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Journal articles on the topic 'Outside CEO'

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Published: 11 September 2021

Last updated: 11 February 2022

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1

Borokhovich, Kenneth A., Robert Parrino, and Teresa Trapani. "Outside Directors and CEO Selection." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 31, no. 3 (1996): 337. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2331395.

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2

Weisbach, Michael S. "Outside directors and CEO turnover." Journal of Financial Economics 20 (January 1988): 431–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(88)90053-0.

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3

Liang, Qiao, and George Hendrikse. "Cooperative CEO Identity and Efficient Governance: Member or Outside CEO?" Agribusiness 29, no. 1 (2013): 23–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/agr.21326.

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4

Judge, William Q., and Gregory H. Dobbins. "Antecedents and Effects of Outside Director’s Awareness of CEO Decision Style." Journal of Management 21, no. 1 (1995): 43–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/014920639502100103.

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There have been increasing calls for greater outside directors to be more aware and informed about the firm S decisions and decision-making process. If outsiders are more informed, it is presumed that they will work more closely with the CEO, and as a result, positively influence firm performance. This research examined individual outside directors’ awareness of one prominent aspect of the CEO’S activity, namely the CEO’S strategic decision style. We found that the outside director3 awareness of the CEOS decision style was positively related to financial profitability and negatively related to financial risk after controlling for industry, organizational size, profit orientation, board leadership, and proportion of insiders. In addition, we found that the CEOS tenure was negatively related to outsider awareness, but this relationship was stronger in non-profit organizations and situations where the CEO did not chair the board. Implications of the findings for future research and application are discussed.

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Liu, Xin, and Youzhi Xue. "Can outside CEO successors bring innovation to firms? Evidence from China." Chinese Management Studies 14, no. 4 (2020): 935–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/cms-11-2018-0765.

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Purpose This paper aims to examine the effect of outside chief executive officer (CEO) succession on firm innovation in Chinese companies and to explore the mechanism behind the process. By analyzing the motivation of CEO successors of different origins in the context of selection, this paper identifies the factors affecting outside CEO successors’ decision-making on post-succession firm innovation. Design/methodology/approach A Poisson regression model is used on a sample of 1,084 firm-year observations taken from Chinese listed companies that endured CEO succession during the period of 2009–2016. Fixed-effect Poisson regression modeling was performed after likelihood ratio and Hausman testing to assess the robustness of the findings. Findings The results show that outside CEO successions are significantly and negatively associated with post-succession firm innovation. Moreover, the authors found a negative effect of outside CEO succession on post-succession firm innovation when the predecessor has a long tenure or the successor is older. Originality/value .This study contributes to the literature on CEO succession, CEO–board relationships and firm innovation by shedding light on how agency, human capital and career-concerning theories in the CEO selection context apply to corporate governance and strategy. Moreover, by exploring the factors influencing CEO successors’ decision-making in terms of firm innovation in the Chinese social and cultural context, this paper identifies ways to promote firm innovation for Chinese companies from the concept of leadership succession.

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Mutlu, Canan, Sunay Mutlu, and Steve Sauerwald. "CEO Outside Board Service and Managerial Ability." Academy of Management Proceedings 2017, no. 1 (2017): 16460. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2017.16460abstract.

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7

Elsaid, Eahab, Wallace N. Davidson, and Xiaoxin Wang. "CEO successor compensation: outside versus inside successions." Journal of Management & Governance 15, no. 2 (2009): 187–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10997-009-9095-8.

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8

Schwartz, Marc A., and Louis B. Barnes. "Outside Boards and Family Businesses: Another Look." Family Business Review 4, no. 3 (1991): 269–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-6248.1991.00269.x.

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The debate over the usefulness of outside board members in family businesses goes on. Two of the three empirical studies on this issue tend to disagree on their value. Using a sample of 262 family business firms, drawn from the Business Week Newsletter for Family-Owned Businesses, this study surveyed CEOs to learn of their attitudes toward inside and outside board members. The findings strongly support the inclusion of outsiders and suggest that the more outside board members the better and the more inside family members the worse, but only where CEO desire, careful selection, and shared expectations are part of that outsider membership.

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9

Wang, Yuwei. "Monitoring CEOs: can insider-dominated boards do a good job?" Managerial Finance 40, no. 4 (2014): 355–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/mf-02-2013-0048.

