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Journal articles on the topic 'Outside director'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 15 February 2022

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1

Heidrick, Gardner W. "Selecting Outside Directors." Family Business Review 1, no. 3 (1988): 271–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-6248.1988.00271.x.

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What characteristics are needed in outside directors, and where should the family look for such individuals? A recognized authority on director search shares his opinions in these areas and outlines the selection process.

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2

Seok, Woonam. "Analysis on Outside Director Election." Korean Journal of Law and Economics 17, no. 2 (2020): 453–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.46758/kjle.2020.08.17.2.453.

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3

Brooks, Deanna S., David J. Taylor, and Kevin Watts. "Executive and Outside Director Benetits." Compensation & Benefits Review 31, no. 6 (1999): 15–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/088636879903100603.

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4

Ying, Chen, and Sidney Leung. "Director ownership, outside directors and commitment to corporate social responsibility." Corporate Board role duties and composition 7, no. 1 (2011): 66–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cbv7i1art6.

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This paper examines the effects of director ownership and the proportion of outside directors on firms’ commitment to corporate social responsibility (CSR). Using a sample of 453 Hong Kong listed companies for 2005, we find that there is a non-linear relationship between the level of director ownership and firms’ engagement in CSR behavior. Commitment to CSR first increases as the proportion of director ownership increases up to 50% and then decreases as that proportion of ownership grows higher. Further, the proportion of outside directors on the board exhibits a positive relationship with the level of CSR commitment. These results provide explanations for firms’ commitment to CSR from the corporate governance perspective.

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5

Veltrop, Dennis B., Eric Molleman, Reggy Hooghiemstra, and Hans van Ees. "The Relationship Between Tenure and Outside Director Task Involvement: A Social Identity Perspective." Journal of Management 44, no. 2 (2015): 445–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0149206315579510.

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Drawing from corporate governance research and social identity theory, the authors argue that the relationship between outside directors’ time in office and outside director task involvement is more complex than generally anticipated. By using a unique multisource data set composed of peer ratings provided by fellow outside directors rating a focal director’s task involvement, this study analyzes director task involvement at the individual director level of analysis. The authors propose and empirically demonstrate that outside director tenure has an inverted U-shaped relationship with outside director task involvement that is moderated by a director’s social identification with the organization. As such, the authors demonstrate that social identification with the organization provides a critical contingency for the curvilinear relationship between outside director tenure and outside director task involvement. Findings suggest that outside directors who socially identify with the organization are more likely to grow “stale in the saddle” at lower levels of tenure. These findings provide support for the merit of analyzing outside directors at the individual level of analysis and suggest that a “one-size-fits-all” approach may not be most appropriate in assessing the effects of tenure on outside director functioning.

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6

Chen, Sheng-Syan, Yan-Shing Chen, Jun-Koo Kang, and Shu-Cing Peng. "Board structure, director expertise, and advisory role of outside directors." Journal of Financial Economics 138, no. 2 (2020): 483–503. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.05.008.

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7

Joo, Soo-Ig. "Strategies for an Outside Director System in Holding Companies - Centering on Appointment of Outside Directors -." Legal Studies Institute of Chosun University 22, no. 3 (2015): 155–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.18189/isicu.2015.22.3.155.

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8

Gogolin, Fabian, Mark Cummins, and Michael Dowling. "The value of director reputation: Evidence from outside director appointments." Finance Research Letters 27 (December 2018): 266–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2018.03.012.

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9

Black, Bernard S., Brian R. Cheffins, and Michael Klausner. "Outside Director Liability: A Policy Analysis." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 162, no. 1 (2006): 5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/093245606776166543.

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10

Boyd, Brian K. "Determinants of US Outside Director Compensation." Corporate Governance: An International Review 4, no. 4 (1996): 202–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.1996.tb00149.x.

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11

Du, Chan, and Ting Ting Lin. "Outside director compensation and earnings quality." International Journal of Accounting and Finance 5, no. 3 (2015): 205. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijaf.2015.075281.

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12

Hempel, Paul, and Charles Fay. "Outside director compensation and firm performance." Human Resource Management 33, no. 1 (1994): 111–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/hrm.3930330107.

