Academic literature on the topic 'Optimism and overconfidence'

The paper was based on survey research design. There is significant association between experience group with herding bias and optimism bias and there is no significant association between experience group with investment decision bias, disposition effect bias, and overconfidence bias. Similarly there is significant association between trading frequency with herding bias, optimism bias, investment decision bias, disposition effect bias, and overconfidence bias. Heuristics may make investors overconfident as they overlook risks causing security price to move away from fundamentals. Investors tend to be overconfident and hence overestimate the accuracy of their forecast due to illusion of knowledge and illusion of control.

PurposeThis paper aims to explore the question of confidence in entrepreneurship, and the impact confidence has on key tasks in the venture development process.Design/methodology/approachPropositions about the relationship between key elements of confidence (optimism and overconfidence) are made in order to unpack the confidence construct. Simple tests of these propositions are conducted using a small sample of Australian entrepreneurs. Further propositions are made about the impact of optimism and overconfidence on activity across different phases of the new venture development process.FindingsTwo elements of confidence, optimism and overconfidence, are distinct in their association with each other and with a third individual difference (regulatory focus). The dual and sometimes opposing impacts of optimism and overconfidence on new venture activity are explored. Optimism and overconfidence are both beneficial when deciding to become an entrepreneur, but overconfidence is harmful when making decisions in response to setbacks.Research limitations/implicationsConclusions are limited by the sample size and simple analytical techniques. Rather, the impact of the paper is in the implications of the independence of optimism and overconfidence. Future research can explore and test the propositions made about when each is harmful and when beneficial.Practical implicationsFor entrepreneurs, it is important to be aware of your optimism and overconfidence in different situations. When optimism is beneficial, use it, but when overconfidence is harmful, mitigate against it by asking the right questions and working with others to check assumptions and strategies.Originality/valueThis paper distinguishes between two individual differences, optimism and overconfidence, that are typically thought to be interdependent and beneficial for entrepreneurs.

We test the impact of CEO overconfidence on the cost of debt and the impact of SOX on overconfidence via CEO selection. Our CEO overconfidence measure is based on the degree of optimism in management earnings forecasts, and the measure for the cost of debt is bond yield spreads. Our evidence supports that the market discounts CEO overconfidence by increasing the cost of borrowing. Moreover, we find that the financial market also incorporates past CEO overconfidence into bond pricing. We document that the board prefers to appoint a more rational CEO over an overconfident CEO. Our findings are consistent with Banerjee et al.’s (2015) argument that an independent board mitigates the costs of CEO overconfidence in terms of investment and risk exposure.

Managerial overconfidence refers to managers’ cognitive bias, according to which they demonstrate unwarranted belief in their own judgments and capabilities. This study provides a new measurement of CEO overconfidence through textual analysis of management discussion and analysis (MD&A) in 10-K documents by making use of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) EDGAR database. Overconfidence was obtained from “optimism” using the Diction program. From a sample of 19,367 US firms from 1994 to 2016, we found that CEO overconfidence was negatively related to corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. Since overconfident CEOs are likely to consider CSR activities less important than their own ability, they seem to reduce CSR activities. Also, CSR activities initiated by overconfident CEOs were negatively related to firms’ long-term performance. However, CSR activities led to positive long-term performance in firms that were financially constrained. Our findings show that CSR activities undertaken as a result of CEO overconfidence by financially unconstrained firms could be harmful to shareholder value in the long term.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to test the competing explanations of stated preferences for firm characteristics, optimism and overconfidence for trading activities in a single framework. Design/methodology/approach A survey methodology is followed to collect the data among retail investors in Malaysia using simple random sampling. Findings The findings show simultaneous identification of stated preferences for firm characteristics, optimism and overconfidence as determinants of trading activities. Preferences for firm’s profitability characteristics, management and product-related attributes and risky characteristics are likely to decrease investors’ trading activities. On the other hand, preferences for firm’s liquidity and trading volume characteristics with relative financial-domain optimism, personal investment optimism and better-than-average aspect of overconfidence are likely to increase investors’ trading activities. Practical implications This finding implies that investors should be careful not only in assessing firm’s characteristics but also need to understand the effects of optimism and overconfidence in trading decisions. Originality/value The study considers various aspects of optimism and overconfidence, and the stated preferences for firm characteristics, unlike one aspect of these behavioral biases and indirect observation of preferences for firm characteristics. Furthermore, the study considers trading frequency, annual portfolio turnover and trading intention, whereas earlier studies considered only one or two of these trading decisions.