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the monitoring effectiveness of insider-dominated boards and outsider-dominated boards on different types of CEOs. Design/methodology/approach – To test whether boards monitor inside CEOs and outside CEOs differently and to compare the sizes of the effects across board types, the paper relates CEO resignations to performance measure. The paper tests the hypotheses using logit models to estimate the probability of a CEO change. Findings – It is widely believed that only an outsider-dominated board can provide effective management oversight. The paper finds evidence supporting this view after categorized CEOs based on their affiliation with their firms upon hire. However, the paper also documents that after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), an insider-dominated board is just as effective as an outsider board in monitoring if the CEO was initially hired from outside of the firm. This suggests that there is no difference between insider and outsider board monitoring of outside CEOs. Therefore, after SOX, as far as board monitoring is concerned, what matters is the independence between the CEO and the firm rather than the board structure itself. Research limitations/implications – If effective board monitoring is the reason of the revised listing standards approved by Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2003 to require companies listed on NYSE or Nasdaq to have a board that is composed of a majority of independent (or outsider) directors, the paper has provided more flexibility and choices to the listed firms. For example, firms that will be better off with insider boards can choose to hire outside CEOs because monitoring effects on outside CEOs are the same regardless of board types after SOX. Originality/value – The results of this paper have interesting implication. First, the paper has shown that an outsider-dominated board is still a better monitor even after categorized CEOs based on their affiliation with their firms upon hire. Second, if effective board monitoring is the reason of the revised listing standards approved by SEC in 2003 to require companies listed on NYSE or Nasdaq to have a board that is composed of a majority of independent (or outsider) directors, the paper has provided more flexibility and choices to the listed firms. For example, firms that will be better off with insider boards can choose to hire outside CEOs because monitoring effects on outside CEOs are the same regardless of board types after SOX.

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10

Uzun, Hatice, and Elizabeth Webb. "After Sarbanes-Oxley: Market reaction to the appointment of outside directors." Corporate Ownership and Control 3, no. 3 (2006): 190–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i3c1p3.

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This paper examines the stock market reaction to the appointment of outside directors to the board both before and after the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002. We also examine whether the abnormal returns following outside director appointments are related to audit committee appointments, and whether the outsider has financial expertise. Results show that the market response to the announcement of an appointment of an outsider to the board of directors is mixed, and abnormal returns are not significantly different after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act compared to those announcements before the Act. Also, we find that the market reaction pre- Sarbanes Oxley is higher when the outsider is expanding the board, lower in cases of CEO/chairman duality, and lower if the outsider is appointed to the audit committee. Post- Sarbanes Oxley CEO/chairman duality has a positive impact on the abnormal returns.

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11

Bahtera, Novyandri Taufik. "SENTIMENT MARKET ANALYSIS ON REPLACEMENT ANNOUNCEMENT OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER (CEO)." TIJAB (The International Journal of Applied Business) 1, no. 1 (2019): 14. http://dx.doi.org/10.20473/tijab.v1.i1.2017.14-32.

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This study examines the market reaction to the announcement of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) measured by abnormal return. The study sample consisted of 55 CEO turnover announcements using the t-test to test information content of the announcement. The author groups the changes into two factors: (1) change process (routine and non-routine) and (2) substitute origin (inside and outside). The market reacts significantly positively to the announcement of CEO turnover routinely with the origin of the replacement from inside (inside) the company. Different reactions occur in the announcement of routine outside and non-routine insidediary CEO turnover where announcements are responded negatively and significantly. The market does not react to the announcement of non routine outside CEO changes. These results show that investors in Indonesia react positively to routine CEO turnover inside because investors believe that new CEOs will continue their strategy and leadership style and have lower levels of uncertainty. Negative reactions to routine outside CEO turnover are caused by the market belief that the successor will not continue the previous CEO's strategy and has a high degree of uncertainty. The cause of a negative market reaction to the announcement of a non-routine inside CEO turnover is that a replacement CEO will continue the old leadership style and jointly be responsible for the company's poor performance.

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12

Liu, Yun. "Outside options and CEO turnover: The network effect." Journal of Corporate Finance 28 (October 2014): 201–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.03.004.

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13

Rashid, Afzalur. "Board leadership structure and firm performance: An examination of resource dependence role." Corporate Board role duties and composition 7, no. 1 (2011): 7–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cbv7i1art1.

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This study examines if the CEO duality influence the firm economic performance in Bangladesh and the moderating effects of board composition in the form of outside independent directors. While doing so, it examines the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance during the pre appointment of outside independent directors and post appointment of outside independent directors (the role of other corporate governance mechanism as moderating variable). The finding is that there is there is a negative (non-significant) relationship between CEO duality and firm performance before appointment of outside independent directors in the board. However, independent leadership structure and firm performance is found to be positively related following the acquisition of resource (outside independent directors in the board) supporting the ’resource dependence theory’. The findings of this study partially support the ’agency theory’ and ’resource dependence theory’ but do not support the stewardship theory. This study contributes to the literature on CEO duality in the context of less a developed country.

