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Journal articles on the topic 'Partis Islamistes'
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1
Aït-Aoudia, Myriam. "Idéologie et religion dans les partis islamistes contemporains." L'Année du Maghreb, no. 22 (July 14, 2020): 223–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/anneemaghreb.6517.
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Boubekeur, Amel. "Les partis islamistes algériens et la démocratie : vers une professionnalisation politique ?" L'Année du Maghreb, no. IV (October 1, 2008): 219–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/anneemaghreb.444.
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Munteanu, Anca. "Intégration politique des partis islamistes et processus de « spécialisation » : perspective comparée Tunisie-Maroc." L'Année du Maghreb, no. 22 (July 14, 2020): 131–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/anneemaghreb.6378.
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Salib, Amany Fouad. "La conception de l’identité [al-hûwiyya] dans le fondamentalisme islamique sunnite contemporain." Thème 24, no. 2 (July 12, 2018): 41–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1050501ar.
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L’arrivée au pouvoir des partis islamistes sunnites dans nombre de pays arabes, avec l’effervescence des révoltes de 2011, révèle une idéologie confessionnelle fondatrice de leur paradigme identitaire et inspirant leur approche des problématiques politiques. Cet article vise à explorer la conceptualisation de l’identité par le biais d’une analyse qualitative de contenu de la littérature des maîtres à penser du fondamentalisme islamique et à la lumière de l’expérience islamiste en Égypte. Nous mettons en lumière la généalogie épistémologique de nombre des constantes relatives à la conception de l’identité, notamment la Charia, en vue d’éclairer une des facettes des tensions ayant marqué le « projet d’État islamique ». Nous analysons le lien entre le dogme fondateur, le discours et l’exercice du pouvoir par l’entremise de la réforme constitutionnelle de 2012. À travers le fondamentalisme islamique, la matrice identitaire constitue-t-elle une « fonction instable » ou une « réalité substantielle » (Lévi-Strauss) ?
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Yankaya, Dilek, Clément Steuer, and Hassan Zouaoui. "Nommer l’islam politique. Répertoire lexical d’un réformisme et ses réappropriations locales dans les noms de partis islamistes." Mots, no. 120 (July 11, 2019): 145–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/mots.25394.
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Günay, Onur, and Erdem Yörük. "Governing ethnic unrest: Political Islam and the Kurdish conflict in Turkey." New Perspectives on Turkey 61 (October 31, 2019): 9–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/npt.2019.17.
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AbstractHow can we explain the mass appeal and electoral success of Islamist political parties? What are the underlying sources of the Islamist political advantage? Scholars have provided numerous answers to these widely debated questions, variously emphasizing the religious nature of the discourses in Islamist movements, their ideological hegemony, organizational capacity, provision of social services, reputation, and structural factors. However, one key aspect of Islamist movements has been underexplored in the current literature; namely, Islamists’ promises to resolve ethnic questions that remain unresolved in secularist nation-states. In this article, we argue that the extent to which Islamists govern ethnic unrest significantly shapes their electoral success and ability to establish broader hegemony. Based on ethnographic and sociological data, this article explores one particular recent electoral puzzle that reveals the limits of the scholarly literature on Islamist political advantage, examining the ethnic politics of the governing Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) in Turkey.
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Gorman, Brandon. "The myth of the secular–Islamist divide in Muslim politics: Evidence from Tunisia." Current Sociology 66, no. 1 (April 18, 2017): 145–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0011392117697460.
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Many scholars argue that politics in majority-Muslim societies are marked by deep polarization: dominated by struggles between secularists and Islamists who hold fundamentally divergent ideological positions. Yet, this finding is likely a result of scholarly focus on Islamist organizations and political parties rather than their constituencies. Using Tunisia as a case study, this article investigates attitudinal polarization between secularists and Islamists at the individual level using a mixed-method design combining statistical analyses of survey data with content analyses of in-depth interviews. Statistical results indicate that Islamists are no different from non-Islamists in attitudes about excommunication ( takfir), popular sovereignty, women’s rights, or minority rights, though they are more skeptical of democracy and express less religious tolerance. Interview results show that many political procedures advocated by Islamists resemble the secular procedures they seek to replace and, though secularists tend to have negative views of Islamists, many express support for Islamist ideological positions. Taken together, these findings provide little evidence of attitudinal polarization along the so-called secular–Islamist divide.
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Yildirim, A. Kadir, and Caroline M. Lancaster. "Bending with the Wind: Revisiting Islamist Parties’ Electoral Dilemma." Politics and Religion 8, no. 3 (June 16, 2015): 588–613. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755048315000310.
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AbstractIslamist parties' electoral performance is a hotly debated question. Two arguments dominate the literature in terms of Islamist parties' performance in democratic elections. The conventional argument has been the “one man, one vote, one time” hypothesis. More recently, Kurzman and Naqvi challenge this argument and show that Islamists tend to lose in free elections rather than win them. We argue that existing arguments fall short. Specifically, we theorize that moderateness of Islamist platform plays a key role in increasing the popularity of these parties and leads to higher levels of electoral support. Using data collected by Kurzman and Naqvi, we test our hypothesis, controlling for political platform and political economic factors in a quantitative analysis. We find that there is empirical support for our theory. Islamist parties' support level is positively associated with moderateness; however, this positive effect of moderation is also conditioned by economic openness.
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Tsaregorodtseva, Irina. "The Islamists in politics in Egypt and Tunisia after 'Arab Spring'." Islamology 7, no. 1 (June 30, 2017): 122. http://dx.doi.org/10.24848/islmlg.07.1.07.
