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Books on the topic 'Ontological assumption'
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1
Nagasawa, Yujin. A Partial Defence of the Classical Ontological Argument I. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198758686.003.0006.
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This chapter presents a partial defence of the classical ontological argument for perfect being theism. It argues for the following three theses: (i) Anselm is the one who invented the classical ontological argument; (ii) the classical ontological argument is powerful because it is designed in such a way that no matter how one approaches it, one cannot refute it without making a significant metaphysical or epistemic assumption, one that is likely to be contentious in its own right; and (iii) Peter Millican’s attempt to refute the classical ontological argument by revealing shallow, logical problems (without making any significant metaphysical or epistemic assumptions) fails.
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Nagasawa, Yujin. A Partial Defence of the Classical Ontological Argument II. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198758686.003.0007.
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This chapter critically discusses another attempt to refute, without making any significant metaphysical or epistemic assumption, the classical ontological argument for perfect being theism. The attempt in question appeals to parallel parodies of the argument purporting to derive the existence (or non-existence) of various absurd entities, such as the ‘Lost Island’, ‘AntiGod’, and the ‘devil’. The chapter argues that the parowdy objection fails because it contains structural and dialectic flaws. It argues, moreover, that, once a parody is modified in such a way as to eliminate its flaws it is, ironically, no longer a parody—it is the ontological argument itself. Of course, one can hardly undermine the ontological argument by appealing to the ontological argument itself.
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Parfit, Derek. Another Triple Theory. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198778608.003.0012.
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This chapter provides some further insights into normative thinking and reconciles a few meta-ethical disagreements. It builds on an earlier assumption that all non-naturalists make ontological claims of a kind which is ‘mysterious and incredible’. But these objections do not apply to the kind of non-realist cognitivism that has been discussed so far. Hence, the non-realist cognitivist view that there are some non-natural, non-ontological normative truths. The chapter details further dissenting views drawn from these arguments, in the process exploring other meta-ethical arguments concerning the use of the word ‘true’, non-realist cognitivism, normative concepts, normativity, oblique expressivism, and so on.
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Ponte, María de, and Kepa Korta. New thoughts about old facts. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198714217.003.0010.
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In a famous paper by Prior, ontological, epistemic, and semantic considerations are entangled in a way that creates the illusion of an ontological argument about the nature of time. This chapter defends the thesis that Prior’s argument is best interpreted as a “knowledge argument,” similar to that raised by Frank Jackson against physicalism. At a linguistic level, the authors argue that an utterance like “Thank goodness that is over [now]” expresses the same proposition as “Thank goodness the date of the conclusion of the root canal is Friday, June 15, 1954,” when uttered on the same date. At the epistemic level, it is argued that the two are associated with different motivating thoughts. At the ontological level, the authors reject the assumption that the proposition related to the utterance “Thank goodness that is over [now]” and its associated thought require the existence of A-properties.
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Thomasson, Amie L. Norms and Necessity. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190098193.001.0001.
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This book develops a new approach to understanding our claims about what is metaphysically necessary or possible: modal normativism. While claims about what is metaphysically necessary or possible have long played a central role in metaphysics and other areas of philosophy, such claims are traditionally thought of as aiming to describe a special kind of modal fact or property, or perhaps facts about other possible worlds. But that assumption leads to difficult ontological, epistemological, and methodological puzzles. Should we accept that there are modal facts or properties, or other possible worlds? If so, what could these things be? How could we come to know what the modal facts or properties are? How can we resolve philosophical debates about what is necessary or possible? The normativist rejects the assumption that modal claims aim to describe modal features or possible worlds, arguing instead that they serve as useful ways of conveying, reasoning with, and renegotiating semantic rules and their consequences. By dropping the descriptivist assumption, the normativist is able to unravel the notorious ontological problems of modality, and provide a clear and plausible story about how we can come to know what is metaphysically necessary or possible. Most importantly, this approach helps demystify philosophical methodology. For we are able to see that resolving metaphysical modal questions does not require a special form of philosophical insight or intuition. Instead, it requires nothing more mysterious than empirical knowledge, conceptual mastery, and an ability to explicitly convey and renegotiate semantic rules.
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Meincke, Anne Sophie. Persons as Biological Processes. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198779636.003.0018.
