Academic literature on the topic 'Optimal public good provision'

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Journal articles on the topic "Optimal public good provision"

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Michael, Michael S. "OPTIMAL CAPITAL TAXES FOR PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION." Bulletin of Economic Research 48, no. 4 (October 1996): 309–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.1996.tb00637.x.

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Snyder, Susan K. "Testable restrictions of Pareto optimal public good provision." Journal of Public Economics 71, no. 1 (January 1999): 97–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0047-2727(98)00053-x.

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Shao, Ran, and Lin Zhou. "Voting and optimal provision of a public good." Journal of Public Economics 134 (February 2016): 35–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.12.006.

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Falkinger, Josef. "On optimal public good provision with tax evasion." Journal of Public Economics 45, no. 1 (June 1991): 127–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(91)90051-3.

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Michael, Michael S. "The Optimal Tariff for Public Good and Public Input Provision." Public Finance Review 25, no. 1 (January 1997): 117–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/109114219702500107.

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Fang, Hanming, and Peter Norman. "Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2, no. 4 (November 1, 2010): 1–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.2.4.1.

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This paper studies the optimal provision mechanism for multiple excludable public goods. For a class of problems with symmetric goods and binary valuations, we show that the optimal mechanism involves bundling if a regularity condition, akin to a hazard rate condition, on the distribution of valuations is satisfied. Relative to separate provision mechanisms, the optimal bundling mechanism may increase the asymptotic provision probability of socially efficient public goods from zero to one, and decreases the extent of use exclusions. If the regularity condition is violated, the optimal solution replicates the separate provision outcome for the two-good case. (JEL D82, H41)
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Holt, Charles A., and Susan K. Laury. "Classroom Games: Voluntary Provision of a Public Good." Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, no. 4 (November 1, 1997): 209–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.11.4.209.

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This paper describes a simple public goods game, implemented with playing cards in a classroom setup. Students choose whether to contribute to the provision of a public good in a situation where it is privately optimal not to contribute, but socially optimal to contribute fully. This exercise motivates discussion of altruism, strategies for private fund-raising, and the role of government in resolving the public good problem.
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Bierbrauer, Felix, and Marco Sahm. "Optimal democratic mechanisms for taxation and public good provision." Journal of Public Economics 94, no. 7-8 (August 2010): 453–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.03.003.

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Douglas Wilson, John. "Optimal public good provision in the Ramsey tax model." Economics Letters 35, no. 1 (January 1991): 57–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(91)90105-t.

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Gravel, Nicolas, and Michel Poitevin. "Optimal provision of a public good with costly exclusion." Games and Economic Behavior 117 (September 2019): 451–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.009.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Optimal public good provision"

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Koppel, Oliver. "On the determinants of cooperative public good provision." [S.l. : s.n.], 2004. http://deposit.ddb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?idn=971854475.

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Fellner, Gerlinde, Yoshio Iida, Sabine Kröger, and Erika Seki. "Heterogeneous productivity in voluntary public good provision - an experimental analysis." WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 2010. http://epub.wu.ac.at/2775/1/wu%2Dwp133.pdf.

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This article experimentally examines voluntary contributions when group members' marginal returns to the public good vary. The experiment implements two marginal return types, low and high, and uses the information that members have about the heterogeneity to identify the applied contribution norm. We find that norms vary with the information environment. If agents are aware of the heterogeneity, contributions increase in general. However, high types contribute more than low types when contributions can be linked to the type of the donor but contribute less otherwise. Low types, on the other hand, contribute more than high types when group members are aware of the heterogeneity but contributions cannot be linked to types. Our results underline the importance of the information structure when persons with different abilities contribute to a joint project, as in the context of teamwork or charitable giving. (author's abstract)
Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series
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Costa, Francisco Junqueira Moreira da. "On the limits of cheap talk for public good provision." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/1738.

