Relevant bibliographies by topics / Oligopoly models

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
  6. Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'Oligopoly models'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 1 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Oligopoly models"

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Sarafopoulos, Georges, and Kosmas Papadopoulos. "Chaos in Oligopoly Models." International Journal of Productivity Management and Assessment Technologies 7, no. 1 (2019): 50–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijpmat.2019010104.

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In this article, the authors investigate the dynamics of two oligopoly games. In the first game, they consider a nonlinear Cournot-type duopoly game with homogeneous goods and same rational expectations. The authors investigate the case, where managers have a variety of attitudes toward relative performance that are indexed by their type. In the second game they consider a Cournot-Bertrand duopoly game with linear demand, quadratic cost function and differentiated goods. In the two games they suppose a linear demand and a quadratic cost function. The games are modeled with a system of two difference equations. Existence and stability of equilibria of the systems are studied. The authors show that the models gives more complex, chaotic and unpredictable trajectories, as a consequence of change in the parameter k of speed of the player's adjustment (in the first game) and in the parameter d of the horizontal product differentiation (in the second game). The authors prove that the variation of the parameter k (resp. d) destabilizes the Nash equilibrium via a period doubling bifurcation (resp. through a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation). The chaotic features are justified numerically via computing Lyapunov numbers and sensitive dependence on initial conditions. In the second game they show that in the case of a quadratic cost there are stable trajectories and a higher or lower degree of product differentiation does not tend to destabilize the economy. They verify these results through numerical simulations. Finally, the authors control the chaotic behavior of the games introducing a new parameter. For some values of this parameter, the Nash equilibrium is stable for every value of the main parameter k or d.
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Tuinstra, Jan. "Oligopoly Dynamics: Models and Tools." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 54, no. 4 (2004): 611–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2003.01.009.

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Yuhelson, Yuhelson. "The Implementation Of Game Theory Models In Transportation." Aksara: Jurnal Ilmu Pendidikan Nonformal 4, no. 1 (2020): 41. http://dx.doi.org/10.37905/aksara.4.1.41-44.2018.

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In most industries a central characteristic of competition is that firm are mutually dependent: firms feel the effects each others’ moves and are prone to react to them (Porter, 1980). This situation, economists call an oligopoly. An oligopoly has few sellers, with interdependent pricing decisions among the larger firms iin the industry (Nafziger, 1997). This interdependency is the essence of competition.
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Fraja, Giovanni, and Flavio Delbono. "GAME THEORETIC MODELS OF MIXED OLIGOPOLY." Journal of Economic Surveys 4, no. 1 (1990): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6419.1990.tb00077.x.

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Szidarovszky, Ferenc, and Koji Okuguchi. "Dynamic oligopoly: models with incomplete information." Applied Mathematics and Computation 38, no. 2 (1990): 161–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0096-3003(90)90052-5.

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Dzobelova, Valentina B., and Natalya Yu Lebedeva. "Oligopoly models and their manifestation in the modern Russian economy." Vestnik of North-Ossetian State University, no. 2(2020) (June 25, 2020): 110–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.29025/1994-7720-2020-2-110-116.

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This publication discusses the characteristics of oligopoly as one of the most common market structures, due to the fact that the attention of economists is constantly attracted to the problems of the functioning of a firm in such market conditions, the article presents a statistical analysis of various oligopoly models. Each model is characterized by certain signs. Based on these signs, oligopolistic markets are assigned to one or another model, an assessment of the appropriateness of using oligopoly models to analyze the interaction of market entities is presented. Based on an analytical comparison, it was revealed that oligopolies continue to be one of the most common market structures in the Russian economy. The influence of oligopolistic enterprises on the state of the country’s economy is very large, so it is so important to understand the processes that occur in oligopolistic markets, to explain the reasons for this or that behavior of firms. The most unfavorable oligopoly model for consumers is the cartel model, since in this case the market situation is close to the sellers monopoly. Most preferable for consumers are models in which there are no clear leaders, several firms can have a significant impact on the market. In an effort to maximize profits by increasing their market share, firms offer the most advantageous offers to consumers.
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AHMED, E., A. S. HEGAZI, and A. T. ABD EL-HAFEZ. "ON PERSISTENCE IN MULTIOBJECTIVE OLIGOPOLY." International Journal of Modern Physics C 12, no. 06 (2001): 901–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0129183101002085.

