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Pulford, Briony D. "Overconfidence in human judgement." Thesis, University of Leicester, 1996. http://hdl.handle.net/2381/234.
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Mulholland, Ron. "The overconfidence bias and entrepreneurs." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape7/PQDD_0011/NQ42779.pdf.
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Solda, Alice. "Overconfidence as an interpersonal strategy." Thesis, Lyon, 2020. http://www.theses.fr/2020LYSE2010.
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Les modèles économiques standard supposent que les individus collectent et traitent l'information d'une manière qui leur donne une perception relativement précise de la réalité. Cependant, cette hypothèse est souvent remise en question. Les données montrent que les individus forment souvent des préjugés positifs à leur égard, ce qui peut avoir des conséquences économiques néfastes. Cette thèse vise à expliquer la persistance de la surconfiance dans les interactions sociales en montrant l'existence d'avantages stratégiques de la surconfiance qui compensent son coût social.À l'aide d'une série d'expériences en laboratoire, cette thèse montre que (i) la surconfiance se manifeste principalement lorsqu'elle procure un avantage dans les interactions sociales (chapitre 2) et (ii) identifie les situations dans lesquelles la surconfiance est susceptible de nuire à la société (chapitres 3 et 4). Cette thèse contribue à la littérature en améliorant notre compréhension des déterminants situationnels de la surconfiance dans les interactions sociales et posent les bases pour améliorer les politiques visant à prévenir ou à limiter les effets négatifsStandard economic models assume that individuals collect and process information in a way that gives them a relatively accurate perception of reality. However, this assumption is often violated. Data shows that individuals often form positively biased beliefs about themselves, which can have detrimental economic con-sequences. This thesis aims to explain the persistence of overconfidence in social interactions by showing the existence of strategic benefits of being overconfident that offset its social cost.Using a series of laboratory experiments, this thesis shows that (i) overconfidence emerges primarily when it provides an advantage in social interactions (Chapter2) and (ii) identify situations in which overconfidence is likely to be socially detrimental (Chapter 3 and 4). This thesis contributes to the literature by enhancing our understanding of the situational determinants of overconfidence in social interactions and lay the foundations to improve policies intended to prevent or limit its negative effects
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Soldà, Alice. "Overconfidence as an interpersonal strategy." Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2019. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/135191/1/Alice_Solda_Thesis.pdf.
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Standard economic models assume that individuals collect and process information in a way that gives them a relatively accurate perception of reality. However, data shows that individuals are often overconfident, which can have detrimental economic consequences. This thesis aims to show that individuals benefits from being overconfident in strategic interactions, which would explain the persistence of this bias despite its social cost. This thesis contributes to the literature by enhancing our understanding of the situational determinants of overconfidence in social interactions and lay the foundations to improve policies intended to prevent or limit its negative effects.
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Gustavsson, Anna, and Emma Svenler. "Overconfidence among Swedish private investors : A regression study between the overconfidence behaviour among Swedish private investors and demographic factors." Thesis, Jönköping University, Internationella Handelshögskolan, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-49584.
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Background: For the past 30 years, the neoclassical finance has been questioned bybehavioural finance. The main difference is behavioural finance ́s ability to explain a behaviour that deviate from rationality. One of the major biases within behavioural finance is overconfidence. Overconfident behaviour describes an investor with too strong belief in their own ability. This bias is not well-examined within behavioural finance in Sweden. The consequences of overconfidence are the investor ́s overvaluation skills which in turn leads to unnecessary risk-taking, excessive trading and economic losses. Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to investigate if the overconfident bias exists among Swedish private investors. A study if the demographic factors; gender, age, marital status, education, and experience effect the level of overconfident behaviour. Further, an investigation to identify industries overconfident investors prefer or despise. Method: Our study use a deductive approach with a quantitative research. From the basis of previous studies, five hypotheses explaining a relation between demographic factors and overconfidence have been formulated. The data is collected through an online survey, published in finance forums between 2020-03-10 to 2020-03-22 which gave 233 participants. A binary logistic model was performed in STATA to examine if the hypothesis should be rejected or not. Conclusion: The findings from our study show presence of overconfidence among Swedish private investors. Statistically significant results confirm that gender, age, education, and experience have an impact on overconfident behaviour. Men are more overconfident than women, younger investors act more overconfident, higher education increase overconfidence, and more experienced investors are more overconfident.
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Lipko, Amanda Rae. "Preschoolers' persistent overconfidence in their recall memory." [Kent, Ohio] : Kent State University, 2008. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=kent1214583736.
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Kent State University, 2008.Title from PDF t.p. (viewed Oct. 5, 2009). Advisor: William Merriman. Keywords: metacognition; recall memory; cognitive development. Includes bibliographical references (p. 65-71).
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Xu, Bin. "Corporate financing decisions : the role of managerial overconfidence." Thesis, Loughborough University, 2014. https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/16652.
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This thesis examines the effects of managerial overconfidence on corporate financing decisions. Overconfident managers tend to overestimate the mean of future cash flow and underestimate the volatility of future cash flow. We propose a novel time-varying measure of overconfidence, which is based on computational linguistic analysis of what the managers said (i.e. Chairman s Statement). The overconfidence of CEO and CFO is also constructed based on what the managers did (i.e. how they trade their own firms shares). We conduct three empirical studies that offer new insights into the roles of managerial overconfidence in the leverage decision (i.e. debt level), pecking order behaviour (i.e. the preference for debt over equity financing) and debt maturity decision (i.e. short-term debt vs. long-term debt). Study 1 documents a negative overconfidence-leverage relationship. This new finding suggests that debt conservatism associated with managerial overconfidence might be a potential explanation for the low leverage puzzle: some firms maintain low leverage, without taking tax benefits of debt, because overconfident managers believe that firm securities are undervalued by investors and thus are too costly (Malmendier, Tate and Yan, 2011). Study 2 finds managerial overconfidence leads to reverse pecking order preference especially in small firms, which sheds light on the pecking order puzzle that smaller firms with higher information costs surprisingly exhibit weaker pecking order preference. This new evidence is consistent with Hackbarth s (2008) theory that overconfident managers who underestimate the riskiness of earnings tend to prefer equity to debt financing. Study 3 finds managerial overconfidence leads to higher debt maturity. This evidence supports our proposition that overconfidence can mitigate the underinvestment problem (which is often the major concern of long-term debt investors) (Hackbarth, 2009), which in turn allows overconfident managers to use more and cheaper long-term debt. This evidence also implies that overconfidence may mitigate the agency cost of debt. Overall, our empirical analysis suggests that managerial overconfidence has significant incremental explanatory power for corporate financing decisions.
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Soriano, Flavio de Oliveira. "Overconfidence and confirmation bias: are future managers vulnerable?" reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/13497.