Summary Overconfidence has long been noted by historians and political scientists as a major cause of war. However, the origins of such overconfidence, and sources of variation, remain poorly understood. Mounting empirical studies now show that mentally healthy people tend to exhibit psychological biases that encourage optimism, collectively known as ‘positive illusions’. Positive illusions are thought to have been adaptive in our evolutionary past because they served to cope with adversity, harden resolve, or bluff opponents. Today, however, positive illusions may contribute to costly conflicts and wars. Testosterone has been proposed as a proximate mediator of positive illusions, given its role in promoting dominance and challenge behaviour, particularly in men. To date, no studies have attempted to link overconfidence, decisions about war, gender, and testosterone. Here we report that, in experimental wargames: (i) people are overconfident about their expectations of success; (ii) those who are more overconfident are more likely to attack; (iii) overconfidence and attacks are more pronounced among males than females; and (iv) testosterone is related to expectations of success, but not within gender, so its influence on overconfidence cannot be distinguished from any other gender specific factor. Overall, these results constitute the first empirical support of recent theoretical work linking overconfidence and war.

While an entrepreneurial career requires some level of optimism and confidence, unfounded optimism and overconfidence can be detrimental to entrepreneurial success. By comparing student and faculty perceptual differences, we assess whether university students are overly optimistic regarding the outcomes they expect from an entrepreneurial career as well as overconfident in their perceptions of barriers to entrepreneurship. Findings suggest that, overall, students are more optimistic but not more confident than faculty. Also, students who are more optimistic and more confident than their faculty, also perceive themselves to be more entrepreneurial and have stronger entrepreneurial intentions than their peers.

L'introduction de la dimension comportementale dans l'explication des phénomènes de fusions-acquisitions a permis de remplacer les suppositions traditionnelles de rationalité des acteurs par des suppositions comportementales potentiellement plus réalistes. La finance d'entreprise comportementale permet de traiter le phénomène de fusion-acquisition dans un cadre élargi en intégrant dans l'analyse l'hypothèse de l' irrationalité des acteurs notamment les dirigeants des acquéreurs. Le présent travail porte sur l'étude de la relation qui existe entre les biais comportementaux des dirigeants des acquéreurs tels que le biais d'excès de confiance, et les opérations d'acquisitions. Nous développons, dans un premier temps, plusieurs mesures d'excès de confiance des dirigeants. Dans un second temps, les différentes mesures développées seront mobilisées pour étudier l'effet de l'excès de confiance sur les politiques d'acquisition. Sur un échantillon d'entreprises françaises engagées dans des opérations d'acquisition durant la période 1999-2007, nous montrons que les dirigeants surconfiants des acquéreurs ont tendance à réaliser plus d'acquisition et à les effectuer avec une prime d'offre plus élevée. Cependant, ces acquisitions ne sont pas rentables pour les actionnaires des acquéreurs étant donné que les rentabilités réalisées sont négatives autour de la date d'annonce
The introduction of the behavioral dimension in the explanation of the phenomena of mergers and acquisitions has allowed to replace the traditional assumptions of rationality of the participants by potentially more realistic behavioral assumptions. Behavioral corporate finance allows to treat the phenomenon of mergers and acquisitions in a framework widened, incorporating into the analysis the hypothesis of the irrationality of participants in particular the managers of bidders. The present work focuses on studying the relationship between the behavioural bias of managers of bidders such as overconfidence bias, and the operations of acquisition. Firstly, we develop several measures of CEO overconfidence. Secondly, these measures are used to study the effect of overconfidence on acquisitions policies. From a sample of French firms involved in operations of acquisitions during the period 1999-2007, we show that the overconfident CEO tend to make more acquisitions and to make them with a higher acquisition premium. However, these acquisitions are unprofitable for the shareholders of the bidders since the returns realized are negative around the date of announcement

Purpose

The main purpose of this paper is to investigate overconfidence and over-optimism in the market. This leads the reader to the question, are the analysts “right” concerning their forecasts? The reader will also get to understand various and sometimes forgotten factors that affect we human beings in our decision making when it comes to investing and analysing which is also known as the behavioural finance theory.

