Academic literature on the topic 'One-party dominance'

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Journal articles on the topic "One-party dominance"

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Sato, Seizaburo. "Is one‐party dominance reemerging in Japan?" Asia-Pacific Review 4, no. 1 (March 1997): 83–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13439009708719941.

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Solinger, Dorothy J. "Ending One-Party Dominance: Korea, Taiwan, Mexico." Journal of Democracy 12, no. 1 (2001): 30–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.2001.0017.

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Butler, Anthony. "CONSIDERATIONS ON THE EROSION OF ONE‐PARTY DOMINANCE." Representation 45, no. 2 (July 2009): 159–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00344890902945681.

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Ostroverkhov, A. A. "In Searching for Theory of One-Party Dominance: World Experience of Studying Dominant-Party Systems (I)." Journal of Political Theory, Political Philosophy and Sociology of Politics Politeia 86, no. 3 (2017): 136–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2017-86-3-136-153.

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Ostroverkhov, A. A. "In Searching for Theory of One-Party Dominance: World Experience of Studying Dominant-Party Systems (II)." Journal of Political Theory, Political Philosophy and Sociology of Politics Politeia 87, no. 4 (2017): 133–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2017-87-4-133-149.

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Ilonszki, Gabriella, and Réka Várnagy. "From party cartel to one-party dominance. The case of institutional failure." East European Politics 30, no. 3 (July 3, 2014): 412–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2014.938739.

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Matisonn, Heidi Leigh. "Beyond Party Politics: Unexpected Democracydeepening Consequences of One-party Dominance in South Africa." Theoria 51, no. 105 (January 1, 2004): 1–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/004058104782267006.

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Kuhonta, Erik Martinez, and Alex M. Mutebi. "Thaksin Triumphant: The Implications of One-party Dominance in Thailand." Asian Affairs: An American Review 33, no. 1 (March 2006): 39–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.3200/aafs.33.1.39-51.

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Carlin, Ryan E., Gregory J. Love, and Daniel J. Young. "Political Competition, Partisanship, and Interpersonal Trust Under Party Dominance: Evidence from Post-Apartheid South Africa." Journal of Experimental Political Science 7, no. 2 (June 17, 2019): 101–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/xps.2019.17.

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AbstractHow does single-party dominance influence interpersonal trust? We draw on evidence from trust games played by more than 2,000 subjects in South Africa, where, since Apartheid, race-based social enmity has persisted under democratic competition characterized by single-party dominance. We find that partisan-based trust discrimination is most pronounced for those who identify with the main opposition party and is driven by strong distrust of rival partisans. These findings underscore how electoral competition, in general, shapes trust across party lines and suggests one-sided competition, in particular, has asymmetrical effects between parties in dominant party systems. Moreover, this study provides additional evidence regarding the relative weights of trustworthiness stereotypes tied to partisanship and race.
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Van Dyck, Brandon. "External Appeal, Internal Dominance: How Party Leaders Contribute to Successful Party Building." Latin American Politics and Society 60, no. 1 (January 15, 2018): 1–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/lap.2017.3.

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AbstractMany successful political parties depend for their initial popularity and cohesion, and even for their long-term brand strength, on a leader. Nevertheless, literature on successful party building downplays the role of leaders. Thus, the question, what type of leader is good for party building?, remains undertheorized. This article presents and provides initial evidence for a leadership-centered theory of successful party building. It argues that externally appealing, internally dominant leaders facilitate party building by lifting new parties to electoral prominence and helping to prevent debilitating schisms. The article provides evidence for this argument through a most similar cases comparison of three new left parties in Latin America: two that took root (Brazil’s Workers’ Party, Mexico’s Party of the Democratic Revolution), and one that collapsed (Peru’s United Left).
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "One-party dominance"

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Hu, Lan. "One Party Dominance Survival: The Case of Singapore and Taiwan." The Ohio State University, 2011. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1316466299.

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Thovoethin, Paul-Sewa. "Techno-bureaucratic governance in a neo-patrimonial society : one-party dominance and the developmental state in Nigeria (1999-2014)." Thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/11394/4967.