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Decision makers often use ‘rules of thumb’, or heuristics, to help them handling decision situations (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979b). Those cognitive shortcuts are taken by the brain to cope with complexity and time limitation of decisions, by reducing the burden of information processing (Hodgkinson et al, 1999; Newell and Simon, 1972). Although crucial for decision-making, heuristics come at the cost of occasionally sending us off course, that is, make us fall into judgment traps (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Over fifty years of psychological research has shown that heuristics can lead to systematic errors, or biases, in decision-making. This study focuses on two particularly impactful biases to decision-making – the overconfidence and confirmation biases. A specific group – top management school students and recent graduates - were subject to classic experiments to measure their level of susceptibility to those biases. This population is bound to take decision positions at companies, and eventually make decisions that will impact not only their companies but society at large. The results show that this population is strongly biased by overconfidence, but less so to the confirmation bias. No significant relationship between the level of susceptibility to the overconfidence and to the confirmation bias was found.
Tomadores de decisão muitas vezes usam 'regras gerais', ou heurística, para ajudá-los a lidar com situações de tomada de decisão (Kahneman e Tversky, 1979b). Esses atalhos cognitivos são tomados pelo cérebro para lidar com a complexidade e pressão de tempo da tomada de decisão, reduzindo assim a carga de processamento de informação (Hodgkinson et al , 1999; Newell e Simon , 1972). Embora fundamental para a tomada de decisões, a heurística tem o custo de, ocasionalmente, nos tirar do curso, isto é, fazer-nos cair em armadilhas de julgamento (Tversky e Kahneman, 1974). Mais de 50 anos de pesquisa em psicologia tem mostrado que a heurística pode levar a erros sistemáticos, ou vieses, na tomada de decisão. Este estudo se concentra em dois vieses particularmente impactantes para a tomada de decisão - o excesso de confiança e o viés de confirmação. Um grupo específico – estudantes de administração e recém-formados de escolas de negócio internacionalmente renomadas – foi submetido a experimentos clássicos para medir seu nível de suscetibilidade a esses dois vieses. Esta população tende a assumir posições de decisão nas empresas, e, eventualmente, tomar decisões que terão impacto não só nas suas empresas, mas na sociedade em geral. Os resultados mostram que essa população é fortemente influenciada por excesso de confiança, mas nem tanto pelo viés de confirmação. Nenhuma relação significativa entre o excesso de confiança e a suscetibilidade ao viés de confirmação foi encontrada.
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Klauss, Christopher Philipp. "Capital investment decisions with managerial overconfidence and regret aversion." Thesis, University of Bath, 2006. https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.428354.
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This research investigated the potential effects of managerial overconfidence and regret aversion in a corporate capital investment context. Three fundamental decision problems are analysed: Project selection (accepting or rejecting a proposed investment), managerial effort, and project evaluation (continuing or abandoning a failing investment). Very little previous research has looked at the role of psychological biases in corporate finance decisions, and the joint analysis of the two studied biases within one model is also a fairly novel contribution. Solving by backward induction a theoretically derived model integrating these decisions as well as overconfidence and regret aversion, I outline the conditions under which a biased manager will make choices that are inefficient from a shareholder value perspective; however, the model also reveals that, in combination, the two psychological phenomena may off-set such that the optimal outcome can be obtained. I further demonstrate how my theoretical propositions can be supplemented with empirical data by means of a survey and two different experiments. The survey of UK managers with capital investment responsibility exposes the pervasiveness of overconfidence and regret aversion within the sample group. In addition, indications for potential associations between these biases and certain capital investment decision choices are found. To my knowledge, no such empirical study exists so far. To explore potential causal relationships between overconfidence and effort, overconfidence and project selection, as well as regret aversion and project evaluation choices, two experiments were designed and conducted. The experimental data provides tentative support for the model and indicates the potential value of largerscale future research. I close by discussing the implications of my results for corporate governance and suggesting avenues for future work in this area.
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Zhou, Jie. "Managerial overconfidence and corporate policy decisions in UK companies." Thesis, University of York, 2008. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/14125/.
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Managerial overconfidence, as a particular form of managerial irrationality, concerns that some managers are less than completely rational and tend to overestimate the outcome of the investment projects under their control. This study focuses on the impact of managerial overconfidence on corporate policy decisions. There are two main objectives. First, it explores the consequences of managerial overconfidence for investment decisions and the cash holding policy by emphasizing the role of financial constraints. Second, it investigates the potential role of managerial overconfidence in determining debt maturity. Using an original and very detailed dataset for a large sample of UK listed firms, we show that investment by overconfident managers tend to be more sensitive to internal funds in financially constrained firms identified by leverage, dividend, age and cash. Meanwhile, a cash holding policy can be associated with investment decision by overconfident managers. We argue that, though investment can increase cash flow sensitivity of cash in financially constrained fines identified by leverage and dividend, managerial overconfidence can reduce this positive relationship. Moreover, managerial overconfidence can induce a biased debt maturity structure. It seems that overconfident managers can take advantage of short-term debt to signal their perceived firms' quality to the market. Hence, firms with managerial overconfidence tend to increase the negative relationship between long-term debt and firms' quality. Finally, we find that the impact of managerial overconfidence on corporate decision can also vary with different corporate governance mechanisms. We show that the impact of managerial overconfidence on corporate policies in firms with weak corporate governance mechanisms (i. e. lower ratio of non-executive directors in boards, lower blockholders' ownership) is pronounced, whereas, in firms with good corporate governance mechanisms, it turns to be insignificant.
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Vitanova, Ivana. "Managerial overconfidence : interactions with corporate governance and firm performance." Thesis, Lyon 2, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014LYO22018.
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Face au constat d'une vision assez négative de la surconfiance managériale dans les travaux académiques en économie et gestion (analysée dans le premier chapitre de cette thèse) nous présentons des implications plus positives de ce biais sur la performance des entreprises. Ainsi, dans le Chapitre 2 nous réalisons une étude empirique qui tient compte de l'endogénéité de la surconfiance managériale et de sa contingence aux facteurs contextuels tels que la gouvernancede l'entreprise et la rémunération du dirigeant. Nous montrons que lorsque nous corrigeons le biais d'endogenéité dans les données (via la méthode de double différence) nous observons une relation positive entre la surconfiance managériale et la performance. Puis, dans le Chapitre 3 nous proposons un modèle théorique qui vise à présenter un médiateur potentiel de cette relation. Notre modèle prédit qu'un dirigeant surconfiant introduirait des tournois incitatifsau sein de l'équipe managériale plus souvent qu'un dirigeant rationnel. Ces tournois auraient pour effet d'accroitre le niveau d'effort total fourni par les membres de l'équipe managériale et d'améliorer ainsi la performance de l'entreprise. Enfin, dans le Chapitre 4 nous démontrons via une étude sur des entrepreneurs naissants que deux types de confiance différents, la confiance en ses propres compétences et la confiance en la réussite de l'opportunité entrepreneuriale, ontdes effets opposés sur la probabilité de réussite du processus entrepreneurial. Le premier type a un effet positif alors que le second a un effet négatif sur la probabilité de créer une entreprise opérationnelleIn light of the observation of a globally negative vision of managerial overconfidence in the economics and management literature (analyzed in the first chapter of this PhD Thesis) we present some positive implications of the overconfidence bias on firm performance. In Chapter 2 we perform an empirical study that accounts for the endogeneity of managerial overconfidence and its contingence upon contextual factors such as corporate governance and managerial compensation. We show that when we control for the endogeneity biais in the data (through the difference-in-differences method) we observe a positive relationship between managerial overconfidence and firm performance. Then, in Chapter 3 we propose a theoretical model that presents one potential mediator of this positive relationship. Our model predicts that an overconfident CEO would implement incentivizing tournaments between the top management team membersmore often than a rational CEO. These tournaments would lead to an increase in the total effort supply of top executives and hence improve the performance of the firm. At last, in Chapter 4 we show, through a study of nascent entrepreneurs, that two different types of confidence, confidence in one's own abilities and confidence in opportunity outcomes have opposed effects on the likelihood of a successful start-up process. The first type has a positive effect whereas the second one has a negative effect on the probability to create an operating business
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Gao-Yu, Ting, and 高于婷. "Managerial overconfidence, investor’s overconfidence,and odds and post-performance of mergers." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/46426607038270722993.
