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Journal articles on the topic 'Nuclear weapons (International law)'
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1
Les, I. "The legality of the use of nuclear weapons in international law." Uzhhorod National University Herald. Series: Law 2, no. 79 (October 25, 2023): 334–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.24144/2307-3322.2023.79.2.52.
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After the Second World War, the views of some military leaders on the use of nuclear weapons changed dramatically. Previously, the use of nuclear weapons was considered an incredible fact. In the minds of many, this view has been replaced by the notion that limited nuclear war is possible and winnable. Such a mentality raises a fundamental question: does any use of nuclear weapons have priority under international law.
Although there is no international convention that expressly prohibits the use of nuclear weapons, the consequences of the use of any weapon are governed by numerous conventions and customary international law. A decision that nuclear weapons would violate one or more principles of humanity enshrined in positive or customary international law cannot be decisive. When a state uses a weapon that emits any gaseous substance or violates the territory of a neutral state, that state is itself violating international law. However, some violations of international law, including the prohibition of causing unnecessary suffering and indiscriminate harm between combatants and non-combatants, may be justified by military necessity if their use is proportionate to military necessity, retaliation or self-defense.
This article examines the various uses of nuclear weapons and assesses their legality under positive and customary international law. It concluded that any nuclear weapons would be subject to a ban on gas and other related weapons. Furthermore, we conclude that in all but the most limited circumstances, the use of nuclear weapons would cause unnecessary suffering, would not distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, and would violate the territorial integrity of neutral States. Even if this remedy is violated by national law, this article demonstrates that the practical necessity of using nuclear weapons, and any resulting military advantage, is inherently disproportionate to the damage caused by any use of nuclear weapons, and thus, accordingly under international law, the use of nuclear weapons is illegal.
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Poole, Bryce G. "Against the Nuclear Option: Planetary Defence Under International Space Law." Air and Space Law 45, Issue 1 (March 1, 2020): 55–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/aila2020004.
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States have grown increasingly concerned with the risk of a meteor or comet impact. Some States and international law scholars advocate using a nuclear weapon to destroy or deflect an incoming space object. This article argues that the use of nuclear weapons for planetary defence purposes is legally dubious. Planetary defence, nuclear weapons, international treaties, customary international law, non-proliferation
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Dockrill, Saki. "Nuclear weapons and international law." International Affairs 64, no. 4 (1988): 661–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2626065.
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Adiningsih, Aprilia Putri, and Ngboawaji Daniel Nte. "North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development: The Impact for International Security and Stability." International Law Discourse in Southeast Asia 1, no. 2 (July 31, 2022): 123–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.15294/ildisea.v1i2.58398.
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The development of nuclear weapons today is in many cases one of the threats of future wars. In fact, the development of this weapon is considered to be able to disrupt international stability and security. Nuclear weapons have developed since World War II, which destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Until now, several countries are still competing to develop nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are weapons that get power from nuclear reactions and have tremendous destructive power, a nuclear bomb can destroy a city. Countries that have nuclear weapons include the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, India, North Korea, and Pakistan. Nuclear weapons can become weapons of mass destruction which of course threaten the stability of international security. As one of the nuclear-armed countries, North Korea is modernizing the country by focusing its strength on the planning economy, heavy industry, and military development. This study aims to analyze the development of North Korea's nuclear weapons in the context of international stability and security and its impact on international law enforcement, especially in the region of Southeast Asian countries.
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The Review. "International humanitarian law and nuclear weapons." International Review of the Red Cross 36, no. 313 (August 1996): 500–502. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s002086040008493x.
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On 8 July 1996, the International Court of Justice gave its advisory opinion in response to two enquiries as to the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Whilst the Court did not examine in detail the request put forward by the World Health Organization, it did give very close attention to the question presented by the General Assembly:“Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?”
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Kapelańska-Pręgowska, Julia. "Freedom from Nuclear Weapons? IHRL And IHL Perspective vs the State-Centred Approach." Age of Human Rights Journal, no. 14 (June 15, 2020): 137–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.17561/tahrj.v14.5481.
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23 years after the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, a general treaty prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons has been adopted. It may be anticipated that the TPNW will probably not enter into force very soon, and when it does, it will neither be universally accepted, nor will it significantly influence thepractice of the nuclear weapon States. It is therefore justified to analyse the problem under consideration, not from a State-oriented perspective, but from a human and environmentally centred one. The article argues not only that any use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, in particular the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, but it would also violate international human rights law. The article further dwells upon the customary international law aspects of the problem under consideration.
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Joyner, Daniel H. "I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 60, no. 1 (January 2011): 209–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020589310000722.
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This article examines a number of major developments in international law and State policy regarding nuclear weapons which have occurred over the past two years.However, in order to understand the context and significance of these developments, I must first very briefly address what has gone on previously in this area of international relations.I have argued elsewhere that over the course of the decade ending in 2008 the original balance of principles underlying the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which comprises the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation legal regime, has been distorted, particularly by nuclear-weapon-possessing governments, led by the United States, in favor of a disproportionate prioritization of non-proliferation principles, and an unwarranted under-prioritization of peaceful use and disarmament principles.1 I also argue that this distortion of principled balance by nuclear weapon states has resulted in a number of erroneous legal interpretations of the NPT's provisions.
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Hamidi, Sidra. "Law as discursive resource: the politics of the nuclear/non-nuclear distinction in the Non-Proliferation Treaty." European Journal of International Relations 26, no. 2 (September 25, 2019): 545–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354066119875999.
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Realist approaches to international law conceptualize the law as epiphenomenal to state interest, whereas liberal institutionalist approaches theorize the ability of law to curb state power. Through the example of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, this article challenges these approaches by arguing that law’s power comes from its productive and constitutive effects. Despite perennial conflict, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons endures because it has ordered nuclear politics by constituting a legal distinction between “nuclear weapon states” and “non-nuclear weapon states.” Instead of assuming that this distinction reflects self-evident material differences, this article shows how states actively construct nuclear status through international law. The dynamics of this construction reflect significant actions on the behalf of conventionally disempowered states and not merely great powers. An analysis of the meeting documents of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee finds that the participants used the forum to perform a burgeoning “non-nuclear” identity. The politics of this distinction also generated the discourse of “nuclear apartheid,” which was subsequently used by states outside the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regime to justify their pursuit of nuclear weapons. Taken together, the role of non-nuclear diplomacy and the discourse of nuclear apartheid demonstrate that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons does not simply endure because the powerful have sanctioned it, but because it created a space for the disempowered to expand their influence from below. Though the article builds on existing sociological approaches to the law, it also moves beyond conflicts over legal and textual interpretation to demonstrate the diplomatic practices around the constitution of legal categories.
