Academic literature on the topic 'Paul Wittgenstein'

Philosophy experienced a turning point at the time of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Likewise, religion (Judaism) encountered transformation during the time of the apostle Paul. Wittgenstein’s metaphor of the ‘River-bed’ that was later subsumed in the language-game theory is a concept that challenged the then status quo of philosophy known as rationalistic foundationalism. This philosophical predisposi­tion is analogous to the religious situation when Paul began his Christian ministry. Paul’s passionate emphasis on ‘justification by faith’ rather than legalistic or ritualistic observance of the law, was a shockwave to the Judaist religious establishment. Wittgenstein and Paul could as well be regarded as ‘radicals’ or rebels in their respective disciplines. Wittgenstein introduced a paradigm shift into philosophy while Paul did it in the Christian religion. Their unconventional outlooks were, however, met with a lot of resistance especially from the diehard philosophers and/or religionists of the day. This paper, therefore, is a comparative work on Wittgenstein (Philosophy) and Paul (Religion) in order to demonstrate sustained revolutionary tendencies toward human innovations and the need to strive for excellence.

Paul Wittgenstein's one-handedness has typically been framed as a physical limitation at odds with an able-bodied ideology driving musical performance. Contemporary reviews, for instance, frame the pianist's disability as a tragedy heroically transcended during the course of virtuosic performance; others suggest that Wittgenstein successfully "passed" as two-handed. A study of Wittgenstein's numerous one-hand arrangements reveals similar narratives: the pianist often attempted to imitate the sound of two-handed piano music, and many of his own keyboard exercises train his one hand to assume the load of two. The "deficiency" model can be seen most dramatically in three attempts to arrange Witt-genstein's commissions for left-hand piano into a more "normal" performance medium: Sergei Prokofiev's expressed (but abandoned) interest in arranging his left-hand piano concerto for piano two-hands, Alfred Cortot's completed draft of a two-hand arrangement of Ravel's Concerto pour la main gauche, and, most significantly, Friedrich Wührer's highly successful two-hand arrangements of Franz Schmidt's left-hand pieces for Wittgenstein, which explicitly adopt a program of "strengthening" and "filling in" the supposed weaknesses of a disabled performance medium. Yet, despite the stigma it may have accrued, one-handed pianism is but a more prominent, more public example of the "bodily limits" all performers must confront; similar discourse surrounds the deficiencies of small hands or stiff fingers, for example. For the performer's body must negotiate its corporeal finitude with the complex demands of the musical score. As seen here in the career of Wittgenstein, an aesthetics of disabled performance presents this dialectic in heightened microcosm.

Abstract Uhland’s poem has found fame as a litmus test in philosophical debates about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Like many works of art, the poem is dynamically produced in its effort to resolve a fundamental conflict. The poem’s conflict arises from the difficulty to connect the count’s life and his daydream. In the end, the poem as a whole serves to embody a critique of the capacity of a daydream to recover memories faithfully. Wittgenstein makes two remarks in a 1917 letter to Paul Engelmann that pertain to the poem. They are to be read in keeping with a resolute reading (James Conant, Cora Diamond) of the Tractatus; Wittgenstein’s first remark imitates the very movement of thought we find in the poem – and in doing so Wittgenstein makes good on his claim to talk about the poem: “the unutterable is, – unutterably – contained in what is uttered.” His second remark has, thus far, played no role in literature – Wittgenstein speaks of Engelmann’s dreams, yet he does not explicitly formulate the poem’s bearing on them. Here, too, he reenacts, in the formulation of his remark, the core conflict of the poem. My interpretation of the poem, finally, distinguishes three interpretive approaches (symbolistic, realistic, critical) in order to capture the understanding of the poem embodied in Wittgenstein's remarks.

Stonborough House is a house in the heart of the city of Vienna that was, apart from architect Paul Engelmann - a disciple of Adolf Loos, designed and constructed by philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, at the suggestion of his sister Margaret Stonborough-Wittgenstein. In an attempt to connect Wittgenstein's philosophy with his work as an architect, the Stonborough House has often been named 'a visible form of his teaching'. Therefore, this paper intends to point out that translation into a substitute language of architecture became a meaningful way of addressing philosophical issues, and that the credo of Wittgenstein's philosophical ethics, which was restraint from the redundant, found articulation of its aesthetic value through architectural rhetoric.