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碩士輔仁大學
企業管理學系管理學碩士班
100
In this study we investigate the relation between managerial overconfidence, investor’s overconfidence, and odds and performance indicators of mergers. Managerial overconfidence, referring to Malmendiar and Tate (2005), is gauged via the keywords from press protrayals. Investor’s overconfidence, referring to Weber (1998) and Tsai (2006), is gauged via the relative trading turnover drived by changes in returns. Using 767 mergers in the sampling period 1997-2010 we find that managerial overconfidence is positively correlated with the odds of completing a merger, implying that overconfident managers tend to pay hefty premium, which facilitate the odds of completing of a merger. However, managerial overconfidence is negatively correlated with the post-merger performance, indicating that overconfident managers are unable to create value that is equilivant to the hefty premium they paid. In contrast, the relation between investor’s overconfidence and the odds of completing a merger is insignificant. However, we find that investor’s overconfidence is positively correalted with the post-merger performance. We further investigate the post-merger financial behavior for firms with overconfident investors and firms without. The result indicates that firms with overconfident investors were more active in seeking external financial sources, including seasoned equity offerings and bond placement, than firms without. The result implies that investor’s overconfidence could ameliorate the underinvestment problem illustrated by Myers and Majluf (1984). That is, investor’s overconfidence reduces the side effect associated with information asymmetry.
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林倖如. "Overconfidence and Asymmetric Information." Thesis, 2005. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/02986078379621343845.
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碩士國立清華大學
科技管理研究所
93
Overconfidence is the most common concept of behavioral finance to explicate the decision making and investment behavior, and it is also the conundrum cared by many financial savants. Furthermore, some savants imagine overconfidence is the most tested detection. This research intends to appraise behavior pattern of investors are overconfident informed traders under asymmetric information to find decision making of investors and anomalies more precisely. We show that when the numbers of informed traders increase, and the degree of overconfidence of informed traders are heavier, the market price will overreact more often, more volatile, and higher the probability of informed trading. This study also leads to policy improvement. The government should consolidate information disclosure to ameliorate asymmetric information, slacken the volatile of asset price and overreaction to deescalate the overconfident informed traders.
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Wang, Zi-fang, and 王子芳. "Discipline, Overconfidence and Performance." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/04854763401711459484.
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碩士國立高雄第一科技大學
財務管理研究所
99
In this paper, our sample are from individual investors who trade Taiwan Weighted Stock Index (TAIEX) futures in the Taiwan Futures Exchange (Taiwan Futures Exchange, TAIFEX). We use overconfidence and discipline measures for quantifying the individual''s abilities of overconfidence and discipline, exam the correction of overconfidence, discipline and performance. Empirical results show that the lower the overconfidence of investors, the better the risk-adjusted performance and performance of its. The higher discipline of investors, the larger the risk-adjusted performance and better performance of its.
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Chang, Li-Jen, and 張立人. "Managerial Overconfidence and Acquisition Decision." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/52719391048947350584.
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碩士國立臺灣大學
國家發展研究所
98
This study examines the effect of CEO overconfidence on merger decisions and the corresponding market responses. Overconfident CEOs tend to overestimate their ability in generating value. Hence, there is a greater chance that they conduct more mergers with a lower-than-average quality and sequentially poorer market responses. We study 673 US firms and their merger bids during 1996 and 2006. The empirical results show that overconfident CEOs are more likely to conduct mergers. This is more evident when the overconfident CEOs are in firms with lower managerial power. The market reacts significantly more negative to the mergers announced by overconfident CEOs than those by rational CEOs.
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Cheng, Wen-Hsine, and 鄭文賢. "Managerial Overconfidence and Catering Effect." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/13177941495757417841.
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碩士國立雲林科技大學
財務金融系
102
Baler and Wurgler (2004) proposed the famous cater to the theory put forward to meet the famous theory, there are three main factors to cater to the theory: (1) lack of information, the company distributed dividends, with the changing needs of time ; (2) limit arbitrage demand will affect prices; (3) catering investor demand. This paper attempts from the investor's point of view to study the needs of managers dvidends payment motivation. Assuming investor demand for dividends over time, preferences change, so managers will cater to investors of the needs of changing dividend policy. Factors affecting dividend policy dividend policy by many factors, from the four variables Fama and French (2001) proposed: The proposed four variables: asset growth rate, return on total assets, the net market value ratio, size of the company company size, you can see most of the factors that can be seen most of the factors and the company's own profit performance related. But in addition to these factors, modern finance has been integrated into the factors adding behavior research in traditional financial theory, the assumption that people are rational, but after a number of major economic events can be found after the person is not rational gradually, there are many economic events are caused by human dominated.Taylor and Brown (1988) proved that most people think they are better than ordinary people, and for the ability to evaluate the expected higher than the equivalent person.Gervais,Heaton and Odean (2002) proposed study senior managers tend to overconfidence three reasons, complex transactions, self-owned and associated information asymmetry (Rotemberg and Saloner,2000；Van den Steen,2004) pointed out that CEO and senior managers are helmsman of company’s major decesions. In this paper, based on the catering theory to join a proxy as overconfidence, to investigate whether overconfidence manager by catering effect will be more pronounced. Research findings show that overconfident managers will cater to investors to change the dividend policy, however, compared with under rational manager, did not produce a more significant effect.
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Chen, Wen-Chun, and 陳文郡. "Managerial Overconfidence and Risk Management." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/42383079122076564718.
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碩士國立暨南國際大學
財務金融學系
102
Using the S&P 1500 non-financial firms over the period 2004 to 2012, this study examines the impacts of managerial overconfidence on corporate risk management, including hedging willingness and hedging extent. The results indicate that firms with overconfident CEO or CFO have significant lower incentive to hedge and hedging extent. When testing the impact of overconfident Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chief Financial Officer (CFO) simultaneously, we find overconfident CEO have more influence on the incentive to hedge than overconfident CFO, but overconfident CFO play the more important role in hedging extent than overconfident CEO.