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Multiobjective oligopoly models are constructed. The objective of the first two models are to maximize profits and to maximize sales. In the third model, the objectives are to maximize profits and to minimize risk. Giving more weight to risk minimization decreased the profits. In all the three models, we found that the weight of the profit maximization has to be higher than a given threshold. Sufficient conditions for persistence of some multiobjective oligopolies are derived. Again, they require that the weight of profit maximization to be higher than certain value.
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Tan, Hua Shan, and Yang Yang. "Pricing Strategy of Cruise Companies." Applied Mechanics and Materials 380-384 (August 2013): 4579–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.380-384.4579.

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This paper researches the product pricing problems of cruise companies in the oligopoly market, discusses a cooperative game model and a non cooperative game model, and gives equilibrium results of pricing game between two oligopoly companies by analyzing the solution of models.
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Severová, L., L. Kopecká, R. Svoboda, and J. Brčák. "Oligopoly competition on market with food products." Agricultural Economics (Zemědělská ekonomika) 57, No. 12 (2011): 580–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.17221/107/2010-agricecon.

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Oligopoly can be defined as a market model of the imperfect competition type, assuming the existence of only a few companies in a sector or industry, from which at least some have a significant market share and can therefore influence the production prices in the market. Many models of oligopoly that differ from one another mostly in the nature of the competitive companies’ behaviour can be found through the study of oligopolistic structures. Some models describe only the behaviour of two companies in the monitored market (duopoly), others describe several companies of the same power (cartel), still others assume that one of the companies has a dominant position in the market, etc. The text of this article deals with oligopolistic competition in the food market in the terms of the behaviour of grocers and with the impact of this competition upon the market competition in the sector. First, it mentions the agreements on common cooperation and procedure, when cartel market structure originates. It also analyzes the examples of behaviour of oligopoly with a dominant firm on the market with products in the food sector, with the goal of detecting whether the market with these products is significantly influenced by the oligopolistic behaviour of companies.  
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Helmes, Kurt, and Rainer Schlosser. "Oligopoly Pricing and Advertising in Isoelastic Adoption Models." Dynamic Games and Applications 5, no. 3 (2014): 334–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13235-014-0123-1.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Oligopoly models"

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Fumagalli, Chiara. "Oligopoly models and competition." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/7600.

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Esta tesis estudia el comportamiento estratégico de las empresas en mercados oligopolísticos y su interacción con otros agentes como compradores potenciales y autoridades públicas. En el Capítulo 2 se estudia si la distribución de recursos financieros internos hecha por el mercado de capitulos internos de un grupo industrial permite a las divisiones competir en el mercado del producto de una manera diferente a las empresas individuales. Se prueba que la subsidiación hecha por la "casa madre" no hace necesariamente la división un competidor más fuerte. Pero, la subsidiación proteger la división de un grupo industrial cuando entre en un mercado en relación con acciones estratégicas de empresas rivales ya presentes en el mercado. Se prueba que eso puede ser una ventaja para la división, pero también un coste. En fin, el mercado de capitales interno crea un ligamen financiero entre divisiones que operan en mercados totalmente dependientes y permite al grupo industrial de extender su poder monopolístico de un mercado a otro. En el Capítulo 3 se prueba que el fraccionamiento de los compradores puede impedir la entrada en un mercado donde ya es presente una empresa y el entrante potencial es más eficiente. En este caso la concentración de los compradores puede favorecer la entrada eliminando el problema de falta de coordinación. Además se estudia si existe un mecanismo que puede solucionar el problema. En el Capítulo 4 se estudian los efectos de la competencia entre naciones o regiones para la localización de una empresa multinacional. Se asume que una región (más pobre) obtiene más beneficios de la localización de la empresa. Pero la empresa prefiere localizarse en la otra región, si los incentivos ofertas son iguales. En esta situación, la competencia entre regiones a través de incentivos puede mejorar el bienestar agregado en comparación con una política que impide la oferta de incentivos porque permite a la región que más necesita la localización de la empresa de conseguirla. Además se comparan los efectos cuando, en ausencia de incentivos, la empresa exporta y cuando la empresa invierte en una de las regiones.
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Hviid, Morten. "Oligopoly models and information transmission." Thesis, University of Warwick, 1987. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/66299/.

