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Journal articles on the topic 'Optimal public good provision'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 1 February 2022

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1

Michael, Michael S. "OPTIMAL CAPITAL TAXES FOR PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION." Bulletin of Economic Research 48, no. 4 (October 1996): 309–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.1996.tb00637.x.

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2

Snyder, Susan K. "Testable restrictions of Pareto optimal public good provision." Journal of Public Economics 71, no. 1 (January 1999): 97–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0047-2727(98)00053-x.

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3

Shao, Ran, and Lin Zhou. "Voting and optimal provision of a public good." Journal of Public Economics 134 (February 2016): 35–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.12.006.

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4

Falkinger, Josef. "On optimal public good provision with tax evasion." Journal of Public Economics 45, no. 1 (June 1991): 127–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(91)90051-3.

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5

Michael, Michael S. "The Optimal Tariff for Public Good and Public Input Provision." Public Finance Review 25, no. 1 (January 1997): 117–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/109114219702500107.

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6

Fang, Hanming, and Peter Norman. "Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2, no. 4 (November 1, 2010): 1–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.2.4.1.

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This paper studies the optimal provision mechanism for multiple excludable public goods. For a class of problems with symmetric goods and binary valuations, we show that the optimal mechanism involves bundling if a regularity condition, akin to a hazard rate condition, on the distribution of valuations is satisfied. Relative to separate provision mechanisms, the optimal bundling mechanism may increase the asymptotic provision probability of socially efficient public goods from zero to one, and decreases the extent of use exclusions. If the regularity condition is violated, the optimal solution replicates the separate provision outcome for the two-good case. (JEL D82, H41)
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7

Holt, Charles A., and Susan K. Laury. "Classroom Games: Voluntary Provision of a Public Good." Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, no. 4 (November 1, 1997): 209–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.11.4.209.

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This paper describes a simple public goods game, implemented with playing cards in a classroom setup. Students choose whether to contribute to the provision of a public good in a situation where it is privately optimal not to contribute, but socially optimal to contribute fully. This exercise motivates discussion of altruism, strategies for private fund-raising, and the role of government in resolving the public good problem.
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8

Bierbrauer, Felix, and Marco Sahm. "Optimal democratic mechanisms for taxation and public good provision." Journal of Public Economics 94, no. 7-8 (August 2010): 453–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.03.003.

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9

Douglas Wilson, John. "Optimal public good provision in the Ramsey tax model." Economics Letters 35, no. 1 (January 1991): 57–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(91)90105-t.

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10

Gravel, Nicolas, and Michel Poitevin. "Optimal provision of a public good with costly exclusion." Games and Economic Behavior 117 (September 2019): 451–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.009.

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11

CHANDER, PARKASH. "PUBLIC PROVISION OF PRIVATE GOODS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES." Singapore Economic Review 61, no. 03 (June 2016): 1640016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0217590816400166.

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In this paper, we characterize optimal redistributive taxes and subsidies on a discrete good which is available in different qualities. We assume that utility function of each consumer is such that his willingness-to-pay for quality increases with income. This separates the rich and the poor through the quality levels of the good actually purchased by them and allows the government to tax the rich and subsidize the poor. It is shown that the deadweight loss associated with the optimal policy may be zero. The notion of a consumer equilibrium introduced in the paper suggests a method for estimating the quality of a good as perceived by the consumers.
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12

Kreiner, Claus Thustrup, and Nicolaj Verdelin. "Optimal Provision of Public Goods: A Synthesis*." Scandinavian Journal of Economics 114, no. 2 (January 10, 2012): 384–408. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2011.01686.x.

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13

Munro, Alistair. "The optimal public provision of private goods." Journal of Public Economics 44, no. 2 (March 1991): 239–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(91)90028-z.

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14

BIERBRAUER, FELIX. "Optimal Income Taxation and Public Good Provision with Endogenous Interest Groups." Journal of Public Economic Theory 11, no. 2 (April 2009): 311–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01412.x.

