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Relevant bibliographies by topics / Online reverse auctions

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Academic literature on the topic 'Online reverse auctions'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 13 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Online reverse auctions"

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Emiliani, M. L., and D. J. Stec. "Wood pallet suppliers' reaction to online reverse auctions." Supply Chain Management: An International Journal 10, no. 4 (2005): 278–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/13598540510612758.

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PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to quantitatively assess wood pallet suppliers' reaction to online reverse auctions and its impact on their business policies and practices.Design/methodology/approachSurvey method was used to determine how pallet suppliers react to online reverse auctions.FindingsDetermines that pallet suppliers do not realize the benefits claimed by online reverse auction service providers. Identifies new sources of costs which accrue to buyers and are not accounted for in so‐called “total cost” request for quotes including: retaliatory pricing practices, less cooperative relationships, and sourcing work back to the original supplier. The qualitative benefits identified for suppliers by third‐party online reverse auction service providers are overstated or false.Research limitations/implicationsThe present work can be extended to other commodity categories to identify similarities and differences in how suppliers react to online reverse auctions, understand the domain of successful and unsuccessful application of the online reverse auction tool, and provide further insight into the evolution of buyer‐seller relationships, including embedded organizational routines such as power‐based bargaining.Practical implicationsFindings mirror the results found in a previous study that examined aerospace parts suppliers' reaction to online reverse auctions, and indicates that market makers have consistently overstated the benefits of online reverse auctions to both sellers and buyers, and the use of this tool will typically result in unfavorable outcomes for both buyers and sellers.Originality/valueThis paper will be of interest to buyers, sellers, and market makers, as it identifies important problems with online reverse auctions, and suggests questions that buyers should ask market makers to ensure better sourcing decisions.

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Mora Cortez, Roberto, and Wesley J. Johnston. "How to recover B2B relationships after a failed online reverse auction." Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing 35, no. 3 (2019): 551–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jbim-02-2019-0095.

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Purpose This paper aims to explore the possible scenarios after a failed reverse auction to continue a current buyer–seller relationship. Design/methodology/approach The authors developed a further understanding of reverse auctions through the examination of a longitudinal case study in the mining industry based on grounded theory. Findings The study indicates that losing a reverse auction is not a death sentence for the current supplier. Four factors influence the potential scenarios: buyer factors, supplier factors, buyer–seller factors and contextual factors. If the overall evaluation favors the current buyer–seller relationship, the supplier can continue the business interaction by full renegotiation or discrete step-by-step reconsideration. Conversely, the buyer–seller relationship would reach a state of dissolution. Originality/value This manuscript contributes to the understanding of reverse auction, an under-researched theme in organizational buying behavior theory. This paper is the first attempt to link buyer–seller relationship dissolution and reverse auctions. The authors suggest that more academic endeavors are needed to study online reverse auctions.

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Jap, Sandy D., and Ernan Haruvy. "Interorganizational Relationships and Bidding Behavior in Industrial Online Reverse Auctions." Journal of Marketing Research 45, no. 5 (2008): 550–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.45.5.550.

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The authors model (1) the impact of the supplier's relationship propensity before the auction on the supplier's bidding aggressiveness in the auction (in terms of the number of bids it submits, the rate at which the bids are submitted, and the price concessions offered) and (2) the impact of bidding behaviors in the auction on the buyer–supplier relationship after auction through longitudinal survey data from 12 online reverse auctions across various product categories. The results suggest that incumbency, many bidders, and a willingness to make specific investments lead to less aggressive bidding, whereas the total number of bids from competing suppliers increases aggressiveness. In turn, aggressive bidding behavior reduces suppliers' disposition toward developing a relationship with the buyer and sours incumbent satisfaction with the relationship. Finally, auctions that are longer in duration can improve the relationship but may risk bidding competition. Collectively, the results suggest that pricing and relationships are intertwined and traded off against each other in complex ways and that the auction does not operate in isolation of key organizational variables.

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A. Majid, Kashef, Andrew Bryant, and Pradeep A. Rau. "“Name your price” – online auctions and reference prices." Journal of Product & Brand Management 23, no. 6 (2014): 420–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jpbm-06-2014-0626.