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The thesis contains 5 independent papers together with an introduction and a general conclusion. All five papers consider private information in simple oligopoly models with linear demand and cost functions. The problem to be analysed is the extend to which private information is transmitted between firms and the consequences thereof. In principle the transmission (or dissemination) can take place voluntarily or involuntarily. In the case of voluntary information transmission (or sharing) we assume that this is done honestly. One of the main results in this strand of the literature is that firms have no incentives to share information unless they can collude over strategies. In chapter II and III we show that this conclusion is not generally true. In chapter II we consider the incentive for risk-averse firms to share their private information. We show that the assumption of risk-aversion in some cases reverse the conclusion in the literature. In chapter III we show that there are cases in which private information and the sharing thereof within a collusive arrangement prove detrimental to the size of a stable collusive arrangement. Thus in some cases private information imply a disincentive to collude. Chapter IV and V looks at the effect of uncertainty and private information on a two-stage duopoly model in which firms first choose capacity, then compete over prices. In chapter IV we show that no pure strategy equilibrium exists regardless of whether uncertainty is resolved before or after capacity is chosen. A mixed strategy equilibrium is shown to exist, and the equilibrium is worked out for a specific distribution of the random variable. In chapter V we modify the equilibrium concept by imposing a no-mill-price-undercutting rule. We shown that if firms' capacities differ, the firm with the highest capacity endogeneously sets the higher price. Examples of private-asymmetric information are considered and the main finding from the examples are that there are cases where neither firm wants to share the information of the best informed. Chapter VI which is joint work with Norman J. Ireland considers involuntary information transmission via output plans. This allows us to rationalise positive consistent conjectures in a simple oligopoly model. General for all the models considered is that the results not only differ from those found under certainty, but also that the results are possibly non-robust, especially with regards to changes in information structures and functional forms.
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Hanig, Marco. "Differential gaming models of oligopoly." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1986. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/14869.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 1987.<br>Title as it appeared in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Graduate List, June 1987: Differential game models of oligopoly.<br>Bibliography: leaves 242-249.<br>by Marco Hanig.<br>Ph.D.
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Tesoriere, Antonio. "Endogenous firm asymmetry vs symmetry in oligopoly models /." Louvain-la-Neuve : Univ. Catholique de Louvain, 2007. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/54345987X.pdf.

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Ahmed, Mohammad. "Market structure, producers conduct, and foreign trade : a case study of urea fertilizer trade." Thesis, University of Sussex, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.385405.

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Sepahvand, Mehrdad. "Privatisation, strategic trade policy and order of moves in mixed oligopoly models." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2004. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.415601.

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POMPERMAYER, FABIANO MEZADRE. "SPATIAL PRICE OLIGOPOLY EQUILIBRIUM MODELS TO THE BRAZILIAN PETROLEUM REFINED PRODUCTS MARKET." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2002. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=3623@1.

