging British commercial interests in South Korea. The Foreign Office ministers decided to delay the inevitable recognition for as long as they could, but then the illegal activities of North Korean diplomats in Europe came to light in 1976 and subsequently put an end to potential public queries about Britain's legal duty to recognise the North Korean regime.
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Taylor, Moe. "“One Hand Can't Clap”: Guyana and North Korea, 1974–1985." Journal of Cold War Studies 17, no. 1 (January 2015): 41–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00530.
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In a little-known episode of the Cold War that challenges many common assumptions, North Korea forged extensive political, economic, military and cultural relations with the small South American-Caribbean coastal state of Guyana in the 1970s and 1980s. During this time, Guyana was ruled by an authoritarian socialist regime under Forbes Burbham, whose unorthodox conception of “socialism” was viewed skeptically by Communist countries other than North Korea. Burnham's program of “co-operative socialism,” which envisaged a population strictly obedient to his own wishes as the supreme leader, was distinctly similar to the juche philosophy espoused by the long-time North Korean dictator, Kim Il-Sung. Burnham deeply admired North Korea's economic and military “achievements,” attributing them to the strict obedience of the North Korean populace to the wishes of Kim Il-Sung. Burnham envisaged a similar role for himself in Guyana and attempted to import various North Korean approaches to socialist education and culture. Guyana came to resemble North Korea in some important respects, but it gradually moved away from this pattern after Burnham's death in 1985.
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PARK, Jeong Won. "Establishment of North Korean regime 70 years and Changes and Prospects of North Korean Constitution." Unification and North Korean Law Studies, no. 20 (December 30, 2018): 255–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.31999/sonkl.2018.20.255.
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Kim, Byung-Yeon, and Yu Mi Koh. "The Informal Economy and Bribery in North Korea." Asian Economic Papers 10, no. 3 (October 2011): 104–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/asep_a_00092.
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This paper uses the data of 227 North Korean refugees who have settled in South Korea to investigate the relationship between working in the informal economy (market component of the economy) and bribe-giving, and between bribe-giving and the number of hours worked in the formal sector (planned component of the economy). The first relationship is positive, and the second relationship is negative. These results imply that widespread informal economy activities in North Korea have been undermining the socialist regime through bribery.
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Raska, Michael. "North Korea’s Evolving Cyber Strategies: Continuity and Change." SIRIUS – Zeitschrift für Strategische Analysen 4, no. 2 (May 26, 2020): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/sirius-2020-3030.
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AbstractPyongyang sees the Korean Peninsula as entrenched in a geopolitical deadlock among great powers, with the United States continuing to employ what the North Korean regime sees as a “hostile policy” detrimental to its survival, its ability to shape relevant events, and the country’s political and economic development. While the core security concerns of South Korea and the United States are North Korea’s growing nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities, the alliance must increasingly also prioritize the continuous development of North Korea’s cyber capabilities, both offensive and defensive. North Korea aims to gain strategic advantage by pursuing cost-effective, asymmetric military capabilities, including cyber strategies, to gather intelligence, coerce its rivals, financially extort others, and otherwise exert influence in ways that are resistant to traditional deterrence and defense countermeasures. Seoul and Washington need a full-spectrum military readiness posture against the full range of potential North Korean provocations, while European democracies need to strengthen their cyber readiness posture to effectively track and counter North Korea’s evolving global cyber operations.
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김동엽. "North Korean military Changes under Kim Jong Un’s Regime." Economy and Society ll, no. 122 (June 2019): 76–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.18207/criso.2019..122.76.
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Gause, Ken E. "Can the North Korean regime survive Kim Jong Il?" Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 20, no. 2 (June 2008): 93–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10163270802062779.
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Maass, Matthias. "Beyond Economic Sanctions: Rethinking the North Korean Sanctions Regime." North Korean Review 7, no. 2 (September 1, 2011): 45–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.3172/nkr.7.2.45.