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Arsić, Katarina. "Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: Position, implementation and significance." Srpska politička misao 86, no. 4 (2024): 47–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/spm86-51046.
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Although there was a opinion that the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons would represent the end of the era of the development of this type of weapon and the threat of nuclear war, this did not happen, having in mind that no country possessing a nuclear arsenal have acceded to the Treaty yet. The paper analyzes the main aspects of this document, its advantages and disadvantages. Additionally, using a comparative method, we will try to determine the relationship of this treaty with other sources of international public law, primarily treaties that may refer to the use of nuclear weapons, but also customs. Special attention is given to the influence of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons on the attitudes of states on the permissibility of the use of nuclear weapons. At the end, taking into account the current political and social circumstances in international relations and the opinions of international law theorists, we will try to answer the question why this treaty is still important, because nuclear weapons are the tool may be played by nuclear powers, especially in terms of their potential use in the case of self-defence.
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Crawford, James. "International Law and the Problem of Change: A Tale of Two Conventions." Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 49, no. 4 (November 15, 2018): 447. http://dx.doi.org/10.26686/vuwlr.v49i4.5335.
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Extensive efforts have been made in the modern period to suppress the possession and use of both chemical and nuclear weapons. However, progress towards the abolition of these two types of weapons presents a rather sharp contrast, as this case study shows. In this article the conventional prohibitions on the possession and use of these weapons are outlined, including the recent Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons of 2017. This Treaty prohibits the possession and use of nuclear weapons but it has not been (and likely will not be) ratified by any of the States that possess nuclear weapons. There is a further, and consequent, contrast between the two kinds of weapons in terms of whether a customary prohibition on the possession and use of chemical and/or nuclear weapons exists; this is also examined. Ultimately, there are lessons to be learned in terms of whether international law can change unless those most concerned, in this case the States that possess chemical or nuclear weapons, want it to change.
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Frei, Daniel. "International Humanitarian Law and Arms Control." International Review of the Red Cross 28, no. 267 (December 1988): 491–504. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020860400071941.
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For almost two decades, the International Red Cross Movement has been engaged in a continuing process of self-examination regarding its contribution to peace and disarmament. At the same time, public attention is being focused on, and sometimes even captivated by, various bilateral and multilateral efforts to achieve progress in nuclear and non-nuclear arms control in fields such as the reduction of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons, nuclear and chemical weapon-free zones, confidence- and security-building measures, and so on. The two lines of action are usually dealt with individually without proper consideration of the manifold interconnections existing between them. Only recently have efforts been made to clarify the relationship between the two. The purpose of this article is to bring them together and to do so by asking the question: To what extent can the effort to promote and implement international humanitarian law be seen as a contribution in terms of arms control?
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Les, Iryna. "The obligation to conduct and conclude negotiations aimed at nuclear disarmament as a custom in international law." Slovo of the National School of Judges of Ukraine, no. 4(45) (February 19, 2024): 91–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.37566/2707-6849-2023-4(45)-8.
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The article explores the international legal foundations of the obligation to conduct and conclude negotiations aimed at nuclear disarmament as a custom in international law. The purpose of the article is to analyze the international legal foundations of the obligation to conduct and conclude negotiations aimed at nuclear disarmament as a custom in international law. Without any pretensions to exhaustiveness, the research we propose reveals in the paper a study of the main trends in international practice regarding the existence in general international law of the obligation to pursue and complete negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in good faith, taking into account the uncertainties that characterize the establishment of international custom. On the one hand, the prohibition of nuclear weapons would constitute a negative norm non facere, on the other hand, the obligation to negotiate on nuclear weapons would constitute a positive obligation facere. In our study, we have particularly highlighted the activities of the states most concerned, i.e. those with nuclear weapons, because their position is most indicative for the purposes of establishing international custom. In addition, the establishment of international custom requires some caution, especially in light of the uncertainty regarding the relative value of each category of manifestation of international practice in the process of formation of general international law. On July 8, 1996, the UN International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion on whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons is compatible with international law. The World Court has established that the threat of using nuclear weapons or their use in general is contrary to international law. In this regard, it is precisely those elements that the Marshall Islands point to in their examples that cause some surprise. Thus, the reference to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of the United Nations on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, where the Court itself seems to have confirmed the existence of an obligation to observe good faith and complete negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament, was interpreted as «an expression of customary international law, which exists today». However, we should not forget the fluctuation of doctrine regarding the role of international jurisprudence in the search for international custom. Similarly, the reference to the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations Organization raises a certain number of questions, taking into account the difficulties that, more generally, concern the meaning of these acts in the development of general international law. Key words:article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, conducting and concluding negotiations, nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament, the International Court of Justice, customary law, convention law, the UN General Assembly.
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Maresca, Louis, and Eleanor Mitchell. "The human costs and legal consequences of nuclear weapons under international humanitarian law." International Review of the Red Cross 97, no. 899 (September 2015): 621–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1816383116000291.
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AbstractThe potential use of nuclear weapons has long been a global concern. This article highlights the principal rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) governing the conduct of hostilities applicable to nuclear weapons, and the issues and concerns that would arise were such weapons ever to be used again, in particular the severe and extensive consequences for civilians, civilian objects, combatants and the environment.In recent years, increased attention has been paid to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. Based on what has been learned from extensive research on the humanitarian and environmental effects of nuclear weapons since they were first used in 1945, and the accompanying implications for IHL, it seems appropriate to conclude that the use of nuclear weapons in or near a populated area would amount to an indiscriminate attack and that there should also be a presumption of illegality with regard to the use of nuclear weapons outside such areas.
