Academic literature on the topic 'Pactum de non petendo'

O pactum de non petendo a despeito de não ser novo instituto ganha nova abordagem diante da atual tratativa processual. Decorrente da Lei de Organizações Criminosas e do acordo de não persecução penal, o tema tornou-se relevante também ao processo civil. Objetiva-se expor brevemente sobre os conceitos de fato jurídico e negócio jurídico, juntamente com princípios pontuais que regem o pactum de non petendo. A problematização se encontra na possibilidade ou não das partes pactuarem promessa de não processar como meio de auxiliar a perspectiva cooperativa consensual de resolução de conflitos. Para tanto, utiliza-se da análise bibliográfica como metodologia, em especial do autor Alberto Trigo, além da legislação pertinente.

A pesquisa refere-se ao negócio jurídico atípico da promessa de não processar (pacto de non petendo) abarcada sua possibilidade pelo disposto no art. 190 do Código de Processo Civil. A despeito de rara doutrina brasileira explanar sobre o tema, a Quarta Turma do Superior Tribunal de Justiça, em relatoria do Ministro Luis Felipe Salomão no Recurso Especial 1.810.444-SP, fixou a tese de invalidade de cláusula de pacto de non petendo em razão da sua supressão ao contraditório e à garantia constitucional da tutela jurisdicional (art. 5º incisos LV e XXXV, Constituição Federal de 1988), portanto, objeto de ordem pública e contrário a dispositivo constitucional, não podendo ser avençado entre as partes. Contudo ainda se perfaz necessária a discussão sobre o tema, visto que se entende sua aplicabilidade possível dentro dos ditames da autonomia privada. Objetiva-se, assim, realizar um contraponto entre o voto prolatado e a doutrina que se debruçou sobre a cláusula de não processar. Mediante a metodologia dedutiva e dialética apresenta-se um estudo doutrinário e jurisprudencial.

The insolvency-remoteness of a special purpose vehicle (SPV) used in a securitisation scheme is of critical importance, because insolvency of the SPV can interrupt the payment streams due to the investors in such schemes. Several contractual methods are implemented to achieve insolvency-remoteness. In this article, it is argued that pacta de non petendo (non-petition clauses), limited recourse provisions, and subordination clauses, all common insolvency-remoteness provisions, do not violate public policy. It is also argued that the capacity provisions in the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Act) do not reduce the insolvency risk of a limited capacity SPV used in a securitisation scheme. The fact that ultra vires contracts concluded by limited capacity companies will be provisionally valid under the Act means that provisions in a company’s MOI that limit a company’s capacity will have very little external significance. It is argued that the right to restrain ultra vires contracts in terms of s 20(5) of the Act, in conjunction with the right to ratify such actions in terms of s 20(2), do not provide reliable legal certainty or protection to the investors in assets securitised through a limited capacity SPV.

In light of the distinction Saint Augustine makes between a committed evil, understood as the result of a mistake in choosing (culpa), and a suffered evil, des­cribed as the effect of a just divine judgment (poena) – a distinction he makes in several texts dealing with the origin of evil – I analyze Augustine’s reflections in the Confessions on his relationship with the unnamed women. He calls the rela­tionship a pactum libidinosi amoris, that is, one aimed at satisfying the passions. The negative moral judgment he passes on this stage of his life is expressed with particular poignancy by the word libido/libidinosus, indicating the passions to which man submits at times. Looking back at his affair with the unnamed woman, he considers the evil committed a culpa; hence one has the impression that he wanted to place the moral responsibility of the evil committed upon himself, thus giving greater witness to the goodness of the merciful God who revealed to him gradually the truth concerning the various phases of his spiritual journey and the pain experienced along the way.