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Philosophiae Doctor - PhD
Most African states today are facing the serious challenge of socio-economic development. This is a problem not generated by the paucity of material and natural resources, but rather by challenges arising from mismanagement of these resources. Nigeria is in fact, a good example of a country in Africa facing socio-economic development challenges not as a result of lack of resources, but rather the mismanagement of abundant resources at its disposal. This mismanagement is associated with the culture of prebendal, clientelist and neo-patrimonial politics which have made it extremely difficult for technocrats and bureaucrats to contribute adequately to the development of the country. In fact, as will be demonstrated in this thesis, technocrats in Nigeria are not allowed to occupy sensitive economic development positions for a sustained period of time and are never the driving forces in the formulation of socio-economic development policies and initiatives. In this country bureaucrats and technocrats have not been a stable force for development- given the constant changes of these groups by the political leadership and the splitting of sensitive ministerial portfolios for political reasons. Instead, political offices are captured and used for the benefits of office holders and those of their associated factions, class and ethnic groups. This negatively affects the insulation of appointed technocrats and bureaucrats from vested political interests. Therefore, instead of appointing or employing technocrats and seasoned bureaucrats to occupy relevant positions, appointments and employments are done in order for people to share from what is commonly referred to as ‘national cake’ in the parlance of Nigerian politics. Central to the argument of this thesis is that one-party dominance and authoritarianism does not necessarily undermines techno-bureaucratic governance, as the cases of countries like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore in Asia as well as Botswana and South Africa in Africa suggest, but when such system is associated with politics of prebendalism, clientelism and neo-patrimonialism techno-bureaucratic governance becomes difficult and the achievement of state’s led development becomes more daunting. This work therefore investigates why attempts at promoting prebendalism, clientelism and neo-patrimonialism under Nigeria’s one-party dominant system undermines techno-bureaucratic governance. It also unravels how these have impacted negatively on socio-economic development of the country from 1999 to 2014. This study will contribute to the understanding of how the insulation of technocrats and bureaucrats from vested political interests can contribute to the development of the underdeveloped countries, using the developmental state argument as a basis of analysis.
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Matisonn, Heidi. "Beyond party politics : to what extent, if any, are there unexpected democracy deepening consequences of one-party dominance in South Africa?" Master's thesis, University of Cape Town, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/5956.

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Bibliography: leaves 135-138.
The degree of centralisation and monopolisation of power by the African National Congress (ANC) is raising concerns about the long-term prospects for democracy in South Africa. Conventional party politics cannot at present provide the mechanism to check tendencies towards authoritarian domination: loyalty to the ruling party, lack of credible opposition parties and the electoral system itself are all factors contributing to the entrenchment of the status quo.
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Spiess, Clemens. "One-party-dominance in changing societies the African National Congress and Indian National Congress in comparative perspective ; a study in party systems and agency in post-colonial India and post-apartheid South Africa /." [S.l. : s.n.], 2004. http://deposit.ddb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?idn=97250981X.

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Ismail, Zenobia. "The alternation fallacy : turnover without transformation in Zambia (1991-2015)." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2018. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/280366.

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Zambia is one of only three countries in southern Africa which has experienced two alternations, but there has been little institutional reform since independence. A time-based comparison of Zambia’s constitution, legislation and institutions from 1991 to 2015 is conducted because the ‘moving picture’ reveals continuities which tend to be overlooked by a ‘snapshot’ analysis. New incumbents are reluctant to relinquish the increasing returns derived from executive dominance and weak oversight institutions such as the national assembly and judiciary. Therefore, institutional weaknesses from Zambia’s one-party state have infiltrated the multi-party era, where they continue to blur the separation of powers. Factionalism stemming from ethnic polarisation, which emerged in the colonial era, undermines all ruling parties in Zambia. The study finds that succession contests, triggered by term limits or the deaths of sitting presidents, are the primary mechanism which repeatedly weakens dominant parties. The outcomes of such intra-party conflicts have far-reaching consequences for the political party system by giving rise to new parties, re-orientating ethnic and political alliances, and contributing to turnover in elections. However, the dissertation reveals that both the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy and the Patriotic Front governments in Zambia reneged on the reforms which they promised while in opposition and opted to maintain the constitutional clauses, repressive legislation and patronage system which they inherited. An extensive analysis of the 35 by-elections which occurred after the 2011 turnover ascertains that there was pervasive co-option of opposition members into the Patriotic Front, leading back to the dominant path. Therefore, the dissertation concludes that one-party dominance in Zambia is path dependent. Consequently, it is an alternation fallacy to expect the ousting of a dominant party to stimulate democratisation. Democracy advocates will need to confront the challenge of providing incentives that will persuade incumbents to undertake reforms which diminish executive dominance and strengthen the independence of oversight institutions.
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Spieß, Clemens [Verfasser], and Subrata K. [Akademischer Betreuer] Mitra. "One-Party-Dominance in Changing Societies: The African National Congress and Indian National Congress in Comparative Perspective: A Study in Party Systems and Agency in Post-Colonial India and Post-Apartheid South Africa / Clemens Spieß ; Betreuer: Subrata K. Mitra." Heidelberg : CrossAsia E-Publishing, 2006. http://d-nb.info/1218726458/34.