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Neff, Stephen C. "I. International Law and Nuclear Weapons in Scottish Courts." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 51, no. 1 (January 2002): 171–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/iclq/51.1.171.
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Britain's Trident nuclear missile programme has long been politically controversial. In 1999, the controversy entered the judicial arena in Scotland, in two cases involving ‘direct action’ against Trident installations by anti-nuclear activists. In both cases, the actions were intended not as protests against Britain's nuclear-weapons policy, but rather as actual operations to disable the weapons themselves. The acts were, in other words, in the nature of acts of sabotage. Both incidents led to criminal prosecutions. In both cases, the accused parties sought to use international law as a defence. In both cases, the Appeal Court of the High Court of Justiciary—the highest court for criminal cases in Scotland—rejected the defence. In the process, however, the Appeal Court had occasion to expound upon some controversial points regarding nuclear weapons. Each of these cases will be discussed in turn.
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Tomljenović, Marija. "Svjetla budućnost za nuklearno razoružanje ili utopija?: Pravna ocjena Ugovora o zabrani nuklearnog oružja iz 2017. i njegov odnos s Ugovorom o neširenju nuklearnog oružja iz 1968." Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu 73, no. 5 (December 29, 2023): 985–1019. http://dx.doi.org/10.3935/zpfz.73.5.06.
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The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is the first universal international treaty that stipulates the prohibition of nuclear weapons and as such represents a major contribution to international law in the field of nuclear disarmament. The main purpose and goal of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. States that are parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons belong to the group that does not possess nuclear weapons, and in relation to them, compliance with the rules and fulfilment of the obligations prescribed by the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons should not pose any problem. However, the practical effect of the nuclear arms control treaty is seen by the major nuclear powers as an unrealistic and progressive approach to disarmament. Therefore, it is very difficult to predict that the nuclear states and their allies will decide to ratify the treaty in the near future. Therefore, in the context of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, an attempt will be made to offer an answer to the following questions. First, can the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons per se constitute a fundamental legal framework to which all states must adhere? And secondly, can nuclear states, according to the persistent objector rule, prevent the possible establishment of customary international law? It is to be assumed that the pressure of the non-nuclear states may in some way influence the nuclear states so that they feel the obligation to comply with the provisions of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons to a certain extent. Due to the establishment of a norm that prohibits nuclear weapons, it is necessary to ultimately explain the relationship of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons with already existing legal instruments, especially with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
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Cassimatis, Anthony E. "International Humanitarian Law, International Human Rights Law, and Fragmentation of International Law." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 56, no. 3 (July 2007): 623–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/iclq/lei185.
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International tribunals and legal scholars have been considering the relationship between International Humanitarian Law (‘IHL’) and International Human Rights Law (‘IHRL’) for a number of years.1 The International Court of Justice famously or infamously (depending on your perspective) considered their relationship in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion in 1996.2 The Court concluded that while IHRL did apply in times of armed conflict, when it came to the prohibition of arbitrarily taking human life in Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, the content of that prohibition had to be found in the lex specialis of IHL.
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Granoff, Dean, and Jonathan Granoff. "International humanitarian law and nuclear weapons: Irreconcilable differences." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 67, no. 6 (November 2011): 53–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0096340211426360.
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Aggarwal, Lalit K., and William M. Evan. "A SURVEY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW." Peace & Change 15, no. 2 (April 1990): 195–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0130.1990.tb00548.x.
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Akande, D. "Nuclear Weapons, Unclear Law? Deciphering the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion of the International Court." British Yearbook of International Law 68, no. 1 (January 1, 1998): 165–217. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bybil/68.1.165.
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Speed, Roger D. "International control of nuclear weapons." Washington Quarterly 20, no. 3 (September 1997): 177–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01636609709550270.
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Yankovskyi, Stanislav. "Ukraine’s nuclear security as a key element of the European security system." Law. Human. Environment 14, no. 3 (July 2, 2023): 102–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.31548/law/3.2023.102.
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Ukraine, as a strategically located territory and an important player in the geopolitical interests of various power blocks, has become a key element of the European nuclear security system, so it is important to study the most important factors shaping the situation around nuclear weapons and take appropriate measures to avoid potential threats. The research aims to outline all aspects and factors of Ukraine’s nuclear security that directly affect the international security system, in particular, the European countries. The methodological basis of the study is a systematic analysis of information and regulatory sources, such as bilateral and multilateral international agreements, documents and materials of international organisations, documents of individual country authorities, speeches, and materials of print and electronic media. The article highlights the historical context, including the transfer of Ukrainian nuclear weapons materials to Russia following the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons. The current stage of development of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime is analysed. Attention is paid to the evolution of the regime under the influence of the confrontation between the two superpowers and the doctrine of mutual deterrence. The situation with nuclear security in Ukraine and its impact on the Black Sea region is analysed. The consequences of military actions in Ukraine and factors that create new dimensions for nuclear security, in particular in the context of control over nuclear materials and the possibilities of their use, are considered. The results of the study of the problem are presented in the description of new threats and risks that require deepening cooperation of international partners and taking effective measures to ensure nuclear safety in the region. The study emphasises the need for joint efforts to counter new challenges and minimise nuclear safety risks. The practical significance of the study is determined by strategies for cooperation with international partners to achieve stability in the field of nuclear safety
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Ruzicka, Jan. "The next great hope: The humanitarian approach to nuclear weapons." Journal of International Political Theory 15, no. 3 (July 30, 2018): 386–400. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1755088218785922.
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This article examines the humanitarian approach to nuclear weapons, which has reinvigorated the efforts to achieve their prohibition. It explores the fundamental arguments made by the ‘Humanitarian Initiative’ and their grounding in a relationship between international law and international politics. The analysis draws on the emphasis that classical realists put on the political nature of international problems, primarily shaped by considerations of power. Such approach is useful because the humanitarian approach attempts to address the political problem of nuclear weapons by recourse to claims about morality and through the means of international law, most notably the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, deliberately choosing to circumvent politics and its concern with power. The classical realist perspective suggests that to overlook the power political dimension and to consider the problem of nuclear weapons chiefly as a moral and legal issue is likely to lead to yet another failure in efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament.