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14

Ellis, M. E. "The Consequences of Forced CEO Succession for Outside Directors." CFA Digest 31, no. 2 (2001): 46–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.2469/dig.v31.n2.869.

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15

John, Kose, Hamid Mehran, and Yiming Qian. "Outside monitoring and CEO compensation in the banking industry." Journal of Corporate Finance 16, no. 4 (2010): 383–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2010.01.001.

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Farrell, Kathleen A., and David A. Whidbee. "The Consequences of Forced CEO Succession for Outside Directors." Journal of Business 73, no. 4 (2000): 597–627. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/209656.

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17

Parrino, Robert. "CEO turnover and outside succession A cross-sectional analysis." Journal of Financial Economics 46, no. 2 (1997): 165–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(97)00028-7.

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18

김영철 and SONG, Sujin. "CEO Compensation and Concurrent Executive Employment of Outside Directors." KDI Journal of Economic Policy 38, no. 3 (2016): 17–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.23895/kdijep.2016.38.3.17.

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Sanford Jr, Douglas, Yong-Yeon Ji, and Won-Yong Oh. "Poison pills and CEOs: The résumé matters." Corporate Board role duties and composition 8, no. 2 (2012): 24–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cbv8i2art3.

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Previous research has linked poison pill to corporate governance characteristics such as ownership structure and board composition while overlooking the attributes of top managers involved in poison pill decision. Based on upper echelons perspective, we changed the focus by investigating the effect of CEO characteristics on poison pills, as measured by age, business education, and outside directorships. Using a sample of Fortune 500 manufacturing firms, we found that CEO business education is positively associated with poison pills, while CEOs’ outside directorships are negatively associated with poison pills. Furthermore, we found that CEO duality moderates the relationship between CEO business education and poison pills. We make implications for both corporate governance research and managerial practices regarding firms’ anti-takeover provisions

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Straughan, Dulcie, Glen L. Bleske, and Xinshu Zhao. "Modeling Format and Source Effects of an Advocacy Message." Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 73, no. 1 (1996): 135–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/107769909607300112.

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When a company wants to spread its ideas, it faces key choices of format and source. It may choose to buy advertising space or to work with media reporters to generate news coverage. The source may be a corporate official, such as the CEO, or it may be an outside, noncommercial authority. The experiment reported in this study suggests that news stories may be more effective than ads. A CEO appears more persuasive than an outside authority because the CEO can generate more interest among the audience. Persuasion, in turn, may lead to behavioral changes.

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Kuang, Yu Flora, Bo Qin, and Jacco L. Wielhouwer. "CEO Origin and Accrual-Based Earnings Management." Accounting Horizons 28, no. 3 (2014): 605–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/acch-50810.

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SYNOPSIS This study examines the influence of CEO origin on accrual-based earnings management and how these effects evolve over the CEO's tenure in office. Compared with CEOs promoted from within the company, CEOs recruited from outside have a stronger incentive to demonstrate their abilities in the initial years after their appointment; these outside CEOs also may have a lower expectation of surviving the short run. We predict and find that outside CEOs engage in greater income-increasing manipulation in the early years of their tenure. However, the differences in earnings management practices become insignificant after CEOs survive the short run. Our results are robust to a variety of alternative hypotheses and sensitivity checks. The findings thus show that CEO origin is an important factor for explaining financial reporting strategies; they also add to our understanding of CEO origin, managerial horizon problems, and the determinants of aggressive accounting. Data Availability: The data used in this study are publicly available from the sources indicated in the text.

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Krigman, Laurie, and Mia L. Rivolta. "Can non-CEO inside directors add value? Evidence from unplanned CEO turnovers." Review of Accounting and Finance 18, no. 3 (2019): 456–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/raf-06-2018-0111.

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Purpose This paper aims to investigate the roles of non-CEO inside directors (NCIDs) in the new CEO-firm matching process using the context of unplanned CEO departures when immediate CEO succession planning becomes a sole board responsibility. Although critics argue that inside directors decrease the monitoring effectiveness of a board, inside directors arguably possess superior firm-specific experience and knowledge that can be beneficial during the leadership transition. Design/methodology/approach The authors use a comprehensive, manually collected data set of unplanned CEO departures from 1993 to 2012. Findings The authors find that NCIDs play an important role in the CEO transitioning process. They help firms identify qualified inside replacements and provide stability as the new permanent or interim CEO. In addition, NCIDs facilitate the transfer of information and help the new external CEOs succeed. They show that the longer the NCID stays with the company, the longer the tenure of the new CEO. They also document that the presence of NCIDs improves operating and stock performance; especially when the new CEO is hired from outside of the firm. Practical implications The impact of NCIDs is particularly important when the firm hires an outsider as the new CEO. These results suggest that board composition affects frictions in the CEO labor market. Originality/value The literature has predominantly focused on the downside of having inside directors. Too many inside directors on a firm’s board is often associated with ineffective boards and entrenchment. To the contrary, the authors focus on a potential benefit of having inside directors.