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Human persons exist longer than a single moment in time; they persist through time. However, so far it has not been possible to make this natural and widespread assumption metaphysically comprehensible. The philosophical debate on personal identity is rather stuck in a dilemma: reductionist theories explain personal identity away, while non-reductionist theories fail to give any informative account at all. This chapter argues that this dilemma emerges from an underlying commitment, shared by both sides in the debate, to an ontology that gives priority to static unchanging things. The claim defended here is that the dilemma of personal identity can be overcome if we acknowledge the biological nature of human persons and switch to a process-ontological framework that takes process and change to be ontologically primary. Human persons are biological higher-order processes rather than things, and their identity conditions can be scientifically investigated.
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Chaudhari, Pia Sophia. Dynamis of Healing. Fordham University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.5422/fordham/9780823284658.001.0001.
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This work is an exploration of possible experiential traces of Orthodox Christian ontology and soteriology in the healing of the psyche as known and experienced through depth psychology. It explores a possible relationship between theology and depth psychology as mediated through a lens of the sacramentality of creation. Using a variety of patristic soteriological images, all of which converge around the central theme of “that which is not assumed is not healed,” it then goes on to offer a possible psychological exegesis of that key patristic maxim, seeking to understand how this might be experienced psychologically. This is done through the lens of the assumption of being qua being as explored through insights into the natural healing impetus of the psyche qua psyche. The exploration then turns to the ontological energies of eros, desire, and will and looks for traces of the assumption of eros in psychological healing, as seen primarily through the lens of object-relations theory.
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Besedovsky, Natalia. Uncertain Meanings of Risk. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198820802.003.0011.
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This chapter studies calculative risk-assessment practices in credit rating agencies. It identifies two fundamentally different methodological approaches for producing ratings, which in turn shape the respective conceptions of credit risk. The traditional approach sees ‘risk’ as an only partially calculable and predictable set of hazards that should be avoided or minimized. This approach is particularly evident in the production of country credit ratings and gives rise to ordinal rankings of risk. By contrast, structured finance rating practices conceive of ‘risk’ as both fully calculable and controllable; they construct cardinal measures of risk by assuming that ontological uncertainty does not exist and that models can capture all possible events in a probabilistic manner. This assumption—that uncertainty can be turned into measurable risk—is a necessary precondition for structured finance securities and has become an influential imaginary in financial markets.
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Hammack, Phillip L. Social Psychology and Social Justice: Critical Principles and Perspectives for the Twenty-First Century. Edited by Phillip L. Hammack. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199938735.013.1.
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This introduction presents the concept of social justice as an idea (and ideal) linked to Enlightenment philosophies and their realization in modern democracies. The historical emergence of social psychology as a discipline is discussed in relation to twentieth-century movements for postcolonial independence and civil rights, the demise of the eugenics movement, and challenges to ideologies of ethnic hierarchy. Five principles of a social psychology of social justice for the twenty-first century are proposed, orienting empirical work toward (1) a critical ontological perspective, (2) assumption of a normative stance toward justice, (3) alliance with the subordinate, (4) analysis of resistance, and (5) commitment to public science and scientific activism. Chapters within the volume are situated in relation to six areas of inquiry: (1) critical ontologies, paradigms, and methods; (2) race and ethnicity; (3) gender and sexuality; (4) class and poverty; (5) globalization and conflict; and (6) intervention, advocacy, and social policy.
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Toadvine, Ted. Phenomenology and Environmental Ethics. Edited by Stephen M. Gardiner and Allen Thompson. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199941339.013.16.
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The historically rich and diverse tradition of phenomenology has contributed broadly to the emergence of environmental thought across the humanities and social sciences and is increasingly influential on environmental ethics and philosophy. Emphasizing the primacy of experience and inquiry into the epistemological and ontological assumptions that inform the historical and contemporary relationship with nature, phenomenology takes a critical distance from metaphysical naturalism and the instrumental framing of environmental problems in resourcist, technological, economic, and managerial terms. The tradition’s distinctive contributions to environmental ethics include its focus on the epistemic and ontological revindication of experience, its critique of metaphysical and modernist assumptions, and its aim to articulate a post-metaphysical conception of the self-world relation and an alternative ethos appropriate to our experience of nature. Key concepts that inform current phenomenological research in environmental ethics include the lifeworld, the earth and elements, the chiasm, and poetic dwelling.
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Di Bella, Stefano. Some Perspectives on Leibniz’s Nominalism and Its Sources. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190608040.003.0009.
