Journal articles on the topic 'Option citoyenne (Political movement)'

Résumé. Selon Fung et Wright, la mise en place d'une gouvernance participative impliquerait l'apparition de contre-pouvoirs spécifiques, différents de ceux qui caractérisent les espaces politiques «agonistiques» dans lesquels opèrent les mouvements sociaux. Nous discutons ces conclusions à partir d'une comparaison des rôles joués par des comités de citoyens à Marseille et à Québec dans l'émergence et l'activité d'instances participatives nouvelles. À l'inverse des deux auteurs, nous soulignons que, dans certains cas au moins, la mise en place d'une gouvernance plus participative ne saurait se passer de l'existence de mouvements sociaux, et que certaines des «qualités» que Fung et Wright prêtent aux contre-pouvoirs spécifiques des nouvelles instances participatives peuvent favoriser, au contraire, des logiques de cooptation, néfastes aux pratiques de la démocratie participative. Nous terminons cette discussion par une réflexion plus générale sur les façons de penser le conflit en science politique et sur leur pertinence épistémologique et heuristique.Abstract. According to Fung and Wright, the establishment of participatory governance involves specific stakeholders, different from those characterizing the “antagonistic” political spaces in which social movements operate. We discuss these conclusions via a comparison of roles played by citizens' committees in Marseille and Quebec City in the emergence of new participatory instances. Contrary to the two authors, we stress that, at least in certain cases, the establishment of more participatory governance could not occur without the existence of social movements. More precisely, some features that Fung and Wright attribute to participatory stakeholders could, on the contrary, favour co-optation, harmful to the practices of participatory democracy. We complete this discussion with a more general overview of ways of perceiving the conflict in political science and their epistemological and heuristic relevance.

Political Science has tended not to problematize human domination over nonhuman animals. Political scientists have been engaged intellectually and politically with other struggles for justice and citizenship leading one to question the apparent indifference to the issue of ‘animal rights’. This paper accounts for the absence of animals in political science research and suggests that recent scholarship has begun to take animal liberation seriously. The paper then looks at the options for the broader animal liberation movement and suggests that incremental change is the best and only option for animal advocates in contemporary liberal democracies.

Latin American Liberation Theology is a transforming theology in two senses: It is able to transform reality, as it has shown in these past decades, and it is transforming itself. This article shows how both types of meaning interweave. The transformations of Liberation Theology enable it to continuously adapt itself to new challenges in history. At present, this global theological movement is diversifying, or even fragmenting, in order to propose creative and effective solutions to different problems. Specifically, the Option for the Poor, which is at Liberation Theology’s core, currently presents profound challenges to European and Western theologies.

The scholarship on the far right has often interpreted nativist organizations as straddling the conceptual space between party and movement. These groups contest elections in order to gain representation in office, yet they also seek to mobilize public support to engage contentious issues like social movements. Despite theoretical commonalities, very little empirical research has focused on far-right “movement parties” as collective actors operating both in the protest and the electoral arenas. The article redresses this inconsistency by exploring the organizational and strategic configuration of two far-right collective actors—the Hungarian Jobbik and the Italian CasaPound. Deploying original interviews with high-ranking officials, the analysis enhances our understanding of the internal “supply side” of the far right as well as empirical knowledge on hybrid organizations that emerge from grassroots activism and successively organize to pursue the electoral option.

Following the end of their government coalition with the Social Democratic Party, German Green Party leaders spoke of "a dawn of new opportunities" for Alliance 90/The Greens. They wanted to capitalize on the strategic opportunities afforded by Germany's new five-party system and on the unexpected rise of climate change in public debate. Shortly before the 2009 federal election, however, the party's "new opportunities" seem rather limited. Selectively focusing on one particular explanatory factor, this article contrasts the Green's neo-radical eco-political position as it has emerged since 2005 with the ways in which environmental issues are addressed by the currently popular LOHAS (Life of Health and Sustainability) consumer movement. It suggests that the German Greens may have paid too little attention to the ongoing reframing of the environmental issue in public discourse and that this has impaired their prospects for a swift return to government office.

This book focuses on the cultural dimensions of the Central Asian form of an Islamic modernist movement, Jadidism, which arose among several groups of Muslims of the Russian Empire in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Politics was not an option for the Jadidists until the final years of the czarist monarchy and the early revolutionary period, so the author relegates that aspect of the movement to the later chapters. To the extent that involvement in politics in Russia became possible, Central Asian Jadidists sought to participate, not to pursue either isolationism or separatism. According to the author, Russian officials were the ones who mistakenly assumed that Jadidism posed a separatist threat; subsequent generations of scholars misperceived the movement through the lens of those fears. The author argues that culture is a significant dimension of the movement in its own right. It mattered in Central Asia both in the rivalry between the Jadidists and traditionalists for leadership of the region's Muslims and as a way for educated Muslims to preserve their distinctiveness within the Russian Empire.

Dictatorships, autocracies and authoritarian political systems must adapt if they wish to survive. The long-lasting dictatorship of Franco's Spain (1939–75) underwent a series of internal adaptations during its almost forty years of existence. The initial project of the Franco regime, which included the destruction of its social and political enemies, lasted until the end of the Second World War. The second phase, marked by a failed autarkic experiment, ended in 1959. The economic change that followed entailed a moderate opening in political terms, whilst maintaining a dictatorial apparatus. This article examines a further feature in the evolution of the Franco regime which initially sought to impose a monolithic national identity (Spanish) by means of the repression of its national minorities (Basque, Catalan, Galician and so on). Due to the absence of a violent political movement as existed in the Basque Country in the form of ETA, Catalonia is a particularly fruitful source to examine the shifts that took place in the Franco regime's policy towards Spain's historic nationalities. This article focuses on the intermediate spaces that appeared between overt opposition on the one hand and active collaboration on the other. This article assesses the evolving policy towards Catalan culture and identity during the dictatorship. I find three main phases in the regime's strategy: repression, followed by comparative tolerance with a final phase of the co-option of Catalan culture, for the purposes of regime legitimation.

School choice has become an increasingly available option for families in the United States. Given the current political climate, music educators must better understand the various dimensions of the school choice movement and how it may affect the music classroom. Following a brief history of school choice, this article offers a look at the movement’s influence on the music teacher workforce, music curricula, and funding for music education. Recommendations surrounding the equity of school music opportunities are explored.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has been the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people since the creation of the Palestinian. The PLO adopted the option of armed struggle against the Israeli occupation, but ended with the signing of the Oslo accords between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel in the 1990s. The Islamic Resistance Movement in Palestine (Hamas) was established in the 1980s. Hamas developed its political ideas through a new political document resulted in a new vision to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by transforming the conflict from religious conflict to political conflict and accepting the establishment of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders as a common ground between the Palestinian movements and parties, while the armed struggle remains a path of resistance. The purpose of this article is to truly understand this development and the possibility of its application on the ground or not, by clarifying the differences between the ideas of the former and the new Hamas, The researcher relied on a number of academic articles and political research in addition to the political TV shows that talked about the new document, the Arab and international positions of this document, The result of this article is that the Palestinian Hamas movement as a Palestinian resistance movement is capable of political development and finding the alternatives available to solve the Palestinian file while preserving the Palestinian national constants. The Conclusion is the Palestinian Hamas movement is developing with the developments of regional and international events and political development has been partially accepted internationally, Hamas have to work more in the political field to balance between political development and the Palestinian constants.

After the unsuccessful end of the spring 2009 French university movement, faculty and student activists searched for new political strategies. One promising option was an internationalist project that sought to unite anti-Bologna Project movements across Europe. Yet an ethnographic study of two international counter-summits in Brussels (March 2010) and Dijon (May 2011) shows that this strategy was unsuccessful. This article explores the causes of these failures, arguing that activist internationalism became caught in a trap of political mimesis, and that the form of official international summits was incompatible with activists’ temporal, representational, and reflexive needs.

Many African political officials have become famous for their political actions, determination, and strong commitment against colonialism, imperialism and even neo-colonialism. In Kenya, Ngugi WA Thiong’o and Mecere Githae Mugo fictionalize the story of Dedan Kimathi. The Trial of Dedan Kimathi (1976) retraces the life of the hero, Kimathi, who leads the Mau Mau movement against British colonizers. Kimathi is imprisoned because of his own brother Wambararia who betrays his people to become free. Whites’ collaborators and neo-colonial actors such as politicians, Business executives and the Church do not succeed to persuade Kimathi to accept the collaborationist option and stop the struggle.

This article uses a political developmental approach to examine African American poll-tax registration and voting in Virginia from 1940 to 1954. Using the concept of multiple orders, the article traces how changes in the state's political system of managed race relations created an opening for African American political mobilization. The Virginia Voters League (VVL), in alliance with other African American political, civic, and social organizations, conducted voter education and poll-tax payment campaigns in order foster political efficacy among the state's disenfranchised black voters. The VVL met with mixed success, affected by past political mobilizations, the impact of NAACP mobilization, and local and statewide political competition between the state's main political machine and insurgents. The VVL campaign was successful in achieving short-term victories, including the election of a few African Americans to local office. By 1954, the VVL's internal weakness coupled with the emergence of “massive resistance” stymied further black electoral mobilization through politics and made protest a more viable option for achieving political and civil rights for black Virginians. By tracing the path from politics to protest, this article shows how a political developmental approach can be successfully used to develop a nuanced understanding of the emergence of the civil rights movement and Southern politics in the pre–Brown v. Board of Educationera.

In New Nation Movement NPC v President of the Republic of South Africa, the Constitutional Court declared parts of the Electoral Act 73 of 1998 unconstitutional in so far as the Act does not provide for independent candidates to stand for political office in the national and provincial legislatures. The court has given the National Assembly two years to redesign the electoral system. Given the constitutional and logistical constraints, the legislature will probably not be able to avoid a major electoral reform. It will be very hard to justify that voters may select a candidate of their choice only when such a candidate runs as an independent but not when a candidate elects to run on a party ticket. The best option would therefore be to introduce a mixed electoral system which combines constituency-based elections with proportional representation of political parties. To keep ballots manageable it would be appropriate to use other electoral design tools such as an entrance hurdle for political parties and deposits and/or nominations by registered voters supporting independent candidates as well. Such a reform might contribute to weed out candidates tainted by corruption because the capacity of political parties to shield them from the electorate in closed lists where the voters have no say about which candidates get elected will be constrained.

This article considers the extent to which the anti-globalisation movement might contribute to a revival of labour politics. The starting point is an awareness that the trade unions and the anti-globalists do not necessarily see eye to eye so that any assumption that they can readily join forces becomes problematical. Four fault lines are identified in relation to key areas of concern: i) political alternatives; ii) participatory democracy; iii) organic cohesion and inclusion; and iv) the renewal of activism. The article focuses on the case of France - regarded as something of an archetype of social movement unionism - and on its interface with the ETUC in the process of European integration. It is pointed out that while - in the view of the author - the anti-globalisation movement does indeed offer a potential source and impetus for a revitalisation of labour politics, this is no tame option but one requiring a carefully thought out strategy on the part of the trade unions and the social movements. The article concludes, accordingly, on a note of scepticism about the way in which the international trade union bodies have so far approached these issues, stressing the risk that the trade unions could find themselves between a rock and a hard place.

Why has the Islamic economy, as a model of socioeconomic development, gained traction as a viable option? The existing literature suggests that the Islamic economy has been popularized by a combination of factors, including anticolonial movements, a global renewal of religiosity, and the activities of new social strata who merge piety with capitalist orientations. These approaches, however, tend to homogenize social actors, subsuming them under the overarching label of Islamism. In contrast, this article employs the lens of “intra-hegemonic struggles” to identify three competing orientations of Islamism and their manifestation in the economy. Drawing on eighteen months of fieldwork in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, it argues that this contestation motivates diverse segments of the society to create and engage in the Islamic economy, rather than any single state-driven or identity-based movement. The article synthesizes three otherwise isolated bodies of work: the political sociology of articulation, new theories of Islamism, and the concept of imaginaries from economic sociology.

AbstractBridging the ways in which scholars have looked at the co-option of both gender and cultural rights through neoliberal governance in Latin America, this article will examine how gender has been utilised by the state as a discourse of governmentality in order to regulate indigenous subjects. Moreover, the article will explore how indigenous women activists in Mexico are creating apracticeof autonomy as a vital strategy to move beyond rights discourse and challenge the ways in which neoliberal states have selectively co-opted social movement demands. Through their grassroots forms of consultation, indigenous women activists shift the concept of autonomy as a right granted by the state to a practice of decolonisation that is part of everyday life and community sociality.

Brain drain is a global phenomenon and has always been so. It is a problem confronting and threatening development in Africa and other developing world regions. A study by Carrington and Detragiache concluded that there is an overall tendency for migration rates to be higher for highly educated individuals. Brain drain can therefore be seen as one of the more detrimental implications of organizational decline and crisis. Skilled migration, taking the form of brain drain and movements of professionals and job transfers, has become an important component of contemporary migration.3 Typically, in a historical context highly skilled migration involved the forced movement of professionals as a result of political conflicts, followed by the emergence of the “brain drain” in the 1960s. In the current situation highly skilled migration represents an increasingly large component of global migration streams.Common wisdom suggests that the migration of people with a high level of human capital is detrimental for the country of emigration. In other words, the loss of skilled human resources will ultimately have a grave effect on the economy and jeopardize development programs of the country experiencing brain drain, as the brain drain is a negative externality on the population left in the source country. However, as Mountford has shown, when educational decisions are endogenous and if successful emigration is not a certainty, a brain drain may increase the productivity of a developing country. There is also sufficient evidence to show that the migration of talent from the South to the North does not always mean that developing countries lose out.

First-generation Asian Americans are noted to be more involved in the politics back home than in the politics of the United States. The studies invested in analysing the causes for such attitudes have so far neglected examination of material interests that the recent immigrants might have in their homelands. This study analyses the politically active Telangana online community, which was involved in a struggle for separation. This article argues that the complex patterns of resistance and hegemonic co-option in the Telangana movement can be understood by situating the texts within the wider context of social and institutional practices both in the home and host societies. This article identifies five key frames with which to analyse the political engagement of the Telangana diaspora: identifying victims and enemies, asserting cultural difference, articulating relations with the host country and transnational actors, negotiating globalization, and conflicts over resources. The article concludes that critical scholarly engagement with the diaspora requires theorization that goes beyond the study of marginal voices in the public sphere and forges new connections between globalization, political processes, state and the media.

In the 1980s extra‐parliamentary social movements and critical theories of race, class, and gender added a new sociocultural understanding of justice—recognition— to the much older socioeconomic one. The best‐known form of the struggle for recognition is the identity politics of disadvantaged groups. I argue that there is still another option to conceptualize their predicament, neglected in recent political philosophy, which understands exclusion not in terms of injustice, more particularly a lack of sociocultural recognition, but in terms of a lack of freedom. I draw my inspiration from Hannah Arendt's model of political action. Arendt diagnoses exclusion not solely as a mode of injustice, but as a lack of participation and public freedom. Consequently, she advocates a struggle for participation, political equality, and freedom as a strategy for emancipation or empowerment. Arendt could help feminists see that collective empowerment is made possible not by a shared identity (the target of poststructuralist critics) but by common action in the service of a particular worldly issue or common end. In other words, feminists would do well to appreciate the revolutionary quality and heritage of the feminist movement better, that is, its character as a set of practices of freedom.

This article is devoted to the stream in political philosophy which came to be known as “luck egalitarianism”. Luck egalitarians are concerned with the questions of distributive justice; their main idea is that no person should be worse-off due to factors which they are unable to influence. Luck egalitarians express this idea via the dichotomy of brute and option luck. The goal of the article is to describe two main lines of critique which luck egalitarianism encounters, and to assess which one is the most dangerous for this movement. Some authors criticize luck egalitarianism from a moral standpoint. They believe that it is overly cruel towards those who suffer due to unfortunate but free choices, humiliating towards those whom it deems to be worthy of help, and that it contradicts our moral intuitions concerning the question of what do people who engage in socially necessary, yet risky professions, deserve. Another important problem for this trend of political thought has to do with metaphysical criticism. Luck egalitarians claim that a person is not responsible not only for the status of her family, her gender, ethnicity, etc., but also for her talents and abilities. The question arises; is there anything for what a person can be genuinely responsible for? Thus, luck egalitarianism encounters the problem of determinism and free will. This problem threatens the identity of luck egalitarianism: if free will does not exist or if it cannot be identified, then the key dichotomy of brute and option luck is meaningless. The article demonstrates that it is the criticism of the second kind which currently poses the greatest problem for luck egalitarianism.

The article deals with ethnic and religious problems of modern Yemen. Based on the analysis of the main barriers between Yemeni societies, the author assesses the political and economic basis of separatist tendencies in the country. In the prospective part of the article the author examines the possible development of disintegration tendencies in the country. The Republic of Yemen is noted for severity and variety of domestic political, sectarian, clan challenges that still manages to soften, but are capable to split the country and lead to the establishment on its territory of the new states in the near future. Despite the fact that the change in top state leadership in Yemen after the "Arab Spring" was held on the softer model compared with Libya or Syria scenario, the transition period is not crowned with the stabilization of the political and economic situation and the onset of systemic reform. The most favorable scenario - the successful completion of a conference on National dialogue involving the main political parties and movements. This is not an easy task, given the negative attitude to this idea of the South Peace Movement and the Movement of al-Husi who are deeply involved in the conflict. Maintaining the status quo - the continuation of the armed conflict in Yemen and growth of base for international terrorism. The negative scenario - the territorial disintegration of the country. In this case, the possible are establishment of two states - South Yemen and North Yemen, as well as creation of an independent state in northern border areas adjacent to Saudi Arabia. The vast majority of the southern Yemeni officials until recently argued for its separation. Decentralization on the basis of the federal state. Separatist tendencies are gaining strength, but as a compromise the creation of a federal state should be considered. The implementation of this option is only possible as a result of peaceful national reconciliation, as well as with external support.

Starting from Richard Feynman’s ideas on the meaning of it all and the notions of enthalpy and entropy, this paper discusses the question of an identity negative construction – an unweaving and unsaying of the self – in the works of poet Robert Duncan and his life-companion, the Chemistry graduate, and painter, Jess (Collins). In a political and sexual poetics, both artists deal with the violence of language in the construction of a model of representation that has no option but to confront the hegemonic discourse (as a way of struggling “with forms to liberate Form”, as Duncan would put it). Both artists deal with the catching of light (beauty/knowledge/wisdom) in the darkness, catching the fragments of a Whole (be it nation, community, love, or the Cosmos itself) that is permanently unreachable, and, yet, they know they are participating in its movement, in “It”. Their joint project of a grand collage composes a radical consciousness of alterity and performativity that takes a metonymic all-inclusive language as a democratic construction of the real.

