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Šimák, Vojtěch. "Soukromé informace při vstupu na koncentrované trhy." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2014. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-194502.
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This thesis deals with gathering of private information when company tries to enter on concentrated markets. Aim of the thesis is to show how much private information will company require and how is its output and profit affected by private information. Thesis uses standard optimalization tools of microeconomic analysis.
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Al-Nowaihi, A. M. "The oligopoly problem." Thesis, London South Bank University, 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.371391.
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Part (I) of this thesis is on the Cournot model. Our aDn has been to collect together the known results on the Cournot model, present them in a systematic manner and derive the results from a single set of postulates. In the process we have corrected some errors, generalised some results and discovered some new ones. Part (II) is a brief review of the two main approaches to oligopoly theory: (1) the Reaction Function approach (also known as the conjectural variations approach, the classical approach or the traditional approach); (2) the game-theoretic approach, particularly the Super-Game approach of James Friedman. We show that the Reaction Function approach leads either to inconsistency, or to implausible econom1C results. We show that the Super-Game approach of James Friedman suffers from several defects, notably lack of credibility. In Part (III) we develop a new approach to oligopoly theory that avoids the difficulties of the two standard approaches. We propose a concept of credibility that promises to reduce the number of a priori possible oligopoly solutions, thus strengthening the predictive power of the theory. (
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Fumagalli, Chiara. "Oligopoly models and competition." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/7600.
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Esta tesis estudia el comportamiento estratégico de las empresas en mercados oligopolísticos y su interacción con otros agentes como compradores potenciales y autoridades públicas.
En el Capítulo 2 se estudia si la distribución de recursos financieros internos hecha por el mercado de capitulos internos de un grupo industrial permite a las divisiones competir en el mercado del producto de una manera diferente a las empresas individuales.
Se prueba que la subsidiación hecha por la "casa madre" no hace necesariamente la división un competidor más fuerte. Pero, la subsidiación proteger la división de un grupo industrial cuando entre en un mercado en relación con acciones estratégicas de empresas rivales ya presentes en el mercado. Se prueba que eso puede ser una ventaja para la división, pero también un coste. En fin, el mercado de capitales interno crea un ligamen financiero entre divisiones que operan en mercados totalmente dependientes y permite al grupo industrial de extender su poder monopolístico de un mercado a otro.
En el Capítulo 3 se prueba que el fraccionamiento de los compradores puede impedir la entrada en un mercado donde ya es presente una empresa y el entrante potencial es más eficiente. En este caso la concentración de los compradores puede favorecer la entrada eliminando el problema de falta de coordinación. Además se estudia si existe un mecanismo que puede solucionar el problema.
En el Capítulo 4 se estudian los efectos de la competencia entre naciones o regiones para la localización de una empresa multinacional. Se asume que una región (más pobre) obtiene más beneficios de la localización de la empresa. Pero la empresa prefiere localizarse en la otra región, si los incentivos ofertas son iguales. En esta situación, la competencia entre regiones a través de incentivos puede mejorar el bienestar agregado en comparación con una política que impide la oferta de incentivos porque permite a la región que más necesita la localización de la empresa de conseguirla. Además se comparan los efectos cuando, en ausencia de incentivos, la empresa exporta y cuando la empresa invierte en una de las regiones.
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Ibrahim, Adyda. "Dynamics of oligopoly model." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2012. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/dynamics-of-oligopoly-model(dbe7d75a-59a9-41c4-9672-3e6404b183c0).html.
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In this thesis, our aim is to study a Cournot tatonnement system which exhibits destabilisation of the Cournot equilibrium as the number of firms increase. Our approach is to first consider the special case of firms behaving identically in a market share attraction model in two different adjustment process: Cournot tatonnement and bounded rationality adjustment. Results from the Cournot tatonnement system shows a superstable equilibrium in two firms model and an unstable equilibrium in a five firms model. In the five firms model, we show that introducing heterogeneity stabilises the Cournot equilibrium. For both two and five firms model, the differences of costs between firms are critical for the convergence of the system to the Cournot equilibrium. Lastly, we study the effect of entries and exits of firms on the number of active firms in the market. We discover that the market can sustain between two to four firms, and the factors are differences of costs and initial outputs between firms, and barriers to entries.
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Chioveanu, Ioana. "Strategic Pricing in Oligopoly Markets." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/4053.
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La tesis contribuye a la teoría del oligopolio. Analiza la competencia en precio cuando hay interacción estratégica entre las empresas. Me interesan particularmente las situaciones en que las empresas toman otras decisiones antes de competir en precios o cantidades.<br/>El capítulo "La Publicidad, la lealtad de marca y los precios" analiza los efectos estratégicos de la publicidad persuasiva en mercados con productos homogéneos. Utiliza un modelo de competencia bidimensional en publicidad y precios. Las empresas primero invierten en publicidad con el fin de inducir lealtad de marca entre consumidores que, en la ausencia de la publicidad, comprarían la marca más barata. Después las empresas compiten en precios para los consumidores que quedan indiferentes entre las marcas existentes. En equilibrio los precios proceden de distribuciones asimétricas. La variación en las distribuciones de precios se refleja en los beneficios esperados y, como consecuencia, los gastos en publicidad de las dos empresas son asimétricos. Una empresa elige una inversión menor en publicidad, mientras las otras eligen el mismo nivel, más alto de inversión. Por este perfil de inversiones, hay una familia de equilibrios de precio con al menos dos empresas utilizando estrategias mixtas. El modelo propone una manera de modelar mercados con productos homogéneos donde la publicidad genera diferenciación sujetiva y cambia la naturaleza de la competencia en precios.<br/>El capítulo "¿Es la venta conjunta anticompetitiva?" analiza las consecuencias de la venta conjunta sobre los precios en un mercado con productos complementarios. Tramite un modelo de competencia imperfecta con diferenciación espacial, identifica los incentivos para elegir la venta conjunto de complementos, por dos tipos de función de demanda, y se estudia como cambian con el número de complementos. Con una demanda inelástica, la venta conjunta proporciona una ventaja frente a competidores que venden componentes separados. Además, los competidores no pueden mejorar su situación a través de la venta conjunta. Con una demanda elástica, los incentivos para venta conjunta son mayores, y cuando existen, el resultado del mercado es venta conjunta simétrica - el más competitivo. El análisis del bienestar muestra que los incentivos para venta conjunta son excesivos. Sin embargo, la venta conjunta simétrica genera un excedente del consumidor mayor y beneficios menores que la venta conjunta asimétrica (el resultado del mercado con una demanda inelástica). El potencial anticompetitivo de la venta conjunta es particularmente sensitivo a la elasticidad de la demanda.<br/>El capítulo "La innovación en un modelo asimétrico: Comparando los equilibrios de Cournot y Bertrand" compara los resultados de mercado y la eficiencia dinámica de dos tipos de equilibrios en un duopolio diferenciado con bienes sustitutivos, en que solo una empresa puede reducir su coste marginal antes de competir en el mercado. Se muestra que, si la diferenciación es baja y los costes de I&D bajos: (i) la innovación puede ser mayor cuando las empresas compiten en precios si la difusión es baja; (ii) la cantidad producida, el excedente del consumidor y el excedente total pueden ser mayores cuando las empresas compiten en cantidades y la difusión es alta. Un nuevo resultado de este análisis es que, con reducción de coste, tanto los consumidores como los productores pueden estar mejor cuando se compite en cantidades. Se presentan ejemplos numéricos que muestran que estos resultados no dependen de la asimetría del modelo. Se identifica también una equivalencia de parámetros que extiende los resultados a modelos con innovación de la calidad. En efecto, los incentivos para mejorar la calidad pueden ser mayores cuando las empresas compiten en precios, si la diferenciación es baja.