Adversus ulteriorem sacramentorum theologiam, quae sacramenti matrimonii considerationem firmare in e,fficatia intendet, SS. Patres admirabili copia symbolorum declarant matrimonii intimam societatem cum divino proposito salvandi. Ex hac perspectiva matrimonium simul est et mysterium et signum. Ab inicio Deus matrimonium secundum archetypum, quod Prius in intimitate sua custoditum posterius revelatum fuit, ordinavit. Ita mysterium matrimoniale originaliter convertitur in signo magni mysterii Christi sponsi Ecclesiae, simul ac Revelatio divina explicitatur et in Christo cons4/llmatur. Permansio matrimonii per diversas oeconomias salutis -quamvis ordo matrimonialis etiam patiatur diversos status quibus .homo possit inveniri- secum fert quod symbolismum matrimonii ut prophetia, vel typus, vel praefiguratio aut rememoratio magni mysterii Christi prospectum sit. Unitas qua SS. Patres duo contemplantur Testamenta explicat quod symbolismum sacramentorum proicietur per oeconomias salvlficas et quod in matrimonio assurgatur iam ab initio, etenim duobus primis hominibus iam fuit matrimonium, non yero cetera sacramenta. luxta character symbolicum, in doctrina Patrum eminet etiam alius aspectus sacramenti, qui incidit etiam in matrimonium. Significatio sacramenti romani obligationem ante divinitatem implicabat. Permansio huius significationis scriptis christianis, transformatae yero novitate christianismi, nullam post philologica studia thematis dubitationem. of,fert. In hoc sensu inspiciendum est quomodo fontes illius aetatis insistant in relatione matrimoniali configurata mysterio Christi. Matrimonium non est ductilis ad simplex pactum inter partes: custoditur in Christo et in Ecclesia. Ita apparet claraconvenientia inter symbolismum matrimonial e et naturam vinculi unionis sponsatorum.

The growth of Sharia Economic accelerating in the last three decades is also affecting the increase of potential disputes on sharia economic field. For the purposes of fast, effective and efficient dispute settlement, the disputing parties tend to prefer non-litigation dispute settlement through alternative dispute resolutions (ADR), one of which is through the National Sharia Arbitration Board. The results of this study showed that the authority of the National Sharia Arbitration Board on sharia economic dispute settlement is determined by whether or not the arbitration agreement, either before a dispute arises (Pactum Compromittendo) or after the dispute arises (Acta Compromise). Thereby, the legitimacy of the authority of the National Sharia Arbitration Board on Syariah economic dispute settlement, based on the principle of Pacta Sunt Servanda and Consensual Principles contained in the Civil Code. Further, registration and execution of the National Sharia Arbitration Board verdict should be carried out by the Religious Courts, including the cancellation of the legal action on the verdict. It is based on two factors: (1) the basic legality of absolute competence of the Religious Courts in the Islamic economic dispute resolution as set out in Article 49 of Regulation No. 3/2006 on the Religious Courts; and (2) the basic relevance of the substance of Islamic law which is implemented by the National Sharia Arbitration Board.

Without a doubt, Slobodan Jovanovic was one of the greatest Serbian jurists, and in the period between the two World Wars, he was probably the most influential Serbian jurist. In this context, his views on the Serbian-Russian relations have exerted an influence on the formation of the dominant discourse, but also on many generations that came after his time (his bust in front of the Faculty of Law in Belgrade symbolically shows how highly he is valued in today?s legal circles, more than 60 years after his death). In his voluminous opus Jovanovic suggests that the Peace of Bucharest, the Akkerman Convention and the Peace of Edirne were bilateral agreements between Russia and Turkey, with provisions that went in favour of the third party (pactum in favorem tretii), i.e. Serbia. He also gave a positive assessment of the Russian diplomacy during the 19th century. In that sense, Jovanovic criticizes the Serbian historians who claimed the opposite, and even Milos Obrenovic himself. Finally, as a jurist, he also rejects the ideological division according to which only reactionary influences came from Russia, and only freedom and enlightenment from the West. In his analysis of the Serbian-Russian relations Jovanovic points out that it was Russia which insisted on the formation of a National Council in Serbia which was to ?limit? the absolute power of Milos Obrenovic. Such an attitude has retained its validity even in the 21st century because the dogma about the so-called Russian reactionary policy is still very much alive. As a jurist, Jovanovic also shows understanding of the conflict of Russian and Serbian interests, or the interests of a small country and those of an empire. He remains midway between the uncritical idealization of Russia and even more intolerant Russophobia. He cites and compares numerous examples. He pointed out that, for instance, a Polish insurrection broke out in 1830, at the very same time when Russia was in negotiations with the Ottoman Porte over the Serbian issue. However, despite these (undeniable) facts, Jovanovic does not draw Russophobic conclusions, which were so prevalent in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. He remains midway between the non-critical idealization of Russia and even more intolerant Russophobia. Such opinions of a jurist, who was ideologically an anglophile, are still very important in 2018, when Russophobia present in the West, but also in a part of the Serbian elite, reaches the Cold War level.

