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1
Thompson, Paul. "The Natal Militia: Defence of the Colony, 1893–1910." Journal of Natal and Zulu History 29, no. 1 (January 2011): 20–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02590123.2011.11964164.
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Bolte, Brandon. "The Puzzle of Militia Containment in Civil War." International Studies Quarterly 65, no. 1 (January 21, 2021): 250–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqab001.
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Abstract In most contemporary civil wars, governments collude with non-state militias as part of their counterinsurgent strategy. However, governments also restrict the capabilities of their militia allies despite the adverse consequences this may have on their overall counterinsurgent capabilities. Why do governments contain their militia allies while also fighting a rebellion? I argue that variation in militia containment during a civil war is the outcome of a bargaining process over future bargaining power between security or profit-seeking militias and states with time-inconsistent preferences. Strong states and states facing weak rebellions cannot credibly commit to not suppressing their militias, and militias with sufficient capabilities to act independently cannot credibly commit to not betraying the state. States with limited political reach and those facing strong rebellions, however, must retain militia support, which opens a “window of opportunity” for militias to augment their independent capabilities and future bargaining power. Using new data on pro-government militia containment and case illustrations of the Janjaweed in Sudan and Civil Defense Patrols in Guatemala, I find evidence consistent with these claims. Future work must continue to incorporate the agency of militias when studying armed politics, since these bargaining interactions constitute a fundamental yet undertheorized characteristic of war-torn states.
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Aliyev, Huseyn. "Strong militias, weak states and armed violence: Towards a theory of ‘state-parallel’ paramilitaries." Security Dialogue 47, no. 6 (November 4, 2016): 498–516. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0967010616669900.
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This article challenges the well-established presentation within conflict studies of paramilitary organizations as state-manipulated death squads or self-defence groups, and argues that some present-day militias extend their functions well beyond the role of shadowy pro-regime enforcers. Drawing its empirical insights from Ukrainian pro-government volunteer battalions and supporting its findings with empirical observations from other parts of the world, the article posits that the rise of powerful militia organizations acting in parallel with the state makes it imperative to revisit the theory and typology of paramilitary violence. The key theoretical argument of the article is that ‘state-parallel’ militias differ qualitatively from the ‘state-manipulated’ paramilitaries that are typical of the Cold War period. The article shows that although ‘state-parallel’ paramilitaries are not a new phenomenon, they have thus far remained critically understudied and undertheorized.
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Cai, Yuan. "The Chinese Legionaries at the Western Frontier: The Military Role of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, 1960-1975." Journal of Chinese Military History 1, no. 1 (2012): 61–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/221274512x651651.
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Abstract The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) is an important paramilitary organization in Xinjiang with the mandate of checking the Uyghur independence movement. However, in the past the XPCC also played an important military role as a strategic reserve force for the defence of Xinjiang, especially during the period of Sino-Soviet confrontation. This paper examines available documentary and archival materials on the national defence role played by the XPCC during the height of the Sino-Soviet split, especially with reference to the XPCC militia and frontier farms.
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Hoffman, D. "The meaning of a militia: Understanding the civil defence forces of Sierra Leone." African Affairs 106, no. 425 (October 1, 2007): 639–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adm054.
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Harnischfeger, Johannes. "The Bakassi Boys: fighting crime in Nigeria." Journal of Modern African Studies 41, no. 1 (March 2003): 23–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x02004135.
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Nigeria's police and judiciary have failed to protect its citizens and have therefore lost all credibility. European principles of justice have likewise become discredited. Militias like the Bakassi Boys offer a popular alternative, which includes public executions and the use of the occult in fighting evil. But the growing fear of crime is only one reason why ‘jungle justice’ may spread. Governors and influential politicians help finance armed vigilante groups, and may make use of young men with machetes and pump-action shotguns to intimidate political opponents. As an ethnic militia that is ready to defend the interests of the ‘Igbo nation’, the Bakassi Boys have also been used to kill members of other ethnic groups. In many parts of Nigeria, ethnic and religious communities are preparing for ‘self-defence’, because they have no trust in the ability of democratic institutions to settle their conflicts.
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Obert, Jonathan, and Elias Schultz. "Right Wing Militias, Guns, and the Technics of State Power." Law, Culture and the Humanities 16, no. 2 (May 6, 2017): 236–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1743872117708851.
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Drawing inspiration from Lewis Mumford’s classic analysis of the “technics” of political organization, this article explores ways in which anti-government militias and like-minded groups frame the civic role of dissent in technological terms. For militia activists, guns are tangible artifacts that uniquely align existing social practices with an important historical tradition, enhance agency, and provide interpretive finality, while militias serve to help embed that protection and defense with participation in an organic, empowering community. To members, these participatory technics provide a seemingly democratic counter to the authoritarian logic of the federal government.
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Gale, Monica R. "Propertius 2.7: Militia Amoris and the Ironies of Elegy." Journal of Roman Studies 87 (November 1997): 77–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/301370.
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Criticism of Propertius 2.7 has usually centred around the elegy's role as evidence for the poets's attitude towards Augustus. Treated as such, it has been used to support a surprising variety of conclusions. For Stahl and Lyne the poem represents a courageous defence of individualism under a repressive and intolerant regime. At the other end of the spectrum, Cairns has tried to show that the poet's deliberate presentation of himself as ‘a morally tainted individual’ undercuts his argument to such an extent that the poem is effectively an endorsement of the legislation which it purports to attack. Between these two extremes, Baker detects ‘a cautious blend of levity and gravity’ and suggests that, while emphasizing the value of amor, the elegy hints at a tension between Propertius' personal inclinations and the demands of others or his own sense of duty; Boucher, who believes that Propertius is generally pro-Augustan, reads 2.7 as an open and straightforward critique of the princeps' attempts at moral reform, which, by its very openness, militates against the reading of subtle irony into apparently patriotic elegies such as 3.11 and 4.6; and Camps speaks of ‘a certain extravagance, even shrillness, in the manner in which Propertius expresses his defiance of ordinary Roman values’ which ‘may reflect tensions within the poet himself’. More recently, Cloud has argued that Propertius has simply used the marriage law as a peg on which to hang his working out of a collection of Hellenistic erotic topoi, and that the poem cannot be read as a serious statement of opposition to the princeps.
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Vlassenroot, Koen, and Frank Van Acker. "War as Exit from Exclusion? The Formation of Mayi-Mayi Militias in Eastern Congo." Afrika Focus 17, no. 1-2 (February 11, 2001): 51–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2031356x-0170102004.
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War as Exit from Exclusion? The Formation of Mayi-Mayi Militias in Eastern Congo In eastern Congo scores of young and marginalized people have been increasingly attracted to the mobilising efforts of new local actors. The inquiry into this phenomenon traces the emergence of the first militias to the end of the eighties. These first generation militias were a result of the growing willingness of marginalized youngsters and school drop-outs to form groups of under-aged combatants acting against every representative of modern political authority and against their desperate feelings of exclusion, for which both their political and social environment were held responsible. As they had nothing more to lose than their marginalization, rebellion became an option, both as a survival strategy and as a strategy of self-defence against a predatory political and social order. The shiftiness of their ideological basis and allies only further proved what these first militias were about: a search for alternatives to a situation of acute deprivation. This article reveals that the present RCD rebellion that rages through the eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo has had an escalating effect on the proliferation of new militias. Before, the Kabila-led AFDL rebellion had already offered the already existing militias a new cause: that of an anti-Tutsi force fighting against foreign occupation. In resistance to the effects of state collapse and armed foreign interventions, rural and urban youth today have combined former traditions and newly developed patterns of mobility in an interpretation of customary and national defence. This has not meant that they link up with the traditional emanations of authority. Rather, a crisis in the social fabric has meant a shift in authority towards these combatants and the use of violence. In addition, shared feelings of antipathy towards the ‘Tutsi-aggressors’ have facilitated the creation of links between these diverse local groupings and other, foreign, factions of armed militia roaming the local countryside. Consolidation, however, remains unlikely as this shared ideology does not run very deep and alliances continuously change. The question remains what the future impact of these militias might be on the local social order. On the one hand, for several years now in some remote areas these armed groupings have become the only representatives of any authority structure, even if this structure is based on violence. Contrary to other cases, these militias in South Kivu are still closely linked to the rural population and have not turned against them. On the other hand, the dynamic of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue has forced their leaders to present their grievances to the outside world.