<br>My Ph.D. Thesis is intended as a contribution to oligopoly theory. It deals with the analysis of price competition when there is strategic interaction amongst firms. I am especially interested in situations where product market competition is preceded by another strategic decision.<br/>In the chapter entitled "Advertising, Brand Loyalty and Pricing", I study the strategic effect of persuasive advertising in homogenous product markets. For this purpose, I construct a model of two-dimensional competition in non-price advertising and prices. Firms, first, invest in advertising in order to induce brand loyalty within consumers who otherwise would purchase the cheapest alternative on the market. Then, they compete in prices for the remaining brand indifferent consumers. I define the outcome of this two-stage game and show that firms invest a positive amount in advertising and prices exhibit dispersion being random draws from asymmetric distributions. The variation in the price distributions is reflected by the expected profits and, in consequence, the advertising levels chosen by the firms are asymmetric. There is one firm choosing a lower advertising level while the remaining firms choose the same higher advertising. Given this profile of advertising expenditure, there are a family of pricing equilibria with at least two firms randomising on prices. The setting suggests a way of modelling homogenous product markets where persuasive advertising creates subjective product differentiation and changes the nature of subsequent price competition.<br/>In "Is Bundling Anticompetitive?", I analyse the implications of bundling on price competition, in a market with complementary products. Using a model of imperfect competition with spatial product differentiation, I identify the incentives to bundle for two types of demand functions and study how they change with the size of the bundle. With an inelastic demand, bundling creates an advantage over uncoordinated rivals (selling separate complementary components). Moreover, the rivals cannot improve by bundling. I show that this no longer holds with an elastic demand. The incentives to bundle are stronger and, whenever they exist, the market outcome is symmetric bundling, the most competitive one. I perform the related welfare analysis and show that the incentives to bundle are socially excessive. However, bundle against bundle competition (the market outcome with an elastic demand) generates higher consumer surplus and lower profits than bundle against component competition (the market outcome with inelastic demand). This analysis shows that the potential anticompetitiveness of bundling is particularly sensitive to the price elasticity of the demand function.<br/>The last chapter is "Innovation in an Asymmetric Setting: Comparing Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria", a joint work with Ugur Akgun. This paper compares the outcomes and the dynamic efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with substitute goods, where only one firm can reduce marginal cost before product market competition. We show that, with high substitutability and low innovation costs: <br/>-R&D levels can be higher under price competition if spillovers are low;<br/>-output, consumer surplus and total welfare can be larger under Cournot if spillovers are high.<br/>A new result of this article is that with process innovation, both consumers and producers can be better off under quantity competition. We provide well-defined numeric examples showing that these findings do not depend on the asymmetry of the model.
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Hviid, Morten. "Oligopoly models and information transmission." Thesis, University of Warwick, 1987. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/66299/.
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The thesis contains 5 independent papers together with an introduction and a general conclusion. All five papers consider private information in simple oligopoly models with linear demand and cost functions. The problem to be analysed is the extend to which private information is transmitted between firms and the consequences thereof. In principle the transmission (or dissemination) can take place voluntarily or involuntarily. In the case of voluntary information transmission (or sharing) we assume that this is done honestly. One of the main results in this strand of the literature is that firms have no incentives to share information unless they can collude over strategies. In chapter II and III we show that this conclusion is not generally true. In chapter II we consider the incentive for risk-averse firms to share their private information. We show that the assumption of risk-aversion in some cases reverse the conclusion in the literature. In chapter III we show that there are cases in which private information and the sharing thereof within a collusive arrangement prove detrimental to the size of a stable collusive arrangement. Thus in some cases private information imply a disincentive to collude. Chapter IV and V looks at the effect of uncertainty and private information on a two-stage duopoly model in which firms first choose capacity, then compete over prices. In chapter IV we show that no pure strategy equilibrium exists regardless of whether uncertainty is resolved before or after capacity is chosen. A mixed strategy equilibrium is shown to exist, and the equilibrium is worked out for a specific distribution of the random variable. In chapter V we modify the equilibrium concept by imposing a no-mill-price-undercutting rule. We shown that if firms' capacities differ, the firm with the highest capacity endogeneously sets the higher price. Examples of private-asymmetric information are considered and the main finding from the examples are that there are cases where neither firm wants to share the information of the best informed. Chapter VI which is joint work with Norman J. Ireland considers involuntary information transmission via output plans. This allows us to rationalise positive consistent conjectures in a simple oligopoly model. General for all the models considered is that the results not only differ from those found under certainty, but also that the results are possibly non-robust, especially with regards to changes in information structures and functional forms.
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Hanig, Marco. "Differential gaming models of oligopoly." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1986. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/14869.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 1987.<br>Title as it appeared in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Graduate List, June 1987: Differential game models of oligopoly.<br>Bibliography: leaves 242-249.<br>by Marco Hanig.<br>Ph.D.
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Stroux, Sigrid. "US and EC oligopoly control /." The Hague : Kluwer law international, 2004. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb392226564.
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Hsu, Yu-Pei. "Technology transfer in cournot oligopoly /." free to MU campus, to others for purchase, 2003. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/mo/fullcit?p3091933.
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BORETTO, MARCO FELICE. "Cournot oligopoly with preference interdependence." Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10281/291150.
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Lo scopo di questa tesi `e di analizzare la presenza di una struttura sociale di preferenze interdipendenti in un oligopolio di Cournot. Per fare ci`o, in- troduciamo un gioco in cui la rete di interazioni si riflette nelle funzioni di utilit`a delle imprese. Considerando le preferenze interdipendenti, possiamo identificare un ulteriore canale di interazione tra le imprese, parallelamente all’ interazione di mercato, che stabilisce un’altra interazione, possibilmente locale o anche una forma di interazione one-to-one.
La modellizzazione proposta si rivela adatta per estendere i risultati sull’esistenza e unicit`a dell’equilibrio di Nash per modelli oligopolistici Cournotiani senza preferenze interdipendenti.
Studiamo il ruolo dell’interdipendenza delle preferenze sulle risultanti pro- priet`a dell’equilibrio di Nash, in termini di sostituibilit`a/complementarit`a strategica.
Caratterizziamo, inoltre, l’equilibrio di Nash attraverso i due canali di in- terazione tra imprese. Ci`o che emerge `e quindi il primato della sfera so- ciale su quella economica in particolari strutture economiche (es. oligopoli Cournotiani) con preferenze interdipendenti.
La caratterizzazione dell’equilibrio, il conseguente grado di competitivit`a derivante dall’interdipendenza delle preferenze sociali e la statica comparata possono essere tutte espresse in termini di misure che descrivono le propriet`a del network.
La statica comparativa ci consente di capire sia come un cambiamento nella struttura di interazione sociale di un singolo giocatore influenzi il risultato del giocatore stesso, in termini di aumento/diminuzione della sua quota di mercato, sia come un cambiamento nella struttura dell’interazione nel suo insieme influisca sul risultato collettivo, in termini di aumento/diminuzione dei profitti.<br>The aim of this thesis is to analyze the presence of a structure of social in- teredependent preferences in a Cournot oligopoly. To do this, we introduce a game in which the network of interactions reflects on the utility functions of firms. Cconsidering interdependent preferences, we can identify an ad- ditional channel of interaction among firms, along with the usual market interaction that establish another, possibly local or even one-to-one form of interaction.