Context in law is everything, or so says the aphorism. That said, to what extent should courts consider the surrounding context of a contract when interpreting and construing it and its provisions? Does the parol evidence rule preclude a court from taking into account contextual evidence or circumstances in interpreting contractual provisions? Or is the court restricted to the contractual provisions and nothing beyond the four corners of the contract? These are some of the central issues that were considered in University of Johannesburg v Auckland Park Theological Seminary (2021 JDR 1151 (CC)) (UJ CC). The Supreme Court of Appeal (Auckland Park Theological Seminary v University of Johannesburg 2020 JDR 0494 (SCA) (UJ SCA)) and the Constitutional Court had divergent views on the matter. This case note provides a critical analysis of both judgments, ultimately preferring the decision of the Constitutional Court.In the law of contract, it is trite that, generally, all personal rights may be freely transferred or ceded to a third party without requiring the consent or knowledge of the other contracting party, who has a correlative duty. This is known as cession. An example is necessary. Consider A’s deposit of R10 000 into B Bank where B Bank is contractually obliged to return the deposit on A’s demand. A then transfers his right to claim (or demand) his deposit to C. There is no requirement that A procures B Bank’s consent to cede his right to claim. For the sake of completeness, cession is a bilateral juristic act aimed at transferring a personal right from a cedent/creditor to another legal person (cessionary). The cessionary then wears the shoes of a creditor in the cedent’s place. Cession can be differentiated from delegation (which concerns the substitution of a debtor, as opposed to a creditor) and assignment (which refers to a combination of cession and delegation).However, the general rule of cession is subject to limitations. There are two crucial limitations in this regard. First, a right cannot be ceded where it is the subject of a pactum de non cedendo, which can generally be defined as an agreement to not cede. Accordingly, a contract may contain a provision that prevents a creditor from ceding a right without the debtor’s consent. An example of a pactum de non cedendo is where a tenant, in a lease agreement, is not permitted to cede her rights of occupation and possession unless there is prior written consent by the landlord. Secondly, there may be certain rights that are so personal in nature that they cannot be ceded. Such rights cannot be ceded because the identity of the creditor is paramount to the debtor and there is an expectation that the party initially contracted with will fulfil the obligations. Claims for pain and suffering in delict, and claims for maintenance, are traditional examples of such rights. These rights are classified as delectus personae.In light of that general background, the author turns to consider the case of University of Johannesburg v Auckland Park Theological Seminary (supra) with a particular focus on the judgments of the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court. To this end, this case note is structured as follows. First, the pertinent facts of the case are canvassed; secondly, the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal is examined; thirdly, the findings of the Constitutional Court are analysed; and lastly, the author provides a critical evaluation of the judgments, and endorses the reasoning furnished by the Constitutional Court.

Since the pactum de non cedendo is prohibitory by its nature and operation, our law should have proceeded with caution when determining its effect. This, unfortunately, is not what transpired in the locus classicus decision. Nor did subsequent cases correct this fatal ratio. The distressing truth is that the old authorities, upon whom the locus classicus judgment is based, were in all probability not writing about pacta de non cedendo. Strangely enough, when this was suggested by an academic in the field, it elicited no response. The lack of response evidences a lack of interest in the topic in general, partly due to the uncertain state of affairs in which the pactum de non cedendo operates, and partly due to the courts&rsquo
unwillingness to rectify the situation. Despite the waning interest, the pactum de non cedendo is prevalent and appears in many types of contracts, most recently in the powerhouse factoring industry, and cannot simply be swept under the rug. This dissertation breathes new life into the pactum de non cedendo and discusses its validity and effect from a fresh perspective: A commercial perspective with a strong influence from American law. Hopefully this re-evaluation of the pactum de non cedendo will re-capture the attention of academics and judges alike, so that those in the position to do so, will re-consider its validity and effect.