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13

Shiah‐Hou, Shin‐Rong, and Chin‐Wei Cheng. "Outside director experience, compensation, and performance." Managerial Finance 38, no. 10 (2012): 914–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/03074351211255146.

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14

Wambach, Achim. "Outside-Director Liability: A Policy Analysis: Comment." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 162, no. 1 (2006): 26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/093245606776166589.

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15

Schmies, Christian. "Outside-Director Liability: A Policy Analysis: Comment." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 162, no. 1 (2006): 21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/093245606776166598.

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16

Boumosleh, Anwar, and Brandon N. Cline. "Outside Director Stock Options and Dividend Policy." Journal of Financial Services Research 47, no. 3 (2013): 381–410. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10693-013-0174-2.

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17

Hsieh, Tsun-Jui, and Yu-Ju Chen. "Family business, director compensation and board efficacy: the case of Taiwan." Corporate Ownership and Control 11, no. 1 (2013): 81–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv11i1art7.

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This paper investigates the impact of outside directors on firm performance during legal transitions and examines how the roles of family business and director compensation influence board efficacy. By using Taiwanese listed companies as our sample, the empirical results show that outside directors who are appointed by legal mandate have less positive impacts on firm performance than outside directors appointed voluntarily. Family business weakens the positive impact of outside director on firm performance. The evidence further suggests that director compensation contributes to firm performance, particularly when outside directors are voluntarily appointed. The findings provide western managers with an understanding of how the typical Chinese family business affects board independence. We also demonstrate and incorporate the cultural and the ownership characteristics into the analysis to present a country-specific pattern that should be informative for foreign investors who are concerned about the quality of corporate governance in East Asia.

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18

Lai, Jung-Ho, Li-Yu Chen, and I.-Ju Chen. "The value of outside director experience to firm strategies: Evidence from joint ventures." Journal of Management & Organization 20, no. 3 (2014): 387–409. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jmo.2014.18.

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AbstractThis study investigates the effect of outside director experience on the performance of a firm's joint venture (JV) engagements, a type of strategic move where the influence of board remains under-investigated despite directors’ active participation in the decision-making process. By examining the direct linkage between director experience and strategic performance, our research presents the first direct evidence of the value outside director experience has for a firm's strategic engagements; this has previously been exclusively assessed by indirect indicators. We address this important issue in the following three ways. First, we explore what type of director experience contributes most to JV outcomes. Second, we investigate what circumstantial factors significantly influence the value of director experience. Lastly, we analyze whether incentive mechanisms moderate the relationship between director experience and firm performance. The results confirm the value of director experience gained from JV engagements but not from relevant industries. In addition, executive experience and the industry affiliation of the JV significantly moderate the value of director experience. Finally, experienced directors with large shareholdings outperform those with experience but limited stakes in the firms’ equity, justifying the necessity to motivate directors’ governance efforts despite their existing fiduciary obligation to shareholders. Our study contributes to agency theory by indicating that director experience holds a significant influence on a firm's strategic performance, an issue which has long been neglected in agency-based governance research. It also contributes to resource-dependence theory by providing a direct measurement of directors’ experiential assets, which have so far been exclusively assessed by indirect indicators. Finally, findings from this study can elucidate the long-standing question of how a firm can realize the purported benefits JVs provide by introducing a vital yet rarely explored factor: board experience.

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19

CAMPBELL, CYNTHIA J., MARK L. POWER, and ROGER D. STOVER. "Quid-pro-quo exchanges of outside director defined benefit pension plans for equity-based compensation." Journal of Pension Economics and Finance 5, no. 2 (2006): 155–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1474747206002472.

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The independence of outside directors is critical to corporate board effectiveness. We examine a unique period in corporate governance when outside directors' defined benefit pensions are replaced with increases in equity. Firms with pension plans significantly underperform their industry in terms of stock returns. Firms terminating the pension plans in exchange for equity have significant increases in stock returns relative to their industry subsequent to the change. All samples outperform the ROA and ROE industry medians both before and after the change in compensation, indicating pressure from organized investors likely comes from stock performance, not accounting performance. Investor rights pressure and outside director compensation and not takeover risk or institutional ownership best explain firms altering outside director compensation, with board of director effectiveness improving.