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COORDENAÇÃO DE APERFEIÇOAMENTO DO PESSOAL DE ENSINO SUPERIOR<br>O mercado brasileiro de derivados de petróleo está sendo aberto para competição este ano, saindo de um ambiente de preços regulados pelo Governo Federal para um ambiente onde os preços são estabelecidos pelas leis de oferta e demanda. Neste contexto, existe a preocupação de como serão estes preços, e seus impactos sobre os consumidores e sobre os produtores locais. Esta Tese propõe alguns modelos matemáticos para estimar preços, níveis de produção, níveis de consumo (demanda), e importação e exportação de derivados de petróleo nas diversas regiões do mercado brasileiro. O fornecimento de derivados de petróleo não é considerado um mercado competitivo, e sim oligopolizado, principalmente no curto prazo, devido à capacidade instalada de refinarias e aos altos custos envolvidos na construção de novas refinarias. Estes modelos são multi- produto, considerando um fato importante na produção de derivados que é a impossibilidade de produzir apenas um derivado. Assim, existem restrições onde a oferta de um derivado é relacionada a oferta dos outros. O primeiro modelo considera um mercado de oligopólio fechado, com um número fixo de firmas. Tal modelo é formulado como um problema de equilíbrio a Nash. Um segundo modelo é apresentado expandindo o primeiro para o caso em que existem preços teto de demanda definidos politicamente. O terceiro modelo relaxa a suposição do mercado fechado, com número fixo de firmas, e considera a possibilidade de competição de novas firmas no mercado. Um quarto modelo é discutido, onde assume-se que existe uma firma líder no mercado, que consegue definir sua estratégia antes das demais firmas, semelhante ao problema econômico de Stackelberg. Todos os modelos foram formulados como problemas de inequações variacionais, sendo que o último modelo é ainda um problema de programação binível. Algoritmos de solução são propostos para os três primeiros modelos. Simulações sobre o mercado brasileiro de derivados são apresentadas.<br>The Brazilian petroleum refined products market is being opened to competition this year, leaving an environment of regulated prices to another one where the prices are defined by the supply demand interactions. Considering this new scenario, there is a concern about how high the prices will be, and about their impact on the consumers and on the local producers. This thesis proposes some mathematical models to predict prices, production, consumption, and import and export levels of petroleum-refined products in all the sub-regions of the Brazilian market. Instead of a competitive market, the supply of refined products is considered an oligopoly market, especially in the short term, given the already installed refining capacity and the high costs involved in building new refineries. These models are multi-products, and they consider an important characteristic of the production of refined products, the impossibility of producing only one refined product. Hence, constraints where the production of one refined product is related to the production of the others are considered. The first model considers a closed oligopoly market, with a fixed number of firms. This problem is formulated as a Nash equilibrium problem. A second model is presented generalizing the first one to consider the possibility of ceiling demand prices politically defined. The third model relaxes the assumption of a fixed number of firms in the first model, and considers the possibility of competition by new entrants. A fourth model is discussed, where it is assumed that there is a leader firm in the market, which can define its strategy before the other firms, similar to the economic problem of Stackelberg. All the models are formulated as variational inequalities problems, and the last model is also a bi-level programming problem. Solution algorithms for the three first models are proposed. Some analyses of the Brazilian petroleum refined- products market are presented.
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Cunningham, Lance Brian. "Oligopoly market models applied to electric utilities : how will generating companies behave in a deregulated industry?" Access restricted to users with UT Austin EID Full text (PDF) from UMI/Dissertation Abstracts International, 2001. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/utexas/fullcit?p3023547.

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Šebedovský, Richard. "Prostředky teorie her v ekonomickém rozhodování." Master's thesis, Vysoké učení technické v Brně. Fakulta podnikatelská, 2012. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-223545.

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Tato práce se zabývá současnými trendy v aplikaci teorie her k tvorbě ekonomických modelů, které se následně využívají při ekonomickém rozhodování s podporou prostředků informatiky. Práce se zejména opírá o poznatky teorie statických a dynamických her a her s dokonalými a nedokonalými informacemi. Zkoumány jsou modely týkající se sdílení zdrojů, aukcí a managementu. Pro každý z popsaných modelů je prezentována konkrétní aplikace.
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Schlosser, Rainer. "Six essays on stochastic and deterministic dynamic pricing and advertising models." Doctoral thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/16973.

