Academic literature on the topic 'Paramilitary forces'

What is the threat posed by paramilitary groups on the state? This paper seeks to examine the role and impact of paramilitary forces on domestic politics and how their involvement results in political (in)stability. It examines how the interplay between the Rapid Support Forces, a paramilitary force in Sudan and the Sudan Armed Forces has resulted in a humanitarian crisis since the overthrow of Omar Al Bashir's government in 2019. The authors argue that the formation of paramilitary groups is aimed at protecting the government from internal and external threats, yet these paramilitary groups can shift or withdraw their loyalty to the political leadership. Such a shift the paper finds creates a high potential for confrontation between the paramilitary forces and regular forces leaving the citizens vulnerable to mass atrocities and war crimes. The paper begins by examining the origin, spread and activities of militia groups globally and at the regional level before examining the concept of paramilitary forces. The authors then look at Sudan’s historical and contemporary experiences with paramilitary groups before discussing the recent crisis between the regular forces and the paramilitary force in Sudan. They find that the preferential treatment of paramilitary forces influences their actions during a crisis.

In order to establish any approach to reparation for victims, it is necessary to establish the context in which violence has developed in Colombia; Thus, two main moments and a context that precedes them are established. In Colombia during the last 70 years it has been a constant story in the nation, in Colombia historiography a milestone was caused with the death of the leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitán, an event which began the first phase of violence from a bipartisan tone. Subsequently, the second phase arises from an insurgent nature and finally the last phase is related to violence fueled by drug trafficking. In this last stage, which began in the 1980s, there was a growth of insurgent forces on the one hand and, in addition, an emergence of paramilitary forces. These are the armed actors that will seriously affect Colombian society and will have to be called transitional justice in this process.In the 1980s, the insurgent forces at the height of their growth made the strategic decision to kidnap notable people of high economic value, in addition to other crimes that violated fundamental human rights. So the guerrilla forces were the authors of the consolidation of their alternative or paramilitary forces, which tended to be financed by money from powerful people behind drug trafficking in the context of the 1980s, who constituted the counterproposal to the insurgency that at first it was called “Death to Kidnappers”, meanwhile the paramilitary forces received financing, training, equipment, weapons and political support from various sectors of society. So, in principle, it has been the serious effects that many independent actors in the conflict had that we want to repair in the contexts of demobilization processes, whether with paramilitary or guerrilla leaders. In that context of the 80s, several types of crimes were committed that would later be understood as victimizing acts, knowing in detail the scourges of kidnapping, torture, the dispossession of land, the commission of massacres, the forced disappearance of people, terrorism, among others. These are the same aspects that through transitional justice we hope to address, know and understand in order to advance as a Colombian society

Governments often supplement the regular military with paramilitaries and progovernment militias (PGMs). However, it is unclear what determines states’ selection of these auxiliary forces, and our understanding of how auxiliary force structures develop remains limited. The crucial difference between the two auxiliary types is their embeddedness in official structures. Paramilitaries are organized under the government to support/replace the regular military, whereas PGMs exist outside the state apparatus. Within a principal–agent framework, we argue that a state’s investment in a particular auxiliary force structure is shaped by available resources and capacity, accountability/deniability, and domestic threats. Our results based on quantitative analysis from 1981 to 2007 find that (a) state capacity is crucial for sustaining paramilitaries, but not PGMs; (b) PGMs, unlike paramilitaries, are more common in states involved in civil conflict; and (c) although both paramilitaries and PGMs are associated with regime instability, there is no significant difference between them in that context.

This paper focuses on how the paramilitary organisations of the Turkish state have transformed and been used over time as a ‘useful’ tool against dissidents, especially the Kurds. Paramilitary groups have been one of the main actors in the war between the Turkish state and the PKK, which has been ongoing for nearly forty years. These groups have sometimes been used as auxiliary forces and at other times made into death squads operating alongside the official armed forces, and they have mainly been used against Kurdish civilians who allegedly support the PKK, especially at the height of the war in unsolved murders, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings since the 1980. In this article, I argue that the Turkish state elites use this apparatus not only in domestic politics but also in conflicts in the Middle East and the Caucasus and that this paramilitary tradition of the state even extends to western Europe.