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Piombo, Jessica R. 1973. "Entering one-party dominant democracy in South Africa : political institutions, social demographies and party strategies, 1994-1999." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8029.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2003.
Includes bibliographical references (p. [357]-377). Includes bibliographical references (p. ).
This study explains the construction and maintenance of a one-party dominant democratic political system in South Africa between 1994 and 1999. Against conventional explanations that rely on historical conditions and voting patterns driven by ascriptive identities, this study offers an explanation of events that focuses on the role of political institutions and social demographics in structuring the incentives that shape strategic choices made by political parties. The process by which the ruling African National Congress (ANC) entrenched its dominant position between 1994 and 1999 was attributable to a number of factors. The analysis found that the ANC actively manipulated political cleavages to perpetuate its hegemonic position in South African politics, rather than simply resting on its status as the liberation party or the ethnic loyalties of its supporters. The process of establishing and maintaining dominance, for the ANC, involved maintaining strategic alliances with labor and leftists, manipulating social and political discourse to reinforce the unity of the political community of non-Whites on whose electoral support the party relied; and finally, manipulating state institutions to help the party to reward supporters and maintain the focus of power on the national level. Through each of these strategies, the ANC worked to maintain a political black-White cleavage, perpetuating electoral patterns that promoted the continued dominance of the party. On the other hand, the major opposition parties in South Africa inadvertently contributed to the dominance of the ANC by failing to activate social divisions and potential political cleavages within the ANC's support base.
(cont.) In response to political institutions that focused political competition on the national sphere and the structure of social cleavages that worked against the cultivation of small ethnic support bases, most parties pursued mobilization strategies capable of providing easily mobilizable, large bases to deliver short-term electoral gains. In pursuing these strategies, the opposition rejected mobilizing smaller groups within the ANC's support base that had long-term potential to fracture the support base of the ANC. In developing these strategies, the each of the parties based their strategies on complex relationship between race, class and political affiliation.
by Jessica R. Piombo.
Ph.D.
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Johnson, Stephen. "Strategies for realignment : Japanese opposition politics under a one party dominant regime 1955-1993." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.318994.

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Oseni, Babatunde Adetayo. "One-party dominant systems and constitutional democracy in Africa : a comparative study of Nigeria and South Africa." Thesis, University of Exeter, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10871/14212.

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Democratization is a fragile process, easily reversed when and where its advance is most recent. African countries present particular challenges to democratization, given generally low levels of economic and social development, often combined with ethnic and cultural fractionalization. Debates about democratization have not been sufficiently developed with the African context in mind. In particular, assessment of the effects of presidential systems on democratization has not been sensitively applied to African cases where most regimes are Presidential. Moreover, a particular feature of African democracy, the dominant party within a multi-party system, also raises questions that have not been so pertinent elsewhere. Debates about the merits and demerits of electoral system options for democratic consolidation also require more empirical analysis in Africa. This study is based on the assumption that debates about the relationship between political institutions and democratization in Africa can only be advanced by recognition of the interactions that can be identified between the institutions of presidential, parliamentary and party systems, particularly within the dynamics of one-party dominance. Empirical leverage takes advantage of an important case with a parliamentary system and proportional representation: South Africa. The most appropriate comparator from the Presidential and majoritarian camp is Nigeria. These are the two largest and most important states in Africa, sharing a British colonial heritage and a federal system and each dominated by a single party for about two decades. The thesis conceptualizes democratization in terms of legitimation and institutionalization. Legitimation focuses on the micro-level: the quality of elections and the voting process, the presence or absence of government-sponsored violence or coercion, the extent of public confidence in politicians and public support for democratic principles and practices. Institutionalization is focused at the macro-level: elite compliance to constitutional norms, political accountability, and the absence of violent intervention against the state, by the military or other internal forces. The thesis finds that leadership transitions within the parties take place with more accountability in South Africa than Nigeria. While corruption is a problem in both countries, it is more pervasive and there are more incentives to generate it in Nigeria due to a combination of the candidate-centred nature of politics, the country’s great dependence on oil exports, and its lower accountability in leadership transitions. Mechanisms to promote consensus politics differ in both countries and within-party arrangements call into question an assumption that one-party government is necessarily majoritarian. Although the process of legitimation has advanced well in both countries, they share many problems associated with lack of development. The main threat to democracy in Nigeria lies partly in the mutual distrust occasioned by the unsettled issues of ‘power rotation’, ‘resource sharing’ as well as the widening economic disparity between regional blocs of the principally Islamic North and largely Christian South with possible central state responses that might increase rather than reduce the conflicts, while in South Africa the threat lies in the high level of inequality between the white and black communities. Radical political action to address this inequality might increase the already high level of violence in the country. Such tension could ultimately lead to the break-up of the ANC, but an end to dominant-party politics in South Africa could as well destabilise rather than consolidate democracy. Similarly, in Nigeria, a break-up of the PDP, which has been nearly made possible due to a crisis of confidence in an ‘elite consensus’ on power rotation among the regional blocs, could as well constitute a threat to democratic consolidation and national integration.
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Mtimkulu, Phillip Frederick Gauta. "The key to one-party dominance: a comparative analysis of selected states." Thesis, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10210/2397.