PACTUM DE NON PETENDO: PROFILI CRITICI E RICOSTRUTTIVI. ABSTRACT Malgrado i patti di inesigibilità del credito non abbiano ancora avuto nel nostro ordinamento una specifica regolamentazione, non può dubitarsi l’istituto, pur così storicamente datato, giochi un ruolo di centrale importanza nella realtà contemporanea. In particolare proprio la crisi epocale delle economia in cui attualmente si versa sembra destinata a rendere ancora più attuale la funzione espletata dall’istituto sia con riguardo all’attività di impresa sia con riferimento a rapporti obbligatori insorti al di fuori di tale perimetro. Svariate sono le applicazioni dell’istituto che si sono diffuse nella prassi per come è dato desumere dalla rilevanza che le stesse hanno avuto in sede giudiziaria. La versatilità del pactum spazia, a titolo meramente esemplificativo, dagli accordi coniugali in sede di separazione, al pactum de non exsequendo, o al pactum de non petendo utilizzato per prevenire una situazione di insolvenza di imprese. L’analisi prende le mosse da una ricostruzione storica, imprescindibile per la comprensione dei problemi sottesi all’istituto, cui è dedicato il capitolo primo. Il pactum de non petendo per il diritto romano classico individuava un negozio informale, con cui il creditore si impegnava nei confronti del debitore a non richiedere, mai più o per un certo tempo, l’adempimento della prestazione. Fu il diritto pretorio ad attribuire rilevanza giuridica al pactum. L’istituto del pactum de non petendo, nel diritto romano classico, non rappresentava un modo di estinzione delle obbligazioni. Esso aveva in comune con il contiguo istituto dell’accepitlatio il fine di rimettere il debito, ma se ne distingueva in quanto appunto la prima estingueva direttamente l’obbligazione, mentre il pactum era destinato ad operare sul piano processuale a mezzo di una exceptio, che consentiva al debitore di paralizzare l’azione del creditore. La contrapposizione appena evocata, fondata sulla effettiva diversità degli effetti del pactum e dell’acceptilatio, venne a perdere, nel periodo successivo, il proprio significato in ragione soprattutto del venir meno del dualismo tra diritto civile e diritto pretorio, che giustificava, sia pur su piani diversi (sostanziale e processuale) l’affiancamento dei due istituti. Una delle principali sfide della dottrina contemporanea è dunque l’individuazione della natura giuridica del patto di inesigibilità, resa ardua da un lato dalla citata contiguità con l’istituto della remissione, e dall’altro dalla mancanza di una disciplina legislativa dell’istituto. Al tema della natura giuridica del pactum de non petendo è dedicato il secondo capitolo, che esamina le varie posizioni dottrinali espresse sull’argomento, a cominciare proprio da quella che riconduce il pactum perpetuo alla remissione del debito. L’analisi procede con la tesi che nega al pactum un’efficacia estintiva del preesistente rapporto obbligatorio, attribuendogli un’efficacia meramente obbligatoria. Secondo tale impostazione, il patto sarebbe fonte di un’obbligazione negativa ( a non chiedere l’adempimento) gravante sul creditore, che si aggiunge all’obbligazione originaria cui esso accede. Altra dottrina, di contro, ha negato che il patto di inesigibilità possa costituire fonte di una nuova obbligazione, qualificando il patto come mero “atto di tolleranza” concesso al debitore per permettergli l’adempimento tardivo. Infine, si prendono in esame le due posizioni dottrinali più recenti espresse sul punto: la prima, che qualifica il patto come fattispecie riduttiva del rapporto obbligatorio; e la seconda (alla quale si aderisce) che lo considera alla stregua di negozio regolamentare, ovvero vicenda modificativa del rapporto obbligatorio. Il capitolo terzo esamina i principali problemi di disciplina relativi al pactum de non petendo, disciplina che non essendo approntata dal legislatore dev’essere necessariamente ricostruita dall’interprete. La disamina prende le mosse dal problema della forma dei patti di inesigibilità, che si pone nel caso in cui essi incidano su obbligazioni che trovano la loro fonte in negozi formali. Si procede poi con il giudizio di meritevolezza del patto, e con l’analisi dei suoi effetti, problema quest’ultimo strettamente correlato a quello della natura giuridica. Inoltre, viene esaminata l’incidenza del patto sull’obbligazione solidale, con particolare riferimento al problema dell’applicazione analogica dell’art. 1301 c.c., che disciplina l’incidenza sul rapporto solidale della remissione del debito. Infine viene trattato il rapporto del patto di inesigibilità con altri istituti con cui presenta tratti di contiguità: la donazione, la novazione, la transazione, la prescrizione. Il quarto capitolo, infine, tratta degli ambiti applicativi del pactum de non petendo, che come si è detto si manifesta nei settori più disparati. Lo studio prende le mosse dal ruolo del negozio nell’ambito della crisi d’impresa, ed in particolare negli accordi di ristrutturazione dei debiti di cui all’art. 182-bis l. fall. Procede poi con la disamina del settore della crisi coniugale, in relazione al quale si rende necessaria un’analisi del divieto di disposizione di cui all’art. 160 c.c. Infine, viene esaminato il ruolo del pactum de non petendo nel processo, trattando di una delle sue manifestazioni: il pactum de non exsequendo.
Pactum de non petendo: a critical reconstruction of the legal framework. Abstract Despite the fact that agreements by which a bad debt is declared unpayable have not yet been specifically regulated by our legal system, such a legal structure—that has always been known as pactum de non petendo—although old still plays a relevant role in contemporary economy. More specifically, the current economical context seems to make the agreement's function more relevant, both with regard to business activity and with other kind of contractual relationships. There are many applications of such an agreement as testified by the case law. The versatility of the pactum the non petendo is declined in various forms, such as, e.g., the spousal agreements at the time of separation or the agreements used to prevent an insolvency. The analysis starts from an historical reconstruction, essential to understanding the problems connected with this kind of agreement, to which the first chapter is devoted. The pactum de non petendo, for the classical Roman law, was an informal contract, with which the creditor committed not to require from the debtor, for some time or forever, the fulfillment of the performance. The Praetorian law attributed legal significance to the pactum. This agreement, in classical Roman law, was not an instrument for extinguishing contractual obligations. It had in common with the similar institution of “acceptilatio” the purpose of waiving the debt, but it was different from it, because the acceptilatio immediately extinguished the obligation, while the pactum was intended to operate on a procedural basis by means of an exceptio, which allowed the debtor to paralyze the creditor’s action. The distinction between pactum de non petendo and acceptilatio lost its significance in the following period, primarily because of the disappearance of a dualism between civil law and Praetorian law. Therefore, one of the major challenges of contemporary scholars is the identification of pactm de non petendo’s nature, made difficult by the contiguity with the remission of loan, and also by the lack of a legislative discipline of the institute. The second chapter deals with this topic, starting by examining the various doctrinal positions expressed on the subject. It starts the theory according to which the perpetual pactum de non petendo is a remission of loan. The analysis proceeds with the thesis that denies an extinctive efficacy to this agreement, i.e. the effect of extinguish the previous obligation. According to this approach, the pact would be the source of a negative obligation (not to claim fulfillment) imposed on the creditor, which is added to the original obligation to which it accedes. Other scholars, on the other hand, has denied that the pact of non-performance could be the source of a new obligation, qualifying the covenant as a mere “act of tolerance” granted to the debtor in order to allow it a belated fulfillment. Finally, the chapter examines the two most recent doctrinal positions on the subject: the first, which sees the covenant as a “reduction” of the obligations; and the second (to which it adheres) that considers it as a contract that modifies the previous contract. Chapter three examines the most important regulatory issues regarding the pactum de non petendo. A normative regulation is not given by the legislator, so it must necessarily be reconstructed by the interpreter. The first problem regards the form of this agreement, which arises in the event that it has as an object obligations that find their source in formal contracts. In addition, chapter three examines the incidence of the pactum the non petendo on the obligation, with particular reference to the problem of the application of art. 1301 c.c. Finally, the chapter considers the relationship between the pactum the non petendo and other similar legal structures, such as donation, novation, transaction, prescription. Finally, the fourth chapter addresses the application areas of the pactum de non petendo, which is manifested in the most disparate sectors. The study is based on the role of the agreement in the business crisis, and in particular in the debt restructuring agreements referred to in art. 182-bis r.d. n. 267/1942. It then proceeds with the examination of the sector of the family crisis, in relation to the spousal agreements at the time of separation. Finally, the role of the pactum de non petendo in the process is examined, dealing with the agreement called “pactum de not exsequendo”.