A new way in which China has tried to expand its control over the South China Sea for the past decade has been to engage paramilitary forces in its territorial disputes. These forces acted as auxiliary devices for the People`s Liberation Army, applying tactics specific to asymmetric conflicts, such as rapid and low-intensity attacks on foreign ships. The leading role was assumed by the People`s Armed Forces Maritime Militia, a structure made up of civilian personnel with military training and fishing vessels equipped with surveillance technology. These actions are part of China’s strategy to attribute its maritime aggression to civilian entities to hinder possible military responses from other countries and in particular from the United States. Using collective case studies, this article illustrated the dynamics of the coercive activities of the Chinese naval forces and the inability of affected states to deal with these unconventional threats. Keywords: South China Sea, asymmetric conflicts, paramilitary forces, maritime aggression, People’s Republic of China

<p><span>The study sheds light on serious crimes of genocide level that the military, paramilitary armed forces and police of the FRY and Serbia have committed in Kosovo, with special emphasis the village of Izbicë in the municipality of Skenderaj. Archival documents, scientific literature as well as interviews in the field, which I have analyzed, treated and carried out during the scientific researches, have clearly proven that the scale of crimes against the civilian population increased in 1999, specifically from the month of March, when the OSCE observers began to withdraw from the field. Released from the pressure of international observers, numerous Serbian military, police and paramilitary forces began actions against the Albanian civilian population throughout Kosova, but the greatest intensity was in Drenica where all age groups and both sexes were not spared, showing strong evidence that Serbia as a state has committed crimes against the civilian population, respectively against children, women and the elderly, such was the massacre in the village of Izbicë where Serbian forces killed, executed, massacred in in a few days 147 Albanian civilians.</span></p><p><span><strong>Keywords: </strong>Drenica, Izbica, Albanian civilians, Serbian military, police and paramilitary forces.</span></p>

Criadas em 1994 como uma confederação de exércitos privados colombianos, as Autodefesas Unidas da Colômbia (AUC) marcaram uma expansão do paramilitarismo e um recrudescimento do conflito armado naquele país, tendo sido atuantes até seu processo de desmobilização, em 2002. Buscando compreender as origens, a organização e os discursos desse fenômeno paramilitar, o presente trabalho realiza uma pesquisa bibliográfica e documental que inclui, entre outros, os documentos originais das AUC e entrevistas com suas principais lideranças. Verifica-se que as AUC constituíram, por um lado, uma continuidade em relação ao paramilitarismo das doutrinas contrainsurgentes da Guerra Fria e aos grupos de civis armados financiados por narcotraficantes e proprietários de terra do final dos anos 70, e, por outro, um ponto de inflexão da estratégia paramilitar na Colômbia, quando esses exércitos buscam se projetar como atores políticos e independentes diante da opinião pública, buscando imitar pelo avesso a retórica e as estruturas guerrilheiras.Palavras-Chave: Paramilitarismo; Contrainsurgência; Colômbia.ABSTRACTCreated in 1994 as a confederation of Colombian private armies, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) marked an expansion of paramilitary and a renewed armed conflict in that country, having been active until its demobilization process in 2002. Seeking to understand the origins, the organization and the speeches of this paramilitary phenomenon, the present work conducts a bibliographic and documentary research that includes, among others, the original documents of the AUC and interviews with its main leaders. It appears that the AUC constituted, on the one hand, a continuity in relation to the paramilitarism of counterinsurgent Cold War doctrines and groups of armed civilians financed by drug traffickers and landowners in the late 1970s, and, on the other hand, a point inflection of the paramilitary strategy in Colombia, when these armies seek to project themselves as political and independent actors before the public opinion, trying to imitate the rhetoric and guerrilla structures inside out.Keywords: Paramilitarism; Counterinsurgency; Colombia. Recebido em: 04/04/2021 | Aceito em: 09/06/2021.

The last armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which took place between 1992 and 1995, was a bloody one. Not only was lots of real blood were spilled, but metaphorically speaking, it resulted in millions of displaced persons, hundreds of mass graves, hundreds of places of detention, hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war, hundreds of thousands of tortured and destroyed lives. During the aftermath of the war, around 700 war crime cases were prosecuted, spanning one thousand defendants, and including all possible war crimes, including genocide. These war crime trials could be observed from different perspectives. While most of these crimes were committed by soldiers and police officers, among those who were not soldiers or police officers, one category is to be particularly observed, the paramilitary. Members of the paramilitary, not soldiers or civilians, according to the database of war crimes, were charged in some 5% of all war crimes cases. But then, if these persons are not soldiers or civilians, the question is who were they, and why they do what they did? Furthermore, what interest did they have in behaving in a way that is characterized as criminal, more precisely, a war crime. Among number of the war crimes committed by the paramilitary groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this paper will analyze ones including most serious crimes and those of most significance. By doing that, this paper will contribute to the better understanding of the position and behavior of the paramilitary groups involved in committing war crimes, further legal regulation of their position, and social understanding of the nature of paramilitary forces in and after the armed conflict.