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Zhang, Liang, Zhe Zhang, Ming Jia, and Yeyao Ren. "Do outside directors matter? the impact of prestigious CEOs on firm performance." Chinese Management Studies 11, no. 2 (2017): 284–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/cms-10-2016-0199.

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Purpose The effect of prestigious CEOs on firm performance is not clear. By integrating resource dependence and agency theories, this paper aims to focus on how prestigious CEOs affect firm performance and how informal relations between the CEO and outside directors affect agency costs and resource benefits associated with prestigious CEOs. Design/methodology/approach The authors use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to analyze their data set, which is conducted by a sample of 4,226 Chinese listed firms from 2009 to 2013. The authors also use OLS regression to assess the sensitivity and robustness of their findings. Findings The findings indicate that prestigious CEOs are significantly and positively associated with firm performance. Moreover, the authors find the effect of prestigious CEOs on firm performance is more pronounced when prestigious outside directors interact with prestigious CEOs. Guanxi – a Chinese concept similar to camaraderie – attenuates this association, particularly when the CEO and outside directors share the same surname. Research limitations/implications Future research should consider whether there is a mediating link between prestigious affiliates (i.e. CEOs) and firm performance. Practical/implications This paper provides two practical implications. First, China Securities Regulatory Commission policymakers should pay more attention to outside directors’ quality and ability and their informal guanxi with the CEO. Second, prestigious CEOs may also have potential costs. Originality/value This study contributes to corporate governance literature and CEO-board relations literature by shedding light on how resource dependence and agency theories apply to corporate governance.

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Lin, Ying-Fen. "Corporate governance, excess compensation, and CEO turnover in family and non-family businesses." Corporate Ownership and Control 4, no. 2 (2007): 46–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv4i2p4.

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The replacement of a CEO is one of the control mechanisms that companies employ to reduce the agency problems. This paper divides companies into non-family businesses and family businesses and investigates the influence of outside directors, outside blockholders, and excess compensation in CEOs termination process. The samples used in the paper come from manufacturing companies in Taiwan listed between 1996-1997; the analytical method is logistic regression model. The conclusion is as follows: 1. the characteristics of family businesses, corporate governance, and excess compensation have no correlation on CEO turnover. 2. External board members play an important role in CEO termination in non-family businesses

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Nam, Yoonsung, Tae-Joong Kim, and Wonyong Choi. "The moderating effect of international trade on outside director system in Korean firms." Journal of Korea Trade 23, no. 1 (2019): 19–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jkt-05-2018-0038.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the moderating effect of international trade on outside director system in Korean firms. The authors expected that Korean firms highly depending on international trade would mitigate the resource provision function of outside director system in order to reduce information asymmetry among global business partners. In addition, the authors tried to find out the functions of outside director system: the control function based on agency theory and resource provision function based on resource dependence theory. Design/methodology/approach The authors tested the hypotheses by Poisson regression with 2011 and 2002 Korean-listed manufacturing firms. The dependent variable is the number of excessively appointed outside directors and independent variable is CEO type: family CEO or professional CEO. The moderating variable is the dependency on international trade measured by export proportion out of total sales. Findings The authors found that not control but resource provision function was a main role of outside director system in Korean firms. The authors also found negative moderating effect of dependency on international trade, which means that firms highly depending on global market tended to consider outside director system as control function, namely “global standard.” Originality/value This paper is the leading study that tries to analyze empirically the relationship between international trade and the function of governance mechanism; outside director system in Korean firms. It also confirms that Korean firms adopted outside director system on the basis of the resource dependence theory.

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Mobbs, Shawn. "CEOs Under Fire: The Effects of Competition from Inside Directors on Forced CEO Turnover and CEO Compensation." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 48, no. 3 (2013): 669–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109013000318.

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AbstractThis study examines board monitoring when a credible chief executive officer (CEO) replacement is on the board. Inside directors whose talents are in greater demand externally, as reflected by their holding outside directorships, are more likely to become CEOs, and their presence is associated with greater forced CEO turnover sensitivity to accounting performance and CEO compensation sensitivity to stock performance. These results reveal that certain insiders strengthen board monitoring by serving as a readily available CEO replacement and contradict the presumption that all insiders are under CEO control. Furthermore, the results persist when accounting for the endogenous firm selection of talented inside directors.