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The chapter considers the presence of nominalist motives in the development of Leibniz’s logical and ontological thought. The discussion begins with Leibniz’s Preface to his reedition of the work of the Renaissance nominalist Nizolius, and emphasizes Leibniz’s acceptance of antirealistic assumptions, his balancing of them with Platonic elements, and his rejection of Hobbes’s conventionalist implications. There is also a consideration of the deflationary treatment of abstract terms that Leibniz offers as part of his program of providing ontological clarification by way of semantic analysis. Leibniz applies an analysis of abstract talk stemming from Hobbes, with the aim of availing himself of the resources of certain expressive devices in logical and scientific language, while avoiding realistic commitments. Leibniz’s final profession of a “precautionary nominalism” confirms his preference for ontological economy, but also leaves unresolved some problems in his “austere” account of the ontology of predication and change.
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Parfit, Derek. Jackson’s Non-Empirical Normative Truths. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198778608.003.0008.
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This chapter presents some arguments on non-empirical normative truths. It considers the assumption that, if there were any non-natural normative truths, these truths would be about ontologically weighty non-natural properties. Given what we have learnt about our world, we know that there are no such properties and truths. But the chapter argues that these normative truths are not about such ontologically weighty non-natural properties. It is implied that metaphysical Nnturalists can consistently believe that there are some non-empirical truths, such as logical, mathematical, and modal truths, and some fundamental normative truths. These truths do not add anything mysterious to a Naturalist's ontology, however.
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Kockelman, Paul. Algorithms, Agents, and Ontologies. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190636531.003.0007.
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This chapter details the inner workings of spam filters, algorithmic devices that separate desirable messages from undesirable messages. It argues that such filters are a particularly important kind of sieve insofar as they readily exhibit key features of sieving devices in general, and algorithmic sieving in particular. More broadly, it describes the relation between ontology (assumptions that drive interpretations) and inference (interpretations that alter assumptions) as it plays out in the classification and transformation of identities, types, or kinds. Focusing on the unstable processes whereby identifying algorithms, identified types, and evasive transformations are dynamically coupled over time, it also theorizes various kinds of ontological inertia and highlights various kinds of algorithmic ineffability. Finally, it shows how similar issues underlie a much wider range of processes, such as the Turing Test, Bayesian reasoning, and machine learning more generally.
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Fabris, Flavia. Waddington’s Processual Epigenetics and the Debate over Cryptic Variability. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198779636.003.0012.
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This chapter reappraises Waddington’s processual theory of epigenetics and examines its implications for contemporary evolutionary biology. It focuses in particular on the ontological difference between two conflicting assumptions that have been conflated in the recent debate over the nature of cryptic variability: a substance view that is consistent with the modern synthesis and construes variability as a preexisting pool of random genetic variation; and a processual view, which derives from Waddington’s conception of developmental canalization and understands variability as an epigenetic process. The chapter also discusses how these opposing interpretations fare in their capacity to explain the genetic assimilation of acquired characters.
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Bhatia, Sunil. Studying Globalization at Home. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199964727.003.0009.
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This chapter documents the ethnographic context in which the interviews and participant observation were conducted for the study presented in this book. It also situates the study within the context of narrative inquiry and develops arguments about the role of self-reflexivity in doing ethnography at “home” and producing qualitative forms of knowledge that are based on personal, experiential, and cultural narratives. It is argued that there is significant interest in the adoption of interpretive methods or qualitative research in psychology. The qualitative approaches in psychology present a provocative and complex vision of how the key concepts related to describing and interpreting cultural codes, social practices, and lived experience of others are suffused with both poetical and political elements of culture. The epistemological and ontological assumptions undergirding qualitative research reflect multiple “practices of inquiry” and methodologies that have different orientations, assumptions, values, ideologies, and criterion of excellence.
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Lynch, Julia, and Martin Rhodes. Historical Institutionalism and the Welfare State. Edited by Orfeo Fioretos, Tulia G. Falleti, and Adam Sheingate. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199662814.013.25.
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This chapter examines how historical institutionalism has influenced the analysis of welfare state and labor market policies in the rich industrial democracies. Using Lakatos’s concept of the “scientific research program” as a heuristic, the authors explore the development and expansion of historical institutionalism as a predominant approach in welfare state research. Focusing on this tradition’s strong core of actors (academic path- and boundary-setters), rules (methodology and methods), and norms (ontological and epistemological assumptions), they strive to demarcate the terrain of HI within studies of the welfare state, and to reveal the capacity of HI in this field to underpin a robust but flexible and enduring scholarly research program.