Ludwig Wittgenstein was born in 1889, son of parents of Jewish extraction but not Jewish religion. Asked how his family came by the name ‘Wittgenstein’ Ludwig said they had been court Jews to the princely family and so had taken the name when Jews were required by law to have European-style names. The father, Karl, was a Protestant, the mother a Catholic. The Jewish blood was sufficient to bring the family later on into danger under Hitler's Nuremberg Laws. They did not think of themselves as Jews or belong to the Jewish community in Vienna. The children were brought up sort-of Catholic though so far as I know only the eldest, Hermine, towards the end of her life, took this seriously and made a profession of faith before friends and household. At 9 years of age Ludwig and Paul, a year or two older than Ludwig, talked together and decided that their religion was all nonsense. Paul became a pianist of some fame, but soon after his debut in Vienna he became a wounded prisoner on the Russian front and his arm was lopped off by a surgeon who did not know he was a pianist.

<p>In this work, I examine Wittgenstein’s possible contributions to an elucidation of the grammatical status of certain metaphors – often found in theoretical and speculative texts – which resist an approach based on the assumption of a clear split between the fields of pragmatics and semantics. I take as examples of works that depart from this assumption Elizabeth Camp’s Contextualism, Metaphor and What is said (which explores the lines suggested by Paul Grice), and John Searle’s Expression and Meaning. Both rely on a distinction between speaker’s meaning (utterance meaning) and sentence meaning to explain the nature of metaphor. They assume that the very metaphorical operation involves meaning something instead of saying something. But it is anything but obvious that, when we consider, e.g., the following metaphor of Philosophical Investigations: “A picture held us prisoners” (§115), we can assume that we are facing a non-descriptive use of language. I argue that Wittgenstein himself can provide us with tools to examine a possible descriptive function of this kind of sentence when he develops his grammatical research methods which: a) are not focused on the linguistic dimension of a sentence but on the linguistic dimension of discourse; b) bring up the issue of language learning; c) lead us to ask if certain metaphors could not work as modifiers of convictions, i.e., if they could not act directly on what Wittgenstein once called Weltbild.</p><p><br />Keywords: Metaphor. Wittgenstein. Weltbild. Saying. Meaning.</p>

Der erklärte Anti-Philosoph Paul Valéry teilt so manche Eigenschaft mit seinen Zeitgenossen, den Kulturphilosophen Ernst Cassirer und Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wie Cassirer war Valéry von den kulturphilosophisch interessanten Positionen der Ideengeschichte lebenslang fasziniert, und wie Wittgenstein verstand er Philosophie wesentlich als Sprachkritik. Mit diesen und anderen Affinitäten – vor allem mit seiner »poïétique« – greift Valéry genuin kulturphilosophische Themen auf.

Paul Wittgenstein's commissioning of concertos for piano left-hand is as enviable a legacy as any performer could wish to have, centred as it is on concertos by Korngold, Franz Schmidt (who also penned for Wittgenstein a set of Concertante Variations on a theme of Beethoven with orchestra and three piano quintets), Richard Strauss, Prokofiev, Britten (his op. 21 Diversions) and Ravel. Yet the maimed pianist's quixotic attitude to the works he received is almost as remarkable. Ravel he offended by the liberties he took with the solo part, while Prokofiev's Concerto No. 4 languished unplayed for a quarter of a century, until three years after the composer's death. Yet these cases pale into insignificance compared to the treatment meted out to the concerto that Paul Hindemith wrote for Wittgensein in 1923.