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Han, Sang-Jin. "Dialogue with John Dunn on Korean Denuclearization." Theory, Culture & Society 36, no. 7-8 (August 7, 2019): 293–311. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0263276419867465.
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This dialogue addresses the global risk that broke out of the North Korean development of nuclear weapons and missiles. It starts from the brutal consequences of the national division for Korea and asks why North Korea has been so preoccupied with nuclear projects as has been found to be the case since the 1990s, and how much and why Kim Jung-un today differs from his father in terms of his future, and where the fundamental limit lies in Moon Jae-In’s as well as Trump’s approaches to Korean denuclearization and peace. The highlight of this dialogue is to explain the intrinsic difficulties for Donald Trump and Kim Jung-un in finding a reasonable solution to their respective demands for denuclearization and regime security, and explore the likely future of the Korean Peninsula from the vantage point of Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy and metamorphosis.
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GOEDDE, Patricia. "Human Rights Diffusion in North Korea: The Impact of Transnational Legal Mobilization." Asian Journal of Law and Society 5, no. 1 (August 15, 2017): 175–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/als.2017.20.
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AbstractThis article asks how legal mechanisms are employed outside of North Korea to achieve human rights diffusion in the country; to what extent these result in human rights diffusion in North Korea; and whether measures beyond accountability can be pursued in tandem for more productive engagement. Specifically, it examines how the North Korean government has interacted with the globalized legal regime of human rights vis-à-vis the UN and details the legal processes and implications of the UN Commission of Inquiry report, including domestic legislation, and evidence collection. While transnational legal mobilization has gathered momentum on the accountability side, it is significantly weaker in terms of achieving human rights protection within North Korea given the government’s perception of current human rights discourse as part of an externally produced war repertoire. Thus, efforts to engage the North Korean population and government require concurrent reframing of human rights discourse into more localized and relatable contexts.
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Kim, Hyun-Sik, and George Kap-Hun Kim. "Reflections on North Korea: The Psychological Foundation of the North Korean Regime and its Governing Philosophy." International Bulletin of Missionary Research 32, no. 1 (January 2008): 22–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/239693930803200106.
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Lee, Hanhee. "Analyzing the political survival prospects of Kim Jong-un's North Korean regime through the framework of selectorate theory." Japanese Journal of Political Science 19, no. 3 (July 17, 2018): 474–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109918000130.
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AbstractThe political survival of Kim Jong-un's regime in North Korea has been a major international concern since his accession in 2012. While international research has endeavored to diagnose the stability of the regime based on its limitations and weaknesses due to political, economic, and international factors, studies based on baseline theoretical models of leadership stability have rarely been undertaken. This paper employs selectorate theory to address this issue, by identifying the selectorate and winning coalition in North Korea and illustrating their relationships with Kim Jong-un's political survival. To reexamine the analytical framework and results, this study has undertaken in-depth interviews with high-level North Korean defectors who have served in key power apparatuses of Kim Jong-il and/or Kim Jong-un's regime. It analyzes how frequent co-optation of top aides, economic ideologies, and policies are utilized for political survival. It further explains the correlation of his political survival with the party-dependent bureaucracy, internal reign of terror, development of nuclear capacity, and continuous military provocations. However, as the regime further intensifies the reign of terror, the possibility of acoup d’étatby the selectorate and coalition cannot be completely ruled out.
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LYONG, CHOI. "Reluctant Reconciliation: South Korea's tentative détente with North Korea in the Nixon era, 1969–72." Modern Asian Studies 54, no. 1 (July 8, 2019): 59–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x18000021.