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Davidson, Wallace N., Dan L. Worrell, and Dipa Dutia. "The Stock Market Effects of CEO Succession in Bankrupt Firms." Journal of Management 19, no. 3 (1993): 517–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/014920639301900301.

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This article examines the effects of CEO successions on stockholder wealth in large firms that are also experiencing bankruptcy. Succession announcements that occurred prior to and subsequent to bankruptcy announcements are associated with positive abnormal returns, and we found a greater incidence of outside succession near bankruptcy than for successions in general. The market’s reaction was also more positive for outsiders than for insiders, and this was especially so when the succession happened after bankruptcy.

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Setiawan, Doddy, Santoso Tri Hananto, and Phua Lian Kee. "An Analysis Of Market Reaction To Chief Executive Turnover Announcement In Indonesia: A Trading Volume Approach." Journal of Business & Economics Research (JBER) 9, no. 11 (2011): 63. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jber.v9i11.6501.

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<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span><p style="margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; text-align: justify; line-height: normal; mso-pagination: none;" class="MsoBodyText2"><span style="color: black; font-size: 10pt; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">This research aims at examining market reaction to Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnover announcements using trading volume approach. The sample of this research consists of 67 CEO turnover announcements without confounding effects and 117 CEO turnover announcements with confounding effects during the period 1992-2003 from Indonesian Stock Exchange. The authors use a t-test to examine the hypotheses. The results for market reaction to CEO turnover announcements using sample firms without confounding effect show that the trading volume before and after the CEO turnover announcements is not significantly different. In contrast, the trading volume before and after the CEO turnover for sample with confounding effect is significantly different. The results show that Indonesian investors consider other confounding events along with the CEO turnover announcements to make investment decisions. Analysis is also conducted to examine the influence of the succession process and the origin of the new CEO on the market reaction toward CEO turnover announcements. We do not find significant difference between the trading volumes before and after the CEO turnover announcement without confounding effect under both organizational contexts. On the other hand, we find significant difference between the trading volumes for non-routine CEO turnover announcements with confounding effects. This suggests that non-routine CEO turnover contains useful information to investors. In addition, significant difference in the trading volume between before and after non-routine CEO turnover with outside successors implies that Indonesian investors expect the incoming CEO from the outside to improve the performance of the company after the turnover process. </span></span></p><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span>

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Nam, Yoon Sung. "Antecedent Variables of CEO Succession from Professional CEO to Family CEO - Focusing on the Role of Outside Director and Family Member in BOD -." Journal of Human Resource Management Research 24, no. 4 (2017): 73–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.14396/jhrmr.2017.24.4.73.

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Lafuente, Esteban, and Miguel Angel García-Cestona. "Managerial turnover and performance in outside boards: Ownership makes the difference." Tec Empresarial 13, no. 3 (2019): 2–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.18845/te.v13i3.4471.

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We examine the relationship between CEO, board and Chairman turnovers and future performance in banks with fully outside boards. Using a rich dataset on executive turnovers from Costa Rica, we find that ownership moderates the effect that control mechanisms have on performance. Our results indicate that executive turnovers followed by the appointment of outside executives (CEO and Chairman) have a positive impact on performance. On the contrary, large board replacements create organisational costs and these negatively affect performance. These results mainly hold for shareholder-oriented banks where managers and owners are more likely to be aligned. Finally, these results underline the importance of examining the effectiveness of governance mechanisms in emerging economies. More detailed information about ownership, legal framework and executive replacements can make a difference when it comes to evaluate the effectiveness of governance mechanisms.

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Du, Fei, and Kehan Xu. "The Path to Independence: Board Cohesion, Cognitive Conflict, and Information Sharing." Journal of Management Accounting Research 30, no. 1 (2017): 31–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar-51834.

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ABSTRACT Corporate boards in America are dominated currently by outside directors because of the belief that they are more effective at monitoring management. There continues to be debate, however, concerning whether regulators should dictate board composition using input-based attributes of directors such as outside status. Opponents contend that board independence is best established through applying voluntary best practices to board processes. In this research, we study board processes and examine how the group task cohesion that is determined by directors' social similarity affects outside directors' reports that the CEO influences their beliefs, a key element of director independence. We propose that the degree of social similarity (similarity as to backgrounds) between outside directors and other directors is positively related to the degree of commitment directors have toward the board's tasks. We show that this task commitment (cohesion) has a positive effect on directors' efforts to obtain and receive information from the firm and CEO. Additional analyses show that the effect of information sharing on the level of CEO influence of outside directors depends on the presence of cognitive conflict—constructive discussion among directors regarding differing viewpoints—between the outside directors and the inside directors. We test our hypotheses using a survey, which was developed based on in-depth field interviews, and the archival data on directors' attributes as well as firm-level outcomes. Results support the hypotheses, and have implications for regulators and boards.