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Purpose – This paper aims to investigate the presence of varying price points on the impact of product valuations in both English and reverse auctions on potential bidders, that is, those not yet engaged in the auction. Internet auctions, both English style and reverse, constitute one of the success stories of digital commerce. Design/methodology/approach – As its method of research, this paper uses an experimental approach to explore the effects of multiple reference prices. Findings – While previous research has done well to show that a lower initial price decreases barriers to entry and can lead to a higher final price in English-style auctions, this research shows that such a strategy may harm potential bidders’ product perceptions due to multiple reference prices. The authors explore situations of multiple reference prices in the context of reverse auctions, where both higher and lower reference prices are shown to be able to increase product valuations. Research limitations/implications – Additional research of a variety of products and using a representative sample would enhance the findings of this paper. Practical implications – The findings show that reference prices have differing impacts, which are dependent upon the goal of either maximizing or minimizing the distance between the initial price and the price consumers are willing to pay in an online auction. Originality/value – The investigation links differing goals created by the type of auction to the potential impact of the reference price. In addition, we explore the effects of multiple reference prices on consumer valuations.

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Emiliani, M. L., and D. J. Stec. "Realizing savings from online reverse auctions." Supply Chain Management: An International Journal 7, no. 1 (2002): 12–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/13598540210414355.

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Jap, Sandy D. "An Exploratory Study of the Introduction of Online Reverse Auctions." Journal of Marketing 67, no. 3 (2003): 96–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.1509/jmkg.67.3.96.18651.

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Buyers are increasingly turning to online reverse auctions in their negotiations with suppliers. How do these price competition mechanisms affect buyer–supplier relationships? The author considers this question in the context of a quasi experiment involving six online reverse auctions conducted in the supply base of a major industrial buyer. The results indicate that these auctions increase both new and current suppliers’ beliefs that buyers act opportunistically, particularly in open-bid auctions. Current suppliers are generally more willing than new suppliers to make dedicated investments toward the buyer. Paradoxically, in sealed-bid auctions, both current and new suppliers increase their willingness to make dedicated investments toward the buyer. Although these auctions can yield cost savings, the savings are category specific and are not systematically related to an open- or sealed-bid format. The author also discusses implications for the use of online reverse auctions in industrial sourcing activities.

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Emiliani, M. L., and D. J. Stec. "Aerospace parts suppliers’ reaction to online reverse auctions." Supply Chain Management: An International Journal 9, no. 2 (2004): 139–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/13598540410527042.

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Pham, Long, Jeffrey Teich, Hannele Wallenius, and Jyrki Wallenius. "Multi-attribute online reverse auctions: Recent research trends." European Journal of Operational Research 242, no. 1 (2015): 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2014.08.043.

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Schoenherr, Tobias, and Vincent A. Mabert. "Online reverse auctions: Common myths versus evolving reality." Business Horizons 50, no. 5 (2007): 373–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2007.03.003.

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Charki, Mohamed Hédi, and Emmanuel Josserand. "Online Reverse Auctions and the Dynamics of Trust." Journal of Management Information Systems 24, no. 4 (2008): 175–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/mis0742-1222240407.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Online reverse auctions"

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Radkevitch, Ulad. "Online reverse auctions for procurement of services /." Rotterdam : Erasmus Research Institute of Management, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1765/13497.

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Parker, Thomas Glenn. "ONLINE-REVERSE-AUCTIONS AND THE BUYER-SUPPLIER RELATIONSHIP: THE EFFECTS OF ONLINE-REVERSE-AUCTION DESIGN ON SUPPLIER COMMITMENT AND SUPPLIER TRUST." OpenSIUC, 2010. https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/dissertations/192.