The aim of this paper was to determine whether the current South African law governing the doctrine of pacta de non cedendo complies with the constitutional mandates imposed by our Constitution. In terms of the current law a pactum de non cedendo will only be accorded validity if the debtor is able to demonstrate a substantial interest in the prohibition against cession. However, the interest requirement is only applicable when a pactum de non cedendo is superimposed onto a pre-existing right, and is not required when a right is born ab initio with a prohibition on transfer. In my opinion the current law falls short of the "spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights", as required by s 39(2) of the Constitution, and is therefore, in need of development. In this paper I propose the following development: Firstly, by requiring the debtor to prove an interest that is served by the pactum de non cedendo, in certain circumstances, the law undermines the value of equality held so dearly by our society. This is because no such requirement exists when other types of restrictive clauses are concluded. It is my contention that the "interest requirement" be relegated from being a free-standing requirement to simply being another factor to be taken into account when conducting the public policy enquiry. Secondly, pacta de non cedendo appearing in book debts and other similar monetary obligations should always be held contrary to public policy due to the importance of the free flow of claims in commerce, specifically, the factoring and securitisation industries. Factoring plays a crucial role in the world economy, the most advantageous aspect of factoring is that small to medium size businesses may obtain much needed finance by selling their claims to a factoring house. Lastly, the current distinction drawn between a pactum de non cedendo that is superimposed onto a pre-existing right, and a right that is created with a pactum de non cedendo is artificial and illogical, the correct distinction that should be drawn is between a pactum de non cedendo that is concluded by the debtor and creditor on the one hand, and between a pactum de non cedendo concluded between the cedent and cessionary on the other.