The article highlights the issue of providing assistance to illegal armed or paramilitary groups created in the temporarily occupied territory and/or armed or paramilitary groups of the aggressor State as a form of collaboration. Providing assistance to illegal armed or paramilitary groups created in the temporarily occupied territory and/or armed or paramilitary groups of the aggressor state is an independent form of collaboration and includes the transfer of material resources to them (Article 111-1(4) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine) and assistance in conducting hostilities against the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations, formed in accordance with the laws of Ukraine, volunteer formations that were formed or self-organized to protect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine (Article 111-1(7) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine). Providing assistance as a form of collaboration is understood as the commission of active actions by a citizen of Ukraine who assists armed or paramilitary formations established in the temporarily occupied territory and/or armed or paramilitary formations of the aggressor state by providing information about Ukrainian citizens for the purpose of using it in an unlawful manner, as well as providing advice, instructions, means or tools or removing obstacles, including in terms of conducting hostilities against the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations established by the It is proposed to include in part 4 of Article 111-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine such an act as the transfer of information about Ukrainian citizens for the purpose of its illegal use. Due to the gaps in the wording of the provision of assistance as a form of collaboration, it is proposed to supplement part 4 of Article 111-1 of the Criminal Code with an indication of assistance to illegally established authorities in the temporarily occupied territory and authorities of the aggressor state, and part 7 of this article – to the armed formations of the aggressor state. It is proposed to eliminate the latency in part 4 of Article 111-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine in terms of defining the range of subjects of collaboration by stating that such a subject can only be a citizen of Ukraine. Also, taking into account the coincidence of most of the signs of aiding the aggressor state (Article 111-2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine), it is proposed to provide in the disposition of part 4 of Article 111-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine the phrase «in the absence of signs of aiding the aggressor state (Article 111-2 of this Code)», which is classic for other articles of the Special Part of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. Key words: collaborationism, collaboration activities, assistance, illegal armed groups, illegal paramilitary groups, aggressor state, armed groups of the aggressor state, temporarily occupied territories, authorities of the aggressor state, citizen of Ukraine, criminal liability, criminal offense, treason, aiding and abetting the aggressor state.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Security Building in a Post-Conflict Environment))--Naval Postgraduate School, Dec. 2004.<br>Thesis Advisor(s): Gaye Christoffersen, Lyman Miller. Includes bibliographical references (p. 73-76). Also available online.

Estudio de la violencia paramilitar en la región de los Montes de María (Colombia) como una respuesta usada por el poder local en contra de las demandas de justicia social y profundización de la democracia de la población. Se aborda un enfoque desde la sociología histórica, propuesta por Charles Tilly, para explicar este fenómeno en función de: i) los procesos históricos de poblamiento y asentamiento social y económico; ii) las formas de organización del Estado en lo local y de la participación política de la población y iii) las dinámicas de la confrontación bélica y de la gestión de los conflictos sociales cuando los grupos armados ingresaron en los territorios de los Montes de María. Del análisis se concluye que hubo diferentes estrategias de violencia parainstitucional que frenaron tres procesos democratizadores fundamentales en los Montes de María: la reforma agraria, el empoderamiento ciudadano para combatir la forma clientelista de acceso a los derechos sociales y, finalmente, la apertura del sistema político para hacerlo más democrático. Los argumentos se presentarán en un marco histórico que transcurre entre 1965 y 2010.<br>Study of the paramilitary violence in the region of Maria's Mounts (Colombia) like a response used by the local power in opposition to the demands of social justice and deepening of the democracy of the population. An approach is approached from the historical sociology proposed by Charles Tilly, to explain this phenomenon depending on: i) the historical processes of poblamiento and social and economic accession; ii) the forms of organization of the State in the local thing and of the political participation of the population and iii) the dynamics of the warlike confrontation and of the management of the social conflicts when the armed groups joined the territories of Maria's Mounts. Of the analysis one concludes that there were different strategies of violence parainstitucional that stopped three processes democratizadores fundamental in Maria's Mounts: the agrarian reform, the civil empoderamiento to attack the form clientelista of access to the social and, rights finally, the opening of the political system to make it more democratic. The arguments will appear in a historical frame that passes between 1965 and 2010.