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Chang, Shih-Ting, and 張詩婷. "Managerial Overconfidence and Earnings Management." Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/11951047090654349587.
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碩士國立高雄應用科技大學
金融資訊研究所
101
Using panel data on publicly traded Taiwan companies from 2006 to 2011, this study investigates the impacts of managerial overconfidence on earnings managements. We define managers as overconfident if they persistently increase their stockholdings. We also analyze how macroeconomic conditions affect earnings managements and whether the effect differs between overconfident and rational managers. The empirical results show that overconfident managers exhibit significantly less degree of earnings managements than rational managers. Besides, as GDP growth rates increases, rational managers will lower their degree of earnings managements while overconfident managers will enhance the degree of earnings managements. After classifying all samples into subsamples of positive and negative earnings managements, we find that the degree of earnings managements is significantly lower for overconfident managers only in the subsample of negative managements. Moreover, GDP growth rates have significantly positive influences on the degree of earnigs managements in the subsample of positive managements. In the subsample of negative managements, managers lower their degree of earnings managements as GDP growth rates increases, and the effect is stronger for rational managers. Finally, we suggest that managers tend to achieve earnings-smoothing by earnings managements. As a robustness check, we redefine managerial overconfidence from habitually increasing stock holdings. We find the measure constructed provides similar results in our sample.
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Cheng, Yu-Ching, and 鄭玉青. "The Determinants of Individual Overconfidence." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/46637112086822362531.
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碩士輔仁大學
金融研究所
94
We develop a self-attribution bias model testing whether investors’ overconfidence come from the inner individual characteristics or breed by the experience. In Gervais and Odean(2001)’s muti-period market model, an investor’s overconfidence comes from the self-attribution learning bias. If an trader’s confidence comes from the inner individual characteristics, then his trading would not be affected by the performance of last period. The second part of our study is about how investor sentiment affects investors trading behavior and would investor sentiment lead to overconfidence? The results of our research are listed below: 1. In various kinds of grouping ways results shows most traders trading behavior would be affected by past performance. The only exception is the man of the highest-turnover investors, their turnover would not be affected by last period performance, so their confidence come from the individual characteristics. And we further find grouping by individual characteristics, when trading, man, the younger, electronic traders, and margin traders have more reaction about past performance. 2. When sentiment is high, the traders would positive increasing their turnover, especially for the high-turnover(3th~5th) investors and this would induce lower performance next period. This implies sentiment would lead them tend to be overconfidence, but this is not always the case. We can see sentiment induce the highest-turnover investors have positive effect about the next period performance. Besides, when grouping by individual characteristics, man, the younger, electronic traders, and margin traders are easier affected by sentiment and tend to be overconfidence.
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Chen, Yun-Ying, and 陳雲英. "Managerial Overconfidence and Earnings Quality." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/13091880793294118961.
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碩士國立中興大學
高階經理人碩士在職專班
104
Due to the scarcity of resources, investors and creditors must carefully evaluate companies'' risk before making their relevant decisions. However, the information asymmetry between outside capital providers and managers may lead to adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Financial reporting is generally considered to be an important tool to reduce agency costs caused by information asymmetry. Although earnings quality is an important characteristic of financial reports that affects allocation of resources, individual manager characteristics actually influence the financing reporting process. Overconfident managers tend to overestimate future returns from their firms’ investment. Thus, this study predicts that overconfident managers will tend to delay loss recognition and use less conservative accounting. Based on a sample of Taiwanese listed companies in the electronics industry from 2005 to 2014, this study investigates the relationship between managerial overconfidence and earnings quality. This study classifies managers as overconfident using a dichotomous variable where OverCon is set equal to 1 if managers increase their ownership in the firm by 10% during the fiscal year. This study uses accruals and discretionary accruals as proxies to measure earnings conservatism. The empirical results show that managerial overconfidence is significantly and negatively associated with negative accruals, indicating that overconfident managers use less conservative accounting. This study further finds that managerial overconfidence is positively associated with positive discretionary accruals, suggesting that overconfident managers tend to manage their earnings upward. Thus, this study suggests a negative association between managerial overconfidence and earning equality.
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Liu, Cheng-Chi, and 劉承啟. "CEO overconfidence and IPO underpricing." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/90668756870056296233.
Full textAbstract:
碩士元智大學
財務金融暨會計碩士班(財務金融學程)
104
This paper examines the relationship between CEO confidence and IPO underpricing. From a large body of literature, we know that there are many factors that affect underpricing, and the main explanation for underpricing is asymmetric information theory. Lowry and Murphy (2007) try to find a relationship between underpricing and IPO options, Chahine and Goergen (2011) also try to find a relationship between the two by considering board independence, and the power of the CEO, and venture capitalists. However, this paper focuses on underpricing from a different perspective. Using CEO confidence to explain underpricing is a new idea since it combines financial behavior and underpricing. I find a strong negative relationship between CEO confidence and underpricing.
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HUNG, JUI-YI, and 洪瑞怡. "Managerail Overconfidence and Stock Repurchase." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/29384534725319480095.
Full textAbstract:
碩士輔仁大學
管理學研究所
98
In this study I use 783 listed firms comprising 2744 share repurchase programs in the period from August 2000 through December 2008 to examine how managerial overconfidence affects firm’s engagement in share repurchases. The proxy of managerial overconfidence refers to Brown and Sarma (2007) using press portrayals. The proxies of overconfidence are gauged by the relative proportion of the words of confidence and optimism shown in the press to the words of non-confident, conservative, pessimistic, frugal, non-optimistic etc. The empirical results are summarized as follows. First, the share repurchase programs launched by overconfident managers are larger in percentage of share and percentage of dollar amount than those launched by their rational counterparts. Moreover, I find that the execution cost of share repurchase somewhat counterbalances managerial overconfidence so that the link between managerial overconfidence and number of share repurchase program and that between managerial overconfidence and execution ratio are less significant, and the relation between announcement return and frequency and the relation between announcement return and percentage of execution are negative. This implies that overconfident managers aiming a higher expected price level. However, after taking account of execution cost, they would stop open market repurchases when the expected level has been attained. The relation between share repurchase and ex-post return shows that the announcement returns associated with overconfident managers are lower. Moreover, programs launched by overconfident managers are associated with a large price drop. Finally, the result is robust after the examination of possible endogenous relation between managerial overconfidence and share repurchase.
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CHANG, SHU-LING, and 張淑玲. "Managerial Overconfidence and Conference Calls." Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/kkns3f.