Although the philosophy (as well as the whole movement) of Enlightenment was born in the Netherlands and England in the late 17th and early 18th century, there were considerable problems in defying the freedom. By the mid 18th century, under the influence of ?national mercantilism? (Max Weber), the freedom was perceived in more and more collective terms, giving bith to the political option of national liberalism. That is why in the second half of 18th century this two countries have been progresively loosing importance for the movement of Enlightenment and two new countries emerged at its leading position, striving for democratic liberalism: United States of America and France. However, individual freedom faced not one, but two dangers during its philosophical and institutional development in the Age of Enlightenment: on the one hand, the danger of wanishing in the national freedom, and, on the other hand, the danger of becoming unbound and (self)destructive. The emerging (national) liberalism in England in the 18th century witnessed the first danger, while the second danger appeared in the wake of the Franch revolution. The French were the first in the Modern epohe to realise that the light of freedom is to powerful to be used without considerable precaussions in the establishement of liberal civil society. Therefore, some moderation hat to be taken into consideration. The idea of humanity, i.e. human rights, was at the end found as most helpful in solving the task of preserving individual freedom, without sacrifying social bonds between free individuals.

The paper aims to present the political aspect of the Republican opposition to the succession to the throne between 1791 and 1793, an uneasy period for the politically divided Polish Republicans. The main focus of the paper is on the political aspects of selected examples that illustrate the dilemmas and contradicting ideas of the Republican thought towards the end of the Republican movement, represented by Polish gentry. The pro-constitutional option adopted by the former opponents of the succession is illustrated by the most famous statements declared by its ardent supporters: Adam Wawrzyniec Rzewuski and Wojciech Turski. Their writings confirm that the earlier criticism of the succession they showed, had not determined the later criticism of the Constitution, although they still a much more serious task, having to justify and explain their former attitudes and motives that governed their earlier actions. As it can be seen, public support of the Constitution did not necessarily demand changing one’s opinions completely, or, in particular, it did not mean that all elements of the former rhetoric had to be abandoned. Later in the paper, two other opposing views are presented, one of Leonard Olizar and one of Szczêsny Potocki. Both were articulated after the victory of the Targowica Confederation, but still before the unexpected second partition. Those opinions, although critical in general, are not void of elements suggesting other concerns and political dilemmas their authors and other Republicans shared in the face of the dramatic developments in Poland.

An enjoyable overview of the world of pop, rock and politics in Beijing, accessible for students of Chinese culture and popular music studies. This is an area that has been exceptionally well covered in the literature, and Baranovitch's claim to originality lies mainly in his focus on ethnicity and gender. The overview of the development of pop from 1978–97 does a useful job of drawing together the various strands, though most of this is very familiar from the writings of Geremie Barmé, Andrew Jones et al. We begin with the introduction of Gangtai (Hong Kong and Taiwan pop) to the mainland, led by Deng Lijun whose ‘coquettish nasal slides,’ Baranovitch rightly suggests, were more truly subversive in China in 1978 than any of the subsequent rock and punk styles. Baranovitch chronicles the rise of the xibeifeng, the Shaanbei folk-infused rock style, linking it into the xungun roots movement and Tiananmen. An interesting section on qiuge or ‘prison songs,’ popular in 1988, explores somewhat less well-known territory. We follow the rise of the commercial, the karaoke craze and Mao fever, and the co-option of at least some of the rebellious rockers by the state. Baranovitch enthusiastically reveals the significance of music in the political arena, and its ability to prefigure, even shape the political.

Over the past 15 years, land reform has returned from the “dustbin of history” to serve again as a viable policy option. Much has been written about its resurgence, with the research tending to focus narrowly on the role of prices, policies, and politics in shaping the design and outcome of distribution. While these are necessary elements to understand, their reification neglects the critical element of process. Land reform programs are implemented by an array of government actors and negotiated on the ground by beneficiaries, social movement activists, large farmers, and the general public. A messy assemblage of actors and interests shapes both the design and the outcome of distribution. Qualitative analysis of the federal agency in charge of land reform in Brazil, the Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária (National Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform—INCRA), reveals that, in the context of increased citizen participation and reduced funding, the agency must work together with social movement activists to perform its task. The analysis suggests that the study of state-society relations today requires a new vocabulary that highlights substance and process rather than form.Nos últimos 15 anos, a reforma agrária foi resgatada do arquivo histórico para servir como opção políticamente viável. Muito se tem escrito sobre essa restauração. Pesquisas têm concentrado atenção no papel de preços, legislação e política no desenho e resultado da distribuição. Ainda que seja necessário entender esses elementos, sua ratificação ignora os elementos críticos do processo. Programas de reforma agrária são implementados por uma variedade de atores governamentais e negociados por beneficiários, ativistas de movimentos sociais, grandes agricultores e pelo público em geral. Um mosaico desengonçado de atores e interesses dão forma tanto ao desenho quanto ao resultado da distribuição. Análise qualitativa da agência federal responsável pela reforma agrária no Brasil, o Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária (INCRA), revela que, no contexto de maior participação de cidadãos e de recursos reduzidos, é importante que a agência atue coordenadamente com ativistas de movimentos sociais para desempenhar seu papel. A análise sugere que o estudo das relações entre sociedade e Estado hoje exige um novo vocabulário que acentue mais a importância de substância e processo do que da forma.

Não se compreende Medellín 1968 sem o Concílio Vaticano II 1962-1965, nem esse último sem se referir à história precedente do cristianismo. Medellín 1968 tem, por conseguinte, uma dimensão de séculos. Quando regressamos para tempos muito remotos e contemplamos a tradição cristã em termos de milênios, percebemos que há, desde os inícios, um movimento em direção à constituição de uma Igreja “autocentrada” (como diria o Papa Francisco), ou seja, ao abandono de temas sociais. Isso já se percebe no primeiro grande conflito do emergente movimento de Jesus, em torno da figura de Marcião, na Roma do século II. Ao longo dos séculos, a questão social inquieta os cristãos, mas, mesmo assim, uma Igreja resolutamente “em saída” encontra sempre resistências, principalmente por parte de uma espiritualidade desligada de questões que agitam a vida humana fora dos recintos sagrados. É nesse ponto preciso que Medellín 1968 constitui uma resoluta tomada de posição quando faz uma “opção pelo pobre”. Configura um momento que não só é fundamental para as Igrejas cristãs no continente latino-americano, mas, também e talvez principalmente, para a sociedade humana em geral, acima de clausuras religiosas, confessionais, culturais e políticas.Abstract: Medellin 1968 cannot be understood without the 19621965 Vatican Council II. Neither can the latter be understood without referring to the previous history of Christianity. Medellin 1968 has, therefore, a dimension of centuries. When we look back at very remote periods and contemplate the Christian tradition in terms of millennia, we realize that there is, from the very beginning, a movement towards the constitution of a “self-centred” Church (as Pope Francisco would say), that is to say, a disregard for social themes. This is already noticeable in the first great conflict of Jesus’ emerging movement, around the figure of Marcion, in the Rome of the second century. Throughout the centuries, the social issue worries the Christians, but, in spite of this, a Church decidedly “on the way out” always finds opposition, particularly from a spirituality disconnected from the issues that stir human life outside the sacred precincts. It is at this precise point that Medellin 1968 constitutes a resolute taking of a stand when it makes an “option for the poor”. It becomes a moment that it is not only fundamental for the Christian Churches in the Latin-American continent, but also, and maybe mostly, for human society as a whole, above the religious, confessional, cultural and political enclosures.Keywords: Church and society; Conference of Medellín; Option for the poor.

The coronavirus pandemic has, since its outbreak in late 2019, not only caused a global health care crisis but has also had a negative impact on the exercise of social, economic, cultural and political rights. Vulnerable and marginalised groups in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania are among the worst affected. To respond to the crisis, the three East African countries imposed several measures aimed at curtailing the spread of the disease, which included a mandatory 14 days of self-quarantine for persons arriving from abroad; the closure of borders, religious and educational institutions; the suspension of international and domestic flights; the suspension of public court proceedings and gatherings; the imposition of a dusk to dawn curfew; and the restriction of people’s movement in certain areas. All these measures in one way or another affect the exercise of fundamental human rights. In the past few months, the number of reported cases of human rights violations has been escalating. This article seeks to highlight the three states’ practice of avoiding the ‘naming, shaming and prosecuting’ of perpetrators of human rights violations during the coronavirus pandemic. It also exposes instances of human rights violations in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania during the pandemic. In addition, the paper proposes measures to be undertaken to intensify legal protection against human rights violations during the coronavirus pandemic. Finally, the paper explores the elusive option of making the top state officials legally accountable for individual human rights violations.

The contemporary Armenian diaspora is spread throughout the world, with its core composed of descendants of the survivors of the atrocities carried out by the Turkish authorities during the decline of the Ottoman Empire (1881-1922). The majority of this established diaspora hails from what was once western Armenia and is now eastern Turkey, in contrast to the newest wave of Armenian economic migrants, who come from portions of eastern historical Armenia ruled by the czarist and then Soviet empires and who left following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Unlike the new migrants, the older diasporans have to negotiate the gap between a mythical homeland and an actual “step-homeland” in the shape of the present Republic of Armenia. This background goes some way to explain why there was been very little “return” migration to Armenia by diasporans. Nonetheless, a very small number of diasporans have actually taken up the option of “return” in the sense of relocating to Armenia. I have termed this trend a particular kind of “sojourning,” located in the conceptual space in between migrant and visitor. The concept of sojourn reflects the increased mobility and flexibility of both the theory and practice of diaspora, challenging the traditional triadic framework of homeland diaspora-host state through which diasporas have been approached. This article plots the evolving and complex relationship of diaspora and “homeland” on the ground, specifically through the experiences of diasporans who have made the move to live in Armenia for varying periods of time. It analyzes and articulates the experiences of these individuals and views them as a counter-community that re-imagines and expands the “homeland” while embodying the transnational. This movement represents identity shaping from below, which does not subvert state categories of belonging (and in fact can reinforce them) but transgresses and expands the boundaries of these categories in practice and in the imagining of the “transnation.”

Yazın ve sanat ürünlerinin, yaratıldığı dönemde yaşanan politik, toplumsal ve ekonomik koşullardan etkilendiği yadsınamaz bir gerçektir. Amerika’da, 1930’lu yılların ekonomik dengesizlikleri, kıtlık ve sınıf ayırımı gibi ‘Büyük Bunalım’ (Great Depression) yıllarının olumsuz etkileri, Nazizm ve ırk ayırımı gibi sorunlar, II. Dünya Savaşı’nın doğum sancıları ve bunlara bağlı olarak toplumun değer yargılarında yaşanan radikal değişimler, dönemin özellikle genç kuşak yazar, sanatçı ve aydınlarını sistemin sorgulanması/değişmesi yönünde belirli bir politik seçenek arayışına yönlendirir. Amerika’da ortaya çıkan genç kuşak yazarlar sisteme karşı toplumsal eleştiri ve yeni bir politik hareket düşüncesinde birleşirler. Bu yazarlar arasında Clifford Odets’in yapıtları yaşadığı dönemin politik, tarihsel ve kültürel yapısını en çarpıcı biçimde yansıtmaktadır (Beşe 143-158). 1935’te yazdığı, Waiting for Lefty, Awake and Sing!, Till the Day I Die, Paradise Lost ve tek perdelik I Can’t Sleep adlı ilk oyunlarıyla başlayan çıkışı, Odets’i bir anda Amerikan tiyatrosunun merkezine taşır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, döneminin önemli yazarı olarak Clifford Odets’in toplumsal eleştiri açısından önemine işaret etmektir.Abstract in English The Social Criticism and Clifford Odets in The 1930s American TheaterLiterary and art products are influenced by the political, social and economic conditions of the time they were created. The Great Depression of the 1930s in America and its negative effects such as the economic imbalances, famine and class distinction as well as problems such as Nazism and racial discrimination in the eve of the World War II and the resultant decline in the value judgments of the society lead especially young generation writers to search for a radical changes and a new political option in terms of the system. In other words, these young generation writers unite in the idea of social criticism and a new political movement against the system. Among these writers, Clifford Odets' works reflect the political, historical and cultural structure of his time in a most striking way (Beşe 143-158). His first plays written in 1935, Waiting for Lefty, Awake and Sing! Till the Day I Die, Paradise Lost and a one act, I Can’t Sleep carry Odets to the center of American theatre. The aim of this study is to point out the importance of Clifford Odets in terms of social criticism.

The purpose of this article is to analyse relationships of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Latvia (ELCL) with the Church of England during Gustavs Tūrs’ time as archbishop. Special attention is given to his visit to U.K. in 1955 as a member of the delegation of Soviet clergy. These contacts are placed in various contexts – theological, socio-political, personal relationships. “Voices” from various sources are placed face to face and confronted with each other. The author has explored materials previously unused in scientific circulation in Latvia – the archive files stored at the Lambeth Palace Library (London). Contacts between the two churches is a continuation of relationships maintained before the Second World War. Delegations of the Lutheran Churches in Estonia and in Latvia had meetings with representatives of the Church of England in 1936 and in 1938. These negotiations resulted in agreement on intercommunion that because of the war was never ratified but respected by the involved parties. The first years after Stalin’s death was a “thaw”, when repression and censorship in the Soviet Union was relaxed. The renewed interest of Soviet leadership in using religious organizations for Soviet foreign politics was used by churches to further their own aims. They tried to reap additional benefits from the Soviet-inspired “parade ecumenism” – theological studies abroad, exchange visits, etc. However, it was not achieved without compromises. Here pops up a theme of collaborationism, which still is sensitive in post-Soviet countries. It may seem easy to evaluate this phenomenon from today’s perspective, whereas for people having no hope that situation would change in their lifetime, adjusting to the political realities was the only option they had. Of course, the question remains what kind of concessions they made to the Soviet system. Contacts between the churches in U.K. and Latvia helped to exchange information; they paved the way to membership in international organizations like the World Lutheran Federation. For Anglicans, the main emphasis during the visit of the delegation of Soviet clergy in 1955 was on Orthodox-Anglican relationships. It is related to the fact that the High-Church movement at that time was at its zenith of influence in the Church of England. The attitude of the Latvian Lutheran Church in diaspora was negative, because it did not recognize ELCL as legitimate, nevertheless, this attitude was not consistent, because the leadership of diaspora church simultaneously tried to maintain personal contacts with the colleagues in Latvia.

The research has been tackled about the emerging democratic political process in Iraq since 2003 , especially it has not received much attention from specialists in political, social and legal reform. So the Iraq’s situation has been subjected to various successive crises which matched with too much differences as well as the continuation of the administration of governance in accordance with the theory of power-sharing between the three presidencies, had brought it to all positions by the responsibility which witnessed a big suspicions; because of the political corruption in both administrative and financial sides .The invitations for procuring the comprehensive reform and empowerment within democracy needed to be the latest phenomena as a part of the policy that declined in previous period, which took place the democratic political process until we found it unable to renew itself and revive its contents from inside owing to the condition of the reliance on the consensus and political quotas by their sectarian, national, ethnic components in the political society . Furthermore , the process of re-revision in order to implement the reform and empowerment in democracy’s process became an urgent need to re - model the experience with a real and effective measures for the experience that can overcome the past and present to looking forward the future, and among these requirements and needs of several trying to be consistent with them according to the requirements of this stage in light of the trend to assess the overall political situation , and others to achieve a specific comprehensive review that does not harm the democratic political process consequently . So that , every country couldn’t get into the political reform without a hierarchical way to re-build the condition of democratic empowerment , although the power-holders make the right choices to secure their presence in the authority by ensuring their electoral supremacy in the democratic political process constitutionally and legally alike .The rules of participatory democratic political action; and the continuation of formal political reforms are considered a cause of crisis with the option of stumbling path reform in the final outcome and this does not serve the whole political experience in Iraq . In spite of the effectiveness of the Iraqi society, which is characterized by effective social mobility and even political at the popular levels, especially in the levels of The middle class itself and others, which began to do so in general, by stimulating the choice between the alternatives offered , to overcome this general problems by the political reform movement that is going on at the level of the ruling political class (National settlement options) or so – called The National Historic distressed under a state of political stagnation which suffered by the most of the partisan forces that relied just on their method visions . That change does not happen on its own, but through the behavior of individuals and their actions that based on the condition of a admixture between the theory of change and actual practice overlapping ultimately the incentives , to move effectively toward the transition into the best , and between the various structural factors contribute to the conditions of overall revision , which requires attaching aspirations to fulfillment action through reformist movements and to rebuild the national peace , stable and continuous pattern of change that starts from the bottom up to the top and not vice versa. Because the recent (reverse) reform structure may lead to abrupt and unexpected results as well as the state of decline in the institutional structure of society . Finally, The previous scenes we found were working in accordance with the current consensuses and alliances based on the profits and rewards, by exercising the authority without relying on the legitimacy of achievement and containment the whole components together. So in the next stage will be confronted a full of crises and with new challenges, which will undoubtedly be affected by failures of traditional parties or otherwise as long as they are part of the democratic political process, because the previous election experiences could not break the barriers and penetrate the equations of the reality within the current political assumptions, So that the limits of the authority itself would not have willing to seek the mission of rebuilding the nation-state or re-building into maintain its existence in a stable, orderly and balanced systematically , despite of the attempts of some leaders and renewal (senior) leaders to move somewhat away from the symbolic model of leadership and management alike . All of that , it depends on the quality of reform and review to accomplish the empowerment in political democracy , and to overcome all the differences among political governing elites presently and for the future , by procuring an active democratic process consequently .