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Industrial online-reverse-auctions have become a common procurement strategy used by many firms to reduce the cost of purchased goods and services. The advantages of online-reverse-auctions include significant price reductions, increased purchasing and selling efficiencies, and access to new supply and purchasing markets. Despite these benefits, practitioners and academics alike have raised concerns with respect to the impact of online-reverse-auctions on the buyer-supplier relationship. Previous research suggests that the parameters and characteristics of an online-reverse-auction can influence the perceptions of online-reverse-auction participants. This dissertation investigates this phenomenon by examining how the design of an online-reverse-auction influences the supplier's perception of the buyer-supplier relationship. Specifically, this research considers the effects of online-reverse-auction design in terms of the independent variables of auction control, auction bid visibility, and auction award rules and the dependent variables of supplier commitment to the buyer and supplier trust in the buyer. Using a 2 x 2 x 2 quasi-experimental design and the statistical technique of MANCOVA, this study tests hypotheses related to how different online-reverse-auction design characteristics influence supplier commitment to the buyer and supplier trust in the buyer. The results of the study suggest that the type of online-reverse-auctions buyers utilize can have an impact on supplier perceptions of the buyer supplier relationship. Overall, the result suggest that supplier trust is influenced by the type of auction design buyers utilize, however, supplier commitment is not. Auctions utilizing third party auction providers, partial bid visibility, and post auction negotiations tended to result in higher levels of trust on the part of suppliers. This study makes a contribution to the literature in the following areas. First, this study is one of only a handful of empirical studies examining the effects of online-reverse-auction designs on the buyer-supplier relationship. While a considerable debate exists within the literature concerning the pros and cons of online-reverse-auctions, little empirical work exists. This study makes a contribution by providing insight with respect to how online-reverse-auction designs influence supplier perceptions of the buyer-supplier relationships. Secondly, this analysis considers the buyer-supplier relationship in terms of commitment and trust. Previous studies have largely neglected these constructs despite their prominence in the buyer-supplier relationship literature. Finally, given that the use of online-reverse-auctions seems well entrenched in the purchasing strategies of many buying organizations; this study provides guidance for the design of online-reverse-auctions such that buyers can potentially reduce the negative aspects of the process.

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Roll, Bruce A. "Online reverse auctions : a pricing tool for government contracting /." Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 2000. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA386693.

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Thesis (M.S. in Management) Naval Postgraduate School, Dec. 2000.<br>Thesis advisors, Nissen, Mark E. ; Gates, William R. "December 2000." Includes bibliographical references (p. 63-64). Also available online.

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Zhong, Fang. "Empirical analyses of online procurement auctions - business value, bidding behavior, learning and incumbent effect." Diss., Atlanta, Ga. : Georgia Institute of Technology, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/19765.

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Thesis (Ph.D)--Management, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2008.<br>Committee Chair: Wu, D.J.; Committee Member: Keskinocak, Pinar; Committee Member: Narasimhan, Sridhar; Committee Member: Toktay, Beril; Committee Member: Zhang, Han.

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Oh, Se-Kyoung. "Procurement Mechanisms in the Presence of Learing by Doing." Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/7525.

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In markets where suppliers experience learning by doing over time or, more generally, economies of scale in production, buyers are auctioning off longer-term contracts with an eroding price policy. Under an eroding price contract, the buyer initially competitively awards production to the lowest-bid supplier via an auction. Before the auction takes place, the buyer makes it clear to the suppliers that, if chosen, a sequence of price reductions will be mandatory in subsequent periods. In this thesis, we mainly study the design of the optimal eroding price contract in a two period setting under three different model settings : (1) Every supplier faces a new cost in each period (NLI model), (2) The supplier who wins the auction in the first period locks-in his cost for the future, and the buyer makes the future payment based on the winning supplier's current bid (LI1), and (3) The supplier who wins the auction in the first period locks-in his cost for the future, and the buyer makes the future payment based on the winning supplier's actual cost (LI1). Under NLI setting, the magnitude of the cost reduction due to learning by doing is common knowledge, while the magnitude is uncertain under LI1 and LI2 settings. We also study the optimal reserve prices in sequential independent auctions under NLI setting. We go on to compare the performance of the eroding price policy against sequential independent auctions (without or with the optimal reserve prices) under the above model settings. Via analytical and numerical comparisons, we find that even in the presence of learning by doing/economies of scale in production, a buyer is often better off running sequential auctions with a reserve price, rather than limiting competition and contracting with a single supplier in the hopes of extracting a better future price.