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The pivotal goal of the study is to reveal the role of the Islamist parties and movements in politics in Egypt and Tunisia before and after the protests of the ‘Arab spring’. In addition, author explains how various Islamist groups interacted with each other and which factors determined the nature of their interaction. According to preliminary observations, there were several common features in the character of Islamists’ participation in politics in Egypt and Tunisia after the Mubarak and Ben Ali. By means of comparative analysis this research shows why Tunisian Islamists appeared to be more successful in politics than their Egyptian counterparts. The method of case-study was employed to investigate the relations between Islamist groups in 20 and 21 centuries. Eventually, the following conclusion was reached: these relations were highly determined not by common goals and ideological closeness of the Islamists, but rather by historical hostility towards each other and pragmatic interests.
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Steuer, Clément. "Qu’est-ce qu’un parti fondé sur une base religieuse ? Interprétations concurrentes d’une catégorie juridique dans le contexte politique égyptien." Social Compass 66, no. 3 (July 12, 2019): 318–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0037768619855254.
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In Egypt, the ‘political parties with a religious basis’ are explicitly prohibited by law since 1977. However, this ban has had a negligible impact on political life, because administrative jurisprudence has since long diminished its scope, by reducing the question of the religious basis of a party to that of the confession of its members. Nevertheless, the secular opponents of the Islamists have repeatedly claimed, since the constitutionalization of this ban in January 2014, that it should be interpreted more strictly. This article first recalls how the Islamist and secular camps emerged during the political and constitutional struggles of the 2011–2013 era, before examining the competing interpretations of the notion of ‘religious party’, such as made by the administrative jurisprudence, by supporters of the ban on Islamist parties, and by the Islamists themselves.
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Cavatorta, Francesco, and Raquel Ojeda Garcia. "Islamism in Mauritania and the narrative of political moderation." Journal of Modern African Studies 55, no. 2 (May 8, 2017): 301–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x17000039.
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ABSTRACTThe rise of Islamism following the Arab Spring has renewed interest in the democratic credibility of Islamist parties and movements. Focusing on the case of Mauritania's Islamists this article analyses the validity of the moderation hypothesis and argues that for some Islamist parties, moderation, when historically situated, has always been a key trait. The case of Mauritanian Islamism is interesting because it takes place within an intellectual and geographical place that straddles both the Arab world and sub-Saharan Africa, therefore providing insights on how Islamism has become an influential ideological framework in both worlds, that are much less separate than superficially believed.
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Sawani, Youssef Mohammad. "Islamist and Non-Islamist Currents and the Struggle for Post-Gaddafi Libya." Contemporary Arab Affairs 11, no. 1-2 (March 1, 2018): 91–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/caa.2018.00001a.
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This paper examines the origin and the relationship between Islamist and non-Islamist political trends in Libya, highlighting the development of the contestation between the two before and after the fall of Gaddafi’s rule. The relationship appears to be that of a contestation between Islamists and liberals but this may be misleading. Islamists are not united but they share an adherence to the establishment of a Muslim society and some form of a khilafa. However, non-Islamists may not easily be identified as “on current.” Indeed, the “current” includes an array of political factions of various dispensations with some not necessarily subscribing to liberal models of democracy. Some belong to pre-Gaddafi-era political parties or were political and human rights’ activists during Gaddafi’s reign. They range from leftist, nationalist, and liberal orientations to populist Arab nationalist forces (including the Ba’th, Pan-Arabists, and others with socialist or communist orientations). When the uprising took place in 2011, the positions each trend took differed before some tactical unity was deemed necessary. When the regime fell, however, differences remerged and became more evident once the transitional structures were put in place. Just before and during the first elections in 2012, Islamists broke ranks with their struggle comrades and fired their cannons at the leaders of the liberal, nationalist, and other elements within the non-Islamist orientations. Islam then became crucial in political expression and rhetoric, especially for Islamist actors. Focusing on the development of this contestation, this paper analyzes the reaction of both Islamist and non-Islamist trends to the policies and tactics adopted by each side in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising and the post-Gaddafi phase. It suggests that although ideology, specifically references to Islam, became crucial in the political contention between Islamists and non-Islamists, the cleavage was not entirely ideological, as both trends considered the Islamic identity of Libya central to their political programs. The interviews with leading representatives of both trends that the author conducted for the purpose of writing this article confirm such a view on the role of ideology in the contestation. As the following discussion indicates, ideology is evidently part and parcel of each sides’ tools, ready to be employed against the other. However, when it does not suit all their purposes, they claim ideology has no role, offering insights into the instrumental and tactical approach to the ongoing contestation of both sides. The article therefore examines the struggle between the two factions as a political competition for the control of resources and positions of power, yet it also argues that ideology and ideas have a role to play, as they constitute the instruments deployed in this struggle, which has, with foreign involvement and backing of different sides, reduced Libya to a “failed state.” In fact although ideological contraposition figures in the contestation, political factionalism and contention in post-2011 were actually fuelled by political factors related to the struggle over access to power and resources, which are instrumental in enabling each side to shape the future state and its political order according to their plans. The struggle between Islamists and non-Islamists may have been the most visible, but it is certainly not the most significant factor in explaining the political dynamics and contention in the country since the fall of Gaddafi.
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Hamzawy, Amr. "Arab Writings on Islamist Parties and Movements." International Journal of Middle East Studies 43, no. 1 (January 24, 2011): 138–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s002074381000125x.
