Journal articles on the topic 'Peacekeeping forces – South Africa'

One of the South Africa's great soft power attributes has been the attraction and power of its transition to inclusive democratic governance after a long period of apartheid rule. This gave South Africa a certain moral authority and prestige to play very significant roles in conflict resolution and mediation through peacekeeping operations. Every government in an ever-changing and dynamic geopolitical environment ensure that its defence force cum foreign policy conform to the international environment while aiming at the defence and protection of its national interests. Using interpretive approach; this work argues that; fundamentally, there are three basic factors that reinforce South Africa’s participation in peacekeeping which are politics, economy and security. By extension these three elements is considered a transformational agent of South Africa’s economy. SANDF is, therefore, considered a dynamic and exceptional foreign policy tool that complements and at same time enhances South Africa’s diplomatic manoeuvrings and influence within the wider international developments. It is concluded that South Africa’s multilateral and foreign policy agendas have been driven by the pursuit of its national interest while trying to ensure peace in other African states.

After the peacekeeping tragedy in the Central African Republic (CAR) in March 2013, South Africa’s participation in peacekeeping missions on the African continent is under investigation. Military personnel of the South African National Defence Force recently took part in both conventional and unconventional, asymmetric warfare in two peace missions, one in the CAR and one in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In the CAR a unilateral military agreement between states existed, while in the DRC a United Nations (UN) mandate for multilateral offensive peacekeeping was authorised. The rationale for South Africa’s participation in African missions is important while the country is serving as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. Its role as one of the leading nations in Africa to deploy peacekeepers is central to its foreign policy. The article focuses on contrasting operations, and diverse challenges such as the authorisation of mandates, funding, logistics and shortcomings in asymmetric training for irregular “new wars” where peacekeepers are required to protect civilians in countries to which they owe little allegiance. Lessons learnt from the widely differing operational experiences in these recent peace missions are discussed.

This article analyses the peacekeeping efforts of Brazil, an emerging power for which peacebuilding is a key element of its international presence, and which has been strongly critical of the dominant liberal paradigm. Peacebuilding is key to Brazil’s approach, as the country by tradition participates (with the contested exception of MINUSTAH) only in Chapter VI peace operations, abjuring the robust use of force. An activity such as peacebuilding which marries development and security concerns is an ideal setting for Brazil’s foreign policy aims; in order to gain a seat in global decisionmaking bodies, in the absence of hard power and the will to use it Brazil turns to peacebuilding to transform its domestic development successes into action in the security arena. The South American giant has also placed significant emphasis on Africa in part as a means to the end of underscoring – as a voice for the global South – its claim to greater international influence. This article will examine the motivations that underpin Brazil’s commitment to peacebuilding operations, as well as its commitment to that practice in Africa, which has taken place largely on a bilateral basis.

This article examines the factors that inhibit the ability of female peacekeepers to make a unique contribution to peacekeeping operations based on their gender. The debates are examined in relation to the claims made about their ability to enhance operational effectiveness and reach out to the local population as women, compared to the actual experiences of South African peacekeepers’ deployed in the Democratic Republic of Congo (drc) and in Darfur/Sudan. The argument is made that factors stemming from both the military and operational context affect the optimal utilization of women in various ways. As most national armed forces tend to draw their peacekeeping troops from the infantry, women come under tremendous performance pressure when deployed and are obliged to assimilate masculine values in order to be recognised as ‘good’ soldiers. It is argued that this, coupled with the hyper-masculine peacekeeping environment which is hostile to women, undermines their optimal utilization, as well as their ability to infuse a more gendered approach in peacekeeping.

United Nations (UN) peace operations are once again at a crossroads, partly due to overstretched capacities. In the meantime, there are indications that peacekeepers face a new and perhaps less expected challenge. Over the last few years, rulers in Burundi, Chad and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have pushed through the reduction of peacekeeping personnel or forced the wholesale withdrawal of peace operations – despite the concerns of the UN. This paper explores whether there is a new hostility to peacekeeping in Africa’s weak states. What should and can the UN do if the assistance they offer in support of peace consolidation is rejected by their putative national ‘partners’, especially when the countries in question continue to face serious post-conflict challenges? Using the cases of UN missions in the DRC and South Sudan, this article examines why the well-established principle of consent of host state governments cannot any longer be taken for granted by peacekeepers. It argues that the increasing hostility towards peace operations is a function of their becoming actors in the domestic power game, as a result of their ever longer and intrusive presence.

The paper presents the existence of a conflict between local ownership and the introduction of gender equality in situations of post-conflict peace-building under the control of international actors, mostly UN peacekeeping forces. The authors present the essential meanings of the term ?local ownership? and understanding of its importance for the success of peacekeeping missions and reforms of the security sector in post-conflict societies in achieveing lasting peace. Local civil or military leaders can actually consider that gender equality is not needed in their culture, and that the participation of women in the security sector is not socio-culturally acceptable. That is why various international actors may be reluctant to advocate for gender equality, considering it as an imposition of foreign cultural values that could potentially destabilize the security sector reform process. The paper presents examples of Sahel region, South Sudan, South Africa, East Timor and Sri Lanka, ilustrating that women and men have different experiences of conflict, and that women in conflict and post-conflict situations are especially vulnerable to sexual and other forms of gender-based violence. Therefore, women?s active participation in peace-building and ending violence and conflicts is essential for peace, security and general cessation of further victimization of women. Supporting the existing power relations characterized by structural gender inequality and violence diminish the value of security sector reform. Moreover, the process of peace-building is destabilized by maintaining permanent sources of victimization of women, discrimination and easy outbreak of armed conflict. This might result in the poorly reformed security sector, which only fits the needs of male local dominant groups and protects their interests, leaving majority of women still in a situation of high risk from various forms of victimization.