Full textAbstract:
博士國立雲林科技大學
財務金融系
106
This study examines the relation between managerial overconfidence and conference calls. Prior studies document that managers consider a variety of costs and benefits when deciding whether to disclosure firm’s material information and this decision is affected by the characteristic of the decision makers. Overconfidence, as an important feature of managers, has become studied in the academic literature in the recent years. Managers tend to be overconfident because they believe that they have more precise knowledge about future events than they actually have. Overconfident managers are apt to convene conference calls since conference call is an important tool to disclose information about future. Therefore, this paper examines how managerial overconfidence affects the occurrence and frequency of conference calls using evidence from Taiwan stock market. I use manager’s purchasing his own firm’s stock over the past 2 years and the average return is negative as the measure of managerial overconfidence basically following Kolasinski and Li (2013). Using data from firm publicly listed in Taiwan for the period from 2005 to 2015, the results provide robust evidence that managerial overconfidence and conference calls is significantly positive correlated. That is, companies with higher managerial overconfidence would be more likely and more frequent to convene conference calls. Prior research of managerial overconfidence was mainly discussing the impact on financing and investing decisions, this study provides further supplementary evidence of the impact on convening conference calls, the managerial decision of disclosure behavior.
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Liu, Cheng-Chun, and 劉成駿. "CEO Overconfidence and Takeover Probability." Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/7b842u.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立臺灣大學
財務金融學研究所
107
According to previous research, investment decisions made by over-confident CEOs are subject to cash resources. Over-confident CEOs tend to over-estimate their investment decisions. Moreover, when needing external financing, they must bear the higher cost of capital. So, Over-confident CEOs give priority to bonds when they have external financing needs. Therefore, they are prone to generating more debts than general CEOS do. In this summary, If a company has sufficient internal funds, CEO has the possibility of over-investment. But if it is necessary to external financing, CEO will relatively reduce spending. On the other hand, Hirshleifer et al. (2012) found that a company would choose overconfident CEO because he or she would be engaged in highly specialized and high-risk jobs which increase the R&D expenditure and finally let their shareholder profit. Empirical results found that innovative activities were significantly enhanced by overconfident managers, further increasing R&D and increasing patent rights to enhance corporate value. However, Lin and Wang (2016) found that empirical results show that R&D expenditure has a positive correlation effect on the probability that firms are merged. Therefore, this study analyzes the impact of CEO''s Overconfidence on the probability of being acquired by the firm itself. The empirical results show that the manager''s overconfidence has a positive relationship with the impact of the firm''s own acquisition probability.
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JI, HONG-JHENG, and 紀洪政. "Overconfidence CFOs and Firm Performance." Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/e85psv.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立雲林科技大學
財務金融系
106
Literature show that overconfidence executives may lead to the distortions of corporate investment. Overconfident executives overestimate their return of the investment projects and think external funds as overpricing. Therefore, they overinvest when they have sufficient internal funds but reduce investment if they need to request external fund. By using the sample of S&P 500 firms, this study investigates the relation of overconfident CFOs and investment. The CFOs are regarded as overconfident if they hold in-the-money options. The results show that overconfident CFOs overinvest and have higher cash-flow investment sensitivity.
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Wu, Yi-Ju, and 吳易儒. "A Study of the Managers’ Overconfidence." Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/44pn4x.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立臺北科技大學
經營管理系碩士班
101
Overconfidence has been widely document in the both psychology and financial literature. However, previous empirical researches have mainly focused on the market data to analyze the investors’ behavior in Taiwan stock market. Only a few studies have been looked into the investors’ other psychological biases and demographic information(gender, age, income, education…). In addition, these characteristics may have some effects on the investors’ trading behavior. Therefore, this study explores overconfidence not only via market data but personal characteristics. A questionnaire was used to investigate what are manager’s tendencies of financial behavior. The results of this study have found that the overconfidence is widely observed on the Taiwanese investors and help investors to get a complete understanding of non-rational side of people.
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Wan-Ni, Shih, and 施宛妮. "Managerial overconfidence and the debt-equity." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/16940820846161971106.
Full textAbstract:
碩士輔仁大學
企業管理學系管理學碩士班
99
In this paper, we examine the relation between managerial overoptimism and the Debt-Equity choice. If managers are subject to overoptimistic in the future, they are more likely to financing equity. And in this condition, the managerial behavior could be effect on the stock price and stock performance. Analyzing two different kind of sample of listed companies in Taiwan, we propose a measure of managerial overoptimism from the relative proportion of the words of confidence and optimism shown in the press to the words of non-confident, conservative, pessimistic, frugal, non-optimistic etc. The empirical results are summarized as follows. First, we compare announcement effect following debt financing and equity financing for a sample, and find that in more financing equity firms, optimism managers exhibits the announcement effect is more negative. Second, we find that equity financing is followed by significantly worse stock performance than debt financing. Final, managerial overoptimism seem to be a significant factor affecting the Debt-Equity choice and post-financing stock performance.
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Wang, Pao-Chien, and 王寶茜. "Corporate Financing Decisions and CEOs Overconfidence." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/13268858333874779743.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立臺灣大學
財務金融學研究所
99
The determinants of financing policies have been extensively discussed in financial literatures. However, even companies with similar fundamentals have different choices of financing policies after considering the taxes, bankruptcy costs, and asymmetric information. To explain the residual variation in debt conservatism and pecking order theory, recent literatures propose that managerial beliefs may be one of the crucial factors. By using the late option exercise of CEOs as a measure of overconfidence, we test if overconfident CEOs underutilize debt. We also test if overconfident CEOs who overestimate future cash flow will prefer internal financing over debt and then over equity. Our empirical results indicate that, overconfidence may not necessarily result in debt conservatism, and overconfident CEOs issue who are more debt conservative may not issue less equity. Conditional on accessing external capital markets, both overconfident and rational CEOs follow the pattern of pecking order theory, but overconfident CEOs issue equity more frequently than rational CEOs. However, overconfident CEOs raise on average 17 cents more debt to cover an additional dollar of financing deficit than other CEOs.
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WU, TING-YEN, and 吳亭諺. "Managerial Overconfidence and Capital Structure Adjustment." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/13525715319332362951.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立臺北大學
統計學系
104
Studies show that the managers will be conditioning the financing strategy on the target capital structure, and adjust the capital structure toward its target. This study aims to figure out how overconfident CEOs manage leverage toward a target through time. We find that managerial overconfidence will lead to an increase in adjustment speed for over-levered firms, while no evidence showing the association between overconfidence and adjustment for under-levered firms. We further find that over-levered firms with overconfident CEOs will speed up capital structure adjustments only when firms have rich firm-specific growth opportunities or during prosperous periods, and they tend to use equity issuance to reduce leverage rather than debt retirement due to the tendency to invest despite that equity issuance is costly for them. This result suggests that overconfident CEOs will take into account the optimal leverage ratio when making financial strategies, especially for over-levered firms.