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Books on the topic "One-party dominance"

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One-party dominance in African democracies. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2013.

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Hamburger, Tom. One party country: The Republican plan for dominance in the 21st century. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2005.

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Hamburger, Tom. One party country: The Republican plan for dominance in the 21st century. Hoboken, N.J: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2006.

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Simutanyi, Neo R. One-party dominance and democracy in Zambia: Studies on political parties and democracy. Maputo, Mozambique: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2008.

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Simutanyi, Neo R. The tendency towards one-party dominance: Democratic struggles and the electoral process in Zambia. [Lusaka: s.n., 1997.

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Inoguchi, Takashi. Public policies and elections: An empirical analysis of voters-parties relationship under one party dominance. Singapore: Dept. of Japanese Studies, Naitonal University of Singapore, 1989.

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Inoguchi, Takashi. Public policies and elections: An empirical analysis of voters-parties relationship under one party dominance. [Singapore]: Dept. of Japanese Studies, National University of Singapore, 1989.

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Johnson, Stephen. Opposition politics in Japan: Strategies under a one-party dominant regime. New York: Routledge, 2000.

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Cornelius, Wayne A. Mexican politics in transition: The breakdown of a one-party-dominant regime. La Jolla, CA: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1996.

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Democracy without competition in Japan: Opposition failure in a one-party dominant state. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

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Book chapters on the topic "One-party dominance"

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Boucek, Françoise. "The Theory of One-Party Dominance." In Factional Politics, 6–32. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137283924_2.

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Khator, Renu. "The Political Party System of India: From One-Party Dominance to No-Party Dominance." In Comparative Democratization and Peaceful Change in Single-Party-Dominant Countries, 339–61. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780312292676_13.

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Khator, Renu. "The Political Party System of India: From One-Party Dominance to No-Party Dominance." In Comparative Democratization and Peaceful Change in Single-Party-Dominant Countries, 339–61. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-38515-7_13.

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Boucek, Françoise. "Why Does One-Party Dominance End in Factionalism?" In Factional Politics, 33–49. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137283924_3.

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Pempel, T. J. "Conclusion. One-Party Dominance and the Creation of Regimes." In Uncommon Democracies, edited by T. J. Pempel, 333–60. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.7591/9781501746161-014.

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Nakano, Koichi. "Complacency and Indecisiveness in Japan’s New One-Party Dominance and Foreign Policy." In Asia’s Alliance Triangle, 107–11. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137541710_8.

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Koelble, Tom. "One-Party Dominance and Public Sector Corruption in South Africa: Consequences for Democracy." In Parties, Governments and Elites, 281–300. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-17446-0_14.

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Otake, Hideo. "4. Defense Controversies and One-Party Dominance: The Opposition in Japan and West Germany." In Uncommon Democracies, edited by T. J. Pempel, 128–61. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.7591/9781501746161-007.

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Strom, Kaare, and Torbjorn Bergman. "Sweden: Social Democratic Dominance in One Dimension." In Party Policy and Government Coalitions, 109–50. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1992. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-22368-8_5.

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Pempel, T. J. "Introduction. Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes." In Uncommon Democracies, edited by T. J. Pempel, 1–32. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.7591/9781501746161-003.