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Ré, Reginaldo. ""Um processo para construção de frameworks a partir da engenharia reversa de sistemas de informação baseados na Web: aplicação ao domínio dos leilões virtuais"." Universidade de São Paulo, 2002. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/55/55134/tde-20052003-120738/.

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Um processo para o desenvolvimento de frameworks para sistemas de informação baseados na Web é proposto. Esse processo é composto pelos subprocessos de engenharia reversa de sistemas baseados na Web, de criação de uma linguagem de padrões e de construção e instanciação do framework. O subprocesso de engenharia reversa utiliza sistemas presentes na Web para derivar um modelo do domínio de aplicação. O desenvolvimento da linguagem de padrões é baseado no modelo do domínio e a construção do framework utiliza essa linguagem de padrões como base de todo o processo. Os produtos resultantes do uso desse processo para o domínio dos leilões virtuais, a Linguagem de Padrões LV e o Framework Qd+, também são apresentados.<br>A process for the development of web-based information systems frameworks is proposed. This process comprises a reverse engineering - for web-based information systems -, a pattern language creation, and a framework instantiation subprocesses. The reverse engineering subprocess uses existing WISs to derive an application domain model. The pattern language is created from the application domain model and the framework is developed from this pattern language. The deliverables of the application of this process to the online auctions domain, the Pattern Language for Online Auctions and the Qd+ Framework, are also presented.

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Mubark, Athmar. "Computer Science Optimization Of Reverse auction : Reverse Auction." Thesis, Linnéuniversitetet, Institutionen för datavetenskap (DV), 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-68140.

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Many people still confused and misunderstand the differences between auction types: In fact, we have only two major types of auctions which are the forward auction and Reverse auction[22]. In a forward auction a single seller offers an item for sale with many competitive buyers driving the price upward: In a Reverse Auction, a single buyer wants to purchase a service or an item from many sellers, they drive the price downward: There are many differences between these type of auction: Including the progress of the auctions; winner selection criterion and other factors: The Reverse Auction nowadays is one of the most preferred types of online auctions: It gains popularity rapidly because of representing the buyers' side and helps him to drive prices down in contrary with the forward auction or traditional auction. The aim of this study is to identify the most common types of the Reverse auctions and compare them to one another to determine when should be used by a buyer and propose the most efficient implementation model for some types: The results of this study are: achieve a written report and a small demonstrator model on how to implement English Auction and Second-Sealed bid Auction.

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Vestin, Albin, and Gustav Strandberg. "Evaluation of Target Tracking Using Multiple Sensors and Non-Causal Algorithms." Thesis, Linköpings universitet, Reglerteknik, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-160020.

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Today, the main research field for the automotive industry is to find solutions for active safety. In order to perceive the surrounding environment, tracking nearby traffic objects plays an important role. Validation of the tracking performance is often done in staged traffic scenarios, where additional sensors, mounted on the vehicles, are used to obtain their true positions and velocities. The difficulty of evaluating the tracking performance complicates its development. An alternative approach studied in this thesis, is to record sequences and use non-causal algorithms, such as smoothing, instead of filtering to estimate the true target states. With this method, validation data for online, causal, target tracking algorithms can be obtained for all traffic scenarios without the need of extra sensors. We investigate how non-causal algorithms affects the target tracking performance using multiple sensors and dynamic models of different complexity. This is done to evaluate real-time methods against estimates obtained from non-causal filtering. Two different measurement units, a monocular camera and a LIDAR sensor, and two dynamic models are evaluated and compared using both causal and non-causal methods. The system is tested in two single object scenarios where ground truth is available and in three multi object scenarios without ground truth. Results from the two single object scenarios shows that tracking using only a monocular camera performs poorly since it is unable to measure the distance to objects. Here, a complementary LIDAR sensor improves the tracking performance significantly. The dynamic models are shown to have a small impact on the tracking performance, while the non-causal application gives a distinct improvement when tracking objects at large distances. Since the sequence can be reversed, the non-causal estimates are propagated from more certain states when the target is closer to the ego vehicle. For multiple object tracking, we find that correct associations between measurements and tracks are crucial for improving the tracking performance with non-causal algorithms.