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Christensen, Mark, and Matthew Restall. "Maya militia: the defense and government of colonial Ixil, Yucatan." Colonial Latin American Review 29, no. 1 (January 2, 2020): 73–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10609164.2020.1733866.
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Mendle, Michael. "The Great Council of Parliament and the First Ordinances: The Constitutional Theory of the Civil War." Journal of British Studies 31, no. 2 (April 1992): 133–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/386001.
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In the militia ordinance of March 5, 1642, the houses of Parliament declared an emergency and “ordained” a solution. The emergency was the “imminent Danger” posed to king, Parliament, and kingdom by the “Rebellion and Insurrections” of “Papists, and other ill-affected Persons.” The solution was the selection of suitable county lieutenants, who were authorized to appoint deputies and officers and otherwise perform their duties.Charles rejected the ordinance, ensuring a double confrontation: an arms race and the public exchanges known as the “war of words.” The Civil War—the predictable outcome of the rattling of words and swords—was bound intimately to the defense or attack of the three propositions stated or implied by the militia ordinance: that there was an emergency, that to address it the two houses required control of the militia, and that an “ordinance” was the appropriate constitutional strategy for the occasion.The third matter is the focus of this study. But the genius of the militia ordinance and, more generally, the central constitutional assertion of the two houses on the eve of civil war was that the emergency, the mobilization of force, and the ordinance were intertwined beyond untangling. It was not merely that the militia ordinance was a response to an emergency situation beyond the reach of exact precedent. It was equally true that the constitutional thinking of parliamentary leaders, developed well before the militia ordinance and the train of events to which it specifically refers (the Irish rebellion of October 1641 and the attempt upon the five members of January 1642), more or less obliged them to produce an emergency as the grounds for the type of action they took.
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Bateson, Regina. "The socialization of civilians and militia members." Journal of Peace Research 54, no. 5 (September 2017): 634–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343317721812.
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When the Guatemalan civil war ended in 1996, the Peace Accords required the demobilization of the civil patrols. Yet, nearly two decades after the end of the war, the ex-patrollers remain organized and active. At first glance, the persistence of Guatemala’s civil patrols sounds like a triumph of socialization: the men enrolled in the civil patrols were effectively socialized during the war, so they continue patrolling today. This argument is seductively simple, but it is incorrect. Using process tracing to analyze historical documents and interviews with former civil patrollers, I show that the military did not succeed in socializing most of its patrollers. The military was, however, remarkably successful at socializing civilians in conflict zones. After enduring a ferocious scorched earth campaign followed by re-education, civilians either learned to fear and comply with the military and the civil patrols, or they internalized the military-promulgated narrative that repression is necessary to guarantee security. Both these outcomes facilitate patrolling in postwar Guatemala, where many civilians in war-affected areas either embrace or tolerate extralegal security patrolling as a means of preventing crime from spreading to their communities. Theoretically, the case of Guatemala’s civil patrols expands our knowledge of socialization in militias and civil defense forces. Mass socialization of group members is not necessary for an armed group to retain its influence in the long term, even after a conflict has ended. Additionally, socialization occurs not just within groups, but also dynamically and interactively across group boundaries. To fully understand the trajectories of armed groups, it is important to analyze both socialization within armed groups and the socialization of the broader civilian population.
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Stapleton, Timothy. "TThe Creation and Early Development of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) 1980-93." Revista Tempo e Argumento 13, no. 32 (April 30, 2021): e0104. http://dx.doi.org/10.5965/2175180313322021e0104.
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Given the 2017 coup in Zimbabwe, a rare event in Southern Africa but sadly common in the rest of the continent, this paper discusses the beginnings of the politicization of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) during the 1980s. At the end of the country’s war for independence in 1980, the ZDF formed as an amalgamation of former Rhodesian state military personnel and insurgents from the liberation movements of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Personnel from ZANU came to dominate Zimbabwe’s new military given the lack of a specific agreement over the integration process, their numerical superiority, and ZANU’s electoral success that gave it political power. During the ZDF integration exercise of the early 1980s, British advisors attempted to create a Western-style force but acted pragmatically while North Korean instructors helped create an overtly ZANU affiliated brigade and party militia. In addition, South African destabilization and the rapid departure of former Rhodesian officers gave way to the accelerated promotion of former insurgents mostly affiliated with the ZANU government. Lastly, the further ZANU-ization of the ZDF occurred within the context of operations in southwestern Zimbabwe where it eliminated ZAPU as an opposition political movement and committed atrocities, and in Mozambique where Zimbabwean troops cooperated with allies from overtly politicized armies of neighboring states
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Armstrong, Robert. "The Militia in Eighteenth-Century Ireland: In Defence of the Protestant Interest. By Neal Garnham. Boydell. 2012. x + 198pp. £65.00." History 98, no. 331 (July 2013): 456–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-229x.12017_20.
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Santoni, Pedro. "The Failure of Mobilization: The Civic Militia of Mexico in 1846." Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 12, no. 2 (1996): 169–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1051843.
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Durante la guerra con los Estados Unidos, varios líderes mexicanos procuraron organizar una milicia cívica que tomara las armas en defensa de la patria. Sin embargo, el esfuerzo de armar a la ciudadanía en 1846 fue un fracaso completo. Este estudio examina los obstáculos que dificultaron la formación de una milicia poderosa. La falta de organización de la milicia cívica fue otro elemento que hizo estragos en el intento de defensa nacional.
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Abelsen, Peter. "Irony and Purity: Mishima." Modern Asian Studies 30, no. 3 (July 1996): 651–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x00016632.
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Tokyo: 25 November 1970, midday. The parade ground of the Self Defence Force's Ichigaya garrison was crowded with personnel. All looked up at the balcony of the main hall, knowing that in the adjoining room the commandant had been taken hostage. On the parapet of the balcony stood one captor, dressed in a brown uniform and donning a headband with an ancient samurai motto, shichishōhōkoku (‘serve the nation for seven lives’). He was Mishima Yukio, the famous writer and founder of a militia named Tatenokai (Shield Society). Hardly able to make himself heard through the wail of sirens and the jeers from the crowd, Mishima held a speech in which he called the constitutional curtailment of the military a threat to Japan's culture. Nothing new, as he had been flirting openly with the extreme right for years. His plea to the men below to follow him in a revolt was greeted with howls of derision.
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McCORMACK, MATTHEW. "CITIZENSHIP, NATIONHOOD, AND MASCULINITY IN THE AFFAIR OF THE HANOVERIAN SOLDIER, 1756." Historical Journal 49, no. 4 (November 24, 2006): 971–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x0600570x.