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15

Ballard, Charles L., and Don Fullerton. "Distortionary Taxes and the Provision of Public Goods." Journal of Economic Perspectives 6, no. 3 (August 1, 1992): 117–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.6.3.117.

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Economists have long been concerned with finding an efficient level of public expenditure. The classic statement of the problem was given by Paul Samuelson (1954). An optimal level of expenditure is where the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between the public good and a reference good equals the marginal rate of transformation between the public good and the reference good (ΣMRS = MRT). However, Samuelson's formula assumes that all of the revenue needed to finance public goods can be raised with lump-sum taxes. Since this is not generally possible, the formula must be modified to account for the distortionary effects of the tax system. An appropriate modification is to multiply the cost side of the equation by a term that is commonly called the marginal cost of public funds (MCF). In the case of Samuelson's formula, where government is entirely financed with lump-sum taxes, the MCF would be exactly 1.0. In the traditional view of economists, distortionary taxes cause the MCF to be greater than one, thus raising the cost of providing public goods. In this paper, we discuss some cases where the MCF may be less than one. We will illustrate this possibility using numerical examples for labor taxes.
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16

Brett, Craig, and John A. Weymark. "PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION AND THE COMPARATIVE STATICS OF OPTIMAL NONLINEAR INCOME TAXATION." International Economic Review 49, no. 1 (February 2008): 255–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2008.00479.x.

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17

Ley, Eduardo. "Optimal provision of public goods with altruistic individuals." Economics Letters 54, no. 1 (January 1997): 23–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(96)00941-x.

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18

Fang, Hanming, and Peter Norman. "Corrigendum: Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 3, no. 1 (February 1, 2011): 328. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.3.1.328.

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19

Aronsson, Thomas, and Olof Johansson-Stenman. "When the Joneses' consumption hurts: Optimal public good provision and nonlinear income taxation." Journal of Public Economics 92, no. 5-6 (June 2008): 986–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.12.007.

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20

Stiglitz, J. E. "Devolution, independence, and the optimal provision of public goods." Economics of Transportation 4, no. 1-2 (March 2015): 82–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecotra.2015.05.001.

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21

Pirttilä, Jukka, and Matti Tuomala. "On optimal non-linear taxation and public good provision in an overlapping generations economy." Journal of Public Economics 79, no. 3 (March 2001): 485–501. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0047-2727(99)00105-x.

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22

MICHELETTO, LUCA. "Optimal Nonlinear Redistributive Taxation and Public Good Provision in an Economy with Veblen Effects." Journal of Public Economic Theory 13, no. 1 (January 6, 2011): 71–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2010.01493.x.

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23

Balestrino, Alessandro, and Umberto Galmarini. "Imperfect Tax Compliance and the Optimal Provision of Public Goods." Bulletin of Economic Research 55, no. 1 (January 2003): 37–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8586.00161.

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24

Bierbrauer, Felix, and Justus Winkelmann. "All or nothing: State capacity and optimal public goods provision." Journal of Economic Theory 185 (January 2020): 104955. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.104955.

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25

Wang, Yongqin, and Haibo Xu. "Social Heterogeneity and Optimal Mix Between Public and Private Provision of Public Goods." Journal of Chinese Political Science 12, no. 3 (September 20, 2007): 201–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11366-007-9014-2.

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26

Akhtar, Muhammad Ramzan. "Provision of Public Goods in an Islamic Economy." Pakistan Development Review 34, no. 4II (December 1, 1995): 879–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.30541/v34i4iipp.879-885.

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Islam establishes a welfare society. It obligates the society to make arrangements for need-fulfilment of all citizens. The Islamic economy working with the market and non-market institutions and guided by Islamic values meets the personal and public needs of its people. The market system in a secular economy under appropriate conditions can efficiently meet personal needs of the people; however, it fails to do so in case of public goods. While supplementing the market system with other institutions, the Islamic economy manages to supply optimal quantity of the public goods. The paper studies this issue in the light of the Qur'an, the Sunnah, and Islamic history. I
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27

Bierbrauer, Felix J. "Optimal Tax and Expenditure Policy with Aggregate Uncertainty." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 6, no. 1 (February 1, 2014): 205–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.6.1.205.

