Academic literature on the topic 'Optimal public good provision'
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Journal articles on the topic "Optimal public good provision"
Michael, Michael S. "OPTIMAL CAPITAL TAXES FOR PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION." Bulletin of Economic Research 48, no. 4 (October 1996): 309–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.1996.tb00637.x.
Full textSnyder, Susan K. "Testable restrictions of Pareto optimal public good provision." Journal of Public Economics 71, no. 1 (January 1999): 97–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0047-2727(98)00053-x.
Full textShao, Ran, and Lin Zhou. "Voting and optimal provision of a public good." Journal of Public Economics 134 (February 2016): 35–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.12.006.
Full textFalkinger, Josef. "On optimal public good provision with tax evasion." Journal of Public Economics 45, no. 1 (June 1991): 127–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(91)90051-3.
Full textMichael, Michael S. "The Optimal Tariff for Public Good and Public Input Provision." Public Finance Review 25, no. 1 (January 1997): 117–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/109114219702500107.
Full textFang, Hanming, and Peter Norman. "Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2, no. 4 (November 1, 2010): 1–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.2.4.1.
Full textHolt, Charles A., and Susan K. Laury. "Classroom Games: Voluntary Provision of a Public Good." Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, no. 4 (November 1, 1997): 209–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.11.4.209.
Full textBierbrauer, Felix, and Marco Sahm. "Optimal democratic mechanisms for taxation and public good provision." Journal of Public Economics 94, no. 7-8 (August 2010): 453–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.03.003.
Full textDouglas Wilson, John. "Optimal public good provision in the Ramsey tax model." Economics Letters 35, no. 1 (January 1991): 57–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(91)90105-t.
Full textGravel, Nicolas, and Michel Poitevin. "Optimal provision of a public good with costly exclusion." Games and Economic Behavior 117 (September 2019): 451–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.009.
Full textDissertations / Theses on the topic "Optimal public good provision"
Koppel, Oliver. "On the determinants of cooperative public good provision." [S.l. : s.n.], 2004. http://deposit.ddb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?idn=971854475.
Full textFellner, Gerlinde, Yoshio Iida, Sabine Kröger, and Erika Seki. "Heterogeneous productivity in voluntary public good provision - an experimental analysis." WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 2010. http://epub.wu.ac.at/2775/1/wu%2Dwp133.pdf.
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Costa, Francisco Junqueira Moreira da. "On the limits of cheap talk for public good provision." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/1738.
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This article studies a model where, as a consequence of private information, agents do not have incentive to invest in a desired joint project, or a public good, when they are unable to have prior discussion with their partners. As a result, the joint project is never undertaken and inefficiency is observed. Agastya, Menezes and Sengupta (2007) prove that with a prior stage of communication, with a binary message space, it is possible to have some efficiency gain since 'all ex-ante and interim efficient equilibria exhibit a simple structure'. We show that any finite message space does not provide efficiency gain on the simple structure discussed in that article. We use laboratory experiments to test these results. We find that people do contribute, even without communication, and that any kind of communication increases the probability of project implementation. We also observed that communication reduces the unproductive contribution, and that a large message space cannot provide efficiency gain relative to the binary one.
Sengupta, Bodhisattva. "Federalism, public good provision and corruption : three essays in political economy." Thesis, McGill University, 2007. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=115649.
Full textIn the second essay, the issue of dynamic public good provision within a federation is analyzed. Provinces lobby for more federal funds to produce a pure, dynamic public good such as an improvement in environmental quality. Allocation of federal funds is dictated by the level of lobbying. Consumers' welfare equals utility from the public good, net of lobbying cost. For symmetric provinces, the steady state lobbying level and stock of public good may be greater in the case when lobbyists are non-benevolent and captures a part of the federal grant as private rent. Second, with a rent-appropriating lobbyist, the welfare of the consumers may be higher under non-cooperative lobbying protocol. In case of asymmetric provinces, welfare may 'flow' from the less efficient province to the more efficient province, violating equalization principle within a federation.
In the third essay, the disciplinary role of elections is discussed. The incumbent politician in a province, with locally procured taxes, provides a local public good and appropriates some private rent. The incumbent's reputation decreases with the amount of rent. Voters may judge the performance of the incumbent in two ways: either his absolute performance matters or his performance is compared with that of the neighboring provinces' incumbent through yardstick competition. In a static setting, the unitary evaluation fares better than relative evaluation in restraining the politician. However, in a dynamic setting, when the stock of reputation increases through time, a relative evaluation imposes higher discipline on incumbent politician.