Conclusion

According to the results from my tests it seems that analysts of the S&P500 are exaggerated by the problem of overconfidence and the over-optimistic biases. The analysis part of this study is confirming the discussed theory of anchoring and herding. Analysts tend to “follow the stream”, by evaluate the standard deviations between forecasts and the realized outcome, as well as the indexed analysts’ consensus estimations for twenty-four months of EPS.

Cette étude examine l'impact de l'incertitude sur l'optimisme et l'excès de confiance des analystes financiers. Les données de l'étude, portant sur 1758 entreprises européennes et concernant la période 1997-2007, sont extraites de la base de données IBES. Étant donné que notre période d'étude comporte un krach boursier en 2000-2001, nos tests ont été conduits avec une comparaison pré- et post-krach. L'incertitude informationnelle est approximée par l'intensité technologique. Les firmes technologiques se caractérisent par une forte incertitude liée à l'aboutissement de leurs projets d'innovations, à la forte rapidité de l'évolution technologique et au traitement comptable spécifique des immatériels. La dispersion de prévision a été utilisée aussi comme deuxième mesure de l'incertitude pour tester la robustesse des résultats fondés sur le caractère technologique. A travers les études antérieures, nous avons montré que l'optimisme des analystes est, d'une part, rationnel, justifié par des incitations économiques et, d'autre part, comportemental expliqué par le phénomène de sur-réaction aux bonnes informations et la sous-réaction aux mauvaises informations. L'excès de confiance implique une sur-réaction aux informations privées et une sous-réaction aux informations publiques. Les résultats obtenus, en se basant essentiellement sur les méthodologies développées par Amir et Ganzach (1998), Easterwood et Nutt (1999) et Bessière et Kaestner (2008), montrent un optimisme plus fort pour les firmes technologiques qui s'atténue et même disparait lorsque l'horizon de prévision décroit. Le phénomène de sur-réaction aux bonnes informations et de sous-réaction aux mauvaises informations est plus fort pour les firmes de haute technologie lorsque l'horizon de prévision est lointain. Ce phénomène s'affaiblit plus pour ces firmes et même s'inverse lorsque la date d'annonce du bénéfice estimé s'approche. Les erreurs de prévisions deviennent moins optimistes pour ces firmes voir même pessimiste. L'analyse pré- et post-krach montre un optimisme plus fort pour les entreprises de haute incertitude avant le krach. Cet optimisme disparait après le krach essentiellement chez les firmes technologiques. L'étude montre aussi que les analystes sur-réagissent plus aux informations privées et sous-réagissent plus aux informations publiques relatives aux entreprises de haute technologie par rapport à celles de faible technologie. L'excès de confiance disparait progressivement à mesure que l'on s'éloigne de la date d'annonce de l'information publique. Il s'atténue significativement après le krach plus précisément pour les firmes de haute technologie. Les résultats trouvés avec la distinction haute/faible dispersion sont globalement similaires à ceux trouvés avec la décomposition haute/faible technologie
This study examines the impact of uncertainty on optimism and overconfidence of the financial analysts. The data of the study, concerning 1758 European firms and covering the period 1997-2007, are extracted from the IBES database. Given that our period of study includes a stock market crash in 2000-2001, our tests were driven with a comparison pre- and post-crash. Informational uncertainty is approximated by technological intensity. The high-tech firms are characterized by a strong uncertainty linked to the culmination of their innovation projects, to the strong speed of technological evolution and to the specific accounting treatment of the intangible investments. The forecast dispersion was also used as second measure of uncertainty to test the robustness of results based on the technological characteristic.Across the previous studies, we showed that the optimism of the analysts is, on the one hand, rational justified by economic instigations and, on the other hand, behavioral explained by the phenomenon of over- reaction to good information and under-reaction to bad information. The overconfidence implies an over- reaction to private information and under-reaction to public information. Our results, principally based on the methodologies developed by Amir and Ganzach (1998), Easterwood and Nutt (1999) and Bessiere and Kaestner (2008), show a stronger optimism for the high-tech firms compared to low-tech firms. This optimism reduces and even disappears when the forecast horizon decreases. The phenomenon of over-reaction to good information and under-reaction to bad information is stronger for the high-tech firms when the forecast horizon is distant. This phenomenon decreases more for these firms and is even reversed when the expected earnings announcement date approaches. The forecast error becomes less optimistic for these firms and even pessimistic with the reduction of forecast horizon. The analysis pre- and post-crash shows a stronger optimism for the high-uncertainty firms before crash. This optimism disappears after crash principally to the high-tech firms.Study shows also that the analysts over-react more to the private information and under-react more to the public information related to the high-tech firms in comparison with low-tech firms. The over confidence disappears progressively as one moves away from the announcement date of public information. It decreases significantly after crash especially for the high-tech firms. The results found with the differentiation high / low dispersion are on the whole similar to those found with the decomposition high/low-tech