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We study optimal income taxation and public-goods provision under the assumption that the cross-section distributions of productive abilities or public-goods preferences are not known a priori. A conventional Mirrleesian treatment is shown to provoke manipulations of the policy mechanism by individuals with similar interests. The analysis therefore incorporates a requirement of coalition-proofness. The main result is that increased public-goods provision is associated with a more distortionary and a more redistributive tax system. With a conventional Mirrleesian treatment, the level of public-goods provision is not related to how distortionary or redistributive the tax system is. (JEL D82, H21, H23, H41)
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28

Flores, N. E., and P. E. Graves. "Optimal Public Goods Provision: Implications of Endogenizing the Labor/Leisure Choice." Land Economics 84, no. 4 (September 12, 2008): 701–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.3368/le.84.4.701.

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29

YANASE, AKIHIKO. "Dynamic Voluntary Provision of Public Goods and Optimal Steady-State Subsidies." Journal of Public Economic Theory 8, no. 1 (January 2006): 171–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00258.x.

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30

Yoshida, Masatoshi, and Stephen J. Turnbull. "Optimal provision of public intermediate goods with imperfect competition: A note." International Journal of Economic Theory 15, no. 2 (September 4, 2018): 209–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12165.

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31

McGinty, Matthew, Garrett Milam, and Alejandro Gelves. "Coalition Stability in Public Goods Provision: Testing an Optimal Allocation Rule." Environmental and Resource Economics 52, no. 3 (December 13, 2011): 327–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9530-6.

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32

Gahvari, Firouz. "On the marginal cost of public funds and the optimal provision of public goods." Journal of Public Economics 90, no. 6-7 (August 2006): 1251–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.11.001.

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33

Heijdra, Ben J., and Jenny E. Ligthart. "Keynesian Multipliers, Direct Crowding Out, and the Optimal Provision of Public Goods." Journal of Macroeconomics 19, no. 4 (October 1997): 803–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0164-0704(97)00043-8.

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34

Blomquist, Sören, Vidar Christiansen, and Luca Micheletto. "Public Provision of Private Goods and Nondistortionary Marginal Tax Rates." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2, no. 2 (May 1, 2010): 1–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.2.2.1.

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Using an optimal taxation model combined with a previously neglected scheme of public provision of private goods, we show that there is an efficiency gain if public provision of selected goods replaces market purchases and that efficiency requires marginal income tax rates to be higher than if the goods were purchased in the market. Part of the marginal tax serves the same role as a market price and conveys information about a real social cost of working more hours. It might be that economies with higher marginal tax rates have less severe distortions than economies with lower marginal tax rates. (JEL H21, H42, I38)
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35

Bierbrauer, Felix. "A note on optimal income taxation, public goods provision and robust mechanism design." Journal of Public Economics 93, no. 5-6 (June 2009): 667–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.02.008.

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36

Jun-jun, Zheng, Yin Hong, and Wang Xian-jia. "Incentive mechanism design for public goods provision: Price cap regulation and optimal regulation." Wuhan University Journal of Natural Sciences 10, no. 5 (September 2005): 817–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02832419.

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37

BATTAGLINI, MARCO, SALVATORE NUNNARI, and THOMAS R. PALFREY. "Legislative Bargaining and the Dynamics of Public Investment." American Political Science Review 106, no. 2 (May 2012): 407–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055412000160.