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The first wave of academic writings on Islamists emerged in the Arab world after the war of June 1967 and the subsequent resurfacing of religious ideologies and religiously inspired social and political movements. Examples in this first wave include works by the Syrian philosopher Sadiq Jalal al-ʿAzm, the Egyptian philosopher Hassan Hanafi, and the Moroccan historian ʿAbdullah al-ʿArawi. These writings advanced three insights. First, the rise of “religious movements,” “religious currents,” and “religious ideologies”—the term islāmī or Islamist was yet to be coined—was seen by some writers as a serious challenge to the legitimacy of the secular state and the secular idea of Pan-Arabism. Second, other writers accused Arab ruling establishments in modernizing countries—the reference was primarily to post-1967 Egypt—of using religious currents and ideologies to enhance the state's popularity and legitimacy in times of crisis. Third, Wahhabism and petrodollars were held responsible by some for the resurfacing of religious currents and their increased appeal in the contest with secular ideas. Most of the writings of the first wave were Egypt centered and were clearly inspired by an antireligious sentiment that saw religious movements and currents as representing an existential threat to secular modernization and progress.
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Shalata, Ahmed Zaghloul. "Islamists in Power." Contemporary Arab Affairs 11, no. 1-2 (March 1, 2018): 111–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/caa.2018.000007.
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In the first parliamentary elections after Mr. Mubarak’s overthrow in February 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood’s newly formed Freedom and Justice Party had won nearly half the seats in the People’s Assembly. The Muslim Brotherhood, had, over the two previous years, gained political expansion in parliament. The Brotherhood entered into a coalition with other Islamist parties including two Salafist parties, forming an Islamist bloc, but their experience ended with their removal from power and significant changes in the structure of the Brotherhood. Based on the political programs of the Islamist parties in Egypt, this article seeks to analyze the experience of Islamists in power by focusing on their practical perceptions of the Islamist political system. The article concludes that the political Islamist organizations lacked a coherent mechanism to propel them from the stage of the organization’s (political party) management to a stage of state administration. Egyptian Islamist groups had no specific perception of the nature of the state, or of an applied model to implement the “Islamic state.” Although these groups had a declared project, which they had been attempting to establish for decades, their focus was solely on discussing the expected outcome they had hoped to achieve, while neglecting to elaborate on how their affairs could be run, once in power. This shortfall was due to an accumulation of the multiple problems the groups had faced, whether they be conceptual reasons of state, power issues, or the organizational obstacles strewn along the paths of the components that comprised the group, which had prevented them, over decades, from overcoming them. Hence, the traditional mechanisms they continued to apply while in power proved inadequate in responding to the crises inherent in the experience of government. They failed to introduce new mechanisms to address the issues as dictated by the necessity for practical experience and solutions once they had attained power.
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Hanna, Michael Wahid. "Egypt's non-Islamist parties." Adelphi Series 55, no. 453-454 (February 17, 2015): 105–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19445571.2015.1131426.
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Mufti, Malik. "The Many-Colored Cloak." American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 27, no. 2 (April 1, 2010): 1–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajiss.v27i2.358.
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This articles argues (a) that democratic discourse has already become hegemonic among mainstream Islamist movements in Turkey and the Arab world; (b) that while this development originated in tactical calculations, it constitutes a consequential transformation in Islamist political thought; and (c) that this transformation, in turn, raises critical questions about the interaction of religion and democracy with which contemporary Islamists have not yet grappled adequately but which were anticipated by medieval philosophers such as al-Farabi and Ibn Rushd. The argument is laid out through an analysis (based on textual sources and interviews) of key decisions on electoral participation made by Turkey’s AK Party and the Muslim Brotherhoods in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Particular attention is focused on these movements’ gradual embrace of three key democratic principles: pluralism, the people as the source of political authority, and the legitimacy of such procedural mechanisms as multiple parties and regular elections.
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Mufti, Malik. "The Many-Colored Cloak." American Journal of Islam and Society 27, no. 2 (April 1, 2010): 1–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v27i2.358.
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This articles argues (a) that democratic discourse has already become hegemonic among mainstream Islamist movements in Turkey and the Arab world; (b) that while this development originated in tactical calculations, it constitutes a consequential transformation in Islamist political thought; and (c) that this transformation, in turn, raises critical questions about the interaction of religion and democracy with which contemporary Islamists have not yet grappled adequately but which were anticipated by medieval philosophers such as al-Farabi and Ibn Rushd. The argument is laid out through an analysis (based on textual sources and interviews) of key decisions on electoral participation made by Turkey’s AK Party and the Muslim Brotherhoods in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Particular attention is focused on these movements’ gradual embrace of three key democratic principles: pluralism, the people as the source of political authority, and the legitimacy of such procedural mechanisms as multiple parties and regular elections.
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Khairullin, Timur R. "Post-islamism: features, processes and prospects." Asia and Africa Today, no. 9 (2021): 34. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s032150750016589-9.
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The article is devoted to the analysis of such an ambiguous phenomenon as Post-Islamism, which emerged as an alternative to the ideas of Islamism that were subjected to the crisis in the 1990s. A distinctive feature of Post-Islamic ideas is their compatibility with the principles of democracy in a globalizing world. Unlike Islamism, Post-Islamism focuses on the rights of an individual instead of his duties. However, these progressive ideas could not become a full-fledged replacement for Islamism, since the decline in its popularity at the end of the XX century turned out to be temporary. The success of a number of Islamist parties in the parliamentary elections at the beginning of the XXI century became a confirmation of this. The events of the Arab Spring have made significant adjustments to the ideological architecture of the region. In the wake of the fall of authoritarian regimes and the growth of democratic calls for the expansion of human rights and freedoms, Islamist movements from moderate to ultra-radical have intensified. Against the background of the victory of moderate Islamists in the parliamentary elections in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, they again started talking about the onset of a phase of Post-Islamism. However, the failures of the Islamists in achieving political power and creating an Islamic state are more a tactical shift in their policy than a strategic one. Few Islamist movements have abandoned their goal of creating an Islamic State with the full application of Islamic law. Since Islamism is ambiguous, the boundaries between it and post-Islamism are still blurred and inaccurate. Despite this, post-Islamism is a more intellectual discourse about Islam and its place in the modern world and society.