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AbstractThis article discusses the impact and implications of Sino-American reconciliation on South Korea's policy towards its conflict with North Korea as well as its effect on South Korean politics in the early 1970s. Specifically, this article will examine how the Park regime altered its policy toward the North in response to the demands of the Nixon administration, before discussing the limitations of the policy in terms of the hostile approach of the Park regime toward Pyongyang during its talks with North Korea in 1972.Based on recent findings in the South Korean and American archives, and an interview with former KCIA official Gang Indeok, this article contends that this particular focus provides an interesting case study to explain the impact of global changes on the domestic politics of specific nation(s) during the Cold War era. Along with many other American client states, the Republic of Korea misunderstood the objective of the United States before Nixon announced his Doctrine in 1969 and intention to reduce American support for Park. To be sure, it was not Washington's intention to build a democratic country in the Korean Peninsula. Rather, as Westad has indicated, the superpower sought greater control over the world and the expansion and extension of its power. This short article will thus demonstrate the process by which the client states of the United States—in particular, South Korea—came to understand the real aims of Washington and learned how to utilize these American intentions for their own national interest.
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Cha, Victor D. "The North Korea Question." Asian Survey 56, no. 2 (March 2016): 243–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2016.56.2.243.
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The North Korean state under a young and unproven leader faces severe challenges. The regime will not change because of a leadership transition or because of the West’s hope of reform. It could crack because its ideology is at odds with the country’s incremental societal change.
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Lee, Eun Jung. "Changes and Prospects of North Korean Civil Law in the 70th Year of the North Korean Regime." Unification and North Korean Law Studies, no. 20 (December 30, 2018): 339–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.31999/sonkl.2018.20.339.
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Moon, Mi-ra. "Reexamining “The origin of North Korean regime” : Kim Jaeung, The origin of North Korean regime : Class above people, state above class (Yoksabipyongsa, 2018)." YŎKSA WA HYŎNSIL : Quarterly Review of Korean History 110 (December 31, 2018): 333–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.35865/ywh.2018.12.110.333.
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Lee, Su Min. "SOCIOECONOMIC ABUSE: FROM GOVERNMENT MISHAP TO SYSTEMETIC FAILURES." Asia Proceedings of Social Sciences 4, no. 2 (April 21, 2019): 31–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.31580/apss.v4i2.708.
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ABSTRACT
The tragic stories of poverty, famine, and the systematic abuse of citizens by the government in North Korea are all too common. In fact, for millions of children in North Korea today, these are recurring themes. The exploitation of underage children—forced into labor and given minimal to no payments—is common. These children are placed in vulnerable situations and exploited by the very government which should be protecting them.
Kim Jong Un, the Supreme Leader, is a perfect example of how dictators often exploit citizens to maintain power, by violating human rights and suppressing freedom. Today, the world is only aware of the modernized Pyongyang, but do they really know what is behind the façade of luxury?
The aim of this paper is to investigate the harsh reality of the exploitation taking place inside North Korea. Secondary sources are the main method of investigation, as well as information taken directly from personal testimonies given by North Korean refugees.
Compared to what has been portrayed in the mass media, the true picture of North Korea’s situation is unbearable. I was able to glean insight into the North Korean regime that has abused its powers through a cascade of systematic measures that suppress and oppress its citizens from attaining communal benefits of society. This research summarizes research goals which identifies specific ways through which North Korea has exercised its abusive power over its citizens – through child labor, “virgin school girlsâ€, state-wide propaganda, etc. While the primary focus of this article is to shed light on the prevalent abuse found inside North Korea, it also attempts to address a much broader question pertinent to general human nature: “Does human nature allow power to lead to corruption?â€
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Pugacheva, O. S. "Inter-Korean Relations: Factors and Prospects." Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law 14, no. 1 (January 28, 2021): 151–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.23932/2542-0240-2021-14-1-8.