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20

Nam, Yoonsung, Tae-Joong Kim, and Wonyong Choi. "The moderating effect of international trade on outside director system in Korean firms." Journal of Korea Trade 23, no. 1 (2019): 19–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jkt-05-2018-0038.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the moderating effect of international trade on outside director system in Korean firms. The authors expected that Korean firms highly depending on international trade would mitigate the resource provision function of outside director system in order to reduce information asymmetry among global business partners. In addition, the authors tried to find out the functions of outside director system: the control function based on agency theory and resource provision function based on resource dependence theory. Design/methodology/approach The authors tested the hypotheses by Poisson regression with 2011 and 2002 Korean-listed manufacturing firms. The dependent variable is the number of excessively appointed outside directors and independent variable is CEO type: family CEO or professional CEO. The moderating variable is the dependency on international trade measured by export proportion out of total sales. Findings The authors found that not control but resource provision function was a main role of outside director system in Korean firms. The authors also found negative moderating effect of dependency on international trade, which means that firms highly depending on global market tended to consider outside director system as control function, namely “global standard.” Originality/value This paper is the leading study that tries to analyze empirically the relationship between international trade and the function of governance mechanism; outside director system in Korean firms. It also confirms that Korean firms adopted outside director system on the basis of the resource dependence theory.

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21

Chen, Chia-Wei, Jang-Shee Barry Lin, and Bingsheng Yi. "Two faces of busy outside directors." Corporate Ownership and Control 6, no. 2 (2008): 467–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv6i2c4p5.

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In this study, we examine how multiple directorships held by outside directors (busy outside directors) influence shareholder wealth in diversifying acquisitions. With a sample of 893 diversifying acquisitions from 1998 to 2004, we find a negative (positive) busy-director effect for diversifying acquisitions of public-targets (private-targets). Busy directors are negatively (positively) associated with the five-day cumulative abnormal returns in acquisitions involving public (private) targets, where merger-related agency problems are more likely. Our evidence support the notion that, in the case of diversifying acquisitions, increased managerial monitoring plays a more important role versus enhanced advising and business connection from busy directors.

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22

Won, Dong-Wook. "The Study on the Independence of Outside Director." BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 31, no. 3 (2017): 129–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.24886/blr.2017.09.31.3.129.

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23

Kim, Jaeho. "A Study on Improvement of Outside Director System." 국제법무 9, no. 2 (2017): 57–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.36727/jjilr.9.2.201711.003.

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24

Vafeas, Nikos. "Length of Board Tenure and Outside Director Independence." Journal of Business Finance Accounting 30, no. 7-8 (2003): 1043–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-5957.05525.

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25

McClain, Guy. "Outside Director Equity Compensation And The Monitoring Of Management." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 28, no. 6 (2012): 1315. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v28i6.7346.

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<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span><p style="margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; text-align: justify; mso-pagination: none;" class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-size: 10pt; mso-themecolor: text1; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">Using a sample of firms that are first time users of outside director equity compensation, I examine the effect of outsider director equity compensation on director monitoring by investigating firm performance and earnings management.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>My results, although lagged and not noticeable until year three, show that those firms that compensate outside directors with a higher percentage of equity compensation have higher stock performance, but lower accounting performance.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>These same firms also have lower discretionary accruals (i.e., less earnings management).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>These results suggest that outside directors do increase their monitoring by lowering discretionary accruals and thereby, lowering accounting earnings.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In addition, this increased monitoring has a positive effect on stock performance.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The results indicate that increased monitoring of accounting earnings results in lower discretionary accruals and thus lower, but more accurate earnings, and stock performance for the same period is not negatively impacted. </span></span></p><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span>

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26

Uzun, Hatice, and Elizabeth Webb. "After Sarbanes-Oxley: Market reaction to the appointment of outside directors." Corporate Ownership and Control 3, no. 3 (2006): 190–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i3c1p3.