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Al-Anani, Khalil. "Islamist Parties Post-Arab Spring." Mediterranean Politics 17, no. 3 (November 2012): 466–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2012.725309.
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Laurence, Jonathan. "The 21st-century impact of European Muslim minorities on ‘Official Islam’ in the Muslim-majority world." Philosophy & Social Criticism 40, no. 4-5 (March 18, 2014): 449–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453714526404.
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The article argues that the growth of religious service provision directed at the Muslim diaspora in Europe has led to greater professionalization and pluralism within the Islam state in Muslim countries. Contemporary Muslim governments have claimed a monopoly over public prayer and religious education and have heavily invested in a network of infrastructure and services – the Islam state. The recent breakthrough of Islamist parties into governments in Turkey and across North Africa poses a challenge to the continued ‘civilian control’ over religion. What will become of the enormous Islamic Affairs ministries that Islamist parties have inherited – the hundreds of thousands of public servants of state Islam across the region, the tens of thousands of mosques and thousands of religious schools? Liberals demand the abolition of the Islam state because it violates the separation of religion and state; Islamists detest it for its repressive qualities. Despite progressive liberalization, governments in the past decade have not sought disestablishment, and have instead increased the resources and policing of state-run religion. I draw on the experience of Muslim governments in the competitive field of state–Islam relations in European countries to explain the modest beginnings of reform of the official religion apparatus in Muslim-majority countries.
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Octavia, Lanny. "Islamism & Democracy: A Gender Analysis on PKS’s Application of Democratic Principles and Values." Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies 50, no. 1 (June 26, 2012): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2012.501.1-22.
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The increasing popular support for Islamist parties in democratic countries incites public suspicion concerning whether the Islamists’ participation in procedural democracy guarantees their commitment for substantial democracy, which in principle requires equality of rights among citizens regardless of their religion and gender. Indeed, gender politics often appears at the centre of the lslamist agenda, as they seek to construct a new moral order based on a conservative gender perspective. A greater concern arises on whether the Islamists will eventually lead society towards democracy or, conversely, towards theocracy. In Indonesia, the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/PKS) shows a remarkable development and significant electoral achievement. Some observers viewed that PKS is opportunistically using democratic means to “hijack” it for their Islamist agenda waiting for when political power is in their hands. Others believe PKS’s involvement in real politics will, in the end, lead to a “gradual secularisation” of their Islamist agenda. Based on a gender analysis, this paper examines whether PKS’s fulfillment of the formalist criteria of democracy is compatible with their application of democratic principles and values.[Semakin menguatnya dukungan terhadap partai Islam memincu kecurigaan publik yang mempertanyakan apakah partisipasi kalangan islamis dalam demokrasi prosedural menjamin komitmen mereka bagi tegaknya demokrasi substansial, demokrasi yang mensyaratkan kesetaraan bagi semua orang tanpa terkecuali. Sebenarnya, agenda politik gender yang didengungkan oleh kalangan islamis tidak bisa dilepaskan dari perspektif konservatif mereka mengenai relasi gender. Pertanyaannya kemudian, apakah yang mereka agendakan akan berlabuh pada pemantapan demokrasi atau --sebaliknya‑‑ menuju teokrasi. Di Indonesia, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) adalah satu-satunya partai Islam di Indonesia yang berhasil berkembang pesat dan mampu mendulang suara secara signifikan. Bagi beberapa pengamat, PKS merepresentasikan partai Islamis yang berhasil “menunggangi” demokrasi untuk memperjuangkan agenda islamis mereka. Ini akan tampak jelas jika PKS berhasil menjadi partai penguasa. Kendati demikian, beberapa kalangan lainnya berkeyakinan bahwa keterlibatan PKS dalam politik demokratis akan “mensekulerkan” agenda islamis mereka. Dengan analisis gender, tulisan ini hendak menjawab apakah kriteria formal mengenai nilai dan prinsip demokrasi yang melekat pada PKS sejalan dengan apa yang mereka praktekkan.]
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Pecastaing, Camille. "Islamist Parties after the Arab Spring." SAIS Review of International Affairs 37, no. 1S (2017): S—39—S—53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/sais.2017.0014.
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Çavdar, Gamze. "Islamist Rationality: An Assessment of the Rational Choice Approach." Politics and Religion 5, no. 3 (December 2012): 584–608. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755048312000314.
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AbstractA growing body of literature criticizes the notion that Islamism is sui generis and argues that it could be explained by existing conceptions about human behavior. This approach relies on rational choice theory and its derivatives, characterizing Islamists as rational political actors that engage in cost-benefit analysis and strategic calculation. This article evaluates the explanatory power of this characterization through three case studies, namely the Turkish Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), the Jordanian Islamic Action Front (Jabhat al-Amal al-Islami), and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimun). It argues that although the approach offers explanations for Islamist pragmatism, this characterization has three major limitations: lack of room for ideological change, extreme voluntarism between violence and non-violence, and lack of insight for intra-group gender relations.
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Akarca, Ali T. "Modeling political performance of Islamist and Islamist-rooted parties in Turkey." Middle East Development Journal 7, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 49–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17938120.2015.1019295.
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Bakour, Bachar. "The Debate on Islamist Party Formation: A Comparative Analysis of al-Būtī and al-Qaradāwī (Perdebatan tentang pembentukan parti islam: analisa per-bandingan antara albuti dan alqardhawi)." Journal of Islam in Asia (E-ISSN: 2289-8077) 15, no. 1 (June 27, 2018): 228–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.31436/jia.v15i1.666.