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Wu, Sicheng. "Comparing the Cold War to the Present, Why Is International Law Increasingly Failing to Limit Nuclear Proliferation?" Lecture Notes in Education Psychology and Public Media 4, no. 1 (May 17, 2023): 279–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.54254/2753-7048/4/20220331.
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Since the possession of nuclear weapons has always been a global issue, from the introduction of nuclear disarmament to its implementation, states have bound each other consistently through international law. However, is this the only effective way? Moreover, is it necessarily the best? From this question, this paper examines the nature of international law. It explores the problem of international law in stopping nuclear proliferation from three counterpoints: the refinement of the global economy, moral capital, and the subjective interpretation of the possession of nuclear weapons, concluding that nuclear proliferation is more likely to go unchecked from the Cold War onward.
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Jain, Isha, and Bhavesh Seth. "India’s nuclear force doctrine: Through the lens of jus ad bellum." Leiden Journal of International Law 32, no. 01 (November 23, 2018): 111–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0922156518000596.
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AbstractNearly three decades after the Cold War, the present-day hostilities between India and Pakistan have shifted the focus of the threat of nuclear escalation to South Asia. It is in this context that this article seeks to assess the legality of India’s military nuclear doctrine under international law.Academic literature on the use of nuclear weapons has largely shied away from discussing the legality of specific military doctrines or ‘policies of deterrence’ of the nuclear weapon states, treating them as issues of military strategy that are beyond the realm of international law. This article hopes to challenge that dichotomy.Though several branches of international law are relevant to any discussion on nuclear weapons, this article shall only examine India’s nuclear doctrine through the lens of jus ad bellum. Specifically, this article shall focus on whether India’s nuclear doctrine constitutes a threat to use force, and if so, whether such threat is lawful. The article concludes that India’s nuclear doctrine can be construed to be a specific threat to use force against Pakistan, and that such threat may be unlawful for contemplating the disproportionate use of force.
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Gunawan, Yordan, and Rima Ayu Andriana. "THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN NORTH KOREA: INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE." JCH (Jurnal Cendekia Hukum) 5, no. 1 (September 30, 2019): 32. http://dx.doi.org/10.33760/jch.v5i1.162.
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The proliferation issue of nuclear weapons in North Korea is becoming a more serious problem to the international community. North Korea has been manufacturing and developing nuclear weapons technology, which receives many critics by the international community expressing that North Korea is being non-compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 1968. The criticism emerged following the North Korea withdrawal from the NPT 1968. Its withdrawal reasoning seems very hard to be justified after series of non-compliance behavior conducted by North Korea and the legitimacy of its withdrawal is being debated. By using normative legal research, the research aims to determine the status of North Korea upon its withdrawal from the NPT 1968 based on the withdrawal procedure that is required in the Article X of the NPT 1968. The result shows that North Korea is still a member and it is bound by the obligations contained in the Treaty and to make progress on a complete nuclear disarmament regime.
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Casey-Maslen, Stuart. "The use of nuclear weapons and human rights." International Review of the Red Cross 97, no. 899 (September 2015): 663–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1816383116000096.
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AbstractInternational human rights law is an as-yet underused branch of international law when assessing the legality of nuclear weapons and advocating for their elimination. It offers a far greater range of implementation mechanisms than does international humanitarian law (IHL), and arguably strengthens the protections afforded to civilians and combatants under IHL, particularly in non-international armed conflict. Of particular relevance are the rights to life, to humane treatment, to health and to a healthy environment, associated with the right to a remedy for violations of any human rights.
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Toktobaev, B., and S. Karabalaeva. "Some Aspects of International Treaties Banning the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Their Significance for the Kyrgyz Republic." Bulletin of Science and Practice 7, no. 1 (January 15, 2021): 362–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.33619/2414-2948/62/41.
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The article considers international legal acts regulating the scope of international security law in the field of nuclear weapons, their varieties, analysis of articles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as their significance for the Kyrgyz Republic.
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Glennon, M. J. "Pre-empting Proliferation: International Law, Morality, and Nuclear Weapons." European Journal of International Law 24, no. 1 (February 1, 2013): 109–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chs083.
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Fujita, Hisakazu. "The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of nuclear weapons." International Review of the Red Cross 37, no. 316 (February 1997): 56–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020860400084308.
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The Advisory Opinion handed down by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on 8 July 1996 concerning the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons contains many elements that are of fundamental interest from the standpoint of international humanitarian law. Indeed, humanitarian law, which has developed to a remarkable extent since the Second World War, has always lacked an express ruling on nuclear weapons.
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Furqon, Arimbi Fajari. "USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN HUMANITER LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVE." Indonesian Journal of Multidisciplinary Science 1, no. 9 (June 25, 2022): 1090–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.55324/ijoms.v1i9.165.
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Human life and technological developments are closely related to the legal awareness of the international community. The discovery of nuclear weapons for the first time was by the United States (US). It was used in World War II to attack and bomb the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The incident resulted in the death of 160,000 (one hundred and sixty thousand) people, and damage to almost all the ecosystem. The devastating negative effects resulting from the use of nuclear weapons were then regulated and contradicted the norms outlined in Additional Protocol I of 1977, to the 1949 Geneva Conventions which regulates the methods and methods of war. Although it has been regulated in the 1949 Geneva Conventions (international humanitarian law), however, it turns out that there are still many countries that continue to develop nuclear weapons for reasons of national security. The research method used is a type of normative juridical research and uses a statutory approach and conceptual thinking. The results of the study indicate that the governing norms regarding; research and possession of nuclear weapons are still discriminatory. In practice, there is a distinction between a nuclear state and a non-nuclear state. Furthermore, in the current reality, there are still countries that are classified as not having good intentions to carry out the agenda of disarming and stopping the development of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, according to the results of this study, to overcome these problems, it is necessary to have new legal principles that can be universally binding.