The proposed modelling approach proves to be suitable to extend the re- sults about existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for Cournotian oligopoly models without interdependent preferences.
We study the role of preference interdependence on the resulting properties of the Nash equilibrium of any game, in terms of strategic substitutabil- ity/complementarity.
We characterize the Nash equilibrium through the two channels of interac- tion among firms. What emerges is then the primacy of the social sphere over the economic one in particular economic structures (i.e. Cournotian oligopolies) with interdependent preferences.
The characterization of the equilibrium, the resulting degree of competitive- ness arising from the interdependence of social preferences and the compar- ative statics can be all expressed in terms of measures that describe the network properties.
Comparative statics allows us to understand both how a change in the social interaction structure of a single player influences the outcome of the player itself, in terms of increased/decreased market share, and how a change in the interaction structure as a whole affects the collective outcome, in terms of increased/decreased profits.
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Strážnický, Matúš. "Application of Game Theory principles in the oligopoly-characterized industry." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2011. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-113005.
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The goals of the master thesis are describing the strategic oligopoly environment of chosen industry of Czech telecommunications, together with introducing basic game theory principles with their possible real case application. It mentions historical shifts in Czech telecommunications sector which influence the actual industry conditions. The thesis briefly describes the individual players in the market and turns its attention towards the industry characterization through standard oligopoly models. Following, it introduces theoretical insight on possible market entry strategies into oligopoly industries. The application part focuses on game-theory in pricing strategies, market entry and entry deterring scenarios with examples. Final part summarizes the objectives in detail and provides final comments on the thesis.
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Šťastný, Kryštof. "Game Theory and Its Applications in The Global Oil Industry." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2015. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-206042.
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This thesis will enable the reader to see how applications of game theory can help understand the development in oil market. Firstly, the thesis will introduce to the reader the foundations of game theory, a branch of microeconomics studying strategic interaction. Special focus will be put on the theory of oligopoly, the most important collusive and non-collusive models of oligopoly and their similarities and differences. Secondly, the thesis will show the reader how these theoretic models can be applied to the past development within the global oil industry, most prominently on the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. Finally, the thesis will present possible applications of game theory and some of the models to the oil market after the price decrease which started in 2014. This would help the reader assess the potential outcomes of the current crisis and possible development in the future.
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Sandin, Rickard. "Heterogeneity in oligopoly : theories and tests." Doctoral thesis, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Samhällsekonomi (S), 1996. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hhs:diva-867.
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This dissertation consists of five separate chapters, of which the three first three are empirical and the last two are theoretical. Chapter 1: Competition in Interrelated Markets: An Empirical Study. (Co-authored with Marcus Asplund.)This chapter studies competition in small, concentrated and interrelated markets. Our data set consists of price information from 543 driving schools in 250 local markets in Sweden, which gives a large sample to test hypotheses on how market structure influences competition. The results show that if prices in nearby markets are low, and the distances to them are short, it reduces prices, as suggested in models of spatial competition. Moreover, we find that prices in closely located markets are interdependent. It is also shown that prices are increasing in firm concentration within a market, as most theories of oligopoly predict. Chapter 2: Estimating the Number of Firms and Capacity in Small Markets. (Co-authored with Marcus Asplund.)Many oligopoly theories predict that there will be a positive correlation between market size and the equilibrium number of firms, and some also imply that competition is more intense in larger markets. We test these predictions with a sample of 535 driving schools in 249 markets. With an ordered Probit, a Tobit, and a Poisson model we estimate the relation between the number of firms, capacity, and market size. We find a strong positive correlation between market size and the number of firms. The results show that the per firm market size is increasing in the number of firms in the market. The market size per capacity unit is smaller in large markets. Since the industry produces a fairly homogenous good, we argue that this is evidence that competition is increasing in market size. Chapter 3: The Survival of New Products. (Co-authored with Marcus Asplund.)We study the product turnover in an industry and, in particular, the survival of new products. The data set consists of monthly sales of all products sold in the Swedish beer market over the time period of 1989-1995. The death rates of newly introduced products are high - out of 199 products an estimated 25 percent were withdrawn within 18 months and 50 percent within approximately 48 months. We use parametric duration models with time varying covariates to estimate survival functions. Our results show that products with low and decreasing market shares have higher hazard rates. Moreover, the hazard rates are dependent on the characteristics of the producer. Products from firms with a large number of other products, and (to a lesser extent) the largest market shares are more likely to be withdrawn. Chapter 4: Uniform Subsidy Reductions in International Oligopoly.This chapter studies the effect of production subsidies used as strategic instruments by two rivalling countries whose firms differ in production efficiency. In particular, it examines the welfare effects of a uniform subsidy reduction from the Cournot-Nash equilibrium under different assumptions regarding technology and taste. It is found that the net exporter (usually the efficient country) gains while the net importer (usually the inefficient country) loses from a uniform subsidy reduction. Results show that a non-linear demand function or marginal cost functions with different slopes across countries is necessary to obtain an increase in total welfare.Chapter 5: Subsidies in Oligopoly Markets: A Welfare Comparison between Symmetric and Asymmetric Costs. (Co-authored with Stephen F. Hamilton.)This chapter studies welfare effects of uniform production subsidies in oligopoly markets, comparing cases of symmetric and asymmetric costs. Cost asymmetry reduces the impact relative to the symmetric-cost case if the deman function is concave and magnifies the impact if demand is convex. The welfare difference increases with the degree of market power and the cost differential in the industry.<br><p>Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögsk. : 1997</p>
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Daniels, Timothy C. (Timothy Craig). "Strategic oligopoly model for industrial economics." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/59119.
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Thesis (M.B.A.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2010.<br>"June 2010." Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.<br>Several years ago, Professor Robert Pindyck of the MIT Sloan School of Management created an oligopoly strategy game for use in his course 15.013: Industrial Economics for Strategic Decisions. This game divided the class up into "firms" (generally consisting of two students each) and randomly formed industries, each consisting of three firms. Students competed throughout the semester in a fictitious market for a heterogeneous good, each firm providing price and production inputs on a weekly basis. The purpose of the game was to provide a hands-on tool to teach students how industry competitors interact, and how forces such as signaling, collusion, demand fluctuations, and emotion affect industry and firm performance. Although the game was carried out successfully for several years, issues surfaced over time. In particular, the Excel model used to run the weekly calculations was set up awkwardly and was therefore difficult to use. Additionally, the memo distributed to students to explain the game was disorganized, lacked sufficient examples, and contained errors. Finally, Professor Pindyck desired to implement the game in other courses with other professors, and this was not possible without a thorough document containing instructions for running the game as well as in-depth background information on the theory behind the calculations. The work carried out for this thesis aimed to fix these problems. Specifically, I rebuilt the Excel model to operate in a simpler and more user-friendly fashion. Additionally, I revised the student memo to rectify the issues described above. Finally, I created a new manual to allow professors and TAs run the game in their courses.<br>by Timothy C. Daniels<br>M.B.A.
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Kamei, Keita. "Essays on International Trade and Oligopoly." Kyoto University, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2433/199049.
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Somogyi, Robert. "Essays on capacity-constrained pricing." Thesis, Université Paris-Saclay (ComUE), 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016SACLX024/document.