La place de la violence dans l'histoire du XX° siècle est l'objet de nombreuses études depuis la publication des ouvrages de l'historien américain George L. Mosse. Si cet intérêt s'est longtemps concentré sur l'étude des mouvements d'extrême-droite, depuis une décennie la recherche historique se penche sur l'étude des relations qu'entretient le communisme, avec la violence. C'est dans cet environnement historiographique que notre étude vise à éclairer la place tenue par la violence dans la vie du PCF de sa naissance, en 1920, à son interdiction en septembre 1939. Dans un premier temps, après avoir analysé la place de la violence dans le mouvement socialiste et ouvrier avant 1914, il s'agit de percevoir la nouveauté introduite par l'idéologie bolchevique dans cette relation au moment où la société française est confrontée à la Grande Guerre et ses séquelles et de déterminer le rôle de la violence dans la naissance du PCF et dans son développement jusqu'à la fin des années 1920. Nous analysons ensuite la période « classe contre classe » où le PC développe pleinement les potentialités contenues dans la culture de guerre civile qu'il cultive depuis sa naissance. Il essaye alors d'inscrire cette guerre civile dans la réalité française. Le discours qui s'appuie sur la simplification de la perception des réalités politiques, économiques et sociales, décryptée au prisme de la culture de la guerre civile se durcit pour marquer l'imminence de la parousie révolutionnaire. Le PCF prône alors la confrontation directe avec les forces de l'ordre dans le but de conquérir la rue tout en essayant de mettre sur pied une force paramilitaire. L'abandon de l'activisme violent à la fin de 1931 entraîne une période d'hésitation sur la place de la violence dans la stratégie communiste, hésitation qui prend fin à partir de 1934 avec le tournant vers le Front populaire qui fait l'objet de notre troisième et dernière partie. La culture de guerre civile, que porte en lui le communisme, s'intègre alors à la culture républicaine sous le signe de l'antifascisme. Ce processus, qui participe aux succès que connaissent alors les communistes, entraîne une atténuation de la place de la violence dans la politique du PCF, mais non sa disparition. Sa trace se retrouve dans la politique interne de vigilance révolutionnaire, l'usage de la force contre les fascistes et les renégats et le rôle des communistes français sur le front espagnol durant la guerre civile<br>The place of violence in history of XX ° century is the object of many studies since the studies of the American historian George L. Mosse. If this interest has concentrated for a long time on the study of the far-right movements, for decade historical research leans over the study of relations communism, with violence. It's in this historiographic environment that our study aims at lighting the place held by violence in the life of PCF since its birth, in 1920 to its ban in September, 1939. At first, having analysed the place of violence in socialist and working movement before 1914 and the novelty introduced by the bolchevik ideology in this relation at the time when the French society is confronted with First World War and its consequences to determine the role of violence in the birth of PCF and in its development during 1920s. We analyse the period «class against class» where the PC develops entirely potentialities contained in the culture of civil war which it cultivates since its birth. He tries to register this civil war in French reality. The speech which leans on the simplification of the perception of political, economic and social realities, having read in prism of the culture of civil war to mark the imminence of the revolutionary parousie. PCF search direct confrontation with police force in the intention of winning the street, while trying to set up a paramilitary force. The end of violent activism at the end of 1931 draws away a period of hesitancy on the place of violence in communist strategy, hesitancy which comes to end from 1934 with turn towards the Popular Front which makes the object of our third and last part. The culture of civil war, that hits in him communism, integrates then with republican culture under the sign of antifascism. This process, which participates in the successes which know then the communists, draws away an alleviation of the place of violence in the policy of PCF, but not its disappearance. Its trace is in the internal policy of revolutionary alertness, the usage of force against the fascists and the renegades and the role of the French communists on the Spanish front during civil war

This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.