Magister Legum - LLM (Public Law and Jurisprudence)
Prior to 2010, as a result of a sluggish global economy, the amalgamation and merger procedure in South Africa was active although it was at an all-time low.1 However, in 2010, there was an increase in amalgamation and merger activity in South Africa which was more pronounced in cross-border deals in South Africa and general corporate restructurings.2 As a result of this, as well as the developed infrastructure that was placed in preparation for the FIFA 2010 World Cup, the country attracted more and more foreign markets to invest in South Africa which contributed to the increasing rate of amalgamations and mergers.3 Nevertheless, the global recession has also contributed to the increase in amalgamations and merger activity as many companies in South Africa have merged to buck the negative trend that most companies find themselves in, increase their revenue and work with each other to advance the position of the company on a par with those of its competitors. However, there are various other reasons as to why companies consolidate their assets and liabilities. Recently, Tiso Blackstar, a merged investment holding company, consolidated their assets, liabilities and skills between Blackstar Plc and Tiso Investment Holdings to expand its operations and to seek investment opportunities in Africa which is boasting with economic growth.4 The company was of the opinion that the merger would not only enhance its scale and profitability, but it would also put the group on a new growth path.5 There are many benefits in which companies may reap from amalgamations and mergers, but elucidating them is beyond the scope of this research.