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Die kumulative Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit stochastischen und deterministischen dynamischen Verkaufsmodellen für langlebige sowie verderbliche Güter. Die analysierten dynamischen Modelle sind durch die Möglichkeit der simultanen Variation von Preis und Werbung in stetiger Zeit charakterisiert und folgen den aktuellen Entwicklungen der Dynamischen Preissetzung. Dabei steht die Berücksichtigung und Analyse von (i) Zeitinhomogenitäten, (ii) Adoptionseffekten, (iii) Oligopolwettbewerb und (iv) der Risikoaversion des Entscheiders im Zentrum der Arbeit. Für die Spezialfälle isoelastischer und exponentieller Nachfrage in Verbindung mit isoelastischer Werbewirkung gelingt es explizite Lösungen der optimalen Preis- und Werbekontrollen herzuleiten. Die optimal gesteuerten Verkaufsprozesse können analytisch beschrieben und ausgewertet werden. Insbesondere werden neben erwarteten Preis- und Restbestandsentwicklungen auch assoziierte Gewinnverteilungen untersucht und Sensitivitätsresultate hergeleitet. Darüber hinaus wird analysiert unter welchen Bedingungen monopolistische Strategien sozial effizient sind und welche Besteuerungs- und Subventionsmechanismen geeignet sind um Effizienz herzustellen. Die Ergebnisse sind in sechs Artikel gefasst und bieten ökonomische Einsichten in verschiedene praktische Verkaufsanwendungen, speziell im Bereich des elektronischen Handels.<br>The cumulative dissertation deals with stochastic and deterministic dynamic sales models for durable as well as perishable products. The models analyzed are characterized by simultaneous dynamic pricing and advertising controls in continuous time and are in line with recent developments in dynamic pricing. They include the modeling of multi-dimensional decisions and take (i) time dependencies, (ii) adoption effects (iii), competitive settings and (iv) risk aversion, explicitly into account. For special cases with isoelastic demand functions as well as with exponential ones explicit solution formulas of the optimal pricing and advertising feedback controls are derived. Moreover, optimally controlled sales processes are analytically described. In particular, the distribution of profits, the expected evolution of prices as well as inventory levels are analyzed in detail and sensitivity results are obtained. Furthermore, we consider the question whether or not monopolistic policies are socially efficient; in special cases, we propose taxation/subsidy mechanisms to establish efficiency. The results are presented in six articles and provide economic insights into a variety of dynamic sales applications of the business world, especially in the area of e-commerce.
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Books on the topic "Oligopoly models"

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Jean, Tirole, ed. Dynamic models of oligopoly. Routledge, 2001.

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Jean, Tirole, ed. Dynamic models of oligopoly. Harwood Academic Publishers, 1986.

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Hviid, Morten. Oligopoly models and information transmission. typescript, 1987.

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Shaffer, Sherrill L. Cournot oligopoly with external costs. Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 1989.

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Al-Nowaihi, Ali. Credibility and multiple equilibria in oligopoly models. University ofLeicester, Department of Economics, 1990.

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Colonques, Rafael Moner. Essays in international oligopoly. CIACO, 1995.

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Feenstra, Robert C. Distance, demand, and oligopoly pricing. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1989.

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Ueng, Shyh-Fang. Three essays on price competition in oligopoly. Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, 1992.

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Appelbaum, Elie. Precommitments and probabilistic entry deterrence in oligopoly. Dept. of Economics, York University, 1990.

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Barros, Fátima. The design of incentive schemes in oligopoly theory. CIACO, 1993.