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Sehwail, Loay. "Implementing business-to-business online reverse auctions." 2006. http://digital.library.okstate.edu/etd/umi-okstate-1888.pdf.

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"Online reverse auction procurement with flexible noncompetitive contracts." 2008. http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5896845.

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Zhang, Nianbing.<br>Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008.<br>Includes bibliographical references (leaves 113-118).<br>Abstracts in English and Chinese.<br>Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1<br>Chapter 1.1 --- Overview --- p.1<br>Chapter 1.2 --- Motivation --- p.2<br>Chapter 1.3 --- The Research Scope and Main Results --- p.4<br>Chapter 1.3.1 --- The Mechanism --- p.4<br>Chapter 1.3.2 --- Statement of Problem --- p.8<br>Chapter 1.3.3 --- Main Results --- p.11<br>Chapter 1.4 --- Structure of Research --- p.13<br>Chapter 2 --- Survey of the Literature --- p.15<br>Chapter 2.1 --- Overview --- p.15<br>Chapter 2.2 --- E-business --- p.16<br>Chapter 2.3 --- Auction --- p.18<br>Chapter 2.3.1 --- Introduction --- p.18<br>Chapter 2.3.2 --- Auction Theory --- p.20<br>Chapter 2.3.3 --- Online Auctions --- p.21<br>Chapter 2.4 --- Combination of Auction and Other Transaction Methods --- p.24<br>Chapter 2.4.1 --- Auction with Posted Price --- p.24<br>Chapter 2.4.2 --- Auction with Negotiation Process --- p.26<br>Chapter 2.4.3 --- Auction with Noncompetitive Contract --- p.28<br>Chapter 3 --- Single Unit Noncompetitive Contract --- p.29<br>Chapter 3.1 --- The Model --- p.29<br>Chapter 3.2 --- Strategy of Suppliers in the Auction --- p.31<br>Chapter 3.3 --- Strategy of Selected Suppliers --- p.33<br>Chapter 3.3.1 --- Selected Supplier of No-Information Case --- p.33<br>Chapter 3.3.2 --- Supplier in Information Case --- p.40<br>Chapter 3.4 --- Buyer´ةs Consideration --- p.44<br>Chapter 3.4.1 --- Buyer's Cost in No-Information Case --- p.44<br>Chapter 3.4.2 --- Buyer's Cost in Information Case --- p.45<br>Chapter 3.4.3 --- Comparison of Costs in the Two Information Scenarios --- p.47<br>Chapter 4 --- Buyer´ةs Strategy: Lower Cost and More Flexibility for Suppliers --- p.49<br>Chapter 4.1 --- Is the Noncompetitive Contract Necessary --- p.50<br>Chapter 4.1.1 --- No-Information Case --- p.50<br>Chapter 4.1.2 --- Information Case --- p.52<br>Chapter 4.2 --- Flexibility of Re-Entrance to Auction --- p.53<br>Chapter 4.2.1 --- No-Information Case --- p.54<br>Chapter 4.2.2 --- Information Case --- p.58<br>Chapter 4.3 --- Flexibility of Making Decision After the Auction --- p.65<br>Chapter 4.3.1 --- No-Information Case --- p.66<br>Chapter 4.3.2 --- Information Case --- p.69<br>Chapter 5 --- Multiple Noncompetitive Contracts --- p.73<br>Chapter 5.1 --- No-Information Case --- p.74<br>Chapter 5.1.1 --- Suppliers's Strategy --- p.74<br>Chapter 5.1.2 --- Buyer´ةs Consideration --- p.76<br>Chapter 5.2 --- Information Case --- p.78<br>Chapter 5.2.1 --- Supplier's Strategy --- p.78<br>Chapter 5.2.2 --- Computation of Buyer's Cost --- p.81<br>Chapter 5.2.3 --- Comparison with the Case of One Noncompetitive Contract --- p.85<br>Chapter 5.2.4 --- The Effect of Supplier´ةs Information --- p.89<br>Chapter 5.3 --- General Number of Noncompetitive Contract --- p.91<br>Chapter 5.3.1 --- No-Information Case --- p.91<br>Chapter 5.3.2 --- Information Case --- p.94<br>Chapter 6 --- Alternative Forms of Contracts --- p.96<br>Chapter 6.1 --- SBIB Model --- p.97<br>Chapter 6.2 --- SNIB Model --- p.98<br>Chapter 6.2.1 --- Supplier's Strategy --- p.98<br>Chapter 6.2.2 --- Buyer´ةs Cost in No-Information Case --- p.100<br>Chapter 6.2.3 --- Buyer's Cost in Information Case --- p.103<br>Chapter 6.2.4 --- Multiple Units Offered --- p.105<br>Chapter 7 --- Conclusion --- p.110