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Cette thèse est composée de trois chapitres. Le premier chapitre, "Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition with Substantial Product Differentiation", étudie le comportement d'un duopole lorsque les deux entreprises sont caractérisées par des contraintes de capacité et produisent un bien différencié à la Hotelling. En limitant l'analyse au cas d'un degré élevé de différentiation du produit, je démontre l'existence d'au moins un équilibre en stratégie pure pour tous les niveaux de capacités. Le deuxième chapitre, "Monopoly Pricing with Dual Capacity Constraints" analyse un monopole qui est contraint par deux types de contraintes de capacité: un sur la quantité produite, l'autre sur le nombre des consommateurs. Je démontre que les prix optimaux choisis par les entreprises en court terme ne sont pas monotones dans le niveau des contraintes de capacité. En outre, le bien-être agrégé des consommateurs peut décroître si une des contraintes de capacité est augmentée. Le troisième chapitre, "Competition with Dual Capacity Constraints", étend l'analyse du deuxième chapitre au cas du duopole symétrique dans lequel les deux entreprises font face aux mêmes niveaux de capacité. Je démontre l'existence de conditions sous lesquelles la non-monotonicité des prix et du bien-être des consommateurs observée dans le 2ème chapitre est également présente dans le cas du duopole. Certains équilibres donnent naissance à des prix de duopole égaux au prix de monopole. En outre, les entreprises peuvent choisir des prix d'équilibre identiques sur les deux marchés malgré leur pouvoir de discrimination des prix<br>This Ph.D. thesis is composed of three chapters. Since Kreps and Scheinkman's seminal article (1983) a large number of papers have analyzed capacity constraints' potential to relax price competition. However, the majority of the ensuing literature has assumed that products are either perfect or very close substitutes. Therefore very little is known about the interaction between capacity constraints and local monopoly power. The aim of the present paper is to shed light on this question using a standard Hotelling setup. The high level of product dierentiation results in a variety of equilibrium firm behavior and it generates at least one pure-strategy equilibrium for any capacity level. The second chapter, "Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition with Substantial Product Differentiation", studies the price-setting behavior of a monopoly facing two capacity constraints: one on the number of consumers it can serve, the other on the total amount of products it can sell. Facing two consumer groups that difer in their demands and the distribution of their willingness-to-pay, the monopoly's optimal non-linear pricing strategy consists of offering one or two price-quantity bundles. The characterization of the firm's optimal pricing as a function of its two capacities reveals a rich structure that also gives rise to some surprising results. In particular, I show that prices are non-monotonic in capacity levels. Moreover, there always exists a range of parameters in which weakening one of the capacity constraints decreases consumer surplus. In the long run, when the firms can choose how much capacity to build, prices and consumer surplus are monotonic in capacity costs. The third chapter, "Competition with Dual Capacity Constraints", studies duopoly pricing under dual capacity constraints, limiting both the total quantity and the number of consumers served. It extends both the analysis of monopoly pricing with dual capacity constraints and the symmetric models of Bertrand-Edgeworth competition with a singular capacity. By isolating parameter regions where a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium exists, I nd that several types of equilibria are possible, depending on the model's specications. For some of them, duopoly prices are identical to monopoly prices. Equilibrium prices are non-monotonic in capacity levels if consumers' valuations are suciently heterogeneous. Moreover, I show that despite their ability to price discriminate, competition may lead firms to charge identical prices across markets
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Akgün, Ugur. "Horizontal Mergers and Equilibria Comparison in Oligopoly." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/4052.
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Esta tesis consiste en cuatro trabajos independientes. En amplios términos los dos temas generales que trata se pueden clasificar como fusiones horizontales y comparaciones de los parámetros del mercado del equilibrio entre competencia en precios y cantidades. <br/>En el articulo, "Fusiones con funciones de oferta", analizo los efectos de una fusión en una industria que produce un bien homogéneo cuando las empresas compiten eligien funciones de oferta. Las empresas eligen las funciones que relacionan su oferta con el precio de mercado. La competencia a la Cournot donde las empresas eligen a las cantidades, y la competencia a la Bertrand donde las empresas eligen los precios son casos especiales de la competencia en funciones de oferta. Considero una industria con un nivel fijo de capital. El capital una empresa define su tecnología de producción. Una fusión crea no solamente una empresa más grande, pero también una con una estructura más eficiente del coste que cualesquiera de sus componentes. Se muestra que cualquier fusión hace que todas las empresas que bajen su producción. La disminución de la producción por las empresas no participantes hace cualquier fusión rentable. Cualquier fusión en una industria con el capital social igualmente distribuido conduce a una pérdida del bienestar. Finalmente, una fusión es más probable que aumente el bienestar si aumenta la "simetría" en la industria. <br/>En mi trabajo "Fusiones bajo la incertidumbre", considero las decisiones de fusionar de empresas que producen bienes diferenciados en un mercado con choques idiosincrásicos de la demanda. Las empresas toman sus decisiones de fusionar antes de que choques afecten a la industria. Todas las empresas comparten la misma información sobre las condiciones de mercado en cualquier momento. En particular, después de un choque, todas las empresas saben todos los parámetros relevantes del mercado. Así, una fusión no produce ninguna ventaja informativa. Exploro el modelo bajo dos modos de competencia. Comparando los incentivos para fusionar con los incentivos en el caso de un mercado determinista, encuentro que la característica incierta en el modelo aumentan la rentabilidad de una fusión bajo competencia de precio, mientras que con competencia en cantidades, su efecto sobre la rentabilidad de la fusión es ambiguo. Sin embargo, si hay incentivos a fusionar en el caso determinista, después de la incertidumbre, aumenta la rentabilidad de la fusión. <br/>En mi trabajo "Comparando los precios de Bertrand y de Cournot: Un caso de substitutos y de complementos " confirma la sabiduría común según la cual la competencia del precio es más competitiva que la competencia de la cantidad. Resultados anteriores que apoyan esta visión en mercados de productos substitutos o en mercados de productos complementarios. Considero el caso cuando los complementos y los substitutos coexisten en un mercado de productos diferenciado. <br/>El artículo "Innovación en un modelo asimétrico: Comparando los equilibrios de Cournot y de Bertrand ". Este artículo compara los resultados y la eficiencia dinámica de los equilibrios de Cournot y de Bertrand en un duopolio diferenciado, donde solamente una empresa puede reducir el coste marginal antes de la competencia en el mercado de producto. Demostramos que, con alta sustitución y costes bajos de innovación: - los niveles de I&D pueden ser más altos bajo competencia de precio si la difusión es baja; - la producción, el exceso del consumidor y el bienestar total pueden ser más grandes bajo Cournot si la difusión es alta. Un nuevo resultado de este artículo es que con la innovación de proceso, los consumidores y los productores pueden encontrarse en mejor situación bajo competencia de cantidad. Proporcionamos ejemplos numéricos bien definidos que demuestran que estos resultados no dependen de la asimetría del modelo.<br>This dissertation consists of four pieces of independent work. In broad terms two general themes that it addresses can be classified as horizontal mergers and comparison of equilibrium market parameters in Cournot and Bertrand competition.<br/>In my paper, "Mergers with supply functions", I analyze the equilibrium effects of a merger in a homogenous good industry when firms compete by choosing supply schedules. Firms choose functions that relate their supply to the market price. Cournot competition where firms commit to quantities, and Bertrand competition where firms commit to prices are special cases of supply function competition - they exogenously impose horizontal and vertical supply schedules on the firms. I consider an industry with a fixed capital stock. A merger creates not only a larger firm, but also one with more efficient cost structure than any of its constituents. I find that any merger results in all firms lowering supply. The decrease in supply by non-participating firms makes any merger profitable. This differs from the effects of mergers under Cournot competition where the non-participating firms expand their supply, reducing the profitability of a merger. Any merger in an industry with equally distributed capital stock leads to a welfare loss. Finally, a merger is more likely to be welfare enhancing if it increases the "symmetry" in the industry.<br/>In my paper, titled "Mergers under uncertainty", I consider the merger decisions of firms producing differentiated products in a market with idiosyncratic demand shocks. Firms make their merger decisions taking into account that future shocks will hit the industry. All firms share the same information about the market conditions at any time. In particular, after the arrival of a shock all firms know all the relevant market parameters. Thus, a merger does not produce any informational advantage. I explore the model under two competition modes. By comparing the incentives for merger with the incentives in a benchmark case of a deterministic market, I find that the uncertain feature in the model increases the attractiveness of a merger under price competition, while with Cournot competition its effect on merger profitability is ambiguous. However, if there are incentives to merge in the deterministic case, then uncertainty increases the profitability of the merger. .<br/>In my short paper, "Comparing Bertrand and Cournot prices: A case of substitutes and complements", I reasses the common wisdom according to which price competition is more competitive than quantity competition. Previous results supporting this view deal with either substitute products markets or symmetric complement products markets. I consider the case when complements and substitutes co-exist in a differentiated products market. I introduce a set of symmetry criteria for this market, and show that when they are fulfilled, there exists a symmetric Bertrand equilibrium with a lower price than the price resulting from any symmetric Cournot equilibrium.<br/>The last piece of work in the thesis, "Innovation in an Asymmetric Setting: Comparing Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria", is a joint work with Ioana Chioveanu. This paper compares the outcomes and the dynamic efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with substitute goods, where only one firm can reduce marginal cost before product market competition. We show that, with high substitutability and low innovation costs: <br/>-R&D levels can be higher under price competition if spillovers are low;<br/>-output, consumer surplus and total welfare can be larger under Cournot if spillovers are high.<br/>A new result of this article is that with process innovation, both consumers and producers can be better off under quantity competition. We provide well-defined numeric examples showing that these findings do not depend on the asymmetry of the model. The fact that innovation levels may be higher in Bertrand competition is consistent with the findings of Bester and Petrakis (1993). We identify a parameter equivalence that extends all their results from process to product innovation: In particular, incentives to improve quality may be larger under price competition, if substitutability is high.
