Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Ontological dependence'

Primitive, unanalysable grounding relations are considered by many to be indispensable constituents of the metaphysician’s toolkit. Yet, as a primitive ontological posit, grounding must earn its keep by explaining features of the world not explained by other tools already at our disposal. Those who defend grounding contend that grounding is required to play two interconnected roles: accounting for widespread intuitions regarding what is ontologically prior to what, and forming the backbone of a theory of metaphysical explanation, in much the same way that causal relations have been thought to underpin theories of scientific explanation. This thesis undermines the need to posit grounding relations to perform either of these jobs. With regard to the first, it is argued that a pair of human psychological mechanisms—for which there is substantial empirical support—can provide a more theoretically virtuous explanation of why we have the intuitions that we do. With regard to the second, I begin by considering what we want from a theory of explanation, and go on to develop three attractive (yet grounding-free) theories of metaphysical explanation. I offer: i) a psychologistic theory that calls upon the aforementioned psychological mechanisms, as well as the modal relations of necessitation and supervenience, ii) a metaphysical variant of the deductive-nomological theory of scientific explanation, and iii) a metaphysical variant of the unificationist theory of scientific explanation. Furthermore, these theories draw upon mechanisms and relations (both logical and ontological) to which we are already committed. Thus, to posit grounding relations in order to explain our priority intuitions, or in order to develop a theory of metaphysical explanation, is ontologically profligate. I conclude that we should not posit relations of ground.

The dissertation’s starting point is the intuitive distinction between events, conceived of as things that happen, and material objects, conceived of as things that participate in events. This distinction raises two connected metaphysical questions: how can the relation of being involved in which holds between material objects and events be adequately characterized? Which is the relation of being ontologically prior than which holds between material objects and events? The Thesis “A World of Events” tries to give an answer to such questions in seven chapters. In Chapter 1 necessary and plausibly jointly sufficient conditions will be established for identifying, respectively, an entity as a material object or as an event. The fundamental questions which have justified this research presuppose the existence of events; however, some arguments in literature have been put forth against the existence of such a kind of entities. In the first part of Chapter 2 the arguments against the existence of events advanced by Aune (1977) and Horgan (1978) will be examined. Thereafter, an argumentative strategy for blocking those arguments will be devised. The subject of Chapeter 3 is the notion of ontological priority. In the first part of the chapter some requirements will be provided which every adequate characterization of the notion of ontological priority has to satisfy. Afterwards, a characterization of the notions of ontological priority and ontological dependence which are based on Fine’s (1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c) and Correia’s (2006) works and which satisfy the requirements settled for the notion of ontological priority will be developed. In the literature some arguments have been designed aiming at providing some constraints which the adequate theories of events have to fulfil. In Chapter 4 such constraints are summed up in two requirements: requirement R1), according to which a material object is an entity which participates in events: a material object enters as a participant in events through which it always remains the same; and requirement R2), according to which events ontologically depend upon the material objects which participate in them. In Chapters 5 and 6 two theories which plausibly satisfy such requirements will be examined: the theory of events as exemplifications of properties or relations and the theory of events as particular and non-substantial ways of being. Particularly, in Chapter 5 two objections raised against the theory of events as exemplifications of properties or relations will be considered and a new version of this theory of events which blocks these objections will be proposed. In the first part of Chapter 7 the validity of requirements R1) and R2) and the correctness of the arguments whence requirements R1) and R2) have been derived will be questioned. Subsequently, the plausibility of a theory of events which fails to satisfy requirements R1) and R2) will be inquired: Quine’s theory of events. This theory of events identifies events and material objects. The argumentative strategy is as follows: first of all, two theoretical costs of Quine’s theory will be highlighted; then Quine’s theory will be defended against an objection proposed by Paul (2000).