Thesis (MASc)--University of Waterloo, 2004.
"A thesis presented to the University of Waterloo in fulfillment of the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Applied Science in Management Sciences." Includes bibliographical references.

Esta pesquisa investiga empiricamente as possíveis influências de gestores cognitivamente enviesados sobre as decisões de financiamento e de investimento das empresas. Especificamente, dois vieses cognitivos amplamente documentados na literatura comportamental e psicológica são enfocados: o otimismo e o excesso de confiança. As hipóteses de pesquisa são derivadas de um crescente corpo de teorias dedicadas à exploração das implicações para a empresa da presença destes traços psicológicos nos seus gestores. Embora o otimismo e o excesso de confiança tendam a se manifestar conjuntamente, é possível tratá-los separadamente para fins analíticos. Genericamente, o otimismo costuma ser modelado como uma superestimação da probabilidade de ocorrência de eventos favoráveis, ao passo que o excesso de confiança reflete-se na subestimação da volatilidade ou do ruído de processos que envolvem incerteza. Argumenta-se que uma predição central emerge do conjunto dos modelos considerados, qual seja, empresas geridas por indivíduos otimistas e/ou excessivamente confiantes são mais propensas ao endividamento, ceteris paribus. Alguns modelos que enfocam apenas o viés do otimismo também sugerem que estas empresas são mais propensas a adotar uma hierarquização de preferências por fontes de financiamento conhecida como pecking order. Quanto ao impacto destes vieses sobre o valor de mercado e sobre as decisões de investimento das empresas os resultados teóricos são ambíguos. O estudo oferece duas contribuições principais. A primeira é o teste pioneiro das predições referidas acima e a segunda é a proposição de uma estratégia inovadora de identificação destes vieses entre os gestores. Especificamente, sólidas evidências empíricas apoiadas por argumentos teóricos diversos sugerem que os indivíduos que gerenciam o seu próprio negócio (empreendedores) são particularmente propensos a exibir excesso de confiança e otimismo exacerbado em seus julgamentos. Alternativamente, estes vieses são identificados com base no padrão de posse de ações da própria empresa por parte dos seus gestores. Utiliza-se uma amostra de 153 empresas brasileiras observadas entre os anos de 1998 e 2003. Diferentes métodos foram empregados para estimar os parâmetros dos modelos empíricos, com destaque para o procedimento baseado no Método dos Momentos Generalizado conhecido como GMM Sistêmico, sempre com o objetivo de controlar os problemas de endogeneidade relacionados, em particular, com variáveis omitidas, erros de mensuração e com a provável determinação simultânea de algumas variáveis. Os dados não mostram evidências favoráveis à hipótese da hierarquização de fontes de financiamento. Tampouco é possível divisar qualquer impacto sistemático das variáveis substitutas do otimismo/excesso de confiança dos gestores sobre medidas do valor de mercado e do volume geral de investimentos das empresas. Um resultado bastante significativo emerge, não obstante, da análise empírica: empresas geridas por indivíduos classificados como otimistas/excessivamente confiantes revelam-se, depois de isolados diversos fatores intervenientes, substancialmente mais alavancadas financeiramente do que as demais. Esta evidência, compatível com a predição central do conjunto de teorias comportamentais consideradas, é robusta a variações do método de estimação, da especificação do modelo empírico e da definição operacional escolhida para os vieses de interesse. A significância econômica aliada à significância estatística da influência observada sugere que otimismo e o excesso de confiança dos gestores podem exercer impacto significativo sobre decisões corporativas e, em especial, podem ser importantes determinantes da estrutura de capital das empresas.
This research empirically investigates the possible impacts of cognitively biased managers on firms\' financing and investment decisions. Specifically, two cognitive biases that are widely recorded in the behavioral and psychological literature are considered: optimism and overconfidence. The testable hypotheses are derived from a growing body of theories that focus on the implications of biased managers for firms. Although optimism and overconfidence tend to appear together, it is possible to treat them separately for analytical purposes. Generically, optimism is usually modeled as an overstatement of the probability of occurrence of favorable events and overconfidence is reflected in the understatement of the volatility or of the noise of processes that involve uncertainty. It is argued that one central prediction emerges from the set of models considered, namely, that companies managed by optimistic and/or overconfident individuals are more inclined towards debt financing, ceteris paribus. Some models that focus on the bias of optimism alone suggest, in addition, that these companies are more prone to establishing an ordering of preferences for alternative sources of financing known as pecking order. When it comes to the impact of these biases on the firm\'s market value and on its investment decisions the theoretical results are more ambiguous. The study offers two main contributions. Firstly, it pioneers in testing the above mentioned predictions. Secondly, it proposes a novel strategy for identifying these biases among managers. Specifically, solid empirical evidence supported by diverse theoretical arguments suggests that people who run their own business (entrepreneurs) are particularly prone to showing overconfidence and optimism in their judgments. Alternatively, these biases were identified based on the amount of firm\'s stock owned by its manager. The available sample comprises 153 Brazilians firms observed from years 1998 to 2003. Different methods were applied for estimating the parameters of the empirical models, emphasizing a procedure based on the Generalized Method of Moments and known as System GMM, aiming at controlling endogeneity problems related to omitted variables, measurement errors and the likely simultaneous determination of some variables. The empirical evidence obtained does not favor the pecking order hypothesis. It is also not possible to distinguish any systematic impact of the proxies for managerial optimism/overconfidence on indicators of firm\'s market value or of its general level of investments. A quite significant result emerges from the empirical analysis, nevertheless: firms managed by individuals that were classified as optimists/overconfident reveal themselves, after intervening factors have been isolated, to be substantially more financially leveraged. This evidence is compatible with the central prediction of the set of theories considered and is robust to variations of the estimation method, specification of the empirical model and to differing operational definitions for the cognitive biases of interest. The economic significance allied to the statistical significance of the observed impact suggests that managerial optimism and overconfidence can indeed play a role in corporate decision making and, specifically, they may be important determinants of firms\' capital structure.