Orzen, Henrik. "Strategic behavior in competitive environments : experiments on markets and public good provision mechanisms." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2003. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.397586.
Full textRostapshova, Olga V. "Pushing a Troika of Development: Promoting Investment, Curbing Corruption, and Enhancing Public Good Provision." Thesis, Harvard University, 2012. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:10717.
Full textReischmann, Andreas [Verfasser], and Jörg [Akademischer Betreuer] Oechssler. "Essays on the Conditional Contribution Mechanism for Public Good Provision / Andreas Reischmann ; Betreuer: Jörg Oechssler." Heidelberg : Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg, 2015. http://d-nb.info/1180499956/34.
Full textNeitzel, Jakob [Verfasser], and Anke [Akademischer Betreuer] Gerber. "Essays on Public Good Provision : Fair Contribution Rules and Institution Formation / Jakob Neitzel. Betreuer: Anke Gerber." Hamburg : Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg, 2014. http://d-nb.info/105985967X/34.
Full textBoero, Riccardo. "The social mechanism of public good provision : analytically researching social dilemmas with empirically founded agent based models." Thesis, University of Surrey, 2007. http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/843499/.
Full textSlack, Sean Edward. "Essays on categorical and universal welfare provision : design, optimal taxation and enforcement issues." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/15659.
Full textBooks on the topic "Optimal public good provision"
Munro, A. The optimal public provision of private goods. Stirling: University of Stirling, 1988.
Find full textFang, Hanming. Optimal provision of multiple excludable public goods. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008.
Find full textHjerppe, Reino. Provision of public and merit goods: Towards an optimal policy mix? Helsinki: United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research, 1997.
Find full textTridimas, George. Optimal public provision under costly take up. Reading, England: University of Reading, Dept. of Economics, 1992.
Find full textTridimas, George. Optimal public provision under costly take-up. Reading: University of Reading, 1992.
Find full textKing, M. A. A Pigovian rule for the optimum provision of public goods. London: Taxation, Incentives and the Distribution of Income Programme, 1985.
Find full textBallard, Charles L. Wage tax distortions and public good provision. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1990.
Find full textTridimas, George. Public good provision under costly take-up. Reading: University of Reading, 1993.
Find full textTridimas, George. Public good provision under costly take-up. Reading, England: University of Reading, Dept. of Economics., 1993.
Find full textBoadway, Robin. Financing and the optimal provision of public expenditure by decentralised agencies. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics, 1996.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Optimal public good provision"
Ahlstrom, Laura J., and Franklin G. Mixon. "The private provision of a public good." In War Movies and Economics, 43–61. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2020.: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429296628-5.
Full textBuchholz, Wolfgang, and Michael Eichenseer. "Strategic Coalition Formation in Global Public Good Provision." In The Theory of Externalities and Public Goods, 61–84. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49442-5_4.
Full textKhalili, Mohammad Mahdi, Xueru Zhang, and Mingyan Liu. "Public Good Provision Games on Networks with Resource Pooling." In Network Games, Control, and Optimization, 271–87. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10880-9_16.
Full textSharma, Shrutivandana, and Demosthenis Teneketzis. "Local Public Good Provision in Networks: A Nash Implementation Mechanism." In Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, 27–42. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_3.
Full textJack, Bryan, and Mancur Olson. "Warr Neutrality and the Natural Egalitarianism of Voluntary Public Good Provision." In Collective Choice, 33–48. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24711-1_3.
Full textPiggotti, John, and John Whalley. "Public Good Provision Rules and Income Distribution: Some General Equilibrium Calculations." In Applied General Equilibrium, 25–33. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag HD, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-50167-8_2.
Full textde Goiter, Harry, David J. Nielson, and Gordon C. Rausser. "The Political Economy of Redistributive Policies and the Provision of Public Good in Agriculture." In GATT Negotiations and the Political Economy of Policy Reform, 85–106. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-79284-7_4.
Full textRodríguez Bolívar, Manuel Pedro. "Political Factors for the Adoption of Different Governance Models in the Provision of Public Services Under Web 2.0 Technologies." In Social Media: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 607–18. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45234-0_54.
Full textBrumme, Anja, Wolfgang Buchholz, and Dirk Rübbelke. "Impure Public Good Models as a Tool to Analyze the Provision of Ancillary and Primary Benefits." In Springer Climate, 109–23. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30978-7_6.