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Chou, Cheng-Ping, and 鄒正平. "CEO Overconfidence and Financial Report Restatements." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/14923355699684690609.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立中興大學
高階經理人碩士在職專班
104
Continued global corporate accounting fraud cases in recent years, such as Enron, WorldCom, United States International Group (AIG), Kanebo, Olympus, Toshiba, false financial statements, fraud and scandal, from 2001 in United States and Japan. These financial statements fraud caused the stock market shock, panic of the investing public, makes the investing public for the preparation of the financial statements of enterprises the reliability and authenticity, and had a great question. Purposes of the preparation of the financial statements provides financial statement users on an enterprise''s financial position and operating results information, report the user to help them plan investment and credit decisions, so management issued by the company''s financial statements, its relevant and reliability is very important for the community. However, we all know that the preparation of the financial statements, in addition to follow generally accepted accounting principles, involving many people make their judgments and estimates that CEOs for some pressure or to achieve certain goals, or for some accounting method of assessment was too optimistic and has adopted a more radical statements, leading to restating in financial statements. This study research CEO’s overconfident personality traits influence on the quality and preparation of financial statements, especially the relevance of CEO overconfidence and financial report restatements. Based on a sample of Taiwanese listed companies in the electronics industry from 2005 to 2015, this study investigates the relationship between CEO overconfidence and financial report restatements. Empirical results show that there’s no significant positive relationship between CEO overconfidence and financial report restatements. It’s means that CEO overconfidence is not an important factor in the financial report restatements. Further, this study found that the more overconfident CEO, the higher business performance and growth opportunities of the company. That is, the more overconfident CEO, the better quality of company’s financial report and CEO overconfidence does not mean that the financial statements exist high risk. Key words: Overconfidence, Restatements
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LU, SEN-MENG, and 鹿森夢. "CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Social Responsibility." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/83992040617340084198.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立高雄應用科技大學
財富與稅務管理系
104
Overconfidence is one of the characteristics of the managers. At the same time, managerial overconfidence plays an important role in business decision-making and the involvement of corporate social responsibility. Nowadays, affected by the global trend of sustainable development, many developed countries put emphasis on the coexisted relation between companies and society. Corporate social responsibilities have been an important factor for sustainable development. This thesis mainly explores how the managerial overconfidence influces the corporate social responsibility and the effect of corporate social responsibility on firm value. The subjects of the study are companies that listed in Taiwan between 2007 and 2014. The list of Corporate Citizenship Award released by Common Wealth Magazine is the original samples of responsible companies and 1,206 valid samples are collected. This study mainly discusses whether overconfident managers would tend to spend more operational costs on corporate social responsible activities and whether overconfidence really leads to excessive investment which affect the performance and value of the company. The empirical results demonstrate that when the managers with overconfident tend to spend more on the activities that fulfill corporate social responsibilities. At the same time, they may also invest excessively for improving personal reputation or other selfish purpose that resulting in nothing on the improvement of firm performance. The excessive investment of corporate social responsible activities has become an agency problem.
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Chia-Hsuan, Tsai, and 蔡嘉軒. "Managerail overconfidence and dividend payout policy." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/28002426733984077193.
Full textAbstract:
碩士輔仁大學
管理學研究所
98
Using 1,134 listed firm in 2000-2008 period I investigate how managerial overconfidence gauged by the press-based proxy of Brown and Sarma (2006) affects firm’s dividend policy. Prior studies illustrate two opposing threads: managerial overconfidence might be negatively correlated with dividend payout due to reserving internal cash for promising investment; managerial overconfidence might be positively correlated with dividend payout due to managers’ optimism about firm’s capability of generating stable and sufficient cash flows. The empirical results support the latter that managerial overconfidence is positively correlated with the odds of dividend payout and the increase in dividend payout. Moreover, firms with overconfident managers tend to increase investment following dividend announcement. These firms are characterized as large in scale and stable in growth. The announcement effect is positively correlated to dividend payout regardless of whether the managers are overconfident or not. This implies that the effect of managerial overconfidence subsides when the signal effect of dividend is taken into consideration. the result is free from the concern of endogeneity problem associated with managerial overconfidence.
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Chen, Wei-Hua, and 陳威樺. "Managerail overconfidence and research and development." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/30262686421801790386.
Full textAbstract:
碩士輔仁大學
管理學研究所
98
Research and development (R&D) is one of the key factors for firms to grow, to be sustainable, and to cultivate competitive advantage in both technology and product markets. However, the impact of R&D is obscure and sometimes untraceable, which fits to the condition that managerial overconfidence might affect its decision. Using the press-based proxy of managerial overconfidence of Brown and Sarma (2006) I investigate whether managerial overconfidence affect firm’s R&D decisions in the 2000-2008 sampling period. The results show that the R&Ds launched by overconfident managers tend to be large in scale and in the up-stream technology rather than down-stream one. However, the relation between managerial overconfidence and R&D frequency is less significant.
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Hsu, Wei-Man, and 許瑋蔓. "Corporate Investment Policy and CEO Overconfidence." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/37832992614699442558.
Full textAbstract:
碩士臺灣大學
財務金融學研究所
98
Prior studies examine the relation between executive overconfidence and corporate investment decisions, and demonstrate that CEO overconfidence effect can explain for investment distortions. In this study, we reexamine the impact of managerial overconfidence on the sensitivity of corporate investment to cash flow under a modified stock option exercise-based overconfidence measure derived from Campbell, Johnson, Rutherford, and Stanley (2009) and further investigate the effect of corporate investment distortion due to managerial overconfidence on subsequent operating performance. Our sample comprises all CEOs over the period, 1994-2008 in the universe of firms covering mainly the S&P 1500. The empirical analysis confirms that overconfident CEOs display the noticeably higher corporate investment-cash flow sensitivity, especially for firms with higher degree of financial constraints. Moreover, overconfident CEOs perform worse than non-overconfident CEOs and their firms reveal more operating performance deterioration than their peers following their abnormal capital investment year.
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LIN, CHING-HSUAN, and 林景暄. "Managerial Overconfidence and Corporate Social Responsibility." Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/daf8x2.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立彰化師範大學
財務金融技術學系
105
Based on data of 1,484 listed nonfinancial firms on the Taiwan Stock Exchange and Taipei Exchange through 2005~2015, this paper examines the linkage between the degree of managerial overconfidence and firm’s performance on Corporate Social Responsibility. While existing literature has mentioned that firm’s financial characteristics, board composition have influences firm’s CSR investment, the degree of managerial overconfidence may influence CSR investment through how downside risk may emerge perceiving by the management. Specifically, while CSR acts as performance insurance has been ever documented, firm with managerial overconfidence may underestimate the possibility of worse operation and thus purchase less insurance, invest less on CSR. Empirical result generally shows that greater degree of managerial overconfidence decreases firm’s engaging in CSR and generates smaller values on SCV per share.
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Hsiao, Sheng-Rung, and 蕭聖融. "CEO Overconfidence and Financial Reporting Quality." Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/x27nwt.
Full textAbstract:
碩士輔仁大學
金融與國際企業學系金融碩士班
106
This paper explores the effects of CEO overconfidence on financial reporting quality by U.S. stock markets data from 2000 to 2014. The empirical results show that, ceteris paribus, the behavior of low overconfidence managers has significant and positive influences on financial report readability. The behavior of high overconfidence managers has insignificant influences on financial report readability. The reason is that if managers are low-overconfident, they will decrease investment behavior to make financial report more readable. In addition, this study also found that if the risk (scale, number of years of company establishment) of company is high, it will enhance (weaken) the positive influence of low-overconfidence managers on the readability of financial statements.
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ONG, WEI CHEN, and 王偉權. "CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Hedging Activities." Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/47p99a.