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Abstract
The paper examines the debate over the legal position of Islamist party formation through comparing views of two preeminent Muslim thinkers: M.S.R al-Būtī (antagonist) and Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī (protagonist). Using a text-by-text scheme, the paper tests the validity of the cited textual evidences on the basis of the primary sources of Sharī‘a and the experience of today’s Islamists: the Muslim Brotherhood (parent organization), Hizb al-Tahrīr, and the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Finally, the paper contends that Islamist parties are a system, accredited by Islamic principles, and a reality imposed by changing circumstances of Muslim nations in history, culture, and politics.
Keywords: al-Būtī, al-Qaradāwī, Islamist, party, political, formation, the Muslim Brotherhood.
Abstrak
Kertas ini membincangkan kedudukan pembentukan parti-parti Islam dengan membandingkan pandangan dua cendiakawan Muslim terkemuka iaitu: M.S.R al-Būtī (antagonis) dan Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī (protagonis). Dengan menggunakan skema ayat dengan ayat, kertas ini mengkaji kesahihan bukti teks yang dirujuk berdasarkan Sharī'a dan pengalaman para Islamis pada hari ini seperti Ikhwanul Muslimin (organisasi induk), Hizb al-Tahrīr, dan Parti Keadilan dan Pembangunan (AKP). Akhirnya, kertas ini menyimpulkan bahawa parti-parti Islam adalah satu sistem, yang berlandaskan prinsip-prinsip Islam, dan juga satu kenyataan yang dikenakan oleh perubahan keadaan negara-negara Islam dalam sejarah, budaya, dan politik.
Kata Kunci: al-Būtī, al-Qaradāwī, Islam, pesta, politik, pembentukan, Ikhwanul Muslimin.
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Ben Shitrit, Lihi. "Authenticating Representation: Women's Quotas and Islamist Parties." Politics & Gender 12, no. 04 (April 21, 2016): 781–806. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1743923x16000027.
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The spread of women's quotas in legislative bodies across the world since the mid-1990s has become one of the most significant factors impacting levels of women's political representation (Dahlerup 2013; Krook 2009; Tripp and Kang 2008). In the Middle East, a region that has long held a place at the very bottom of global rankings of women's representation, the adoption of such quotas is transforming levels of representation (Kang 2009). But there is still much debate over the utility of quotas for women's meaningful participation in political life. There is now a well-established literature that examines the effects of quotas on women's descriptive or numerical representation. We have a fairly robust idea about the types of quotas that are appropriate for particular sets of electoral system contexts when the goal is to generate a target percentage of women elected to legislative bodies (Jones 2005; Larserud and Taphorn 2007). However, questions about whether and how quotas benefit women beyond the simple addition of several women parliamentarians to the political game remain contested. The various arguments for the utility of quotas rest mainly on two underlying propositions. The first is that quotas, by bringing more women to the political sphere, promote the substantive representation of women's interests. The second is that quotas have a symbolic effect. They help demonstrate that women are fit and able to govern and so contribute to countering women's historical exclusion from politics.
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Friedman, Jeremy. "The Enemy of My Enemy: The Soviet Union, East Germany, and the Iranian Tudeh Party's Support for Ayatollah Khomeini." Journal of Cold War Studies 20, no. 2 (June 2018): 3–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00815.
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This article examines the strategy of the Iranian Tudeh Party in concert with its Soviet and East German patrons and allies during and after the Iranian revolution of 1979. The article assesses the thinking behind the Tudeh's strategy of unwavering support for Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his Islamist allies, even after other major leftist parties had begun fighting the new Islamic regime. This strategy was a product of the international Communist movement's model of revolution in the developing world that envisioned new states following a “non-capitalist path of development.” In Iran, this was compounded by the use of Allende-era Chile as a model for the politics of revolutionary Iran, as well as a deep conviction that Islamism could not provide an effective model of governance in the twentieth century and therefore would collapse of its own accord within months after the Islamists seized power.
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Hannase, Mulawarman. "The Dilemma Between Religious Doctrine and Political Pragmatism: Study of Hamas in Palestine." Religió: Jurnal Studi Agama-agama 10, no. 1 (April 7, 2020): 54–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.15642/religio.v10i1.1308.
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This paper aims to examine how Hamas as an Islamic movement which adheres to the Muslim Brotherhood ideology came into the political public sphere from 2006 until today. Can Hamas maintain the purity of its religious doctrine when the movement engages in a political election in Palestine? This research uses a qualitative method and adopts the theory of political normalization by Antony Bubalo and Greg Feely to analyze how Islamists movement runs into a secular democratic system by participating in the election, establishing political parties, and contributing within a parliamentary and presidential system. From a theological perspective, this research shows that violence involved by an Islamist group in particular due to their theological interpretation. Meanwhile, from a political perspective, Hamas tries to adapt its approach with the political condition and runs with the contextual realm as well as other political groups from different ideological backgrounds.
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Goldin, Julián, and Joaquín Sosa. "Indonesia: ¿Una nueva meca del islamismo?" Asia/AméricaLatina 5, no. 9 (October 31, 2020): 92–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.33177/9.6.
