Academic literature on the topic 'Patronat judiciaire'

In Chapter 11, Sahar Aziz discusses rule of law and judicial independence in the context of the Egyptian transition. She argues that while many external observers have viewed the Egyptian judiciary as relatively independent, political control by the Mubarak regime limited that independence successfully, and rendered the judiciary conservative. Further, she argues, while the concept of rule of law has been operational in the country, rather than a thick understanding of rule of law, there has been a hybrid version, of thin rule of law combined with rule by law. These phenomena operate in the co

David Kenny’s chapter examines a recent proposals to eliminate politics from appointments with a system based on solely on ‘merit’. Merit, however, is an ‘empty vessels for substantive norms’ – it is filled with content that is invariably political. In Part II, the chapter argues that the composition of the judiciary in Ireland lacks diversity in terms of personal and educational background, and this compounds the homogeneity of judicial viewpoints, which inevitably shape our views on what the Constitution is for, and what the Constitution means, and therefore the diversity of our judiciary matters. In Part III, the chapter advance three suggestions in light of my conclusion that there are irreducible political considerations in judicial appointments: that we abandon the language of merit, along with any aspiration to nominate judges in a manner that expresses no political viewpoint about what judging should be; that, however we might reform judicial appointments to excise political patronage, we should not delegate this function from government to an independent body; and that we should increase the diversity of our judiciary, in terms of both professional and personal background. The way forward lies in admitting, rather than concealing, the politics at play in judicial appointments.

Chapter 5 deals with populists in office and exposes what the author terms the “populist blueprint.” Once again based on comparative empirical analysis, it explains how populist parties consolidate in power by means of grabbing the top state administration and depriving key liberal institutions of autonomy, especially the judiciary, state-independent authorities, and the media. Another common characteristic of all populist parties in office is their systematization of patronage politics under the logic of excluding the opposition from state-related benefits and other resources. Finally, the pieces of the illiberal and populist project are put together in an effort to think about it all in a systematic and rationalizing way.