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Haloho, Yunia Utami Indah, Xavier Nugraha, and Atiqoh Farhan Maulani. "Analisis Penerapan No First Use Policy Dalam Penggunaan Senjata Nuklir: Sebuah Tinjauan Yuridis." JURNAL ILMIAH LIVING LAW 12, no. 2 (October 2, 2020): 107. http://dx.doi.org/10.30997/jill.v12i2.2770.
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The preservation of the stability of world peace became one of the wishes of the entire international community. But these expectations seemed to be a sense of concern in the event of a war between countries using nuclear weapons. International law governs the nuclear weapons of international treaties, one of which is the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968. In addition to providing a guarantee of a sense of security was formed No First Use Policy to ensure the country owners of nuclear weapons are not the first party to use nuclear weapons in the event of a conflict with other countries. The purpose of this research is to learn about the implementation of No First Use Policy on the use of nuclear weapons by the countries that have them and the international security of the world. The method used in the study is normative juridical is supported by data obtained by library research. Regarding the implementation of the No First Use Policy each country with nuclear weapons has different attitudes about it. Whereas No First Use Policy has had a positive impact on the arrangement of the use of nuclear weapons of the world for security and order.
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Yeremyan, A., and L. Yeremyan. "International Law Issues of Cyber Defense." Moscow Journal of International Law, no. 2 (July 6, 2022): 85–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/0869-0049-2022-2-85-100.
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INTRODUCTION. The world has many times faced cardinal changes triggered by technological development. Creation of the Internet and the emergence of the artificial intelligence have become the major trend of the ongoing changes with the signifi-cant potential to affect all spheres of live, including the military affairs and the geopolitical phenomena in general. In this paper, in particular, we discuss the opportunities and challenges of the rapid technological development in the defense sector in the context of globalization. The pace and the nature of changes in defense dictate the necessity to analyze the current and future challenges of our digitized age in search of adequate and timely legal and strategic practical solutions. Cyber means of warfare are the weapons of the present. Over the past decades, cyber means of warfare have been frequently used against states in the context of international and non-international armed conflicts, as well as outside of such context. Thus, the fundamental scientific questions that arise are the following: a) are the current legal regulations at international and national levels sufficient to address all the challenges caused by the spillover of armed conflicts into the virtual domain and by the future advancement of cyber weapons, and b) are the current cyber weapons or those of the future capable of changing the nature of “war” described by General Carl von Clausewitz yet in the 19th century as a violent method of forcing its political will by one party of the conflict to the other. We have analyzed the above-mentioned questions in the light of the cyber weapons, which already exist and are being used for military purposes, in the light of possible advancement of cyber weapons and integration of AI into them, as well as in the light of the Big Data management. We have reflected on the dangers, which the smart and entirely data driven world would face, from legal and geopolitical perspectives, through the several possible scenarios of development, emphasizing, in particular, the probable military (defense) aspect of data management. While most frequently the specific problems of application of International Law to the traditional cyber warfare situations become subject for academic debates and discussions, we stress the necessity to also analyze the legal and practical implications of further advancement of cyber weapons, as well as the necessity to consider the role of Big Data management in changing the nature of war and, consequently, also the applicable legal solutions.MATERIALS AND METHODS. The works of academics and international scholars in the field of international law and, specifically, international humanitarian law, and military theorists, as well as international treaties, commentaries to international treaties, and national cyber defense and cyber security strategies comprise the theoretical basis for the current paper. The research has been conducted via general and specific scientific methods of cognition, in particular the dialectical method, comparative legal method, method of interpretation, as well as methods of deduction, induction, analysis, synthesis, and others.RESEARCH RESULTS. The ongoing changes taking place in the world have resulted in a situation, when cyber domain is considered one of the traditional war domains. In this context the international community is now debating more flexible interpretations of international legal regulations in order to most efficiently address the new reality. It is also important that states at national level undertake measures to timely and adequately address the challenges already created and those that potentially may take place as a result of the globalization along with the rapid evolution of the cyber technologies and their military use. In the current article we conclude that the categories of the present generation of cyber weapons are lawful. However, the future developments in cyber weapon technologies, as well as the possible quasi-military implications of Big Data management raise many theoretical and practical questions deserving attention. The efforts of the international community and individual states in the field of legal regulation of cyber technologies should be directed toward creating guarantees that the products of the technological development are used for the benefit of humankind. As one of such measures The Authors indicate national cyber security and cyber defense strategies, which according to the Authors, should be elaborated giving due consideration to the possible future developments.DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. In this paper we analyze the peculiar features of evolution of the world in the 21st century and argue that wars are not static and autonomous phenomena isolated from the global context and all the changes taking place in the world. In particular, we address one of the most popular debates among the scholars in the field of military affairs concerning the issue whether the nature of war has changed or will change overtime, referring to Carl von Clausewitz’s thoughts. With regard to the current generation of cyber weapons, we conclude that even if they might prima facie seem to be inherently indiscriminate (such as, for example, nuclear weapons) in reality cyber weapons are not per se indiscriminate, but rather are weapons with a very high potential of being used indiscriminately or in violation of the principle of discrimination. However, the high potential of indiscriminate use of cyber weapons does not outlaw the cyber weapons as such. We also agree with the widely accepted opinion that the cyber weapons, which are currently used, are sufficiently regulated by the International Law. At the same time, the future tendencies for advancement and improvement of military cyber technologies, inter alia, via integration of artificial intelligence, may seriously call into question the possibility of their application in compliance with the international legal regulations. Finally, the possible scenarios of advancement of Big Data management have led us to the conclusion that big data management per se has the potential of being used as a weapon with less lethal or even non-lethal consequences, however equally effective in enforcing one’s policy as the traditional weapons or potentially kinetic cyber-weapons. If big data analysis at its current stage of development does not produce very accurate predictions, the well-distributed and structured informational flow in the cyber domain is capable of influencing and manipulating behaviours. In such case if Big data monopoly (including both: hardware and soſtware) vests in one of several actor, it could drastically change the nature of war by making the element of violence redundant and consequently alter the geopolitical balance. One of the measures for early response to future challenges, in our opinion, could be through reflecting on lex ferenda in cyber security and cyber defence national strategies. From the analysis of the content of different strategies we could conclude that most states acknowledge cyberspace as a military domain like land, air or maritime, analyse the main specific characteristics of current generation of cyber weapons, and set state objectives and action plan for cyber offense, cyber defense and cyber deterrence respectively. While the future advancement of cyber means of warfare and the quasi-military dimension of the big data management seem to be overlooked by states in general.