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RESUMEN: Indonesia, uno de los países con mayor cantidad de población musulmana en el mundo, inició durante los primeros años del siglo XXI un proceso de democratización que se ha ido consolidando cada vez más a partir de las sucesivas elecciones que han tenido lugar en el archipiélago. Frente a las posturas que plantean que en el país está teniendo lugar una radicalización y crecimiento de los partidos islámicos e islamistas los cuales bogan por el establecimiento de la sharía como ordenamiento jurídico del Estado, el siguiente articulo pretende a través del análisis de las elecciones de 2004 y 2009 examinar cuál es el rol y la importancia de estos grupos dentro de la democracia indonesia. Palabras clave: Indonesia, Democracia, Islam, Sudeste Asiático, Elecciones ABSTRACT: Indonesia, one of the countries with the largest Muslim population in the world, began during the first years of the 21st century a process of democratization that has been increasingly consolidated by means of the successive elections that have taken place in the archipelago. In light of opinions that state that the radicalization and growth of Islamic and Islamist parties is taking place in the country, which advocate the establishment of Sharia as the legal order of the State. The following article seeks through the analysis of the elections of 2004 and 2009 to examine what is the role and importance of these groups within the Indonesian democracy.
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Wegner, Eva, and Francesco Cavatorta. "Revisiting the Islamist–Secular divide: Parties and voters in the Arab world." International Political Science Review 40, no. 4 (August 30, 2018): 558–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0192512118784225.
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Electoral politics in the Arab world are either portrayed as clientelistic affairs void of content or as highly ideological clashes between Islamist and Secular Left forces. Although both arguments are intuitively appealing, the empirical evidence to date is limited. This article seeks to contribute to the debate by investigating the extent of programmatic voter support for Islamist and Secular Left parties in seven Arab countries with data from recent surveys by the Arab Barometer, Afrobarometer and World Values Survey. Ideological congruence between voters and parties exists but is limited to the Islamist–Secular core divide with regard to the role of religion in politics and gender values. In contrast, there are virtually no differences in economic attitudes between respondents and there is no evidence of class-based voting, with Islamist and Secular Left parties sharing the same voter base of better-off, more educated voters. Core results are robust across surveys.
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Hwang, Julie Chernov. "When Parties Swing: Islamist Parties and Institutional Moderation in Malaysia and Indonesia." South East Asia Research 18, no. 4 (December 2010): 635–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.5367/sear.2010.0016.
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Schwedler, Jillian. "Democratization, Inclusion and the Moderation of Islamist Parties." Development 50, no. 1 (March 2007): 56–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.development.1100324.
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Saleem, Raja M. Ali. "Identifying Islamist Parties Using Gunther and Diamond’s Typology." SAGE Open 4, no. 3 (August 12, 2014): 215824401454428. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2158244014544288.
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Pasuni, Afif. "The 2011 Egyptian Revolution and Islamists in Egypt and Malaysia." American Journal of Islam and Society 30, no. 4 (October 1, 2013): 160–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v30i4.1097.
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The opposition Islamist PAS (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, or Pan
Malaysian Islamic Party) is one of the oldest political parties in
Malaysia. Inspired by Egypt’s Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Muslim
Brotherhood [MB]), PAS is also influenced by occurrences in the
Middle East; following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, its leaders
revamped their organizational structure to entrust key decisions
to religious scholars. The ramifications of the 2011 Egyptian revolution,
arguably one of the most significant Middle Eastern political
events in recent times, thus deserves a closer look.
This short article attempts to look at this revolution’s possible impact
on Islamists in Malaysia. I argue that Malaysia had already
undergone its own version of a revolution in the 1998 reformasi
(reformation) due to the shared characteristics between the two
events: both (1) shared the same premise of alleged political injustice;
(2) provided opportunities for Islamists to influence the
political discourse, with the difference that in Egypt there was a
political vacuum; and (3) utilized the Internet heavily to rally the
masses. However, due to Malaysia’s freer democratic and electoral
processes, political changes there will not be as abrupt as in
Egypt. Furthermore, both Egypt’s revolution and Malaysia’s reformasi
have hardly ended; the former is a tumultuous ongoing
process of battling for the legitimacy of rule by appealing to the
masses, while the latter is an ongoing process of appealing to voters
in order to come to rule.
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Wanto, Adri. "The Paradox Between Political Islam and Islamic Political Parties: The Case of West Sumatera Province." Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies 50, no. 2 (December 27, 2012): 329. http://dx.doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2012.502.329-368.
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<p>The aim of this paper is to explain the apparent paradox between political Islam and Islamic political parties in Indonesia. On one hand, the support for Islamic political parties is in decline, while, on the other religious intolerance and the implementation of local regulations based on the shari’ah laws have increased in many provinces. This paper argues that political Islam and Islamic political parties are not synonymous. Moreover, the aim of achieving an ideal society according to an Islamist’s vision and their religious interpretations does not only by adopt a top-down strategic model through participation in formal politics but also by using bottom-up strategic model by focusing on the societal level. By adopting gradualist approaches, hardliner Islamist ideas disseminate peacefully in Indonesia today. This study will focus on West-Sumatra as a case study, considering West Sumatra is one of the most widely province issued the shari’ah laws in Indonesia. This article will shed light on local and often underestimated dynamics.</p><p>[Artikel ini menjelaskan paradoks antara Islam politik dan partai politik Islam di Indonesia. Jika pada satu sisi, dukungan terhadap partai politik Islam menurun, namun pada sisi berbeda tingkat intoleransi dan angka peraturan daerah berbasiskan syariah meningkat. Karena itu, artikel ini berargumen bahwa Islam politik dan partai politik Islam tidak selalu sejalan. Selain itu, cita-cita untuk mewujudkan masyarakat yang Islami tidak melulu harus diwujudkan dari atas-ke-bawah melalui partisipasi politik, namun juga dari bawah-ke-atas, yakni menitikberatkan pada level masyarakat. Dengan strategi gradual -perlahan-lahan-, gagasan fundamentalis Islam tanpa sadar telah menginfiltrasi. Artikel ini menjelaskan Sumatra Barat sebagai studi kasus persoalan di atas. Pilihan Sumatra Barat berdasarkan pada realitas bahwa di propinsi inilah, perda shari’ah paling banyak diberlakukan. Artikel ini akan berkontribusi pada diskusi mengenai politik lokal dan dinamikanya.]</p>
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Ahmad, Waqas. "The Evolving Interplay between Islam and Politics: From Islamist to Islamic Democrat." ICR Journal 9, no. 4 (October 16, 2018): 154–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.52282/icr.v9i4.99.