Punto di partenza della dissertazione è la distinzione intuitiva tra eventi, intesi come cose che accadono, e oggetti materiali, intesi come cose che prendono parte o partecipano ad eventi. La distinzione pone al metafisico due questioni connesse: quale possa essere una caratterizzazione adeguata della relazione di prendere parte o di partecipazione tra oggetti materiali ed eventi e quale relazione di priorità ontologica sussista tra gli uni e gli altri. La tesi “Un mondo di eventi” cerca di rispondere a tali questioni, a cominciare da quella della priorità ontologica, che sarà chiamata “Priorità”. La tesi si articola in 7 capitoli. Nel Capitolo 1 si fissano le caratterizzazioni di oggetto materiale e di evento. Nel Capitolo 2 si osserva che le questioni che motivano il lavoro di dottorato presuppongono l’esistenza degli eventi, ma questa non è stata sempre accettata. Nel corso del capitolo si esaminano gli argomenti contro l’esistenza degli eventi proposti da Aune (1977) e da Horgan (1978) e si sostiene che essi non sono conclusivi. Oggetto del Capitolo 3 è la nozione di priorità ontologica. Innanzitutto, si stabiliscono vari requisiti che una caratterizzazione adeguata della nozione di priorità ontologica deve soddisfare. Nella parte finale del capitolo si avanza una caratterizzazione della nozione di priorità ontologica e di dipendenza ontologica basata sui lavori di Fine (1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c) e di Correia (2006) che soddisfa i requisiti di adeguatezza stabiliti inizialmente. Nel Capitolo 4 si affronta la questione dell’adeguatezza di una teoria degli eventi. In letteratura essa è subordinata al soddisfacimento di due requisiti: il requisito R1), secondo cui un oggetto materiale è un’entità che partecipa ad eventi attraverso i quali rimane sempre lo stesso, e il requisito R2), secondo il quale gli eventi dipendono ontologicamente dagli oggetti materiali che vi partecipano. Nei capitoli 5 e 6 si esaminano, rispettivamente, due teorie metafisiche che si è ritenuto soddisfino i requisiti in questione: la teoria degli eventi come esemplificazioni di proprietà o relazioni e la teoria degli eventi come modi di essere particolari e non sostanziali. In particolare, nel Capitolo 5 si considerano le obiezioni mosse contro la teoria degli eventi come esemplificazioni di proprietà o relazioni e si formula una nuova versione di tale teoria che blocca le obiezioni in questione. Nella prima parte del Capitolo 7 si mette in questione la validità dei requisiti R1) e R2). Nella parte seguente del capitolo di esamina la plausibilità della teoria sostenuta da Quine (1953a, 1960, 1976b, 1985), Goodman (1951) e Lemmon (1967) che identifica gli eventi e gli oggetti materiali e si mettono in luce alcuni costi metafisici a cui tale teoria è soggetta.

Le platonisme mathématique, la thèse selon laquelle les mathématiques portent sur des objets abstraits existant de manière indépendante à notre esprit et notre langage, est un des sujets les plus débattues dans la philosophie des mathématiques. L’image des mathématiques qui s’en dégage est souvent perçue comme se heurtant à des problèmes épistémologiques considérables : si il est vrai que les mathématiques sont une science qui porte sur des objets en dehors de l’espace et du temps, comment nous, des êtres situés spatio-temporellement, pouvons avoir une quelconque connaissance mathématique ? En conséquence, la défense du platonisme et le débat sur l’ontologie des mathématiques se sont largement concentrées sur cette dimension épistémologique. Dans ce travail de thèse, nous essaierons de réitérer le rôle de la métaphysique et de la pratique des mathématiques dans le débat sur l’ontologie des objets mathématiques. Notre objectif principal est plus particulièrement le développement et l’application d’un programme métaphysique général, capable de rendre compte des aspects ontologiques des mathématiques qui sont propres à une interprétation platoniste des mathématiques. Pour ce faire, notre stratégie consiste à insister tout d’abord sur le besoin de clarification des thèses platonistes concernant la nature abstraite des objets mathématiques et l’indépendance de ces objets et à essayer d’étendre la portée du platonisme au-delà des concepts et théories mathématiques habituelles
Mathematical platonism is the idea according to which mathematics is about a domain of abstract objects, existing independently of our though and language. It is one of the central subjects in philosophy of mathematics, and is often considered to face important epistemological problems. If, as the platonist thinks, mathematics really are a science of objects outside of space and time, then how is mathematical knowledge even possible? As a consequence of the epistemological problem, the debate has focused mainly around the epistemological dimension of platonism. In this study however, we will try to move away from epistemology and restate the role of metaphysics and mathematical practice in the ontological debate on mathematical objects. Our main objective will be to develop and apply a general metaphysical program in order to explain the ontological aspects of a platonist interpretation of mathematics. In order to do this, it will be necessary to clarify the abstract nature of mathematical objects and the ontological independence of these entities, and to extend the scope of platonism beyond the usual concepts and mathematical theories