L'objet principal de notre recherche sera d'essayer d'éclairer l'obscurité relative à la figure du contrat normatif, existante particulièrement en espagne, en élaborant une étude minutieuse et en profondeur qui fait actuellement défaut dans la littérature juridique. de même, il sera aussi bien nécessaire d'analyser si la notion de contrat normatif, telle qu'elle est proposée par la doctrine et jurisprudence espagnole et surtout italienne, peut être transposée au droit français des contrats. et, d'autre part, si la notion française de contrat-cadre correspond à celle, espagnole, de « contrato marco ». pour ce faire, il sera nécessaire d'entamer une étude de ses différences et similitudes au moyen d'une comparaison de l'emploi, par les professionnels du droit de chaque pays, de chacun des termes. finalement il sera envisagé, le cas échéant, l'opportunité d'une éventuelle transposition de la figure du contrat-cadre au droit espagnol à travers celle de « contrato marco », l'intégrant comme équivalente ou application de la figure de contrat normatif.ainsi, une fois notre recherche achevée nous serons en mesure de proposer une définition complète et claire de contrat normatif, de déterminer sa nature juridique, d'obtenir ses principaux caractères, d'en tirer sa portée et, enfin, de rassembler ces principales applications pratiques. et ce, naturellement sans oublier de relever tant l'histoire ou la genèse de cette figure que sa valeur actuelle, en tant que nouvelle forme de négociation, d'autorégulation et de limitation volontaire de la liberté contractuelle
How far are now individuals free to create the most appropriate contractual tool to achieve the satisfaction of their needs and interests? What they have in common figures as diverse as a joint-venture agreement, a franchise agreement or a marriage contract? Is the old general theory of contract adapted to the contractual practice of the XXI century? A deep study of the normative contract in this book provides answers to these and to many other momentous matters of Private Law of Contract. Reconstructed from the detailed analysis of the theory and legal practice, the notion of normative contract as an agreement of cooperative nature could constitute the bridge to a new and inspiring way of conceiving the contract. Not surprisingly, as shown by its main practical manifestations, the contract is often more than just an instrument to organize an exchange of goods and services, a powerful regulatory tool of reality and human behavior. To put it briefly, if on the one hand in this essay the author seeks find a remedy for a situation of great uncertainty regarding the so-called normative contract, in the other hand he also invites the legal community to reflect calmly on the role played by contract in present society.Keywords: Normative contract, Normenvertrag, Alfred HUECK, genesis, concept, pactum de modo contrahendo, contrat-cadre, framework agreements, distribution, collective agreement, financial transactions, joint venture, marriage contract, codes of conduct, Spanish private law, French private law, contractual clause, cooperative agreement, intuitus personae, no-obligational and obligational content of the contract, union of contracts, regulatory function of contract, general contract theory, theory of legal regulation, Hans KELSEN , freedom of contract

Due to its relevance, this dissertation aims to discern about the repercussions of insolvency in franchise agreements. In order to it, its applicable legal regime is studied. It is also analysed the general regime of the insolvency effects in current businesses, according to the CIRE, in order to consider the inclusion of the contract in the legal provisions of the referred legislation. Last, but not least, it’s argued the way that insolvency may lead to the termination of the franchise agreement, so as the consequences thereof.
Pela pertinência, visa-se com a presente dissertação discernir acerca das repercussões que a insolvência comporta no quadro dos contratos de franquia. Para tal, estuda-se o regime jurídico aplicável ao contrato de franquia, de seguida, analisa-se o regime geral dos efeitos da insolvência nos negócios em curso à luz do CIRE, com vista, a refletir-se acerca da inclusão do contrato nas previsões normativas do referido diploma legal. Por fim, discute-se de que forma a insolvência influi na cessação do contrato de franquia, assim como, as consequências daí advenientes.