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This article explores mid-Georgian debates about the nature of citizenship by focusing on a key political scandal that has hitherto been overlooked by modern historians. In 1756, one of the many Hanoverian soldiers who were stationed in England was arrested for theft in Maidstone. The subsequent efforts to release him on the part of his military superiors and the British government created a political controversy that highlighted issues such as legal liberty, the abuse of executive power, home defence policy, and the moral state of the nation. In particular, this article argues that the furore gave weight to contemporary calls to reform the militia, not so much for instrumental military reasons, but for the supposed social and political benefits of an organization that relied upon the patriotic zeal and masculine virtue of the indigenous citizen. This article is therefore a contribution to the new cultural histories of politics that emphasize the roles of nation and gender in conceptions of citizenship, and argues that the Seven Years War was in this respect a moment of crucial importance.
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Graham, A. "Ireland and Empire, 1692-1770, by Charles Ivar McGrath * The Militia in Eighteenth-Century Ireland: In Defence of the Protestant Interest, by Neal Garnham." English Historical Review 128, no. 535 (November 27, 2013): 1586–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ehr/cet302.
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Gridnev, Valery. "Feat of the Leningrad Militia in Defense of the City on Neva (1941-1944)." Administrative consulting, no. 2 (2018): 100–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.22394/1726-1139-2018-2-100-107.
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Cohen, Stuart A. "Small states and their armies: Restructuring the militia framework of the Israel defense force." Journal of Strategic Studies 18, no. 4 (December 1995): 78–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402399508437620.
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Cooney, Jerry W. "Dubious Loyalty: The Paraguayan Struggle for the Parana Frontier, 1767-1777." Americas 55, no. 4 (April 1999): 561–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1008321.
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For nearly three centuries, the vecinos of colonial Paraguay defended Spanish interests in the Upper Plata. Turbulent as they were, protesting with violent regularity against unpopular governors and official policies, these “hijos del país” have traditionally been portrayed as the bedrock from which the Paraguayan people and identity sprang. Offspring of the Spanish conquerors of the 1500s and their guaraní consorts, the “mancebos de la tierra,” possessed the full rights of Europeans. They guarded their noble status jealously, while dominating the rural society of the province. With the passage of time their numbers increased, providing the manpower for Paraguay's eighteenth century frontier expansion. In the course of Paraguay's colonial development, vecinos bore the brunt of the militia defense of the province, “a su costa y minsión,” in an unrelenting struggle against nomadic Indians and the putative designs of neighboring Lusitanians.
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Konings, Piet. "University Students' Revolt, Ethnic Militia, and Violence during Political Liberalization in Cameroon." African Studies Review 45, no. 2 (September 2002): 179–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0002020600031486.
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Abstract:The political liberalization process in Cameroon was marked by protracted strike actions on the campus of the University of Yaounde during the period 1990–96. Political liberalization provided space for students to organize and voice their multiple grievances about the poor living and study conditions on campus as well as the process of “institutional liberalization,” which blocked their pursuit of upward mobility. The unprecedented degree of violence that accompanied the protracted strikes may be attributed not only to the persistent refusal of the university authorities and the regime to enter into any meaningful form of dialogue with the students, but also to the internal divisions among the students along party and ethnoregional lines. The mayor lines of division were between two groups: the “stranger” students organized in the Students' Parliament and closely allied to the radical opposition; and the “autochthonous” Beti students organized in the Committee for Self-Defense and the Beti milida and closely allied to the regime in power. In their fight with Parliament, the latter groups resorted to violent forms of ethnic exclusion to reestablish control over what they considered to be their university and to maintain their regime in power.
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Tobin, John P. "Observations on the mental health of a civilian population living under long-term hostilities." Psychiatric Bulletin 24, no. 2 (February 2000): 69–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1192/pb.24.2.69.
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The civilian population of southern Lebanon has endured military conflict, civil war, and two invasions since the foundation of the State of Israel in 1948. Currently part of the south is under Israeli occupation forming a buffer zone between Israel and the hostile forces of the Hizbollah and Amal militias. The Israeli Defence Forces are aided by the South Lebanese Army which is the remnants of a Christian militia. The Hizbollah is supported by Iran and Syria and is the dominant force outside the occupation zone. In the south of Lebanon there is a United Nations mandate force which is attempting to return Lebanese government control over the south, decrease hostilities, protect the civilian population and provide humanitarian aid. This is part of the humanitarian mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) that I had the opportunity to observe and to treat the mental health problems of the civilian population who were living under long-term artillery bombardment and living with continuous fluctuating conflict. Under such circumstances, rigorous scientific methodology in assessing the mental health of the population is extremely difficult. In order to operate effectively, as well as my own rudimentary Arabic, a translator was required. A translator does more than just translate language they also translate custom, culture and provide a valuable source of local information. Utilising my own observations and those of my valued translator, Basima, I did my best to assess how the civilian population coped with what was difficult circumstances. These assessments are value laden and I suppose are in many ways personal. My position as a military psychiatrist in the United Nations allowed me access to both the occupation zone and unoccupied Lebanon.
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Bartlett, Thomas. "The militia in eighteenth-century Ireland: in defence of the Protestant interest. By Neal Garnham. Pp x, 198.Woodbridge, Suffolk: The Boydell Press. 2012. £65." Irish Historical Studies 38, no. 151 (May 2013): 535–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021121400001693.
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Parsons, John. "Border Militias." Journal of Extreme Anthropology 4, no. 1 (March 7, 2020): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.5617/jea.7350.
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Narratives of security and threat are continually used to justify morally contentious activities. In the past three years, the United States’ government has increasingly promoted narratives of “criminal migrants” and “immigrant invasions.” In response to perceived threats, the US-Mexico border has undergone a process of militarization. During this time, various border militias have continued to operate along the southern US border. My research was conducted over 11 months with two militias operating on the US-Mexico border I have labeled Border Watch. This militia provides a snippet of how morality is operationalized in the legitimization of actions and how morality is intrinsically linked to security in the lived experiences of its volunteers. In this article, I argue that the volunteers make sense of their experiences away from the border through the narrative espoused by the US government. The resonance between experience and narrative defines the latter as truth and the ability to dismiss counter-narratives. For the volunteers of Border Watch who adhere to a notion of citizenship through the lens of the citizen-soldier ideal, the narrative delivers a moral imperative to act in defense of the nation. Within the nexus of danger, security, and morality, the volunteers of Border Watch conceptualize their project as one in which moral citizens protect the nation and its citizens from an evil Other.
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Armstrong, Gary, and James Rosbrook-Thompson. "Terrorizing defences: Sport in the Liberian civil conflict." International Review for the Sociology of Sport 47, no. 3 (February 3, 2012): 358–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1012690211433480.
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The democratically elected President of Liberia was between 1997 and 2004 also the country’s ‘Chief Patron of Sport’. Enjoying tennis more than team games, the one-time President, Charles Taylor, realized that the electorate’s enthusiasm for the game of football meant that the game could be a useful vehicle with which to associate. As well as funding the salaries of the national ‘Lone Star’ football team, Taylor also sponsored a football team in the national league drawn from his personal militia known as the ‘Anti-Terrorist Unit’ (ATU). Prone to random murder by night, the same players, out of their recognizable uniform and in match kit, respected the rules of the game and the position of the referee. Others seeking the same sporting enjoyment were, when on the field of play in 2003, captured and forced to join the Presidential militia when rebel forces sought to overthrow Taylor. Players of another team – mainly children – were killed mid-match when a rocket-propelled grenade – origins contested – landed in their midst. The Liberian nation’s most famous citizen and one-time FIFA World Footballer of the Year, George Weah, twice fled the country in terror, once when threatened by the forces of the President, and again years later when an angry mob of irate football supporters blamed him for their national football team’s failure to qualify for the World Cup Finals. There was no shortage of incidents in Liberia in the aforementioned years that could be classed as ‘terrorist’ and indeed terrifying; sporting practice at times exemplified the alternatives available to conflict, yet at other times it accentuated the fault lines in what BBC political journalist Fergal Keane famously called Africa’s ‘basket case’.