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This paper examines the stock market reaction to the appointment of outside directors to the board both before and after the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002. We also examine whether the abnormal returns following outside director appointments are related to audit committee appointments, and whether the outsider has financial expertise. Results show that the market response to the announcement of an appointment of an outsider to the board of directors is mixed, and abnormal returns are not significantly different after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act compared to those announcements before the Act. Also, we find that the market reaction pre- Sarbanes Oxley is higher when the outsider is expanding the board, lower in cases of CEO/chairman duality, and lower if the outsider is appointed to the audit committee. Post- Sarbanes Oxley CEO/chairman duality has a positive impact on the abnormal returns.

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27

Gee, Inn Hee, and Albert Cannella. "Outside Director to Executive: A New View of the Resource-Provision Role of Directors." Academy of Management Proceedings 2020, no. 1 (2020): 21868. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2020.21868abstract.

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28

Gilson, Ronald J., and Reinier Kraakman. "Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors." Stanford Law Review 43, no. 4 (1991): 863. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1228922.

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29

Taeg-Sik Ahn. "Nomination of Outside Director and Activism of Institutional Shareholder." Dankook Law Riview 41, no. 2 (2017): 255–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.17252/dlr.2017.41.2.008.

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30

Linn, Scott C., and Daniel Park. "Outside director compensation policy and the investment opportunity set." Journal of Corporate Finance 11, no. 4 (2005): 680–715. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2004.11.002.

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31

Tompkins, James, and Robert Hendershott. "Outside director‐shareholder agency conflicts: evidence from bank consolidation." Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society 12, no. 3 (2012): 378–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/14720701211234627.

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32

Early, Michael W. "Protecting the innocent outside director after Enron and WorldCom." International Journal of Disclosure and Governance 2, no. 2 (2005): 177–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jdg.2040051.

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33

Muchtar, Susy, and Arifan Budianto Prabowo. "PENGARUH KARAKTERISTIK DEWAN DIREKSI TERHADAP PENGUKURAN KINERJA BANK DI INDONESIA." Jurnal Manajemen dan Pemasaran Jasa 2, no. 2 (2009): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.25105/jmpj.v2i2.550.

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<p>The purpose of this research is to analyse the effect of Characteristics of The Board of towar Directors s Bank Performance. This research was used are 19 banking firm which listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange during 2005-2008. Independent variables from this research are board size and Outside Director. Dependent variables are bank performance which include Net Interest Margin (NIM), Return On Asset (ROA), Return On Equity(ROE) and Efficiency Ratio. Control Variables are Size, Risk and Capital Ratio. The analysis method was used are multiple regression analysis. The result from this research shows that Board Size did not has related to bank performance. Outsiders has related to bank performance.<br /> <br />Keywords: Board Size, Outside Director, Net Interest Margin (NIM), Return On Asset (ROA), Return On Equity(ROE) and Efficiency Ratio</p>

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34

Fich, Eliezer M. "Are Some Outside Directors Better than Others? Evidence from Director Appointments by Fortune 1000 Firms*." Journal of Business 78, no. 5 (2005): 1943–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/431448.

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35

Gray, Stephen, and John Nowland. "Director workloads, attendance and firm performance." Accounting Research Journal 31, no. 2 (2018): 214–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/arj-02-2016-0023.

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Purpose This paper examines whether increased director workloads are benefiting firms or are causing directors to become too busy, resulting in lower director attendance and weaker firm performance. Design/methodology/approach This paper conducts empirical analysis of the relationships between meeting frequency, director attendance rates and firm performance using archival data from Australia. Findings Attendance rates for both outside and inside directors decrease as they are required to attend more meetings. The benefits firms obtain from holding additional meetings are significantly eroded by lower director attendance. Originality/value This study brings together the literatures on meeting frequency, director busyness and firm performance to show that increased director workloads are only beneficial to firms if directors do not become too busy to fulfill their obligations to shareholders.

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36

Miglani, Seema, Kamran Ahmed, and Darren Henry. "Corporate governance and turnaround: Evidence from Australia." Australian Journal of Management 45, no. 4 (2020): 549–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0312896220902225.

