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Humphrey, Patrick. "Campbell's objectivist philosophy : a critical examination of the Philosophy of rhetoric." Virtual Press, 1988. http://liblink.bsu.edu/uhtbin/catkey/539792.
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As several rhetorical scholars have previously critically reviewed works written by philosophers and rhetoricians, and have focused upon their treatment of the concepts of epistemology, ontology, and rhetoric, this study critically examines the epistemology and ontology of George Campbell, eighteenth-century philosopher-rhetorician, and author of the Philosophy of Rhetoric. Campbell's work is interpreted as indicative of an "objectivist" stance consistent with the position of twentieth-century scholars such as Cherwitz and Hikins. This objectivist stance embodies four basic tenets: (1) Reality is certain; (2) Reality is independent; (3) Reality is knowable; and (4) Reality is communicable.Although most authors examining Campbell's philosophy have focused upon external connections between Campbell and other philosophers, this study conducts a critical, textcentered analysis of his work. Every statement deemed relevant as indicative of Campbell's objectivist stance is categorized according to the objectivity tenets; passages either directly refer to these tenets, indirectly suggest them, and/or are unclear, requiring assistance from other sources. The findings, taken as a whole, offer sufficient evidence that Campbell's epistemology and ontology were objective. Significant implications arise from this study, which may increase our understanding concerning Campbell's philosophy, his historical context, and terms used in the modern epistemology debate. Moreover, some difficult passages potentially imply inconsistencies in Campbell's objectivist philosophy; subsequent analysis reduces the threat made to this study's claim. In addition, several scholars have made findings which corraborate this study's claim.<br>Department of Speech Communication
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Mulder, Stacy S. "Objective romanticism : a study of the romantic roots in the objectivist philosophy of Ayn Rand." Virtual Press, 1994. http://liblink.bsu.edu/uhtbin/catkey/902497.
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The purpose of this study was to examine a thesis stating that the fundamental concepts of Romanticism form the basic components of the Objectivist philosophy demonstrated in the works of Ayn Rand. The study reviewed some of the scholarship on the topic of Romanticism, notably that of Morse Peckham and Henry Remak. Analogies were drawn between European and American Romanticism; the nature of romanticism as a developmental morality in relation to principles established by Lawrence Kohlberg was discussed. This study adopted a definition of Romanticism as a state of mind which begins in the individual and involves an entire society in a moral development that renounces the static, embraces the dynamic, and holds humanity at its center.Next examined was the Objectivist philosophy of Ayn Rand. A review of that ethic indicated that Objectivism also is a developmental ethic that holds humanism as its primary tenet. The characteristics of diversity, the creative imagination, growth and change, pride/self-worth/self-knowledge/love, leadership of the mind, and autonomy were found evident in both Objectivism and Romanticism, leading into a blending of the systems into an ethic of objective Romanticism. Such an ethic was examined in the context of Ayn Rand's works and found consistent in its appearance as an epistemology consequent to the progression of an individual or a community toward a level of self-actualization as defined by Abraham Maslow.A review of Rand's aesthetic ethic as presented in The Romantic Manifesto provided support for the romantic roots in Rand's writing. Rand's own premises for the evaluation of a romantic work were found evident in her own writings. It was therefore determined that Ayn Rand's works do indeed blend the components of Romanticism and Objectivism into a moral ethic that relies heavily upon the development of the individual state of mind toward a level of self-actualization in which the "I" becomes the axiom of human existence.<br>Department of English
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Allen, Robin Geoffrey. "'A test for poetry' : an examination of Louis Zukofsky's 'objectivist principles' and poetic practice." Thesis, University of Greenwich, 1985. http://gala.gre.ac.uk/5701/.
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My aim in this thesis is to examine Louis Zukofsky's poetry in relation to his stated objectivist principles using those principles and Zukofsky's unpublished statements as a test for his theory and practice. The first chapter introduces Zukofsky's poetic principles and examines the relationship between his work and Ezra Pound's Imagism. My aim here is to put the origins of Zukofsky's principles into an appropriate context, disputing the idea of the `objectivist' as a temporarily revivified Imagist. Chapter II examines Zukofsky's earliest verse, both umpublished juvenilia and the few early poems retained for publication. These poems all predate the `objectivist' statements and a comparison is made between these poems which anticipate the poet's later technique and those which do not. The chapter culminates in a study of `Poem beginning `The'' as the first identifiably objectivist work. Chapter III is concerned with Zukofsky as editor and critic since it was in this dual role that he first expressed his poetic theory. The principles of this theory are examined in detail here and the relationship between Zukofsky's poetry and criticism closely defined. The fourth chapter examines Zukofsky's shorter poems in the light of the critical framework provided by the `objectivist principles'. Individual poems are closely examined to reveal the `mechanism' of `objectivist' poetry and to facilitate a reading of Zukofsky's long poem `A'. Chapters V and VI are concerned with the two halves of `A'. Attention is given to the poem's detailed composition and to its overall structure and movement. This analysis is guided by the overriding question of the application of `objectivist princples' to a long rather than a short poem. The final chapter reviews Zukofsky's sustained critical idiom in both poetry and prose criticism and concludes that this idiom provides a flexible but principled and consistent framework for his life's work.
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Byle, Nicholas. "Gadamer and Nāgārjuna in Play: Providing a New Anti-Objectivist Foundation for Gadamer’s Interpretive Pluralism with Nāgārjuna’s Help." Scholar Commons, 2010. https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/1584.
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Hans-Georg Gadamer rejects objectivism, the position that an interpreter may come to a single correct truth concerning any particular object, in favor of interpretive pluralism. What is not clear is how Gadamer grounds this position. This ambiguity leaves Gadamer open to multiple objectivist counters, ones which he would not wish to allow. The following argument, using a comparative and analytic approach, takes two concepts, pratītyasamutpāda (interdependence) and śūnyatā (emptiness), as they are deployed by Nāgārjuna to provide Gadamer with this much needed anti-objectivist foundation. Specifically, the new foundation is anti-realist in which interpreters and objects of interpretation are metaphysically empty, or devoid of independent existence, and are ultimately dependent on their “position” in a cultural and historical horizon. If there is no metaphysical object apart from the interpreter’s engagement with it, then there is no stable phenomenon to which objectivists may appeal.
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Ward, Laura Aline. "Objectivity in Feminist Philosophy of Science." Thesis, Virginia Tech, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/36098.