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Book chapters on the topic "Oligopoly models"

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Kóczy, László Á. "Oligopoly Models." In Theory and Decision Library C. Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69841-0_11.

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Isac, G., V. A. Bulavsky, and V. V. Kalashnikov. "Models of Oligopoly." In Complementarity, Equilibrium, Efficiency and Economics. Springer US, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3623-6_4.

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Tremblay, Victor J., and Carol Horton Tremblay. "Dynamic Monopoly and Oligopoly Models." In Springer Texts in Business and Economics. Springer New York, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-3241-8_11.

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Kuenne, Robert E. "Hotelling Models and Other Spatial Analogs." In Price and Nonprice Rivalry in Oligopoly. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-50371-7_4.

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Bischi, Gian Italo, Fabio Lamantia, and Elena Viganò. "Evolutionary Oligopoly Models of Commercial Fishing with Heterogeneities." In Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games. Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_13.

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Tremblay, Victor J., and Carol Horton Tremblay. "Quantity and Price Competition in Static Oligopoly Models." In Springer Texts in Business and Economics. Springer New York, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-3241-8_10.

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Meimand, Amir H., and Terry L. Friesz. "Computable Models of Static and Dynamic Spatial Oligopoly." In Handbook of Regional Science. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23430-9_105.

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Petit, Maria Luisa, and Boleslaw Tolwinski. "Dynamic Games and Oligopoly Models of Technological Innovation." In Theory and Decision Library. Springer US, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4627-6_13.

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Matsumoto, Akio, Ugo Merlone, and Ferenc Szidarovszky. "Dynamic Oligopoly Models with Production Adjustment and Investment Costs." In Essays in Economic Dynamics. Springer Singapore, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1521-2_6.

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Agliari, Anna, Nicolò Pecora, and Alina Szuz. "Dynamical Analysis of Cournot Oligopoly Models: Neimark-Sacker Bifurcation and Related Mechanisms." In Qualitative Theory of Dynamical Systems, Tools and Applications for Economic Modelling. Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33276-5_3.

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Conference papers on the topic "Oligopoly models"

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Ibrahim, Adyda. "Dynamics of two nonlinear oligopoly models." In PROCEEDINGS OF THE 3RD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES. AIP Publishing LLC, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/1.4882510.

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Wang, Junyan. "Analysis on Cournot Oligopoly Game Models With Two Firms and More Than Two Firms." In ASME 2008 International Mechanical Engineering Congress and Exposition. ASMEDC, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/imece2008-66151.

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This paper reviews the standard game models and its Nash equilibrium and then analyses Cournot oligopoly game from two firms to the case with more than two firms. Due to Cournot equilibrium point, the concept of Cournot equilibrium point is the same as the concept as the non-cooperative game with pure strategy but the strategy can be chosen in Cournot game is infinity and it can not be obtained base on Nash equilibrium theorem. Finally, the existence conditions of Cournot equilibrium point are given and the theorem and its proof of the existence Cournot equilibrium point are given too.
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Alikhanzadeh, A., and M. Irving. "Combined oligopoly and oligopsony bilateral electricity market model using CV equilibria." In 2012 IEEE Power & Energy Society General Meeting. New Energy Horizons - Opportunities and Challenges. IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/pesgm.2012.6345293.

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Shiau, Ching-Shin, and Jeremy Michalek. "A Game-Theoretic Approach to Finding Market Equilibria for Automotive Design Under Environmental Regulation." In ASME 2007 International Design Engineering Technical Conferences and Computers and Information in Engineering Conference. ASMEDC, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/detc2007-34884.