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This article studies a model where, as a consequence of private information, agents do not have incentive to invest in a desired joint project, or a public good, when they are unable to have prior discussion with their partners. As a result, the joint project is never undertaken and inefficiency is observed. Agastya, Menezes and Sengupta (2007) prove that with a prior stage of communication, with a binary message space, it is possible to have some efficiency gain since 'all ex-ante and interim efficient equilibria exhibit a simple structure'. We show that any finite message space does not provide efficiency gain on the simple structure discussed in that article. We use laboratory experiments to test these results. We find that people do contribute, even without communication, and that any kind of communication increases the probability of project implementation. We also observed that communication reduces the unproductive contribution, and that a large message space cannot provide efficiency gain relative to the binary one.
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Sengupta, Bodhisattva. "Federalism, public good provision and corruption : three essays in political economy." Thesis, McGill University, 2007. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=115649.

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The thesis consists of three essays. In the first essay, the role of party politics in provision of public goods within a federal economy is analyzed. The public goods, which have inter-jurisdictional spillover effect, are locally produced with federal transfers and local revenues. The federal government can not commit to the level of transfers. The direction and magnitude of federal fund flows are influenced by local revenues as well as the re-election probability of the parties in power at the federal and provincial levels. Under such a scenario, politically motivated grants alter the incentive for raising local revenues. If votes swing heavily in favor of either the incumbent or the challenger in the provincial elections and/or if the coefficients for absolute prudence from the utility of public good are low enough, then grants are designed in such a way that the incentive for increasing revenues is lower in the province where the party identity is similar with the federal government. If these conditions are not met, such incentive is higher in the politically favorite regime. This result is generalized over different combinations of ruling parties in different seats of government.
In the second essay, the issue of dynamic public good provision within a federation is analyzed. Provinces lobby for more federal funds to produce a pure, dynamic public good such as an improvement in environmental quality. Allocation of federal funds is dictated by the level of lobbying. Consumers' welfare equals utility from the public good, net of lobbying cost. For symmetric provinces, the steady state lobbying level and stock of public good may be greater in the case when lobbyists are non-benevolent and captures a part of the federal grant as private rent. Second, with a rent-appropriating lobbyist, the welfare of the consumers may be higher under non-cooperative lobbying protocol. In case of asymmetric provinces, welfare may 'flow' from the less efficient province to the more efficient province, violating equalization principle within a federation.
In the third essay, the disciplinary role of elections is discussed. The incumbent politician in a province, with locally procured taxes, provides a local public good and appropriates some private rent. The incumbent's reputation decreases with the amount of rent. Voters may judge the performance of the incumbent in two ways: either his absolute performance matters or his performance is compared with that of the neighboring provinces' incumbent through yardstick competition. In a static setting, the unitary evaluation fares better than relative evaluation in restraining the politician. However, in a dynamic setting, when the stock of reputation increases through time, a relative evaluation imposes higher discipline on incumbent politician.
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Orzen, Henrik. "Strategic behavior in competitive environments : experiments on markets and public good provision mechanisms." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2003. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.397586.

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Rostapshova, Olga V. "Pushing a Troika of Development: Promoting Investment, Curbing Corruption, and Enhancing Public Good Provision." Thesis, Harvard University, 2012. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:10717.

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In recent decades, a new direction of development economics has emerged, led by economists on a mission to improve the quality of life for citizens of developing countries through proven, cost-effective interventions. This micro-economic focus on development hinges on identifying barriers to growth and implementing targeted programs designed to alleviate these constraints. However, identifying constraints is far easier than measuring their magnitude, and designing effective measures to quantify these barriers remains a substantial challenge. Numerous microeconomic indicators of development are famously intractable and resist simple methods of accurate measurement. This dissertation tackles measurement challenges by quantifying three major development drivers: efficient investment, effective institutions, and public good provision. Using three case studies on business development and cooperation conducted in Russia and Kenya, I develop novel ways to quantify constraints and suggest methods to alleviate them. In the first chapter, I estimate marginal rates of return to capital for small retail firms, evaluate the causes of inefficiency and examine interventions that may aid growth. Next, I examine corruption as a barrier to small business growth and assess whether policy reform is capable of decreasing corrupt activity. Finally, I investigate the causes of heterogeneity in the financing of local public goods and experimentally document the conditions that improve communities’ ability to cooperate and coordinate on efficient Nash equilibria. In sum, I propose new ways of measuring marginal rates of return to capital, corruption incidence, and cooperation in public good provision; then leverage these measures to shed light on barriers to growth and to assess the effectiveness of possible interventions to enable development and achieve more efficient resource distribution.
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Reischmann, Andreas [Verfasser], and Jörg [Akademischer Betreuer] Oechssler. "Essays on the Conditional Contribution Mechanism for Public Good Provision / Andreas Reischmann ; Betreuer: Jörg Oechssler." Heidelberg : Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg, 2015. http://d-nb.info/1180499956/34.

