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Relevant bibliographies by topics / Optimal Incentives

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Academic literature on the topic 'Optimal Incentives'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 7 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Optimal Incentives"

1

Che, Yeon-Koo, and Seung-Weon Yoo. "Optimal Incentives for Teams." American Economic Review 91, no. 3 (2001): 525–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.3.525.

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Much of the existing theory of incentives describes a static relationship that lasts for just one transaction. This static assumption is not only unrealistic, but the resulting predictions appear to be at odds with many work organizations. The current paper introduces possible long-term interaction among agents, and studies how the design of explicit incentives and work organizations can exploit, and interact with, the implicit incentives generated by the repeated interaction of the agents. The optimal incentive scheme is shown to display observed features of the increasingly popular “teams,”

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ROBERTS, JOHN. "Designing incentives in organizations." Journal of Institutional Economics 6, no. 1 (2010): 125–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137409990221.

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Abstract:The design of incentive systems is a central issue in the economics of organization. This paper argues that very often the ideal incentive systems to use within firms will involve low-powered incentives. Five particular circumstances leading to weak incentives being optimal are examined.

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Osband, Kent. "Optimal Forecasting Incentives." Journal of Political Economy 97, no. 5 (1989): 1091–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/261644.

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Mann, Richard P., and Dirk Helbing. "Optimal incentives for collective intelligence." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114, no. 20 (2017): 5077–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1618722114.

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Collective intelligence is the ability of a group to perform more effectively than any individual alone. Diversity among group members is a key condition for the emergence of collective intelligence, but maintaining diversity is challenging in the face of social pressure to imitate one’s peers. Through an evolutionary game-theoretic model of collective prediction, we investigate the role that incentives may play in maintaining useful diversity. We show that market-based incentive systems produce herding effects, reduce information available to the group, and restrain collective intelligence. T

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Zhao, Jinxin, Yong Wang, Pengjian Jin, and Chongsheng Yang. "The optimal managerial incentive mechanism for China’s local and central SOEs: An empirical study of listed companies." Corporate Board role duties and composition 13, no. 1 (2017): 79–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cbv13i1c1art2.

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By studying listed companies, this paper investigates the effects of financial incentives and administrative incentives on the performance of managers in China’s local state-owned enterprises and central state-owned enterprises (SOEs) respectively. We find that administrative incentives are more effective on managers of central SOEs, while financial incentives are more effective on those of local SOEs. We conclude that against the current background of mixed-ownership reform, we should realise the limitations of administrative incentives and broaden the role of financial ones. Moreover, we sho

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Bobek, Donna D., Jason C. Chen, Amy M. Hageman, and Yu Tian. "Are More Choices Better? An Experimental Investigation of the Effects of Multiple Tax Incentives." Journal of the American Taxation Association 38, no. 2 (2016): 111–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/atax-51478.

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ABSTRACT The U.S. federal income tax system includes numerous incentives intended to encourage many behaviors. However, these incentives add complexity. This study investigates how one source of complexity, the number of different incentives, affects individuals' use of tax incentives. The results from two experiments detect no evidence that having more (versus fewer) incentive choices (i.e., high choice complexity) affects individuals' decisions to engage in the targeted behavior or select an incentive. However, the results do show that individuals faced with high choice complexity are more l

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Di Tella, Sebastian, and Yuliy Sannikov. "Optimal Asset Management Contracts With Hidden Savings." Econometrica 89, no. 3 (2021): 1099–139. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ecta14929.

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We characterize optimal asset management contracts in a classic portfolio‐investment setting. When the agent has access to hidden savings, his incentives to misbehave depend on his precautionary saving motive. The contract dynamically distorts the agent's access to capital to manipulate his precautionary saving motive and reduce incentives for misbehavior. We provide a sufficient condition for the validity of the first‐order approach, which holds in the optimal contract: global incentive compatibility is ensured if the agent's precautionary saving motive weakens after bad outcomes. We extend o

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Yan, Qian, and Hong Yan Liu. "Design Mechanism on Dynamic Incentive Machnism Considering Special Talents of the Manager." Advanced Materials Research 664 (February 2013): 1191–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.664.1191.