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Chong, Han Hwee. "Imports and oligopoly behaviour in Australian manufacturing." Curtin University of Technology, School of Economics and Finance, 2003. http://espace.library.curtin.edu.au:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=14094.
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Oligopoly behaviour by domestic firms faced with foreign competition in a small open economy is examined in the context of a market for differentiated products. This paper concentrates on the responsiveness of import flows to import price in the context of trade with imperfect competition. The empirical work analyses the behaviour over time of the interaction between domestic industry prices and domestic costs as well as foreign competitors' prices. A structural model is employed for estimation purposes with consumer demand derived from a CES (constant elasticity of substitution) utility function of domestic and foreign composites of goods. Domestic firms are assumed to face Leontief production functions and maximise profit independently subject to their conjectures about the reactions of rivals. Firm behaviour is modelled using conjectural variations to identify market power, distinguishing two models of oligopoly, namely, Cournot and Bertrand conjectural variations. This leads to the econometric specification of pricing, import and budget share equations consistent with oligopolistic equilibrium. The interrelationship between the budget share equations and the price-cost margin provides encompasses either Cournot or Bertrand conjectural variations. The econometric specification is applied to each of the two digit Australian manufacturing industries using quarterly data covering the period from 1984 to 2000. Results of the industrial behaviour indicate that industries that produce consumer products are generally react to price movements The classification of industry 21 to 24 is more proximate to consumer products as compared to higher industrial numbering. The regression results for industry 25 to 28 suggest quantity reactions. This is in line with the nature of the products produce by these industries, which are heavy industrial manufacturing products.<br>The elasticity with respect to foreign price is distinguished between the "partial" and the "total" effect. The partial elasticity of import demand ranges from .6205 to 4.9497, while the total elasticity of import demand ranges from .6505 to 19.8132. The elasticity of demand ranges from .0191 for Wood and Paper Product manufacturing to 3.4093 for Food, Beverage and Tobacco manufacturing.
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Eryganov, Ivan. "Aplikace kooperativní teorie her pro Cournotovy oligopoly." Master's thesis, Vysoké učení technické v Brně. Fakulta strojního inženýrství, 2019. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-401580.
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This Master’s thesis deals with the application of cooperative game theory for solving the problems of Cournot's oligopolies. The knowledge of oligopoly theory and game theory has been elaborated to build a model describing the behavior of companies at a market that meets the preconditions of Cournot's oligopoly. The definition of cooperative game is based on the -characteristic function, which takes into account, compared to classical methods, that companies which are not in the coalition are pursuing their own profits, not suppressing coalition positions. The properties of the resulting cooperative games are examined in detail, focusing on monotony and convexity. Several theorems about these properties have been derived and their economic interpretations are given. Also, the question of calculation of the -characteristic function using the best-reply dynamics algorithm is being solved, and its convergence for a given type of games is justified. The model is applied to data from the oil market, which is further characterized by the results of the cooperative game.
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Zhang, Jingjing. "Taxes, tariffs and trade costs under oligopoly." Thesis, Cardiff University, 2017. http://orca.cf.ac.uk/111146/.
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This study compares ad valorem and per-unit taxes in public finance and international trade and examines the welfare effects of trade cost in general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE). In chapter two, following Grazzini (2006), the welfare comparison of ad valorem and per-unit taxation is conducted in an exchange economy under Cournot competition. It is shown that the exceptional result in Grazzini (2006) that a per-unit tax can be welfare superior to an ad valorem tax, entirely depends on the form of social welfare function. Furthermore, the possibility of the dominance of per-unit taxation is due to the effect of taxation on the redistribution of income rather than from any efficiency gain. In chapter three, assuming that the home government maximises the tariff revenue, the welfare with ad valorem tariff is higher than that with per-unit tariff given the constraint of FDI cost. The maximum revenue collected by the home government is always higher with ad valorem tariff under Cournot competition. However, under Bertrand competition with differentiated products, the maximum revenue with per-unit tariff is higher than that with ad valorem tariff if the FDI cost is sufficiently low. This is because the introduction of product differentiation and nature of Bertrand competition both intensify the competition and lower the prices. In chapter four, by using the general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE) model developed by J. Peter Neary, it is shown that social welfare is also U-shaped in the trade cost under Cournot competition. The result is in line with Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983). In particular, when the trade cost is sufficiently high, a reduction in trade cost will increase the competitive wage due to the redistribution of labour, and the equilibrium prices as a function of trade costs follows a hump-shaped pattern if the products are homogeneous.
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Chong, Han. "Imports and oligopoly behaviour in Australian manufacturing." Thesis, Curtin University, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/857.
Full textAbstract:
Oligopoly behaviour by domestic firms faced with foreign competition in a small open economy is examined in the context of a market for differentiated products. This paper concentrates on the responsiveness of import flows to import price in the context of trade with imperfect competition. The empirical work analyses the behaviour over time of the interaction between domestic industry prices and domestic costs as well as foreign competitors' prices. A structural model is employed for estimation purposes with consumer demand derived from a CES (constant elasticity of substitution) utility function of domestic and foreign composites of goods. Domestic firms are assumed to face Leontief production functions and maximise profit independently subject to their conjectures about the reactions of rivals. Firm behaviour is modelled using conjectural variations to identify market power, distinguishing two models of oligopoly, namely, Cournot and Bertrand conjectural variations. This leads to the econometric specification of pricing, import and budget share equations consistent with oligopolistic equilibrium. The interrelationship between the budget share equations and the price-cost margin provides encompasses either Cournot or Bertrand conjectural variations. The econometric specification is applied to each of the two digit Australian manufacturing industries using quarterly data covering the period from 1984 to 2000. Results of the industrial behaviour indicate that industries that produce consumer products are generally react to price movements The classification of industry 21 to 24 is more proximate to consumer products as compared to higher industrial numbering. The regression results for industry 25 to 28 suggest quantity reactions. This is in line with the nature of the products produce by these industries, which are heavy industrial manufacturing products.The elasticity with respect to foreign price is distinguished between the "partial" and the "total" effect. The partial elasticity of import demand ranges from .6205 to 4.9497, while the total elasticity of import demand ranges from .6505 to 19.8132. The elasticity of demand ranges from .0191 for Wood and Paper Product manufacturing to 3.4093 for Food, Beverage and Tobacco manufacturing.