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Crosbie, Christopher. Revenge Tragedy and Classical Philosophy on the Early Modern Stage. Edinburgh University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474440264.001.0001.
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This book discovers within early modern revenge tragedy the surprising shaping presence of a wide array of classical philosophies not commonly affiliated with the genre. By recovering the pervasive influence of Aristotelian faculty psychology on The Spanish Tragedy, Aristotelian ethics on Titus Andronicus, Lucretian atomism on Hamlet, Galenic pneumatics on Antonio’s Revenge and Epictetian Stoicism on The Duchess of Malfi, this book reveals how the very atmospheres and ontological assumptions of revenge tragedy exert their own kind of conditioning dramaturgical force. The book also revitalises our understanding of how the Renaissance stage, even at its most lurid, functions as a unique space for the era’s practical, vernacular engagement with received philosophy.
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Ehlers, Nadine. Identities. Edited by Lisa Disch and Mary Hawkesworth. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199328581.013.18.
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This chapter explores how the concept of “identity” has been formulated within feminist theory. Looking specifically to the ongoing contestations to how identity has been imagined, it explores the ontological and epistemological assumptions of these imaginings. Additionally, the chapter addresses recent moves away from focusing on identity in some contemporary feminist thought and the implications of such a move. In considering how feminism has thought about identity, it becomes clear that there is no linear or teleological trajectory; there are competing theories within—and links across—each of the broad time periods and rubrics of thought traced out, and all feminist theories of identity are themselves marked by contradictory possibilities and imaginings for/of the self.
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Arai, Paula. The Zen of Rags. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190469290.003.0008.
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This chapter combines ethnographic research (including in-depth interviews with Zen monastics and laity, especially women) with private and public instruction to reveal the significance and the roles of rags in Zen culture. It provides a critical analysis of root assumptions embedded in Zen rags, and it reinterprets Dōgen’s radical nondual wisdom recorded in the Eihei shingi, Eihei kōroku, and Shōbōgenzō with rags in mind. It also elucidates various Zen practices and anecdotes in which rags wipe, wring, clean, protect, heal, and teach both ontological and soteriological dimensions of Zen. This chapter also explores how rags reveal the dynamics of enlightenment in everyday monastic and domestic spheres, and highlights the dimensions of healing and beauty that shape the practices inherent in Zen material culture.
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Stroud, Barry. Unmasking and Dispositionalism. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809753.003.0014.
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This chapter presents a response to Mark Johnston’s ‘Subjectivism and Unmasking’, which was directed at the author’s book, The Quest for Reality. Johnston defends an ontological account of what colours are and explains how, on that view, it could be true that no colours belong to the everyday objects we perceive in the world. The author’s resistance to the subjectivity of colour perceptions and beliefs turns rather on the proper understanding of colour terms as predicates ascribing colours to objects, and not as names or terms referring to the colours. The chapter explains the main assumptions of the ‘Ramsey/Lewis’ theory of colour. It also considers how the complex relations we understand to hold among the contents of perception, thought, and belief stand as a challenge to all forms of dispositionalism.
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Heck, Richard Kimberly. Logicism, Ontology, and the Epistemology of Second-Order Logic. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198792161.003.0008.
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In two recent papers, Bob Hale has attempted to free second-order logic of the “staggering existential assumptions” with which Quine famously attempted to saddle it. This chapter argues, first, that the ontological issue is at best secondary: the crucial issue about second-order logic, at least for a neo-logicist, is epistemological. It is then argued that neither Crispin Wright’s attempt to characterize a ‘neutralist’ conception of quantification that is wholly independent of existential commitment, nor Hale’s attempt to characterize the second-order domain in terms of definability, can serve a neo-logicist’s purposes. The problem, in both cases, is similar: neither Wright nor Hale is sufficiently sensitive to the demands that impredicativity imposes. Finally, the chapter defends the author’s own earlier attempt to finesse this issue, in “A Logic for Frege’s Theorem,” from Hale’s criticisms.
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Potter, Nancy Nyquist. Good defiance and flourishing. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/med/9780199663866.003.0003.