Full textSmith, Richard D., and Joanna Coast. "The Economics of Resistance Through an Ethical Lens." In Ethics and Drug Resistance: Collective Responsibility for Global Public Health, 279–94. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27874-8_17.
Full textConference papers on the topic "Optimal public good provision"
Kang, Zi Yang. "Optimal Public Provision of Private Goods." In EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3465456.3467566.
Full textZhang, Meng, Jianwei Huang, and Rui Zhang. "Wireless power provision as a public good." In 2018 16th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks (WiOpt). IEEE, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.23919/wiopt.2018.8362809.
Full text"Public Good Provision: Lindahl Tax, Income Tax, Commodity Tax, and Poll Tax, a simulation." In 20th International Congress on Modelling and Simulation (MODSIM2013). Modelling and Simulation Society of Australia and New Zealand, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.36334/modsim.2013.f4.fukiharu.
Full textMukaromah, Nahdiyatul. "Adolescent Response on Menarche: A Scoping Review." In The 7th International Conference on Public Health 2020. Masters Program in Public Health, Universitas Sebelas Maret, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.26911/the7thicph.03.03.
Full textFiala, Zdenek, and Olga Sovova. "NEW CHALLENGES FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AT THE AGE OF THE RIGHT TO THE INTERNET ACCESS." In 4th International Scientific Conference – EMAN 2020 – Economics and Management: How to Cope With Disrupted Times. Association of Economists and Managers of the Balkans, Belgrade, Serbia, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.31410/eman.2020.201.
Full textHerdhianta, Dhimas, and Hanifa Maher Denny. "Implementation of Hospital Safety and Health Management System: Resource, Organization, and Policy Aspects." In The 7th International Conference on Public Health 2020. Masters Program in Public Health, Universitas Sebelas Maret, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.26911/the7thicph.04.09.
Full textTsalavoutas, A., M. Kelaidis, N. Thoma, and K. Mathioudakis. "Correlations Adaptation for Optimal Emissions Prediction." In ASME Turbo Expo 2007: Power for Land, Sea, and Air. ASMEDC, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/gt2007-27060.
Full textChen, Yiling, Biaoshuai Tao, and Fang-Yi Yu. "Cooperation in Threshold Public Projects with Binary Actions." In Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-21}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/15.
Full textŠPIČKA, Jindřich. "WHAT DETERMINES PROPENSITY TO GET PUBLIC INVESTMENT SUBSIDIES? A CASE STUDY OF THE CZECH FOOD INDUSTRY." In RURAL DEVELOPMENT. Aleksandras Stulginskis University, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.15544/rd.2017.052.
Full textAndriani, Dhea, Janthy T. Hidayat, and Indarti Komala Dewi. "The Implementation of Children Friendly City in DKI Jakarta through Assesesment of Children Friendly Integrated Public Space." In 55th ISOCARP World Planning Congress, Beyond Metropolis, Jakarta-Bogor, Indonesia. ISOCARP, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.47472/hddu4907.
Full textReports on the topic "Optimal public good provision"
Fang, Hanming, and Peter Norman. Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, February 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w13797.
Full textBowen, T. Renee, George Georgiadis, and Nicolas Lambert. Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w22772.
Full textSpencer, Michael, Stephen Swallow, Jason Shogren, and John List. Rebate Rules in Threshold Public Good Provision. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w14559.
Full textCoate, Stephen. Evaluating Durable Public Good Provision using Housing Prices. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, February 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w18767.
Full textAngeletos, George-Marios, Fabrice Collard, Harris Dellas, and Behzad Diba. Optimal Public Debt Management and Liquidity Provision. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, February 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w18800.
Full textKing, Mervyn. A Pigovian Rule for the Optimum Provision of Public Goods. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 1985. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w1681.
Full textCalabrese, Stephen, Dennis Epple, Thomas Romer, and Holger Sieg. Local Public Good Provision: Voting, Peer Effects, and Mobility. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w11720.
Full textAzzimonti, Marina, and Pierre Yared. The Optimal Public and Private Provision of Safe Assets. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w24534.
Full textLopes, Helena, José Castro Caldas, Ana Costa, Luís Francisco Carvalho, José Guilherme Gusmão, João Leão, João Rodrigues, and Ana Cordeiro dos Santos. Public good provision – why people do (not) contribute? An experimental exploration. Research report. DINÂMIA'CET-IUL, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.7749/dinamiacet-iul.wp.2004.36.
Full textFrank, Richard, David Salkever, and Jean Mitchell. Market Forces and the Public Good: Competition Among Hospitals and Provision of Indigent Care. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w3136.
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