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We present a legislative bargaining model of the provision of a durable public good over an infinite horizon. In each period, there is a societal endowment that can either be invested in the public good or consumed. We characterize the optimal public policy, defined by the time path of investment and consumption. In a legislature representatives of each ofndistricts bargain over the current period's endowment for investment in the public good and transfers to each district. We analyze the Markov perfect equilibrium under different voting q-rules where q is the number of yes votes required for passage. We show that the efficiency of the public policy is increasing in q because higher q leads to higher investment in the public good and less pork. We examine the theoretical equilibrium predictions by conducting a laboratory experiment with five-person committees that compares three alternative voting rules: unanimity (q = 5), majority (q = 3), and dictatorship (q = 1).
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38

Pines, David. "Profit Maximizing Developers and the Optimal Provision of Local Public Good in a Closed System of a Few Cities." Revue économique 36, no. 1 (January 1985): 45. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3501678.

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39

Pines, David. "Profit maximizing developers and the optimal provision of local public good in a closed system of a few cities." Revue économique 36, no. 1 (1985): 45–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/reco.1985.408833.

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40

Batina, Raymond G. "Is Policy Coordination a Good Idea? Public Inputs and Policy Harmonization with Skilled and Unskilled Workers." Public Finance Review 45, no. 3 (April 26, 2016): 423–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1091142116644777.

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We extend the classic Zodrow–Mieszkowski model of tax competition with a public input to the case where there is skilled and unskilled labor. The policy rule governing the optimal provision of the public input contains a new term capturing an equity effect that takes into account the disparity in wages between skilled and unskilled workers. The equity effect can work in the opposite direction of efficiency. Under a coordinated policy reform across countries, total welfare improves unambiguously if the public input is underprovided prior to the reform and a concern for equity enhances the effect of improved efficiency on welfare. However, total welfare may also improve even if the public input is initially overprovided if the improvement in the unskilled wage due to the reform is large enough.
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41

Okamoto, Ryosuke. "THE OPTIMAL PROVISION OF LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS IN A METROPOLITAN AREA WITH FLEXIBLE JURISDICTIONAL BOUNDARIES." Journal of Regional Science 49, no. 2 (May 2009): 349–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9787.2008.00586.x.

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42

Kaplow, Louis. "On the (Ir)Relevance of Distribution and Labor Supply Distortion to Government Policy." Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, no. 4 (November 1, 2004): 159–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/0895330042632726.

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Should the assessment of government policies, such as the provision of public goods and the control of externalities, deviate from first-best principles to account for distributive effects and the distortionary cost of labor income taxation? For example, is the optimal extent of public goods provision smaller than indicated by the Samuelson rule because finance is distortionary? Or should environmental regulations fail to internalize externalities fully if the incidence of the regulations is regressive? It is suggested that these questions are best addressed by considering distribution-neutral implementation, in which budget balance is achieved by choosing an adjustment to the income tax that offsets the distributive impact of the policy in question. In basic cases, both distribution and labor supply distortion are moot because the target policy and the tax adjustment produce offsetting effects on each. Thus, traditional first-best principles provide good benchmarks for policy analysis after all. Moreover, even when actual implementation will not be distribution neutral in aggregate, distribution-neutral policy analysis has many conceptual and practical virtues that render it quite useful to investigators.
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43

Delgado, Michael S., and Neha Khanna. "Voluntary Pollution Abatement and Regulation." Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 44, no. 1 (April 2015): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1068280500004597.

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We consider private provision of an environmental public good and the link between voluntary pollution-abatement markets and the optimal level of mandatory environmental regulation. We show that voluntary abatement markets react to the level of mandatory abatement imposed and that an optimal regulatory policy must account for that reaction. We consider several assumptions about consumer behavior and find that the voluntary market's reaction to regulation depends on the motivating behavior of consumers. Whether the optimal level of mandatory abatement is higher than the level provided by traditional settings depends on the direction and magnitude of the voluntary market's reaction to changes in mandatory abatement.
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44

Ihori, Toshihiro, and C. C. Yang. "Interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition: The optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy." Journal of Urban Economics 66, no. 3 (November 2009): 210–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2009.08.001.