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This quantitative research aims to investigate the impact of strategic investment decisions on firm value creation, when taken by optimistic and overconfident managers. The research was conducted under the irrational managers approach (BAKER et al., 2005) and used a sample consisting of 502 strategic investment announcements made by 131 managers from 116 different Brazilian publicly traded companies, from January/2005 to December/2009. Strategic investments are considered as being all capital expenditures which create growth opportunities for companies (KESTER, 1984). The empirical results suggest that investors react negatively to announcements of strategic investments when made by optimistic and overconfident managers, pointing that differences in style, opinion and perception of reality motivated by personal managers characteristics are perceived by the market and thus discounted from companies stock price. Unlike the models prescribed by Gervais et al. (2003) and Hackbarth (2004), which predict that moderate levels of optimism and overconfidence exhibited by managers are beneficial for firm s shareholders, only partial support was found to the hypothesis that the magnitude or degree of manager s optimism/overconfidence is relevant. The results suggest that managers who exhibit a moderate degree of optimism and overconfidence are better perceived by investors than others considered markedly biased. However, the results do not confirm the existence of a degree or level for optimism/overconfidence that is beneficial to the firm and also superior to others. Managers regarded as rational and less biased were those who had their strategic investment announcements best assessed by the market.
Esta pesquisa, de natureza quantitativa, buscou investigar o impacto das decisões de investimentos estratégicos na criação de valor para as empresas, quando tomadas por gestores otimistas e excessivamente confiantes. A pesquisa, conduzida dentro da abordagem dos gestores irracionais (BAKER et al., 2005), utilizou uma amostra formada por 502 anúncios de investimentos estratégicos, realizados por 131 gestores de 116 diferentes empresas brasileiras de capital aberto, no período compreendido entre janeiro/2005 e dezembro/2009. São considerados investimentos estratégicos todos aqueles dispêndios de capital que criam oportunidade de crescimento para as empresas (KESTER, 1984). Os resultados da pesquisa empírica sugerem que os investidores reagem negativamente aos anúncios de investimentos estratégicos quando realizados por gestores otimistas e excessivamente confiantes, indicando que as diferenças de estilo, opinião e de percepção da realidade motivadas por características pessoais dos gestores são consideradas pelo mercado e descontadas do preço das ações das empresas. Ao contrário dos modelos prescritos por Gervais et al. (2003) e Hackbarth (2004),os quais predizem que a presença de um nível moderado desses vieses nos gestores é benéfica aos acionistas das empresas, encontrou-se suporte apenas parcial à hipótese de que a intensidade ou grau de enviesamento do gestor é relevante. Os resultados da pesquisa sugerem que os gestores que exibem grau moderado de otimismo e confiança excessiva são melhor percebidos pelos investidores do que outros considerados pronunciadamente enviesados.Entretanto, os resultados não confirmam a existência de um grau de intensidade para otimismo/confiança excessiva que seja benéfico à empresa e, ainda, superior aos demais.Gestores tidos como racionais e menos enviesados foram os que tiveram seus anúncios de investimentos estratégicos melhor percebidos pelo mercado