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Neitzel, Jakob [Verfasser], and Anke [Akademischer Betreuer] Gerber. "Essays on Public Good Provision : Fair Contribution Rules and Institution Formation / Jakob Neitzel. Betreuer: Anke Gerber." Hamburg : Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg, 2014. http://d-nb.info/105985967X/34.

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Boero, Riccardo. "The social mechanism of public good provision : analytically researching social dilemmas with empirically founded agent based models." Thesis, University of Surrey, 2007. http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/843499/.

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This work puts into close relationship the approach of Analytical Sociology, characterised by a search for explanatory social mechanisms, and the tools of Complexity Science, particularly useful for studying social systems characterised by non-linearity and out of equilibrium dynamics. It starts by presenting arguments for analytical social research, touching on epistemological, theoretical and methodological issues. After having introduced and debated the analytical approach to social theory, it describes a kind of bounded rationality that seems to be consistent with both the methodological individualism implied by the approach and the need for final explanations of social phenomena. The focus then passes onto the choice of an appropriate tool for the analysis of social systems: Agent Based Simulations. In the second half of the work this framework is applied to a social dilemma, voluntary public good provision. The critical point about the provision of public good is connected to the general social dilemma of cooperation: individuals would improve their wealth by making a full contribution to the public good in the case of cooperation with others, but free riding can be widespread and have a strong impact on the system dynamics. Thus the work, having introduced some not very common tools, concentrates on attempts to analyse and simulate the behaviour of subjects in economic experiments about the voluntary provision of public goods, pointing out that the mechanism in such dilemma is mainly the result of conditional cooperation. A case study of a rural community in Italy helps to validate the results and to direct attention to some other key issues, such as the structure of the interactions between the community members. The work ends by presenting a mechanism-based theory of voluntary public good provision that helps in understanding the boundaries of validity of social explanation and in extending it.
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Slack, Sean Edward. "Essays on categorical and universal welfare provision : design, optimal taxation and enforcement issues." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/15659.

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Part I comprises three chapters (2-4) that analyse the optimal combination of a universal benefit (B≥0) and categorical benefit (C≥0) for an economy where individuals differ in both their ability to work and, if able to work, their productivity. C is ex-ante conditioned on applicants being unable to work, and ex-post conditioned on recipients not working. In Chapter 2 the benefit budget is fixed but the test awarding C makes Type I and Type II errors. Type I errors guarantee B > 0 at the optimum to ensure all unable individuals have positive consumption. The analysis with Type II errors depends on the enforcement of the ex-post condition. Under No Enforcement C > 0 at the optimum conditional on the awards test having some discriminatory power; whilst maximum welfare falls with both error propensities. Under Full Enforcement C > 0 at the optimum always; and whilst maximum welfare falls with the Type I error propensity it may increase with the Type II error propensity. Chapters 3 and 4 generalise the analysis to a linear-income tax framework. In Chapter 3 categorical status is perfectly observable. Optimal linear and piecewise-linear tax expressions are written more generally to capture cases where it is suboptimal to finance categorical transfers to eliminate inequality in the average social marginal value of income. Chapter 4 then derives the optimal linear income tax for the case with classification errors and Full Enforcement. Both equity and efficiency considerations capture the incentives an increase in the tax rate generates for able individuals to apply for C. Part II (Chapter 5) focuses on the decisions of individuals to work when receiving C, given a risk of being detected and fined proportional to C. Under CARA preferences the risk premium associated with the variance in benefit income is convex-increasing in C, thus giving C a role in enforcement.
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Books on the topic "Optimal public good provision"

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Munro, A. The optimal public provision of private goods. Stirling: University of Stirling, 1988.