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Suppose the firm's output is influenced by the agent’s effort level observable and the ability unobservable, researching the optimal level of incentives under the two levels of incentives associated. Study found that corporate client based on the first period of corporate performance, the agents ability to judge the case, risk aversion, the variance of the degree of capacity, the degree of attention of the principal agents the ability have an impact on the agents first and second of the optimal incentive level. In addition, of the optimal incentive level in first period is correlated with the

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Reichmann, Steffen, and Anna Rohlfing-Bastian. "Decentralized Task Assignment and Centralized Contracting: On the Optimal Allocation of Authority." Journal of Management Accounting Research 26, no. 1 (2013): 33–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar-50654.

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ABSTRACT To provide efficient incentives, the three components of an incentive system (i.e., performance measurement, rewards, and the allocation of decision rights) need to be balanced against each other. In practice, the authority to decide on these components is frequently distributed across hierarchical levels, thus requiring adjusting centralized decisions with regard to decentralized authority. This paper investigates the centralized design of incentive contracts when decision authority, with respect to the allocation of tasks, is delegated to lower hierarchical levels. It provides an an

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Glover, Jonathan C., and Haijin H. Lin. "Accounting Conservatism and Incentives: Intertemporal Considerations." Accounting Review 93, no. 6 (2018): 181–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-52107.

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ABSTRACT We study intertemporal incentive properties of conditional accounting conservatism. Conservatism has detrimental and beneficial properties. In our first model, conservatism introduces downward bias in the first period; any understatement of first-period performance is reversed in the second period. A conservative bias is not costly in the first period but instead is costly in the second period when a new manager may be rewarded for the performance of his predecessor. In an extension on learning, we illustrate a beneficial role of conservatism in fine-tuning incentives. In the second m

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Optimal Incentives"

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Manoharan, Visnu. "Optimal Equity Based Incentives : A Norwegian Perspective." Thesis, Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet, Institutt for industriell økonomi og teknologiledelse, 2012. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:no:ntnu:diva-21076.

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We analyze optimal executive compensation in a principal agent framework using two sample firms from the Norwegian market, design and solve a bi-level principal agent optimization problem. Our analysis reports three important findings. First, our unambiguous results shows that stock options should be a part of the optimal contract in addition to a certain base salary. The options, rather than restricted shares produce the right incentives. Second, indexed options should be granted instead of traditional options in cases where firms have a volatility higher than the market index and where it is

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Li, Ying 1971 Mar 16. "Maintaining optimal CEO incentives through equity grants and CEO portfolio rebalancing." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8479.

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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2002.<br>Includes bibliographical references.<br>My thesis examines the joint hypotheses that firms set optimal levels for CEO incentives, and that firms and CEOs jointly correct deviations from these optimal levels through equity grants and CEO portfolio rebalancing. I investigate two equity-based CEO incentives, pay-for-performance sensitivity and risk-taking incentive. Pay-for-performance sensitivity is defined as the change in CEO wealth for a given change in the firm's stock price, while risk-taking incenti

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Jung-Senssfelder, Karoline. "Equity financing and covenants in venture capital : an augmented contracting approach to optimal German contract design /." Wiesbaden : Dt. Univ.-Verl, 2005. https://www.lib.umn.edu/slog.phtml?url=http://www.myilibrary.com?id=134354.

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Sachs, Dominik [Verfasser]. "Optimal Social Insurance and Redistribution: Incentives for Educational Investment, Work and Savings / Dominik Sachs." Konstanz : Bibliothek der Universität Konstanz, 2013. http://d-nb.info/1042376611/34.

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Kløve, Birgit, and Stian Strande Valholm. "Optimal Executive Incentives in a Principal Agent Framework : The Effects of Risk Aversion Modelling Choices." Thesis, Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet, Institutt for industriell økonomi og teknologiledelse, 2011. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:no:ntnu:diva-15069.