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Recent research has extended prior efforts to integrate firm-level objectives into engineering design optimization models by further enlarging the scope to investigate the effects of regulation on the design decisions of profit-seeking firms in competition. In particular, one study examined the effects of environmental policy on vehicle design decisions by integrating quantitative models of engineering performance, market demand, production cost and regulatory penalties in a joint optimization framework using game theory to model the effects of competition on design and pricing. Model complexity and the solution methods used to solve for market equilibria in prior research have led to a limitation where the prior approach is too computationally intensive to allow extensive parametric studies on the effects of policy changes on design. To address this issue, we present an alternative game-theoretic approach utilizing necessary and sufficient conditions with Nash conditions to find market equilibria in an oligopoly of automakers, and we use this approach to examine the resulting optimal design responses under various regulation scenarios.
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Michalek, Jeremy J., Panos Y. Papalambros, and Steven J. Skerlos. "A Study of Emission Policy Effects on Optimal Vehicle Design Decisions." In ASME 2003 International Design Engineering Technical Conferences and Computers and Information in Engineering Conference. ASMEDC, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/detc2003/dac-48767.

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A methodology is presented for studying the effects of automobile emission policies on the design decisions of profit-seeking automobile producers in a free-entry oligopoly market. The study does not attempt to model short-term decisions of specific producers. Instead, mathematical models of engineering performance, consumer demand, cost, and competition are integrated to predict the effects of design decisions on manufacturing cost, demand, and producer profit. Game theory is then used to predict vehicle designs that producers would have economic incentive to produce at market equilibrium under several policy scenarios. The methodology is illustrated with three policy alternatives for the small car market: corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) regulations, carbon dioxide emissions taxes, and diesel fuel vehicle quotas. Interesting results are derived, for example, it is predicted that in some cases a stiffer regulatory penalty can result in lower producer costs because of competition. This mathematical formulation establishes a link between engineering design, business, and marketing through an integrated optimization model that is used to provide insight necessary to make informed environmental policy.
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Bocutoğlu, Ersan. "Have Credit Rating Agencies Got a Role in Triggering 2007 Global Financial Crisis?" In International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c06.01238.

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The efforts for understanding the 2007 Global Financial Crisis requires more elaborated studies on the institutions, processes and other micro foundations of financial services industry instead of studies solely on mainstream business cycles theories that have obviously failed in understanding, explaining and predicting the crisis. This paper attempts to investigate whether or not credit rating agencies had played a triggering role in 2007 Global Financial Crisis. It is a study of parties, institutions and processes within financial services market. It is well documented that the credit rating agencies whose main function is to provide investors with information about the credit-worthiness of securities on which they plan to invest had hardly ever performed that function properly during the crisis. By changing their business models from ‘investor pays model’ to ‘issuer pays model’, they paved the way to conflict of interest and inevitably created chaos in financial services industry. Credit rating agencies doubtlessly are responsible for triggering the 2007 Global Financial Crisis. However it should be fair to emphasize also the responsibility of the US regulatory processes in emerging the conflict of interest in credit rating industry by giving some credit rating agencies an oligopoly power in the credit rating market and taking their credit ratings as the basic points of reference for regulatory purposes. It is obvious that the credit rating industry needs a reform.
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Ifrach, Bar, Vivek Farias, and Gabriel Y. Weintraub. "A two tiered dynamic oligopoly model." In the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory. ACM Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807472.

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8

Hong-Yan, Shi, Xu Zhen, and Chen Zhongju. "Analysis on Betrand model of oligopoly market." In 2010 2nd IEEE International Conference on Information and Financial Engineering (ICIFE). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icife.2010.5609489.

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Chen, Jizhi. "Research on Bertrand dual-oligopoly dynamic game model." In 2010 International Conference on Logistics Systems and Intelligent Management (ICLSIM). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iclsim.2010.5461433.

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Wang, Yan, and Yuanguo Zhu. "An Uncertain Multi-Oligopoly Model of Bertrand Type." In 2017 4th International Conference on Information Science and Control Engineering (ICISCE). IEEE, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icisce.2017.181.

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Reports on the topic "Oligopoly models"

1

Kim, Dae-Wook, and Christopher Knittel. Biases in Static Oligopoly Models? Evidence from the California Electricity Market. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w10895.

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