From the deployment of Roger's Rangers in the Seven Years War to the Sunni Awakening in the Second Gulf War, indigenous force cooperation has been a hallmark of significant armed conflicts in modern history. Indigenous forces are, by definition, recruited locally and are paramilitary in nature, as, for the most part, are their activities. They are not regular police, gendarme, or military forces. Rather, they represent a subset of a broader category of force that includes paramilitaries, unconventional forces, guerrillas, some militias, and auxiliaries. The focus of this dissertation is indigenous force cooperation. Indigenous force cooperation occurs when a metropolitan power (be it imperial or expeditionary) collaborates with one or more indigenous forces. Despite recurring employment, indigenous force cooperation remains largely ignored in historical literature and there has been no comprehensive study of the nature, structure, function, or experience of these forces. Using comparative case studies of indigenous force cooperation in Palestine Mandate and Ethiopia during the Second World War, this project seeks to identify whether successful indigenous force cooperation in war exists as a unified historical phenomenon and whether it was instrumental to theatres of operation in which it took place. The research supporting this dissertation includes personally conducted interviews with veterans of the indigenous forces and examinations of recently declassified documents. The comparative framework allows the project to determine what, if any, underlying patterns connect cases of indigenous force employment and govern the success or failure of cooperation. This dissertation consists of a comparative examination of four questions: why cooperation occurred, how cooperation was structured, what happened during cooperation, and whether cooperation was effective. Each chapter of this dissertation addresses one of the questions. Answering these questions will support a number of areas of study, including imperial history and contemporary strategic studies, by providing a theoretical framework by which to understand other cases of indigenous force cooperation.