This article presents an edited version of lectures given by Paul Ricœur at Johns Hopkins University in April 1966. Ricœur offers a comparative analysis of Wittgenstein’s and Husserl’s late works, taking the problem of language as the common ground of investigation for these two central figures of phenomenology and analytic philosophy. Ricœur develops his study in two parts. The first part considers Husserl’s approach to language after the Logical Investigations and concentrates on Formal and Transcendental Logic; leaving a transcendental reflection on language behind it re-examines a phenomenological conception, according to which the sphere of logic is not separable from that of experience. The main focus of the second part is Wittgenstein’s later philosophy as it moved on from the conception of an isomorphic relation between language and the world, as set out in the picture theory in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, to the more pragmatic notion of a language-game in the Philosophical Investigations. In order to get beyond the irrevocable differences between the two philosophies and the unresolved theoretical issues on both sides, Ricœur suggests turning to a semiological paradigm based on the Saussurean distinction between “language” and “speaking.” Keywords: Analytic Philosophy, Husserl, Phenomenology, Semiology, Wittgenstein.Résumé Cet article est une version éditée de conférences données par Paul Ricœur à la Johns Hopkins University en avril 1966. Ricœur propose une analyse comparée des dernières œuvres de Wittgenstein et Husserl, avec le problème du langage comme sol commun d’investigations pour ces deux figures centrales de la phénoménologie et la philosophie analytique. Cette analyse de Ricœur se joue à travers deux parties. La première partie revient sur l'approche du langage chez Husserl depuis Recherches logiques avec une attention particulière aux développements de Logique formelle et logique transcendantale; dans le cadre d’une réflexion transcendantale sur le langage il revient sur une conception phénoménologique selon laquelle, le domaine du logique n’est pas séparable de celui de l'expérience. La deuxième partie se concentre principalement sur la dernière philosophie de Wittgenstein alors qu’il s'est départi de l’idée d’une relation isomorphique entre le langage et le monde telle que posée par la théorie du tableau dans le Tractatus logico-philosophicus, pour s’engager vers la notion plus pragmatique de jeu de langage dans les Investigations philosophiques. Afin de surmonter les différences irrémédiables entre les deux philosophies et, dans une certaine mesure, certains des problèmes théoriques non résolus depuis les deux bords, Ricœur fait finalement référence à un paradigme sémiologique et à la distinction saussurienne entre “langue” et “parole.” Mots-clés: Husserl, phénoménologie, sémiologie, philosophie analytique, Wittgenstein

Пианист Пауль Витгенштейн, желая расширить и обновить свой концертный репертуар, внес в XX веке существенный вклад в фортепианную литературу для левой руки. В 1929–1930 годах он заказывает фортепианный концерт сначала Морису Равелю, а затем Сергею Прокофьеву. Это оказалось возможным благодаря наследству, полученному пианистом после смерти отца — сталелитейного магната Карла Витгенштейна. Если Равелю удалось, хоть и не полностью, удовлетворить потребности заказчика, то Прокофьеву было вовсе отказано в исполнении его музыки. Одной из главных причин неудачи Прокофьева можно считать творческий кризис конца зарубежного периода, когда композитор находился в поисках нового музыкального языка — «новой простоты». В статье прослеживается и сравнивается судьба этих произведений; устанавливаются причины сравнительной невостребованности концерта Прокофьева исполнителями; анализируется композиция, фортепианная фактура и техника, оркестровка. Освещены биографические факты из жизни Пауля Витгенштейна, а также непростые отношения между заказчиком и композиторами. In the twentieth century, the one-armed pianist Paul Wittgenstein made a significant contribution to piano literature for the left hand, which was due to his wish to broaden and update his concert repertoire. In 1929–1930 he ordered a left-handed piano concerto first to Maurice Ravel and then to Sergei Prokofiev. It was possible through the inheritance that Wittgenstein received after the death of his father, the steel magnate Karl Wittgenstein. While Ravel was able to meet the client’s needs, though not completely, Prokofiev was completely denied the performance of his music. One of the main reasons for Prokofiev’s failure might be the creative crisis of the end of the foreign period, when the composer was in search of a new musical language — “the new simplicity”. The article traces and compares the destiny of these piano concertos, specifying the reasons for the relative lack of demand for Prokofiev’s left-handed concerto on behalf of performers. The article also analyzes music, piano texture and technique, form, orchestration of the lefthanded concertos. Special attention is paid to biographical facts from Paul Wittgenstein’s life, as well as uneasy relationship between the client and the composers.