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We examine the relationship between ownership and outside director attributes and corporate turnaround outcomes using matched samples of 99 turnaround and 99 non-turnaround listed Australian firms during the 2004–2015 period. Based on agency theory principles, we propose that key shareholder groups (block ownership, director ownership, institutional ownership) and outside directors are related to firm-level turnaround outcomes, and particularly changes in these attributes across decline to turnaround periods. Our results provide evidence that turnaround and non-turnaround firms differ in terms of their ownership and board composition structures, and that changes in director ownership and the degree of board independence are important in determining the likelihood of turnaround success. JEL Classification: G33, G34, M40

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37

Wan-Jin Choi. "Issues and Solutions Regarding the Outside Director System for Corporations." HUFS Law Review 35, no. 3 (2011): 141–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.17257/hufslr.2011.35.3.141.

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38

Cordeiro, James, Rajaram Veliyath, and Edward Eramus. "An Empirical Investigation of the Determinants of Outside Director Compensation." Corporate Governance 8, no. 3 (2000): 268–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8683.00204.

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39

McClain, Guy. "The Impact Of Outside Director Equity Compensation On Dividend Policy." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 28, no. 4 (2012): 743. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v28i4.7057.

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This study investigates the impact outside director equity compensation has on dividend policy. The analysis, conducted over a 4 year period from 1997-2000, is based on a sample of 89 first time adopters of equity compensation. The use of first time adopters attempts to control for the fact that many of the variables in the study are endogenously determined over time. The results indicate that as the percentage of equity compensation increases a firms propensity to pay dividends decreases as does the level of dividends. These results also indicate that firms with higher profitability pay a lower level of dividends. Taken together these result indicate that as managers send signals about positive performance, outside directors with a financial stake in the company decrease the level of monitoring by paying fewer dividends.

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40

Roth, Markus. "Outside Director Liability: German Stock Corporation Law in Transatlantic Perspective." Journal of Corporate Law Studies 8, no. 2 (2008): 337–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14735970.2008.11421531.

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41

Boumosleh, Anwar. "Firm Investment Decisions, Dividend Policy, And Director Stock Options." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 28, no. 4 (2012): 753. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v28i4.7058.

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Since risk plays a role in setting dividend policy and granting stock options to directors, the paper investigates the effect of director compensation structure on the riskiness of the firms investment strategy by examining the firms dividend payout policy. The results imply that stock options to outside directors increase the firms appetite for risk and suggest that director stock options constitute a major incentive to changing corporate policies. The results also indicate that director stock options align the risk preferences of managers and directors. Finally, the results suggest that stock options do not motivate directors to act opportunistically in setting investment and payout policies.

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42

Gabrielsson, Jonas, and Morten Huse. "“Outside” directors in SME boards: A call for theoretical reflections." Corporate Board role duties and composition 1, no. 1 (2005): 28–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cbv1i1art3.

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Good governance for SMEs is critical for economic development and growth in both developed and developing economies. In this paper we focus on boards and governance in small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) by investigating the role and contribution of “outside” directors in this setting. By contrasting board role theories against different types of SMEs, firms are expected to recruit “outside” board members for various reasons. Illustrated by 52 empirical studies of “outside” directors in SMEs we show how agency theory, resource based view of the firm, and resource dependence theory can be applied to understand the multiple roles that “outside” directors can play in family firms, venture capital-backed firms and other SMEs. The illustration shows that the concept “outside” director is not the same in different theories and in different empirical settings. Based on this finding, we argue for the need to have a conscious and balanced use of theories for understanding the role and contribution of “outside” directors in SMEs.

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43

김한종. "A Study on the Outside Director System in Korean Stock Corporation." Journal of hongik law review 17, no. 1 (2016): 479–506. http://dx.doi.org/10.16960/jhlr.17.1.201602.479.

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44

Veltrop, Dennis, Eric Molleman, Reggy Hooghiemstra, and Hans Van Ees. "The Moderated Curvilinear Relationship between Outside Director Tenure and Task Performance." Academy of Management Proceedings 2013, no. 1 (2013): 15513. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2013.15513abstract.

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45

Dewally, Michaël, and Sarah W. Peck. "Upheaval in the boardroom: Outside director public resignations, motivations, and consequences." Journal of Corporate Finance 16, no. 1 (2010): 38–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2009.02.002.