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RAMET, SABRINA P. "Vladko Maček and the Croatian Peasant Defence in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia." Contemporary European History 16, no. 2 (May 2007): 215–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0960777307003803.
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AbstractIn the years 1936–41, the Croatian Peasant Party, led by Vladko Maček, operated two militias – the Croatian Peasant Defence (HSZ) in the villages and the Croatian Civil Defence in the cities. The HSZ was intended to protect Croatian peasants from attacks by Serb Chetniks as well as by communists, and was thus itself a symptom of the lawlessness prevailing in the interwar Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The HSZ also formed part of Maček's efforts to compete with the fascistic Ustaša movement, an armed organization behind the so-called ‘Velebit uprising’ of 1932.
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Watt, Timothy D. "The Militia in Eighteenth-Century Ireland: In Defence of the Protestant Interest. By NealGarnham. Woodbridge: Boydell. 2012. 208 p. £75 (hb). ISBN 978-1-84383-724-4." Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies 40, no. 2 (May 9, 2017): 311–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1754-0208.12437.
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Gana, Modu Lawan. "STRATEGY OF CIVILIAN JOINT TASK FORCE MILITIA IN COMBATING BOKO HARAM IN NORTHERN NIGERIA." International Journal of Legal Studies ( IJOLS ) 7, no. 1 (June 30, 2020): 345–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.3126.
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Since 2013, the northern region of Nigeria has witnessed the unprecedented mobilization of militia group Civilian Joint Task Force to aid combating the Islamic fundamentalist Boko Haram. The participation of the militia was reportedly successful in routing the insurgent. Before the CJTF, Boko Haram defied most of the counterinsurgency measures of the government including the military and the political approaches. However, despite the successes of the CJTF, the strategy that influences the successes was not adequately known. This article, therefore, investigated the strategy of the CJTF that influences its successes. The study was conducted using a qualitative method designed in a case study. Data were collected from thirteen informants through in-depth interviews supported by non-participant observation. The finding shows that CJTF is a kind of informal self-defense group that emerged in response to the inadequate protections by the State. The combating successes of the group were influenced by the information-centric approach of its campaign. Careful intelligence gathering and procession along with the sociocultural linkage of the participants and in-depth knowledge over the physical terrain emerged influential to the groups’ combating. The article recommended that the Nigerian government should re-strategize its existing conventional counterinsurgency approach to adapt to the population-centric paradigm. The government should also adopt palliative measures of promoting sustainable counter-insurgency that should focus on inclusive governance, accountability, and addressing socio-economic issues of poverty and unemployment with all levels of seriousness rather than sticking to the security-only campaign.
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Bermúdez-Hernández, Jonathan, Karen Cristina Hormecheas-Tapia, Eliana María Villa-Enciso, Óscar Fernando Castellanos-Domínguez, Claudia Nelcy Jiménez-Hernández, and Breyner Jiménez-Navia. "Rol de la gestión de la tecnología e innovación en las instituciones militares en escenarios de posacuerdo: Caso Colombiano / Role of the Management of Technology and Innovation in Military Institutions in Post-Agreement Scenarios: Colombian Case." Revista Internacional de Ciencias Sociales 8, no. 1 (March 20, 2019): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.37467/gka-revsocial.v8.2044.
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ABSTRACTIn the military institutions the help is to increase the capacities to reap the strategic advantages to achieve my objectives as the defence of a nation. The aim of this study is the role of military institutions in the processes of peace in the countries and in the way in which GTI connects with the new post-agreement states. The methodology was based on a review of the literature. As a result of this, military institutions in the workplace were reduced in the personal order and budget in the defence sector. It is suggested that the GTI is a key element to achieve the objectives proposed in the military strategy.RESUMENEn las instituciones militare la GTI ayuda a aumentar sus capacidades militares redundando en ventajas estratégicas que les permita alcanzar objetivos misionales como la defensa de una nación. El objetivo es estudiar cuál ha sido el rol de las instituciones militares en los procesos de paz de algunos países y cómo la GTI conecta con los nuevos escenarios de posacuerdo, tomando como caso de estudio Colombia. La metodología utilizada fue una revisión de literatura en bases de datos especializadas. Como resultado se tiene que las instituciones militares en el posacuerdo se enfrentan a cambios como la disminución de personal y de presupuesto destinado al sector defensa. Se sugiere que la GTI sea un elemento clave para lograr los objetivos propuestos en la estrategia militar.
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Pattison, Gary. "Soldier self-defence: the theoretical and legal bases for command-imposed restrictions." Military Law and the Law of War Review 59, no. 1 (June 2, 2021): 23–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/mllwr.2021.01.02.
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This article confronts what has been described as the ‘ongoing self-defence controversy’ within the international military community over the legitimacy of commanders issuing orders that have the practical effect of restricting soldiers’ use of force in self-defence. Within this controversy, some argue that soldier self-defence is legally sacrosanct, a right that must invariably take precedence over any command-imposed restrictions. This article explores whether there is any legal basis for this view. It finds that there is not, and that such an absolutist approach misconstrues the basic theoretical and legal origins of self-defence. What is more, the article forewarns that reasoning in such absolute terms might actually serve to devalue rather than promote soldiers’ safety by failing to properly account for the longstanding military tradition of commands such as ‘hold fire’ orders, the central importance of these directives to the ordered application of military force and military effectiveness, and the interrelationship of the military and the state’s responsibility for national security. Cet article se penche sur la controverse qui entoure la légitime défense au sein de la communauté militaire internationale, quant à la légitimité du commandement de donner des ordres ayant pour effet, dans la pratique, de restreindre l’emploi de la force des soldats à des fins de légitime défense. Dans le cadre de cette controverse, certains soutiennent que la légitime défense des soldats est sacro-sainte d’un point de vue juridique et que ce droit doit toujours l’emporter sur toute restriction imposée par le commandement. Cet article cherche à déterminer si ce point de vue repose sur un fondement juridique. L’article conclut que non, et qu’une telle approche absolutiste dénature les origines théoriques et juridiques à la base de la légitime défense. Qui plus est, l’article met en garde qu’un raisonnement en de tels termes absolus pourrait en fait nuire à la sécurité des soldats, au lieu de l’améliorer, parce qu’il ne tient pas suffisamment compte de la longue tradition militaire d’ordres tels que «halte au feu», de l’importance de ces directives pour l’application ordonnée de la force militaire et pour l’efficacité militaire, et de l’interaction entre l’armée et la responsabilité de l’État pour la sécurité nationale. Dit artikel gaat in op wat is omschreven als de ‘voortdurende controverse over zelfverdediging’ binnen de internationale militaire gemeenschap over de legitimiteit van commandanten die bevelen uitvaardigen waarbij het gebruik van geweld door soldaten uit zelfverdediging praktisch wordt beperkt. Binnen deze controverse betogen sommigen dat de zelfverdediging van soldaten wettelijk onaantastbaar is, een recht dat altijd voorrang moet hebben op alle beperkingen die door het commando worden opgelegd. Dit artikel gaat na of er een wettelijke basis is voor dit