Purpose This paper aims to analyze whether the domestic policy reforms in India would suffice, or there is a need to conform to stricter international standards as well. The paper is arranged along the following lines. First, the paper offers a brief review of the cooperation in the field of harmonization of vehicle regulations which is provided by the so-called WP.29 Forum. Second, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) standards and their membership along with Indian participation in the forum are presented. Third, reforms in India through the “Make in India” (MII) initiative and its trade in the auto-component segment are analyzed. Fourth, the possible non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on imports of auto-components in select partner countries is computed and presented. Fifth, the penetration pattern of partner countries in India’s automotive sector export value chain is analyzed. Finally, based on the observations, key policy conclusions are drawn both from global and Indian perspectives. Design/methodology/approach This paper blends expertise in law and economics and enables readers to have a finer understanding of the automotive sector which is one of the most internationalized product groups in world trade, characterized by not only cross-border movement of final products, but also of intermediate products like auto-parts and components as well as major global investment and relocation decisions. This paper focuses on India for four crucial reasons, which makes India both a key player (and potential disruptor) at global level and the rather complex approach chosen by the country vis-a-vis many regulations (including UNECE and WTO), reflecting its tendency to rely on domestic consolidation through measures such as the 2014 MII initiative. Findings The data analysis in the current paper indicates that after conforming to the UNECE 1998 standard, India’s relative trade with these countries has increased both in terms of auto-components and automobile products. Moreover, the value contribution from these partner countries in India’s exports is rising. On the other hand, the relative share of the UNECE 1958 countries in India’s trade basket has declined and a mixed trend is noticed for the common contracting parties (CPs). In addition, the share of the countries without accession to any of the UNECE agreements in India’s trade has shown an upward trend. The observation indicates that the divergence in automotive product standards might crucially influence India’s trade flows. It seems that in the short run, an orientation for exporting to UNECE 1998 partners and non-members emerges as a dominant strategy, underlining a specialization in medium-quality segment. Nevertheless, the long-term robustness of such a move deserves closer analysis, particularly by focusing on whether India may need to join the UNECE 1958 agreement to sustain its export growth. Before joining UNECE 1998, the sector has enjoyed protection through high tariff barriers. Given the differing perspective on opening-up, automobile sector earlier emerged as an obstacle in conclusion of EU–India Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA), which is being negotiated since 2007. However, after entry into an regional trade agreement (RTA), tariff preference in itself may not provide a country the requisite market access. The recent standard-setting exercises in ASEAN, a group with which India is deepening trade integration since 2010, may be considered as a case in point. Research limitations/implications The analysis so far indicates that absence of participation in UNECE 1958 standard may restrict future options for India. Presently, Indian vehicle exports are reaching UNECE 1998 member countries (e.g., Ford India sending Ecosport to USA). It is also directed towards African and Latin American countries, presently not part of any agreement. However, the ASEAN countries, currently partnering India through free trade agreement (FTA), are increasingly moving towards UNECE 1958 standards. India’s sectoral trade surplus with ASEAN countries over 2009-2013 to 2014-2018 has declined from US$548.44mn to US$529.53mn, respectively. The potential challenges in reaching ASEAN and other UNECE 1958 member countries, in turn, may influence the relocation decisions of global auto majors in India, defeating the core purpose of MII initiative. Practical implications Given the scenario, a number of policy choices for India emerge. First, joining UNECE 1958 may not be a short-run option for India, but after evaluating the evolving trade pattern, in the long run, the country may consider adopting certain core 1958 standards, in line with its economic interests. Such a move may facilitate greater export flows from India to UNECE 1958 countries. The experience of Indonesia and Vietnam, who have conformed to select UNECE 1958 standards in spite of not being formally part of any agreement, deserves mention in this regard. Second, it is observed that India’s trade balance (TB) is not improving for several Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) member countries, in spite of obtaining tariff preferences through an existing trade bloc. Part of the poor performance has been explained by Indian exporters often using the most favoured nation route rather than the preferential route, to avoid the associated compliance-related complexities. The standards and mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) conformance provisions in ASEAN–India FTA are also found to be weaker vis-à-vis the comparable provisions for other ASEAN-centric bilateral RTAs with other RCEP members. This underlines the need for both rules of origin (ROO) reforms and agreement on MRAs, which may enhance the trade potential in general and in automotive sector in particular. In the short run, India should therefore attempt to enhance exports to the UNECE 1998 members and CPs, given the commonality in standards. However, in the long run, there is a need to explore harmonization with certain core 1958 standards, to promote exports in general and even within its RTAs in particular. Originality/value The automotive sector is one of the most internationalized product groups in world trade. It is known that harmonization of product standards with partner countries can facilitate bilateral trade flows. Presently, three agreements exist for harmonization of automotive standards relating to passenger and vehicle safety under the aegis of UNECE – UNECE 1958, UNECE 1997 and UNECE 1998. Through a series of reforms and launch of the MII initiative in 2014, India has deepened its presence in world automotive sector trade and aspires to play a bigger role in coming days. Moreover, India is a WTO member and has joined the UNECE 1998 standard in 2006, which means that several important conventions regulate and bind the country. The current paper intends to analyze whether the domestic policy reforms in India would suffice in promoting the exports from this sector, or there is a need to conform to stricter international standards. The data analysis reveals that India’s relative trade orientation is deepening towards the UNECE 1998 members and countries not part of any UNECE agreements. On the other hand, the relative trade share of the UNECE 1958 countries in India’s trade basket has declined and a mixed trend is noticed for the common CPs. The analysis indicates that the divergence in automotive product standards might crucially influence India’s trade flows in general and participation in international production networks in particular. The paper argues that in the long run, India needs to consider adherence to certain UNECE 1958 standards as well as speeding up the pending domestic reforms.

Following the publication of Luther’s theses on 31 October 1517, the Diet of Worms was the next fundamental step in the reform movement of the 16th-century European Christianity. In the “Holy Roman Empire,” the way was opened for further religious and new institutional development in the previously unified church, culminating in the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, which granted individual rulers of political units in the country, princes, prince-bishops etc. the right to decide on the religion of their Catholic and Lutheran subjects. The immediate cause of “Worms 1521” and the consequent “Edict of Worms” were two papal bulls addressed to Luther. The first, Exsurge Domine from 1520, threatened him with excommunication unless he recanted almost one half of the theses published in 1517. Luther responded by proclaiming the pope the Antichrist, although he had until then somewhat avoided criticising him, and publicly burned the bull in December of the same year. Exsurge Domine was followed in January 1521 by the bull Decet Romanum Pontificem excommunicating Luther, which also meant death sentence and exile from the state. According to the established doctrine and practice the execution of the sentence would follow automatically. This doctrine was rejected by Frederick the Wise, Elector of Saxony, who was not convinced by the arguments about Luther’s “heresy” and demanded judgement by domestic experts and authorities. He had his University of Wittenberg in mind, which firmly defended Luther’s views. Frederick the Wise reached the agreement with Emperor Charles that “the case of Luther” would be discussed at the Diet, and that Luther was guaranteed safe arrival in Worms and return to Wittenberg. Luther appeared before the Diet on April 17 and 18. The party representing Luther’s conviction gave him only the option of renouncing the convicted theses, which is why he requested more time for reconsideration and was granted the emperor’s personal permission. The next day, on April 18, Luther performed brilliantly, to which the emperor personally responded on April 19. Thus, Emperor Charles and the monk Luther literally stood opposite each other at the Diet, in front of the highest representatives of the state, which was previously completely unimaginable. Both presented their religious perceptions and understandings, referring to their own conscience. They were in a very unequal position not only as emperor and monk; it was a much more sensitive matter, since the emperor was religiously “free” while Luther was a validly convicted and excommunicated “heretic”. The case of Luther at the Diet was far from solely religious in nature, but rather a reflection of the broader socio-religious situation at the turning point in history. The conflict culminated in the contradictions between “cultural” Rome and barbaric “Germanism”, as perfectly illustrated by the correspondence of the papal nuncio, Girolamo Aleandro the elder. The great understanding for Luther’s resistance to Rome was supported at the Diet by decades-old German complaints (gravamina) debated at Diets, which were not taken seriously in Rome. The most notable figures in the case of Luther (causa Lutheri) at the Diet were: Martin Luther, Emperor Charles V, Elector of Saxony Frederick the Wise, and the papal nuncio Girolamo Aleandro the elder. Although at the end of the Diet each of them was “victorious” in one way or another, the actual winner was Martin Luther, who achieved unprecedented success only by appearing before the Diet, not renouncing the convicted theses and being able to return to Wittenberg under the emperor’s protection. It is true that he published his fundamental reform writings as early as 1520, but the door for the Reformation has only now opened. After Luther was “abducted” on his way back, he undertook the translation of the Bible into German, which became the only recognized religious basis, and he incorporated his theology into the translation. He used his native, German language to communicate the faith. This was already demonstrated at the Diet, where he spoke first in German and only then in Latin for those who did not understand German, e.g. the emperor and the papal nuncio Aleandro. Pamphlets (Flugschriften) handed out in the streets also reported about the events at the Diet in German. At first glance, the conclusion of the Diet was not favorable for Luther. The Edict of Worms, dated May 8 and signed by the emperor on May 26, as an act of the emperor and not as a resolution of the Diet, legitimized Luther’s conviction. The edict was drafted by the nuncio Aleandro, and partly also by Peter Bonomo, later Trubar’s teacher. However, the edict did not have fatal consequences for Luther, because the emperor did not send it to the province of Saxony; consequently Frederick, Elector of Saxony, did not have to declare it, so the edict did not apply where the “heretic” lived. This, in turn, enabled Luther to continue working as both a religious reformer and a university professor at the University of Wittenberg, which became a central institution for the education of Lutheran reformers.

Perfect vision for the path ahead? As I write this editorial it seems that once again, we stand on the threshold of yet another significant date. The fortieth anniversary of ISCPES and also that of this journal, that has been the voice of the society’s contribution over that period, has been and gone. This time it is 2020 that looms on the near horizon. It is a date that has long been synonymous with perfect vision. Many may perhaps see this as somewhat ironic, given the themes surrounding change and the directions it has taken, that have been addressed previously in these pages. Perfect vision and the clarity it can bring seem a far cry away from the turbulent world to which we seem to be becoming accustomed. So many of the divisions that we are facing today seem to be internal in nature and far different from the largely: nation against nation; system against system strife, we can remember from the cold war era. The US, for example, seems to be a nation perpetually at war with itself. Democrats v Republicans, deplorables v elites - however you want to label the warring sides - we can construct a number of divisions which seem to put 50% of Americans implacably opposed to the other 50%. In the UK, it has been the divide around the referendum to leave the European Union – the so-called Brexit debate. Nationally the division was 52% to 48% in favour of leaving. Yet the data can be reanalysed in, it seems, countless ways to show the splits within a supposedly ‘United’ Kingdom. Scotland v England, London and the South East v the English regions, young v old are just some of the examples. Similar splits seem to be increasing within many societies. Hong Kong has recently been the focus of world interest We have watched this erstwhile model of an apparently successful and dynamic compromise between two ‘diverse’ systems, appear to tear itself apart on our television screens. Iran, Brazil, Venezuela are just three further examples of longstanding national communities where internal divisions have bubbled to the surface in recent times. These internal divisions frequently have no simple and single fault line. In bygone times, social class, poverty, religion and ethnicity were simple universal indicators of division. Today ways of dividing people have become far more complex and often multi-dimensional. Social media has become a means to amplify and repeat messages that have originated from those who have a ‘gripe’ based in identity politics or who wish to signal to all and sundry how extremely ‘virtuous’ and progressive they are. The new technologies have proved effective for the distribution of information but remarkably unsuccessful in the promotion of communication. This has been exemplified by the emergence and exploitation of Greta Thunberg a sixteen-year-old from Sweden as a spokesperson for the ‘Extinction Rebellion’ climate change lobby. It is a movement that has consciously eschewed debate and discussion in favour of action. Consequently, by excluding learning from its operation, it is cutting itself off from the possibility of finding out what beneficial change will look like and therefore finding a way by which to achieve it. Put simply, it has predetermined its desired goal and defined the problem in inflexible terms. It has ignored a basic tenet of effective problem solving, namely that the key lies in the way you actually frame the problem. Unfortunately, the movement has adopted the polarised labelling strategies that place all humans into the category of either ‘believers’ or ‘deniers’. This fails to acknowledge and deal with the depth and complexity of the problem and the range of our possible responses to it. We are all the losers when problems, particularly given their potential significance, become addressed in such a way. How and where can human behaviour learn to rise above the limits of the processes we see being followed all around us? If leadership is to come, it must surely come from and through a process of education. All of us must assume some responsibility here – and certainly not abdicate it to elite and powerful groups. In other words, we all have a moral duty to educate ourselves to the best of our ability. An important part of the process we follow should be to remain sceptical of the limits of human knowledge. In addition, we need to be committed to applying tests of truth and integrity to the information we access and manage. This is why we form and support learned societies such as ISCPES. Their duty is to test, debate and promote ideas and concepts so that truth and understanding might emerge from sharing and exploring information, while at the same time applying the criteria developed by the wisdom and experience of those who have gone before. And so, we come to the processes of change and disruption as we are currently experiencing them at International Sports Studies. Throughout our history we have followed the traditional model of a scholarly journal. That is, our reason for existence is to provide a scholarly forum for colleagues who wish to contribute to and develop understanding within the professional and academic field of Comparative Physical Education and Sport. As the means of doing this, we encourage academics and professionals in our field to submit articles which are blind reviewed by experts. They then advise the editor on their quality and suitability for publication. As part of our responsibility we particularly encourage qualified authors from non-English speaking backgrounds to publish with us, as a means of providing a truly international forum for ideas and development. Where possible the editorial team works with contributors to assist them with this process. We have now taken a step further by publishing the abstracts in Portuguese, Spanish and Chinese on the website, in order to spread the work of our contributors more widely. Consistent with international changes in labelling and focus over the years, the title of the society’s journal was changed from the Journal of Comparative Physical Education and Sport to International Sports Studies in 1989. However, our aim has remained to advance understanding and communication between members of the global community who share a professional, personal or scholarly interest in the state and development of physical education and sport around the world. In line with the traditional model, the services of our editorial and reviewing teams are provided ex gratia and the costs of publication are met by reader and library subscriptions. We have always offered a traditional printed version but have, in recent years, developed an online version - also as a subscription. Over the last few years we have moved to online editorial support. From 2020 will be adopting the practice of making articles available online immediately following their acceptance. This will reduce the wait time experienced by authors in their work becoming generally available to the academic community. Readers will no doubt be aware of the current and recent turbulence within academic publishing generally. There has been a massive increase in the university sector globally. As a result, there has been an increasing number of academics who both want to and need to publish, for the sake of advancement in their careers. A number of organisations have seen this as providing a business opportunity. Consequently, many academics now receive daily emails soliciting their contributions to various journals and books. University libraries are finding their budgets stretched and while they have been, up until now, the major funders of scholarly journals through their subscriptions, they have been forced to limit their lists and become much more selective in their choices. For these reasons, open access has provided a different and attractive funding model. In this model, the costs of publication are effectively transferred to the authors rather than the readers. This works well for those authors who may have the financial support to pursue this option, as well as for readers. However, it does raise a question as to the processes of quality control. The question arises because when the writer becomes the paying customer in the transaction, then the interests of the merchant (the publisher) can become more aligned to ensuring the author gets published rather than guaranteeing the reader some degree of quality control over the product they are receiving. A further confounding factor in the scenario we face, is the issue of how quality is judged. Universities have today become businesses and are being run with philosophies similar to those of any business in the commercial world. Thus, they have ‘bought into’ a series of key performance indicators which are used to compare institutions one with another. These are then added up together to produce summative scores by which universities can be compared and ranked. There are those of us that believe that such a process belittles and diminishes the institutions and the role they play in our societies. Nonetheless it has become a game with which the majority appear to have fallen in line, seeing it as a necessary part of the need to market themselves. As a result, very many institutions now pay their chief executives (formerly Vice-Chancellors) very highly, in order to for them to optimise the chosen metrics. It is a similar process of course with academic journals. So it is, that various measures are used to categorise and rank journals and provide some simplistic measure of ‘quality’. Certain fields and methodologies are inherently privileged in these processes, for example the medical and natural sciences. As far as we are concerned, we address a very significant element in our society – physical education and sport - and we address it from a critical but eclectic perspective. We believe that this provides a significant service to our global community. However, we need to be realistic in acknowledging the limited and restricted nature of that community. Sport Science has become dominated by physiology, data analytics, injury and rehabilitation. Courses and staff studying the phenomenon of sport and physical education through the humanities and social sciences, seem to be rarer and rarer. This is to the great detriment of the wellbeing and development of the phenomenon itself. We would like to believe that we can make an important difference in this space. So how do we address the question of quality? Primarily through following our advertised processes and the integrity and competence of those involved. We believe in these and will stick with them. However, we appreciate that burying our heads in the sand and remaining ‘king of the dinosaurs’ does not provide a viable way forward. Therefore, in our search for continuing strategy and clear vision in 2020, we will be exploring ways of signalling our quality better, while at the same time remaining true to our principles and beliefs. In conclusion we are advising you, as our readers, that changes may be expected as we, of necessity, adapt to our changing environment while seeking sustainability. Exactly what they will be, we are not certain at the time of going to press. We believe that there is a place, even a demand for our contribution and we are committed to both maintaining its standard and improving its accessibility. Comments and advice from within and outside of our community are welcome and we remain appreciative, as always, of the immense contribution of our international review board members and our supportive and innovative publisher. So, to the contributors to our current volume. Once again, we would point with some pride to the range of articles and topics provided. Together, they provide an interesting and relevant overview of some pertinent current issues in sport and physical education, addressed from the perspectives of different areas across the globe. Firstly, Pill and Agnew provide an update to current pedagogical practices in physical education and sport, through their scoping review of findings related to the use of small-sided games in teaching and coaching. They provide an overview of the empirical research, available between 2006 and 2016, and conclude that the strategy provides a useful means of achieving a number of specific objectives. From Belgium, Van Gestel explores the recent development of elite Thai boxing in that country. He draws on Elias’ (1986) notion of ‘sportization’ which describes the processes by which various play like activities have become transformed into modern sport. Thai boxing provides an interesting example as one of a number of high-risk combat sports, which inhabit an ambiguous area between the international sports community and more marginalised combat activities which can be brutal in nature. Van Gestel expertly draws out some of the complexities involved in concluding that the sport has experienced some of the processes of sportization, but in this particular case they have been ‘slight’ in impact rather than full-blown. Abdolmaleki, Heidari, Zakizadeh XXABSTRACT De Bosscher look at a topic of considerable contemporary interest – the management of a high-performance sport system. In this case their example is the Iranian national system and their focus is on the management of some of the resources involved. Given that the key to success in high performance sport systems would appear to lie in the ability to access and implement some of the latest and most effective technological information intellectual capital would seem to be a critical component of the total value of a competitive high performance sport system Using a model developed by a Swedish capital services company Skandia to model intangible assets in a service based organisation, Abdolmaleki and his associates have argued for the contribution of human, relational and structural capital to provide an understanding of the current place of intellectual capital in the operations of the Iranian Ministry of Sport and Youth. An understanding of the factors contributing to the development of these assets, contributes to the successful operation of any organisation in such a highly competitive and fast changing environment. Finally, from Singapore, Chung, Sufri and Wang report on some of the exciting developments in school based physical education that have occurred over the last decade. In particular they identify the increase in the placement of qualified physical education teachers as indicative of the progress that has been made. They draw on Foucault’s strategy of ‘archaeological analysis’ for an explanation of how these developments came to be successfully put in place. Their arguments strongly reinforce the importance of understanding the social and political context in order to achieve successful innovation and development. May I commend the work of our colleagues to you and wish you all the best in the attempt to achieve greater clarity of vision for 2020!