Full textAbstract:
碩士輔仁大學
金融與國際企業學系金融碩士班
106
This paper explores the relation between CEO overconfidence and corporate hedging activities by Taiwan stock markets data from 2009 to 2014.The empirical results show that the high-overconfident CEO negatively relates to corporate hedging activities. It means that the CEOs with highly overconfident personality traits in the company tend to overestimate their ability to predict the future, therefore they will not be using hedging in the process of investing heavily in high risk financial instruments. After adding control variables, the empirical results still show a negative relation between high-confidence CEO and hedging activities. Otherwise low-overconfident CEO positively relates to corporate hedging activities. Moreover, the results also show that when companies have higher quick ratios or firm sizes, high-overconfident CEO negatively relates to corporate hedging activities. Meanwhile, when companies have lower quick ratios or firm sizes, low-overconfident CEO positively relates to corporate hedging activities.
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Lin, Pei-Yu, and 林沛瑜. "Managerial Overconfidence and Seasoned Equity Offerings." Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/vy233g.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立彰化師範大學
財務金融技術學系
106
This paper explores whether managerial overconfidence will influence seasoned equity offerings decision. I collect the information of seasoned equity offerings from Taiwan stock market. The sample period is from 2000 to 2016. The results indicate overconfident managers tend to launch seasoned equity offerings. The results also show that overconfident managers will launch seasoned equity offerings during higher stock return. Overconfident managers are less likely to launch seasoned equity offerings when firms are lack of internal funds.
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Hung, Tzu-Chun, and 洪子峻. "CEO Overconfidence Propagation in Supply Chain." Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/gs26ve.
Full textAbstract:
碩士元智大學
財務金融暨會計碩士班(財務金融學程)
106
This paper examines the CEO overconfidence propagation in supply chain. Our sample includes 1202 firms in U.S. during 1994 to 2016. Using the overconfidence measure proposed in Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2005b, 2008), we find that it is evident that CEO overconfidence propagates in supply chain. Overconfidence of customer CEOs will increase the propensity of overconfidence of suppliers’ CEOs. In addition, during recession, this propagation effect declines significantly. We also perform two robustness checks to certify our results. First, we examine the propagation effect in innovative industries. Results show that propagation effect becomes more evident. Second, to mitigate the endogenous problems arising from our regression design, we use R&D expense as instrument variable and perform two-stage regression. Our results remain the same. Behavior traits of CEOs diffuse through the linkage of supply-chain relationship.
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RendySentosa and 王孟涛. "CEO Overconfidence and Cost of Equity." Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/4z59px.
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Yu, Tzu-Yi, and 游子誼. "Managerial overconfidence and pension plan management." Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/27pk52.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立交通大學
財務金融研究所
106
In this paper, we examine the effect of managerial overconfidence on defined benefit pen-sion plan management. Our findings show that overconfident executives show their expectation and belief on actuarial pension assumptions by using aggressive assumption choices. Mean-while, our findings show that there is no difference between overconfident managers and non-overconfident managers on risk-tanking behavior. In other words, we argue the belief of managerial overconfidence in actuarial pension assumptions could be separated from the corre-sponding risk-taking behavior in pension management. We also find that pension benefit own-ership of executives does not mitigate the effect of overconfidence on pension assumptions choices.
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Lin, Hsiao-Chien, and 林曉謙. "Overconfidence, Informed Trading and Product Market Competition." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/25758098127371195214.
Full textAbstract:
碩士輔仁大學
金融研究所
94
In recent years, there are some papers try to discuss corporate strategies with integrated point of view. For example, Han, Chian-Shan (2004) states that there are important linkages between product market and insider trading. Corporate manager is not only the management but also insider of a company. This makes the issues that combine insider trading and product market competition very interesting. This paper continues the former research about insider trading and product market competition but put more weight on manager’s behavior. That’s because lots of surveys revealed overconfidence is an attribute of human being, and as the degree of job professionalism increase the tendency of overconfidence become more apparent. Obviously, a corporate manager will fit such kind of description. Therefore, through the setting of model, this paper shows how an overconfident manager acts in the stock market and product market. Finally, we bring up the idea that overconfident manager will trade more volumes in the stock market than rational manager. However, there is no necessity he will produce more in the product market. The quantity he produces depends on the market condition.
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Meng-Chin, Hsieh, and 謝孟芹. "Overconfidence and Withdrawal of Merge and Acquisition." Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/p7tr2h.
Full textAbstract:
碩士東吳大學
企業管理學系
103
Merger is one of the mains method for companies to pursue growth and expand rapidly, while the CEO’s attitude plays a big role in acquisition. However, irrational behavior will not only damages the growth of the company, but also bring negative impact on stock price. Previous studies found that there are negative abnormal returns resulting from announcement of merger by overconfident CEOs. This study examined the impact of overconfidence CEO and merger withdrawal announcement from different perspectives using 344 samples of American public firms between 1997 and 2014, via linear regression analysis with acquisition experience as the moderator. The results show that, overconfident CEOs have positive cumulative abnormal return when they announce the withdrawal of merger. And overconfident CEOs in the company which has successful acquisition experiences before also have positive relation to cumulative abnormal return. This study recommends that CEOs should have courage to declare withdrawal of M&A when they find that it will cause impact to the company. Also, the company with successful acquisition experiences should make the most use of their power to monitor CEO so as to assist them to make better decisions.
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Tzeng, Shiow-Hwan, and 曾秀環. "Firm’s Size, Overconfidence and Disposition Effect:Taiwan Evidence." Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/xyp33y.
Full textAbstract:
碩士樹德科技大學
金融系碩士班
103
In this dissertation we study the difference of disposition effects and overconfidence phenomenon between the large (before 10%) and small (after 10%) size firms by the measures suggested by Weber and Camerer (1998) and Tang(2013) etc. Furthermore, we also investigate whether these effects are influenced by the market conditions (bull or bear market) in that time. The sample includes all the companies listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange, and the sample period is from May 2008 to December 2012. Our empirical results show that: First, the disposition effect of large size firms is larger than those of small size firms, and the overconfidence phenomenon is significantly correlated with firm size. Second, the disposition effect of large size firms in bull and bear markets are both larger than those of small size firms, but for overconfidence phenomenon, the result is opposite. In addition, the disposition effects of large size firms are significantly different in bull and bear markets, but not for small size firms. Finally, the disposition effect and overconfidence phenomenon of the large and small size firms in the bull markets are not smaller than those in the bear markets.
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Yang, Ting-Fang, and 楊廷芳. "CEO Overconfidence and M&A Performance." Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/76110506937873302823.
Full textAbstract:
碩士銘傳大學
國際企業學系碩士班
97
This study investigates how managerial overconfidence affects M&A performance in publicly traded firms in Taiwan. The frequency of M&As the manager engaged during his tenures [Doukas and Petmezas (2007)] , the management earnings forecasts [Lin, Hu and Chen(2005, 2007)] , the manager held the stocks during his tenures [Malmendier and Tate (2005a)], and, the premium of M&As [Antonious, Arbour and Zhao(2008)] are used as the proxy variables of managerial overconfidence in this study. The results show there is significantly positive less M&A abnormal stock return for the overconfidence managers, comparing with the sample of the non- overconfidence CEO. The overconfidence CEO will not obtain more CARs, when he/she does more M&As. And the long-term performance of the companies with overconfidence CEO does not change over time. On the other hand, unrelated diversification M&A is not the key factor for overconfident CEO to get better performance after M&As.