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Steinmetz, Alexander. "Essays on Strategic Behavior and Dynamic Oligopoly Competition." kostenfrei, 2009. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn=nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-47934.
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Zhang, Anming. "Essays on strategic and contractual relationships in oligopoly." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/31116.
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The thesis consists of three essays. In the first essay, the strategic effects of bonus/penalty compensation contracts are analysed. This essay consists of the first three chapters of the thesis. In Chapter 1, viewing each firm as a "principal-agent" pair, we examine firms' rivalry in bonus/penalty contracts in oligopolistic markets when the agents are risk-neutral. Under standard assumptions concerning production, demand, and cost functions, we show that bonus/penalty contracts may be used for strategic purposes. We find that whether agents' actions would (in equilibrium) be encouraged through bonuses or discouraged through penalties would critically depend on the existing strategic relationships between agents' actions or firms' products. We further show that firms' capita] stocks can affect their strategic positions in the bonus/penalty rivalry. The social welfare implication of the bonus/penalty rivalry is also examined. In Chapter 2, using a general framework of rivalrous agency with risk-averse agents, we identify two distinctive effects of bonus/penalty contracting, namely, the strategic effect and the incentive effect. We find that the two effects may or may not work in the same direction for a principal-agent pair, depending on the nature of strategic relationships between agents' actions. In Chapter 3, we compare the strategic effects of bonus/penalty contracts with that of linear contracts. We find that, if only one principal is active in designing agency compensation contracts, then he/she would be indifferent between a bonus/penalty contract and a linear contract. If both principals are active in designing agency contracts, however, the choice between bonus/penalty and linear contracts would in general matter to the principals. In particular, we show in an example that both principals would non-cooperatively choose a bonus contract over a linear contract.
The second essay of the thesis, as in Chapter 4, presents an analysis of common sales agents based on their precommitment role when consumers are imperfectly informed about the products on the market. We show that an exclusive channel stucture can create a cost due to exclusive channels' inability to commit themselves to sales impartiality. We further show that independent non-cooperative firms may use common agents as a precommitment device to convince potential consumers that the risk of being misrepresented has been reduced or eliminated. We demonstrate that a market involving common sales agents can arise as an equilibrium outcome. Our analysis shows that common sales agents can be welfare improving for both firms and consumers.
The third essay, as in Chapter 5, investigates the dynamic pattern of firm competitive conduct, using time-series and firm-specific data for a set of duopoly airline routes. We estimate the mean conduct parameters for each firm and each period, and infer whether the data are consistent with the Cournot, Bertrand, Friedman, or Green-Porter models. We find that airlines' competitive behavior may switch between the competitive and collusive regimes. Moreover, we find that airline profits in a collusive period appear less than the (single-period) monopoly profits, and the degree of overall market competitiveness is between the Cournot and monopoly solutions but closer to the Cournot solution. Our data suggest that major carriers might use quantity volumes, rather than prices, as their strategy variables. We also conduct some Bayesian analysis of seeing how our results would influence priors associated with different models. We illustrate a model choice criterion based on Bayesian analysis and use the criterion to choose the "best" model among competing models.<br>Business, Sauder School of<br>Graduate
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Tesoriere, Antonio. "Endogenous firm asymmetry vs symmetry in oligopoly models /." Louvain-la-Neuve : Univ. Catholique de Louvain, 2007. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/54345987X.pdf.
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Salvo, Alberto. "Price competition, mergers and structural estimation in oligopoly." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2005. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1858/.
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This thesis examines the exercise of market power by oligopolistic firms. The first part deals with a phenomenon that has important implications for market power: horizontal mergers. I seek to uncover why the pattern of equilibria in sequential merger games of a certain type is similar across a fairly wide class of models studied in the literature. By developing general conditions characterising each element of the set of possible equilibria, I show that the solution to models that satisfy a certain sufficient condition will be restricted to the same subset of equilibria. This result is of empirical relevance in that the pattern of equilibria obtained for this class of models is associated with mergers happening, not in isolation, but rather in bunches. I extend the results to the analysis of cross-border mergers, studying two standard models that satisfy my sufficient condition: Sutton's (1991) vertically-differentiated oligopoly and Perry and Porter's (1985) fixed-supply-of-capital model. The second part is concerned with the structural inference of market power, a central theme in empirical Industrial Organisation. I demonstrate that when an industry faces potential entry and this threat of entry constrains pre-entry prices, cost and conduct cannot be identified from the comparative statics of equilibrium. In such a setting, the identifying assumption behind the well-established technique of relying on exogenous demand perturbations to distinguish empirically between alternative hypotheses of conduct is shown to fail. The Brazilian cement industry, where the threat of imports restrains market outcomes, provides an empirical illustration. In particular, price-cost margins estimated using this established technique are biased heavily downwards, underestimating the degree of market power. I propose a test of conduct, adapted to this constrained setting, which suggests that outcomes in the industry are collusive and characterised by market division. Robustness of this result is verified along several dimensions: by considering simple dynamic multimarket games which in equilibrium give rise to market division; by reviewing the spatial competition literature; and by resorting to a gravity model to statistically analyse shipments.
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Raith, Michael Alexander. "Product differentiation, uncertainty and price coordination in oligopoly." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1996. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1439/.
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This thesis consists of three self-contained analyses of models with price-setting firms. It explores the relationships between different sources of market imperfection that may be present simultaneously: product differentiation, imperfect information and collusive pricing. Chapter 2 analyses the circumstances under which oligopolists have an incentive to exchange private information on unknown demand or cost parameters. It presents general model which encompasses virtually all models in the current literature on information sharing as special cases. Within this unifying framework it is shown that in contrast to the apparent inconclusiveness of previous results, some simple principles determining the incentives for firms to share information can be obtained. Existing results are generalised, some previous interpretations questioned and new explanations offered. Chapter 3 addresses the question of how price setting between firms in a spatial retail market is affected if the relevant consumers commute between their home and their workplace and try to combine shopping with commuting. It is shown within a specific model that for small commuting distances, an increase in commuting leads to a decrease of equilibrium prices, since due to a reduction of effective travel costs the firms' products become better substitutes. Under quite general conditions, however, larger or dispersed commuting distances lead to the nonexistence of a price equilibrium. Chapter 4 analyses the question how product differentiation affects the scope for oligopolists to collude on prices. It suggests a precise theoretical foundation for the conventional view that heterogeneity is a factor hindering collusion, a view which has been challenged in recent theoretical work. It is argued that, in a world of uncertainty, an increase in the heterogeneity of products leads to a decrease in the correlation of the firms' demand shocks. With imperfect monitoring, this makes collusion more difficult to sustain, as discriminating between random demand shocks and deviations from the cartel strategy becomes more difficult.
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Sun, Wei S. M. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "Price of anarchy in a Bertrand oligopoly market." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/39211.