La thèse examine, à partir d’une relecture de Peirce et de certaines de ses interprétations des philosophes et des problèmes antiques, les arguments qui peuvent permettre à une conception pragmatiste des croyances et de la signification de parer aux accusations de conduire au relativisme. Ces arguments résident dans la façon dont ces conceptions s’articulent entre elles, et acceptent une forme de réalisme
This thesis examines arguments taken from Peirce’s reading in Ancient philosophy, which could be used to block accusations of relativism being latent in a pragmatist conception of belief and concepts. The argument lies in the articulation of the two conceptions and their compatibility with a realist view

En la primera sección se argumenta que las exposiciones que intentan estar en conformidad con el desideratum de neutralidad no son suficientemente esclarecedoras. A ello le siguen dos modos dehacer manejable la familia de relaciones de dependencia ontológica: los casos que teóricamente caen en ella, y la función que cumple. La sección se zanja con ciertas objeciones en contra de que la generación de niveles ontológicos sea consecuencia de una falacia representacionalista. El segundo capítulo está dedicado enteramente a hacer explícita la noción de existencia entendiéndola, o bien como una propiedad o predicado no real, o bien o como una propiedad o predicado real. Se argumenta que la primera noción no permite hacer comprensible la dependencia existencial. Las primeras partes del segundo capítulo están dedicadas a exponer la familia de relaciones de dependencia existencial. Posteriormente se presenta la dependencia existencial específica y los problemas que suelen ser tenidos en cuenta, en particular: la mera asociación modal, la simetría dependencial entre propiedades esenciales y substancias, y la dependencia dada entre la vida de un individuo y el individuo en cuestión. Se argumenta que el condicional estricto ha de ser reemplazado por un condicional relevante cuya relevancia sea dada por el operador modal de necesidad metafísica. La tercera parte del segundo capítulo se concentra en la dependencia genérica y el dictum de acuerdo con el cual esta caracteriza a la concepción inmentista de los universales. Se argumenta que si la relación de dependencia es presuntamente asimétrica y se toma dicha concepción à la Armstrong, entonces el dictum es falso. Y, en segundo lugar, se ofrecen casos para no tomar la relación de dependencia genérica como un caso de instanciación. El capítulo tercero se destina a presentar diferentes modelos. Se expone la relación directa y sin intermediarios que parece estar en la base tanto de Aristóteles como de Suárez. Se presenta el modelo de este último especialmente centrado en la diferencia entre dependencia material y dependencia efectiva. Se argumenta que este modelo bloquea las secuelas de la dependencia específica. Dentro de la exégesis spinozista hay dos interpretaciones compatibles con los textos de acuerdo con las cuales, o bien hay identidad entre la Naturam naturatam y Naturam naturantem expuesta en términos de instanciación, o bien hay diferencia. Se argumenta a favor de la segunda mediante la composición restricta. La sección se cierra con un número de enunciados aparentemente inconsistentes atribuibles a Leibniz. Se propone que, quizá, la inconsistencia comete capciosidad por equivocación al interpretar «existencia» del mismo modo en un enunciado que en otro. En § 5 se argumenta que se da cierta concomitancia entre el hecho de que haya cosas y alguna supuesta estructura del ámbito de lo ente. Se añade que si la identidad de las cosas no se reduce a la composición de sus elementos constituyentes, cierta indeterminación óntica aparece conjuntamente con restricciones en esa composición. Ante tal indeterminación, Johnston apela a los substrata como aquello que explica tanto la individuación de las cosas como aquello que soporta los elementos constituyentes de la cosas. Se da una explicación de cómo entender la propiedad de ser soporte sin que ello sea una relación interna, ni sea identificado con una relación de inherencia, sino más bien con una relación de dependencia óntica. El capítulo sexto está dedicado a la dependencia esencial, presentando inicialmente el campo semántico asociado a aquello que hace que una cosa sea la que es: naturaleza, esencia (quidditas),haecceitas, realitas, y cómo surgirían diferentes relaciones de dependencia. Se evalúa finalmente la propuesta de Fine proponiendo que si los modelos monistas recogen la dependencia esencial, estos no satisfacen su caracterización.