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Feminist philosophy of science has long been considered a fringe element of philosophy of science as a whole. A careful consideration of the treatment of the key concept of objectivity by such philosophical heavyweights as Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper, followed by an analysis of the concept of objectivity with the work of such feminist philosophers of science as Donna Haraway, Lynn Hankinson Nelson, and Sandra Harding, reveals that feminist philosophers of science are not members of some fringe movement of philosophy of science, but rather are doing philosophical work which is both crucial and connected to the work of other, "mainstream" philosophers of science.<br>Master of Arts
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Pinson, James L. "Objective journalism and Ayn Rand's philosophy of objectivism /." free to MU campus, to others for purchase, 1996. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/mo/fullcit?p9821352.
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Haely, Karen Cordrick. "Objectivity in the feminist philosophy of science." Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2003. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1064415629.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2003.<br>Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains viii, 145 p.; also includes graphics. Includes abstract and vita. Advisor: Louise M. Antony, Dept. of Philosophy. Includes bibliographical references (p. 142-145).
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Watkins, George Michael. "A subjectivist's guide to objectivism about colors /." The Ohio State University, 1993. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu148784853136588.
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Thornton, Tim. "Judgement, objectivity and practice : an investigation of the objectivity of empirical judgement." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.319883.
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Goodman, Christopher Peter. "Beyond objectivism and subjectivism : the post-critical philosophy of Michael Polanyi." Thesis, University of Sheffield, 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.299357.
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Barton, Jon. "Warrant and objectivity." Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 2007. http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/1082/.
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Wright's 'Truth and Objectivity' seeks to systematise a variety of anti-realist positions. I argue that many objections to the system are avoided by transposing its talk of truth into talk of warrant. However, a problem remains about debates involving 'direction-of-fit'. Dummett introduced 'anti-realism’ as a philosophical view informed by mathematical intuitionism. Subsequently, the term has been associated with many debates, ancient and modern. 'Truth and Objectivity' proposes that truth admits of different characteristics; these various debates then concern which characteristics truth has, in a given area. This pluralism of truth is at odds with deflationism. I find fault with Wright's argument against deflationism. However, transmission of warrant across the Disquotational Schema suffices to ground Wright's proposal, which survives as a pluralism of classes of warrant. The two main debates concern whether truths are always knowable (Epistemic Constraint) and whether disagreements in an area must be down to some fault of one of those involved (Cognitive Command). I introduce Assertoric Constraint, relating to Epistemic Constraint, where truths cannot outstrip the availability of warrant for their assertion. I solve a structural problem by a comparison with a constitutive analysis of Moore's Paradox. The relativism of blameless disagreement is problematic. Wright's response invokes a sort of ignorance which he calls 'Quandary'. I criticise this before proposing an alternative. I agree with Wright that Dummett's original anti-realism does not belong among the positions which Wright seeks to systematise. However, two candidates show that the proposal suffers a weakness. Wright thinks Expressivism misguided, and implicitly rules out his earlier non-cognitivism about necessity. I argue that Expressivism has promise, and I endorse Wright’s Cautious Man argument for non-cognitivism about necessity; both involve play with 'direction-of-fit'. I conclude that this sort of anti-realist debate needs to be accommodated by the proposal.
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Brewer, Bill. "Objectivity, agency and self-location." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1989. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.303509.
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Carter, Eric Kevin. "Objectivity, Language, and Communication." The Ohio State University, 2011. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1308311590.
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Botchkina, Ekaterin. "Issues in objectivity and mind-dependence." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/107329.
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Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2016.<br>Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.<br>Includes bibliographical references (pages 90-93).<br>Reality and objectivity are often characterized in terms of independence from the mind: the first-pass idea is that what it takes for any particular subject matter to be real and objective is for facts about it to obtain independently of beliefs, linguistic practices, conceptual schemes, and so on. But if we take seriously the possibility that significant realms of reality, including social kinds, judgment-dependent properties, and mental phenomena themselves, stand in various dependence relations to the mental, then this first-pass characterization needs to be significantly revised. In this set of papers, I consider the special questions that metaphysically mind-dependent entities raise for issues of objectivity and realism. In Part 1, 1 substantiate the notion of metaphysical mind-dependence with a taxonomy of the various ways in which entities can stand in metaphysical relations of dependence to mental phenomena. In Part II, I address the question of realism and mind-dependence: I argue that while certain entities stand in relations of significant, direct, and essential dependence on mental activity, they are nevertheless fully real. In making the argument, I elaborate a distinction between enactive and essential dependence on mental phenomena, arguing that both kinds of dependence may obtain without impinging on an entity's reality. In Part III, I address the question of objectivity and mind-dependence: I argue that certain kinds of mind-dependence, in particular, dependence on judgments, have the effect of undermining the objectivity of the relevant domain. One consequence of the view I develop is that the objectivity of a subject matter can come apart from the reality of its associated entities; another is that objectivity is a feature that is relative, rather than absolute, and depends crucially on which perspectives are brought to bear for the purposes of evaluation.<br>by Ekaterina Botchkina.<br>Ph. D.
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Tingley, Edward. "Notes on the objectivity of meaning Gadamerian observations." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 1989. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/5900.
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James, Eric Peter. "Aspects of truth and objectivity in mathematics." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1990. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.314976.
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Schellekens, Anna Elisabeth. "A reasonable objectivism for aesthetic judgments : towards an aesthetic psychology." Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 2003. http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/1056/.
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This doctoral thesis is an examination of the possibility of ascribing objectivity to aesthetic judgements. The aesthetic is viewed in terms of its being a certain kind of relation between the mind and the world; a clear understanding of aesthetic judgements will therefore be capable of telling us something important about both subjects and objects, and the ties between them. In view of this, one of the over-riding aims of this thesis is the promotion of an ‘aesthetic psychology’, a philosophical approach, that is to say, which emphasises the importance of the psychological processes involved in the making of aesthetic judgements. One of the aims of this thesis is to develop a revisionary account of the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity in the domain of value. This revision will undertake to dismantle some of the assumptions implicit in a metaphysical framework which traditionally ascribes objectivity only to judgements about facts, and not to judgements about values and other concerns such as norms and emotions. Further, the thesis examines the intricate ways in which aesthetic properties, the focus of aesthetic judgements, depend on the (emotional and other) responses of the subjects of experience. The particular role played by first-hand experience in the making of aesthetic judgements is among the things critically investigated in the interests of reaching a clearer understanding of the manner in which aesthetic judgements may be objective in the sense of being justifiable. Eventually, a defence is outlined of the view that aesthetic judgements can be supported by good reasons, but not in the same way as ordinary cognitive judgements. Finally, I outline the main tenets of a proposed ‘reasonable objectivism’ for aesthetic judgements, an objectivism grounded on justifying reasons.