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45

Jin Kim and Seung-jin Shim. "Optimal Provision of Global Public Goods under Uncertainty: Strategic Transfers and Reservations in a Multilateral Treaty Obligation." Journal of International Logistics and Trade 12, no. 3 (December 2014): 39–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.24006/jilt.2014.12.3.003.

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46

Kim, Jin, and Seung-jin Shim. "Optimal Provision of Global Public Goods under Uncertainly: Strategic Transfers and Reservations in a Multilateral Treaty Obligation*." Journal of International Logistics and Trade 12, no. 3 (December 2014): 39–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.24006/jilt.2014.12.3.39.

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47

Meunier, Guy, and Ingmar Schumacher. "The importance of considering optimal government policy when social norms matter for the private provision of public goods." Journal of Public Economic Theory 22, no. 3 (December 10, 2019): 630–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12418.

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48

Tsai, Ming Jyh, and Tien Yu Huang. "Using Genetic Algorithm to Help the Seller Strategies in Online Auction." Key Engineering Materials 474-476 (April 2011): 1760–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/kem.474-476.1760.

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In e-commerce platform, the auction market is the most attractive channel for the general public. Because of low cost, making the entry barriers are low. Online sellers rely on the auction website as the platform. However, “What sellers should do to maximize the profit?” is the main purpose for this paper. This study used Apple ipod nano as an auction object on Yahoo!Auctions, and we came up with eleven factors as research variables , and tried to use genetic algorithm to build a successful auction model for sellers. In this research , if the results showed that the optimal seller behavior of chromosomes are 1,6,9,11 from the portfolio, it means that the seller need to provide product images, accept “Buy it now” , inform buyers about deliver time and maintain a good seller reputation. Therefore, the seller might be recommend to make efforts on the provision of product information, include pictures of auction goods and answer all detail questions, accept “Buy it now” , inform the buyers when sending out the goods, and maintain good reputation.
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49

Sundari, C. U. Tripura. "Asian Development Bank, Asian Economic Integration Report 2018 Toward Optimal Provision of Regional Public Goods in Asia and the Pacific." Journal of Asian Economic Integration 1, no. 2 (September 2019): 289–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2631684619882811.

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50

Pavliuk, N. V. "FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION IN THE SPHERE OF PUBLIC HEALTH CARE: MEANS OF INFORMATION PROVISION FOR CRIMES INVESTIGATION." Theory and Practice of Forensic Science and Criminalistics 17 (November 29, 2017): 93–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.32353/khrife.2017.11.

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The paper considers the questions of applying scientific and technical means of information provision for corruption crimes investigation, researches on corruption directions of activity and corresponding risks of corruption manifestation in the sphere of public health of Ukraine, as well as the possibility to use these data for filling of a database of the automated information system «Сorruption сounteraction» are considered. The offered system is a means of information provision for the formation of proofs in the investigation of a corruption oriented crimes and will give the chance to the subjects authorized on carrying out pre-trial inquiry, to get uninterrupted access to the systematized information, to take potentially useful data, to receive offers of optimal decisions, sequences of actions and result in the convenient form for the decision of tactical problems. On the basis of studying of activity directions in public health care sphere of Ukraine there are presented the proposals concerning the list of corruption risks, the main from them are: imperfect mechanism of the organization and carrying out of the state purchases ofmedical preparations and equipment; impossibility of the automated control over procedure ofpurchases; avoidance of officials responsibility for decision-making; possibility of the companiesintermediaries to take part in purchases; imperfect systems of declaring on cost of medicines; absence of control over factual receipt of the goods and services, their quality, quantity, suitability terms; inconsistence of the treaty provisions to the offer of the auction winner; laying down discrimination conditions for the participation in the public sale; refusal of the customer to conclude the contract with auction winners; possibility ofpurchase conditions infringement; absence of a single register ofpatients which need treatment; absence of open competition choice of the heads ofpublic health care institutions.
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