In the first section it is argued that the exposures that attempt to conform to the desideratum of neutrality are not sufficiently illuminating. This is followed by two ways of making the family of relations of ontological dependence manageable: the cases that theoretically fall into it, and the function that it fulfills. The second chapter is devoted entirely to making explicit the notion of existence by understanding it, either as a non-real property, or as a real property. It is argued that the first notion does not allow the existential dependence to be made comprehensible. The first parts of the second chapter are devoted to exposing the family of existential dependency relationships. Subsequently the specific existential dependence and the problems that are usually taken into account are presented: the mere modal association, the dependent symmetry between essential properties and substances, and the dependence given between the life of an individual and the individual in question. It is argued that the strict conditional has to be replaced by a relevant conditional whose relevance is given by the modal operator of metaphysical necessity. The third part of the second chapter focuses on generic dependence and dictum according to which it characterizes the immanent conception of universals. It is argued that if the relationship of dependence is presumably asymmetric and this conception is taken à la Armstrong, then the dictum is false. And, secondly, cases are offered for not taking the generic dependency relation as a case of instantiation. The third chapter is intended to present different models. It exposes the direct relationship and without intermediaries that seems to be at the base of both Aristotle and Suarez. Within the spinozist exegesis there are two interpretations compatible with the texts according to which either there is identity between Naturam naturatam and Naturam naturantem exposed in terms of instantiation, or else there is difference. It is argued in favor of the second. The section is closed with a number of seemingly inconsistent statements attributable to Leibniz. It is proposed that inconsistency commits misleading fallacy in interpreting "existence" in the same way in one statement than in another. To end, Fine’s proposal is evaluated, proposing that while the monist models collect the essential dependence, they do not satisfy his characterization. The sixth chapter is devoted to essential dependence, initially presenting the semantic field associated with that which makes a thing what it is: nature, essence (quidditas), haecceitas, realitas, and how different relations of dependence would arise. To end, Fine’s proposal is evaluated, proposing that while the monist models collect the essential dependence, they do not satisfy its characterization.

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Este trabalho se propôs a abordar dois momentos da receptividade das idéias de Lukács no Brasil: a das idéias filosófico-estéticas; a das idéias filosófico-ontológicas. Demonstrou-se que o significativo consiste no caráter ídeo-político que se conferiu a ambos momentos – configurando uma unidade de continuidade-descontinuidade. No decurso dos anos 1960, jovens comunistas inspiraram-se nas idéias estéticas do filósofo para a elaboração de um projeto de política cultural como um momento de uma “renovação” política (do PCB). Neste contexto, se enfatizou dois pontos: que a política cultural de extração lukacsiana é incompatível com a tradição cultural do partido, que, no campo específico da arte, além de determinar-se por categoriais não-imanentes à produção estético-artística, caracterizara-se por elementos estéticos de extração stalinistazhadnovista; e, que em razão de conceber dialeticamente as relações entre as revoluções burguesa e proletária, As Teses de Blum se distinguem das Teses (de extração terceiro-internacionalista stalinizada) estratégico-políticas propugnadas pelo PCB após 1958. Mediados pelas idéias ontológicas de Lukács, no contexto do capitalismo contemporâneo, autores marxistas (Sérgio Lessa, Ricardo Antunes, José Chasin, José Paulo Netto, Ivo Tonet), explicitam, primeiro, a falácia das teses que propugnam a descentralidade do trabalho do mundo humano-social, segundo, que a determinação do trabalho como o fundamento ontológico do ser social une-se à imperiosa necessidade de se emancipar a humanidade dos ditames do capital – neste sentido, conferem à sua adoção destas idéias lukacsianas, ainda que no âmbito das atividades acadêmicas, uma dimensão ídeo-política. Enfatizou-se esta dimensão em três momentos: mediante a explicitação de que o trabalho abstrato fundamenta as sociedades contemporâneas...