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The relations between South Korea and North Korea were improved in 2018 on the basis of the Sunshine policy ideational platform and the inter-Korean agreements reached between the two countries under the progressive administrations of Kim Dae-jung in 2000 and Roh Moohyun in 2007. However, inter-Korean relations had been at a lull since the US-North Korea summit in Hanoi in February 2019 despite the intentions of the parties to develop diverse forms of cooperation. After that, the month of June saw a severe deterioration in the Inter-Korean relations. The aim of this article is to analyze the inter-Korean relations and the North Korean policies of the South Korean governments from 1998 to 2020 as well as explain the reasons behind Seoul’s inability to make progress in dialogue with Pyongyang. South Korea’s prioritizing of its ties with the United States as well as its increased dependence on the United States were the main reason behind the stagnation of inter-Korean relations. Under the international regime of sanctions against the DPRK, Moon Jae-In has failed to put the Sunshine policy into practice, for instance, re-open Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mount Kumgang tourism zone. The fact that inter-Korean economic cooperation was actually still linked to the denuclearization of the DPRK also had a negative impact on the prospects for maintaining the positive dynamics of inter-Korean relations. The exacerbation of inter-Korean relations in June 2020 showed that in the absence of practical inter-Korean cooperation and with the continuing deadlock in the US-North Korean negotiations on the nuclear issue, Pyongyang is not interested in normalizing relations with Seoul and it can concentrate on relations with the United States. At the same time, the intensifying confrontation between China and the United States in the Asia-Pacific region is not conducive to a political settlement of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue and it can potentially lead to an aggravation of inter-Korean relations.
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Bennett, Bruce W., and Jennifer Lind. "The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements." International Security 36, no. 2 (October 2011): 84–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00057.
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In North Korea, the upcoming leadership transition in the Kim Jong-il regime will be a precarious time for the Kim family's hold on power. A collapse of the North Korean government could have several dangerous implications for East Asia, including “loose nukes,” a humanitarian disaster, a regional refugee crisis, and potential escalation to war between China and the United States. To respond to a collapse and these problems, neighboring countries may perform several military missions to stabilize North Korea. These include the location and securing of North Korean weapons of mass destruction, stability operations, border control, conventional disarmament, and combat/deterrence operations. Assuming that collapse occurs in a relatively benign manner, military missions to stabilize North Korea could require 260,000 to 400,000 troops. If collapse occurs after a war on the peninsula, or if it sparks civil war in North Korea, the number of missions—and their requirements—would grow. Because of the size and complexity of these missions, and because of the perils associated with mismanaging them, advance and combined planning is essential. Combined planning should include those actors (e.g., China, South Korea, and the United States) that could otherwise take destabilizing action to protect their own interests.
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Habib, Benjamin Luke. "The Implications of Climate Vulnerability for North Korean Regime Stability." International Journal of Climate Change: Impacts and Responses 1, no. 1 (2009): 83–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.18848/1835-7156/cgp/v01i01/37076.
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Lawrence, Christopher. "Normalization by Other Means—Technological Infrastructure and Political Commitment in the North Korean Nuclear Crisis." International Security 45, no. 1 (July 2020): 9–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00385.
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The 1994 Agreed Framework called for North Korea to dismantle its plutonium-production complex in exchange for civilian light water reactors (LWRs) and the promise of political normalization with the United States. The accord succeeded at rolling back North Korea's nuclear program, but the regime secretly began enriching uranium when the LWR project fell behind schedule. Today, scholars look back at the Agreed Framework as a U.S. offer of “carrots” to bribe the regime, but this framing overlooks the credibility challenges of normalization and the distinctive technical challenges of building LWRs in North Korea. A combiniation of political and technical analysis reveals how the LWR project helped build credibility for the political changes promised in the Agreed Framework. Under this interpretation, the LWR project created a platform for important breakthroughs in U.S.-North Korean engagement by signaling a U.S. commitment to normalization, but its signaling function was undercut when the United States displaced the costs of LWR construction to its allies. The real challenge of proliferation crisis diplomacy is not to bribe or coerce target states into giving up nuclear weapons, but to credibly signal a U.S. commitment to the long-term political changes needed to make denuclearization possible.
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Clemens, Walter C. "North Korea and the World: A Bibliography of Books and URLs in English, 1997–2007." Journal of East Asian Studies 8, no. 2 (August 2008): 293–325. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1598240800005336.