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Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Computation for Design and Optimization Program, 2006.<br>Includes bibliographical references (p. 107-110).<br>The price of anarchy quantifies the inefficiency that occurs in the total system objective in the user optimization as compared to the system optimization setting. It is well known that this inefficiency occurs due to lack of coordination among the competitors in the system. In this thesis, we study the price of anarchy in a Bertrand oligopoly market by comparing the total profits in the two settings. The main contribution of this thesis is a lower and an upper bound for the price of anarchy that only depends on the price sensitivity matrix characterizing the demand sellers face. We first derive these bounds for a symmetric affine demand model. Using the same approach, we also provide a lower bound for asymmetric affine demand as well as a lower and an upper bound for nonlinear demand. These bounds are easy to compute. In addition, we illustrate that the worst-case price of anarchy value occurs for a uniform demand model when quality differences do not exist among sellers. This implies that in many real-world instances where quality differences exist, the performance under the user optimization may in fact be close to what is achieved under system optimization. We illustrate several insights on the bounds we present through simulations.<br>by Wei Sun.<br>S.M.
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Cardenas, Oscar Javier. "MIXED OLIGOPOLY, ESSAY ON LOCATION AND CAPITAL OWNERSHIP." University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2001. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin991745935.
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Pazdera, Martin. "Proč klesá spotřeba instantních potravin? Analýza determinant poptávky." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2014. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-194202.
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There has been a significant decline in instant food market. I investigate the determinants of demand for instant food in this thesis. Oligopoly market structure motivates me to investigate the demand for instant food produced by particular firm. I use yearly and quarterly scanner data for instant food sales on the retail market in Czech Republic in the empirical part of the thesis. The yearly data analysis finds healthy diet trend as a possible cause of instant food market decline. According to quarterly data analysis I find instant food as an inferior good with income elasticity -0,6295. Both these factors can affect stagnant or decreasing revenues of instant food producers. Analysis of demand for instant food produced by particular firm illustrates strong relation between demanded quantity of producer's instant food and prices of his own and competing production. This indicates that price increase is not an optimal strategy in order to stabilize revenues of instant food producer.
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Rocha-Akis, Silvia. "Labour tax policies and strategic offshoring under unionised oligopoly." Inst. für Volkswirtschaftstheorie und -politik, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 2006. http://epub.wu.ac.at/394/1/document.pdf.
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In a model with a unionised immobile labour force we analyse how labour taxes and transfers towards unemployed workers are optimally chosen when a welfare maximising government faces oligopolistic and partly mobile firms. We consider two polar types of government: one whose objective consists of aximising the sum of domestic producer's and consumers' surplus and one that aims at maximising employed and unemployed workers' payoffs. We show that depending on the combination of foreign labour costs, the degree of domestic union bargaining power, and the sunk costs of relocation, the former type of government may choose to set taxes so as to induce an outward relocation of production. (author's abstract)<br>Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series
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Correa, Lopez Monica. "Unionised oligopoly with wage bargaining : microeconomic and macroeconomic implications." Thesis, University of Warwick, 2003. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.399497.
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Costa, Luis Filipe Pereira da. "Oligopoly and capital accumulation in a small open economy." Thesis, University of York, 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.323688.
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LU, Juan. "Equilibrium and strategies of horizontal mergers inasymmetric differentiated oligopoly." Digital Commons @ Lingnan University, 2013. https://commons.ln.edu.hk/econ_etd/26.
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Building an asymmetric differentiated goods quantity competition model, the present paper explores how substitutability of products, one of the factors affecting the unilateral effect, determines horizontal mergers and acquisitions equilibrium and strategies. It seems intuitively obvious that the merger between firms with goods that are sufficiently close substitutes can be more profitable. However, this thesis's counter-intuitive results show that, for some parameter values, a merger is more profitable for the merging firm when the target firm produces a distant substitutes (i.e., when it is not the closest competitor to the acquiring firm in the market).The theoretical analysis shows that to merge with firm with low substitute parameter is more profitable provided that target firms are close enough and the both of them are distant enough from merging firms. The results in Cournot model and Bertrand have some similarities, for example, they both harm to consumer surplus and the optimal strategy harms most. For the difference, for example, in Coumot model, whenever it is profitable to merge with a distant competitor, it is the optimal strategy, while in Bertrand model, it depends. The paper also extends the classical "horizontal merger paradox" to a setting of asymmetric differentiated oligopoly.
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Ahmed, Mohammad. "Market structure, producers conduct, and foreign trade : a case study of urea fertilizer trade." Thesis, University of Sussex, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.385405.
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Han, Lihua, and Hikaru Ogawa. "Partial Privatization and Market-Opening Policies: A Mixed Oligopoly Approach." 名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科附属国際経済政策研究センター, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/2237/11911.
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Azar, Jose. "A New Look at Oligopoly| Implicit Collusion Through Portfolio Diversification." Princeton University, 2013.
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Neven, D. J. "On the pricing and selection of differentiated products in oligopoly." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1985. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.371709.
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Bonanno, Giacomo. "Topics in oligopoly : local equilibria, choice of product, entry deterrence." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1985. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.267267.
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The first chapter is an introductory one. In chapter 2 I study the existence of oligopoly equilibria when firms have only a local knowledge of their demand curves. I introduce two notions of equilibrium: "local" and "first-orde'r" Nash equilibria. The first is a point where all firms are at a local maximum of their profit functions, the latter is.a point wh~re the first-order conditions for profit maximization are simultaneously satisfied for all firms (this is an equilibrium if each firm only knows the linear approximation to its own demand curve at that point). The main result is that a first-order equilibrium exists always, that is, with arbitrary demand functions. In chapter 3 I consider the problem of choice of product quality by two firms which enter the market simultaneously. I show that Hotelling's principle of minimum differentiation may hold or not, depending on the solution concept which is adopted for the post-entry game and on the structure of costs. In chapter 4 I re-examine the common claim that in the presence of threat of entry firms tend to produce more products than they would otherwise. I show that entry deterrence is always optimal, but it need not be achieved through p~oduct proliferation: in some cases the incumbent monopolist resorts to an entry-deterring strategy based on location choice rather than product proliferation. I also show that in some cases the number of products chosen by the incumbent facing the threat of entry is strictly greater than the minimum number required to deter entry. ,In chapter 5'1 show that advertising can be used as a barrier to entry even if there are no asymmetries in the effectiveness of advertising between existing ... f!irms ,and, new entrants .HI also show-that entry deterrence is achieved through "excessive" advertising.
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Martini, Gianmaria. "Oligopoly, collusion and antitrust policy : a strategic and experimental approach." Thesis, University of York, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.362020.
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Gautier, Luis Antonio. "Pollution abatement under oligopoly with free-entry : theory and evidence /." Available to subscribers only, 2009. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1878997441&sid=5&Fmt=2&clientId=1509&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Southern Illinois University Carbondale, 2009.<br>"Department of Economics." Keywords: Abatement subsidy, Environmental policy, Free entry, Oligopoly. Includes bibliographical references (p. 77-86). Also available online.
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Gautier, Luis. "Pollution Abatement Under Oligopoly With Free-Entry: Theory And Evidence." OpenSIUC, 2009. https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/dissertations/56.