This work has the objective to learn about two moments of receptivity of the ideas of Lukács here in Brazil: Philosophical Esthetics and Philosophcal-Ontologics. It demonstrated it`s importance based on the aspect of political ideology in both cases forming a unity of continuitydiscontinuity. In the nineteen sixties young communist were inspired by the esthetics of the philosopher to formulate a political-cultural project as part of renovating political ideas (PCB). In this context two important aspects were enphesized: the political-cultural views of Lukács are incompatible with the cultural tradition of the party, arts specifically, are not judged on there esthetic artistic value, but are more an enlightening on esthetics based on Stalin-Zhadnov; because of that there is a dialectic relationship between the bourgeois and proletarian revolution. The Blum Theses distinguish them selves from the Theses (influenced by the third international under Stalin) political strategies defended by the PCB party after 1958. Applying the ontological ideas of Lukács to contemporary capitalism, marxist authors like (Sérgio Lessa, Ricardo Antunes, José Chasin, José Paulo Netto, Ivo Tonet) in first place show fallacy In the theory that defend decentralization of work in the human social society, secondly a definition of work as an ontological foundation that meets the imposing necessity to overcome exploration by capital and in this way they atribute to the receptivity of Lukács ontology ideas, although in the academic world this was a political ideology. In three occasions this ideology demonstrated itself: highlighting that employment is the fundament of contemporary society which confirms Marx social theory to confront the consequences of offensive capital over work; by defending the thesis of ontological dependency of other social interactives in relation to work...(Complete abstract, acess undermentioned eletronic adress)

Orientador: Marcos Tadeu Del Roio
Banca: Antonio Carlos Mazzeo
Banca: Paulo Douglas Barsotti
Resumo: Este trabalho se propôs a abordar dois momentos da receptividade das idéias de Lukács no Brasil: a das idéias filosófico-estéticas; a das idéias filosófico-ontológicas. Demonstrou-se que o significativo consiste no caráter ídeo-político que se conferiu a ambos momentos - configurando uma unidade de continuidade-descontinuidade. No decurso dos anos 1960, jovens comunistas inspiraram-se nas idéias estéticas do filósofo para a elaboração de um projeto de política cultural como um momento de uma "renovação" política (do PCB). Neste contexto, se enfatizou dois pontos: que a política cultural de extração lukacsiana é incompatível com a tradição cultural do partido, que, no campo específico da arte, além de determinar-se por categoriais não-imanentes à produção estético-artística, caracterizara-se por elementos estéticos de extração stalinistazhadnovista; e, que em razão de conceber dialeticamente as relações entre as revoluções burguesa e proletária, As Teses de Blum se distinguem das Teses (de extração terceiro-internacionalista stalinizada) estratégico-políticas propugnadas pelo PCB após 1958. Mediados pelas idéias ontológicas de Lukács, no contexto do capitalismo contemporâneo, autores marxistas (Sérgio Lessa, Ricardo Antunes, José Chasin, José Paulo Netto, Ivo Tonet), explicitam, primeiro, a falácia das teses que propugnam a descentralidade do trabalho do mundo humano-social, segundo, que a determinação do trabalho como o fundamento ontológico do ser social une-se à imperiosa necessidade de se emancipar a humanidade dos ditames do capital - neste sentido, conferem à sua adoção destas idéias lukacsianas, ainda que no âmbito das atividades acadêmicas, uma dimensão ídeo-política. Enfatizou-se esta dimensão em três momentos: mediante a explicitação de que o trabalho abstrato fundamenta as sociedades contemporâneas...(Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo)
Abstract: This work has the objective to learn about two moments of receptivity of the ideas of Lukács here in Brazil: Philosophical Esthetics and Philosophcal-Ontologics. It demonstrated it's importance based on the aspect of political ideology in both cases forming a unity of continuitydiscontinuity. In the nineteen sixties young communist were inspired by the esthetics of the philosopher to formulate a political-cultural project as part of renovating political ideas (PCB). In this context two important aspects were enphesized: the political-cultural views of Lukács are incompatible with the cultural tradition of the party, arts specifically, are not judged on there esthetic artistic value, but are more an enlightening on esthetics based on Stalin-Zhadnov; because of that there is a dialectic relationship between the bourgeois and proletarian revolution. The Blum Theses distinguish them selves from the Theses (influenced by the third international under Stalin) political strategies defended by the PCB party after 1958. Applying the ontological ideas of Lukács to contemporary capitalism, marxist