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In order to determine the structure of the optimal CEO contract, we create a principal agent model and implement it on a sample of Norwegian firms. The model takes account of executives loss&#8208; and risk&#8208;aversion and the fact that undiversified and risk&#8208;averse executives do not put the same value on stock options as shareholders do. We employ the certainty equivalent approach in determining the perceived value of the CEOs stock options and conduct a comprehensive numerical computer simulation to determine the optimal CEO contract.Our analysis delivers fou

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Tizale, Chilot Yirga. "The dynamics of soil degradation and incentives for optimal management in the Central Highlands of Ethiopia." Thesis, Pretoria : [s.n.], 2007. http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-06082007-094341.

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Rodriguez-Mancilla, Jose Ramon. "Investment under risk tolerance constraints and non-concave utility functions: implicit risks, incentives and optimal strategies." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/31468.

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The objective of this thesis is to contribute in the understanding of both the induced behavior and the underlying risks of a decision maker who is rewarded through option-like compensation schemes or who is subject to risk tolerance constraints. In the first part of the thesis we consider a risk averse investor who maximizes his expected utility subject to a risk tolerance constraint expressed in terms of the risk measure known as Conditional Value-at-Risk. We study some of the implicit risks associated with the optimal strategies followed by this investor. In particular, embedded proba

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Sudhaakar, Swathi Priyadarshini. "Multiscale Decision Making for Multiple Decision Alternatives." Thesis, Virginia Tech, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/19236.

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In organizations with decision makers across multiple hierarchical levels, conflicting objectives are commonly observed. The decision maker, or agent, at the highest level usually makes decisions in the interest of the organization, while a subordinate agent may have a conflict of interest between taking a course of action that is best for the organization and the course of action that is best for itself. <br />The Multiscale Decision-Making (MSDM) model was established by Wernz (2008). The model has been developed to capture interactions in multi-agent systems, by integrating both the hierarc

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Ennasri, Ahmed. "Incitations optimales dans un contexte de concurrence entre agences." Thesis, Montpellier 1, 2010. http://www.theses.fr/2010MON10068/document.

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Cette thèse s'intéresse aux effets de l'environnement concurrentiel de l'entreprise sur la rémunération incitative et sur l'effort de son dirigeant. Elle comporte trois essais, traitant chacun d'un aspect spécifique de cette problématique. En premier lieu, nous étudions, au travers d'un modèle théorique, le schéma de rémunération optimal et le niveau d'effort à l'équilibre. L'effet de la concurrence est analysé par l'entrée d'une entreprise sur un marché monopolistique. Ainsi, nous comparons les schémas de rémunération et le niveau d'effort du dirigeant entre ceux caractéristiques d'une situat

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Hu, Xianbiao. "Developing the Analysis Methodology and Platform for Behaviorally Induced System Optimal Traffic Management." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/301703.

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Traffic congestion has been imposing a tremendous burden on society as a whole. For decades, the most widely applied solution has been building more roads to better accommodate traffic demand, which turns out to be of limited effect. Active Traffic and Demand Management (ATDM) is getting more attention recently and is considered here, as it leverages market-ready technologies and innovative operational approaches to manage traffic congestion within the existing infrastructure. The key to a successful Active Traffic and Demand Management strategy is to effectively induce travelers' behavior to

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Books on the topic "Optimal Incentives"

1

Freeman, Richard B. Optimal inequality/optimal incentives: Evidence from a tournament. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006.

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B, Freeman Richard. Optimal inequality / optimal incentives: Evidence from a tournament. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006.

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Beath, J. Optimal incentives for incom-generation within universities. St. Salvator's College, 2000.

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Polinsky, A. Mitchell. Decoupling liability: Optimal incentives for care and litigation. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1991.

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Saez, Emmanuel. The optimal treatment of tax expenditures. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2000.

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6

Edmans, Alex. A calibrative model of optimal CEO incentives in market equilibrium. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007.

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Stollery, K. R. Incentives and optimal fishing quotas with centralized and decentralized management. University of Portsmouth, Centre for the Economics and Management of Aquatic Resources, 1993.

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Edmans, Alex. A calibratable model of optimal ceo incentives in market equilibrium. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007.

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Hall, Brian J. Optimal exercise prices for executive stock options. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2000.