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Shawn, Hyuk. "Relationship between Outside Director’s Social Ties with CEO and Tax Avoidance." Korean Journal of Accounting Research 22, no. 3 (2017): 21–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.21737/kjar.2017.06.22.3.21.

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Li, Haidan, and Yiming Qian. "Outside CEO directors on compensation committees: whose side are they on?" Review of Accounting and Finance 10, no. 2 (2011): 110–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/14757701111129607.

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Kanagaretnam, Kiridaran, Robert Mathieu, and Ramachandran Ramanan. "Outside director remuneration and the decision to grant CEO stock options." International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics 1, no. 2/3 (2004): 137. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijbge.2004.005250.

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Rose, Caspar. "Stock market reactions to CEO succession announcements: inside versus outside recruitment?" Journal of Management and Governance 23, no. 1 (2018): 33–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10997-018-9425-9.

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CHAN, MIN-LEE, CHO-MIN LIN, HSIN-YU LIANG, and MING-HUA CHEN. "DOES CEO INCENTIVE PAY IMPROVE BANK PERFORMANCE? A QUANTILE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF U.S. COMMERCIAL BANKS." Annals of Financial Economics 09, no. 02 (2014): 1440005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s2010495214400053.

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The U.S. subprime crisis in 2008 have raised concerns about bank performance and the incentive pay of CEOs. Whether the CEO's incentive compensation improves bank performance deserves further investigation. This research studies the improvement in bank performance by examining the CEO incentive pay of 68 U.S. commercial banks from 1993 to 2005 using quantile regression (QR) analysis. The empirical evidence indicates that the relationship between bank performance and incentive pay does vary based on bank performance levels. Our results confirm that CEO incentive compensation improves the performance of high-performing banks and, at the same time, the accrued risks need to be taken into consideration and controlled through the efficient monitoring of outside directors. For low-performing banks, we find that outside directors have a significantly positive effect on performance regardless of whether such performance is adjusted or not adjusted. We suggest that banks with various performance levels require different mechanisms to enhance their performance. A "stick" approach consisting of efficient monitoring by outside directors may ensure that low-performing banks improve their performance improvements, whereas a "carrot" approach (i.e. CEO incentive pay) is appropriate for high-performing banks under risk controls and could also be accomplished through monitoring by outside directors.

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Grühn, Bastian, Steffen Strese, Tessa C. Flatten, Nikolai A. Jaeger, and Malte Brettel. "Temporal Change Patterns of Entrepreneurial Orientation: A Longitudinal Investigation of CEO Successions." Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 41, no. 4 (2017): 591–619. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/etp.12239.

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This study investigates the temporal change patterns of entrepreneurial orientation (EO) subsequent to chief executive officer (CEO) successions. Integrating prior research, we hypothesize that CEO successions lead to a change in EO and that this change exhibits an inverse U‐shape over time. Based on data collected for 67 CEO successions, our empirical results support our hypotheses, showing that successions effectuate changes in EO and tend to increase the level of EO in firms. Changes in EO peak in the second to fourth year of a new CEO's tenure, with less change before and after. We also demonstrate that changes in EO occur later but are more pronounced if the newly appointed firm leader is an outside CEO.

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Kim, Hong Soon, and SooCheong (Shawn) Jang. "Outside CEOs and restaurant performance: the moderating effect of franchising and recession." International Journal of Contemporary Hospitality Management 33, no. 4 (2021): 1319–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijchm-07-2020-0717.

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Purpose This paper aims to explore the effect of hiring outside chief executive officers (CEOs) on restaurant performance. As outside CEOs have a mandate to bring changes but lack internal knowledge, this study expected that outside CEOs impose a significant influence on restaurant performance. It was further expected that the relationship is substantially moderated by franchising and recession. Design/methodology/approach The CEO data was manually collected from firms’ annual filings and the EXECOMP database. The COMPUSTAT database was used for company financial data. A two-way panel regression was used to examine the proposed relationships. Findings The results revealed that outside CEOs have a positive effect on growth but a negative effect on restaurant profitability. It was further turned out that franchising significantly moderates the outside CEO-performance relationship. However, the moderating effect of recession turned out to be insignificant. Practical implications The results suggested that outside CEOs play a critical role in determining restaurant performance. The results further imply that franchising helps to maximize the positive effect of outside CEOs while mitigating the adverse effects of outside CEOs. Originality/value This study is one of the first to examine the effect of outside CEOs in the hospitality context. Moreover, this study extended the literature by revealing the relationship in the restaurant industry and highlighting the importance of long-term organizational context.