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This survey of books in English on North Korea, 1997–2007, identifies nearly 240 titles—mostly by US authors but also by authors in Australia, Europe, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Russia. The books fall into eleven categories: history and culture; the Korean War revisited; the DPRK regime and its leaders; human rights and humanitarian issues; the economy: Juche, Songun, collapse, or reform; DPRK military assets and programs; relations with the United States; arms control negotiations and outcomes; regional and world security; prospects for North-South unification; and North Korea's future. A final section includes useful websites. This survey points to a wide interest in North Korea and underscores the serious and ongoing efforts of many scholars and policy analysts to understand developments there.
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Sung, Minkyu. "Surveillance and Anti-Communist Authoritarianism in South Korea." Surveillance & Society 15, no. 3/4 (August 9, 2017): 486–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.24908/ss.v15i3/4.6592.
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In this essay, I argue that anti-communist authoritarianism has still survived into the 21st century South Korean public sphere, having been intensified in the idea of jongbuk. Jongbuk combines jong (to follow) and buk (North Korea) ideologically labeling people who are presumed to blindly follow, or be willfully serve North Korea’s totalitarian regime. People who are labeled jongbuk, pro-North Korea followers, are not only stigmatized and marginalized socially, but they are also subject to legal sanctions in their civic participation under the National Security Law. Especially under Park Geun-hye, daughter of military dictator and former President Park Chung-hee (1961-1979), I present how jongbuk has served as continued politicized commitments to national security and public safety used to justify the illegitimate and indiscriminate online surveillance and censorship of civilians and artists, as well as Park’s political opponents, to safeguard her regime.
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Hong, Suk-Hoon, and Yun-Young Cho. "Consistent pattern of DRPK’s policy on ROK: What shapes North Korea’s foreign policy?" International Area Studies Review 20, no. 1 (December 21, 2016): 57–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2233865916683602.
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Identity is the basis of North Korea’s regime legitimacy. As a divided country, North Korea’s legitimacy is forged in the inter-Korean comparison. This paper starts with the question of what factors influence whether North Korea chooses to implement risky or cooperative policies toward South Korea, as well as what role domestic politics and ideology play in The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) formation and enactment of foreign policy. This paper confirmed that the Pyongyang leadership’s policy priority has mostly depended on identity need. Also, we infer that Pyongyang tends to take a hostile stance whenever the South government is willing to infringe Pyongyang’s legitimacy and dignity regardless of the South’s economic assistance. This research attempts to explain how historical and cultural contexts play in the DPRK’s formation of its policy toward the Republic of Korea, and also examines Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the Pyongyang regime, through the lens of content analysis in order to determine the DPRK’s perception and policy preferences toward the The Republic of Korea (ROK).
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Kim, Yeon Joo. "Economic sanctions and the rhetorical responses of totalitarian regimes: Examining North Korean rhetorical strategies, 1949–2010." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47, no. 2 (May 10, 2014): 159–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2014.04.006.
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This study investigates the impact of economic statecraft on the North Korean Government. As a totalitarian regime, which is characterized by a controlled mass media, the North Korean Government tries to contain potential problems caused by sanctions by using three types of political rhetoric: appeasement, backlash, and surveillance. Using timeseries data from 1949 to 2010 derived from a content analysis of the New Year’s Day addresses by Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un, the empirical results suggests that the North Korean Government does alter its rhetorical strategies in response to external economic sanctions. Negative sanctions cause the regime to use appeasement strategies (or calls for reforms and internal changes). It tends to use backlash rhetoric (or blaming the sanctioning powers) in response to, interestingly, positive sanctions. Surveillance rhetoric, or the call for internal vigilance against enemies, on the other hand, does not have any statistical connection with sanctions, rather driven by other factors, such as the Korean War, external instability, and so on.
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Armstrong, Charles K. "The Korean Peninsula on the Verge." Current History 110, no. 737 (September 1, 2011): 229–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/curh.2011.110.737.229.
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Byman, Daniel, and Jennifer Lind. "Pyongyang's Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea." International Security 35, no. 1 (July 2010): 44–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00002.