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Fund, International Monetary. Optimal incentives to domestic investment in the presence of capital flight. International Monetary Fund, 1989.

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Book chapters on the topic "Optimal Incentives"

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Basov, Suren, and Ishaq Bhatti. "Optimal Incentives for Takaful Operators." In Islamic Finance in the Light of Modern Economic Theory. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-28662-8_14.

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Wirl, Franz. "Optimal conservation incentives under asymmetric information." In The Economics of Conservation Programs. Springer US, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-6301-3_8.

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Blickle, Marina. "Information Systems and the Design of Optimal Contracts." In Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-75060-1_6.

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Feldman, Michal, Ran Tessler, and Yoav Wilf. "Optimal Incentives for Participation with Type-Dependent Externalities." In Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_32.

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Nwogugu, Michael I. C. "Perception-Based Decisions, Strategic Alliances and Optimal Financial Contracting: Auctions, Strategic Alliances and a Critique of Third-Generation Prospect Theory and Related Approaches." In Complex Systems, Multi-Sided Incentives and Risk Perception in Companies. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-44704-3_4.

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Kanbur, Ravi, and Matti Tuomala. "Incentives, Inequality and the Allocation of Aid When Conditionality Doesn’t Work: An Optimal Nonlinear Taxation Approach." In Poverty, Inequality and Development. Springer US, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/0-387-29748-0_16.

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Stark, Oded, Alessandra Casarico, and Silke Uebelmesser. "An Optimal Selective Migration Policy in the Absence of Symmetric Information, and in the Presence of Skill Formation Incentives." In Corruption, Development and Institutional Design. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230242173_8.

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Wagner, Gerhard. "Tort Law and Human Rights." In Interdisciplinary Studies in Human Rights. Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73835-8_12.

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AbstractThe article explores the relationship between tort law and human rights. It explains the potential inherent in holding corporations liable in tort for human rights violations along the supply chain, such as the 2013 Rana Plaza collapse in Bangladesh. On a theoretical level, it devises a legal framework of tort liability that is optimal from the standpoint of social welfare. Such an optimal liability system would make manufacturers internalise the full cost of production, including harm caused to workers, third parties and the environment. In contrast, the present global liability situation is characterised by legal fragmentation and enforcement deficits. These factors provide the explanation for the large-scale externalisation of production risks we witness today, leading to an inflated global demand. In principle, tort law is well suited to offer a remedy, as the interests protected by human rights and national tort law broadly overlap. Furthermore, the duty of care which is the core requirement for shifting losses to others via tort law is a flexible concept that may even be stretched to accommodate cross-border human rights policies. The new French “devoir de vigilance,” or human rights due diligence, as well the UK Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence, aim to tap this potential. On the other hand, the article raises doubt in relation to the adverse economic incentives and market shifts if such duties are imposed selectively, i.e. only in some jurisdictions, but not in others. After all, private international law often stands in the way of a global application of national tort law. Finally, alternative mechanisms of enforcement are assessed and examined with a view to their comparative effectiveness. This analysis casts doubt on the usefulness of tort law as a means to further the human rights cause.

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Okada, Isamu, and Ichiro Takahashi. "Exploring Optimal Wage Incentive System Using ABS." In Agent-Based Approaches in Economic and Social Complex Systems VIII. Springer Japan, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55236-9_10.

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Rahmani-Andebili, Mehdi, Mahmud Fotuhi Firuzabad, and Moein Moeini-Aghtaie. "Optimal Incentive Plans for Plug-in Electric Vehicles." In Electric Distribution Network Planning. Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7056-3_11.

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Conference papers on the topic "Optimal Incentives"

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Akbarpour, Mohammad, Scott Duke Kominers, Shengwu Li, and Paul R. Milgrom. "Investment Incentives in Near-Optimal Mechanisms." In EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. ACM, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3465456.3467525.

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Mandayam, Chinmoy V., and Balaji Prabhakar. "Road traffic networks: Optimal transport and incentives." In 2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton). IEEE, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/allerton.2013.6736646.