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Wang, Jianwei, Bo Zhou, Hongyang Zhao, et al. "A sandwich-type sulfur cathode based on multifunctional ceria hollow spheres for high-performance lithium–sulfur batteries." Materials Chemistry Frontiers 3, no. 7 (2019): 1317–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1039/c9qm00024k.

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Francis, Bill, Iftekhar Hasan, and Yun Zhu. "Benchmark on themselves: CEO-directors’ influence on the CEO compensation." Managerial Finance 45, no. 7 (2019): 810–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/mf-03-2018-0123.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine whether or not the chief executive officers’ (CEO) compensation is affected by the compensation of the outside directors sitting on their board, who are also CEOs of other firms. Design/methodology/approach The authors collect CEOs’ and CEO-directors’ compensation data from Execucomp. The authors then match the CEO-directors’ compensation with appointing firms’ CEO compensation and financial statements, from Execucomp and Compustat, respectively. The sample contains 7,561 firm-year observations from 1996 to 2010, with 1,213 distinct S&P 1500 firms and 1,563 distinct CEO-directors. The authors use ordinary least squared method with firm and year fixed effect in most of the analysis. Findings With both annual and excess compensation, the authors find strong evidence that CEO-directors’ compensation is related to the compensation of the CEO. Causally, when CEO-director overturns his/her excess compensation from negative to positive, the CEO is more likely to have similar upward change in the following year, while more interestingly, the opposite does not hold. These findings are persistent over time and remain robust to various additional tests. Research limitations/implications Due to the data availability, this paper investigates the S&P 1500 public firms. Originality/value It is the first work that investigates the link between board members’ external compensation and the CEO’s compensation. This sheds new light on the process of the CEO’s compensation design, in regard to both the information being utilized in the design procedure and the CEO’s influence on his/her own compensation. Second, this paper adds additional evidence to the choice of peer groups in compensation construction. Third, the authors enhance the understanding of the role of CEO-directors. The authors show that CEO-directors may be the ally of CEO, and help in justifying CEO’s compensation, especially when underpaid.

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Deng, Xin, and Huasheng Gao. "Nonmonetary Benefits, Quality of Life, and Executive Compensation." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 48, no. 1 (2013): 197–218. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109013000033.

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AbstractWe examine the effects of nonmonetary benefits on overall executive compensation from the perspective of the living environment at the firm headquarters. Companies in polluted, high crime rate, or otherwise unpleasant locations pay higher compensation to their chief executive officers (CEOs) than companies located in more livable locations. This premium in pay for quality of life is stronger when firms face tougher competition in the managerial labor market, when the CEO is hired from outside, and when the CEO has short-term career concerns. Overall, the geographic desirability of the corporate headquarters is an effective substitute for CEO monetary pay.

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Shaique, Muhammad, Fei Guo, Ruqia Shaikh, Shahbaz Khan, and Muhammad Usman. "Role of Social Relations of Outside Directors with CEO in Earnings Management." International Journal of Financial Studies 5, no. 4 (2017): 34. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijfs5040034.

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Horstmeyer, Derek. "Beyond Independence: CEO Influence and the Internal Operations of the Board." Quarterly Journal of Finance 09, no. 02 (2019): 1950006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s201013921950006x.

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Using a detailed dataset on the meeting sub-structure of the board, this paper investigates the time trends and cross-sectional determinants of internal boardroom control. First, I document that the principal governance reform following Sarbanes–Oxley was the removal of the CEO as a participating member in board monitoring and investment decisions. Consistent with this being against the preferences of the average CEO, I find that CEO power is negatively related to monitoring work handled outside of the CEO’s presence and positively related to board-time spent in the executive committee. Together the results highlight internal operations as governance concerns of the modern board.

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Nourayi, Mahmoud M., Lawrence Kalbers, and Frank P. Daroca. "The Impact Of Corporate Governance And The Sarbanes-Oxley Act On CEO Compensation." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 28, no. 3 (2012): 463. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v28i3.6962.