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Lin, Wen-wei, and 林文偉. "The Study of Analysts' Overoptimism and Overconfidence." Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/43443492355446557928.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立臺灣科技大學
財務金融研究所
97
The purpose of this study comprehend the relationship between overoptimism and overconfidence when analysts forecast earnings, the results found that prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, analysts forecast exist overoptimism, and when analysts receive a better message and recession, the degree of overoptimism is more serious. In addition, also found that prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley, analysts overweight their private information in their earnings forecast, and when analysts receive a better message, the overweight bias comes from incentives hypothesis. To meet the research needs, the study choose data whose overweight bias comes from overconfidence hypothesis, and the result found that analyst earnings forecasts overoptimism is more serious, the bias of overconfidence is stronger, and the overconfidence more is serious, the degree of overoptimism is stronger. The study also found that the accuracy of earnings forecast is positive correlation with the trading volume, and higher corporation information transparency, the accuracy of earnings forecast of the impact on trading volume larger.
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YANG, WEI-LING, and 楊薇齡. "Family Ownership, CEO Overconfidence, and Investment Policy." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/09445071536327011348.
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碩士國立臺北大學
企業管理學系
104
This study examines the influence of family ownership on overconfident CEOs. The literature suggests that because family owners of firms seek to leave family businesses to their descendants, they are more likely to be risk averse to maintain firm stability and survival. This study’s analysis of S&P 1500 firms from 2001 to 2010 shows that overconfident CEOs, who overestimate future cash flow of investment project and underestimate project risk, leading to overinvestment, will be affected by the conservative tendency of the family firms and reduce their overinvestment behaviors. Further, the sensitivity of investment to cash flows is also reduced significantly. Family ownership also mitigates overconfident CEOs’ risk preferences. As a result, the total risks of firms with overconfident CEOs are negatively related to family ownership. Although overconfident managers in family firms reduce their overinvestment and risk-taking behaviors, the over monitoring of family ownership make overconfident CEOs tend to reduce their innovation activities and abandon positive NPV projects rather than negative NPV projects, reducing firm value.
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Ho, Kun-Fang, and 何昆芳. "The Relationships between CEO Overconfidence and Innovation." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/76181344321946168457.
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碩士國立中興大學
高階經理人碩士在職專班
104
Abstract Undoubtedly, the core competitiveness of some companies lies on innovation. The application of the new way of doing business, developing new technologies, or offering new products and services, are the risks and challenges for an innovation project. Without innovation, a company will just be waiting to be beaten or defeated by the emerging rival. Way back in 1934 in Schumpeter''s study, the model has proven to be successful that innovation is the way for an enterprise to obtain an excessive profits, and the key to avoid for being eliminated. Especially for now when technology life cycle is extremely short, the rise and fall is just in a blink. Such giant companies like Kodak, Nokia, and Acer, who once ruled the roost in their respective fields are the significant lessons for other companies. When the positive impact of implicating the innovation and growth is profits, then the opposite will be facing the risk of failure. According to the upper-echelons theory, the composition of the top management team especially the qualities of the manager will highly affect the company''s strategy, thereby affecting the path of the entire enterprise. Any decision made by the company''s CEO is a personal "explicit faith" performance, therefore, this study manages to explore the relevance between the qualities of enterprise managers and the leadership with “overconfidence” personality and the innovation activities. This study employs the data from 2005 to 2015 of Taiwan electronics companies as samples, investigate the relevance of overconfidence manager and the innovation activities in the business. Empirical results show that an overconfidence manager, the R&D expenses and amount of patents granted did not show a significant positive correlation, therefore overconfidence manager is not apparently an important factor in innovation activities of the enterprises. In the other hand, the revenue growth rate (SalesGrowth) and capital intensity (Ppesales) presents a significant positive correlation. This study found that when the manager is overconfidence, the products sell, the business performance and the growth of the company will perform better. Keywords：Overconfidence, patents, R&D expenses
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Reis, Leonor Alves Minhós dos. "Political ideology and overconfidence in decision-making." Master's thesis, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/29672.
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This dissertation aims to analyze the correlation between overconfidence and political ideologies. Because we live in the European Union that is facing social and economic disintegrations as well as new challenges, it’s more usual to see the arising of more extreme, radical political ideologies. In this paper it is studied, based on previous literature, how conservatives/right-wing parties might display higher amounts of overconfidence bias than liberals/left-wing parties. With the assistance of an online survey, overconfidence is tested not only in financial literacy but also in decision making. Subjective and Objective Knowledge are also analyzed independently so that it is possible to correlate both overconfidence and political ideologies. Regression Models are also used. It was confirmed that it’s not possible to correlate objective knowledge and political ideology, however it wasn’t possible to confirm that conservatives do display higher amounts of overconfidence than liberals. It was concluded that political ideology might not be a good estimator for overconfidence.Esta dissertação procura analisar a correlação entre ideologias políticas e o excesso de confiança. Porque atualmente vivemos na União Europeia que sofre com uma desintegração social e económica, e novos desafios, é frequente ver a ascensão de partidos e ideologias mais extremistas e radicais. Nesta dissertação é estudado como Conservadores/ Defensores de partidos de Extrema Direita cometem mais o erro de excesso de confiança do que os Liberais/Defensores de partidos de Extrema Esquerda, algo já defendido anteriormente noutros estudos científicos. Com o auxílio de um questionário realizado online, o excesso de confiança é testado no conhecimento financeiro, assim como na tomada de decisão de cada indivíduo. Conhecimento Subjetivo e Objetivo são também analisados independentemente, de forma a ser possível correlacionar o excesso de confiança com as diferentes ideologias políticas. Modelos de Regressão Linear são também usados. Foi confirmado que não é possível correlacionar conhecimento objetivo com ideologias políticas, no entanto, não foi possível confirmar que pessoas mais conservadoras demonstram maiores níveis de excesso de confiança do que liberais. Foi concluído que ideologias políticas não são o melhor estimador para prever o excesso de confiança de um individuo.
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Lin, Wan-Ting, and 林婉婷. "CEO Overconfidence and Types of Turnaround Initiatives." Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/11971346312034692581.
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碩士國立臺灣大學
會計學研究所
104
This thesis examines the effect of CEO overconfidence on the choice of turnaround initiatives. Using a sample of distressed firms in S&P 1500 from 2002 to 2013, the results show that overconfident CEOs are less likely to implement extensive operating initiatives in response to declining performance; i.e., they are less likely to employ ‘threat-rigidity’ responses. We also find that there is no significant difference of preference between short-term and long-term strategic turnaround initiatives for overconfident CEOs.