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This chapter examines the relationship between defiance and flourishing by analyzing three cases and unpacking some of the epistemic and ontological assumptions that undergird our naïve ideas about flourishing. The aim is to clarify under what conditions a person with a mental disorder might be able to flourish, what a claim of flourishing entails, and why some defiant behavior is central to this theory of flourishing—it counts as good defiance. It argues against Aristotle’s account of human virtue as a function of excellent reasoning and against positive psychology’s conception of mental health as well-being and flourishing. Instead, it identifies features of non-ideal flourishing that are then applied to three people with diagnoses: one with schizophrenia, one with depression, and one with Borderline Personality Disorder. The author then explains how she would evaluate these three cases in terms of their defiant behavior.
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Uranga, Emilio. Essay on an Ontology of the Mexican (1951). Translated by Carlos Alberto Sánchez. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190601294.003.0013.
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Emilio Uranga challenges the underlying assumptions of Samuel Ramos’s popular and controversial thesis regarding the “Mexican inferiority complex.” Uranga’s basic claim, influenced by Heidegger, is that Ramos’s analysis overlooks a more foundational “difference”: that between ontological sufficiency and insufficiency. Ramos’s analysis remains always at an ontic, or philosophically superficial, level of explanation, attributing “inferiority” to the Mexican character without explaining that on which it is grounded. The clue to its grounding lies in fragility, unwillingness, and melancholy, seemingly essential characteristics that define Mexican existence. Thus, fragility is not related to a simple feeling of inferiority, which is itself related to actual intersubjective relationships between Mexicans and their European colonizers, but rather to a more complex emotive life predicated on an unconscious awareness of a primordial relationship to nothingness and non-being. Unwillingness, likewise, is not a simple lack of will, but a refusal to be part of the world.
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Meretoja, Hanna. Narrative Hermeneutics. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190649364.003.0002.
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The chapter delineates narrative hermeneutics as a framework for exploring the ethical complexities of the relationship between life and narrative and discusses the interconnections between the ethical and ontological assumptions underlying different conceptions of narrative. It outlines a broad Nietzschean-hermeneutic conception of interpretation and proposes three interconnected advantages of privileging this approach in theorizing narrative, experience, subjectivity, and their interrelations. It allows one to (1) understand how narrative relates to experience without seeing their relationship as dichotomous or identifying them with each other, that is, how they exist in a tensional but reciprocal relationship, best understood in terms of an interpretative continuum; (2) articulate how life does not form one coherent narrative but is instead a process of constant narrative reinterpretation; and (3) understand the relationship between narrative webs and the individual subjects entangled in them as fundamentally dialogical and as entwined with practices of power.
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Ross, Jacob. Idealism and Fine-Tuning. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198746973.003.0015.
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This chapter argues that, given certain background assumptions, a kind of idealism follows from a version of the fine-tuning thesis. The kind of idealism in question ascribes explanatory priority, not ontological priority, to the mental. The version of the fine-tuning thesis in question is the strong fine-tuning for consciousness thesis, according to which (i) the values of the fundamental physical parameters are fine-tuned for consciousness and (ii) this fine-tuning for consciousness is not the inevitable by-product of fine-tuning for something more basic than consciousness, such as life. The chapter argues that, assuming a particular account of the nature of explanation—namely, the unificationist account—the strong fine-tuning for consciousness thesis entails that consciousness plays a fundamental explanatory role in nature, and so this thesis entails explanatory idealism. The chapter concludes by arguing that similar reasoning leads to the conclusion that consciousness is the final cause of the universe.
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Florio, Salvatore, and Øystein Linnebo. The Many and the One. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198791522.001.0001.
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Plural logic has become a well-established subject, especially in philosophical logic. This book explores its broader significance for philosophy, logic, and linguistics. What can plural logic do for us? Are the bold claims made on its behalf correct? After introducing plural logic and its main applications, the book provides a systematic analysis of the relation between this logic and other theoretical frameworks such as set theory, mereology, higher-order logic, and modal logic. The applications of plural logic rely on two assumptions, namely that this logic is ontologically innocent and has great expressive power. These assumptions are shown to be problematic. The result is a more nuanced picture of plural logic’s applications than has been given so far. Questions about the correct logic of plurals play a central role in the last part of the book, where traditional plural logic is rejected in favor of a “critical” alternative. The most striking feature of this alternative is that there is no universal plurality. This leads to a novel approach to the relation between the many and the one. In particular, critical plural logic paves the way for an account of sets capable of solving the set-theoretic paradoxes.
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Martin, Jeffrey J. Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190638054.003.0002.