Dans les conflits armés du Guatemala, du Pérou et de Colombie, des groupes paramilitaires ont été créés afin de lutter contre les guérillas et aussi d’empêcher la mobilisation des secteurs sociaux intéressés à transformer l’ordre social établi. Dans ces pays, différentes circonstances ont mené à la désactivation officielle des structures paramilitaires.Les groupes paramilitaires du Guatemala (PAC) ont été créés par l’État au début des années 80 et ont été officiellement démobilisés en 1996, après la signature des accords de paix entre le gouvernement et la guérilla URNG. Au Pérou, les rondes paysannes ont été créées dans la cordillère sud-centrale au cours des années 1980. En 2003, après la chute du Fujimori, l’État péruvien cesse de motiver l’organisation de ces groupes. En Colombie, les groupes paramilitaires ont été promus pendant les années 80 par différents acteurs, parmi lesquels figuraient les élites régionales, l’armée et les narcotrafiquants. En 2003, ces groupes armés ont signé un accord de paix avec le gouvernement du président Uribe, dans lequel ils s’engagent à remettre les armes et à commencer un processus progressif de démobilisation.Même si au Guatemala, au Pérou et en Colombie, des processus pour désactiver les groupes paramilitaires ont été mis en place, ceux-ci continuent d’exister. Ainsi, il est pertinent de se demander si ces structures sont encore une forme de paramilitarisme et d’identifier les raisons pour lesquelles elles sont toujours présentes. En vue de répondre à cette question, l’objectif principal de recherche est d’analyser depuis une perspective comparative les processus de transformation des PAC, des rondes paysannes et des paramilitaires colombiens à partir du moment où les États respectifs prennent la décision officielle de désactiver ces groupes. Ce travail est développé en trois chapitres.Le premier chapitre compare l’émergence des groupes paramilitaires étudiés. A partir de cette perspective comparative et en utilisant certains éléments des approches systémique et structurelle fonctionnaliste, nous élaborons une conceptualisation théorique du phénomène paramilitaire. Selon cette conceptualisation, la fonction principale du paramilitarisme dans les trois cas d’étude est la protection de l’ordre social menacé.Le deuxième chapitre étudie les processus qui ont conduit à la désactivation officielle du paramilitarisme dans les trois pays analysés. À cette fin, nous comparons les conditions dans lesquelles se sont terminés les conflits armés respectifs, le contexte où chaque État a pris la décision de désactiver le paramilitarisme et les processus de Désarmement, de Démobilisation et de Réintégration (DDR).Le troisième chapitre compare la transformation des PAC, des rondes paysannes et des paramilitaires colombiens après leur désactivation officielle.La recherche se base sur la méthode comparative. Pour chaque chapitre, des variables de comparaison sont construites. Les sources d’information principales sont, premièrement, une révision bibliographique sur la conceptualisation théorique du paramilitarisme, les conflits armés et l’origine et l’évolution des PAC, des rondes paysannes et des paramilitaires colombiens. Deuxièmement, l’analyse des caractéristiques actuelles des groupes étudiés se base principalement sur une étude de presse on line.L’analyse comparative de l’émergence du paramilitarisme au Guatemala, au Pérou et en Colombie permet de conclure que l’existence d’un ordre social perçu comme menacé est à l’origine de la création de structures armées dont la fonction principale n’est pas de lutter contre la guérilla, mais la protection de cet ordre social. En conséquence, la persistance d’un contexte dans lequel l’ordre social ou le statu quo sont toujours considérés en danger est l’élément qui explique la poursuite du paramilitarisme. Ainsi, les structures qui existent actuellement au Guatemala et en Colombie sont, en effet, une forme de paramilitarisme, à la différence du Pérou<br>In the armed conflicts of Guatemala, Peru and Colombia, paramilitary groups were created to fight the guerrillas and also to prevent the mobilization of the social sectors interested in transforming the established social order. In these countries, different circumstances led to the official deactivation of paramilitary structures.Guatemala's paramilitary groups (PAC) were established by the state in the early 1980s and were formally demobilized in 1996 after the signing of peace agreements between the government and the guerrilla group URNG. In Peru, the peasant rounds were created in the south-central cordillera during the 1980s. In 2003, after the fall of President Fujimori, the Peruvian state ceases to motivate the organization of these armed groups. In Colombia, paramilitary groups were promoted during the 1980s by various actors, including regional elites, militaries and drug traffickers. In 2003, these armed groups signed a peace agreement with the government of President Uribe, in which they pledge to surrender arms and begin a gradual process of demobilization.Despite the aforementioned processes to disable paramilitaries, those groups continue to exist. Thus, it is relevant to ask whether these structures are still a form of paramilitarism and to identify the reasons why they are still present. In order to answer these questions, the main research objective is to analyze, from a comparative perspective, the transformation processes of PAC, peasant rounds and Colombian paramilitaries from the moment when the respective States took the official decision to disable these groups. This work is developed in three chapters.The first chapter compares the emergence of the paramilitary groups studied. From this comparative perspective and using certain elements of the systemic and the structuralist functionalist approaches, I propose a theoretical conceptualization of the paramilitary phenomenon. According to this conceptualization, the main function of paramilitarism in the three study cases is the protection of the threatened social order.The second chapter examines the processes that led to the official deactivation of paramilitarism in the three countries. To this end, we compare the conditions under which the respective armed conflicts ended, the context in which each State took the decision to disable the paramilitary and the different Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) processes.The third chapter compares the transformation of PACs, peasant rounds and Colombian paramilitaries after their official deactivation.The research is based on the comparative method. For each chapter, comparison variables are constructed. The main sources of information are, first, a bibliographic review on the theoretical conceptualization of paramilitarism, the armed conflicts of the respective countries and the origin and evolution of the studied groups. Secondly, a study of the online press about the recent activities of the PACs, peasant rounds and Colombian paramilitary groups to analyze the current characteristics these groups.Finally, the comparative analysis of the emergence of paramilitarism in Guatemala, Peru and Colombia leads to the conclusion that the existence of a social order perceived as threatened is the core element to explain the creation of those armed structures. The main objective is not to fight guerrilla, but to protect the social order. As a result, the persistence of a situation in which the social order or the status quo is still considered “in danger” explains the persistence of paramilitarism. Thus, the structures that currently exist in Guatemala and Colombia are, indeed, a form of paramilitarism, unlike Peru

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited<br>Paramilitary-style active shooter attacks in a multi-hazard environment are an emerging threat against the U.S. homeland. Lessons learned from previous paramilitary style attacks demonstrate the breaking points of the fire service policy of standing by until law enforcement declares that the scene is secure. When followed, the standby policy prevents fire fighters from taking calculated risks to accomplish the fire service mission of saving lives and protecting property. It is likely that the standby policy will be ignored when immediate action is required to save lives or mitigate hazards in areas of the incident in which the potential for violence, but no active threat exists. The optimal fire service response policy to save lives and mitigate hazards during paramilitary style attacks in a multi-hazard environment is a force protection model in which law enforcement officers accompany and protect fire fighters in the warm zone. This model is an adaptation of the successful escort model used by law enforcement and fire fighters during civil unrest incidents. As has occurred many times in the past, the fire service must incorporate a new core mission competencywarm zone operations at paramilitary style attacks.