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Marauhn, Thilo. "Remarks and Questions by Thilo Marauhn." Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting 116 (2022): 223–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/amp.2023.22.
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It is my pleasure to be with you on this occasion, if only virtually. This year's annual meeting has as an overall theme: “Personalizing International Law.” For this year's closing plenary, we thought of a truly important topic: “International Law Needs People: Humanitarian Arms Control and the Peace Movement.” Nuclear war, whether big or small, would have disastrous consequences for humankind. Nuclear arms control is crucial—not least in light of the humanitarian consequences. Following the failure of nuclear weapon states to implement Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), NGOs and governments of non-nuclear weapon states pushed for the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Given the role of civil society, of individuals, in this process, and given current circumstances, we want to discuss whether there is both a need and an opportunity to enhance international law and increase lawmaking and implementation by leveraging these actors. We will do so against the background of two distinct developments which I will highlight in opening the panel:
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Greenwood, Christopher. "The Advisory Opinion on nuclear weapons and the contribution of the International Court to international humanitarian law." International Review of the Red Cross 37, no. 316 (February 1997): 65–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s002086040008431x.
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The request by the United Nations General Assembly, in resolution 49/75 K (1994), that the International Court give an advisory opinion on the question “Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?” gave the Court an unusual opportunity to consider the principles of international humanitarian law. It is an opportunity which the Court might well have preferred to do without. The question was not well framed and the reasons for asking it were wholly unsatisfactory. In particular, the necessarily abstract nature of the question placed the Court in an exceptionally difficult position, because it could not possibly consider all the combinations of circumstances in which nuclear weapons might be used or their use threatened. Yet unless one takes the position that the use of nuclear weapons is always lawful (which is obvious nonsense), falls wholly outside the law (which no State suggested) or is always unlawful (a view which has had some supporters but which the majority of the Court quite rightly rejected), then the answer to the General Assembly's question would have to depend upon a careful examination of those circumstances.
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Roberts, Adam. "Law, lawyers, and nuclear weapons - Istvan Pogany (ed.), Nuclear Weapons and International Law, Aldershot: Avebury, 1987, xiii + 253 pp. - Istvan Pogany (ed.), Nuclear Weapons and International Law, Aldershot: Avebury, 1987, xiii + 253 pp." Review of International Studies 16, no. 1 (January 1990): 75–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210500112653.
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Thakur, Ramesh. "The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone." India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 44, no. 3-4 (July 1988): 253–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/097492848804400305.
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The pursuit of nuclear non-proliferation has been a major international concern of our times. The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 is of great historical significance for having created the world's first nuclear-free zone (NFZ). Article 5 of the Treaty prohibits any nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste in the Antarctica. The Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967 established the first internationally recognised Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (NWFZ) in a populated region of the world, namely Latin America. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 was an attempt to bring in a global regime to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). States in the latter category can adhere to the NPT while accepting a stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories, as long as they do not exercise jurisdiction and control over the weapons. West Germany is an obvious example of such a country. A NWFZ, however, prohibits such stationing of nuclear weapons. The three essential characteristics of a NWFZ are non-possession, non-deployment and non-use of nuclear weapons. NWFZs can help to strengthen and promote non-proliferation by providing a means of extending and reinforcing the NPT. In fact Article 7 of the latter accepts that, “Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of states to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.” The article merely acknowledged that one such treaty had been negotiated more or less simultaneously with the NPT. The second NFWZ in an inhabited region was not to be established for another eighteen years. At the Sixteenth South Pacific Forum meeting held in Rarotonga, Cook Islands, Forum countries adopted the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty on 6 August 1985 (Hiroshima Day). The Preamble to the treaty expresses the commitment to world peace, a grave concern at the continuing nuclear arms race, the conviction that every country bears an obligation to strive for the elimination of nuclear weapons, a belief in the efficacy of regional arms control measures, and a reaffirmation of the NPT for halting nucleor proliferation. The core NFZ obligations are contained in Articles 3–7. Each party agrees not to manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control—or seek to do so—over any nuclear device; not to assist or encourage others to make or acquire nuclear weapons; to prevent the stationing or testing of nuclear weapons on its territory; not to dump radioactive wastes at sea anywhere in the zone, and to prevent such dumping by others in its territorial sea. Discussions at the United Nations had, by the mid-1970s, identified nine major principles as the guiding elements of a NWFZ: (1) the initiative should come from the countries of the region; (2) the specific provisions of the NWFZ treaty should be negotiated between the regional member states in the form of a multilateral treaty establishing the zone in perpetuity; (5) while adherence to the treaty should be voluntary, the NWFZ must nevertheless embrace all militarily significant states in the region: (4) existing treaty relationships within the zone should not be disturbed; (5) there should be an effective verification system: (6) peaceful nuclear development should be allowed; (7) the zone should hare clearly defined and recognised boundaries; (8) in defining the territory of the zone, members must respect international law, including freedom of the seas and straits used for international navigation and of international airspace; and (9) the NWFZ should have the support of the nuclear-weapon states. Thus the NWFZ concept in established United Nations vocabulary does not prohibit the temporary presence of nuclear vessels during transit or on port calls, and it does not necessarily preclude the acquisition of sensitive nuclear facilities and materials tantamount to having a nuclear-weapon capability or producing untested nuclear bomb components. Nevertheless, it will be useful to follow the UN criteria in order to examine the nature and implications of the South Pacific zone.
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Chung, Tai-uk. "Rawls' Theory of War and Nuclear Weapons: A Comparison with International Law." Wonkwang University Legal Research Institute 39, no. 3 (September 30, 2023): 159–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.22397/wlri.2023.39.3.159.