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Conference papers on the topic "One-party dominance"

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Qaui, Bouhania, and Latrish Ismaiel. "Political Governance in the Light of the Constitutional Amendment in Algeria and the Mechanisms of Political Reform (Organizing Powers as a Model)." In REFORM AND POLITICAL CHANGE. University of Human Development, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.21928/uhdiconfrpc.pp13-25.

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Since the transformation of the Algerian political system in 1989, the principle of separation of powers has emerged strongly in political life, as an inevitable alternative to what prevailed in the past from the consolidation of power under the one-party system, and with the fading of manifestations of enshrining the principle in the 1996 Constitution and the subsequent amendments that contributed to Strengthening presidential dominance of power, which resulted in a clear imbalance between powers, which called for the intervention of the Algerian constitutional founder in order to introduce new reforms in line with the urgent popular demands aimed at sending promising political reforms that guarantee good political governance, especially with regard to orga…
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Krogmann, Alfred, Magdaléna Němčíková, Ján Veselovský, and Andrej Svorad. "Geographical approach to the analysis of elections on the example of parliamentary elections in Slovakia in 2016." In 27th edition of the Central European Conference with subtitle (Teaching) of regional geography. Brno: Masaryk University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.5817/cz.muni.p210-9694-2020-8.

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With regard to surprising results of Parliamentary elections in Slovakia their geographic dimension is also important. The aim of this article is to analyze the milieu of elections and the subsequent spatial differentiation of the results of the 8 parties which were successful to enter the Parliament. Election data were processed via the diversification of election preferences, the identification of areas of election support and correlation analysis by means of which the mutual cohesion of individual parties election results was studied. We found out that within the diversification of election preferences the one party dominance – the winning SMER – SD (40 out of Slovakia’s 79 districts) – prevails. Further we have dealt with the identification of areas of political parties support, with emphasis to their core regions.
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Haydaroğlu, Ceyhun. "Political Economy of Russia’s Voting Power on Eurasian Countries." In International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c04.00635.

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The relationship between economy and politics shows itself explicitly while governments are determining and implementing national and international economic policies. In democratic societies voting power, which means that economical and political units uses against one another in decision making mechanisms, shapes stability and/or unstability. It can be explained that a government, which is structured by the sovereignty of a single party in a parlament, has a monopoly power. Putin, has an important voting power in both The Council of The Federation and State Duma. The confidence through this voting power, while national economic and political equlibrium is provided, in international context, stable and strong policies are followed. Russia, increases the pressure and makes its economical and political power apperant on the eurasian countries, especially which were under its’ authority before. In this context Russia’s voting power calculated seperately for all election periods by Normalized Banzhaf Index. According to this, the effect of today’s Russia’s dominance on the Eurasian countries has been analyzed within the boundaries of political economics dicipline. In consequence of the analysis; it is indicated that, there is a linear relationship between the Russia’s voting power and economical stability, and Russia’s efficieny on the eurasian countries gradually increases. The most important feature of this study, which makes it differentiated form others, is making political economy of Russia’s efficiency on the eurasian countries within the context of political economics literatüre by the voting power perspective, besides cultural, historical and social factors.
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Jeglic, Franci. "Analysis of Ruptures and Trends on Major Canadian Pipeline Systems." In 2004 International Pipeline Conference. ASMEDC, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/ipc2004-0272.

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The number of ruptures per year is one of the National Energy Board’s (the Board) measures of safety performance of the federally regulated oil and gas pipelines. This measure was examined and analyzed over twenty, ten, and five years with respect to the rupture causes, ignitions, fatalities, injuries, pipeline age, in-line inspections, and the Board’s safety interventions. There were forty-six ruptures over the twenty-year period, twenty-three over the ten-year period, and seven over the five-year period (Ref. 1 and 2) on the 43,000 km of the regulated pipelines. The average time from the pipeline installation to the time of rupture for the time-dependent rupture mechanisms is twenty-eight years. There were three fatalities and fourteen injuries caused by the ruptures of the federally regulated pipelines over the past twenty years. Ruptures associated with fires of the gas and high vapour pressure pipelines caused most of the fatalities and injuries. The dominant rupture causes are external corrosion, stress corrosion cracking, and third-party damage in this order of magnitude. The pipelines that ruptured during the last five years were internally inspected. The in-line inspection tools could not properly detect the defects that caused the ruptures. Regulatory interventions, such as public inquires, Board Orders, and regulatory requirements, have reduced the number of ruptures due to the targeted cause. The number of ruptures and safety consequences associated with them have decreased over the last ten years.
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