standpunt. De conclusie is dat die er niet is en dat een dergelijke absolutistische benadering de theoretische en juridische grondslagen van zelfverdediging miskent. Bovendien waarschuwt het artikel dat een redenering in dergelijke absolute termen de veiligheid van de soldaten eerder zou kunnen aantasten dan bevorderen, doordat niet naar behoren rekening wordt gehouden met de gevestigde militaire traditie van bevelen zoals ‘staakt het vuren’-bevelen, het centrale belang van deze richtlijnen voor de bevolen toepassing van militair geweld en militaire doeltreffendheid, en de onderlinge relatie tussen het leger en de verantwoordelijkheid van de staat voor de nationale veiligheid. Este artículo aborda lo que se ha venido a llamar la ‘controversia existente en torno a la autodefensa’ dentro de la comunidad militar internacional sobre la legitimidad de los comandantes que emiten órdenes que tienen el efecto práctico de restringir el uso de la fuerza en defensa propia por parte de los soldados. Dentro de esta controversia, algunos argumentan que la autodefensa de los soldados es legalmente sacrosanta, un derecho que invariablemente debe prevalecer sobre cualquier restricción impuesta por el mando. Este artículo explora si existe alguna base legal para este punto de vista. Se llega a la conclusión de que no existe base alguna y que tal enfoque absolutista malinterpreta los orígenes teóricos y legales básicos de la autodefensa. A mayor abundamiento, el artículo advierte que el razonamiento en términos tan absolutos podría servir para devaluar, en lugar de promover, la seguridad de los soldados al no tener en cuenta adecuadamente la tradición militar inmemorial de órdenes como las órdenes de ‘mantener el fuego’, la importancia central de estas directivas para la aplicación ordenada de la fuerza militar y la eficacia militar, y la interrelación de las fuerzas armadas y la responsabilidad del Estado por la seguridad nacional. Questo articolo affronta quella che è stata descritta come la ‘continua controversia di autodifesa’ all'interno della comunità militare internazionale sulla legittimità dei comandanti che emettono ordini che hanno l'effetto pratico di limitare l'uso della forza da parte dei soldati nell'autodifesa. All'interno di questa controversia, alcuni sostengono che l'autodifesa dei soldati sia giuridicamente sacrosanta, un diritto che deve invariabilmente avere la precedenza su qualsiasi restrizione imposta dal comando. Questo articolo esamina se vi sia una base giuridica per questa interpretazione. Trova che non esiste, e che un tale approccio rigido fraintenda le origini teoriche e giuridiche di base di autodifesa. Inoltre, l'articolo ammonisce che ragionare in termini così assoluti potrebbe effettivamente sminuire piuttosto che promuovere la sicurezza dei soldati, non riuscendo a tenere adeguatamente conto della lunga tradizione militare di comandi come ‘non aprire il fuoco’, dell'importanza centrale di queste direttive per l'ordinata applicazione della forza militare e dell'efficacia militare e l'interrelazione tra la responsabilità militare e quella dello Stato per la sicurezza nazionale. Dieser Artikel befasst sich mit dem, was innerhalb der internationalen Militärgemeinschaft bezeichnet wird als ‘andauernde Selbstverteidigungskontroverse’ (‘ongoing self-defence controversy’) in Bezug auf die Legitimität von Befehlshabern, die Befehle erteilen, wobei die Gewaltanwendung aus Selbstverteidigung durch Soldaten praktisch beschränkt wird. Im Rahmen dieser Kontroverse argumentieren manche, dass die Selbstverteidigung von Soldaten rechtlich als sakrosankt gilt und dass dieses Recht immer vor jeder vom Kommando auferlegten Beschränkung Vorrang haben muss. Dieser Artikel prüft, ob es irgendeine gesetzliche Basis für diese Auffassung gibt. Der Autor stellt fest, dass dies nicht der Fall ist, und dass eine solche absolutistische Sichtweise die theoretischen und gesetzlichen Grundlagen der Selbstverteidigung verkennt. Darüber hinaus erteilt der Artikel eine Warnung, auf diese absolute Weise zu argumentieren könnte eigentlich dazu beitragen, die Sicherheit der Soldaten zu beeinträchtigen statt sie zu fördern, indem der althergebrachten militärischen Tradition von Befehlen, wie ‘Feuer einstellen’, der zentralen Bedeutung dieser Richtlinien für die geordnete Anwendung von Militärgewalt und für die Militäreffizienz sowie der Wechselbeziehung zwischen der Armee und der Verantwortung des Staates für die nationale Sicherheit nicht gebührendermaßen Rechnung getragen wird.
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Shepherd, Michael, David Currie, and Ian R. Hartley. "Mate-Guarding, Territorial Intrusions and Paternity Defence in the Polygynous Corn Bunting Miliaria calandra." Journal of Avian Biology 27, no. 3 (September 1996): 231. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3677227.
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KURNIADI, ANWAR. "EVALUASI KEBIJAKAN PELAKSANAAN LATIHAN OPERASI MILITER TNI AL DALAM RANGKA MEMPERTAHANKAN STABILITAS EKOSISTEM." JURNAL GREEN GROWTH dan MANAJEMEN LINGKUNGAN 4, no. 1 (December 1, 2014): 40. http://dx.doi.org/10.21009/jgg.041.04.
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This research aimed to evaluate the policy implementation of Armada Jaya Military Operation Exercise of Indonesia Navy in Sangatta 2012, East Kutai District, East Kalimantan. In frame of sustain ecosystem stability. The method of this research was policy research with content analysis design. The results of this research was expect to be recommendation to the Minister of Defence and Commander in Chief and Chief of Staf Indonesia Naval in order to make new regulation act of Military Operation Exercise in Indonesia that sustainable environment. The data were collected through observation, interviews, taking specimens, recording and documentation.The result showed that 1) the location of military operation is able to be exercise area and the conducting of Armada Jaya Military Operation Exercise were not follow yet the rule of Protection; 2) no impact to the environment, eventhough could not conduct Amdal, audit and restoration of environment, and involved less institusional and also social communities.The recommendation were to Defence Ministery and Commander in Chief of TNI to make new rule and also the new body of environment, while Chief of Staf Indonesia Navy have to make new rule of environment that account more technical operation, and make new Body of Environment and also conduct cooperation with Minister of Environment and Royal Australian Navy to educate and training Officers about environment in war military operation or other than war.
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Sarty, Roger. "“The Army Origin of the Royal Canadian Navy”: Canada’s Maritime Defences, 1855-1918." Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord 30, no. 4 (June 10, 2021): 341–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.25071/2561-5467.41.
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In 1954 army historian George Stanley claimed that naval initiatives from the eighteenth century to the 1870s by the French and British armies in Canada and the local land militia were the true roots of the Royal Canadian Navy. He privately admitted that he was being intentionally provocative. The present article, however, reviews subsequent scholarship and offers new research that strengthens Stanley’s findings, and shows that the Canadian army continued to promote the organization of naval forces after the 1870s. The army, moreover, lobbied for the founding of the Royal Canadian Navy in 1910, and supported the new service in its troubled early years. En 1954, l’historien de l’armée George Stanley a affirmé que les initiatives navales entreprises du 18e siècle aux années 1870 par les armées française et britannique au Canada et par la milice terrestre locale étaient les véritables racines de la Marine royale canadienne. Par contre, il a aussi admis en privé qu’il avait été délibérément provocateur. Le présent article passe en revue les études ultérieures et propose de nouvelles recherches qui viennent renforcer les conclusions de Stanley et indiquent que l’armée canadienne a continué de promouvoir l’organisation des forces navales après les années 1870. De plus, l’armée a fait pression en faveur de la fondation de la Marine royale canadienne en 1910, puis elle a appuyé le nouveau service au cours de ses premières années tumultueuses.
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Echeverri, Marcela. "Popular Royalists, Empire, and Politics in Southwestern New Granada, 1809 – 1819." Hispanic American Historical Review 91, no. 2 (May 1, 2011): 237–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00182168-1165208.