Most of the existing research on Paul Wittgenstein (1887–1961) focuses on his performing career in central Europe as a left-hand pianist and his commissions from the most prominent composers of the 20th century such as Richard Strauss and Maurice Ravel, and his favourite composer, Franz Schmidt. His British performing career and the compositions Ernest Walker, Norman Demuth and Benjamin Britten composed for and dedicated to him, however, remain relatively unexplored. By examining a variety of primary sources that are disclosed here for the first time, this thesis offers the first scholarly research into Wittgenstein’s performing activities in Great Britain in the 1920s–50s and his British commissions in order to fill a major research gap in Wittgenstein studies. Chapter 1 explores Wittgenstein’s self-recognition as a member of the Viennese aristocracy and the shaping of his musical identity, conception and taste, followed by an overview of the related primary sources that are currently located in Hong Kong and the United Kingdom, a detailed summary of his performing activities in Great Britain and a discussion of the British reception of him as a left-hand pianist. Chapter 2 focuses on Walker and the three compositions he wrote for piano left-hand, two of which he composed before meeting Wittgenstein and one after, and the pianist’s attitude towards them. Chapter 3 brings to light the much-neglected composer Demuth and the two works he composed for Wittgenstein and discusses possible reasons why the pianist never performed them. Chapter 4 examines Wittgenstein’s first and only official British commission, the Diversions, Op. 21 by Britten, and investigates the interaction between composer and pianist in the compositional process and their differing conceptions of the work.

Paul Wittgenstein (1887-1961) made significant contributions to the piano literature for the left hand through numerous commissioned works as well as his own transcriptions. In the transcriptions, Wittgenstein preserved the texture of two-hand music, aiming for the simulation of the original works. This requires special techniques in the performance by the left hand alone. This dissertation investigations technical means and performance problems associated with the transcriptions as well as Wittgenstein's own recordings of selections from his works. Chapter 1 serves as an introduction, providing a historical overview of the role of the left hand in two-hand piano literature. Chapter 2 gives biological information on Paul Wittgenstein and discusses the commissioned works. Chapter 3 investigates special techniques in the transcriptions, in the areas of arpeggios, widespread chords, fingering, pedaling, and others. Chapter 4 discusses Wittgensteins's performance style based on his recordings. Chapter 5 presents a conclusion pointing to the benefits of performing left-hand music in two-hand piano playing.

Orientador : Antonio Miguel<br>Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Faculdade de Educação<br>Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-01T11:52:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Jesus_WilsonPereirade_D.pdf: 1668667 bytes, checksum: 1236005663c18044409a6c53c2adc5dc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2002<br>Doutorado

Le solipsisme a été thématisé comme un préalable pour fonder la connaissance au dix-septième siècle. Cette doctrine suggérait, qu’en vue de la certitude, il fallait admettre transitoirement la concevabilité d'un doute portant sur l'existence du monde extérieur en totalité et des autres esprits. L'existence du monde extérieur a pu ainsi être tenue pour établie à l'occasion de preuves de l'existence d'un créateur unique ou tenue pour assurée à l’aide d'une déduction transcendantale. En comparaison, rien ne semble pouvoir prouver l'existence des autres. D'une part, rien ne semble compter comme une preuve a posteriori de l'existence d’autrui, puisque ce doute ne peut s'appuyer sur l'expérience. D'autre part, une preuve permettant de lever ce doute ne peut être produite a priori, puisque l'absence empirique généralisée des autres est concevable a posteriori. Ainsi, rien ne semble exclure la possibilité d'une découverte a priori de son unicité. Cette thèse entreprend de mettre au jour le traitement de cette difficulté par Sartre et Wittgenstein. Les deux philosophes se sont confrontés à l'illusion de confinement qui est le corollaire de l’admission, à titre de possibilité pertinente, de l'absence généralisée des autres esprits. Sartre propose dans L'être et le néant une preuve conceptuelle de l'existence d'autrui pour montrer que ledit problème théorique de l'existence d'autrui est un faux-problème, tandis que Wittgenstein propose dans le Tractatus de dissoudre les problèmes philosophiques de l'existence du monde extérieur et des autres esprits par le biais d'une réflexion sur les conditions d'intelligibilité de l'expression. Dans les deux cas, il s'agit de dissiper l’apparence d’un doute portant sur le monde en totalité et du même coup sur les autres esprits. Non seulement une preuve de l'existence d'autrui est impossible, mais elle est en plus superflue. Ainsi, requérir une telle preuve ne peut que conduire à manquer l’obviété de nos engagements envers les autres, et par là au déni de leurs existences<br>Solipsism was conceived as a preliminary to grounding knowledge in the seventeenth century. This doctrine suggested that, in order to achieve certainty, one had to temporarily admit the conceivability of doubt about the existence of other minds and the external world as a whole. The existence of the external world was then taken to be established by means of proofs of the existence of a unique creator, or assured by means of transcendental deduction. By comparison, nothing seems to prove the existence of others. On the one hand, nothing seems to count as proof a posteriori of the existence of others, for the doubt it would dispel cannot be grounded in experience. On the other hand, nor can a proof which would dispel such doubt be produced a priori, for the empirical and generalized absence of others is conceivable a posteriori. Thus, nothing seems to exclude the possibility of an a priori discovery of one’s unicity. This thesis endeavours to bring out the similarity of the treatment of this difficulty by Sartre and Wittgenstein. Each of these philosophers confronted the illusion of confinement that presupposes admitting the generalized absence of others. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre proposes a conceptual means to establish that the theoretical problem of the existence of other minds is a pseudo-problem. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein proposes to dissolve the philosophical problems of the existence of the external world and the existence of other minds via reflexion on the intelligibility conditions of expression. Both cases involve dispelling the appearance that doubt about the world and other minds is possible and required. Not only that proof of the existence of other minds is impossible, it is also superfluous. To require such a proof therefore can lead to nothing but missing the obviousness of our commitments to others, and thereby to denying their existence