authors like (Sérgio Lessa, Ricardo Antunes, José Chasin, José Paulo Netto, Ivo Tonet) in first place show fallacy In the theory that defend decentralization of work in the human social society, secondly a definition of work as an ontological foundation that meets the imposing necessity to overcome exploration by capital and in this way they atribute to the receptivity of Lukács ontology ideas, although in the academic world this was a political ideology. In three occasions this ideology demonstrated itself: highlighting that employment is the fundament of contemporary society which confirms Marx social theory to confront the consequences of offensive capital over work; by defending the thesis of ontological dependency of other social interactives in relation to work...(Complete abstract, acess undermentioned eletronic adress)
Mestre

My research topic is the ontology of causation in Aristotle, with a view to also making a contribution to contemporary philosophy. I offer a new interpretation of Aristotle’s account of causation and perception. I argue that Aristotle understands the causal link in terms of a single complex entity which involves essentially two interdependent natures (e.g. an activity that grounds teaching and learning). Internally, such an entity has the same metaphysical structure as a line that grounds two vectors with opposite directions. But the causal entity, as opposed to the line and vectors, is itself ontologically dependent on the two substances that are in causal interaction. This is because the entity’s two natures are the realisation of two interdependent potentialities of the two substances (e.g. for teaching and learning). Aristotle builds a causal bridge between substances out of mutually realised potentialities of the two substances. Their mutual realisation binds them together into a net of ontological dependencies which delineates the boundary of the causal entity. In my thesis I describe the multifarious ontological dependencies and argue that Aristotle has made a unique contribution to the history of the analysis of causation by offering an ontological account of it in terms of potentiality-actuality and ontological dependence. Furthermore, Aristotle puts in use his theory of causation to account for the metaphysical status of what we call after Locke secondary properties, e.g. colours, sounds, etc. I reconstruct Aristotle’s theory of secondary properties in the light of my understanding of his two-in-one metaphysical model. I put Aristotle’s theory of causation as applied to his theory of perception to the test of whether it gives philosophical gains in contemporary philosophy in the field of the philosophy of mind. I engage with David Chalmers’ arguments against Primitivism – which is a new contemporary account of the metaphysics of colours. Primitivism is the account of colours philosophically most alike to Aristotle’s own one. I put forward my own original position on the metaphysics of colours.

This thesis is about global catastrophic risks and the conscious effect of such risks at the level of everyday life. Utilising R. D. Laing's concept of "ontological security", this thesis questions the extent to which risks that loom in the global environment cause a sense of ontological insecurity amongst individuals at the local-level. In addressing this question, this thesis responds to the theories of Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens who maintain that the contemporary age is marked both by the emergence of global risks that exist as the unintended consequences of modernisation and a greater sense of risk owing to how information about such risks is disseminated by the media. While no objection is made to the argument that the global environment has become more objectively threatening, this thesis questions whether individuals in fact perceive such threat in their daily lives. This argument rests on the view that global risks, in the main, lack a tangible dimension needed to elicit a sense of urgency. Seeking to ground the risk literature from the level of theoretical abstraction to that of lived experience, this thesis presents a case study of how risk is perceived in the tourist-dependent township of Akaroa. Despite the fact that New Zealand is generally seen as "safe" and "secure" and removed from the vicissitudes of global events, its economic reliance on international tourism ensures a susceptibility to external forces that disrupt global tourism flows. Given the recent publicity as to how such risks as climate change and peak oil may undermine international tourism in New Zealand, it is clear that areas that are particularly reliant on the international visitor market, like Akaroa, are significantly exposed to global events. This not only makes Akaroa an ideal case study in which to establish the extent to which global risks undermine ontological security in daily life, it also helps measure how seriously individuals in tourist-dependent areas consider the possibility of a substantial tourist decline.