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Psychology grew out of philosophy, and the science of psychology is at the heart of how psychologists develop a body of knowledge. Despite the central role of science and philosophy in psychology, sport and exercise psychologists often ignore issues related to philosophy of science. This chapter discusses the scientific method upon which most quantitative research is based. It also discusses ontological and epistemological issues and the various philosophical assumptions that underpin research. In particular, two epistemological opposites are addressed, social constructionism and cognitivism, along with their strengths and weaknesses and resultant implications for past and future research. Because psychology is inherently the study of how and why people think and act, to completely disavow the mind as the primary cause of human agency is antithetical to the discipline and profession of psychology. Thus considerable attention is given to refuting critics who refute the primacy of the mind and its role in human behavior while still acknowledging that social, environmental, and culture factors play important roles in people’s lives.
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Özkazanç-Pan, Banu. Transnational Migration and the New Subjects of Work. Policy Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/policypress/9781529204544.001.0001.
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This book brings about insights and key concepts from the field of transnational migration studies to bear upon the field of organization studies. It expands upon multiscalar global perspective, moving beyond methodological nationalism, and historical global conjuncturesas relevant transnational concepts for studying people and difference in novel ways including agentic, reflexive mobile subjectivities as the new subjects of diversity research that emerge in a ‘post-identitarian’ world. Specifically, the book offers transmigrant, hybrid, and cosmopolitan subjectivities as new the subjects of diversity research. Beyond new subjectivities, mobility ontology requires rethinking the epistemology of multiculturalism, examining inequalities, and redirecting the methodologies adopted to attend to difference. In expanding on these, the book offers new frameworks for the study of people on-the-move and organizations through a mobility ontology that foregrounds movement as the natural order of the social world. It also calls into question the ways existing research paradigms and approaches have potentially replicated the creation of boundaries and borders through implicit assumptions about difference, race/ethnicity and belonging. By shifting the ontological premise upon which the field of organization studies rests, this book provides novel ways of theorizing difference, people and work beyond static epistemologies guiding much of the field.
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Corry, Richard. Power and Influence. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198840718.001.0001.
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This book investigates the metaphysical presuppositions of a common—and very successful—reductive approach to dealing with the complexity of the world. The reductive approach in question is one in which we study the components of a complex system in relative isolation, and use the information so gained to explain or predict the behaviour of the complex whole. So, for example, ecologists explain shifts in species population in terms of interactions between individuals, geneticists explain traits of an organism in terms of interactions between genes, and physicists explain the properties of a gas in terms of collisions between the particles that make up the gas. It is argued that this reductive method makes substantive metaphysical assumptions about the world. In particular, the method assumes the existence of causal powers that manifest ‘causal influence’—a relatively unrecognized ontological category of which forces are a paradigm example. The success of the reductive method, therefore, is an argument for the existence of such causal influence. The book goes on to show that adding causal influence to our ontology gives us the resources to solve some traditional problems in the metaphysics of powers, causation, emergence, laws of nature, and possibly even normative ethics. What results, then, is not just an understanding of the reductive method, but an integrated metaphysical world view that is grounded in a novel ontology of power and influence.
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Radner, Hilary, and Alistair Fox. An Elegy for Cinema1. Edinburgh University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474422888.003.0005.
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This chapter describes how Raymond Bellour in the twenty-first century enters into the on-going debates about the end of cinema that commenced in France in the late 1980s. The chapter underlines how he focuses largely on the changing shape and nature of the dispositif (or viewing situation, including the assumptions that a spectator brings to the viewing experience) in response to new technologies, with an emphasis on moving-image installation art shown in the museum or gallery. Whereas some scholars, such as Francesco Casetti, among others, have claimed that digital technologies and the proliferation of diverse viewing platforms mark a further development, a continuation of what was once cinema (and perhaps even the nineteenth century novel, the photo-roman, the comic book. etc.), Bellour sees these changes as constituting a fundamental break, an ontological shift in the nature of the medium. For Bellour, the dispositif – the apparatus, or physical setting and its technological and psychic potentiality for interaction, as well as the codes that inform this interaction, within which the viewer confronts and makes meaning out of a narrative, visual or otherwise – is fundamental to the experience of cinema and the ideas that it generates. This section offers an exploration Bellour’s understanding of these crucial changes, the implications of which animate discussions about contemporary media across the disciplines.