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Krehbiel, Matthew D. "Science is as science does : aligning teaching philosophy, objectives, and assessment." Manhattan, Kan. : Kansas State University, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/2097/191.
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Palatnik, Nataliya. "Kant's Science of the Moral World and Moral Objectivity." Thesis, Harvard University, 2015. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:23845444.
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Kant’s Science of the Moral World and Moral Objectivity
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Critics of Kant's moral philosophy often object that it cannot account for moral requirements that are both genuinely objective and contentful. Notwithstanding the long history of this dispute, Kantians have been unable to put these objections to rest. I argue that we can answer these objections and fully understand Kantian moral objectivity only if we consider Kant’s moral philosophy in light of his methodological and architectonic concerns.
My dissertation takes up this task by providing a new account of Kant’s conception of moral theory as a philosophical science: Kant’s moral philosophy, I argue, appropriates the central features of the then revolutionary method of Newtonian natural science for the investigation of practical cognition. Just as Newtonian science begins with a priori (largely mathematical) principles and then gradually "comes down to" particular concrete physics, so too Kantian moral philosophy begins with general a priori moral principles that then gradually translate into a system of particular requirements. The objectivity of the content of our practical thought develops as the background conditions of moral deliberation become progressively more inter-subjectively justifiable. This progress is possible only through co-deliberation and collective action demanded by the duty to make morality fully efficacious in our shared social world, that is, the duty to promote the highest good.
My account highlights the attractiveness of Kant’s conception of the relationship between a priori and empirical aspects of practical thought, between theory and practice, and enables its systematic defense against objections by later German Idealists, particularly by Hegel. I argue that Hegel’s polemic against Kant's account of morality is fundamentally a disagreement about the nature of philosophical science and its method, and adjudicating between their views requires adjudicating the methodological dispute itself. I offer a systematic assessment of the methodological grounds of Hegel’s approach and of his critique of Kant’s moral philosophy. I argue that (1) Hegel’s approach does not, on the whole, present a viable alternative to Kant’s moral theory and (2) Hegel’s challenge can be met, but only by appealing to developmental or genetic aspects of Kant’s conception of moral objectivity grounded in his views on the proper method and form of a philosophical science. I show that these aspects of Kant’s thought, generally overlooked by commentators and Kantian theorists, are indispensable to his moral theory and provide a basis for a fruitful engagement with contemporary issues in moral philosophy, such as questions about the nature and role of imperfect duties.<br>Philosophy
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Strickland, Susan. "Objectivity, perspectivity and difference : issues in feminist epistemology." Thesis, University of Hull, 1993. http://hydra.hull.ac.uk/resources/hull:8103.
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James, Steven Michael. "Triangulation and the Problem of Objectivity." The Ohio State University, 2011. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1316500581.
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McFarland, Kathryn. "Feigning Objectivity: An Overlooked Conversational Strategy in Everyday Disputes." The Ohio State University, 2015. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1426205479.
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Rosenkranz, Sven. "Objectivity and realism : meeting the manifestation challenge." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/14685.
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The anti-realist maintains that all thoughts that we may entertain are thoughts whose truth-values we can in principle come to recognise. The realist refuses to make any such claim about the limits of our thinking. The anti-realist purports to arrive at her position on the basis of considerations which relate to the manifestability of understanding, i.e. the idea that grasp of thoughts must be manifested in linguistic abilities. Thus she argues against the realist that this requirement cannot be met unless truth is understood not to extend beyond what we can know. Turning the tables, I argue that it is the antirealist who cannot vindicate her position on these grounds. Some thoughts are apt for objective truth; their truth cannot be equated with their current assertibility. Our grasp of such thoughts is not yet manifested in our ability to assert or deny sentences. Once we have identified patterns of linguistic usage which display our grasp of such thoughts however, it transpires that there is no reason either to believe that their truth-values can in principle be recognised.
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Wood, Jonathan David. "Kant's theory of objectivity in the #Critique of pure reason'." Thesis, Birkbeck (University of London), 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.309475.
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Garibay, Petersen Cristobal. "Kant on time : self-affection and the constitution of objectivity in transcendental philosophy." Thesis, University of Essex, 2018. http://repository.essex.ac.uk/21752/.
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This dissertation’s contribution consists in providing a novel interpretation of the role time plays in Kant’s transcendental idealism. A significant part of Kant scholarship on the Critiques tends to assume that time, as understood in transcendental philosophy, is solely a formal property of intuition. This assumption has led several commentators to overlook a fundamental feature of transcendental idealism, namely, that in being the most basic form of intuition time is, also, a provider of content in and for experience. In looking attentively at such feature this dissertation shows that time is the activity of the self that grounds the possibility of objectivity and explores the philosophical implications of such an interpretation. In the first Chapter I conduct a comprehensive survey of relevant literature and show that it is impossible to separate general metaphysics from transcendental logic in the context of Kant’s transcendental philosophy without making serious philosophical sacrifices. I then argue, in the second Chapter, that time is not merely a formal property of intuition but is, rather, the fundamental form of intuition and that, even if space is in no way reducible to, or derivable from it, time has nonetheless primacy over space on both logical and ontological grounds. From this I argue that by time, or self-affection, Kant understands the activity of subjectivity that brings about the possibility of relating to objects through the power of imagination. In the third Chapter, I show that such relation is not left wholly undetermined and that, instead, it occurs in accordance with the layout presented by Kant in the Table of Judgments, the Table of Pure Concepts of the Understanding, the Schemata and, importantly, in the System of Principles of the Understanding. I show that only an interpretation that acknowledges the systematicity found in the Analytic section of the Critique of Pure Reason can justify the distinction drawn by Kant between the mathematical and the dynamical and conclude, from that, that time does indeed provide a specific content in and for experience to be found in the Schematism doctrine. Finally, in the fourth Chapter I broaden the philosophical scope and inquire as to whether Kant has the theoretical means to articulate something like an uncategorized schema or time-determination. I conclude that, although in the Critical period Kant can do so only problematically, in the post-Critical period there are means to do so categorically: system, as such, is a time-determination for which the understanding lacks a pure concept.