Research on social movements shows a bias towards movements that oppose the status quo. Consequently, state–movement relations are primarily characterised as antagonistic. Where cooperative relationships are considered, the focus is on co-option and institutionalisation of movements. By contrast, this article focuses on social movements that support the status quo and how in their collaborations with governmental actors, they act as para-statal agencies. Drawing on findings from a multi-site ethnography examining the implementation of the UK Prevent counter-terrorism programme, I show how neoconservative think tanks and counter-extremism civil society organisations help to enact and extend Prevent as a distinct form of political repression. As such, this article gives close attention to the otherwise neglected role that non-state actors play in non-violent political repression. My argument builds on and extends emerging work analysing social movement activity beyond the prism of the ‘challengers versus authorities’ paradigm.

In the New Order era (Orde Baru), the end of the 1970s until the early 1990s, the student movement is faced with repressive measures, a policy of limiting the political activities of students applied, then the search for a new format motion is a must. The study group is an option to avoid the political power. In the expansion, the study group turns into a political party, the People’s Democratic Party (PRD). The emergence of the PRD as an opposition party to the New Order Indonesian political public attention, because of their political program is so radical. Also, the communist stigma attached by the government to the party’s young people reap the reaction of pro and cons in the community. After the collapse of the New Order, PRD became an electoral party but failed to reap the support of voters. This paper describes the process of changing the format of the student movement of the 1990s, from the study group into action committees, later became a political party, in this paper also described the political progress of PRD in the reform era.

As Salvador Allende and his supporters forged a democratic path towards socialism, the task of building a more sovereign and egalitarian national economy became one of the Popular Unity (UP) revolution’s first priorities. To that end, Allende’s coalition promoted a massive downward redistribution of income during its first months in office while also extending state control over many of the country’s most essential industries. Chile’s food economy, including its agricultural sector, received special attention during this early period as both purchasing power and domestic production soared. However, when a combination of economic, ecological and political factors caused consumer production to stagnate, acute shortages for a wide range of goods raised questions about the viability of the UP’s plans for a more just consumer economy. The emergence of a powerful opposition movement also raised questions about the government’s reluctance to pursue substantive political changes at the same time that it implemented major economic reforms. By examining the political economy of the UP experiment in the context of Chile’s 2019–20 uprising against inequality and political exclusion, this article reconsiders the consequences of the UP’s inability to link economic transformations with changes in how political power was exercised in mid-century Chile.

The Five Star Movement (M5S) emerged as Italy’s largest party in the 2018 election. After one year in government with the far-right League, the party formed a new coalition with the center-left Democratic Party (PD). These unconventional alliances and the M5S’s ambiguity on substantive issues such as immigration and minority rights raise questions on the value positioning of its voters. Does the M5S represent a socially liberal electorate, or has the party become a new home for voters expressing sentiments of hostility toward immigrants and minorities? I hypothesize that the M5S’s ambivalence on social issues enabled the party to attract a significant share of voters with exclusionary attitudes toward foreigners and minorities. I use survey data to measure individuals’ dispositions toward outgroups and run binary and multinomial logistic regressions to predict vote choice for the M5S and the other main parties in the 2018 election. The empirical findings suggest that the M5S has become a valid option for voters adhering to exclusionary attitudes, and show that there is no particular elective affinity between the voters of the M5S and the PD.

Since the 1990s, engagement practices have been transforming, becoming more diverse (Ion 1997; Sommier 2003; Bobineau 2010), especially with the growing use of new communication technologies (Blondeau 2007; Cardon and Granjon 2010). In the wake of these changes, discourses insisting on a loss of community and collective action have surfaced that encourage scepticism about the potential of these technologies to support political and social engagement, arguing that communication technologies were the cause of social fragmentation and of growing individualism (Putnam 2000; Bauman 2006). Recent social movements, such as the Arab Spring, the Indignados, Occupy and the ‘carrés rouges’ (red square) movement in Quebec are now casting doubt on this discourse. While many researchers have set out to examine how social movements under authoritarian regimes use social media and mobile technologies to organize, gain visibility and disseminate images of their actions around the world, the reconfiguration of collective action associated with the use of social media, and the relationship between social engagement and the use of technology in contemporary liberal democracies have been largely neglected. Technology is used in complex social, political and technological contexts that generate cultural interpretations and frameworks of practice in response to which individuals and groups stake out a space of freedom to practise resistance and appropriation (Jouët 2000; Jauréguiberry and Proulx 2011). How ICT and mobile communication uses contributed to and were embedded in the transformation of engagement practices during the carrés rouges and what it reveals about the transformations engagement practices, is the focus of the present paper. The red square movement, launched by student strikers in Quebec in spring 2012, provides a rich opportunity to study how social movements with historical roots can embrace mobile and participatory technologies, and evolve along with their communicational environment. Based on a study of mobile and participatory technology practices used by the red squares, and using an approach midway between communications, sociology and social work research, we argue that by encouraging mobilization and coordination (Millette, Millette and Proulx 2012) and citizen expression (Monnoyer-Smith 2011), the use of social media and mobile technologies contributes to the hybridization (Bennett and Segerberg 2012; Canclini 2010) of political and social engagement practices. RÉSUMÉ EN FRANÇAIS Depuis la fin des années 1990, les pratiques d'engagement se diversifient et se transforment (Ion, 1997; Sommier, 2003; Lamoureux, 2008; Bobineau, 2010), notamment en lien avec les technologies de communication (Blondeau, 2007; Cardon et Granjon, 2010 ). Or, une perspective déplorant le déclin de la vie communautaire et associative a nourri une méfiance face aux usages de ces technologies comme pratiques d’engagement social et politique, celles-ci étant considérées comme favorisant l’individualisme et la fragmentation de l’action collective (Putnam, 2000 ; Bauman, 2006). Or, de récentes mobilisations, dont les mouvements du printemps arabe (2010), des indignés (2011) et des carrés rouges au Québec (2012) remettent en cause ces discours. Depuis la fin des années 1990, les pratiques d'engagement se sont diversifiées et transformées (Ion, 1997; Sommier 2003; Bobineau 2010), notamment en lien avec les technologies de communication (Blondeau 2007; Cardon et Granjon 2010). Une perspective déplorant le déclin de la vie communautaire et associative a nourri une méfiance face aux usages de ces technologies comme pratiques d’engagement social et politique, celles-ci étant considérées comme favorisant l’individualisme et la fragmentation de l’action collective (Putnam 2000; Bauman 2006). Or, les récentes mobilisations du Printemps Arabe, du mouvement des Indignados, d’Occupy et des carrés rouges au Québec, remettent en cause de tels discours. Si plusieurs travaux se sont penchés sur les mobilisations citoyennes dans des contextes politiques autoritaires, pour décrire comment les médias sociaux ont notamment servi à rendre visible l’indignation et l’action citoyennes, peu de chercheurs ont abordé les reconfigurations de l’action collective associées aux usages des médias sociaux, de même que les relations entre engagement et usages des technologies dans le contexte des démocraties libérales contemporaines. Or, au-delà de la stricte manipulation des technologies, un usage s’inscrit dans un contexte social, politique et technologique d’où émergent des interprétations culturelles et des cadres de pratiques, face auxquels les individus et les collectifs conservent toutefois un espace de liberté pour pratiquer résistances et détournements (Jouët 2000; Jauréguiberry et Proulx 2011). Comment les usages des TIC mobiles ont-ils contribué et comment ont-ils été enchassés dans les transformations des pratiques d’engagement sociales et politiques pendant le mouvement québécois des carrés rouges québécois, et que cela révèle-t-il des transformations des pratiques d’engagement? Initié par la grève des étudiant.es du Québec en 2012, le cas des carrés rouges offre l'occasion d'observer comment des mouvements s'inscrivant en continuité avec des formes de mobilisation « historiques » peuvent intégrer les technologies mobiles et participatives et se transformer avec leur environnement communicationnel. À partir d’une description des pratiques liées aux technologies mobiles et participatives déployées dans le cadre du mouvement des carrés rouges et d’une approche à l’intersection des études en communication, de la sociologie de la communication et du travail social, nous proposons ainsi de considérer que les usages de ces technologies de communication, à travers des pratiques de mobilisation, de coordination (Millette, Millette et Proulx 2012) et d'expression citoyenne (Monnoyer-Smith 2011), contribuent à une hybridation (Bennett et Segerberg 2012; Canclini 2010) des pratiques d’engagement sociales et politiques.

The declaration of the new Czechoslovak national state in October 1918 brought revolutionary changes not only to the political, social, economic and cultural scene, but also to the religious life of the country. The new Czechoslovak national church created thirteen months later combined national orientation, the reformed clerical movement, theological modernism, the Hussite and reformation tradition and protest against the Catholic Church, definitively discredited in World War I. The newly established Czechoslovak Church received support from various authorities and was seen as the proper option for the good Czechoslovak citizen, primarily the worker. At the same time, it produced a violent conversion movement (1921, 1930) and many local conflicts (1920s). The paper will focus on the workers’ religious and national identification and changes in today’s Ostrava region – an industrial region (the centre of Czechoslovak heavy industry) situated on the ethnic borderline and in the melting pot of many nationalities (Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Germans and Jews). It will analyse the interactions between class and the religious and national identification of workers. It will try to clarify the process and the motivation to convert between different churches. Special attention will be given to conversions among the working class population in the 1920s and 1930s. This analysis will be based on conversion protocols, census documents from 1921 and 1930 and ecclesiastical files of the Roman Catholic and Czechoslovak church.

The article suggests the best option for designing a spacecraft. The process of activity of proposed structure of a spacecraft in outer space must be based on the acceleration due to the electromagnetic fields of the Solar System and the Milky Way Galaxy. Purpose of the study. Suggest a design solution to create a model of a spacecraft that is accelerated in motion using space electromagnetic fields. The relevance of the chosen topic is based on the need to address issues related to the limited resources of the planet, significant levels of overpopulation, problems of demography, ecology, sociology and political life. Novelty. It is determined that in order to obtain calculations of the acceleration of 1 g of spatial arbitrary direction, it is necessary to make measurements along the chain and to deduce the amount of charge on the useful surface of the object. Methodology. Magnetic field strength measurement method, electromagnetic measurement method. Results and conclusions. The article presents a scheme of creating a modified magnetic type engine, the result its process of activity will be an acceleration of 0.05 g. It will be achieved by free movement in outer space with the appropriate current.

Dissatisfied with the decisions of the Western political class to remain uninvolved in helping settle the conflict in Syria, many hip-hop, rap, and pop artists from Syria and the surrounding region have been creating and performing politically charged music that promotes liberty, and justice in the Middle East. One artist in particular, Omar Offendum (in the United States), writes and brings to the stage his hip-hop music in a way that continues and enhances this political-artistic movement across the Atlantic. Employing rhymes and rhythms that foster commotion and make noise, Offendum breaks the global indifference accumulated around the topics of the Syrian war and the unsolvable debates about allowing a certain number of Syrian asylum seekers to apply for refugee status in Western nations. He underscores that apathy is not an option for those who oppose the oppressor. In this paper, we argue that Offendum’s music constitutes an effective tool of political propaganda that can raise social consciousness of the needs of Syrians today and inspire social justice. Because the political-ideological space that feeds his creative act is set in a civil-rights-conscious U.S., Offendum often appeals to a heritage, reminding the listener of the activism of the Black Panthers, the legacy of Malcom X, and the freedom battles of Rodney King and his followers. In many of his songs, Offendum uses Arabic, both as a means of highlighting the authenticity of his hybrid identity and as a method of marking a cultural space for a diverse audience to come together. In this paper, we offer a brief historical look at the role of hip-hop in the struggle for civil rights in the US in order to locate the legacy Offendum’s music builds on and to assess its power. We then perform a close analysis of three of his most famous songs and conclude with a brief discussion of the impact of Offendum’s on social media platforms globally. KEYWORDS: Hip-Hop; Activism; Social Justice; Omar Offendum; Social Consciousness; Syrian War; Syrian Refugees; Civil Rights

This article was written from the perspective of a black African who has been unfairly subjected to colonialism, apartheid and neo-colonialism. This African is learning to simultaneously blame others for mistakes committed against him and interrogate his own agency in being an answer to his own prayers. He has observed that communities of poverty are usually seen as undesirable. As a consequence of this, most of its residents prefer to move away, if they have the option of doing so. This article explored the concept of thin places as a vehicle to nurture agency amongst people living in communities of poverty such as Soshanguve. It uses the narrative approach of storytelling to recount particular past events and present ones as a tool to cultivate a ‘can-do attitude’ in ordinary people. The goal is to raise agents of hope who will bring good news to their neighbours and anybody else, using biblical principles as a critical tool in their toolkit. Communities of poverty are usually seen as undesirable. As a consequence, most of its residents prefer to move out, if they have the choice to do so. This article reflects on the efforts of a missional team, InnerCHANGE, to help residents of the township of Soshanguve migrate from a victim mentality to become agents of their own hope. It uses a theology of place that alludes to concepts of thin places which challenges ordinary people to become participants in the flourishing of lives around them. A reflection on agency influenced by the Black Consciousness Movement and other African scholars gave context, meaning and relevance to such a theology of place. Stories of agency from Africa are remembered and retold to inspire ordinary people. Some of the latter have taken to heart these inspirational stories and have been transformed into agents. This article calls such people transformation agents. A conclusion was made that the Church needs to continue playing its prophetic role in society. Such a role could entail reminding people of existing assets they may have such as stories told around them of people who defied the normal victim mentality seen in poor communities and actively built thin places around them.Intradisciplinary and/or interdisciplinary implications: This article was based on the field of missiology. It engaged historical facts (history) in a way that could nurture and develop agency in ordinary people. It challenges a general apathy towards community involvement found within the body of Christ located in South African communities of poverty.

Economic sanctions can be attractive policy tools for a number of governments that want to influence a country's behavior. From an economic point of view, sanctions, based on their nature, can lead to changes that turn against the initiating party. There is no convincing evidence in the literature that economic sanctions are an effective foreign policy instrument. However, the number of sanctions episodes is growing, and in recent years, this tool is still popular. This study analyzes the mechanism of the work of sanctions, and the problems that countries face when applying sanctions as a foreign policy tool. The focus is on the example of the imposition of sanctions by the West against the Russian Federation. The conclusion of the study is well-reasoned evidence of the fact that economic sanctions are also a source of economic costs for the countries initiating them, as well as countries supporting their introduction. A country faced with sanctions may develop trade relations with third parties that are not members of the sanctions coalition. The study notes that sanctions are mainly taken in addition to diplomatic and other forms of pressure. The sanction mechanism and technologies for their introduction are in constant development. Increasingly, the so-called “smart” sanctions are used, which are aimed at financial transactions, business activity, as well as private individuals, to limit their freedom of movement. The study notes that when taking various sanctions measures, it is difficult to make an accurate assessment of the degree of achievement of the final results. It was revealed that a higher effectiveness of influence is achieved with the integrated use of measures of a political and economic nature. At the same time, despite the identified shortcomings in the use of economic sanctions and the lack of evidence of their effectiveness, it can be argued that they are a preferable option in comparison with military intervention. At the same time, sanctions are not always a guarantee of preventing a military clash