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Books on the topic "Online reverse auctions"

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Online Reverse Auctions: A Pricing Tool for Government Contracting. Storming Media, 2000.

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The Auction App: How Companies Tap the Power of Online Auctions to Maximize Revenue Growth. McGraw-Hill, 2002.

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Book chapters on the topic "Online reverse auctions"

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Schoenherr, Tobias. "Online Reverse Auctions: Challenges and Best Practices." In The Evolution of Electronic Procurement. Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93985-8_5.

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Schoenherr, Tobias. "The Advent of the Internet and Online Reverse Auctions." In The Evolution of Electronic Procurement. Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93985-8_4.

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Krysta, Piotr, and Orestis Telelis. "Limited Supply Online Auctions for Revenue Maximization." In Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_41.

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Li, Ling, Xing Liu, and Zhineng Hu. "A Bid Evaluation Method for Multi-attribute Online Reverse Auction." In Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing. Springer Singapore, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1837-4_102.

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Ma, Mingfan, Jun Gao, Ning Lu, and Wenbo Shi. "A Privacy-Preserving Online Reverse Multi-attributes Auction Scheme Based on Degree-Matching." In Cloud Computing and Security. Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48671-0_38.

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Markov, Marin, Penka Markova, Mukesh Mohania, and Yahiko Kambayashi. "Increasing Realized Revenue via Profit Redistribution: A Variant of Online Dutch Auction." In E-Commerce and Web Technologies. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45229-4_3.

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Jing, Tao, Fan Zhang, Liran Ma, Wei Li, Xuhao Chen, and Yan Huo. "Truthful Online Reverse Auction with Flexible Preemption for Access Permission Transaction in Macro-Femtocell Networks." In Wireless Algorithms, Systems, and Applications. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39701-1_42.

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Lee, Peggy D. "The Purchasing Agent's View of Online Reverse Auctions." In Electronic Business. IGI Global, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-60566-056-1.ch120.

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This chapter views online reverse auctions from the purchasing agent’s perspective. I found that purchasing agents with a high level of buying experience will perceive that online reverse auctions have a negative impact on the trust and cooperation in supplier relationships. Purchasing agents did not see a negative impact of online reverse auctions on long term viability of suppliers. The chapter discusses the evolution of the buyer-supplier relationship, emphasizing the critical success factors in supplier selection. Further, it discusses the role of the online reverse auction in the buyer-supplier relationship. By understanding the lens through which purchasing agents view online reverse auctions, managers can do a better job of managing the procurement function through improved training programs for purchasing agents that incorporate the appropriateness of online reverse auctions vs. other sourcing strategies. In addition, they will be able to better manage online reverse auctions, minimizing any negative impact of the auction on existing supplier relationships.

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Gumussoy, Cigdem Altin, and Bilal Gumussoy. "Acceptance of E-Reverse Auction From the Buyer Perspective." In Advanced Methodologies and Technologies in Business Operations and Management. IGI Global, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-5225-7362-3.ch008.

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E-reverse auction is an online, real-time dynamic auction between a buyer organization and a group of pre-qualified suppliers. There occurs a competitive environment, which can lead to great price reductions for the items auctioned. In addition, cycle-time savings for buyers and suppliers, growing markets, accessing to a larger pool of suppliers can be the other advantages. Using e-reverse auction also includes risks such as damaging supplier relationships and increasing the total cost of procurement. This leads to a resistance from internal users and suppliers in the use of e-reverse auction. In the chapter, a research model including risks and benefits of using e-reverse auction is proposed in order to understand the important factors in the decision to use e-reverse auction.