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Garner, Stephanie. "McDowell's oscillation, objectivity and rationality." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2010. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:716edcdd-3b37-4b12-811c-cf7c3355a779.
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Mind and World is written in a Wittgensteinian spirit. It is a work whose aim is to address a specific philosophical discomfort. John McDowell diagnoses a tension between the urge for what he describes as 'minimal empiricism' and its apparent impossibility. Minimal empiricism is defined as the idea that constraint is exercised on our thought by the world through experience. In his view, minimal empiricism stands in tension with the fact that conceptually unstructured impressions can have no rational bearing on our beliefs and judgements. This tension forces an oscillation between two equally unattractive positions: the Myth of the Given and coherentism. McDowell's aim is to dissolve this apparent tension which he sees as resting on the more basic assumption of a dualism between reason and nature. Through his invocation of 'second nature' he aims to present a naturalised Platonism in which man's occupation of the space of reasons can be seen as an aspect of his animal nature, not as something essentially alien to us. The thesis starts by outlining McDowell's attempt to escape the oscillation he detects between the Myth of the Given and coherentism. In Chapter One, the content of Mind and World is briefly laid out. The underlying dualism of reason and nature on which the oscillation is said to rest is considered and the resources he employs in his attempt to escape it discussed. These resources include his metaphysical rejection of sideways-on accounts of understanding. The second chapter reinforces the first by isolating and defining a number of key concepts in McDowell's picture. The material discussed here is largely drawn from works other than Mind and World. Three key assumptions are isolated: the rejection of sideways-on accounts of understanding, the de re nature of singular thought and the fully conceptual nature of experience. These assumptions are shown to play a pivotal role in his philosophy by considering his work on Aristotle and Descartes. McDowell aims to provide a 'therapeutic dissolution' of the oscillation between the Myth of the Given and coherentism. In order to be successful it must meet (at least) three criteria which emerge from his writings. These criteria are discussed alongside attempts by other philosophers to escape the oscillation that McDowell detects. The third chapter develops, in broad outline, the argument of the thesis. Two lines of thought are traced from the three central elements of McDowell's view identified in the second chapter. The first stems from his rejection of sideways-on accounts of understanding, whilst the second arises from the object-dependence of singular thought. The picture in Mind and World incorporates what Julian Dodd has termed a 'modest identity theory of truth'. Put simply, an identity theory states that facts are true propositions, and the theory is modest if facts are taken to be composed of senses. McDowell himself explicitly accepts that his picture is committed to a modest identity theory, though its exact nature is unclear from his writings. McDowell's semantic externalism appears to provide an account in which singular senses are object-dependent. Thoughts are composed of these senses, and so are dependent on objects in the world for their content. One would expect that facts too (which are true possible thoughts) would be object-dependent. After all they are composed of object-dependent entities, namely senses. Such a position encourages the idea that objects are explanatorily independent of facts. In Kit Fine's terminology, propositions about objects 'ground' propositions about senses. However, this idea stands in tension with McDowell's rejection of sideways-on accounts of understanding. He claims that the world is composed of facts and that reality does not exist beyond the conceptual realm. Such a position suggests that objects exist only derivatively from their role in facts: "objects figure in the world by figuring in facts, which are true thinkables" [McDowell (1999a) p94. My italics]. In other words, that propositions about facts 'ground' propositions about objects. Since 'grounding' is an asymmetric notion, there is a tension in McDowell's picture which needs to be resolved. Chapter Four examines McDowell's Kantian account of objects. Objects are derived from facts. McDowell is not committed to a substantial semantic externalism in which, when we investigate whether our terms have a reference, we look at the world to see whether there is an object corresponding to our sense of the term. Instead, McDowell's semantic externalism is truistic: once a sense appears in a fact, no further questions can be asked about the reference of the term. The sense's figuring in a true possible thought ensures that there is a reference. There can be no sense without reference because objects are derived from facts (which are true possible thoughts). The conception of objects that McDowell offers, however, fails to sustain important common-sense realist intuitions. Looked at as an account of empirical objects (rather than formal objects, such as mathematical ones), there are deficiencies which can be brought out. His account can be challenged on the grounds that it is unable to allow that sapient and sentient environments have a common ontology. The discussion is framed as a dialogue between a common-sense realist and a McDowellian thinker. This provides for responses to the reasoning to be considered at every appropriate point. These responses are, in the end, not sufficient to allow his account to meet the realist intuitions. He has therefore failed to provide an account based on mere reminders of common-sense truisms. His account of objects is revisionary and must be either replaced or defended by positive arguments. The quietist's claim that only negative arguments are needed to defend his position is undermined once the position abandons common-sense realism. In Chapter Five the focus shifts back to the overall argument laid out in Chapter Three. It might be thought that McDowelPs particular conception of objects is a peripheral error. If this were the case, since his basic account has not been shown to abandon common-sense realism, his revisionary conception of objects could simply be dropped. This line of thought is countered. I present the arguments of two commentators to show the strength of my objection. Mark Sainsbury argues that McDowell should not maintain a substantial form of semantic externalism if he stands firm to his rejection of sideways-on accounts of understanding. Ruth Millikan argues that McDowelPs commitment to a substantial form of semantic externalism stands in tension with his account of sense, which is a central element in his rejection of sideways-on accounts of understanding. The tension which concerns these commentators needs to be addressed. The conception of objects considered in Chapter Four is required. It provides McDowell's explanation of how his rejection of sideways-on accounts of understanding is consistent with his semantic externalism. The final chapter concludes the argument of the thesis. It is shown that McDowell's theory (as it stands) fails to meet his therapeutic aspirations. In particular he has failed to meet two of the three therapeutic requirements attributed to him in Chapter Two. His conception of objects is revisionary and his picture does not avoid the appearance of an insurmountable problem in world-directed thoughts. Its failure to provide for common-sense realism means that he can no longer avail himself of the quietist strategy which disavows the need to provide positive arguments for its conclusions. Therapeutic dissatisfaction with his picture is the result. The argument of this thesis is then located within a broader philosophical landscape.
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Dickerson, A. B. "Kant on representation and objectivity /." Cambridge : Cambridge university press, 2004. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb39088471t.