Thesis advisor: Richard Kearney<br>By the 20th century the Confessions had become a “classic” of western civilization, yet it seems to elude any easy explanation and categorization. While scholars of Late Antiquity puzzled over the nature, structure, and meaning of the work, a parallel reception was occurring by some of the most original thinkers across both traditions of Contemporary philosophy, including Ludwig Wittgenstein, Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt, Hans Jonas, Karl Jaspers, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Marion, Jean Louis Chrétien and Stanley Cavell. This study will focus on four of these thinkers, Wittgenstein, Gadamer, Ricoeur and Marion, and the ways that the Confessions has influenced their attempts to address fundamental questions on subjects ranging from time and memory to history and hermeneutics, evil and the will, the self and personal identity, language and narrative, conversion, skepticism and materialism, God and onto- theology, and ultimately the very practice of philosophy itself, its autobiographical and especially its confessional character. In turn, this study also asks whether the engagements of these highly original contemporary philosophers can uncover new dimensions of this highly original work that has been read and interpreted throughout a centuries-long history of reception. The hermeneutic wager is that the past illumines the present philosophical terrain, but also that present insights allow us to read a classic text of the past with new understanding. This study will benefit from the interconnected nature of the problems that these writers confront, in their “family resemblance” of shared affinities and marked differences. Chapter One, “Scholarly Engagements: A Problematic Classic,” introduces some of the key interpretive problems which arose in the course of a century of scholarly engagements, including occasion, veracity, composition, and sources of Saint Augustine’s Confessions. Chapter Two “The Early Wittgenstein: Tractatus, Testimony and Confession” discusses the confessional philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, and the deep affinities he shared with Saint Augustine in his life and his first major work, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922), despite its reception and use as a foundational for Logical Empiricism and its spirited offspring. Chapter Three: “The Later Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations as Philosophical Confession” discusses the influence of Saint Augustine on Wittgenstein’s second major work, the Philosophical Investigations (1953), which uses a quotation from the Confessions as a point of departure for his own philosophical confession of errors and temptations. Chapter Four “Saint Augustine and Gadamer: Hermeneutic Anticipations and Affinities” discusses the hermeneutical insights of Saint Augustine, through the ways he encountered or struggled with texts in the Confessions, as well as through his idea of the “inner word” which would be for Gadamer the foundation of a philosophical hermeneutics. Chapter Five, “Ricoeur: Sin, Time, Memory, and Narrative” discusses Ricoeur’s engagement with Saint Augustine on the question of evil as well as his appropriation of the Augustinian aporia of time from the Confessions as pivotal for his narrative turn. Chapter Six, “Jean-Luc Marion’s Confessions” lays out Marion’s phenomenological unfolding of the Confessions beyond and before metaphysics, offering his reading of six dimensions of the inaccessibility of the self explored by Saint Augustine in the Confessions. This study will conclude by highlighting the themes that have suggested themselves across the many readings of this classic text<br>Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2019<br>Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences<br>Discipline: Philosophy