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Fred-Rivera, Ivette, and Jessica Leech, eds. Being Necessary. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198792161.001.0001.
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What is the relationship between ontology and modality: between what there is, and what there could be, must be, or might have been? Throughout a distinguished career, Bob Hale’s work has addressed this question on a number of fronts, through the development of a Fregean approach to ontology, an essentialist theory of modality, and in his work on neo-logicism in the philosophy of mathematics. This collection of new essays engages with these themes in Hale’s work in order to make further progress in our understanding of ontology, modality, and the relations between them. Some essays directly address questions in modal metaphysics, drawing on ontological concerns. Others raise questions in modal epistemology and its links to matters of ontology, such as the challenge to give an epistemology of essence. There are also several essays engaging with questions of what might be called ‘modal ontology’: the study of whether and what things exist necessarily or contingently. Such issues can be raised and addressed directly, but they also have an important bearing on the kinds of semantic commitments engendered in logic and mathematics, e.g., to the existence of sets, or numbers, or properties, and so on. It is thus explored in some chapters to what extent one’s ontology—and indeed, one’s ontology of necessary beings—interacts with other plausible assumptions and commitments.
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Berger, Jason. Xenocitizens. Fordham University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.5422/fordham/9780823287758.001.0001.
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Sociality under the sign of liberalism has seemingly come to an end—or, at least, is in dire crisis. Xenocitizens returns to the antebellum United States in order to intervene in a wide field of responses to our present economic and existential precarity. In this incisive study, Berger challenges a shaken but still standing scholarly tradition based on liberal-humanist perspectives. Through the concept of xenocitizen, a synthesis of the terms “xeno,” which connotes alien or stranger, and “citizen,” which signals a naturalized subject of a state, the book uncovers realities and possibilities that have been foreclosed by dominant paradigms. Xenocitizens glimpses how antebellum writers formulated, in response to varying forms of oppression and crisis, startlingly unique ontological and social models for thinking about personhood and sociality as well as unfamiliar ways to exist and to leverage change. Today, the old liberal-national model of citizen is not only problematic, but also tactically anachronistic. And yet, standard liberal assumptions that undergird the fading realities of humanist and democratic traditions often linger within emerging scholarly work that seeks to move past them. Innovatively reorienting our thinking about traditional nineteenth-century figures such as Ralph Waldo Emerson, Margaret Fuller, and Henry David Thoreau as well as formative writers such as Harriet Beecher Stowe, William Wells Brown, and Martin Delany, Xenocitizens offers us a new nineteenth century—pushing our imaginative and critical thinking toward new terrain.
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Sass, Louis A., and Elizabeth Pienkos. Delusion. Edited by K. W. M. Fulford, Martin Davies, Richard G. T. Gipps, George Graham, John Z. Sadler, Giovanni Stanghellini, and Tim Thornton. Oxford University Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199579563.013.0039.
Full textAbstract:
This chapter offers an overview of the phenomenological approach to delusions, emphasizing what Karl Jaspers called the "true delusions" of schizophrenia. Phenomenological psychopathology focuses on theexperienceof delusions and the delusional world. Several features of this approach are surveyed, including emphasis on formal qualities of subjective life (e.g., mutations of time, space, causality, self-experience, or sense of reality) and questioning of standard assumptions about delusions as erroneous belief (the traditional doxastic view, or "poor reality-testing" formula). The altered modalities of world-oriented and self-oriented experience that precede and ground delusions in schizophrenia, especially the experiences of revelation that Klaus Conrad termed the outer and innerapophany, are then discussed. The chapter first considers the famous "delusional mood" (feelings of strangeness and tension, and a sense of tantalizing yet ineffable meaning ), then the role of ipseity-disturbance (altered minimal or core self, of the basic, pre-reflective sense of existing as a unified and vitalsubjectof experience). In both cases it is explained how delusions can develop out of these distinctive alterations of perception and feeling. The classic question of the understandability or comprehensibility of schizophrenic delusion, together with the related issues of wish-fulfillment and rationalizing motives are then considered. The chapter addresses the crucial but neglected issue of the felt reality-status of delusions or the delusional world, discussing derealization, "double bookkeeping" (in which the patient experiences delusional reality as existing in a different ontological domain from everyday reality), and "double exposure" (merging of two perspectives on reality, with the potential for confusion this implies). The chapter concludes by discussing delusions typically found in paranoid and affective psychoses, and monothematic delusions found in certain organic conditions.