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Pitstick, Christina L. "Egoism the ethical system of Ayn Rand /." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 1997. http://www.tren.com.
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Bernardoni, Joseph. "Knowing nature without mirrors Thomas Kuhn's antirepresentationalist objectivity /." Diss., Connect to the thesis, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10066/3605.
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Kuklok, Allison Sara. "Conceptualism and Objectivity in Locke's Account of Natural Kinds." Thesis, Harvard University, 2013. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:11079.
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Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding is considered by many to be the locus classicus of a number of influential arguments for conventionalism, according to which there are no objective, privileged ways of classifying things in the natural world. In the dissertation I argue that Locke never meant to reject natural kinds. Still, the challenge is to explain how, within a metaphysics that explicitly denies mind-independent essences, we can make sense of a privileged, objective sorting of substances. I argue that we do so by looking to Locke's conception of God as divine architect of created substances.<br>Philosophy
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Fagan, Melinda Bonnie. "Objectivity in practice integrative social epistemology of scientific inquiry /." [Bloomington, Ind.] : Indiana University, 2007. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:3274925.
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, Dept. of History and Philosophy of Science, 2007.<br>Title from PDF t.p. (viewed Nov. 11, 2008). Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-07, Section: A, page: 2974. Adviser: Elisabeth A. Lloyd.
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Ressler, Mark Raymond. "The logic of relative systems /." Connect to thesis, 2009. http://repository.unimelb.edu.au/10187/4295.
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Alton, Aymeric d'. "La critique de l'objectivisme dans la philosophie du droit du XX[e] siècle." Bordeaux 4, 2006. http://www.theses.fr/2006BOR40050.
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La substitution de l'intellect (i. E. La pensée) au réel en tant que sub-jectum, emporte une modification du sens de l'objet. L'objet n'est plus une forme de réalité, mais une forme intentionnelle subjective, étrangère à toute réalité au point de s'y substituer et de produire sa synonymie avec elle. Le monde n'accède alors à la réalité, qu' à l'instant précis où le sujet consent à se le donner comme objet ; l'objectivisme déborde ainsi le réalisme. L'objectivisme juridique consiste dès lors, dans le sillage de cette réduction, à définir la règle de droit et l'existence juridique des choses, non plus selon leur réalité, mais selon les formes objectives que le sujet intellectuel leur impute. Dépassant l'objectivisme juridique et l'abstraction qui le caractérise, la critique vise à restaurer à la racine de l'objectivité du droit, l'expression ontologique initiale du devoir être qui lui fournit son ultime justification. Remontant alors de la nature vers la valeur qu'elle sous-tend, l'intellect découvre, contre toute forme d'interprétation qui identifierait la valeur à son activité, que sa présence au juste et son expression objective constituent en réalité son intime vocation<br>To substitute the intellect (i. E. The mind) with reality as sub-iectum, modifies the meaning of the object. The object no longer arises from reality, and remains a subjective intentional form alien to any kind of reality, to the extent that it produces its synonymy with it. Thus the world only has access to reality at the precise moment when the subject "objectivates" it, only then is it challenged in its reality by the objectivist argument. Subsequently, legal objectivism is, in this way, defining the rule of law and legal existence of things, by objective forms ascribed on them by the intellect. Overcoming legal objectivism, the critical commitment aims to retrieve at the roots of legal objectivity, the genuine ontological expression of the "ought to be" from which the rule of law holds its justification. Coming up from nature to value from which nature holds its intelligibility, intellect unweils, against each form of interpretation which identifies value to intellectual activity, that its presence to justice and its objective expression, are in reality its intimate vocation
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Stein, Sebastian. "The objectivity of freedom : a systematic commentary on the introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2012. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:6b709922-9487-4b90-a2b7-9b63c43b0739.
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The introduction (§§1-33) to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right is the key to the work’s structure, its argumentative strategy and it functions as a foundation for Hegel’s practical philosophy in general. Its explanatory potential is best realised by situating it within the systematic context of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences and the Science of Logic. This interpretative strategy reveals that for Hegel, the true site of agency is ‘the concept’ and that particular individuals and their arbitrary activity are at best the concept’s ‘appearance’. This does not render their activity ‘false’ but describes how willing and freedom are ‘for us’ as self-conscious subjects that confront an external world. For Hegel, ‘true’ freedom in the sense of ‘self-determination to itself’ resides with the universal and singular concept that negatively unites itself with its objectivity to form what he calls the ‘Idea of the will’ or ‘right’. This interpretation contradicts the mainstream of contemporary Hegel scholarship since its proponents either deny the reality of the universal concept as agent or absolutely differentiate between the concept’s activity (subjective action) and its objective reality (norms, institutions). This prevents the interpreter from appreciating that it is Hegel’s concept that is manifest in form of particular willing subjects and their socio-political context. Since most commentators associate ‘activity’ or ‘freedom’ primarily with particular subjects, their notions of freedom are, by Hegel’s standards, either empty and fail to describe actual willing or they fall short of the standard of ‘true freedom’, viz. ‘self-determination to itself’ because their agents’ freedom depends on something that differs from the agents.1 The present commentary argues that such a dilemma can be avoided by an interpretation that attributes agency to Hegel’s concept. By determining itself to be Idea, the universal concept determines itself (as subject) to itself (as object) and rational agency and rational institutions are grasped as aspects of the same entity. This is what Hegel calls the unconditioned Idea of right or ‘objective freedom’.
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Descarreaux, Samuel. "Étude sur l'épistémologie naturalisée de Hermann von Helmholtz et Friedrich-Albert Lange dans la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle et ses analogies argumentaires avec l'épistémologie naturalisée de W.V.O. Quine au XXe siècle." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Université de Lorraine, 2023. https://docnum.univ-lorraine.fr/ulprive/DDOC_T_2023_0288_DESCARREAUX.pdf.