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Abstract This article examines the royalist forces that rose in defense of the colonial order in the southwestern region of New Granada, Colombia, a royalist stronghold where slaves and local Indians united with Spanish forces to fight against independence armies. Enslaved blacks and Indians were perceived by royalist elites as valuable allies, and for that reason elites were willing to negotiate and offer concessions to secure their loyalty. I describe the complex negotiations with Indians in terms of tribute payment, and with slaves over freedom, that have been left completely out of an independence narrative that has assumed that Indians and blacks participated as royalists exclusively as cannon fodder or always in disadvantageous terms. My contribution is specifically to provide insight into the ways in which Indians and slaves positioned themselves as political actors in the context of empire, and how their particular political histories determined their negotiation with royalist factions during the independence process, when, for both groups, militia service became an avenue for social mobility and provided new means of protecting and expanding their rights.
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Frei, A., A. Han, M. G. Weiss, V. Dittmann, and V. Ajdacic-Gross. "Use of Army Weapons and Private Firearms for Suicide and Homicide in the Region of Basel, Switzerland." Crisis 27, no. 3 (May 2006): 140–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/0227-5910.27.3.140.
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Objectives: Switzerland has one of the highest rates of firearm suicides in the world. International studies show a positive correlation between the rate of households with guns and femicides with guns. Because its defense system requires a militia to keep personal firearms at home, Switzerland has a high rate of households with a gun. Methods: Records of suicides in the region of Basel between 1992 and 1996 were reviewed. Suicides with either army weapons or private firearms and suicides by other means were compared. Methods and types of homicides that occurred in the region at the same time were also analyzed. Findings: Firearm suicides were clearly the most frequent means of suicide. They were also used in 30.0% of domestic homicides, although other means were used at similar rates. Firearms for suicide were mainly used by men, especially army weapons. These men were younger, professionally better qualified, and fewer had ever been treated in one of the local state psychiatric services. Discussion: The use of firearms for suicide, rather than homicide, and particularly of army weapons by young, well-educated men, requires more attention in debates and informed policy regarding access to firearms and suicide prevention in Switzerland.
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Kaasik, Peeter. "Hävituspataljonidest Eestis 1941. aasta sõjasuvel [Abstract: The Destruction Battalions in Estonia in the Summer War of 1941]." Ajalooline Ajakiri. The Estonian Historical Journal 167, no. 1 (December 31, 2019): 3–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/aa.2019.1.01.
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Abstract: The Destruction Battalions in Estonia in the Summer War of 1941
A state of war was declared in the western regions of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. This did not in any case mean only purely military operations. The safeguarding of security in the rear was considered extremely important. On 25 June 1941, the Union-wide Communist Party (CPSU) Central Committee Politburo adopted the decision ‘On the tasks in the rear of front-line forces’, which placed all agencies and units of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs and State Security (NKVD and NKGB) under the command of the commanders of rear defence of the front lines. The following was prescribed as the more general tasks of rear defence: maintenance of law and order in the rear and on roads; the capture of deserters and ‘disorganisers of the rear’; protection of communications; the organisation of evacuations and the transportation of supplies; the destruction of saboteurs. Since rebellion against Soviet rule also began in parallel with combat action in many regions (primarily in regions that the Soviet Union occupied and annexed in 1939/1940), then combat against the so-called internal enemy became the primary task of rear defence units in the vicinity of the front in many areas. Thirdly, rear defence units were assigned the task of destroying all property of any value that could not be removed from the region of the front in the event of possible retreat.
At the same time, all communications of military importance were to be destroyed in the course of retreat. NKVD internal forces and border guard forces on the one hand, and irregular people’s defence units (destruction battalions, workers’ regiments, people’s defence divisions, etc.) formed locally in the summer of 1941 on the other hand were to bear the brunt of this action. The various irregular people’s defence units were on the one hand supposed to be manifestations of ‘nationwide struggle’ deriving from ideology; on the other hand, the need for an improvised territorial defence force was due to pragmatic needs that made it possible to skip many of the formalities associated with mobilisation, transport, formation and supply. At the same time, the possibilities for utilising these units were also considerably more flexible. The formation and utilisation of the ‘people’s defence force’ varied from region to region. The destruction battalions that were formed in the Estonian SSR are considered illustratively in this article.
As elsewhere in areas in the vicinity of the front, the formation of destruction battalions began in the Estonian SSR at the end of June, 1941. The ‘Estonian SSR operative group of destruction battalions’ was established for their formation and command at the NKVD Baltic Border Guard District headquarters. At the start of July, this operative group was placed under the command of the assistant responsible for rear area defence of the commander of the 8th Army, which had retreated into Estonia.
The destruction battalions did not have any definite composition of personnel. Although the self-evidence of patriotism was stressed, in reality the battalions were manned in Estonia by way of ‘Party mobilisation’. If a person was a member or candidate member of the CPSU or the communist youth organisation and did not have any other administrative duties, joining the destruction battalions was in essence mandatory. Generally speaking, this obligation also applied to the employees of other Soviet institutions as well.
The operations of destruction battalions in Estonia can conditionally be divided into three periods: 1) combat against the armed resistance movement before the arrival of German forces; 2) the direct employment of destruction battalions in military assignments alongside securing the rear area; 3) the deployment of destruction battalions and regiments formed out of them at the front in combat against regular Wehrmacht units.
This periodisation is nevertheless conditional. It is rather difficult to present temporal frames of reference more precisely because the actions and composition of different units varied depending on the situation at the front and they also do not match temporally. While battalions were initially formed in the counties and in the cities of Tallinn and Narva, later on units were disbanded and combined, and new additional units were also formed. In total, over 20 such units operated in Estonia (in addition to several more Latvian destruction units that had retreated into Estonia) in the summer war of 1941. Over 6,000 fighters were entered in the lists of the Estonian SSR militia companies, destruction battalions and workers’ regiments. These in turn were divided up according to specific assignments: some went on raids and later fought at the front line as part of the Red Army; others were part of the armed units guarding certain industrial enterprises or Soviet institutions, or provided security for communications of military importance (railroads, bridges, communications lines, and other such sites). Third, there was a large group that was formally connected to destruction battalions because they were tied mainly to other military-administrative duties (the organisation of evacuation, fortification works, mobilisation of horses and motor vehicles, future partisan warfare, and other such duties).
As the name ‘destruction battalion’ already says, these units were initially supposed to be used mainly in combatting saboteurs, spies and local ‘bandits’, and in carrying out ‘scorched earth tactics’. Yet as we can already see from the previous periodization, the role of destruction battalions in Estonia already became blurred at the start of July, 1941. Since the front was breached in many places, some units that were completely unprepared for it were quickly sent to the front to plug the holes. The Southern Estonian destruction battalions that had retreated in the direction of Narva fell apart, disintegrating into isolated troops that retreated together with civilians who wanted to evacuate. Other units were incorporated into the Red Army in Northern Tartu County in the latter half of July, and most of them were cut off there in a pocket. In August, two companies were formed in Harju County and Narva out of the remnants of the destruction battalions, and were already utilised directly as front-line units.
In conclusion it can be said that while the destruction battalions that operated in Estonia initially were indeed a rather effective force for a short time in the fight against armed resistance, their utilisation in front-line combat not only had negligible effect, it was also rather short-sighted in terms of Soviet rule because it resulted in the destruction of a large proportion of the cadre that was trustworthy in the eyes of the Soviet regime, and this cadre was already quite modest in numbers to begin with. A large proportion of the fighters of the destruction battalions left behind in the rear met their end in the course of vigilante justice in the summer war of 1941. And secondly, since the Germans did not count the members of the destruction battalions as soldiers, the status of prisoners of war did not extend to them, and many of them who were taken prisoner were shot on the spot or were executed at a later time as ‘active communists’.