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Islam is unique in its relationship with politics. It plays a vital role in politics and governance, initially under the Rashidun and subsequently in many Muslim empires. The collapse of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924 and the process of decolonisation which started in the mid-twentieth-century led to the start of many Islamic political movements in newly independent Muslim countries. These movements now sit at a critical juncture, with Muslims around the world being polarised around two political extremes. On the one hand, we have Islamic radical groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda, while on the other hand we have secular parties which do not see any role for Islam in politics and governance in Muslim countries. In response, many traditional Islamist parties are now evolving into Muslim democratic parties. Unlike Islamists, Muslim democrats take a more inclusive approach, preferring to integrate Islamic religious values into political platforms designed to win regular democratic elections. The Ennahda Party of Tunisia is one Muslim party that reflects this evolution. R. Ghannouchi, who outlined Ennahdas transition, has argued that Tunisians today are less concerned about Islamisation or secularisationthan with building a democratic government that is inclusive and meets their aspirations for a better life. This paper is an attempt to investigate this shift and its consequences for Islamism across the Muslim world.
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Yildirim, A. Kadir. "Globalization, Political Islam, and Moderation: The Case of Muslim Democratic Parties." Sociology of Islam 3, no. 1-2 (August 25, 2015): 76–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22131418-00301004.
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In this article, I examine the rising significance of a moderate kind of Islamist party emerging in the Middle East in recent years—Muslim democratic parties—and, the factors underlying their electoral success. In this, the manuscript takes a closer look at an important constituency of Islamist parties, the small and medium business owners (smes). Briefly, I argue that smes’ support underlies the success of moderate Muslim democratic parties as opposed to more conservative Islamist parties, and what determines smes’ support for a moderate party is the change in their political preferences. The change in sme preferences, I show, is due to the form that economic liberalization takes, whether economic liberalization is more inclusive (what I call competitive liberalization) or exclusive/selective (what I call crony liberalization). Empirically, I rely on original field interviews I conducted with party officials and business owners in Egypt, Morocco, and Turkey. I also integrate primary sources such as party publications into the analysis.
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Rahman, Md Mizanur. "The making of an Islamist public sphere in Bangladesh." Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 4, no. 4 (November 21, 2018): 330–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2057891118811952.
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The article examines the process of making an Islamist public sphere in Bangladesh and identifies the actors involved. It argues that Islamist social Islamization movements in the form of various da’wa (preaching) activities, madrassah activisms, and Islamist political parties’ Islamization projects collectively contribute to the making of an Islamist public sphere. It shows how da’wa movements’ everyday living experiences, madrassah’s absolute authority over public Islam, and Islamist political parties’ social welfare, and associated activities construct an Islamist imagination. A parallel counter Islamist discursive arena with secular discourse is in construction and circulation that formulates oppositional interpretations based on Islamist identities, interests, and needs. The article argues that instead of explicitly challenging the secular hegemonic discourse, Islamist social movements engage in a contested relationship with it, and gradually claim their separate position. It further maintains that although these Islamist movements differ ideologically, and vary the ways they perform and propagate Islam, they invariably contribute to the rise of an Islamist public sphere in Bangladesh.
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Karakaya, Suveyda, and A. Kadir Yildirim. "Islamist moderation in perspective: comparative analysis of the moderation of Islamist and Western communist parties." Democratization 20, no. 7 (December 2013): 1322–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2012.696612.
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Clark, Janine Astrid, and Jillian Schwedler. "Who Opened the Window? Women's Activism in Islamist Parties." Comparative Politics 35, no. 3 (April 2003): 293. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4150178.
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Haynes, Jeffrey. "Islamist parties and political normalization in the Muslim world." Democratization 22, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 201–2. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2014.977264.
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Guazzone, Laura. "The success of Islamist parties works against al‐Qaida." International Spectator 41, no. 2 (April 2006): 95–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03932720608459418.
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Almukhametov, Ali, Nurlan Abzhetov, and Zhuldyz Zhumashova. "FORMATION AND SPREAD OF SALAFISM." Al-Farabi 74, no. 2 (June 30, 2021): 146–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.48010/2021.2/1999-5911.12.
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The “Arab Spring” led to the rise of Islamists and the influx of Islamic movements throughout the region. Islamists have debated democracy, pluralism, and personal freedom. In this regard, it is important to understand the emerging concept of Islam among them and how the players in this game perceive themselves. The article provides a brief description and identification of modern Islamists. Features of Islamic political parties are described. The authors provide a definition of the most modern trends in neo-Islamism, including areas such as non-traditional religiosity, gradualism, modernization in Islam, nationalism, and pragmatic relations with the West.
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Cavatorta, Francesco, and Samir Amghar. "Symposium—Islamism, Islamist Parties, and Economic Policy-Making in the Neo-Liberal Age." Politics and Religion 13, no. 4 (July 9, 2020): 685–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755048320000371.
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AbstractThis article introduces the symposium on the relationship between Islamist and Salafi parties and neo-liberal economics. Through a mix of analyses of the party manifestos and ethnographic work, this symposium unveils how Islamist and Salafi parties across the Arab world and abroad have thought about the economy, how they attempted to incorporate the Islamic economy into their discourses and practices and how they have ultimately dealt with the current economic doctrine of neo-liberalism whether in power or opposition.