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46

Judge, William Q. "Outside Director Responses to Organizational Decline: Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect." Corporate Governance: An International Review 3, no. 1 (1995): 9–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.1995.tb00088.x.

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47

Hwang, Induck, Hyungtae Kim, and Sangshin Pae. "Outside Director Equity Compensation and the Quality of Analyst Earnings Forecasts." International Journal of Business and Management 10, no. 11 (2015): 13. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ijbm.v10n11p13.

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<p><strong>Purpose</strong><strong>:</strong> This article investigates how outside directors’ equity compensation affects the quality of analyst earnings forecasts.</p><p><strong>Design/methodology/approach:</strong> The authors implement firm clustered OLS regression with year, quarter, and industry dummies since there may exist biases from firm, year, quarter, and industry specific characteristics.</p><p><strong>Findings: </strong>Using 7,159 firm-year compensation data from ExecuComp, the authors find that the quality of analyst earnings forecasts improves when the proportion of equity compensation awarded to outside directors increases. They also separate equity compensation into stock and option. Their results show consistent improvement: more accurate and less dispersed analyst earnings forecasts. Overall, the findings suggest that the quality of analyst earnings forecasts is better when outside directors are compensated with equity compensation.<strong></strong></p><p><strong>Research limitations/implications: </strong>This study provides empirical evidence of benefit from equity compensation of outside directors in line with existing compensation studies in accounting and finance literature. Unlike a majority of the extant studies, this study examines how the composition of director compensation affects the quality of information which financial analysts produce. Consistent with an argument that equity compensation aligns the interests, outside directors with more equity compensation tend to provide financial information with better quality, the authors document that analysts are likely to provide more accurate and less disperse information.</p><p><strong>Practi</strong><strong>cal</strong><strong> </strong><strong>implications: </strong>For and board members, this study offers an implication that equity compensation could contribute to enhancing their firms’ information environment. In addition, analysts could improve their forecasting performance by following firm monitored by outside directors remunerated with equity compensation. For investors who put much emphasize on the quality of firms’ financial information, the use of equity compensation can be a useful criterion in their investment decision.</p><p><strong>Originality/value: </strong>This study provides empirical evidence of benefit from equity compensation in line with compensation studies in accounting and finance literature. Therefore, equity compensation can be a useful criterion in their decision makings for various parties, including analysts, regulators, and individual investors.</p>

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48

Kanagaretnam, Kiridaran, Robert Mathieu, and Ramachandran Ramanan. "Outside director remuneration and the decision to grant CEO stock options." International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics 1, no. 2/3 (2004): 137. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijbge.2004.005250.

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49

Vafeas, Nikos. "On Audit Committee Appointments." AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory 20, no. 1 (2001): 197–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/aud.2001.20.1.197.

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This study examines determinants of audit committee appointment by comparing characteristics of 262 nonexecutive directors appointed to corporate audit committees between 1995 and 1998 with characteristics of 262 nonexecutive, age-matched control directors. The likelihood of audit committee appointment is found to increase with the degree of outside director independence, and decrease with compensation committee membership, other committee memberships, and the length of board tenure. Importantly, audit committee appointments are unrelated to the amount of stock owned by directors and the number of other directorship posts they hold. Together, these results highlight several director attributes beyond affiliation that could be important in guiding director decisions and suggest the need for further research toward understanding the quality of audit committee appointments.

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Ellis, Jesse A., C. Edward Fee, and Shawn Thomas. "Playing Favorites? Industry Expert Directors in Diversified Firms." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 53, no. 4 (2018): 1679–714. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109018000169.

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We examine the influence of outside directors’ industry experience on segment investment, segment operating performance, and firm valuation for conglomerates. Given board composition is endogenous, we instrument for the presence of industry expert directors using the supply of experienced executives near conglomerate firms’ headquarters. We find that industry expert representation on the board causes increased segment investment. Consistent with experienced directors playing favorites rather than acting as dispassionate advisors, segment profitability (firm value) is lower for segments (firms) with industry expert outside directors. We do not find analogous negative profitability or valuation effects of director experience for single-segment firms.

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