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Cet ouvrage est consacré au kantisme non orthodoxe de Friedrich-Albert Lange (1828-1875) et Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-1894) développé dans la seconde moitié du XIXe qui propose une révision psychophysique de l'épistémologie kantienne. On affirme que ce procédé n'aboutit pas à une réduction psychologique de la connaissance qui aurait pour conséquence d'éliminer une objectivité judicative (contrairement à ce que prétendent plusieurs commentateurs) ; en revanche, ce procédé apporte des modifications significatives aux conditions de possibilité nécessaires et universelles de l'expérience qui légitiment chez Kant une objectivité judicative. On démontre que l'épistémologie développée par ces deux auteurs peut être qualifiée de « naturalisme méthodologique » et partage avec l'épistémologie naturalisée développée au XXe siècle par Willard von Orman Quine (1908-2000) une série de stratégies argumentaires analogues qui expliquent essentiellement « how evidence relates to theory, and in what ways one's theory of nature transcends any available evidence. » (Quine, 1969, 83) Ainsi afin de soutenir qu'il existe une telle épistémologie naturalisée au XIXe siècle, on divise l'ouvrage en trois parties. La première section (chapitres premier et deuxième) introduit le concept de « naturalisme épistémologique » et étudie ses conséquences doctrinales et conceptuelles. La seconde section (chapitres troisième, quatrième et cinquième) argumente que l'inscription de l'épistémologie kantienne dans un cadre conceptuel naturalisé n'implique pas l'élimination d'une réflexion de second ordre sur les raisons qui légitiment une objectivité judicative au profit d'une simple étude des causes psychophysiques de la perception et des jugements qui s'y rapporte. La troisième section (chapitres sixième et septième) est consacrée à la question de l'objectivité des jugements logico-mathématiques et plus particulièrement à leur signification intuitive dans le cadre de l'expérience psychophysique. À partir de ces trois sections, on prétend pouvoir démontrer que l'épistémologie naturalisée de Helmholtz, Lange et Quine mobilise des stratégies argumentaires structurellement analogues malgré des contextes historiques et conceptuels radicalement différents. On retrouve à la fin de chaque section des remarques conclusives comparatives qui mettent en valeur (autant que faire se peut) ces stratégies argumentaires analogues utilisées au XIXe et au XXe siècle<br>This study is dedicated to the psychophysiological revision of Kant's epistemology by Friedrich-Albert Lange (1828-1875) and Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-1894). I assert that this procedure does not lead to a psychological reduction of knowledge, which would eliminate the possibility for a judicative objectivity (contrary to what several commentators claim). On the contrary, this procedure modifies Kant's necessary and universal conditions of possibility of experience to preserve a second-order reflection on the reasons that give objectivity to the judgments of a scientific theory. I demonstrate that the epistemology developed by these two authors can be described as "methodological naturalism" and shares with the naturalized epistemology developed in the twentieth century by Willard von Orman Quine (1908-2000) a series of analogous argumentative strategies that essentially explain "how evidence relates to theory, and in what ways one's theory of nature transcends any available evidence." (Quine, 1969, 83) To argue that such a naturalized epistemology exists in the nineteenth century, we divide the study into three parts. The first section (chapters one and two) introduces the concept of "epistemological naturalism" and examines its doctrinal and conceptual consequences. The second section (chapters three, four and five) argues that placing Kantian epistemology within a naturalized conceptual framework does not imply the elimination of a second-order reflection on the reasons that legitimize a judicative objectivity in favor of a simple study of the psychophysical causes of perception and the judgments that relate to it. The third section (chapters six and seven) is devoted to the question of the objectivity of logical-mathematical judgements, and more specifically to their intuitive significance in psychophysical experience. From these three sections, I demonstrate that the naturalized epistemology of Helmholtz, Lange and Quine mobilizes structurally analogous argumentative strategies despite radically different historical and conceptual contexts. At the end of each section are concluding comparative remarks that highlight (as far as possible) these analogous argumentative strategies used in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
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Lindenlaub, Hans. "The problematic alliance between reconstruction and objectivity in international theory." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/9311.
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This thesis aims to critique three leading advocates of a particular strand of post-positivism, which has become influential in contemporary international theory, and which is characterized by three defining features: the idea that a proper understanding of the world requires taking into account the intrinsically contingent character of that world, which is developed in opposition to the positivist philosophy of science; the attempt to conceptualize the contingent coming about of identities and practices as an ongoing and open process of intersubjective (re-) constitution; and the aim to understand this ongoing intersubjective constitution in a way that excludes normative judgements. The main purpose of the thesis is to point out a tension between these three features. What it argues is that the conceptualization of practices as intersubjectively constituted stands in tension with both the aim to account for the contingent character of these practices and the aim to understand these practices in a way that excludes normative judgements. In particular, the thesis attempts to point out three problems that arise from the combination of these three aims: first, it argues that the notion of intersubjective constitution entails a particular kind of determinism, which undermines the post-positivists' aim to account for the contingent character of practices; second, the thesis argues that this notion inevitably entails a normative stance by the theorist, which undermines the post-positivists' aim to understand intersubjective process of in a way that excludes normative judgements; third, it argues that, in the post-positivist empirical analyses, this normative stance is never defended and, as a result, entails the arbitrary privileging of particular moral attitudes over others. The main implication of this critique suggest the need for a fundamentally different notion of social scientific understanding, which explicitly recognizes and grounds the role of moral judgements. A minor implication is that contemporary cosmopolitan agendas in world politics seem inherently flawed.
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Spoor, Iris P. "Defending Perceptual Objectivism: A Naturalistic Realist Analysis of Aesthetic Properties." University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2017. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1511799160442784.
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Meghani, Zahra Iqbal. "Can medical theories be objective?" Diss., Connect to online resource - MSU authorized users, 2006.
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Duffy, Simon J. "An intuitionist response to moral scepticism : a critique of Mackie's scepticism, and an alternative proposal combining Ross's intuitionism with a Kantian epistemology." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/1724.