In August 2017, a white supremacist rally marketed as “Unite the Right” was held in Charlottesville, Virginia. In participation were members of the alt-right, including neo-nazis, white nationalists, neo-confederates, and other hate groups (Atkinson). The rally swiftly erupted in violence between white supremacists and counter protestors, culminating in the death of a counter-protester named Heather Heyer, who was struck by a car driven by white supremacist James Alex Fields, and leaving dozens injured. Terry McQuliffe, the Governor of Virginia, declared a state of emergency on August 12, and the world watched while white supremacists boldly marched in clothing emblazoned with symbols ranging from swastikas to a cartoon frog (Pepe), with flags featuring the nation of “Kekistan”, and carrying tiki torches chanting, “You Will Not Replace Us... Jews Will Not Replace Us”.The purpose of this essay is not, however, to examine the Internet symbols that circulated during the Unite the Right rally but rather to hone in on a specific moment that illustrates a key part of Internet culture that was often overlooked during analysis of the events that occurred during the riots: a documentary filmmaker, C. J. Hunt, was at the rally to record footage for a project on the removal of Confederate monuments. While there, he saw a rally-goer dressed in the white polo t-shirt and khaki pants uniform of the white nationalist group Vanguard America. The rally-goer, a young white man, was being chased by a counter-protester. He began to scream and beg for mercy, and even went as far as stripping off his clothing and denying that he really believed in any of the group’s ideology. In the recording by Hunt, who asks why he was there and why he was undressing, the young white man responded that shouting white power is “fun”, and that he was participating in the event because he, quote, “likes to be offensive” (Hunt).As Hunt notes in a piece for GQ reflecting on his experience at the rally, as soon as the man was cut off from his group and confronted, the runaway racist’s demeanor immediately changed when he had to face the consequences of his actions. Trolls often rely on the safety and anonymity of online forums and digital spaces where they are often free from having to face the consequences of their actions, and for the runaway racist, things became real very quickly when he was forced to own up to his hateful actions. In a way, many members of these movements seem to want politics without consequence for themselves, but with significant repercussions for others. Milo Yiannopoulos, a self-professed “master troll”, built an entire empire worth millions of dollars off of what the far-right defends as ironic hate speech and a form of politics without consequences reserved only for the privileged white men that gleefully engage in it. The runaway racist and Yiannopoulos are borne out of an Internet culture that is built on being offensive, on trolling, and “troll” itself being an aspirational label and identity, but also more importantly, a political aesthetic.In this essay, I argue that trolling itself has become a kind of political aesthetic and identity, and provide evidence via examples like hoaxes, harassment campaigns, and the use of memes to signal to certain online populations and extremist groups in violent attacks. First coined by Walter Benjamin in order to explain a fundamental component of using art to foster consent and compliance in fascist regimes, the term since then has evolved to encompass far more than just works of art. Benjamin’s original conception of the term is in regard to a creation of a spectacle that prevents the masses from recognizing their rights – in short, the aestheticization of politics is not just about the strategies of the fascist regimes themselves but says more about the subjects within them. In the time of Benjamin’s writing, the specific medium was mass propaganda through the newly emerging film industry and other forms of art (W. Benjamin). To Benjamin, these aesthetics served as tools of distracting to make fascism more palatable to the masses. Aesthetic tools of distraction serve an affective purpose, revealing the unhappy consciousness of neoreactionaries (Hui), and provide an outlet for their resentment.Since political aesthetics are concerned with how cultural products like art, film, and even clothing reflect political ideologies and beliefs (Sartwell; McManus; Miller-Idriss), the objects of analysis in this essay are part of the larger visual culture of the alt-right (Bogerts and Fielitz; Stanovsky). Indeed, aesthetic aspects of political systems shift their meaning over time, or are changed and redeployed with transformed effect (Sartwell). In this essay, I am applying the concept of the aestheticization of politics by analyzing how alt-right visual cultures deploy distraction and dissimulation to advance their political agenda through things like trolling campaigns and hoaxes. By analyzing these events, their use of memes, trolling techniques, and their influence on mainstream culture, what is revealed is the influence of trolling on political culture for the alt-right and how the alt-right then distracts the rest of the public (McManus).Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Troll?Large scale analyses of disinformation and extremist content online tends to examine how certain actors are connected, what topics emerge and how these are connected across platforms, and the ways that disinformation campaigns operate in digital environments (Marwick and Lewis; Starbird; Benkler et al.). Masculine and white-coded technology gave rise to male-dominated digital spaces (R. Benjamin), with trolling often being an issue faced by non-normative users of the Internet and their communities (Benjamin; Lumsden and Morgan; Nakamura; Phillips, Oxygen). Creating a kind of unreality where it is difficult to parse out truth from lies, fiction from non-fiction, the troll creates cultural products, and by hiding behind irony and humor confuses onlookers and is removed from any kind of reasonable blame for their actions. Irony has long been a rhetorical strategy used in politics, and the alt right has been no exception (Weatherby), but for our current sociopolitical landscape, trolling is a political strategy that infuses irony into politics and identity.In the digital era, political memes and internet culture are pervasive components of the spread of hate speech and extremist ideology on digital platforms. Trolling is not an issue that exists in a vacuum – rather, trolls are a product of greater mainstream culture that encourages and allows their behaviors (Phillips, This Is Why; Fichman and Sanfilippo; Marwick and Lewis). Trolls, and meme culture in general, have often been pointed to as being part of the reason for the rise of Trump and fascist politics across the world in recent years (Greene; Lamerichs et al.; Hodge and Hallgrimsdottir; Glitsos and Hall). Although criticism has been expressed about how impactful memes were in the election of Donald Trump, political memes have had an impact on the ways that trolling went from anonymous jerks on forums to figures like Yiannapoulos who built entire careers off of trolling, creating empires of hate (Lang). These memes that are often absurd and incomprehensible to those who are not a part of the community that they come from aim to cheapen, trivialize, and mock social justice movements like Black Lives Matter, feminism, LGBTQ+ rights, and others.But the history of trolling online goes as far back as the Internet itself. “Trolling” is just a catch all term to describe online behaviors meant to antagonize, to disrupt online conversations, and to silence other users (Cole; Fichman and Sanfilippo). As more and more people started moving online and engaging in participatory culture, trolling continued to evolve from seemingly harmless jokes like the “Rick Roll” to targeted campaigns meant to harass women off of social media platforms (Lumsden and Morgan; Graham). Trolling behaviors are more than just an ugly part of the online experience, but are also a way for users to maintain the borders of their online community - it’s meant to drive away those who are perceived to be outsiders not just from the specific forum, but the Internet itself (Graham). With the rise of modern social media platforms, trolling itself is also a part of the political landscape, creating a “toxic counterpublic” that combines irony with a kind of earnestness to spread and inject their beliefs into mainstream political discourse (Greene). As a mode of information warfare, these subversive rhetorical strategies meant to contradict or reverse existing political and value systems have been used throughout history as a political tactic (Blackstock).The goal of trolling is not just to disrupt conversations, but to lead to chaos via confusion about the sincerity and meaning of messages and visuals, and rather than functioning as a politics of outrage (on the part of the adherents), it is a politics of being as outrageous as possible. As a part of larger meme culture, the aesthetics of trolls and their outrageous content manage to operate under the radar by being able to excuse their behaviors and rhetoric as just “trolling” or “joking”. This ambiguity points to trolling on the far right as a political strategy and identity to absolve them of blame or accusations of what their real intentions are. Calling them “trolls” hides the level of sophistication and vast levels of influence that they had on public opinion and discourse in the United States (Geltzer; Starks et al.; Marwick and Lewis). We no longer live in a world apart from the troll’s influence and immune from their toxic discourse – rather, we have long been under the bridge with them.Co-Opted SymbolsOne of the most well-known examples of trolling as a political aesthetic and tactic may be the OK hand sign used by the Christchurch shooter. The idea that the OK hand sign was a secretly white supremacist symbol started as a hoax on 4chan. The initial 2017 hoax purported that the hand sign was meant to stand for “White Power”, with the three fingers representing the W and the circle made with the index finger and thumb as the P (Anti-Defamation League, “Okay Hand Gesture”). The purpose of perpetuating the hoax was to demonstrate that (a) they were being watched and (b) that the mainstream media is stupid and gullible enough to believe this hoax. Meant to incite confusion and to act as a subversive strategy, the OK hand sign was then actually adopted by the alt-right as a sort of meme to not just perpetuate the hoax, but to signal belonging to the larger group (Allyn). Even though the Anti-Defamation League initially listed it as not being a hate symbol and pointed out the origins of the hoax (Anti-Defamation League, “No, the ‘OK’ Gesture Is Not a Hate Symbol”), they then switched their opinion when the OK hand sign was being flashed by white supremacists, showing up in photographs at political events, and other social media content. In fact, the OK hand sign is also a common element in pictures of Pepe the Frog, who is a sort of “alt right mascot” (Tait; Glitsos and Hall), but like the OK hand sign, Pepe the Frog did not start as an alt-right mascot and was co-opted by the alt-right as a mode of representation.The confusion around the actual meaning behind the hand symbol points to how the alt-right uses these modes of representation in ways that are simultaneously an inside joke and a real expression of their beliefs. For instance, the Christchurch shooter referenced a number of memes and other rhetoric typical of 4chan and 8chan communities in his video and manifesto (Quek). In the shooter’s manifesto and video, the vast amounts of content that point to the trolling and visual culture of the alt-right are striking – demonstrating how alt-right memes not only make this violent ideology accessible, but are cultural products meant to be disseminated and ultimately, result in some kind of action (DeCook).The creation and co-optation of symbols by the alt-right like the OK hand sign are not just memes, but a form of language created by extremists for extremists (Greene; Hodge and Hallgrimsdottir). The shooter’s choice of including this type of content in his manifesto as well as certain phrases in his live-streamed video indicate his level of knowledge of what needed to be done for his attack to get as much attention as possible – the 4chan troll is the modern-day bogeyman, and parts of the manifesto have been identified as intentional traps for the mainstream media (Lorenz).Thus, the Christchurch shooter and trolling culture are linked, but referring to the symbols in the manifesto as being a part of “trolling” culture misses the deeper purpose – chaos, through the outrage spectacle, is the intended goal, particularly by creating arguments about the nature and utility of online trolling behavior. The shooter encouraged other 8chan users to disseminate his posted manifesto as well as to share the video of the attack – and users responded by immortalizing the event in meme format. The memes created celebrated the shooter as a hero, and although Facebook did remove the initial livestream video, it was reuploaded to the platform 1.2 million times in the first 24 hours, attempting to saturate the online platform with so many uploads that it would cause confusion and be difficult to remove (Gramenz). Some users even created gifs or set the video to music from the Doom video game soundtrack – a video game where the player is a demon slayer in an apocalyptic world, further adding another layer of symbolism to the attack.These political aesthetics – spread through memes, gifs, and “fan videos” – are the perfect vehicles for disseminating extremist ideology because of what they allow the alt-right to do with them: hide behind them, covering up their intentions, all the while adopting them as signifiers for their movement. With the number of memes, symbols, and phrases posted in his manifesto and spoken aloud in his mainstream, perhaps the Christchurch shooter wanted the onus of the blame to fall on these message board communities and the video games and celebrities referenced – in effect, it was “designed to troll” (Lorenz). But, there is a kernel of truth in every meme, post, image, and comment – their memes are a part of their political aesthetic, thus implicit and explicit allusions to the inner workings of their ideology are present. Hiding behind hoaxes, irony, edginess, and trolling, members of the alt-right and other extremist Internet cultures then engage in a kind of subversion that allows them to avoid taking any responsibility for real and violent attacks that occur as a result of their discourse. Antagonizing the left, being offensive, and participating in this outrage spectacle to garner a response from news outlets, activists, and outsiders are all a part of the same package.Trolls and the Outrage SpectacleThe confusion and the chaos left behind by these kinds of trolling campaigns and hoaxes leave many to ask: How disingenuous is it? Is it meant for mere shock value or is it really reflective of the person’s beliefs? In terms of the theme of dissimulation for this special issue, what is the real intent, and under what pretenses should these kinds of trolling behaviors be understood? Returning to the protestor who claimed “I just like to be offensive”, the skepticism from onlookers still exists: why go so far as to join an alt-right rally, wearing the uniform of Identity Evropa (now the American Identity Movement), as a “joke”?Extremists hide behind humor and irony to cloud judgments from others, begging the question of can we have practice without belief? But, ultimately, practice and belief are intertwined – the regret of the Runaway Racist is not because he suddenly realized he did not “believe”, but rather was forced to face the consequences of his belief, something that he as a white man perhaps never really had to confront. The cultural reach of dissimulation, in particular hiding true intent behind the claim of “irony”, is vast - YouTuber Pewdiepie claimed his use of racial and anti-Semitic slurs and putting on an entire Ku Klux Klan uniform in the middle of a video were “accidental” only after considerable backlash (Picheta). It has to be noted, however, that Pewdiepie is referenced in the manifesto of the Christchurch shooter – specifically, the shooter yelled during his livestream “subscribe to Pewdiepie”, (Lorenz). Pewdiepie and many other trolls, once called out for their behavior, and regardless of their actual intent, double down on their claims of irony to distract from the reality of their behaviors and actions.The normalization of this kind of content in mainstream platforms like Twitter, YouTube, Facebook, and even Instagram show how 4chan and alt-right Internet culture has seeped out of its borders and exists everywhere online. This “coded irony” is not only enabled rhetorically due to irony’s slippery definition, but also digitally via these online media (Weatherby). The aesthetics of the troll are present in every single platform and are disseminated everywhere – memes are small cultural units meant to be passed on (Shifman), and although one can argue it was not memes alone that resulted in the rise of the alt-right and the election of Donald Trump, memes are a part of the larger puzzle of the political radicalization process. The role of the Internet in radicalization is so powerful and insidious because of the presentation of content – it is funny, edgy, ironic, offensive, and outrageous. But these behaviors and attitudes are not just appealing to some kind of adolescent-like desire to push boundaries of what is and is not socially acceptable and/or politically incorrect (Marwick and Lewis), and calling it such clouds people’s perceptions of their level of sophistication in shaping political discourse.Memes and the alt-right are a noted phenomenon, and these visual cultures created by trolls on message boards have aided in the rise of the current political situation worldwide (Hodge and Hallgrimsdottir). We are well in the midst of a type of warfare based on not weapons and bodies, but information and data - in which memes and other elements of the far right’s political aesthetic play an important role (Molander et al.; Prier; Bogerts and Fielitz). The rise of the online troll as a political player and the alt-right are merely the logical outcomes of these systems.ConclusionThe alt-right’s spread was possible because of the trolling cultures and aesthetics of dissimulation created in message boards that predate 4chan (Kitada). The memes and inflammatory statements made by them serve multiple purposes, ranging from an intention to incite outrage among non-members of the group to signal group belonging and identity. In some odd way, if people do not understand the content, the content actually speaks louder and, in more volumes, that it would if its intent was more straightforward – in their confusion, people give these trolling techniques more attention and amplification in their attempt to make sense of them. Through creating confusion, distraction, and uncertainty around the legitimacy of messages, hand signs, and even memes, the alt-right has elevated the aestheticization of politics to a degree that Walter Benjamin could perhaps not have predicted in his initial lament about the distracted masses of fascist regimes (McManus). The political dimensions of trolling and the cognitive uncertainty that it creates is a part of its goal. Dismissing trolls is no longer an option, but also regarding them as sinister political operatives may be overblowing their significance. 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In 1996, the iconoclastic economist John Kenneth Galbraith wrote a manifesto, The Good Society, that elaborated his vision for what societal excellence and goodness should amount to. Though nearly 96, Galbraith was still a rabble-rouser, and he castigated the powers that be in the United States for propping up a “democracy of the fortunate” (8). To Galbraith, those who engaged in electoral politics, win or lose on any specific issue, tended to have all the social and economic advantages, while the less well off were deliberately marginalised by ‘the system.’ He lamented that “money, voice and political activism are now extensively controlled by the affluent, very affluent, and business interests" (140), making of the political sphere an "unequal contest" (8).To make democracy American style more inclusive, Galbraith called for “a coalition of the concerned and the compassionate and those now outside the political system” (143), so that all citizens had optimal prospects for enjoying “personal liberty, basic well-being, social and ethnic equality, the opportunity for a rewarding life" (4). Have inroads been made, in the nearly 15 years since first publication of The Good Society, in making come true Galbraith’s version of a good society? If not, how might such a coalition be achieved? What would it look like? Who among Americans would constitute the concerned, compassionate outsiders that would make such a coalition authentically ‘Galbraithian’? A Coalition on the MoveWhat about MoveOn.org? A progressive public advocacy group founded in 1998, MoveOn.org, according to Lelia Green in The Internet, is “an important indicator of the potential for bringing together communities of like-minded individuals” (139). Green singles out MoveOn.org as particularly pivotal in galvanising support for Barack Obama’s presidency (139). The New York Times describes MoveOn.org as “a bottom-up organization that has inserted itself into the political process in ways large and small” (Janofsky and Lee). Indeed, it represents “the next evolutionary change in American politics, a move away from one-way tools of influence like television commercials and talk radio to interactive dialogue, offering everyday people a voice in a process that once seemed beyond their reach.” MoveOn.org has expertly utilised the Internet to mobilise its members “to sign online petitions, organize street demonstrations and donate money to run political advertisements”. Green considers MoveOn.org one of today’s standout “coalitions of interests and political agendas”, “extraordinary” in its ability to “use websites and email lists to build communities around a shared passion” (139). In 2008, its 4.2 million members were at the vortex of a “dynamic that tipped the balance in favour of a more radical agenda with the election of President Barack Obama in 2008” (139). Galbraith, for one, would certainly agree with MoveOn.org’s politics, and likely would claim that their radical agenda is a compassionate and encompassing one that effectively addresses the concerns of everyday citizens. Yet the fact is that millions of disaffected Americans are not liberals, and so are not in sync with MoveOn.org’s interests and agendas, such as its firm insistence that a ‘public option’ is the best way to bring about meaningful health care reform, and its demand that all U.S. troops be immediately withdrawn from Iraq and Afghanistan. Tea Anyone?Another sort of coalition filled the void created by MoveOn.org. Enter the Tea Party. A movement that has been every bit as effective in its way in inspiring once-jaded ordinary citizens to coalesce around a set of interests and agendas – albeit, at least in principal if not necessarily in actual practice, of a professed libertarian strain – the Tea Party got underway in the waning days of the second presidential term of George W. Bush. It started out as a one-issue protest group voicing umbrage over the proposed economic stimulus plan, which it considered an unconstitutional subsidy. After Barack Obama became president, the Tea Party burgeoned into a much more influential movement that now professes to be a grassroots citizens’ watchdog for all unconstitutional activities (or what it deems to be such) on the part of the federal government. A New York Times article notes that many of its members are victims of the economic downturn; they “had lost their jobs, or perhaps watched their homes plummet in value, and they found common cause in the Tea Party’s fight for lower taxes and smaller government” (Zernike). Its members are akin to the millions of middle class Americans who lost their livelihoods during the Great Depression of the 1930s, an unparalleled economic downturn that eventually “mobilized many middle-class people who had fallen on hard times” to join forces in order to have an effective political voice. But those during the Great Depression who were aroused to political consciousness “tended to push for more government involvement”; in contrast, the Tea Party is a coalition that “vehemently wants less”. While Galbraith depicted the Republican Party of his time as “avowedly on the side of the fortunate” (141), the majority of today’s Tea Party members align themselves with the Republican Party, yet they are by no means principally made up of "the fortunate." Erick Erickson, a prominent Tea Party spokesman and a television commentator for the CNN news channel, blogs on Redstate.com that the Tea Party “has gotten a lot of people off the sidelines and into the political arena...” Erickson further contends that the Tea Party has “brought together a lot of likeminded citizens who thought they were alone in the world. They realized that not only were they not alone, but there were millions of others just as concerned.” Galbraithian Coalitions?Do MoveOn.org and Tea Party constitute Galbraithian-type coalitions, each in its own right? Both have inspired millions of once-disenchanted common citizens to come together around common political concerns and become a force to be reckoned with in electoral politics. As such, each has served as an effective counterweight against the money, voice and political activism of the very affluent. While Galbraith would probably have as much disdain for the Tea Party as he would have praise for MoveOn.org, the fact is that both groups have seen to it that an increasing number of regular Americans whose concerns had been ignored in the political arena now have to be reckoned with. But this is by no means where their commonality ends. Above and beyond the fact that both are comprised of millions who had been political