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This article tries to examine John Rawls’ theories of war and nuclear weapons especially from the perspective of international law. Rawls's theory of war is based on the just war theory of Western tradition. It rejects realism and does not adopt pacifism. Rawls's theory of jus ad bellum is similar to the position of current international law in that it recognizes a war of self-defense and exceptionally a war of humanitarian intervention. HIs theory of jus in bello largely reflects the principles of existing International Humanitarian Law(IHL), such as the distinction between combatants and civilians, protection of human rights, and restrictions on military necessity. However, Rawls deviates from international humanitarian law in that it permits military action against civilians in the case of the so-called supreme emergency. Regarding nuclear weapons, it differs from the existing International Court of Justice (ICJ) theory of nuclear permitting by permitting nuclear weapons only to well-ordered peoples and presenting human rights standards for nuclear use. In addition, by evaluating the Hiroshima-Nagasaki atomic bombings as great wrongs, it presents a precedent in international humanitarian law for the use of nuclear weapons. The official position of the United States regarding the Hiroshima-Nagasaki atomic bombings was that it was a justifiable measure to end the war early. However, Rawls rejects the U.S. government's arguments and says that the atomic bombing was a representative case of the failure of so-called 'statesmanship'. This article attempted to support Rawls's perspective from the perspective of international humanitarian law. The claim that the Hiroshima-Nagasaki atomic bombings were intended to reduce the casualties of U.S. soldiers does not comply with the principle of military necessity under international humanitarian law. Additionally, the claim that it was an inevitable choice to reduce the damage to Japanese civilians that would result from a prolonged war is not valid in that there was room for a third option to end the war. The dropping of the Hiroshima-Nagasaki atomic bombs reflected America's political interest for the victory of unconditional surrender and ending the war before Russia (the former Soviet Union) entered the war. This did not comply with the principles of military necessity or humanitarian necessity of international humanitarian law.
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Slade, Richard, Robert Tickner, and Phoebe Wynn-Pope. "Protecting humanity from the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons: Reframing the debate towards the humanitarian impact." International Review of the Red Cross 97, no. 899 (September 2015): 731–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1816383116000229.
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AbstractThe international community has been struggling to reach agreement on the non-proliferation and elimination of nuclear weapons since they were first used in 1945. Encouragingly, recent global debate has, for the first time, focused on the devastating humanitarian consequences that the use of nuclear weapons will have not only for nuclear weapons States but for all humanity. The fact that the risks and overwhelming humanitarian consequences of a nuclear event are so high, combined with the inability of the global community to adequately respond to the needs of victims, has compelled policy-makers to consider new ways to work towards the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons under international law. This article examines how the “humanitarian initiative” has reframed the nuclear weapons debate away from the traditional realm of State security, deterrence and military utility, and towards the grim reality of the humanitarian impacts that would confront humankind if nuclear weapons were ever used again.
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Muslikhatin, Lilik, Rizal Yusuf, Suhara Golan, Taufiq Shobri, Wildan Akbar H R, Yudhi Murfi, I. Wayan Midhio, and Purnomo Yusgiantoro. "Indonesia's Potential to Build Nuclear Energy in Geopolitical Perspective." Technium Social Sciences Journal 53 (January 9, 2024): 323–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.47577/tssj.v53i1.10436.
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The use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict has become a major focus in today's geopolitical world. With growing tensions between major powers and ongoing regional conflicts, the debate over the use of nuclear weapons is increasingly heated. In the midst of this global context, Indonesia, as an active member of ASEAN which consistently promotes peace and stability in the region, is faced with major challenges related to the use of nuclear weapons in international conflicts. In this context, the research in this journal aims to examine Indonesia's policies in dealing with the use of weapons. nuclear power in a growing international conflict. This research uses the theories of Situational Leadership and Transformational Leadership to understand Indonesia's potential in developing nuclear weapons. The approach used is qualitative involving in-depth interviews, document analysis, and participant observation. A phenomenological approach is used to understand subjective interpretations from the experts' point of view. The Hierarchical Process Analysis (AHP) data processing method is used to analyze data and support decision making. and it was concluded that Indonesia had no interest or intention to develop or produce nuclear weapons. Political factors, international law, and commitment to world peace provide a strong basis for this country in rejecting the option of developing nuclear weapons.
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Amerasinghe, C. F. "Case Analysis: The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the WHO Nuclear Weapons Case: A Critique." Leiden Journal of International Law 10, no. 3 (September 1997): 525–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0922156597000393.
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The World Health Organization (WHO) had, among other things, been examining and deliberating the hazardous effects to health by the use of nuclear weapons. These discussions culminated in a resolution which requested an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons in the following terms: [i]n view of the health and environmental effects, would the use of nuclear weapons by a Stare in war or other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations under international law including the WHO Constitution?
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Chesterman, Simon. "The International Court of Justice, Nuclear Weapons and the Law." Netherlands International Law Review 44, no. 02 (August 1997): 149. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0165070x00004423.
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Arbess, Daniel J. "International Law Revisited: Meeting the Legal Challenge of Nuclear Weapons." Bulletin of Peace Proposals 16, no. 2 (April 1985): 105–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/096701068501600203.
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Barnum, Miriam, and James Lo. "Is the NPT unraveling? Evidence from text analysis of review conference statements." Journal of Peace Research 57, no. 6 (November 2020): 740–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343320960523.
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The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is a landmark international treaty that is widely regarded as a cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, pessimists point to a growing divergence of preferences between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states as a precursor to the impending ‘unraveling of this vital piece of international law’. In this article, we test for evidence of preference divergence using statements from NPT review conferences, which are manifestos presenting each country’s position on the NPT. We measure preferences on the NPT using Wordfish, a method that is frequently used to estimate ideological preferences from election manifestos. Our measure estimates the latent positions of state actors along a ‘non-proliferation vs. disarmament’ dimension, and shows little evidence of growing preference divergence between the nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states. Thus, a significant premise underlying more pessimistic assessments of the NPT appears to be in doubt.
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Les, I. O. "Regulatory and Legal Support of International Nuclear Law." Analytical and Comparative Jurisprudence, no. 6 (December 27, 2023): 687–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.24144/2788-6018.2023.06.118.
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Between the first regulatory and legal development of international nuclear law in 1957 and modern achievements, three main stages of this process can be distinguished.