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This thesis sets out an argument in defence of moral objectivism. It takes Mackie as the critic of objectivism and it ends by proposing that the best defence of objectivism may be found in what I shall call Kantian intuitionism, which brings together elements of the intuitionism of Ross and a Kantian epistemology. The argument is fundamentally transcendental in form and it proceeds by first setting out what we intuitively believe, rejecting the sceptical attacks on those beliefs, and by then proposing a theory that can legitimize what we already do believe. Chapter One sets out our intuitive understanding of morality: (1) that morality is cognitive, moral beliefs can be true or false; (2) that morality is real, we do not construct it; (3) that morality is rational, we can learn about it by rational investigation; and (4) that morality places us under an absolute constraint. The chapter ends by clarifying the nature of that absolute demand and by arguing that the critical idea within morality is the idea of duty. In Chapter Two Mackie’s sceptical attack on objectivism is examined. Four key arguments are identified: (1) that moral beliefs are relative to bfferent agents; (2) that morality is based upon on non-rational causes; (3) that the idea of moral properties or entities is too queer to be sustainable; and (4) that moral objectivism involves queer epistemological commitments. Essentially all of these arguments are shown to be ambiguous; however it is proposed that Mackie has an underlying epistemological and metaphysical theory, scientific empiricism, which is (a) hostile to objectivism and (b) a theory that many find attractive for reasons that are independent of morality. Chapter Three explores the nature of moral rationality and whether scientific empiricism can use the idea of reflective equilibrium to offer a reasonable account of moral rationality. It concludes that, while reflective equilibrium is a useful account of moral rationality, it cannot be effectively reconciled with scientific empiricism. In order to function effectively as a rational process, reflective equilibrium must be rationally constrained by our moral judgements and our moral principles. Chapter Four begins the process of exploring some alternative epistemologies and argues that the only account that remains true to objectivism and the needs of reflective equilibrium is the account of intuitionism proposed by Ross. However this account can be developed further by drawing upon number of Kantian ideas and using them to supplement Ross ’ s intuitionism. So Chapter Five draws upon a number of Kant's ideas, most notably some key notions from the Critique of Judgement. These ideas are: (1) that we possess a rational will that is subject to the Moral law and determined by practical reason; (2) that we possess a faculty of judgement which enables us to become aware of moral properties and (3) that these two faculties together with the third faculty of thought can function to constitute the moral understanding. Using these ideas the thesis explores whether they can serve to explain how intuitions can be rational and how objectivism can be justified.
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Coletto, Renato. "The legitimacy crisis of science in late-modern philosophy : towards a reformational response / Renato Coletto." Thesis, North-West University, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10394/1124.
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This study investigates the challenges to the legitimacy and authority of scientific research in late modern
philosophy of science. The author suggests that the different challenges to the legitimacy
of science have led to relativism and amount to a crisis. Keeping in mind the positivist
background, he illustrates the legitimacy crisis of science in the period from Popper to the
present. In particular his analysis focuses on the "historical school" (Kuhn, Feyerabend etc.) in
philosophy of science.
The main question of this study is: what are the causes and the nature of the legitimacy crisis
emerging in the contemporary philosophical assessment of science? To answer this question, a
few specific challenges to the legitimacy of science emerging in particular areas are analysed: for
example the difficulties of anchoring scientific certitude to its proper object of study, the loss of
objectivity, growing scepticism about the possibility of communication and scientific progress.
After substantiating the gradual emergence of relativist and sceptical approaches in the abovementioned
areas, this study provides a "diagnosis" aiming at identifying the causes of the crisis.
The humanist ground motive of nature and freedom and the choice of anchoring scientific
certainty either in the subject or in the object of knowledge are considered the main sources of the
crisis. They lead to arbitrary absolutisations of particular aspects of the scientific enterprise and
(in the case of subjectivist approaches) to sceptical approaches to the possibility of scientific
objectivity, communication and progress.
This study also indicates a few possible resources, available in the reformational tradition, to
counteract the legitimacy crisis of science. The main resource indicated in this study is the
recognition of the structural order for reality, which is accessible to scientific analysis,
"constrains" scientific research but also constitutes a common ground for researchers. Other
important resources are the recognition of the link between scientific and pre-scientific
knowledge and the acknowledgment that universality and individuality are traits of everything
that exists.<br>Thesis (Ph.D. (Philosophy))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2007.
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Miller, Jean Anne. "Naturalism & Objectivity: Methods and Meta-methods." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/28329.
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The error statistical account provides a basic account of evidence and inference. Formally, the approach is a re-interpretation of standard frequentist (Fisherian, Neyman-Pearson) statistics. Informally, it gives an account of inductive inference based on arguing from error, an analog of frequentist statistics, which keeps the concept of error probabilities central to the evaluation of inferences and evidence. Error statistical work at present tends to remain distinct from other approaches of naturalism and social epistemology in philosophy of science and, more generally, Science and Technology Studies (STS). My goal is to employ the error statistical program in order to address a number of problems to approaches in philosophy of science, which fall under two broad headings: (1) naturalistic philosophy of science and (2) social epistemology. The naturalistic approaches that I am interested in looking at seek to provide us with an account of scientific and meta-scientific methodologies that will avoid extreme skepticism, relativism and subjectivity and claim to teach us something about scientific inferences and evidence produced by experiments (broadly construed). I argue that these accounts fail to identify a satisfactory program for achieving those goals and; moreover, to the extent that they succeed it is by latching on to the more general principles and arguments from error statistics. In sum, I will apply the basic ideas from error statistics and use them to examine (and improve upon) an area to which they have not yet been applied, namely in assessing and pushing forward these interdisciplinary pursuits involving naturalistic philosophies of science that appeal to cognitive science, psychology, the scientific record and a variety of social epistemologies.<br>Ph. D.
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Logan, Benjamin A. "SELF-RESPECT AND OBJECTIVITY: A CRITIQUE OF RAWLS." UKnowledge, 2016. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/philosophy_etds/10.
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In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls names two conditions as necessary and sufficient for an agent to have self-respect. I argue that Rawls’s two conditions constitute an inadequate understanding of self-respect. Contrary to Rawls, I argue that self-respect requires moral desert, and that self-respect is a distinct concept from self-esteem.
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Gullberg, Ebba. "Objects and objectivity : Alternatives to mathematical realism." Doctoral thesis, Umeå universitet, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier, 2011. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-43692.
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This dissertation is centered around a set of apparently conflicting intuitions that we may have about mathematics. On the one hand, we are inclined to believe that the theorems of mathematics are true. Since many of these theorems are existence assertions, it seems that if we accept them as true, we also commit ourselves to the existence of mathematical objects. On the other hand, mathematical objects are usually thought of as abstract objects that are non-spatiotemporal and causally inert. This makes it difficult to understand how we can have knowledge of them and how they can have any relevance for our mathematical theories. I begin by characterizing a realist position in the philosophy of mathematics and discussing two of the most influential arguments for that kind of view. Next, after highlighting some of the difficulties that realism faces, I look at a few alternative approaches that attempt to account for our mathematical practice without making the assumption that there exist abstract mathematical entities. More specifically, I examine the fictionalist views developed by Hartry Field, Mark Balaguer, and Stephen Yablo, respectively. A common feature of these views is that they accept that mathematics interpreted at face value is committed to the existence of abstract objects. In order to avoid this commitment, they claim that mathematics, when taken at face value, is false. I argue that the fictionalist idea of mathematics as consisting of falsehoods is counter-intuitive and that we should aim for an account that can accommodate both the intuition that mathematics is true and the intuition that the causal inertness of abstract mathematical objects makes them irrelevant to mathematical practice and mathematical knowledge. The solution that I propose is based on Rudolf Carnap's distinction between an internal and an external perspective on existence. I argue that the most reasonable interpretation of the notions of mathematical truth and existence is that they are internal to mathematics and, hence, that mathematical truth cannot be used to draw the conclusion that mathematical objects exist in an external/ontological sense.