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Esta dissertação pesquisou 99 empresas localizadas na cidade de Juiz de Fora (MG), buscando identificar um perfil de financiamento das mesmas. Utilizou-se a Análise Conjunta (Conjoint) para identificar as características mais desejadas de um instrumento de financiamento por essas empresas. Realizaram-se revisões bibliográficas acerca de temas como estrutura de capital, finanças comportamentais e trabalhos empíricos realizados em micro e pequenas empresas, além da Análise de Correspondência, para se identificar os atributos das empresas relacionados à decisão de financiamento atual e ideal. Constatou-se que a maior parte das empresas da amostra utiliza financiamentos de curto e de longo prazo; o endividamento total se apresenta próximo a 20% do capital total. A variável ‘novos Investimentos’ foi significativa para os financiamentos de curto longo prazos. As variáveis ‘tamanho’ (medida pelo faturamento), ‘, ‘expectativa de retorno dos novos investimentos’ e ‘fonte de financiamento dos novos investimentos’ foram significantes para financiamentos de curto prazo. Com os financiamentos de longo prazo, estão relacionadas ‘destino do financiamento’, ‘percepção da volatilidade’, ‘expectativa de crescimento’ e ‘intenção de novos investimentos’. Conclusivamente, observa-se adequação da hierarquia de fontes modificada (HOLMES e KENT, 1991) e do modelo de decisão de estrutura de capital em pequenas empresas (MICHAELAS et al, 1998).
This dissertation surveys 99 companies located in Juiz de Fora (Minas Gerais State), searching for patterns in their capital structure. Conjoint Analysis was used to capture the most preferable items in a financing instrument chosen by them. A literature review on capital structure, behavioral finance and empirical works concerning to small companies was made and Correspondence Analysis was used to identify companies attributes related either to the actual capital structure and capital structure preferences. The findings were: most of the companies in the sample use short and long term funds. Debt was nearly 20% of total funds. Variable “new investments’ was significant to the short- and long-term debt. Variables “size” (measured by Net Income), “new investments return expectation” and “funding source of new investments” were related to short-term debt. Variables “application of new funding”, “volatility perception”, “growth expectation” and “intention of doing new investments” were related to long-term debt. Conclusively, evidences of the modified pecking order theory (HOLMES e KENT, 1991) and the capital structure model adequacy in small companies (MICHAELAS et al, 1998) were found.