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Abroskin, Vyacheslav. "Legal regulation of the state of emergency in the legislation of the Russian Empire." Legal Ukraine, no. 3 (April 30, 2020): 6–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.37749/2308-9636-2020-3(207)-1.
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The article considers the history of legal regulation of the state of emergency in the Russian state, starting with the period of reign of Ivan the terrible to the reign of Nicholas II. It is shown that the General form of the input of such a regime was the introduction of the oprichnina, conscription, the creation of the militia, the imposition of additional taxes and imposition of duties of the population to strengthen the Fortezza, the supply of food and fodder. In the Russian Empire, control over the implementation of the emergency condition were assigned to governors, heads of police, and commanders of military units during hostilities. With the aim of systematizing a normative-legal acts adopted during this historical period, was divided into three stages: 1) nucleation (the reign of Ivan the terrible, Peter i); 2) formation (the period of reign of Alexander i, Nicholas i); 3) formation (during the reign of Alexander II, Alexander III and Nicholas II). The outset is characterized in that the first normative-legal acts in this sphere was adopted during the reign of Ivan IV the terrible in the middle of the XVI century. by the introduction of the oprichnina, which was a direct rule of Moscow Czar. The next step in the development of the history of the state of emergency was the rule of Peter i, who in February 20, 1705, issued a Decree against conscription, first in southern and later throughout the Empire. The period of the legislation regarding state of emergency began during the reign of Alexander i. The Governor has declared a state of emergency on the territories of hostilities between the French and the Russians on the basis of manifestos and a separate Imperial decrees. During the reign of Nicholas I the question of introducing a state of emergency was decided by the Emperor and control over the implementation of such legal acts darecasa the Third Department of His Imperial Majesty's Chancellery. The period of formation of bases of a state of emergency to the period of the reign of Alexander II. The development of legal regulation of the state of emergency significantly affected by the introduction in the Empire police reforms 60-70-ies of the XIX century. In the early twentieth century legal regulation of emergency has undergone significant changes. So in 1901, Nicholas II approved the «regulation on the control of fortresses», which established the responsibilities of tenants unquestionably carry out the orders of the military leadership. In the Russian Empire, a state of emergency was introduced during the military actions, mass demonstrations, strikes, terrorist acts, by granting exclusive powers to the governors-General, military and local authorities concerning the transfer of suspected persons to the military courts, attracting people to defence works, the collection of militias, expulsion of unreliable and suspicious persons to Siberia and the Far East. Key words: legal regime; state of emergency; legal act; oprichnina; mobilization; governors general; terrorism.
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Georg Uebel, Roberto Rodolfo, and Rita Inês Paetzhold Pauli. "A IMIGRAÇÃO COMO UMA POLÍTICA DE DEFESA NACIONAL: É POSSÍVEL? O CASO DA IMIGRAÇÃO ESPANHOLA PARA A OCUPAÇÃO DA FRONTEIRA SUL DO BRASIL / Immigration as a National Defence Policy: is it Possible? The Case of the Spanish Immigration to the Occupation of Brazilian Southern Borderland." Geographia Meridionalis 1, no. 2 (December 18, 2015): 315. http://dx.doi.org/10.15210/gm.v1i2.6015.
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O processo colonial do Brasil trouxe muitas questões sobre a ocupação do seu espaço territorial por colonos e imigrantes como uma forma de apropriação das territorialidades fronteiriças do país visando à conservação e defesa do jovem Estado. Todavia, o povoamento específico do estado do Rio Grande do Sul por imigrantes europeus observou um caráter não só econômico, mas também estratégico, de defesa das fronteiras. Nesse sentido, o presente trabalho aborda o caso da imigração espanhola para a fronteira sul do Brasil com o Uruguai e Argentina e também, por meio do Acordo de Migração entre Brasil e Espanha, as especificidades e pontualidades que essa distinta imigração trouxe à luz de uma possível e subjetiva política de defesa nacional, em prol do estabelecimento e consolidação das fronteiras brasileiras no território do Rio Grande do Sul. Este estudo é resultado de pesquisas documentais e in loco acerca da imigração espanhola e seus aportes econômicos, sociolaborais e territoriais no Rio Grande do Sul durante o século XX, que dentre suas potencialidades verificou a possibilidade político-militar de defesa nacional por meio de um acordo de migração, fato inédito até então na historiografia do país.ABSTRACTThe colonization process of Brazil brought many questions about the occupation of its territorial space by settlers and immigrants as a way of appropriation of the border territorialities of the country aiming at the conservation and protection of the young State. However, the specific settlement of the state of Rio Grande do Sul by European immigrants noticed not only an economic, but also a strategic, of borderlands defence features. In this sense, the present work deals with the case of Spanish immigration to the southern border of Brazil with Uruguay and Argentina and also, through the Migration Agreement between Brazil and Spain, the specificities of this distinct immigration that brought to light a possible and subjective policy of national defence, towards the establishment and consolidation of Brazilian borders on the territory of Rio Grande do Sul. This study is result of documentary and literature review researches about the Spanish immigration and its economic, socio-occupational and territorial contributions in Rio Grande do Sul during the twentieth century, which, among its potentialities verified the political and military possibility of national defence through an immigration agreement, an unprecedented fact until then in the country's historiography.Keywords: Immigration, Spaniards, Brazil, Border, Defence.
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Estancona, Chelsea, Lucia Bird, Kaisa Hinkkainen, and Navin Bapat. "Civilian self-defense militias in civil war." International Interactions 45, no. 2 (January 24, 2019): 215–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2019.1554570.
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De Moraes Cicero, Pedro Henrique. "“Unidade cívico-militar” como fundamento da doutrina de defesa nacional bolivariana | “Civil-military Integration” as the foundation of the bolivarian nacional defence doctrine." Mural Internacional 6, no. 2 (July 23, 2016): 202–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.12957/rmi.2015.22162.
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O artigo compila a trajetória institucional empreendida pela Revolução Bolivariana com vistas a adensar as relações cívico-militares no país, ou seja, a incorporar a civis em atividades até então restritas ao corpo militar nacional. Este projeto ancora-se em construções teóricas relacionadas aos conceitos de “guerra assimétrica” e de “pueblo en armas”. O texto conclui que, mesmo representando uma interessante e inovadora estratégia de ampliação do escopo da defesa nacional, em especial no que concerne à utilização do aparelho militar como apoio para conferir maior escala e eficiência na implementação de programas sociais, a crescente inclusão de civis em atividades eminentemente militares resulta numa potencialmente problemática transferência de responsabilidades no âmbito das estruturas de poder do Estado.ABSTRACTThe article compiles the institutional trajectory taken by the Bolivarian Revolution in order to enhance the civil-military relations in the country, i.e., to incorporate civilians in activities previously restricted to the national military structure. This project is anchored in theoretical constructs related to the ideas of “asymmetric warfare” and “pueblo en armas.” The paper concludes that, despite the fact that the initiative represents an interesting and innovative strategy of expansion of the scope of national defense, especially regarding the use of the military as a support to enhance the scale and efficiency in the implementation of social programs, the increasing inclusion of civilians in activities that are eminently military results in a potentially problematic transfer of responsibilities within the state power structures.Palavras-chave: Unidade cívico-militar – Guerra assimétrica – VenezuelaKeywords: Civil-military Integration - Asymmetric warfare – Venezuela DOI: 10.12957/rmi.2015.22162 Recebido em 24 de março de 2016 / Received March 24, 2016.Aceito em 20 de junho de 2016 / Accepted June 20, 2016
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Sanz Roldán, Félix. "Política europea de Seguridad y Defensa: una aproximación militar." Arbor CLXXXIV, A2 (December 30, 2008): 33–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.3989/arbor.2008.ia2.343.