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This research examines the role of the abatement subsidy as a potential environmental policy option under various scenarios. This is achieved through a combination of theoretical and empirical analyses. The main motivation for this work stems from the existing literature on the abatement subsidy where its role seems to be a negative one from a policy standpoint. The reason for this is that in oligopoly models with free-entry the abatement subsidy encourages new firms into the market via higher profits thereby raising the level of total emissions in the industry, even though at the same time it lowers each firm's emissions. The overarching findings indicate that the abatement subsidy might play a role in environmental policy. The theoretical component of the work employs a symmetric free-entry Cournot oligopoly model both in a closed-economy and international settings. The key findings from these are that the subsidy lowers per-firm emissions and total industry emissions, and that the subsidy is welfare-enhancing when implemented multilaterally. As for the empirical component of the work, the analyses suggest that the subsidy is associated to lower per-firm emission levels and that the number of firms variable is not statistically significant.
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Alder, Lisa. "Strategies in the Australia-Japan Coking Coal Bilateral Oligopoly Market." Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2001. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/227110/1/T%28BS%29%20235_Alder_2001.pdf.
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Studies of price and output behaviour in the Australia-Japan coking coal market since Ben Smith
(1977) have focused on low and inflexible prices determined with quantities under the contract system,
and the outcomes have been attributed to the cartel behaviour of integrated Japanese Steel Mills
(JSMs). When viewed with theory on oligopoly, these price and associated output outcomes are not
unexpected nor are they necessarily inefficient. Oligopoly theories contribute to an understanding of
the way in which oligopolists comprehend their interdependence and use their knowledge and
experience to achieve joint profit maximisation without coordination or collusion. Yet these oligopoly
theories only serve to explain certain behaviours within the Australia-Japan coking coal market. The
presence oflarge coordinated oligopsonist buyers introduces factors specific to the study of bilateral
oligopoly. Yet the way in which supplier oligopolists use output and costs to survive in the presence of
the countervailing power of large organised buyers (JSMs) has not been fully investigated. Neither
oligopoly suppliers nor oligopsonist buyers in the Australia-Japan coking coal market achieve joint
profit maximisation. Instead, Australian oligopoly coking coal suppliers are price takers, which
oversupply the market, earn reasonable profit, and through internal cost minimisation and risk
diversification strategies, still manage to operate efficiently and effectively in the presence of cartel
buyers. This study redirects the focus on coking coal to the internal behaviour and strategies ( drawing
on game theories and strategic behaviour) of oligopolist suppliers and oligopsonist buyers to explain
price and quantity levels in the presence of countervailing oligopsonists. The study highlights the
strategies open to Australian coking coal oligopolists, and areas for future investigation.
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Fayad, Marwan Abdallah. "Planning capacity expansion under oligopoly : the case of the petrochemical industry." Thesis, Imperial College London, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10044/1/12010.
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Reiter, Miklós. "Internet congestion pricing : long-term bandwidth contracts and investment in oligopoly." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.613397.
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Wulff, Marco. "Strategic behavior and cooperation in an asymmetric oligopoly an economic analysis." München Verl. Dr. Hut, 2008. http://d-nb.info/992162785/04.
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Toe, Joseph Akee. "Welfare Effects Of Industrial Policies Under Asymmetric Oligopoly And Endogenous Quality." Available to subscribers only, 2009. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1879660391&sid=2&Fmt=2&clientId=1509&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
Full textAbstract:
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Southern Illinois University Carbondale, 2009.<br>"Department of Economics." Keywords: Asymmetric oligopoly, Endogenous quality, Industrial policies, Production cost, R&D cost, Welfare effects. Includes bibliographical references (p. [67]-69). Also available online.
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Linnosmaa, Ismo. "Essays on product market competition and managerial incentives in oligopoly firms /." Kuopio : Kuopion yliopisto, 2001. http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy035/2002507609.html.
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Bhaskar, V. "Oligopoly and the macro-economy : A study of pricing, employment and investment." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1987. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.381764.
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Leães, Ana Paula Steiner. "Análise da indústria de carne bovina no Rio Grande do Sul : movimentação de bovinos para abate entre as mesorregiões geográficas & concentração da indústria." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/169258.
Full textAbstract:
Este trabalho analisou o cenário em que está inserida a comercialização de bovinos para abate, no estado do Rio Grande do Sul. Para isto, foram utilizados dados obtidos através das Guias de Trânsito Animal (GTAs), entre os anos de 2010 (ano em que o sistema informatizado para GTAs foi implantado na Secretaria da Agricultura, Pecuária e Agronegócio - SEAPA) a 2013. Também foram utilizados dados da Declaração Anual de Rebanho, fornecidos pela SEAPA. Um dos diferenciais deste trabalho é esta fonte única, com documentos obrigatórios a todos que comercializam animais e o agrupamento por mesorregião geográfica das informações obtidas. Para o entendimento deste cenário, foram utilizadas como aporte teórico a Teoria da Localização, que considera a otimização da localização de uma firma, e a Organização Industrial, que através do Modelo E-C-D proporciona subsídios para caracterização da concentração em uma indústria. Os resultados mostraram que o número de animais abatidos é diferente entre as mesorregiões geográficas. Os matadouros-frigoríficos recebem animais para abate provenientes da mesorregião geográfica em que se estão localizados, mas também de outras mesorregiões do RS, em diferentes proporções. Nas análises, as mesorregiões geográficas Centro Oriental e Metropolitana destacaram-se pelo maior número de animais abatidos. No entanto, o rebanho nestas mesorregiões ainda não foi o suficiente para a demanda gerada pelo mercado consumidor, que está muito próximo devido as grandes cidades que compõem estas mesorregiões, como Santa Maria e Porto Alegre. A Mesorregião Sudoeste é a terceira que mais abateu animais. A quantidade abatida nesta mesorregião é composta por 74% de animais da própria mesorregião Sudoeste, porém, o seu rebanho foi uma importante fonte de animais para as demais mesorregiões. Neste cenário, o estado do RS apresentou mais de 60 mil ofertantes (pecuaristas) em 2013, e o número de demandantes (matadouros-frigoríficos) chegou a 459. O matadouro-frigorífico que mais abateu em 2010 perdeu participação de mercado até 2013, e frigoríficos menores conseguiram aumentar as suas participações, havendo uma tendência de maior equilíbrio entre as empresas. Não existe concentração na indústria de carne bovina, e as medidas de concentração analisadas mostram índices cada vez menores.<br>This study analyzed the scenario in which the marketing of cattle for slaughter is inserted in the state of Rio Grande do Sul. For this, it was used data of Animal Transit Guides (GTAs) for slaughter since 2010 - year that these guides were made available electronically by the Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock and Agribusiness (SEAPA) - to 2013. It was also used data from Herd Annual Statement, supplied by SEAPA, which is one of the remarkable points of this paper, the unique and reliable source that was provided with a set of mandatory documents that all cattle sellers must have. Based on information that was founded, it was used the theory of location, considering the optimization of the location of a firm, and the Industrial Organization, through the S-C-P model, focusing on the structure that allows one to see if there was concentration in the industry. The Metropolitan ant Eastern Center Mesoregions are the ones that slaughter the most, having their own production as their raw material. However, these cattle are still not enough for the demand generated by the consumer market, which live close to these centers. The Southwest Mesoregion slaughters a great number of animals, with 74% of these slaughtered cattle coming from their own production and it is still an important source of animals for other Mesoregions. The number of suppliers (farmers) exceeded 60,000 in 2013, and the slaughter houses had reached 459. There is no concentration in the beef industry, and analyzed concentration measurements show dwindling numbers. The most important slaughterhouse in 2010 lost market by 2013, and smaller slaughterhouses were able to increase their holdings, with a trend towards greater balance between companies.
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Merzoni, Guido Stefano. "Economic theory of incentives and the market for managers." Thesis, University of Warwick, 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.310830.
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