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Vermillion, Sean D., and Richard J. Malak. "A Theoretical Look at the Impact of Incentives on Design Problem Effort Provision." In ASME 2018 International Design Engineering Technical Conferences and Computers and Information in Engineering Conference. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/detc2018-85845.

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Searching for and selecting among design solutions is not an effortless task. The principle of least effort suggests people seek to minimize the amount of effort they apply towards completing their tasks. In the context of engineering design, it is conceivable that expending more effort on the design problem yields a design solution with greater performance. In this paper, we investigate the impact of incentives on motivating engineering designers to increase the amount of effort they apply to solving design problems. Specifically, we formulate an analytical model of effort provision towards d

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Thomas, Andrew. "Optimal incremental pricing methodology for valuing demand management incentives." In 2016 Australasian Universities Power Engineering Conference (AUPEC). IEEE, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/aupec.2016.7749300.

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Sarker, Mushfiqur, Miguel Ortega-Vazquez, and Daniel Kirschen. "Optimal coordination and scheduling of demand response via monetary incentives." In 2016 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting (PESGM). IEEE, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/pesgm.2016.7741139.

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Liu, Guo-yao, Hong Xu, Lin Xiao, and Ming Zeng. "The optimal generation capacity and investment incentives of peak units." In Third International Conference on Electric Utility Deregulation and Restructuring and Power Technologies, 2008. DRPT 2008. IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/drpt.2008.4523606.

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Mariamou, S. E., G. E. Asimakopoulou, and N. D. Hatziargyriou. "Bilevel framework for optimal design of incentives for wind investments." In MedPower 2014. Institution of Engineering and Technology, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/cp.2014.1636.

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Yu, Ziwen, Pengcheng You, and Zaiyue Yang. "Residential Load Reduction Scheduling with Optimal Power Flow and Segmented Incentives." In 2018 IEEE Power & Energy Society General Meeting (PESGM). IEEE, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/pesgm.2018.8585973.

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Desfontaines, Lucie, and Laura Wynter. "Optimal decentralized queuing system with diversion: Using incentives to influence behavior." In 2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC). IEEE, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cdc.2016.7798544.

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Nwulu, Nnamdi. "A mathematical modelling framework for optimal demand response incentives and retrofit." In 2017 International Conference on Energy, Communication, Data Analytics and Soft Computing (ICECDS). IEEE, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icecds.2017.8390179.

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Reports on the topic "Optimal Incentives"

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Freeman, Richard, and Alexander Gelber. Optimal Inequality/Optimal Incentives: Evidence from a Tournament. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w12588.

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Björklund, Anders, and Richard Freeman. Searching for Optimal Inequality/Incentives. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w14014.

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Polinsky, A. Mitchell, and Yeon-Koo Che. Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w3634.

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Edmans, Alex, Xavier Gabaix, and Augustin Landier. A Calibratable Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w13372.

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Razin, Assaf, and Efraim Sadka. Optimal Incentives to Domestic Investment in the Presence of Capital Flight. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w3080.

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Maurer, Raimond, Olivia Mitchell, Ralph Rogalla, and Tatjana Schimetschek. Optimal Social Security Claiming Behavior under Lump Sum Incentives: Theory and Evidence. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w23073.

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Baker, George, Robert Gibbons, and Kevin Murphy. Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w4480.

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Kopczuk, Wojciech. Incentive Effects of Inheritances and Optimal Estate Taxation. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w18747.

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Cordella, Tito, and Andrew Powell. Preferred and Non-Preferred Creditors. Inter-American Development Bank, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0003109.

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International financial institutions (IFIs) generally enjoy preferred creditors treatment (PCT). Although PCT rarely appears in legal contracts, when sovereigns restructure bilateral or commercial debts, they normally pay IFIs in full. This paper presents a model where a creditor, such as an IFI, that can commit to lend limited amounts at the risk-free rate and can refrain from lending into arrears is always repaid and adds value. The analysis suggests that IFIs and market lenders can both enhance welfare, even if banning commercial borrowing can sometimes be optimal. To maintain their status,

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Gibbons, Robert, and Kevin Murphy. Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w3792.

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