I denna uppsats avhandlas alternativ till det sociokulturella perspektivet inom lärande och språkutveckling om hur förståelse konstitueras. Denna syn på språket grundar sig i Ludwig Wittgensteins teorier om till exempel språkspel som utvecklat en språktradition som kallas fenomenografi. Det fenomenografiska perspektivet ta i beaktande den föregående lärandeprocessen i medvetandet om hur konceptualisering av förståelse konstitueras. Detta är vad som inom filosofin kallas intentionalitet. Språket kan inte förstås utifrån en förutbestämd vokabuläranvändning eller logiska ideal. Inlärning borde istället förstås utav hur språket används i en kontext i en konkret användning. Förståelse blir därför något som inte går att utforska utifrån sociala relationer eller ideala lösningar.

El propòsit principal d'aquesta tesi és analitzar críticament l'antropologia filosòfica de Charles Taylor.<br/><br/>A la primera part abordem qüestions preliminars: les fonts, els fonaments teòrics i els elements metodològics del seu pensament.<br/><br/>A la segona part elaborem la seva teoria de la identitat. Això implica: (1) donar compte de la relació inextricable entre el jo de la persona i la seva orientació moral, i (2) per mitjà d'arguments transcendentals, articular una ontologia que determini els trets perennes de la naturalesa humana.<br/><br/>Una ontologia de la identitat exigeix l'articulació de les continuïtats i discontinuïtats entre els animals humans i no humans. És a dir, una filosofia de la biologia que aporti les intuïcions de l'aristotelisme al post-darwinisme. En línia amb Adaslair MacIntyre, intentem completar les aportacions realitzades per Taylor en el context de la seva filosofia de l'acció.<br/><br/>D'altra banda, identifiquem alguns dels trets distintius de l'agent humà (lingüisticitat, propòsit i dialogicitat), i abordem els desafiaments de (1) les versions que radicalitzen les conseqüències de la contingència del subjecte i (2) els reduccionisme que prosperen entre els filòsofs analítics. Per això hem confrontat a les interpretacions de Richard Rorty sobre Nietzsche i Freud, i a la posició quasi-budista de Parfit, l'hermenèutica forta de Charles Taylor i Paul Ricoeur.<br/><br/>A la tercera part, estudiem la dimensió històrica de la identitat humana. Això implica assenyalar les peculiaritats del anthropos modern. Per això, a més de contraposar al jo modern la versió premoderna de la nostra comuna humanitat, hem hagut d'enfrontar a la interpretació de Taylor sobre el sentit de les mutacions cosmovisionales, antropològiques i ètiques de la modernitat, les interpretacions que a aquestes mutacions concedeixen autors com Michel Foucault, Alasdair MacIntyre i Jürgen Habermas.<br>El propósito principal de esta tesis es analizar críticamente la antropología filosófica de Charles Taylor. <br/><br/>En la primera parte abordamos cuestiones preliminares: las fuentes, los fundamentos teóricos y los elementos metodológicos de su pensamiento. <br/><br/>En la segunda parte elaboramos su teoría de la identidad. Eso implica: (1) dar cuenta de la relación inextricable entre el yo de la persona y su orientación moral; y (2) por medio de argumentos trascendentales, articular una ontología que determine los rasgos perennes de la naturaleza humana. <br/><br/>Una ontología de la identidad exige la articulación de las continuidades y discontinuidades entre los animales humanos y no humanos. Es decir, una filosofía de la biología que aporte las intuiciones del aristotelismo al post-darwinismo. En línea con Adaslair MacIntyre, intentamos completar los aportes realizados por Taylor en el contexto de su filosofía de la acción. <br/><br/>Por otro lado, identificamos algunos de los rasgos distintivos del agente humano (lingüisticidad, propósito y dialogicidad); y abordamos los desafíos de (1) las versiones que radicalizan las consecuencias de la contingencia del sujeto y (2) los reduccionismos que prosperan entre los filósofos analíticos. Para ello hemos confrontado a las interpretaciones de Richard Rorty sobre Nietzsche y Freud, y a la posición cuasi-budista de Parfit, con la hermenéutica fuerte de Charles Taylor y Paul Ricoeur.<br/><br/>En la tercera parte, estudiamos la dimensión histórica de la identidad humana. Eso implica señalar las peculiaridades del anthropos moderno. Para ello, además de contraponer al yo moderno la versión premoderna de nuestra común humanidad, hemos tenido que enfrentar a la interpretación de Taylor sobre el sentido de las mutaciones cosmovisionales, antropológicas y éticas de la modernidad, las interpretaciones que a éstas mutaciones conceden autores como Michel Foucault, Alasdair MacIntyre y Jürgen Habermas.<br>The main purpose of this thesis is to critically analyze the philosophical anthropology of Charles Taylor.<br/><br/>The first part deals with preliminary issues: the sources, the theoretical and methodological elements of his thought.<br/><br/>In the second part we elaborate his theory of identity. This implies: (1) to account for the inextricable relationship between the self of the person and his moral orientation, and (2) by means of transcendental arguments, to articulate an ontology that determines the perennial features of human nature.<br/><br/>An ontology of identity requires the articulation of the continuities and discontinuities between human and nonhuman animals. That is, a philosophy of biology which provides insights from Aristotelianism to post-Darwinism. In line with Adaslair MacIntyre, we try to complete the contributions made by Taylor in the context of his philosophy of action.<br/><br/>On the other hand, we identify some of the distinctive features of human agency (language, purpose and dialogue) and tackle the challenges of (1) versions that radicalized the consequences of the contingency of the subject and (2) the reductionism that thrive among the analytical philosophers. So we confront the interpretations of Richard Rorty about Nietzsche and Freud, and the quasi-Buddhism of Parfit, with the strong hermeneutics of Charles Taylor and Paul Ricoeur.<br/><br/>In the third part, we study the historical dimension of human identity. That means pointing out the peculiarities of the modern anthropos. Therefore, in addition to contrast the modern self with the premodern version of our common humanity, we confront Taylor's interpretation of the meaning of the cosmological, anthropological and ethical mutations of modernity, with the interpretations that authors as Michel Foucault, Jürgen Habermas and Alasdair MaIntyre offer about these mutations.