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Mohamed, Eid, and Bessma Momani. "The Muslim Brotherhood: Between Democracy, Ideology and Distrust." Sociology of Islam 2, no. 3-4 (June 10, 2014): 196–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22131418-00204006.
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Following the Arab Spring, democracy exercised through free and fair elections had allowed Islamist political parties to gain power in Egypt. There was a transformation happening in the ideology of Islamists, who were increasingly trying to influence legislation through democratic processes and social activism. It could be argued that for a time, the u.s. and other Western governments no longer viewed Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood as a threat comparable with Jihadist groups such as Al-Qaeda. This did not translate into a domestic political success, however, once Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood was elected into power in 2012, it simplified good governance to a single and effective slogan: “Islam is the solution!” Yet, it had no real solution to the everyday problems of Egyptians and the sheer chaos that characterizes the daily lives of its people. In a devout region with growing inequality and poverty, religious credentials will matter less than offering specific solutions to these growing social issues. This paper argues that the myth of political Islam has been exposed in Egypt and that the Muslim Brotherhood’s identity, torn between political pragmatism and religious conservatism, shaped its political actions under Morsi’s rule.
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Medhat Abdelkader, Nora. "Islamist parties and social movements: cases of Egypt and Tunisia." Review of Economics and Political Science 4, no. 3 (July 12, 2019): 224–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/reps-12-2018-0044.
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Purpose This paper aims to shed light on the previous ideological stands of the newly established Islamist parties in terms of the idea of party formation, and different models of their relations with the social movements from which they emanated through focusing on some case studies, namely, Egypt and Tunisia, with an attempt to study their impact on the parties’ paths by concentrating on two dimensions: the decision-making process and alliances’ building. Design/methodology/approach The paper is written according to the comparative case studies approach and Huntington’s new institutionalism. Findings The research findings proved that, in the light of the two case studies, there are two different models of relations exist between the Islamist political parties and the social movements they emanated from, and despite that both parties had come out from social movements or took the form of a movement in their beginnings and were established within the same context, they showed different perspectives in dealing later on with the new institutional and political context and their rising challenges. These perspectives affected the parties’ decision-making process and alliances’ building, as well as their institutional legitimacy and determined their political future. Originality/value In the end, this paper attempts to deal with the degree of institutionalization these parties enjoyed, based on how the movements they emanated from had dealt with the dilemma of party building and the party-movement relations.
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Hellmich, Christina. "Jillian Schwedler:Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen." Democracy and Security 3, no. 3 (December 13, 2007): 397–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17419160701410707.
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Karam, Azza M. "Islamist parties in the Arab world: Ambiguities, contradictions, and perseverance." Democratization 4, no. 4 (December 1997): 157–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510349708403540.
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Longley, April. "The High Water Mark of Islamist Politics? The Case of Yemen." Middle East Journal 61, no. 2 (April 1, 2007): 240–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.3751/61.2.13.
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In Yemen, Islamists seem to have lost their edge in an area formerly considered their strength: grassroots politics. In the 2006 local council elections the Islamist party Islah suffered a resounding defeat at the hands of the ruling General People's Congress (GPC) party. The overwhelming victory of the GPC in the local councils can be accounted for with reference to four main factors: the GPC's use of the state to advance its electoral aims; the political skill of GPC politicians; the political blunders of the Joint Meeting Parties) JMP; and finally, several political liabilities particular to Islah, including internal fragmentation and party members' often harmful records in office. The elections show that President 'Ali 'Abdullah Salih and his supporters have developed a more nuanced semi-authoritarian framework for maintaining power. In contrast, the opposition demonstrated political immaturity, internal weakness, and an inability to use potential grassroots support to oppose the regime. The future of accountability and competitive politics in Yemen is intimately connected to the political survival and revitalization of Islah. In the aftermath of the elections, the opposition must conduct serious, critical self-evaluation if it intends to hold the regime accountable and to curb the ever-increasing centralization of power around the President and his family.
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Barnett, Carolyn. "The Socialization of Female Islamists: Paternal and Educational Influence." Hawwa 7, no. 1 (2009): 57–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156920809x449544.
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AbstractMany women have played an important role in Islamic renewal as advocates and activists within Islamist movements and parties. Women's participation is of particular interest, given the reputation of these groups as insufficiently supportive of women's rights. The specific influences and experiences that lead women to approach their own empowerment through Islam and to reform Islamist movements from within have been neglected. This article investigates some of the important influences on two prominent female Islamists: Heba Raouf Ezzat, Professor of Political Science at Cairo University, and Nadia Yassine, founder and head of the women's branch of the Moroccan movement Justice and Spirituality (JSA). First and foremost, it overviews the circumstances in which prominent women in Egypt and Morocco have asserted themselves in the past century, highlighting the consistent importance of paternal influence and the expansion of access to education, as well as the evolving role of religion and religious discourse in arguments for women's rights. This article discusses the role of paternal influence and schooling as agents of political socialization, pointing out that scholars have underestimated the important role that fathers play in strongly patriarchal societies and the ability of schools in former colonies to produce anti colonial and nationalist political sentiments. It then turns to Ezzat and Yassine themselves, presenting in detail the influence their fathers and foreign schools had on their political socialization. Both fathers held progressive views on women's education, but they differed in their specific political views, such as their attitude towards Islamism, and the extent to which they sought to transfer their political views to their daughters. This article ends by discussing the role of foreign education in Ezzat's and Yassine's socialization and identity construction, emphasizing the importance of encounters with racist and condescending attitudes as a contributing factor to women's search for Islamic alternatives.