In third-party litigation funding agreements, funders agree to finance a litigant’s litigation on condition that the funder will deduct a specified percentage from the capital awarded to the litigant in the event of success. In contingency fee agreements, such funding is provided by lawyers. Initially both these agreements were illegal in South Africa and England, but as civil courts became able to counter corruption and abuse – and with the recognition of the need to give more litigants access to justice – both were recognised as legal. Third-party litigation funding agreements by non-lawyers are unregulated in most jurisdictions. As the voluntary self-regulation in England is unsatisfactory, mandatory statutory regulation should be introduced in South Africa. The Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997 caps the fee to 25% on the capital amount in South Africa. Since no such cap exists in Ontario (Canada), the cap of 25% in South Africa should be revised.
Eka Mintwanano yo nyika nseketelo wa mali eka nandzu wa thedi phati, vanyiki va mali va pfumela ku hakela mali ya nandzu wa mumangali hi xipimelo xa leswaku munyiki wa mali u ta susa phesenteji leyi kombisiweke ku suka eka mali leyi nyikiweke mumangali loko a humelela. Eka mintwanano ya tihakelo ta vukorhokeri, nseketelo walowo wa mali wu nyikiwa hi maloyara. Ekusunguleni mintwanano leyi hinkwayo a yi nga ri enawini eAfrika Dzonga na le England, kambe tanihi leswi tikhoto ta mfumo ti koteke ku kokela etlhelo eka timhaka ta vukungundzwana na nxaniso- na ku anakanyiwa ka xilaveko xo nyika vamangali votala mfikelelo wa vululami- hinkwayo yi anakanyiwile tanihi leyi nga enawini. Mintwanano yo nyika nseketelo wa mali eka nandzu wa thedi phati hi vanhu lava nga riki maloyara a yi lawuriwi eka vuavanyisi byotala. Tanihileswi vutilawuri byo tinyiketa eEngland byi nga riki kahle, mafambiselo ya nawu lama lavekaka ya fanele ya tivisiwa eAfrika Dzonga. Nawu wa Tihakelo ta Vukorhokeri wa 66 wa 1997 wu veka mpimo wa hakelo eka 25% eka xiphemu xa tsengo wa mali eAfrika Dzonga. Ku sukela loko ku ri hava mpimo lowu nga kona eOntario (Canada), mpimo wa 25% eAfrika Dzonga wu fanele wu langutisiwa hi vuntshwa.
Kha thendelano dza ndambedzo dza mbilo ine ya itelwa muthu, vhabadeli vho tenda u badela mbilo ya muthu o no khou itelwa mbilo tenda mubadeli a tshi ḓo ṱusa phesenthe yo tiwaho kha tshelede yo avhelwaho muthu ane a khou itelwa mbilo arali a kunda. Kha thendelano dza mbadelo dzine dza badelwa musi ramilayo o no kunda kha mulandu, mbadelo idzo dzi ṋetshedzwa nga vhoramilayo. Mathomoni thendelano idzi vhuvhili hadzo dzo vha dzi siho mulayoni Afurika Tshipembe na England, fhedzi musi khothe dza mbilo dzi tshi vho thoma u hanedzana na tshanḓanguvhoni na u tambudzwa - na u dzhiela nṱha ṱhoḓea ya u ṋea vhathu vhane vha khou itelwa mbilo u swikelela vhulamukanyi –vhuvhili hadzo dzo dzhiwa sa dzi re mulayoni. Thendelano dza ndambedzo dza mbilo ine muthu a itelwa nga vhathu vhane vha sa vhe vhoramilayo a i langulwi kha vhulamukanyi vhunzhi. Samusi u langulwa ha ndaulo nga iwe muṋe hu ha u tou funa ngei England a zwi ṱanganedzwi, ndaulo ya khombekhombe ya mulayo i fanela u ḓivhadzwa Afurika Tshipembe. Mulayo wa Mbadelo dzine dza badelwa Ramilayo musi o kunda wa nomboro 66 wa 1997 mutengo wawo u guma kha 25% mutengo wa tshelede Afurika Tshipembe. Samusi tshikalo itsho tshi sa wanali ngei Ontario (Canada), tshikalo itsho tsha 25% Afurika Tshipembe tshi fanela u sedzuluswa hafhu.
Private Law
LL. M.

A presente pesquisa busca examinar a possibilidade de pactuar Cláusulas de Non Petendo, por meio de negociações processuais, frente ao Princípio do Acesso à Justiça previsto no artigo 5º, inciso XXXV da Constituição Federal. Compete ainda verificar o conceito da Cláusula de Non Petendo a ser materializada, por meio de um negócio processual. Além disso, pretende-se perquirir como a Jurisprudência Brasileira tem recepcionado a cláusula em cotejo, ou seja, se há posicionamento jurisprudencial para a admissão ou não admissão do pacto em óbice no Direito Brasileiro.