This chapter examines Wittgenstein’s critique of philosophy’s premium on simplicity and generality. Although philosophy overlaps with the sciences, it also leans toward the humanities in the open-ended character of its core issues. Additionally, the author discusses Alasdair MacIntyre’s and Jean-Paul Sartre’s different views on the appeal of stories, and discusses as well how the insights of stories have the same features as those of the humanities in being indexical, prescriptive, and perspectival. The social sciences occupy a midpoint between the natural sciences and humanities, aiming to be descriptive, with high value on collective knowledge. But because they deal with human societies, there are constraints on efforts to minimize indexicality. And, because many issues about human societies cannot be addressed without understanding the viewpoints of individuals in the societies, there are also challenges in minimizing perspectivality and complexity.

This chapter attempts to explain the fascination that animals have long exerted upon the motion picture medium. It explores some of the differences among the human gaze, the animal gaze, and the cinematic gaze. Utilizing examples ranging from the philosophies of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Jean-Paul Sartre to films by Edward Dmytryk, Jacques Tourneur, and Paul Schrader, the author explicates affect, identification, and the status of the face in cinematic representations of nonhuman species.

A discussion of the influence of Ludwig Wittgenstein on Cavell is followed by an attempt to expand the latter’s account of the Hollywood response to skepticism to other film genres. In particular, this chapter examines what I call the redemptive lawyer drama, where a barrister at the end of his rope saves himself by winning an honourable legal case in a David vs. Goliath situation. The examples here are Paul Newman in The Verdict, and Billy Bob Thornton in the Amazon Prime miniseries Goliath.

Many of the apparent impasses and/or paradoxes in Translation Studies result from the lack of greater coherence between our basic assumptions about the relation language/world and the theories we derive from them. One of these apparent dilemmas is the concept of hypothetical untranslatability, which is logically dependent on the premise that translation is a phenomenon of language as a system, as opposed to the primacy of the practice from which language itself emerges. Paul Ricoeur, in three conferences published posthumously, coined a formula capable of dissolving this impasse: translation as the Construction of the Comparable. My aim here is to show the profound implications of this insight of Ricoeur, assuming a conception of language informed by the philosophical therapy of the later Wittgenstein and considering authors who start out from this therapy to formulate philosophical theses on how language and perception are articulated. This is another step towards an Epistemology of Translating, tributary of the later Wittgenstein and in line with Arley Moreno’s Epistemology of the Usage.