outsiders, each has a decided anti-establishmentarian strain, along with a professed sense of alienation from and disdain for "politics as usual" and an impassioned belief in the right to self-government (though they differ on what this right amounts to). Moreover, both consider themselves grassroots-driven, and harbor anathema for professional lobbying organisations, which both regularly criticize for their undue political influence. Even though the two groups usually differ to the nth degree when it comes to those solutions they believe would effectively remedy the most pressing public problems in the U.S., they nonetheless share the conviction that one must initially focus one’s efforts at the local level if one is eventually to have the greatest impact on political decision-making on a national scale. The two groups came of age during the Internet revolution – indeed, it would have been impossible for their like-minded members to have found one another and coalesced so quickly and in such great numbers without the Internet – and they utilise the Internet as the principal tool for spurring concerted activism at the local level among their members. One can consider their shared approach Deweyan, in that Dewey maintained that genuinely democratic community, “in its deepest and richest sense, must always remain a matter of face-to-face intercourse” (367). Yet the two groups’ legion differences prevent them from engaging in meaningful face-to-face exchanges with one another. While the prospect of cultivating linkages between Tea Party and MoveOn.org are remote for the foreseeable future, it might nonetheless be seen as a promising development that some rank and file Tea Party acolytes do at least recognise that they must not identify solely with the Republican Party, lest they discourage potential recruits from rallying around their cause. For instance, one warns fellow members on the Redstate.com blog to be wary of casting their lot with Republicans, “because it would drive away the Democrats and Independents”. He actually uses Galbraith’s coinage in describing the Tea Party: “This movement is a coalition of the concerned, not a Republican outreach program.” Indeed, contrary to popular belief, the Tea Party is not, as a whole, on the conservative fringe (though it does often seem that those members who are given the most attention by the mainstream media are the fringe element, particularly the breakaway Tea Party Express). A Gallup Poll reveals that fully 17 percent of all Americans of voting age identify themselves as affiliated with the Tea Party; and while a majority have Republican leanings, fully 45 percent of all Tea Party members claimed they were either Democrats (17 percent) or independents (28 percent). To Tea Party leader Erick Erickson, the paramount challenge today for the Tea Party is for it to transform itself into a greater umbrella coalition, since the “issues and advocacy within the tea party movement are issues that resonate with the majority of Americans.” After all, he asserts, the Tea Party’s is “a very American cause — the first amendment right to protest, petition, and speak up.” While an expansion of its coalition does not in any way make it incumbent for the Tea Party to find common cause with MoveOn.org, can the claim nonetheless be legitimately made – utilising Erickson’s own criteria – that MoveOn.org’s is equally a very American cause? Christopher Hayes points out in an essay in The Nation that most of MoveOn.org’s members, as with the Tea Party’s, are “not inclined to protest,” but their “rising unease with the direction of the country has led to a new political consciousness.” Hayes could just as well be speaking of the Tea Party when he describes MoveOn.org’s members as made up mostly of “citizens angered, upset and disappointed with their government but [who were] unsure how to channel those sentiments.” For such citizens, MoveOn.org “provides simple, discrete actions: sign this petition, donate money to run this ad, show up at this vigil.” This is convincing evidence that MoveOn.org’s is also “a very American cause”, by the very benchmarks set forth by Erickson. A ‘Higher Coalition’?But is this in any way akin to a demonstrable sign that these unlikeliest of political bedfellows might be inspired at some future point to see themselves as part of a ‘higher coalition’ — one of the unlikeminded, that celebrates difference? Might a critical mass in both movements ever deem it a boon to coalesce around the cause of democratic pluralism? As things stand, neither side embraces such pluralism. Rather, one other attribute they share pervasively is dogmatism: both are convinced that their respective political sensibilities are beyond reproach. As a consequence, over the shorter term, neither group is likely to shed its brand of dogmatism and supplant it with an openness or receptivity to new, much less opposing, points of view. So, for instance, even as the Tea Party seeks to expand its fold, it is no more inclined to change its ideology-based stances on the issues than is MoveOn.org. For the time being, each group not only is entrenched in its own collective political mindset, but each coalesces around a demonstrated antipathy towards alternative approaches to public problem-solving. Is there any remotely plausible scenario by which the members of MoveOn.org and Tea Party might eventually come not just to tolerate their differences but to extol them? One other key Galbraithian element that those comprising an ideal coalition in a democracy must possess is compassion. For members of any coalition to cultivate compassion, they must first, or concomitantly, inculcate empathy, which is typically considered either a precursor to compassion or, along with understanding, a vital component of it. Henning Melber, Executive Director of the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, and Reinhard Kössler maintain that “(w)hile empathy does not automatically translate into solidarity (nor into ethical behaviour), it can serve as a compass” for doing so, and can lead to a Galbraithian “coalition of the concerned and aware”(37). Such empathy is “a prerequisite for the ability to listen to one another and for permissiveness and openness towards ‘otherness’, and further, can only be born out of a sense of shared suffering” (37). To the authors, it isn’t just that “(s)uffering in its variety of forms requires empathy and solidarity by all,” but that it necessarily “transcends a politically correct ideology” (37). Millions in both the Tea Party and MoveOn.org long suffered from being a mere afterthought to the political establishment, both of them impacted by policies that they are convinced exacerbated rather than ameliorated their woes. But they have shown few if any indications of a willingness to transcend a politically correct ideology. For this to come about, it would, as Melber and Kössler maintain, require “hard, sustained, and imaginative work” (33). How might this come to pass? Greg Anderson, in The Athenian Experiment: Building an Imagined Political Community in Ancient Attica, 508-490 B.C., points to ancient Athens as a paradigmatic example of a society that undertook the hard imaginative work needed to develop the types of mediated connections that over time created a sense of shared belonging to a democratic community. “The process of transformation” in Attica, he argues, is “best understood as a bold exercise in social engineering, an experiment designed to bring together the diverse and far-flung inhabitants of an entire region and forge them into a single, self-governing political community of like-minded individuals” (5). While those males of sufficient socioeconomic distinction who were privileged enough to be citizens in the West’s first experiment in democracy were indeed like-minded, prising a self-governing political community, they were not single-minded; rather, those in the twelve dispersed tribes throughout Attica who coalesced to form a self-governing community apparently thrived on the free exchange and consideration of a wide range of ideas. They held that greater insights emerged only when a variety of views were subjected to scrutiny in the public sphere. Paul Woodruff notes in First Democracy that each Athenian was “given a share of the ability to be citizens, and that ability is understood both as a pair of virtues and as a kind of citizen wisdom.” Governing in this way was based on the shared view that “it is a natural part of being human to know enough to help govern your community” (149). Neither Tea Party nor MoveOn.org followers at present have this shared view on any semblance of a broad scale; rather, each betrays the sensibility that each ‘knows better’. As a consequence, any efforts at expanding their respective folds clearly do not include making overtures (or even extending olive branches) to one another. Even so, as impossibly optimistic as it might seem under current circumstances, I believe eventually they might come to see themselves as part of a greater or higher coalition – one serving the overriding cause of democracy itself – over the much longer term. But for this to become a reality, each group will first have to suffer some more. One other commonality they demonstrate is the power of grassroots activism – and the decided limitations. My hunch is that just as MoveOn.org’s progressives came to feel betrayed when Obama abandoned the liberal agenda of his presidential campaign to engage in political compromise and accommodation, Tea Party activists will come to find that their own expectations for political change will be equally stymied. In the 2010 elections, the Tea Party was a kingmaker in electoral politics, giving Republicans a decisive majority in Congress in the 2010 elections. But I suspect that those candidates the Tea Party supported will eventually resort to the practice of “politics as usual,” largely departing from the Tea Party agenda, in order to accomplish anything in Washington or become irrelevant in the existing system – a system long dominated by two political parties interested above and beyond all else in perpetuating their shared stranglehold on political power, and each equally beholden to corporate America for the contributions to their coffers that enable them to sustain this. If this scenario plays out, then at least some Tea Party activists might plausibly arrive at the unsettling conclusion that their suffering in the political arena is remarkably similar to that experienced by MoveOn.org’s cadre of concerned citizens who catapulted Obama into the office in the land, only to have most of their principal concerns neglected or dismissed, lost in the seamy world of back-room political deal-making. There is another possible scenario: What if either MoveOn.org or Tea Party becomes such an overwhelming force in politics that the other is attenuated, its members relegated once again to the fringe? If this occurred, the public sphere in the United States would be missing a vital dimension that has been part of its makeup since its founding days. For as Joseph Ellis, the Pulitzer Prize-winning historian, points out: the achievement of the revolutionary generation was a collective enterprise that succeeded because of the diversity of personalities and ideologies present in the mix. Their interactions and juxtapositions generated a dynamic form of balance and equilibrium, not because any of them was perfect or infallible, but because their mutual imperfections and fallibilities, as well as their eccentricities and excesses, checked each other… . (17) At the United States’s beginnings, the ties that bound those who revolted against Britain were forged despite their unbridgeable chasms of ideology; their “differing postures toward the twin goals of freedom and equality” were “not resolved so much as built into the fabric of our national identity” (16). Even or especially as irreconcilable differences prompted early Americans to continue waging a battle of ideas in the political trenches, Thomas Jefferson, for one, believed they were all (or nearly all) “constitutionally and conscientiously democrats” (185). Extrapolating from this, one can posit that MoveOn.org and Tea Party, regardless of whether they choose to acknowledge it, are in tandem a modern-day manifestation of the original American coalition. If they could be inspired to see that each is an important player in furthering the democratic experiment as singularly practiced in the U.S., they just might come to care more for one another. Out of such caring, they might realise that neither has a monopoly on political wisdom, and as a result coalesce around the cause of promoting a less hostile body politic. AcknowledgementsThe author is grateful to the two blind peer reviewers for their most helpful suggestions. ReferencesAnderson, Greg. 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The Alt Right Are Not Alright Academic explorations complicating both the Internet and whiteness have often focussed on the rise of the “alt-right” to examine the co-option of digital technologies to extend white supremacy (Daniels, “Cyber Racism”; Daniels, “Algorithmic Rise”; Nagle). The term “alt-right” refers to media organisations, personalities, and sarcastic Internet users who promote the “alternative right”, understood as extremely conservative, political views online. The alt-right, in all of their online variations and inter-grouping, are infamous for supporting white supremacy online, “characterized by heavy use of social media and online memes. Alt-righters eschew ‘establishment’ conservatism, skew young, and embrace white ethnonationalism as a fundamental value” (Southern Poverty Law Center). Theoretical studies of the alt-right have largely focussed on its growing presence across social media and websites such as Twitter, Reddit, and notoriously “chan” sites 4chan and 8chan, through the political discussions referred to as “threads” on the site (Nagle; Daniels, “Algorithmic Rise”; Hawley). As well, the ability of online users to surpass national boundaries and spread global white supremacy through the Internet has also been studied (Back et al.). The alt-right have found a home on the Internet, using its features to cunningly recruit members and to establish a growing community that mainstream politically extreme views (Daniels, “Cyber Racism”; Daniels, “Algorithmic Rise; Munn). This body of knowledge shows that academics have been able to produce critically relevant literature regarding the alt-right despite the online anonymity of the majority of its members. For example, Conway et al., in their analysis of the history and social media patterns of the alt-right, follow the unique nature of the Christchurch Massacre, encompassing the use and development of message boards, fringe websites, and social media sites to champion white supremacy online. Positioning my research in this literature, I am interested in contributing further knowledge regarding the alt-right, white supremacy, and the Internet by exploring the sinister conducting of Zoom-bombing anti-racist events. Here, I will investigate how white supremacy through the Internet can lead to violence, abuse, and fear that “transcends the virtual world to damage real, live humans beings” via Zoom-bombing, an act that is situated in a larger co-option of the Internet by the alt-right and white supremacists, but has been under theorised as a hate crime (Daniels; “Cyber Racism” 7). Shitposting I want to preface this chapter by acknowledging that while I understand the Internet, through my own external investigations of race, power and the Internet, as a series of entities that produce racial violence both online and offline, I am aware of the use of the Internet to frame, discuss, and share anti-racist activism. Here we can turn to the work of philosopher Michel de Certeau who conceived the idea of a “tactic” as a way to construct a space of agency in opposition to institutional power. This becomes a way that marginalised groups, such as racialised peoples, can utilise the Internet as a tactical material to assert themselves and their non-compliance with the state. Particularly, shitposting, a tactic often associated with the alt-right, has also been co-opted by those who fight for social justice and rally against oppression both online and offline. As Roderick Graham explores, the Internet, and for this exploration, shitposting, can be used to proliferate deviant and racist material but also as a “deviant” byway of oppositional and anti-racist material. Despite this, a lot can be said about the invisible yet present claims and support of whiteness through Internet and digital technologies, as well as the activity of users channelled through these screens, such as the alt-right and their digital tactics. As Vikki Fraser remarks, “the internet assumes whiteness as the norm – whiteness is made visible through what is left unsaid, through the assumption that white need not be said” (120). It is through the lens of white privilege and claims to white supremacy that online irony, by way of shitposting, is co-opted and understood as an inherently alt-right tool, through the deviance it entails. Their sinister co-option of shitposting bolsters audacious claims as to who has the right to exist, in their support of white identity, but also hides behind a veil of mischief that can hide their more insidious intention and political ideologies. The alt-right have used “shitposting”, an online style of posting and interacting with other users, to create a form of online communication for a translocal identity of white nationalist members. Sean McEwan defines shitposting as “a form of Internet interaction predicated upon thwarting established norms of discourse in favour of seemingly anarchic, poor quality contributions” (19). Far from being random, however, I argue that shitposting functions as a discourse that is employed by online communities to discuss, proliferate, and introduce white supremacist ideals among their communities as well as into the mainstream. In the course of this article, I will introduce racist Zoom-bombing as a tactic situated in shitposting which can be used as a means of white supremacist discourse and an attempt to block anti-racist efforts. By this line, the function of discourse as one “to preserve or to reproduce discourse (within) a closed community” is calculatingly met through shitposting, Zoom-bombing, and more overt forms of white supremacy online (Foucault 225-226). Using memes, dehumanisation, and sarcasm, online white supremacists have created a means of both organising and mainstreaming white supremacy through humour that allows insidious themes to be mocked and then spread online. Foucault writes that “in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed according to a certain number of procedures, whose role is to avert its powers and danger, to cope with chance events, to evade ponderous, awesome materiality” (216). As Philippe-Joseph Salazar recontextualises to online white supremacists, “the first procedure of control is to define what is prohibited, in essence, to set aside that which cannot be spoken about, and thus to produce strategies to counter it” (137). By this line, the alt-right reorganises these procedures and allocates a checked speech that will allow their ideas to proliferate in like-minded and growing communities. As a result, online white supremacists becoming a “community of discourse” advantages them in two ways: first, ironic language permits the mainstreaming of hate that allows sinister content to enter the public as the severity of their intentions is doubted due to the sarcastic language employed. Second, shitposting is employed as an entry gate to more serious and dangerous participation with white supremacist action, engagement, and ideologies. It is important to note that white privilege is embodied in these discursive practices as despite this exploitation of emerging technologies to further white supremacy, there are approaches that theorise the alt-right as “crazed product(s) of an isolated, extremist milieu with no links to the mainstream” (Moses 201). In this way, it is useful to consider shitposting as an informal approach that mirrors legitimised white sovereignties and authorised white supremacy. The result is that white supremacist online users succeed in “not only in assembling a community of actors and a collective of authors, on the dual territory of digital communication and grass-roots activism”, but also shape an effective fellowship of discourse that audiences react well to online, encouraging its reception and mainstreaming (Salazar 142). Continuing, as McBain writes, “someone who would not dream of donning a white cap and attending a Ku Klux Klan meeting might find themselves laughing along to a video by the alt-right satirist RamZPaul”. This idea is echoed in a leaked stylistic guide by white supremacist website and message board the Daily Stormer that highlights irony as a cultivated mechanism used to draw new audiences to the far right, step by step (Wilson). As showcased in the screen capture below of the stylistic guide, “the reader is at first drawn in by curiosity or the naughty humor and is slowly awakened to reality by repeatedly reading the same points” (Feinburg). The result of this style of writing is used “to immerse recruits in an online movement culture built on memes, racial panic and the worst of Internet culture” (Wilson). Figure 1: A screenshot of the Daily Stormer’s playbook, expanding on the stylistic decisions of alt-right writers. Racist Zoom-Bombing In the timely text “Racist Zoombombing”, Lisa Nakamura et al. write the following: Zoombombing is more than just trolling; though it belongs to a broad category of online behavior meant to produce a negative reaction, it has an intimate connection with online conspiracy theorists and white supremacy … . Zoombombing should not be lumped into the larger category of trolling, both because the word “trolling” has become so broad it is nearly meaningless at times, and because zoombombing is designed to cause intimate harm and terrorize its target in distinct ways. (30) Notwithstanding the seriousness of Zoom-bombing, and to not minimise its insidiousness by understanding it as a form of shitposting, my article seeks to reiterate the seriousness of shitposting, which, in the age of COVID-19, Zoom-bombing has become an example of. I seek to purport the insidiousness of the tactical strategies of the alt-right online in a larger context of white violence online. Therefore, I am proposing a more critical look at the tactical use of the Internet by the alt-right, in theorising shitposting and Zoom-bombing as means of hate crimes wherein they impose upon anti-racist activism and organising. Newlands et al., receiving only limited exposure pre-pandemic, write that “Zoom has become a household name and an essential component for parties (Matyszczyk, 2020), weddings (Pajer, 2020), school and work” (1). However, through this came the strategic use of co-opting the application by the alt-right to digitise terror and ensure a “growing framework of memetic warfare” (Nakamura et al. 31). Kruglanski et al. label this co-opting of online tools to champion white supremacy operations via Zoom-bombing an example of shitposting: Not yet protesting the lockdown orders in front of statehouses, far-right extremists infiltrated Zoom calls and shared their screens, projecting violent and graphic imagery such as swastikas and pornography into the homes of unsuspecting attendees and making it impossible for schools to rely on Zoom for home-based lessons. Such actions, known as “Zoombombing,” were eventually curtailed by Zoom features requiring hosts to admit people into Zoom meetings as a default setting with an option to opt-out. (128) By this, we can draw on existing literature that has theorised white supremacists as innovation opportunists regarding their co-option of the Internet, as supported through Jessie Daniels’s work, “during the shift of the white supremacist movement from print to digital online users exploited emerging technologies to further their ideological goals” (“Algorithmic Rise” 63). Selfe and Selfe write in their description of the computer interface as a “political and ideological boundary land” that may serve larger cultural systems of domination in much the same way that geopolitical borders do (418). Considering these theorisations of white supremacists utilising tools that appear neutral for racialised aims and the political possibilities of whiteness online, we can consider racist Zoom-bombing as an assertion of a battle that seeks to disrupt racial justice online but also assert white supremacy as its own legitimate cause. My first encounter of local Zoom-bombing was during the Institute for Culture and Society (ICS) Seminar titled “Intersecting Crises” by Western Sydney University. The event sought to explore the concatenation of deeply inextricable ecological, political, economic, racial, and social crises. An academic involved in the facilitation of the event, Alana Lentin, live tweeted during the Zoom-bombing of the event: Figure 2: Academic Alana Lentin on Twitter live tweeting the Zoom-bombing of the Intersecting Crises event. Upon reflecting on this instance, I wondered, could efforts have been organised to prevent white supremacy? In considering who may or may not be responsible for halting racist shit-posting, we can problematise the work of R David Lankes, who writes that “Zoom-bombing is when inadequate security on the part of the person organizing a video conference allows uninvited users to join and disrupt a meeting. It can be anything from a prankster logging on, yelling, and logging off to uninvited users” (217). However, this beckons two areas to consider in theorising racist Zoom-bombing as a means of isolated trolling. First, this approach to Zoom-bombing minimises the sinister intentions of Zoom-bombing when referring to people as pranksters. Albeit withholding the “mimic trickery and mischief that were already present in spaces such as real-life classrooms and town halls” it may be more useful to consider theorising Zoom-bombing as often racialised harassment and a counter aggression to anti-racist initiatives (Nakamura et al. 30). Due to the live nature of most Zoom meetings, it is