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New, Steven. "Innovation and B2B E-Commerce." In Electronic Business. IGI Global, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-60566-056-1.ch017.

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The massive wave of enthusiasm for B2B (business- to-business) e-commerce generated with the “dot-com” boom led many to believe that a fundamental transformation of how firms bought and sold products was just around the corner. The new “wired” world of commerce would lead to real-time, Internet-driven trading, with significant implications for — amongst other things — the nature of buyer-supplier relationships, pricing, and the management of industrial capacity. Despite the excitement, such a transformation has largely failed to materialise, and whilst there has been a limited uptake of B2B innovations (for example, the use of online reverse auctions), the fundamental character of B2B trade has remained mostly unchanged. Drawing on a multi-stranded empirical study, this chapter seeks to explain the divergence between the expected and realised degrees of innovation.

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Conference papers on the topic "Online reverse auctions"

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Jinhong Xu, Weijun Xu, Jinling Li, and Yucheng Dong. "Competitive Algorithms about Online Reverse Auctions." In 2008 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation (CEC). IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cec.2008.4631185.

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Tsai, Chia-sheng, and Bo-fu Shen. "Online Reverse Auctions via Wireless Instant Message Networks." In 2006 6th International Conference on ITS Telecommunications. IEEE, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/itst.2006.288797.

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Paulson, G. D. "Online reverse auctions: power tools and fair perceptions?" In 5th Annual IEEE-UT Engineering Management Conference. IEEE, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/utemc.2004.1633398.

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Zhou, Xueguang, and Jian Zhang. "An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Perspective on Online Reverse Auctions." In 2010 International Conference on Management and Service Science (MASS 2010). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmss.2010.5577273.

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Li, Bin, Dong Hao, Dengji Zhao, and Makoto Yokoo. "Diffusion and Auction on Graphs." In Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-19}. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2019/62.

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Abstract:

Auction is the common paradigm for resource allocation which is a fundamental problem in human society. Existing research indicates that the two primary objectives, the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency, are generally conflicting in auction design. For the first time, we expand the domain of the classic auction to a social graph and formally identify a new class of auction mechanisms on graphs. All mechanisms in this class are incentive-compatible and also promote all buyers to diffuse the auction information to others, whereby both the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency are significantly improved comparing with the Vickrey auction. It is found that the recently proposed information diffusion mechanism is an extreme case with the lowest revenue in this new class. Our work could potentially inspire a new perspective for the efficient and optimal auction design and could be applied into the prevalent online social and economic networks.

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Mao, Weichao, Zhenzhe Zheng, Fan Wu, and Guihai Chen. "Online Pricing for Revenue Maximization with Unknown Time Discounting Valuations." In Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-18}. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/61.

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Online pricing mechanisms have been widely applied to resource allocation in multi-agent systems. However, most of the existing online pricing mechanisms assume buyers have fixed valuations over the time horizon, which cannot capture the dynamic nature of valuation in emerging applications. In this paper, we study the problem of revenue maximization in online auctions with unknown time discounting valuations, and model it as non-stationary multi-armed bandit optimization. We design an online pricing mechanism, namely Biased-UCB, based on unique features of the discounting valuations. We use competitive analysis to theoretically evaluate the performance guarantee of our pricing mechanism, and derive the competitive ratio. Numerical results show that our design achieves good performance in terms of revenue maximization on a real-world bidding dataset.

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"Mechanism Design of Online Multi-Attribute Reverse Auction." In 2009 42nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences. IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/hicss.2009.306.

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Da-yong, Hu, and Feng Yu-qiang. "Research on post-bidding bundle strategy for online reverse auction." In 2010 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering (ICMSE). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmse.2010.5719784.

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Li-fang, Fu, and Feng Yu-Qiang. "Winner Determination in Online Multi-Attribute Reverse Auction Under Incomplete Information Settings." In 2007 International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management. IEEE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icsssm.2007.4280230.

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Huirong, Jing. "Study on the online reverse auction & the innovation of enterprise management." In 2013 6th International Conference on Information Management, Innovation Management and Industrial Engineering (ICIII). IEEE, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iciii.2013.6703576.

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