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Fang, Hanming. Optimal provision of multiple excludable public goods. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008.

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Hjerppe, Reino. Provision of public and merit goods: Towards an optimal policy mix? Helsinki: United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research, 1997.

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Tridimas, George. Optimal public provision under costly take up. Reading, England: University of Reading, Dept. of Economics, 1992.

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Tridimas, George. Optimal public provision under costly take-up. Reading: University of Reading, 1992.

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King, M. A. A Pigovian rule for the optimum provision of public goods. London: Taxation, Incentives and the Distribution of Income Programme, 1985.

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Ballard, Charles L. Wage tax distortions and public good provision. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1990.

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Tridimas, George. Public good provision under costly take-up. Reading: University of Reading, 1993.

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Tridimas, George. Public good provision under costly take-up. Reading, England: University of Reading, Dept. of Economics., 1993.

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Boadway, Robin. Financing and the optimal provision of public expenditure by decentralised agencies. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics, 1996.

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Book chapters on the topic "Optimal public good provision"

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Ahlstrom, Laura J., and Franklin G. Mixon. "The private provision of a public good." In War Movies and Economics, 43–61. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2020.: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429296628-5.

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Buchholz, Wolfgang, and Michael Eichenseer. "Strategic Coalition Formation in Global Public Good Provision." In The Theory of Externalities and Public Goods, 61–84. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49442-5_4.

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Khalili, Mohammad Mahdi, Xueru Zhang, and Mingyan Liu. "Public Good Provision Games on Networks with Resource Pooling." In Network Games, Control, and Optimization, 271–87. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10880-9_16.

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Sharma, Shrutivandana, and Demosthenis Teneketzis. "Local Public Good Provision in Networks: A Nash Implementation Mechanism." In Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, 27–42. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_3.

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Jack, Bryan, and Mancur Olson. "Warr Neutrality and the Natural Egalitarianism of Voluntary Public Good Provision." In Collective Choice, 33–48. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24711-1_3.

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Piggotti, John, and John Whalley. "Public Good Provision Rules and Income Distribution: Some General Equilibrium Calculations." In Applied General Equilibrium, 25–33. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag HD, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-50167-8_2.

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de Goiter, Harry, David J. Nielson, and Gordon C. Rausser. "The Political Economy of Redistributive Policies and the Provision of Public Good in Agriculture." In GATT Negotiations and the Political Economy of Policy Reform, 85–106. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-79284-7_4.

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Rodríguez Bolívar, Manuel Pedro. "Political Factors for the Adoption of Different Governance Models in the Provision of Public Services Under Web 2.0 Technologies." In Social Media: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 607–18. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45234-0_54.

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Brumme, Anja, Wolfgang Buchholz, and Dirk Rübbelke. "Impure Public Good Models as a Tool to Analyze the Provision of Ancillary and Primary Benefits." In Springer Climate, 109–23. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30978-7_6.

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Smith, Richard D., and Joanna Coast. "The Economics of Resistance Through an Ethical Lens." In Ethics and Drug Resistance: Collective Responsibility for Global Public Health, 279–94. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27874-8_17.

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Abstract Economics is concerned with the analysis of choice and the efficient use of resources. Markets for antibiotics are heavily affected by their ‘public good’ nature and the externality that results from their consumption in terms of resistance. The non-excludability and non-rivalry associated with knowledge production in antibiotic development also has implications for the supply of antibiotics. On the demand side there are ethical issues associated with free-riding by consumers, free-riding across nations and free-riding across time. On the supply side, the lack of a pipeline for new antibiotics for the future causes both ethical and economic issues – and from both perspectives, efforts should perhaps focus more on alternatives to antibiotics and adjustments to heath care systems to reduce reliance on antibiotics. Indeed, unlike many areas of health care, where economics and ethical perspectives may differ, antimicrobial resistance is a case where the two perspectives align in terms of ensuring efficient and sustainable development and use of this precious resources. All strategies for dealing with resistance should share the same goals of achieving an optimal balance in the use of antimicrobial agents and explicit consideration of the distributional implications.
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Conference papers on the topic "Optimal public good provision"

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Kang, Zi Yang. "Optimal Public Provision of Private Goods." In EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3465456.3467566.