increasingly difficult to halt the threat of the alt-right from Zoom-bombing meetings. In “A First Look at Zoom-bombings” a range of preventative strategies are encouraged for Zoom organisers including “unique meeting links for each participant, although we acknowledge that this has usability implications and might not always be feasible” (Ling et al. 1). The alt-right exploit gaps, akin to co-opting the mainstreaming of trolling and shitposting, to put forward their agenda on white supremacy and assert their presence when not welcome. Therefore, utilising the pandemic to instil new forms of terror, it can be said that Zoom-bombing becomes a new means to shitpost, where the alt-right “exploits Zoom’s uniquely liminal space, a space of intimacy generated by users via the relationship between the digital screen and what it can depict, the device’s audio tools and how they can transmit and receive sound, the software that we can see, and the software that we can’t” (Nakamura et al. 29). Second, this definition of Zoom-bombing begs the question, is this a fair assessment to write that reiterates the blame of organisers? Rather, we can consider other gaps that have resulted in the misuse of Zoom co-opted by the alt-right: “two conditions have paved the way for Zoom-bombing: a resurgent fascist movement that has found its legs and best megaphone on the Internet and an often-unwitting public who have been suddenly required to spend many hours a day on this platform” (Nakamura et al. 29). In this way, it is interesting to note that recommendations to halt Zoom-bombing revolve around the energy, resources, and attention of the organisers to practically address possible threats, rather than the onus being placed on those who maintain these systems and those who Zoom-bomb. As Jessie Daniels states, “we should hold the platform accountable for this type of damage that it's facilitated. It's the platform's fault and it shouldn't be left to individual users who are making Zoom millions, if not billions, of dollars right now” (Ruf 8). Brian Friedberg, Gabrielle Lim, and Joan Donovan explore the organised efforts by the alt-right to impose on Zoom events and disturb schedules: “coordinated raids of Zoom meetings have become a social activity traversing the networked terrain of multiple platforms and web spaces. Raiders coordinate by sharing links to Zoom meetings targets and other operational and logistical details regarding the execution of an attack” (14). By encouraging a mass coordination of racist Zoom-bombing, in turn, social justice organisers are made to feel overwhelmed and that their efforts will be counteracted inevitably by a large and organised group, albeit appearing prankster-like. Aligning with the idea that “Zoombombing conceals and contains the terror and psychological harm that targets of active harassment face because it doesn’t leave a trace unless an alert user records the meeting”, it is useful to consider to what extent racist Zoom-bombing becomes a new weapon of the alt-right to entertain and affirm current members, and engage and influence new members (Nakamura et al. 34). I propose that we consider Zoom-bombing through shitposting, which is within “the location of matrix of domination (white supremacy, heteropatriarchy, ableism, capitalism, and settler colonialism)” to challenge the role of interface design and Internet infrastructure in enabling racial violence online (Costanza-Chock). Conclusion As Nakamura et al. have argued, Zoom-bombing is indeed “part of the lineage or ecosystem of trollish behavior”, yet these new forms of alt-right shitposting “[need] to be critiqued and understood as more than simply trolling because this term emerged during an earlier, less media-rich and interpersonally live Internet” (32). I recommend theorising the alt-right in a way that highlights the larger structures of white power, privilege, and supremacy that maintain their online and offline legacies beyond Zoom, “to view white supremacy not as a static ideology or condition, but to instead focus on its geographic and temporal contingency” that allows acts of hate crime by individuals on politicised bodies (Inwood and Bonds 722). This corresponds with Claire Renzetti’s argument that “criminologists theorise that committing a hate crime is a means of accomplishing a particular type of power, hegemonic masculinity, which is described as white, Christian, able-bodied and heterosexual” – an approach that can be applied to theorisations of the alt-right and online violence (136). This violent white masculinity occupies a hegemonic hold in the formation, reproduction, and extension of white supremacy that is then shared, affirmed, and idolised through a racialised Internet (Donaldson et al.). Therefore, I recommend that we situate Zoom-bombing as a means of shitposting, by reiterating the severity of shitposting with the same intentions and sinister goals of hate crimes and racial violence. References Back, Les, et al. “Racism on the Internet: Mapping Neo-Fascist Subcultures in Cyber-Space.” Nation and Race: The Developing Euro-American Racist Subculture. Eds. Jeffrey Kaplan and Tore Bjørgo. 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The habitual passenger cannot grasp the folly of traffic based overwhelmingly on transport. His inherited perceptions of space and time and of personal pace have been industrially deformed. He has lost the power to conceive of himself outside the passenger role (Illich 25).The most basic definition of Stillness refers to a state of being in the absence of both motion and disturbance. Some might say it is anti-American. Stillness denies the democratic freedom of mobility in a social system where, as Ivan Illich writes in Energy and Equity, people “believe that political power grows out of the capacity of a transportation system, and in its absence is the result of access to the television screen” (26). In America, it isn’t too far of a stretch to say that most are quite used to being interpolated as some sort of subject of the screen, be it the windshield or the flat screen. Whether in transport or tele-vision, life is full of traffic and flickering images. In the best of times there is a choice between being citizen-audience member or citizen-passenger. A full day might include both.But during the summer of 2008 things seemed to change. The citizen-passenger was left beached, not in some sandy paradise but in their backyard. In this state of SIMBY (stuck in my backyard), the citizen-passenger experienced the energy crisis first hand. Middle class suburbanites were forced to come to terms with a new disturbance due to rising fuel prices: unattainable motion. Domestic travel had been exchanged for domestication. The citizen-passenger was rendered what Paul Virilio might call, “a voyager without a voyage, this passenger without a passage, the ultimate stranger, and renegade to himself” (Crepuscular 131). The threat to capitalism posed by this unattainable motion was quickly thwarted by America’s 'big box' stores, hotel chains, and news networks. What might have become a culturally transformative politics of attainable stillness was hijacked instead by The Great American Staycation. The Staycation is a neologism that refers to the activity of making a vacation out of staying at home. But the Staycation is more than a passing phrase; it is a complex cultural phenomenon that targeted middle class homes during the summer of 2008. A major constraint to a happy Staycation was the uncomfortable fact that the middle class home was not really a desirable destination as it stood. The family home would have to undergo a series of changes, one being the initiation of a set of time management strategies; and the second, the adoption of new objects for consumption. Good Morning America first featured the Staycation as a helpful parenting strategy for what was expected to be a long and arduous summer. GMA defined the parameters of the Staycation with four golden rules in May of 2008:Schedule start and end dates. Otherwise, it runs the risk of feeling just like another string of nights in front of the tube. Take Staycation photos or videos, just as you would if you went away from home on your vacation. Declare a 'choratorium.' That means no chores! Don't make the bed, vacuum, clean out the closets, pull weeds, or nothing, Pack that time with activities. (Leamy)Not only did GMA continue with the theme throughout the summer but the other networks also weighed in. Expert knowledge was doled out and therapeutic interventions were made to make people feel better about staying at home. Online travel companies such as expedia.com and tripadvisor.com, estimated that 60% of regular vacation takers would be staying home. With the rise and fall of gas prices, came the rise of fall of the Staycation.The emergence of the Staycation occurred precisely at a time when American citizens were confronted with the reality that their mobility and localities, including their relationship to domestic space, were structurally bound to larger geopolitical forces. The Staycation was an invention deployed by various interlocutors most threatened by the political possibilities inherent in stillness. The family home was catapulted into the circuits of production, consumption, and exchange. Big TV and Big Box stores furthered individual’s unease towards having to stay at home by discursively constructing the gas prices as an impediment to a happy domestic life and an affront to the American born right to be mobile. What was reinforced was that Americans ideally should be moving, but could not. Yet, at the same time it was rather un-American not to travel. The Staycation was couched in a powerful rhetoric of one’s moral duty to the nation while playing off of middle class anxieties and senses of privilege regarding the right to be mobile and the freedom to consume. The Staycation satiates all of these tensions by insisting that the home can become a somewhere else. Between spring and autumn of 2008, lifestyle experts, representatives from major retailers, and avid Staycationers filled morning slots on ABC, NBC, FOX, CBS, and CNN with Staycation tips. CNN highlighted the Staycation as a “1st Issue” in their Weekend Report on 12 June 2008 (Alban). This lead story centred on a father in South Windsor, Connecticut “who took the money he would normally spend on vacations and created a permanent Staycation residence.” The palatial home was fitted with a basketball court, swimming pool, hot tub, gardening area, and volleyball court. In the same week (and for those without several acres) CBS’s Early Show featured the editor of behindthebuy.com, a company that specialises in informing the “time starved consumer” about new commodities. The lifestyle consultant previewed the newest and most necessary items “so you could get away without leaving home.” Key essentials included a “family-sized” tent replete with an air conditioning unit, a projector TV screen amenable to the outdoors, a high-end snow-cone maker, a small beer keg, a mini-golf kit, and a fast-setting swimming pool that attaches to any garden hose. The segment also extolled the virtues of the Staycation even when gas prices might not be so high, “you have this stuff forever, if you go on vacation all you have are the pictures.” Here, the value of the consumer products outweighs the value of erstwhile experiences that would have to be left to mere recollection.Throughout the summer ABC News’ homepage included links to specific products and profiled hotels, such as Hiltons and Holiday Inns, where families could at least get a few miles away from home (Leamy). USA Today, in an article about retailers and the Staycation, reported that Wal-Mart would be “rolling back prices on everything from mosquito repellent to portable DVD players to baked beans and barbecue sauce”. Target and Kohl’s were celebrated for offering discounts on patio furniture, grills, scented candles, air fresheners and other products to make middle class homes ‘staycationable’. A Lexis Nexis count revealed over 200 news stories in various North American sources, including the New York Times, Financial Times, Investors Guide, the Christian Science Monitor, and various local Consumer Credit Counselling Guides. Staying home was not necessarily an inexpensive option. USA Today reported brand new grills, grilling meats, patio furniture and other accoutrements were still going to cost six percent more than the previous year (24 May 2008). While it was suggested that the Staycation was a cost-saving option, it is clear Staycations were for the well-enough off and would likely cost more or as much as an actual vacation. To put this in context with US vacation policies and practices, a recent report by the Center for Economic and Policy Research called No-Vacation Nation found that the US is the only advanced economy in the world that does not guarantee its workers paid vacation (Ray and Schmidt 3). Subsequently, without government standards 25% of Americans have neither paid vacation nor paid holidays. The Staycation was not for the working poor who were having difficulty even getting to work in the first place, nor were they for the unemployed, recently job-less, or the foreclosed. No, the Staycationers were middle class suburbanites who had backyards and enough acreage for swimming pools and tents. These were people who were going to be ‘stuck’ at home for the first time and a new grill could make that palatable. The Staycation would be exciting enough to include in their vacation history repertoire.All of the families profiled on the major networks were white Americans and in most cases nuclear families. For them, unattainable motion is an affront to the privilege of their white middle class mobility which is usually easy and unencumbered, in comparison to raced mobilities. Doreen Massey’s theory of “power geometry” which argues that different people have differential and inequitable relationships to mobility is relevant here. The lack of racial representation in Staycation stories reinforces the reality that has already been well documented in the works of bell hooks in Black Looks: Race and Representation, Lynn Spigel in Welcome to the Dreamhouse: Popular Media and Postwar Suburbs, and Jeremy Packer in Mobility without Mayhem: Safety, Cars and Citizenship. All of these critical works suggest that taking easily to the great open road is not the experience of all Americans. Freedom of mobility is in fact a great American fiction.The proprietors for the Great American Staycation were finding all sorts of dark corners in the American psyche to extol the virtues of staying at home. The Staycation capitalised on latent xenophobic tendencies of the insular family. Encountering cultural difference along the way could become taxing and an impediment to the fully deserved relaxation that is the stuff of dream vacations. CNN.com ran an article soon after their Weekend Report mentioned above quoting a life coach who argued Staycations were more fitting for many Americans because the “strangeness of different cultures or languages, figuring out foreign currencies or worrying about lost luggage can take a toll” (12 June 2008). The Staycation sustains a culture of insularity, consumption, distraction, and fear, but in doing so serves the national economic interests quite well. Stay at home, shop, grill, watch TV and movies, these were the economic directives programmed by mass media and retail giants. As such it was a cultural phenomenon commensurable to the mundane everyday life of the suburbs.The popular version of the Staycation is a highly managed and purified event that reflects the resort style/compound tourism of ‘Club Meds’ and cruise ships. The Staycation as a new form of domestication bears a significant resemblance to the contemporary spatial formations that Marc Augé refers to as non-places – contemporary forms of homogeneous architecture that are scattered across disparate locales. The nuclear family home becomes another point of transfer in the global circulation of capital, information, and goods. The chain hotels and big box stores that are invested in the Staycation are touted as part of the local economy but instead devalue the local by making it harder for independent restaurants, grocers, farmers’ markets and bed and breakfasts to thrive. In this regard the Staycation excludes the local economy and the community. It includes backyards not balconies, hot-dogs not ‘other’ types of food, and Wal-Mart rather than then a local café or deli. Playing on the American democratic ideals of freedom of mobility and activating one’s identity as a consumer left little room to re-think how life in constant motion (moving capital, moving people, moving information, and moving goods) was partially responsible for the energy crisis in the first place. Instead, staying at home became a way for the American citizen to support the floundering economy while waiting for gas prices to go back down. And, one wouldn’t have to look that much further to see that the Staycation slips discursively into a renewed mission for a just cause – the environment. For example, ABC launched at the end of the summer a ruse of a national holiday, “National Stay at Home Week” with the tag line: “With gas prices so high, the economy taking a nosedive and global warming, it's just better to stay in and enjoy great ABC TV.” It comes as no shock that none of the major networks covered this as an environmental issue or an important moment for transformation. In fact, the air conditioning units in backyard tents attest to quite the opposite. Instead, the overwhelming sense was of a nation waiting at home for it all to be over. Soon real life would resume and everyone could get moving again. The economic slowdown and the energy crisis are examples of the breakdown and failure of capitalism. In a sense, a potential opened up in this breakdown for Stillness to become an alternative to life in constant and unrequited motion. That is, for the practice of non-movement and non-circulation to take on new political and cultural forms especially in the sprawling suburbs where the car moves individuals between the trifecta of home, box store, and work. The economic crisis is also a temporary stoppage of the flows. If the individual couldn’t move, global corporate capital would find a way to set the house in motion, to reinsert it back into the machinery that is now almost fully equated with freedom.The reinvention of the home into a campground or drive-in theatre makes the house a moving entity, an inverted mobile home that is both sedentary and in motion. Paul Virilio’s concept of “polar inertia” is important here. He argues, since the advent of transportation individuals live in a state of “resident polar inertia” wherein “people don’t move, even when they’re in a high speed train. They don’t move when they travel in their jet. They are residents in absolute motion” (Crepuscular 71). Lynn Spigel has written extensively about these dynamics, including the home as mobile home, in Make Room for TV and Welcome to the Dreamhouse. She examines how the introduction of the television into domestic space is worked through the tension between the private space of the home and the public world outside. Spigel refers to the dual emergence of portable television and mobile homes. Her work shows how domestic space is constantly imagined and longed for “as a vehicle of transport through which they (families) could imaginatively travel to an illicit place of passion while remaining in the safe space of the family home” (Welcome 60-61). But similarly to what Virilio has inferred Spigel points out that these mobile homes stayed parked and the portable TVs were often stationary as well. The Staycation exists as an addendum to what Spigel captures about the relationship between domestic space and the television set. It provides another example of advertisers’ attempts to play off the suburban tension between domestic space and the world “out there.” The Staycation exacerbates the role of the domestic space as a site of production, distribution, and consumption. The gendered dynamics of the Staycation include redecorating possibilities targeted at women and the backyard beer and grill culture aimed at men. In fact, ‘Mom’ might suffer the most during a Staycation, but that is another topic. The point is the whole family can get involved in a way that sustains the configurations of power but with an element of novelty.The Staycation is both a cultural phenomenon that feeds off the cultural anxieties of the middle class and an economic directive. It has been constructed to maintain movement at a time when the crisis of capital contains seeds for an alternative, for Stillness to become politically and culturally transformative. But life feels dull when the passenger is stuck and the virtues of Stillness are quite difficult to locate in this cultural context. As Illich argues, “the passenger who agrees to live in a world monopolised by transport becomes a harassed, overburdened consumer of distances whose shape and length he can no longer control” (45). When the passenger is the mode of identification, immobility becomes unbearable. In this context a form of “still mobility” such as the Staycation might be satisfying enough. ConclusionThe still citizen is a threatening figure for capital. In Politics of the Very Worst Virilio argues at the heart of capitalism is a state of permanent mobility, a condition to which polar inertia attests. The Staycation fits completely within this context of this form of mobile immobility. The flow needs to keep flowing. When people are stationary, still, and calm the market suffers. It has often been argued that the advertising industries construct dissatisfaction while also marginally eliminating it through the promises of various products, yet ultimately leaving the individual in a constant state of almost satisfied but never really. The fact that the Staycation is a mode of waiting attests to this complacent dissatisfaction.The subjective and experiential dimensions of living in a capitalist society are experienced through one’s relationship to time and staying on the right path. The economic slowdown and the energy crisis are also crises in pace, energy, and time. The mobility and tempo, the pace and path that capital relies on, has become unhinged and vulnerable to a resistant re-shaping. The Staycation re-sets the tempo of suburbia to meet the new needs of an economic slowdown and financial crisis. Following the directive to staycate is not necessarily a new form of false consciousness, but an intensified technological and economic mode of subjection that depends on already established cultural anxieties. But what makes the Staycation unique and worthy of consideration is that capitalists and other disciplinary institutions of power, in this case big media, construct new and innovative ways to control people’s time and regulate their movement in space. The Staycation is a particular re-territorialisation of the temporal and spatial dimensions of home, work, and leisure. In sum, Staycation and the staging of National Stay at Home Week reveals a systemic mobilising and control of a population’s pace and path. As Bernard Stiegler writes in Technics and Time: “Deceleration remains a figure of speed, just as immobility is a figure of movement” (133). These processes are inexorably tied to one another. Thinking back to the opening quote from Illich, we could ask how we might stop imagining ourselves as passengers – ushered along, falling in line, or complacently floating past. To be still in the flows could be a form of ultimate resistance. In fact, Stillness has the possibility of becoming an autonomous practice of refusal. It is after all this threatening potentiality that created the frenzied invention of the Staycation in the first place. To end where I began, Illich states that “the habitual passenger must adopt a new set of beliefs and expectations if he is to feel secure in the strange world” (25-26). The horizon of political possibility is uniformly limited for the passenger. Whether people actually did follow these directives during the summer of 2008 is hard to determine. The point is that the energy crisis and economic slowdown offered a potential to vacate capital’s premises, both its pace and path. But corporate capital is doing its best to make sure that people wait, staycate, and see it through. The Staycation is not just about staying at home for vacation. It is about staying within reach, being accounted for, at a time when departing global corporate capital seems to be the best option. ReferencesAlban, Debra. “Staycations: Alternative to Pricey, Stressful Travel.” CNN News 12 June 2008. 6 Mar. 2009 ‹http://edition.cnn.com/2008/LIVING/worklife/06/12/balance.staycation/index.html›.Augé, Marc. Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity. Verso, London, 1995.hooks, bell. Black Looks: Race and Representation. Boston: South End Press, 1992.Illich, Ivan. Energy and Equity. New York: Perennial Library, 1974.Leamy, Elisabeth. “Tips for Planning a Great 'Staycation'.” ABC News 23 May 2008. 6 Mar. 2009 ‹http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Parenting/story?id=4919211›.Massey, Doreen. Space, Place, and Gender. Minneapolis: Minnesota U P, 1994.Packer, Jeremy. Mobility without Mayhem: Safety, Cars, and Citizenship. Durham, NC: Duke U P, 2008.Ray, Rebecca and John Schmitt. No-Vacation Nation. Washington, D.C.: Center for Economic and Policy Research, May 2007.Spigel, Lynn. Make Room for TV: Television and the Family Ideal in Postwar America. Chicago: Chicago U P, 1992.———. Welcome to the Dreamhouse: Popular Media and Postwar Suburbs. Durham, NC: Duke U P, 2001.Stiegler, Bernard. Technics and Time 2: Disorientation. Trans. Stephen Barker. California: Stanford University Press, 2009.USA Today. “Retailers Promote 'Staycation' Sales.” 24 May 2008. 6 Mar. 2009 ‹http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/retail/2008-05-24-staycations_N.htm›.Virilio, Paul. Speed and Politics. Trans. Mark Polizzotti. New York: Semiotext(e), 1986.———. In James der Derian, ed. The Virilio Reader. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1998.———. Politics of the Very Worst. New York: Semiotext(e), 1999.———. Crepuscular Dawn. New York: Semiotext(e), 2002.