Ontological database management systems are a powerful tool that combine traditional database techniques with ontological reasoning methods. In this setting, a classical extensional database is enriched with an ontology, or a set of logical assertions, that describe how new, intensional knowledge can be derived from the extensional data. Conjunctive queries are therefore answered against this combined knowledge base of extensional and intensional data. Many languages that represent ontologies have been introduced in the literature. In this thesis we will focus on existential rules (also called tuple-generating dependencies or Datalog^± rules), and three established languages in this area, namely guarded-based rules, sticky rules and weakly-acyclic rules. The main goal of the thesis is to enrich these languages with non-deterministic constructs (i.e. disjunctions) and investigate the complexity of the answering conjunctive queries under these extended languages. As is common in the literature, we will distinguish between combined complexity, where the database, the ontology and the query are considered as input, and data complexity, where only the database is considered as input. The latter case is relevant in practice, as usually the ontology and the query can be considered as fixed, and are usually much smaller than the database itself. After giving appropriate definitions to extend the considered languages to disjunctive existential rules, we establish a series of complexity results, completing the complexity picture for each of the above languages, and four different query languages: arbitrary conjunctive queries, bounded (hyper-)treewidth queries, acyclic queries and atomic queries. For the guarded-based languages, we show a strong 2EXPTIME lower bound for general queries that holds even for fixed ontologies, and establishes 2EXPTIME-completeness of the query answering problem in this case. For acyclic queries, the complexity can be reduced to EXPTIME, if the predicate arity is bounded, and the problem even becomes tractable for certain restricted languages, if only atomic queries are used. For ontologies represented by sticky disjunctive rules, we show that the problem becomes undecidable, even in the case of data complexity and atomic queries. Finally, for weakly-acyclic rules, we show that the complexity increases from 2EXPTIME to coN2EXPTIME in general, and from tractable to coNP in case of the data complexity, independent of which query language is used. After answering the open complexity questions, we investigate applications and relevant consequences of our results for description logics and give two generic complexity statements, respectively, for acyclic and general conjunctive query answering over description logic knowledge bases. These generic results allow for an easy determination of the complexity of this reasoning task, based on the expressivity of the considered description logic.

In my Master's thesis, I focus on the problem of dependence and independence of elementary propositions in the Tractatus and Some Remarks on Logical Form. The main issue I wish to analyze in my investigation is the question of whether the independence of elementary propositions (asserted in the Tractatus) is necessary for the maintenance of Tractarian truth-functional analysis of propositions. The motivation behind this is the fact that, in the SRLF, Wittgenstein explicitly rejects, after precise argumentation, the independence of elementary propositions concerning characteristics allowing gradation. After analyzing the essential arguments and precise rendering of independence of elementary propositions in the Tractatus and considering arguments for their dependence in the SRLF, I argue that (based on my analysis of both works) the mutual dependence of some elementary propositions is not problematic for Tractarian truth-functional analysis.

Addiction is one of the most significant problems facing contemporary society. Consequently many scholars, institutions and clinicians have sought to understand this complex phenomenon, as is evident in the abundance of etiological models of addiction in existence today. A literature review pointed that there is little consensus regarding the nature and etiopathogenesis of addiction, and integrative models have not yet been able to provide the sought-after integration. In addressing this problem, this study offers a theoretical analysis of the paradigmatic and meta-paradigmatic suitability of Integral Theory in the design of an integrated metatheory of addiction. The data consisted of the most prominent etiological theories and models of addiction. The study focused on several essential features constituting the architectonic of any metatheory that attempts to provide conceptual scaffolding for the construction of a comprehensive metatheory of addiction. The criteria for the construction of a metatheory were conceptual integration, ontological span, ontological depth, empirical validity and internal consistency. Integral Theory was critically assessed in terms of each of the abovementioned criteria. The study suggests that Integral Theory is eminently suitable as a philosophical foundation for the development of an integrated metatheory of addiction.