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Zhang, Meng, Jianwei Huang, and Rui Zhang. "Wireless power provision as a public good." In 2018 16th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks (WiOpt). IEEE, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.23919/wiopt.2018.8362809.

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"Public Good Provision: Lindahl Tax, Income Tax, Commodity Tax, and Poll Tax, a simulation." In 20th International Congress on Modelling and Simulation (MODSIM2013). Modelling and Simulation Society of Australia and New Zealand, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.36334/modsim.2013.f4.fukiharu.

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Mukaromah, Nahdiyatul. "Adolescent Response on Menarche: A Scoping Review." In The 7th International Conference on Public Health 2020. Masters Program in Public Health, Universitas Sebelas Maret, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.26911/the7thicph.03.03.

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ABSTRACT Background: Menarche (first menstrual period) is a sign of physical maturity in adolescent girls, which has an impact in the future, both from a psychological and socio-cultural perspective on adolescents. Menarche provides different responses and emotions to adolescent; this is due to differences in preparation for dealing with menarche. Scoping review aims to overview the menarche acceptance among adolescent. Subjects and Method: This was a scoping review study using the Arksey & O’Malley framework with 5 stages, including: identifying scoping review questions, identifying relevant articles using databased including PubMed, ScienceDirect, and EBSCO. This study using gray literature, selecting relevant articles using inclusion and exclusion criteria, mapping data charting and compiling, summarizing and producing a review report. Results: There were 6 articles selected using the Hawker assessment checklist tools. Articles obtained were using qualitative methods. The article selected in this study were based on the methodology, year of publication, and the participants used in the article. Two major themes that emerged as a result of the scoping review were knowledge and attitude. Conclusion: The acceptance of menarche among adolescents will differ depending on the information and support environment for adolescents. The acceptance of menarche in adolescents was still need an attention from health workers, families, and teachers. The provision of pre-menarche health education before adolescent reach menarche is important. So that adolescents are better prepared to gain good experiences and perceptions. Keywords: acceptance, menarche, adolescence, scoping review Correspondence: Nahdiyatul Mukaromah. Universitas ‘Aisyiyah Yogyakarta. Jl. Siliwangi, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Email: nadianad996@gmail.com. Mobile: 085880451711 DOI: https://doi.org/10.26911/the7thicph.03.03
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Fiala, Zdenek, and Olga Sovova. "NEW CHALLENGES FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AT THE AGE OF THE RIGHT TO THE INTERNET ACCESS." In 4th International Scientific Conference – EMAN 2020 – Economics and Management: How to Cope With Disrupted Times. Association of Economists and Managers of the Balkans, Belgrade, Serbia, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.31410/eman.2020.201.

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The paper discusses the challenges, benefits, and risks of the digitization in public services; argues the internet access right as a fundamental human right and the obligation of a state to provide digital services in the public administration; points out the main tasks of public administration when introducing the principles of good governance; addresses the development of the mentioned principles in the European public space as well at the examples of the Czech Republic. The authors critically describe evaluation methods of digitized public administration and e-Government, including the general model of user acceptance of information technology and benchmarking within the global worldwide information society. The paper highlights practical examples of digitization of the public space in the European Union and in the Czech Republic. The paper concludes with the issues of the state obligation to cover gaps between the legal and economic demand for digitization and provision of digital public services and needs of communities and individuals. The authors use the economic approach to examine legal issues of digitization in public administration. The comparison of the European legislation and Czech national legislation form the primary methodology of the interpretation of the rights of users as well as the obligations of the public administration. Practical examples, figures and tables highlight the argued issues.
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Herdhianta, Dhimas, and Hanifa Maher Denny. "Implementation of Hospital Safety and Health Management System: Resource, Organization, and Policy Aspects." In The 7th International Conference on Public Health 2020. Masters Program in Public Health, Universitas Sebelas Maret, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.26911/the7thicph.04.09.