Pat Buchanan’s infamous speech to the 1992 Republican convention (Buchanan), has often been understood as a defining moment in the US culture wars (Hartman). The speech’s central claim that “there is a religious war going on in our country for the soul of America” oriented around the idea that the US was a nation divided between two opposing values systems. On one side were Democrat defenders of “abortion on demand” and “homosexual rights” and on the other those who, like then Republican presidential candidate George Bush, stood by the “Judeo-Christian values and beliefs upon which this nation was built.”Buchanan’s speech helped popularise the idea that the US was riven by fundamental cultural divides, an idea that became a media staple but was hotly contested by scholars.The year before Buchanan’s speech, James Davison Hunter’s Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America advanced a “culture wars thesis” based in claims of a growing “political and social hostility rooted in different systems of moral understanding” (Hunter 42). Hunter cited increasing polarisation in debates on “abortion, child care, funding for the arts, affirmative action and quotas, gay rights, values in public education, or multiculturalism” (Hunter 42) and claimed that the defining religious divides in the US were no longer between religions but within them. In the intense scholarly debate that followed its publication, as Irene Taviss Thomson has summarised, little empirical evidence emerged of any real divide.Yet this lack of empirical evidence does not mean that talk of culture wars can be easily dismissed. The culture wars, as I have argued elsewhere (Davis), were and are a media product designed to sharpen social divides for electoral gain. No doubt because of the usefulness of this product, culture wars discourse remains a persistent feature of public debate across the west. The symbolic discourse that positions the culture wars and its supposedly intractable differences as real, I argue, deserves consideration in its own right.In what follows, I analyse the use of culture wars discourse in two defining documents. The first, Pat Buchanan’s 1992 “culture wars” speech, reputedly put the culture wars front and centre of US politics. The second, Allum Bokhari and Milo Yiannopoulos’s 2016 article in Breitbart News, “An Establishment Conservative’s Guide to the Alt-Right” (Bokhari and Yiannopoulos), sought to define its moment by affirming the arrival of a new political movement, the “alt-right”, as a force in US politics. With its homage to Buchanan and written in the belief that “politics is downstream from culture” the article sought to position the alt-right as an inheritor of Buchanan’s legacy and to mark a new defining moment in an ongoing culture war.This self-referential framing, I argue, belies deep differences between Buchanan’s rhetoric and that of Bokhari and Yiannopoulos. Buchanan’s defence of American values, while spectacularly adversarial, is at base democratic, whereas, despite its culturalist posturing, one project of “An Establishment Conservative’s Guide to the Alt-Right” is to reinstate biological notions of race and gender difference in the political agenda.Culture Wars ThenBuchanan’s speech came after decades of sniping. The emergence of the “counterculture” of the 1960s helped create a basis for the idea that US politics was defined by an irreducible clash of values (Thomson). Buchanan played a direct role in fostering such divides. As he famously wrote in a 1971 memo to then President Richard Nixon in which he suggested exploiting racial divides, if we “cut … the country in half, my view is that we would have far the larger half.” But the language of Buchanan’s 1992 speech, while incendiary, is nevertheless democratic in its emphasis on delineating rival political platforms. Much culture wars discourse focuses on the embodied politics of gender, sexuality and race. A principal target of Buchanan’s speech was abortion, which since the Roe versus Wade judgement of 1973 that legalised part-term abortion in the US has been a defining culture wars issue. At the “top” of Democrat candidate Bill Clinton’s agenda, Buchanan claimed, is “unrestricted abortion on demand.” Buchanan singled out Hillary Clinton for special attack:friends, this is radical feminism. The agenda Clinton & Clinton would impose on America–abortion on demand … homosexual rights, discrimination against religious schools, women in combat … is not the kind of change America wants.Buchanan then pledges to support George Bush, who had beaten him for the Republican nomination, and Bush’s stance “against the amoral idea that gay and lesbian couples should have the same standing in law as married men and women.” He also supports Bush on “right-to-life, and for voluntary prayer in the public schools.” Buchanan’s language here references essentialist ideas of morality and contrasts them against the supposed immorality of his opponents but is ultimately predicated in the democratic languages of law-making and rights and the adversarial language of electoral politics. Through these contrasts the speech builds to its famous centrepiece:my friends, this election is about much more than who gets what. It is about who we are. It is about what we believe. It is about what we stand for as Americans. There is a religious war going on in our country for the soul of America. It is a cultural war, as critical to the kind of nation we will one day be as was the Cold War itself.Buchanan, here, sharpens and maps the contrasts he has been working with onto differences in identity. Politics, here, is not about the distribution of resources but is about identity, values and a commensurate difference in belief systems. On one side are righteous Americans, on the other a culture of immorality that threatens the proper religious basis of the nation. Notably, the speech makes no direct mention of race. It instead uses code. Evoking the LA riots that took place earlier that year, Buchanan sides with the troopers who broke up the riots.they walked up a dark street, where the mob had looted and burned every building but one, a convalescent home for the aged. The mob was heading in, to ransack and loot the apartments of the terrified old men and women. When the troopers arrived, M-16s at the ready, the mob threatened and cursed, but the mob retreated. It had met the one thing that could stop it: force, rooted in justice, backed by courage … and as they took back the streets of LA, block by block, so we must take back our cities, and take back our culture, and take back our country. God bless you, and God bless America.Unsaid here is that the “mob” were black and reacting against the injustice of the beating of a black man, Rodney King, by police. The implication is that to “take back our culture … take back our country” is to vanquish the restive black enemy within. By using code Buchanan is able to avoid possible charges of racism, positioning the rioters not as racially different but as culturally different; their deficit is not genetic but patriotic.Culture Wars NowSince the 1990s culture wars discourse has become entrenched as a media staple. Supposedly intractable values divides between “conservatives” and “liberals” play out incessantly across a conservative media sphere that spans outlets (Fox News), platforms (Breitbart News), broadcasters (Rush Limbaugh), and commentators such as Ann Coulter, in debate over issues ranging from gun control, LGBTQI rights, American history and sex education and prayer in schools. This discourse, crystalised in divisive terms such as “cultural Marxist,” “social justice warrior” and “snowflake”, is increasingly generated by online bulletin boards such as the 4chan/pol/(politically incorrect) and /b/-Random boards, which function as a crucible for trolling and meme-making (Phillips) that routinely targets minorities, women and especially feminists. As Angela Nagle has said (24), Gamergate, the 2014 episode in which female game reviewers and designers critical of sexism in the gaming industry were targeted with organised trolling, played a pivotal role in “uniting different online groups and spreading the tactics of chan culture to the broad online right.” Other conduits for extremist discourse to the mainstream include sites such as the white supremacist Daily Stormer, alt-right sites, and “men’s rights” sites such as Return of Kings. The self-described aim of this discourse, as the white nationalist Jared Swift has said, has been to move the “Overton window” of what constitutes acceptable public discourse far to the right (in Daniels).The emergence of this diverse conservative media sphere provided opportunities for new celebrities willing to parse older forms of culture wars discourse with new forms of online extremism and to announce themselves as ringmasters of whatever circus might result. One such person is Milo Yiannopoulos. Quick to read the opportunities in Gamergate, he announced himself a sudden convert to the gaming cause (which he had previously dismissed) and helped turn the controversy into a rallying point for a nascent alt-right (Yiannopoulos). In 2014 Yiannopoulos was recruited by Breitbart News as a senior editor. Breitbart’s founder, Andrew Breitbart, is perhaps most famous for his dictum that “politics is downstream from culture”, an apt motto for a culture war.In 2016 Yiannopoulos, working with Bokhari, another Breitbart staffer, published, “An Establishment Conservative’s Guide to the Alt-Right”, which, written with Andrew Breitbart’s dictum in mind, sought to announce the radicalism of a new antiestablishment conservative political force and yet to make it palatable for a mainstream audience. The article claims the “paleoconservative movement that rallied around the presidential campaigns of Pat Buchanan” as one of the origins of the alt-right. Donald Trump is praised as “perhaps the first truly cultural candidate for President since Buchanan.” The rest, they argue, is little more than harmless online mischief. The alt-right, they claim, is a fun-loving “movement born out of the youthful, subversive, underground edges of the internet,” made up of people who are “dangerously bright.” Similarly, the “manosphere” of “men’s rights” sites, infamous for misogyny, are praised as “one of the alt-right’s most distinctive constituencies” and positioned as harmless alongside an endorsement of masculinist author Jack Donovan’s “wistful” laments for “the loss of manliness that accompanies modern, globalized societies.” Mass trolling and the harassment of opponents by “the alt-right’s meme team” is characterised as “undeniably hysterical” and justifiable in pursuit of lulz.The sexism and racism found on bulletin boards such as 4 chan, for Bokhari and Yiannopoulos, is no less harmless. Young people, they claim, are drawn to the alt right not because of ideology but because “it seems fresh, daring and funny” contrasted against the “authoritarian instincts of the progressive left. With no personal memories or experience of racism, they “have trouble believing it’s actually real … they don’t believe that the memes they post on/pol/ are actually racist. In fact, they know they’re not—they do it because it gets a reaction.”For all these efforts to style the alt-right as mere carnivalesque paleoconservatism, though, there is a fundamental difference between Buchanan’s speech and “An Establishment Conservative’s guide to the Alt-Right.” Certainly, Bokhari and Yiannopoulos hit the same culture wars touchstones as Buchanan: race, sexuality and gender issues. But whereas Buchanan’s speech instances the “new racism” (Ansell) in its use of code to avoid charges of biological racism, Yiannopoulos and Bokhari are more direct. The article presents as an exemplary instance of how to fight a culture war but epitomises a new turn in the culture wars from culture to biologism. The alt-right is positioned as unashamedly Eurocentric and having little to do with racism. Yiannopoulos and Bokhari also seek to distance the alt-right from the “Stormfront set” and “1488ers” (“1488” is code for neo-Nazi). Yet even as they do so, they embrace “human biodiversity” ideology (biological racism), ethnic separatism and the building of walls to keep different racial groups apart. “An Establishment Conservative’s guide to the alt-right” was written in secret consultation with leading white supremacist figures (Bernstein) and namechecks the openly white supremacist Richard Spencer who is given credit for helping found “the media empire of the modern-day alternative right.”Spencer has argued that “Race is something between a breed and an actual species” and a process of “peaceful ethnic cleansing” should take place by which non-white Americans leave (Nagle 59). He is an admirer of the Italian ‘superfascist’ and notorious racist Julius Evola, who Yiannopoulos and Bokhari also namecheck. They also excuse race hate sites such as VDARE and American Renaissance as home to “an eclectic mix of renegades who objected to the established political consensus in some form or another.” It is mere happenstance, according to Yiannopoulos and Bokhari, that the “natural conservatives” drawn to the alt-right are “mostly white, mostly male middle-American radicals, who are unapologetically embracing a new identity politics that prioritises the interests of their own demographic.” Yet as they also say,while eschewing bigotry on a personal level, the movement is frightened by the prospect of demographic displacement represented by immigration. Border walls are a much safer option. The alt-right’s intellectuals would also argue that culture is inseparable from race. The alt-right believe that some degree of separation between peoples is necessary for a culture to be preserved.“Demographic displacement” here is code for “white genocide” a meme assiduously promoted over many years by the US white supremacist Bob Whitaker, now deceased, who believed that immigration, interracial marriage, and multiculturalism dilute white influence and will drive the white population to extinction (Daniels). The idea that “culture is inseparable from race” and that “some degree of separation between peoples is necessary for a culture to be preserved” echo white supremacist calls for a white “ethno-state.”“An Establishment Conservative’s Guide to the Alt-Right” also namechecks so-called “neoreactionaries” such as Nick Land and Curtis Yarvin, who according to Yiannopoulos and Bokhari regard egalitarianism as an affront to “every piece of research on hereditary intelligence” and see liberalism, democracy and egalitarianism as having “no better a historical track record than monarchy.” Land and Yarvin, according to Yiannopoulos and Bokhari, offer a welcome vision of the conservative future:asking people to see each other as human beings rather than members of a demographic in-group, meanwhile, ignored every piece of research on tribal psychology … these were the first shoots of a new conservative ideology—one that many were waiting for.Culture Wars FuturesAs the culture wars have turned biological so they have become entrenched ever more firmly in mainstream politics. The “new conservative ideology” Yiannopoulos and Bokhari mention reeks of much older forms of conservative ideology currently being taken up in the US and elsewhere, based in naturalised gender hierarchies and racialised difference. This return to the past is fast becoming institutionalised. One of the stakes in the bitter 2018 dispute over the appointment of Brett Kavanaugh to the US Supreme Court was the prospect that Kavanaugh’s vote will create a conservative majority in the court that will enable the revisiting of a talismanic moment in the culture wars by overturning the Roe versus Wade judgement. Alt-right calls for a white ethno-state find an analogue in political attacks on asylum seekers, the reinforcement of racialised differential citizenship regimes around the globe, the building of walls to keep out criminalised Others, and anti-Islamic immigration measures. The mainstreaming of hate can be seen in the willingness of Donald Trump as a presidential candidate and as president to retweet the white supremacist tweets of @WhiteGenocideTM, his hesitation to repudiate a campaign endorsement by Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke, his retweeting of bogus black crime statistics, his accusations that illegal Mexican immigrants are criminals, drug dealers and rapists, and his anti-Islamic immigration stance. It can be seen, too, in the recent electoral successes of white nationalist parties across Europe.For all their embrace of Eurocentrism and “the preservation of western culture” the alt-right revisiting of issues of race and gender in terms that seek to reinstate biological hierarchy undermines the Enlightenment ethics of equality and universalism that underpin western human rights conventions and democratic processes. The “Overton window” of acceptable public debate has moved far to the right and long taboo forms of race and gender-based hate have returned to the public agenda. Buchanan’s 1992 Republican convention speech, by contrast, for all its incendiary rhetoric, toxic homophobia, sneering anti-feminism, and coded racism, somehow manages to look like a relic from a kinder, gentler age.ReferencesAnsell, Amy Elizabeth. New Right, New Racism: Race and Reaction in the United States and Britain. Palgrave Macmillan, 1997.Bernstein, Joseph. “Here’s How Breitbart and Milo Smuggled Nazi and White Nationalist Ideas into the Mainstream.” BuzzFeed News, 10 May 2017. 4 Dec. 2018 <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/josephbernstein/heres-how-breitbart-and-milo-smuggled-white-nationalism>.Bokhari, Allum, and Milo Yiannopoulos. “An Establishment Conservative’s Guide to the Alt-Right.” Breitbart, 29 Mar. 2016. 4 Dec. 2018 <http://www.breitbart.com/tech/2016/03/29/an-establishment-conservatives-guide-to-the-alt-right/>.Buchanan, Pat. “1992 Republican National Convention Speech.” Patrick J. Buchanan - Official Website, 17 Aug. 1992. 4 Dec. 2018 <http://buchanan.org/blog/1992-republican-national-convention-speech-148>.Daniels, Jessie. “Twitter and White Supremacy, A Love Story.” Dame Magazine, 19 Oct. 2017. 4 Dec. 2018 <https://www.damemagazine.com/2017/10/19/twitter-and-white-supremacy-love-story/>.Davis, Mark. “Neoliberalism, the Culture Wars and Public Policy.” Australian Public Policy: Progressive Ideas in the Neoliberal Ascendency. Eds. Chris Miller and Lionel Orchard. Policy Press, 2014. 27–42.Hartman, Andrew. A War for the Soul of America: A History of the Culture Wars. University of Chicago Press, 2015.Hunter, James Davison. Culture Wars: The Struggle to Control the Family, Art, Education, Law, and Politics in America. Basic Books, 1991.Nagle, Angela. Kill All Normies: Online Culture Wars from 4chan and Tumblr to Trump and the Alt-Right. Zero Books, 2017.Phillips, Whitney. This Is Why We Can’t Have Nice Things: Mapping the Relationship between Online Trolling and Mainstream Culture. MIT Press, 2015.Thomson, Irene Taviss. Culture Wars and Enduring American Dilemmas. University of Michigan Press, 2010.Yiannopoulos, Milo. “Feminist Bullies Tearing the Video Game Industry Apart.” Breitbart, 1 Sep. 2014. 4 Dec. 2018 <http://www.breitbart.com/london/2014/09/01/lying-greedy-promiscuous-feminist-bullies-are-tearing-the-video-game-industry-apart/>.