Psychology
M.A. (Psychology)

Text in German
Am Beginn der Menschheit steht das von Gott erschaffene Paar, in der Postmo­ derne ist es das aufgeklarte, autonome Individuum. Eine Diskrepanz zwischen ursprunglicher Schopfungsintention und der postmodernen Lebenswelt wird deutlich. Denn Mann und Frau wurden auf eine ganzheitliche Lebensgemein­ schaft hin erschaffen, die nicht nur den trinitarischen Gott widerspiegeln soli, sondem fur einen gelingenden Lebensvollzug urn die konstitutive Notwendigkeit der Gebundenheit des GeschOpfes an seinen Schopfer weiss. Das Bewusst­ sein, dass der Mensch nur in dieser existentiellen Verankerung zum wahren Mann- oder Frausein befahigt wird, ist in der aufgeklarten Postmoderne, primar durch deren zentrales Merkmal, der Absolutsetzung von Freiheit, abhanden ge­ kommen. Erschwerend kommt die Ablehnung der (ontologischen) Sundhaftig­ keit hinzu, was nicht nur das Heilsgeschehen per se obsolet werden lasst,son­ dern zugleich die Wiederherstellung der Beziehung zu Gott als Quelle allen Le­ bens a priori verunmoglicht. Damit verschliesst sich das postmoderne Indivi­ duum aber gleichzeitig die Meglichkeit zur Annaherung an die Schopfungs­ intention von Beziehung und Abhangigkeit der Geschlechter durch die in Jesus erlangte,endgultige Oberwindung der Sunde und deren Konsequenzen. Das Wissen urn die Intention Gottes mit Mann und Frau ist deshalb so entscheidend, weil vom Vorhandensein eines schopfungsbedingt angelegten anthropologischen Grundskriptes ausgegangen wird, welches die Beziehung und Abhangigkeit der Geschlechter entscheidend pragt.1 Das Geschlechterver­ haltnis ist also nicht beliebig und Folgen los veranderbar, resp. den sozio-kul­ turellen Vorgaben und Erwartungen anpassbar, eben weil dessen Kern unver­ anderbar ist. Dem steht jedoch das postmoderne Verstandnis gegenuber, wel­ ches die Geschlechteridentitat des evolvierten Primaten als reine sozio-kulturel­ le Konstruktion und damit als beliebig modellier- und veranderbar versteht. Ge­ nau in dieser Diskrepanz zwischen unaufhebbarem anthropologischem Grund­ skript einerseits und der vermeintlich ganzlichen Beliebigkeit des Geschlechter­ verhaltnisses andererseits liegt ein zentraler Grund fOr die Heute stark Problem belasteten Ehen. At the beginning of humanity we find man and woman as a couple created by God; in post-modern society, however, this place is taken by the enlightened individual. The discrepancy is evident. Man and woman were created for a lifelong marriage which was not only to reflect the triune creator but which was anchored in the dependence on the creator as a constitutive necessity for building a solid, successful and lifelong marriage. This awareness of the fundamental necessity of God as the creator of man has been lost in post-modern society. Instead we find the claim for absolute freedom, linked to the negation of the ontological sinfulness of man. It is obvious that such negation makes the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ by which sin is finally overcome superfluous, rending the re-establishement of the relationship between God and man impossible. But it is by this grounding in God the creator and redeemer alone that man and woman will unterstand marriage in its originally intended depth and fullness. The present study has resulted in discerning a fundamental, God-given anthropological script which defines both relation and dependence of man and woman; this implies that these fundamental elements cannot be deliberately transformed and/or adapted to various socio-cultural norms and expectations. However, the post-modern understanding of gender presents itself in clear opposition to this creational view. Nowadays, gender identity is seen solely as a socio-cultural structure and therefore subject to unlimited changes and modifications. In this study, one main reason for the instability of marriages in postmodern society has been discerned in the discrepancy between the permanent anthropological basic script and the apparent variability of the relation and dependence between man and woman. The negation of God the creator and redeemer proves to be of equal importance, as it is only through and in him that the basic script for marriage can be realized in its originally intended allembracing dimension.
Systematic Theology and Theological Ethics
D. Th. (Systematic Theology)