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ABSTRACT Background: Hospital occupational health and safety is all activities to ensure and protect the safety and health of hospital human resources, patients, patient companions, visitors, and the hospital environment through efforts to prevent occupational accident and occupational disease in the hospital. It is necessary to support resources, organization, and policies in the implementation of occupational safety and health in hospitals in order to create a safe, secure and comfortable hospital condition. This study aimed to analyze the implementation of occupational safety and health at Hospital X Semarang, Central Java. Subjects and Method: This was a qualitative study conducted at Hospital X Semarang, Central Java. A total of 6 informants consisting of the main informants (members of the hospital occupational health and safety team) and triangulation informants (head of the hospital occupational health and safety team) were enrolled in this study. The data were obtained from in-depth interview method. The data were analyzed descriptively. Results: The hospital already had and provided the special budget needed in the field of hospital occupational health and safety, such as 1) Activity and provision of hospital occupational health and safety infrastructure; 2) Human Resources (HR) and assigns personnel who have clear responsibilities, authorities, and obligations in handling hospital occupational health and safety; 3) Hospital occupational health and safety official team but with double work burden; and 4) Policies were owned and compiled in written form, dated, and endorsed by the main director as well as commitment from the top leadership. Conclusion: The implementation of occupational safety and health in hospital X is quite good. Meanwhile, there is still a double work burden and have no independent hospital occupational health and safety team. Keyword: resources, organization, policy, work safety, occupational health, hospital Correspondence: Dhimas Herdhianta, Masters Program of Health Promotion, Faculty of Public Health, Universitas Diponegoro. Email: herdhianta@gmail.com. Mobile: 085749312412 DOI: https://doi.org/10.26911/the7thicph.04.09
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Tsalavoutas, A., M. Kelaidis, N. Thoma, and K. Mathioudakis. "Correlations Adaptation for Optimal Emissions Prediction." In ASME Turbo Expo 2007: Power for Land, Sea, and Air. ASMEDC, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/gt2007-27060.

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An approach for estimating the pollutants emitted from a gas turbine using semi-empirical correlations is described. An extensive literature review has been carried out, in order to obtain information already available in the public domain, on the subject of pollutants emitted from turbine engines and on the effect of different parameters on them. It is shown that application of correlations in their original form does not provide a reliable estimation of emissions. Such estimation requires adaptation to the particular case studies. The possibility of adapting the considered semi-empirical correlations to available emissions measurements, through the use of optimization method is further studied. Multivariate analysis, for the establishment of generic correlations had been also applied. Results are presented and compared to the test data that derive from the dry performance of an industrial turbine and a turbojet military engine. It is demonstrated that a good predictive ability can be established.
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Chen, Yiling, Biaoshuai Tao, and Fang-Yi Yu. "Cooperation in Threshold Public Projects with Binary Actions." In Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-21}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/15.

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When can cooperation arise from self-interested decisions in public goods games? And how can we help agents to act cooperatively? We examine these classical questions in a pivotal participation game, a variant of public good games, where heterogeneous agents make binary participation decisions on contributing their endowments, and the public project succeeds when it has enough contributions. We prove it is NP-complete to decide the existence of a cooperative Nash equilibrium such that the project succeeds. We demonstrate that the decision problem becomes easy if agents are homogeneous enough. We then propose two algorithms to help cooperation in the game. Our first algorithm adds an external investment to the public project, and our second algorithm uses matching funds. We show the cost to induce a cooperative Nash equilibrium is near-optimal for both algorithms. Finally, the cost of matching funds can always be smaller than the cost of adding an external investment. Intuitively, matching funds provide a greater incentive for cooperation than adding an external investment does.
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ŠPIČKA, Jindřich. "WHAT DETERMINES PROPENSITY TO GET PUBLIC INVESTMENT SUBSIDIES? A CASE STUDY OF THE CZECH FOOD INDUSTRY." In RURAL DEVELOPMENT. Aleksandras Stulginskis University, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.15544/rd.2017.052.