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Vegas, Jesús Luis Castillo. "CIUDADANÍA Y MILICIA EN EL REPUBLICANISMO FLORENTINO." Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía 37, no. 1 (November 28, 2013): 135. http://dx.doi.org/10.21555/top.v37i1.119.
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La creación de una milicia ciudadana es una pretensión característica del republicanismo renacentista. La república no puede ni carecer de defensa, ya se conoce el desenlace de los “profetas desarmados”, ni tampoco defenderse con ejércitos mercenarios. Para Maquiavelo, Guicciardini o Giannotti el ciudadano republicano tiene un conjunto de virtudes, como la austeridad, la disciplina, el patriotismo o la valentía, que le configuran como el mejor soldado. Por ello, el régimen republicano necesita que los ciudadanos sean soldados, porque la propia disciplina militar es un medio necesario para forjar esas virtudes cívicas sin las cuales no puede sobrevivir la república.
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Cabrera, Gerardo. "plan estratégico de defensa del partido de Arica y sus consecuencias en el mando civil-militar durante los conflictos anglo-francés y anglo-español (1787-1792)." Americanía: Revista de Estudios Latinoamericanos, no. 13 (July 7, 2021): 81–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.46661/americania.5286.
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La disputa diplomática de Francia contra la alianza anglo-prusiana sobre el conflicto político interno en los Países Bajos, como también la posterior disputa diplomática anglo-española sobre la bahía Nootka-Sound, fueron acontecimientos que obligaron a la corona española a establecer un plan estratégico de defensa imperial preventivo. Para el caso de la Intendencia de Arequipa, sus esfuerzos se concentraron en la movilización de las milicias y en el mejoramiento de la defensa del puerto y ciudad de Arica, dirigido de acuerdo a un plan estratégico-militar elaborado por el intendente Antonio Álvarez y Jiménez. Sin embargo, la ejecución del plan de defensa causó una abierta confrontación entre las autoridades civiles y militares, así como también una lucha en la dirección del mando entre oficiales veteranos y coroneles de milicias. Por estas consecuencias, las reformas militares borbónicas introducidas en el sur peruano, durante la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII, más que una solución a los problemas políticos-militares de seguridad imperial, fueron una causa clave en la escalada de las luchas de poder entre criollos y peninsulares.
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Ryabchenko, A. G., and E. V. Orel. "Military threat in Krasnodar. 1942-1943." Scientific bulletin of the Southern Institute of Management, no. 4 (December 25, 2018): 112–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.31775/2305-3100-2018-4-112-117.
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The Article is devoted to the significant date, the 75th anniversary of the liberation ofKrasnodarfrom the German-fascist invaders. Immediately after the outbreak of war with fascist invaders inKrasnodarstarted to prepare for it. Since the early days, in particular, was organized by the city destroyer battalion. In parallel, the organization of the assault battalions in four inner-city areas,Krasnodar. Was created regiment of militia. Built a defensive perimeter around the city.Krasnodarcity Committee of the CPSU (b), from 07. 07. 1942 informed that the date of completion of the defensive line of the city defense Committee of the city appointed on 10 August 1942 the measures Taken have led to the fact that as a result, on July 20 the construction of the defensive alignment (of the turn) and setting her weapon emplacements, there are 8 thousand people. The route passes through the settlements adjacent to the city. Each local district was assigned areas battery manned by gunners and cadets of theKrasnodarmortar school. Since the beginning of August 1942 for the construction of theKrasnodardefensive bypass (internal and external) daily had uvlekalas to 30 thousand civilians. But unfortunately, despite the measures taken, the city fell. Six months of the occupation had been the most terrible ordeal for the residents of the city, maybe in its history. In the historical memory of our people deposited the traces of the brutal cruelty by the Nazi occupiers. Moreover, the historical memory of the population passed, and the events leading up to the occupation associated with severe logistical difficulty.
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Katz, Rebecca S., and Joey Bailey. "The Militia, a Legal and Social Movement Analysis: Will the Real Militia Please Stand Up? Militia Hate Group or the Constitutional Militia?" Sociological Focus 33, no. 2 (May 2000): 133–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00380237.2000.10571162.
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Stopka, Krzysztof. "Milites et nobiles: Ormianie a stan szlachecki Królestwa Polskiego i Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego od XIV do XVI wieku." Lehahayer 5 (May 15, 2019): 15–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.12797/lh.05.2018.05.02.
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Armenians and Noble Status in Kingdom of Poland and Great Duchy of Lithuania, 14th-16th CenturiesArmenians living in Kingdom of Poland and Great Duchy of Lithuania were mostly burghers, however, cases of social advancement were noted on Ruthenian territory officially belonging to the Crown. Initially, the advancement was possible only for royal court-based Armenian translators, but later also for those with merits for the country’s defence. Another way to advance socially was to marry a Polish nobleman. In such marriages religious differences rarely posed a serious problem; generally, females did not need to convert from their Christian Armenian denomination. Nevertheless, ennoblement was rarely attractive for Polish Armenians at that time; trade and other typically burgher activities brought more profit than the landownership privilege. For this reason ennobled men and their descendants often took on those activities anyway and pleaded their noble status only to escape inconvenient legal consequences or town court. A few Polish noble families of Armenian origin are dated back to that time: the Tyszkiewicz, the Siekierzyński, the Balicki, the Zwartowski, the Sołtanowicz-Chalepski, the Lenkowicz-Ipohorski, the Iwaszkiewicz, the Makarowicz, the Domażyrski, the Pleszkowski.
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McCord, Edward A. "Militia Training and State Control in Republican Hu’nan." Journal of Chinese Military History 1, no. 1 (2012): 5–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/221274512x631112.
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Abstract This study of Hunan province during China’s Nanjing decade (1927-1937) shows how militia training could play a key role in the extension of state control both over local militia and through militia into local society. Provincial authorities in Hunan used an argument for the need to increase the efficacy of militia through more rigorous military training to justify an activist intervention in local militia organizations. This training goal then provided a means of extending increased state control over militia as provincial personnel were dispatched to “supervise” local militia training, as local militia leaders were evaluated on the basis of their ability to provide this training, and as training content was expanded to include political indoctrination as well as military skills. Meanwhile the government strengthened ties with local militia officers through extended training programs in the provincial capital or in army units. While many of these efforts focused on standing militia forces and their officers, training programs were also instituted for the mass membership of lower-level “volunteer corps.” More than just political indoctrination, the regimentation instilled by regular training programs also worked to increase the state’s control over the lives of its citizens.
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Tejado Borja, Rafael. "Guerra y milicias en el Siglo de las Luces." Cuadernos Dieciochistas 21 (December 31, 2020): 197–233. http://dx.doi.org/10.14201/cuadieci202021197233.
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A lo largo del siglo xviii las milicias se consolidaron como una fuerza que complementó a los ejércitos permanentes, tanto cumpliendo misiones de defensa del territorio como constituyendo una fuerza militar de reserva a la que recurrir siempre que la situación lo requiriese. En oposición a sus predecesoras de los siglos anteriores, estas estuvieron organizadas por una regulación común y controladas directamente por la Corona, lo que constituyó su principal garantía de supervivencia frente a sus detractores. En este artículo se expone la creación, organización y evolución de las milicias que se establecieron en la Monarquía de España durante el Siglo de las Luces, con especial atención a la provincial, y, además, se trata de rebatir las críticas vertidas contra estos cuerpos durante su existencia, así como en tiempos posteriores.
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Mowle, Thomas S. "Iraq's militia problem." Survival 48, no. 3 (October 2006): 41–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330600905528.
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