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Speculation about the future of the North Korean regime has been intense for nearly two decades. In the 1990s, economic crises and famine led to predictions of the Kim regime's imminent downfall. Today analysts highlight impending famine as well as threats to the regime's position brought by eroding information control. Several theories of authoritarian control help to explain how Kim Jong-il and his family have remained in power and how this might change over time. The Kim regime has employed a variety of authoritarian “tools” to protect itself both from popular revolt and from internal coups. Its social policies, reliance on certain ideas and nationalism, and use of force prevent the onset of revolution. Through numerous other tools (elite co-optation, manipulation of foreign governments for financial aid, and the “coupproofing” of domestic institutions), the regime protects itself from coups d'état and elite unrest. This framework not only helps to explain the past resilience of the regime, but it suggests that the regime is not in danger of being unseated by coups or revolution. Yet it also suggests that the regime has not adequately prepared for succession after Kim's death. This analysis has implications for policy planning about the future of the Korean Peninsula, as well as for negotiations with and coercive strategies toward Pyongyang.
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Lankov, A. N. "North Korean Miracle: 30 Уears of Surviving Crisis and Isolation." Journal of International Analytics 12, no. 2 (August 19, 2021): 31–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.46272/2587-8476-2021-12-2-31-48.
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The article examines those factors that allowed the Kim family regime to stay in power in extremely unfavorable environment. In political science literature, it is generally accepted that an authoritarian regime faces three major threats: an elite conspiracy/coup, a mass protest, a foreign invasion. The article demonstrates that in the case of the DPRK, which is a much poorer part of a divided country, the potential threat of mass popular protests might be higher than in many other authoritarian regimes. However, the autocrat and his entourage successfully counter this threat by exercising an unusually thorough policy of informational self-isolation, further reinforced by strict administrative control and police surveillance. On the other hand, the ever present threat of Seoul-led “unification-by-absorption” strengthens the elites’ unity and reduces the likelihood of conspiracies. This is important since elite conspiracies and coups have constituted the major danger for post-1945 autocracies. North Korean elites understand that even a successful coup can eventually provoke the outbreak of popular discontent, followed by the collapse of North Korean statehood and German-style unification under Seoul’s control. Under this scenario, conspiracy’s winners and losers will perish alike, with all members of the current elite having little chance to retain their power and privileges. Hence, the elite has reasons not to “rock the boat.” Finally, the threat of a foreign invasion (or foreign intervention into a domestic crisis) is successfully neutralized by the existence of a nuclear deterrent. Since the North Korean faces a grave existential threat which is created by the existence of the South, it is ready to sacrifice the economic development for the sake of political stability. Hence, the elite is willing to invest large resources into military programs and overlook the difficulties the self-isolation and other survival-oriented policies create for the economic development of the country.
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Asmolov, Konstantin. "Problems and Prospects for the DPRK’s Development: Forecasting Model-2021." Problemy dalnego vostoka, no. 4 (2021): 134. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s013128120016161-8.
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Since the 1990s, there have been many publications predicting an imminent "collapse of the North Korean regime" or a shift of the country’s political vector. However, this has not happened so far, and the DPRK’s political regime continues to exist. What leads to such chronically unrealistic forecasts for North Korea, and what are alternative options for the future of this country in the short and medium term? Revising a number of unfulfilled predictions, the authors try to explain the reason for these failures. They are usually closely related to an ideological framework, lack of information and dependence on certain sources, which leads to an underestimation of the DPRK's capabilities and misinterpretation of data, when any event is seen as a sign of the regime’s imminent collapse. Using the theoretical approaches of G. Tallok and V.I. Lenin, the article identifies the main types of threats to the current political regime (external invasion, a coup within the elite, economic collapse, mass protests), as well as the likelihood of their implementation under the current policies of the DPRK leadership. The authors describe several development scenarios based on an analysis of factors that can affect the situation in North Korea in the short and medium term. Maintaining the status quo stands out in the first place in terms of probability. Less likely scenarios include “sinofication” due to Beijing's growing influence on Pyongyang, military escalation leading to an armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula, political and economic crisis.