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The aim of the paper is to is to quantify differences in structural and economic indicators between participants and nonparticipants of the investment support programmes in the Czech food industry at the beginning of the old programming period (2007). Research was conducted on a dataset of supported projects from the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Industry and Trade combined with structural and economic indicators of participating and nonparticipating companies provided by MagnusWeb database. Final database contained 1 225 companies. However, not all indicators were available for all companies. Original set of variables was selected through Principal Component Analysis. Propensity to be supported was calculated through probit regression. Public investment support has had pretensions to increase productivity of the food industry as well as the added value of agricultural production by supporting many operations in agricultural processing and marketing. Ex-post evaluation of the “old” programming period 2007–14 shows that companies with larger size, lower trade margin, optimal liquidity, lower debt ratio and higher credit debt ratio had higher propensity to be supported. Conclusions about size and credit debt ratio follow previous research by other authors that small companies had lower chance to be supported because of more difficult access to good advisory services and bank loans.
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Andriani, Dhea, Janthy T. Hidayat, and Indarti Komala Dewi. "The Implementation of Children Friendly City in DKI Jakarta through Assesesment of Children Friendly Integrated Public Space." In 55th ISOCARP World Planning Congress, Beyond Metropolis, Jakarta-Bogor, Indonesia. ISOCARP, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.47472/hddu4907.

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The government of DKI Jakarta province is attempting to build public space to change the city face by means of constructing Children Friendly Public Space (thereafter called RPTRA) as the attempt of supporting Jakarta to be Child-Friendly City. In realizing a Child-Friendly City in DKI Jakarta it is supported by several governor regulations governing RPTRA standardization, RPTRA Management Guidelines, and the DKI Jakarta government also makes Jakarta grand design towards a Child-Friendly City. According to the Governor Regulation Number 196 of 2015, Child Friendly Integrated Public Space is an open place or space that combines community activities and activities by implementing 10 (ten) family empowerment and welfare programs to integrate with child-friendly city program. This RPTRA is part of a child-worthy infrastructure to achieve the fulfillment of one of the 24 child-worthy city indicators set by the Republic of Indonesia Minister of Women Empowerment and Child Protection Regulation Number 12 of 2011 concerning District/City eligible for children Indicators. The government of DKI Jakarta province built 6 (six) RPTRA in Kemayoran, Central Jakarta with each RPTRA having different characteristics. RPTRA Mutiara Sumur Batu has the highest score of 1.66 and RPTRA Harapan Mulya, which is 1.62. The purpose of this research was to assess the suitability and characteristics of RPTRA in Kemayoran District. This research method used GAP analysis, observation, and questionnaire. The results of this research showed that the RPTRA in Kemayoran Subdistrict is still not optimal because only 2 RPTRA have good values, while the other (4 RPTRA) still have constraints in developing RPTRA as fulfilling children's infrastructure.
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Reports on the topic "Optimal public good provision"

1

Fang, Hanming, and Peter Norman. Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, February 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w13797.

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Bowen, T. Renee, George Georgiadis, and Nicolas Lambert. Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w22772.

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Spencer, Michael, Stephen Swallow, Jason Shogren, and John List. Rebate Rules in Threshold Public Good Provision. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w14559.

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Coate, Stephen. Evaluating Durable Public Good Provision using Housing Prices. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, February 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w18767.

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Angeletos, George-Marios, Fabrice Collard, Harris Dellas, and Behzad Diba. Optimal Public Debt Management and Liquidity Provision. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, February 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w18800.

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King, Mervyn. A Pigovian Rule for the Optimum Provision of Public Goods. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 1985. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w1681.

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Calabrese, Stephen, Dennis Epple, Thomas Romer, and Holger Sieg. Local Public Good Provision: Voting, Peer Effects, and Mobility. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w11720.

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Azzimonti, Marina, and Pierre Yared. The Optimal Public and Private Provision of Safe Assets. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w24534.

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Lopes, Helena, José Castro Caldas, Ana Costa, Luís Francisco Carvalho, José Guilherme Gusmão, João Leão, João Rodrigues, and Ana Cordeiro dos Santos. Public good provision – why people do (not) contribute? An experimental exploration. Research report. DINÂMIA'CET-IUL, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.7749/dinamiacet-iul.wp.2004.36.

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Frank, Richard, David Salkever, and Jean Mitchell. Market Forces and the Public Good: Competition Among Hospitals and Provision of Indigent Care. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w3136.

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