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This paper examines the effects of corporate governance on CEO compensation in light of regulatory controls introduced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). The influence of economic and corporate governance variables on incentive-based CEO compensation are considered, using cross-section time-series panel data that includes multiple observations for the years 1999 to 2005. As expected, sales, firm performance (returns), and CEO age were found to positively affect the incentive components of CEO compensation. CEO duality, board size, and the percentage of outside directors had a significant influence on CEO compensation in the pre-SOX, but not post-SOX, period. The influences of these three variables in the pre-SOX period were not in the expected directions. Stratification of our sample into two groups by size reveals similarities and differences between smaller and larger firms. For both groups, economic determinants are more dominant than corporate governance variables as determinants of incentive-based CEO compensation. We find differences in the pattern and significance of variables between the smaller and larger firms, particularly for corporate governance variables, pre- and post-SOX. These results suggest that the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms may vary by size of company.

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Oh, Won-Yong, and Vincent L. Barker. "Not All Ties Are Equal: CEO Outside Directorships and Strategic Imitation in R&D Investment." Journal of Management 44, no. 4 (2015): 1312–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0149206315614371.

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Prior research has identified two different sources of strategic imitation—through perceived organizational cluster similarity (cluster effects) and direct social connections (tied-to effects). In the research on tied-to effects, top executives’ social ties, such as outside directorships, have long been studied as a mechanism through which strategic imitation develops. However, are all ties the same? There has been little examination of whether some social ties have more influence than others. Using the attention-based view of the firm, we argue that certain social ties garner more attention by being salient to top executives. We empirically test this assertion by examining the effects of CEO outside directorships on R&D spending. Using panel data from large U.S. manufacturing firms, we find that CEOs imitate the R&D intensity of tied-to firms (i.e., a firm in which the CEO serves as an outside board member) in their own firm’s R&D decisions. Consistent with attention-based arguments, our results show evidence of selective imitation, as imitating relationships are stronger when the CEO has longer tenure as a director of a tied-to firm and the tied-to firm is performing well. In contrast to conventional institutional theory, our findings also show that CEOs imitate relatively smaller tied-to firms when they make R&D investment decisions. Not all social ties have equal influence on imitative strategic decision making; thus, they have different strategic implications.

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Sheikh, Shahbaz. "An examination of the dimensions of CEO power and corporate social responsibility." Review of Accounting and Finance 18, no. 2 (2019): 221–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/raf-01-2018-0034.

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Purpose This study empirically aims to examine the relation between CEO power and firm engagement in corporate social responsibility (CSR). It undertakes an in-depth analysis of how the structural, ownership and expert dimensions of CEO power affect individual dimensions of CSR. Design/methodology/approach This study uses ordinary least squares and industry fixed-effects regressions. It also uses instrumental variable-generalized method of moment regressions to test the robustness of empirical results. Findings Results indicate that CEO power is negatively related to CSR. However, the relation between CEO power and CSR is influenced by CSR strengths, as power is negatively related to CSR strengths and is not related to CSR concerns. Results also indicate that the structural and ownership dimensions of CEO power are negatively related to CSR, and the expert dimension has no significant effect on CSR. Moreover, results show that CEO power is not related to the product dimension of CSR performance. Research limitations/implications CEO power is measured using the structural, ownership and expert dimensions of power. However, CEOs also acquire power through social networks and connections outside the corporation which is not covered in this study. Originality/value This study uses comprehensive measures of CEO power and CSR. It is the first study that examines the effect of dimensions of CEO power on individual dimensions of CSR performance.

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Cain, Matthew D., and Stephen B. McKeon. "CEO Personal Risk-Taking and Corporate Policies." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 51, no. 1 (2016): 139–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109016000041.

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AbstractThis study analyzes the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) personal risk-taking, corporate risk-taking, and total firm risk. We find evidence that CEOs who possess private pilot licenses (our proxy for personal risk-taking) are associated with riskier firms. Firms led by pilot CEOs have higher equity return volatility, beyond the amount explained by compensation components that financially reward risk-taking. We trace the source of the elevated firm risk to specific corporate policies, including leverage and acquisition activity. Our results suggest that nonpecuniary risk preferences revealed outside the scope of the firm have implications for project selection and various corporate policies.

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Nam, Yoonsung. "A moderating effect of Family CEO on the Influence of Outside Director System." Journal of the Korea Contents Association 16, no. 3 (2016): 439–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.5392/jkca.2016.16.03.439.

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Kim, Jiyoon, Changsu Kim, Jong-Hun Park, and Hyunjin Park. "The Effect of Outside CEO Successor and R&D Intensity on Internationalization." INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS REVIEW 24, no. 1 (2020): 49–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.21739/ibr.2020.03.24.1.49.

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김필수, 최순규, and Young-Ryeol Park. "The Interaction Effects of Outside Director Ratio and CEO Duality on Acquisition Performance." Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship 10, no. 3 (2015): 85–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.16972/apjbve.10.3.201506.85.

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