碩士
真理大學
企業管理學系碩士班
99
Overconfidence is relatively easy to make people overestimate their ability to underestimate the risk of the existence. It is the kind of bias behavior. In the past there were few studies which were discussed with employees for the bank. In this study, we would like to know whether credit officers have a tendency to overconfidence or not. Second, if credit officers generally are overconfident, to investigate the impact of the experience is good or bad if would affect the degree of overconfidence personnel; Finally, the passed studies often confused with the optimism and overconfidence, in this study were divided into two concepts, we would like to investigate that whether the different levels of optimism would interfere with past experience for overconfidence or not. 　　This study conducted a questionnaire survey to collect samples, the way is convenience sampling. Targeting a bank in Taipei City and County of micro-enterprises (capital of 30 million or less) credit department personnel branch by someone’s help for providing internal distribution, the total sample of 75, and 71 valid samples. The results showed that overconfidence universally exist in credit officers’ mind indeed; Second, past experience of credit officers and overconfidence is negative. That is worse experience, and the overconfident degree is higher; The more the total number of credit, the more easy to overconfidence; Third, optimism and overconfidence are two different concepts certainly, but the level of optimism does not interfere with the past experience of the degree of overconfidence. Therefore, we get three points. First, the areas of expertise are more likely to be overconfident; Second, when a bad credit experience (experience of overdue loans), they are more likely overconfident. It represents that if the occurrence of overdue loans event, we more seriously review the question of the reasons, to prevent the credit officers’ the enhancement degree of overconfidence; the more total number of credit articles and the more easily overconfidence. Credit managers should pay attention to hidden performance problems caused by the rating. The credit officer has not made excessive overconfidence; Finally, although The level of optimism doesn’t interfere with the degree of past experience on the impact of overconfidence, but this study proved that optimism and overconfidence are indeed two different concepts. Key words：Overconfidence; Experience of Credit Granting; Optimism

碩士
國立高雄大學
金融管理學系碩士班
103
The aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between momentum strategy returns and investor’s behavioral pitfalls in the US stock market. In comparison with the prior studies, this study not only examines the lead-lag relationship between momentum strategy returns and investor’s behavioral pitfalls but also explores the effect of major negative events and stock characteristics on the aforementioned relationship. Empirical results show that firstly, the returns of momentum strategy in the US stock market are significantly greater than zero while the price momentum phenomenon weakens during the influential period of the major negative events. Secondly, investor’s behavioral pitfalls play an important role in the momentum profits. Thirdly, the ability of investor’s behavioral pitfalls to predict the momentum strategy performance exhibits a decreasing pattern during the dotcom bubble burst. Finally, when the conservative investors with low risk tolerance prefer to trade the stocks of good companies, there is a statistically insignificant lead-lag relationship between the profits of momentum strategy based on portfolios that includes only the stocks of good companies and the proxies of investor’s behavioral pitfalls.

A mente humana é limitada em sua habilidade de processar informações e tomar decisões. Consequentemente, os indivíduos se utilizam de heurísticas e vieses no intuito de reduzir complexidade do ambiente a níveis gerenciáveis. Heurísticas e vieses de julgamento afetam o processo de tomada de decisão, permitindo que o gestor tome decisões de grande complexidade sob condições simplificadas, com o benefício da economia de tempo. Dessa forma, podem ser úteis aos gestores, tornando mais eficiente o processamento de informações ao direcioná-lo às relevâncias e urgências comuns ao processo de tomada de decisão. Entretanto, este processo também pode levar a importantes inconsistências ou lapsos de decisão que, persistentes e previsíveis, geram padrões de comportamento que podem ser compreendidos pela teoria. O objetivo deste trabalho consiste em diagnosticar vieses do excesso de confiança, otimismo e ancoragem, em gestores de uma importante empresa de construção civil do Brasil. Neste propósito, uma amostra de 84 gestores foi submetida a um questionário estruturado, contento instrumentos selecionados na literatura de processo decisório, no intuito de identificar a presença de vieses. A partir de testes paramétricos e nãoparamétricos, uni e bivariados, constatou-se que os gestores da empresa analisada: (1) são excessivamente confiantes em suas estimativas; (2) parecem mais otimistas que outros grupos de agentes econômicos; (3) São amplamente influenciados por âncoras em suas estimativas. Os resultados corroboram com evidências empíricas, emanadas da literatura sobre heurísticas e vieses, particularmente, com conceitos da Teoria do Prospecto e contrapõem-se aos conceitos oriundos da literatura que aborda o modelo racional de tomada de decisão, mais especificamente, à Teoria da Utilidade Esperada. A partir do diagnóstico dos vieses estudados, propõe-se um modelo de conscientização e treinamento, baseado na literatura existente, de forma a contribuir à mitigação dos vieses sistemáticos dos gestores da empresa analisada.
The human mind is limited in its ability to process information and make decisions. Therefore, individuals use heuristics and biases in order to simplify the complex managerial level environment. Judgment heuristic and biases affects the decision-making process; and it not only enables managers to make high complexity decisions in a simple way, but also saves time. Thus, it can be useful for managers as it makes the information processing more efficient, focusing on what is usually relevant and imperative for the decision-making. However, it can also lead to serious inconsistencies or mistakes which are persistent and predictable, creating behavioral patterns that can be understood by the theory. The objective of this work is to diagnose the biases of overconfidence, optimism, and anchoring in managers of an important Brazilian civil construction organization. A sample from 84 managers was collected in order to achieve our goals, and a structured questionnaire containing selected instruments based on the literature about the decision-making process was applied to identify the presence of biases. Using parametric and non-parametric tests, as well as univariate and bivariate tests, we learnt that the managers of the analyzed organization: (1) were excessively confident in their estimates; (2) seemed to be more optimistic than other economic agent groups; and (3) were greatly influenced by anchors in their estimates. The results corroborate the empiric evidence from the literature about heuristics and biases, especially the concepts of the Prospect Theory, and they refute the concepts from the literature about the rational decision-making model, particularly the Expected Utility Theory. Based on the diagnosis of the studied biases, a training and awareness model was proposed deriving from the existing literature in order to contribute to the mitigation of systematic biases in the managers of the analyzed organization.