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Briggs, Cece Woods. "Psychic objectivity and the Eye of God| Bearing witness to the myth of the apocalypse." Thesis, Pacifica Graduate Institute, 2016. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3746304.
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<p> Exploring the symbolism of the eye alongside the ancient religious concept of the omniscient Eye of God, this dissertation engages in a depth psychological analysis of consciousness, the God-image, and postmodern notions of the apocalypse. By considering all aspects of the eye as represented throughout mythology and religious texts, this study addresses everything from blindness to the comprehensive sight of mystical union. The one-eyed Cyclops, the Eye of Horus, the figure of the many-eyed Argus, and the third eye of the Buddha are examples that elucidate the range of eye types addressed. </p><p> The penetrating image of the eye as it emerges within the unconscious in dreams and visions is given ample consideration through the work of Carl Jung and other prominent depth psychologists. Theories regarding the archetypal dimension of the eye are discussed including Jung’s contention that the eye acts as a regulating principle, or <i>yantra</i> within the psyche, restoring balance in times of psychological chaos, upheaval, and transition. As the nucleus of a psychic mandala, the eye serves as a centering force while simultaneously making its numinous presence clear and felt to the individual ego. Edward Edinger’s contention that the eye marks the ego’s encounter with an overwhelming other is given credence while the difference between a feeling-tone of judgment versus equanimity perceived by the observed is weighed.</p><p> Connecting eye symbolism to the God-image, this dissertation embarks upon an exegesis of the eye in religious texts and challenges the omniscient Eye of God in its traditional projected, sky-bound sense. Arguing for personal responsibility in relation to the God-image, this study advocates for a reengagement with <i>anima mundi</i> or the world soul through the advancement of consciousness on a personal level. The recognition of the immanence of divinity and the need for an earth-based religiosity is emphasized. This study points out that eye symbolism is cropping up with increasing regularity in our current, apocalyptically entranced culture in an effort to jolt us from an unconscious slumber and provide the necessary psychic objectivity required to survive a planetary transformation.</p><p> Keywords: Apocalypse, Consciousness, Depth Psychology, Eye, God-Image, Mythology, Objectivity, Postmodern, Self, Witness</p>
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Phillips, Pamela L. "Beyond Subjective Well-Being." Bowling Green State University / OhioLINK, 2005. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1131386877.
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Konesko, Patrick M. "Constructing a "sense of life" Ayn Rand's Night of January 16th from conception to "disaster" /." Bowling Green, Ohio : Bowling Green State University, 2009. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=bgsu1245105207.
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Edeh, Jude Ndubuisi [Verfasser], and Michael [Akademischer Betreuer] Kühler. "Moral objectivity and the psychology of motivation / Jude Ndubuisi Edeh ; Betreuer: Michael Kühler." Münster : Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Münster, 2019. http://d-nb.info/1195045700/34.
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Grizzard, Jeannine Annette. "Integralism and Objectivism on Forms of the Mind/Body Dichotomy in Western Thought." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2005. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/1.
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This thesis compares philosophers Ken Wilber (Integralism) and Leonard Peikoff (Objectivism), who argue that Western philosophy is saturated with a fallacious mind/body dichotomy, which they trace historically and psychologically. Wilber’s and Peikoff’s agendas, worldviews and starting points are contrasted, specifically, Wilber’s holons, Kosmos model, the Big Three Value Spheres and Peikoff’s metaphysical axioms. Their definitions of consciousness are reviewed, along with their mutual epistemological emphasis on knowledge as contextual. Wilber makes mystical validity claims supported by stages of cognitive development. Discussed attributes of the mind/body dualism are: regression and repression; control versus chaos; hedonism, uniformity and authoritarianism; Subjectivism and Intrinsicism; Ego-agency versus Eco-communion. Both philosophers maintain that each partial strategy collapses into the dysfunctions of the opposite strategy. Their respective models of resolution through integration are presented in conclusion, particularly Wilber’s case for nondual Self-realization.
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Teoli, Roberto. "Myth, the body and wholeness : towards a more holistic conception of education." Thesis, McGill University, 2002. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=29523.
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The literature in education is conspicuously lacking in any meaningful or sustained discussion of the body's role in education. This thesis suggests that body and mind do not mutually exclude one another but rather, they are the two aspects that, together, form the whole person. Paradox is a key concept here because it offers a vision of reality that brings together "apparent opposites" into a tensed relationship thereby creating a framework that allows for the integration of body and mind into a cohesive whole. This thesis argues that myth is an expression of humankind's paradoxical nature, and that the hero myth, in particular, points to a path that leads to the embodiment of paradox, and thus to wholeness. This, however, requires a journey into the depths of the body in order to get in touch with the body and the entire range of its feelings. It is further argued that this process reconnects us to our body. To embody paradox, therefore, signifies the integration of body and mind into a unified whole. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)
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Sonnemaker, Tyler. "Objectivity and the Role of Journalism in Democratic Societies." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2015. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1057.
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In this essay, I argue that the institution of journalism plays a vital role in informing citizens of a deliberative democratic society, and that to effectively fulfill this role, journalists must report the news objectively. I first examine the historical evolution of objectivity as it pertains to journalism. Then, I elaborate on some of the philosophical concepts that provide the foundation for objectivity. Next, I introduce John Rawls’ idea of public reason, which provides an improved understanding of the role of journalism within a democratic society. I claim from this that journalism must re-envision its role as guardian of the public political forum. Finally, I bring these various discussions together by drawing in the requirements that Stephen Ward lays out in his theory of pragmatic objectivity, and argue that these are necessary to help journalism legitimize its authority to safeguard this forum. In doing so, journalism can ensure both that citizens are objectively informed and that the public forum offers them a sphere in which they can effectively participate in the governance of their democracy.