The first period of development of international nuclear law corresponds to the period of development of nuclear energy and guarantees of its peaceful use by all non-nuclear weapon states. This dual purpose was legally confirmed by the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957 and the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970.
The first stage in the development of international nuclear law was complemented by a second growth phase aimed at increasing collective resilience to the dangers of nuclear energy. The Three Mile Island accident in 1979 and especially the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 triggered intense regulatory activity aimed at preventing nuclear accidents and better managing their consequences on an international scale.
As a result, several international conventions have been adopted in this area: The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.
Unlike the first-generation nuclear nonproliferation treaties, these norms do not violate the essential sovereignty of the states parties. By merging binding provisions and flexible legislation, a cooperative system was created for flexible and decentralized management of nuclear activities on an international scale.
The third stage of the development of international nuclear law, in which we are currently located, is characterized by both negative and positive elements.
On the negative side, there are problems that affect the effectiveness of international nuclear law. The most alarming issue in this area is the independence of nuclear regulatory authorities in several countries, although it is regulated by Article 8 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and Article 20 of the Joint Convention on Nuclear Safety.
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Vakil, Amir Saed. "The Non-Proliferation Treaty in the Mirror of Contemporary International Public Order." Journal of Politics and Law 12, no. 2 (May 30, 2019): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v12n2p1.
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International law is aimed to control self-interest seekers’ behaviors with respect to very universal values which present foundations of the contemporary international community as a whole. The global pluralism may be considered as a product of international public order regulating common interests or needs. Achieving comprehensive results necessitate unified approaches to the most essential issues of international affairs such as non-proliferation of mass destructive nuclear weapons; however, paradoxical treatments in the context of nuclear international co-operations by influencer states show confusing directions against object and purpose of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This paper through reviewing non-proliferation regime as a tool for global governance establishes that universal public policy requires nuclear-weapon states’ compliance from integrity of the Treaty, including disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful use. Therefore, selective approach as well as inconsistency to object and purpose of the treaty weakens the pillars of the international public order consolidated by peremptory norms of international law.
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Clark, Roger S. "Building on Article 8(2)(b)(xx) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Weapons and Methods of Warfare." New Criminal Law Review 12, no. 3 (2009): 366–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/nclr.2009.12.3.366.
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Article 8(2)(b) of the Rome Statute treats as a war crime in international armed conflict the use of poison or poisoned weapons, of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of expanding bullets. Early drafts of the Statute included the use of these forbidden weapons in non-international as well as in international armed conflict. They also included as crimes the use of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons (weapons of mass destruction). Proposals are circulating about revisiting these and other weapons issues at the Review Conference to be held in 2010, or in later reviews. This article examines the history of the negotiations culminating in Rome. It then turns to possibilities for building on the Rome provisions both by expanding the prohibitions to non-international conflict and by adding to the list of prohibited weapons. As well as reconsidering weapons of mass destruction, the author suggests that attention should be given to such items as nondetectable fragments, blinding laser weapons, antipersonnel land mines, and cluster munitions. Ambiguities in the Rome Statute's amendment provisions that affect whether such additions can be made applicable to all parties to the Statute, or only to those who agree specifically to them, are also addressed.
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Luo, Wei. "Research Guide to Export Control and WMD Nonproliferation Law." International Journal of Legal Information 35, no. 3 (2007): 447–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0731126500002468.
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After World War II, the non-proliferation of weapons of massive destruction (WMD) and the export controls of conventional weapons and civilian and military dual use technologies have been one of the most important focal point of international cooperation. Many international treaties have been signed and the international organizations have been established to promote these non-proliferation and export control efforts. The industrialized countries and the developing countries of China, India, and Pakistan that possess nuclear weapons and missile technologies have also enacted domestic laws and set up administrative regimes to control these goods and technologies from flowing to other countries or undesirable people. Among these countries, the United States has been the leader strongly advocating non-proliferation of WMD and export controls of civilian and military dual use goods. In fact, the United States has established a very sophisticated export control system to prevent its weapons and technologies from going to the hands of any adversaries. Because the complicities and overlaps of international treaties and domestic laws on this topic, it warrants a research guide for would-be researchers to walk through the maze of international and domestic export control regimes.
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Gill, Terry. "The Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice and the Fundamental Distinction Between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello." Leiden Journal of International Law 12, no. 3 (September 1999): 613–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s092215659900031x.
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The 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion of the International Court has been both hailed and criticized on various grounds. However, one area, namely the Court's treatment of the distinction between the law regulating the use of force and the humanitarian law of armed conflict, has received relatively little attention. This author is convinced and concerned that the Court's treatment of this issue misconstrued the relationship between these two branches of the law, and in doing so potentially weakened any restraining influence the law of armed conflict might have on the potential use of nuclear weapons.
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Bugnion, François. "The International Committee of the Red Cross and nuclear weapons: From Hiroshima to the dawn of the 21st century." International Review of the Red Cross 87, no. 859 (September 2005): 511–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s181638310018436x.
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AbstractNuclear weapons raise fundamental questions which go to the very heart of international humanitarian law and of Red Cross assistance activities. Sixty years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the author describes the attempts of the International Committee of the Red Cross to deal with these weapons.
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Beaucillon, Charlotte. "Limiting Third States’ Military Activities in the EEZ: ‘Due Regard Obligations’ and the Law on the Use of Force Applied to Nuclear Weapons." International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 34, no. 1 (February 18, 2019): 128–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15718085-12341045.
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Abstract The aim of this article is to contribute to the general analysis of ‘due regard obligations’, through their articulation with branches of international law other than the law of the sea. More specifically, it focuses on the law of military activities at sea, as governed by international law on the use of force and nuclear weapons. It is argued here that the scope of the Law of the Sea Convention’s ‘due regard obligations’ cannot be examined in a vacuum, but should rather, to the extent possible, be interpreted in conformity with other related sources of international law. Reciprocally, this paper shows that some rules of jus ad bellum and jus in bello applicable to the use of nuclear weapons in a third state’s exclusive economic zone, fail to consider other simultaneously applicable obligations, which could well be grasped through the prism of ‘due regard’.