This chapter assesses the behavior of corporate managers and boards of directors within the framework of agency theory, stewardship theory, and psychological biases. In agency theory, a chief executive officer (CEO) is motivated to act in his or her own best interests rather than those of shareholders. Stewardship theory posits that a CEO is a self-actualizing individual seeking to grow and reach a higher level of achievement through leading an organization. A CEO exhibits self-interested behavior in managing the firm. The CEO also exhibits optimism, overconfidence, and risk-aversion behaviors that are not optimal for the company. In the context of agency theory, the board of directors should enact incentive structures and monitoring to control these behaviors. However, directors also suffer from self-interests and cognitive biases. Specifically, boards may suffer from group-dynamic problems such as social loafing, poor information sharing, and groupthink.

This chapter examines the strategic role of overconfidence. It describes mentally healthy people that exhibit an overestimation of their capabilities, an illusion of control over events, and a perceived invulnerability to risk. It also describes overconfidence that has long been noted as a cause of disasters and wars, citing Geoffrey Blainey, Barbara Tuchman, and Stephen Van Evera who all blamed false optimism as one of the key causes of World War I. The chapter reviews the considerable discussion of the role of overconfidence in the contemporary world, such as the U.S. planning for the 2003 Iraq War and the 2008 financial crisis. It elaborates how overconfidence can offer adaptive advantages by increasing ambition, resolve, and perseverance.

Recent crisis periods have shown how corporate communication could contribute to organizational performance regarding financial outcomes, reputation concern, etc. The efforts to reduce information asymmetry, deal with agency problems, improve stakeholder engagement have brought it to the fore. Past research on reporting mechanisms has overly focused on its normative structure and manifested ethical or problematic issues. Some research has argued credibility of both reporters and assurance providers of this information. Although some limited research on management control over reporting mechanisms and on some weaknesses of assurance providers' verification statements, this research doesn't explain enough why this manipulative control occurs. Shifting our lenses to behavioral finance paradigm, it's understood that judgmental decision making seems to be exposed to diverse systematical biases and fallacies. Amidst them, inopportune optimism, alias overconfidence, stands for one of the most serious biases.

This chapter introduces the role of psychological factors in behavioral finance, thus explaining the theory of behavioral finance, the application of behavioral finance theory, the empirical achievement in behavioral finance, the utilization of psychological factors in behavioral finance regarding beliefs (i.e., overconfidence, too much trading, optimism and wishful thinking, representativeness bias, conservatism bias, belief perseverance, anchoring, and availability bias) and preferences (i.e., prospect theory and ambiguity aversion). Behavioral finance is a comparatively new management field that seeks to combine behavioral and cognitive psychological theory with conventional economics and finance to provide descriptions for why people make unreasonable financial decisions. Psychological factors in behavioral finance hold out the expectation of a better understanding of financial market behavior and scope for investors to make better investment decisions. Applying psychological factors in behavioral finance will tremendously enhance financial performance and achieve strategic objectives in global finance.