ABSTRACT Introduction Since its detection in the early 1980s, HIV and AIDS have claimed 32.7 million lives. The HIV epidemic continues to plague the world with its most devastating effects felt in Eastern and Southern Africa. The exposure, vulnerability, and impact of HIV have been prominent among military personnel due to environmental, demographic, and socioeconomic characteristics. Policies have been developed to mitigate its exposure, vulnerability, and impact on the military. However, there are disparities across these policies, especially on recruitment, enlistment, and deployment. These contentions inspired this evaluation, which was designed to provide vital information and insights for militaries developing new HIV policies, for example, the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF). Materials and Methods Content analyses of key documents and secondary resources from South Africa (SA), the USA, and the United Nations and International Labour Organizations were undertaken. The key documents evaluated included HIV and AIDS policies of the SA National Defence Force (SANDF), the U.S. DoD, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and International Labour Organization (ILO); national HIV and AIDS policies; and legislations of SA and the USA. Results The SANDF policy permits the recruitment of HIV-positive applicants while the U.S. DoD policy does not. Mandatory pre-employment health assessments including HIV testing is conducted for prospective applicants. Again, discrimination against persons living with HIV (PLHIV) is discouraged by national policies and legislations of both countries and the ILO policy. At the same time, the SA national policy permits discrimination based on requirement of the job.On deployment, the SANDF policy explicitly permits deployment of HIV-positive service members, while the U.S. DoD policy cautiously does so. Both policies support mandatory pre-deployment health assessments in line with the UN peacekeeping policy and medical standards even though voluntary confidential HIV counseling and testing is recommended by the UN. All HIV-positive service members are retained and offered treatment and care services; however, the U.S. DoD policy retires unfit service members after 12 months of consecutive non-deployment. Further, the UN policy repatriates service members with pre-existing medical conditions and pays no compensation for death, injury, or illness, which is due to pre-existing medical conditions or not mission-related. Conclusions First, the contents of the military policies are not very diverse since most militaries do not enlist or deploy PLHIV except few countries including SA. Implementation and interpretation is however inconsistent. Some militaries continue to exclude PLHIV despite the existence of policies that permit their inclusion. Second, discrepancies exist among the military policies, national legislations, and international policies. The UN policy is not coherent and empowers the military to exclude PLHIV. Also, potential costs to be incurred, in the form of compensation and repatriation, seem to be a major factor in the decision to deploy HIV-positive service members. Harmonization of military HIV policies to ensure uniform standards, interpretation, and implementation and the coherence of the UN policy are essential to guide countries developing new policies, for example, GAF.

Since 1987, the Lord’s Resistance Army has continued systematic human rights violations in the Central African region. Cases of kidnapping, village raids, mass rapes, and murders, have become defining factors to the urgency of resolving the crisis. In an attempt to respond to the conflict, the United Nations Security Council has initiated a number of political and military-based resolutions to control the conflict since 2008, which includes extending UN peacekeeping mandates in Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Sudan, as well as coordinate efforts with relevant African Union bodies. However, its success is far-reached, urging the need to contextualize the forms of hindrances that the UN faced in responding to the crisis. Employing Rourke and Bouyer’s (1996) concept of collective security and measures of response success, with a research limitation set to 2008-2012, a qualitative research utilizing secondary data is implemented, concluding the following hindrances that can be categorized into the following; (1) Implementation of the additional mandate of the UN Peace Forces, (2) Application of the AU Regional Task Force, and (3) Implementation of the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement, and Reintegration program. Received: 16 December 2020 / Accepted: 11 March 2021 / Published: 10 May 2021

The National Peacekeeping Force (NPKF) was designed to meet a serious security challenge anticipated in the run-up to South Africa's first democratic elections in April 1994. Its establishment was an imaginative and constructive, but ultimately disastrous initiative. Its failure – however inevitable in retrospect – constituted a major tragedy, less as it proved for the free and fair conduct of the elections than for the longer-term prospects of forging a truly national army. This study seeks to explore: (i) the genesis and evolution of the concept of an integrated South African peacekeeping force; (ii) its character, composition, command structure, and cohesion; and (iii) the causes and consequences of its fateful deployment on the volatile East Rand.

Over the last two decades, Chinese armed forces have been increasingly exposed to the global norms of UN peacekeeping, not least through expanded participation in international peacekeeping operations. As the largest Security Council permanent member troop contributor, more than four fifths of Chinese troops in UN peacekeeping operations are deployed in Africa. As such, China is increasingly in a position to strengthen peacekeeping operations, contribute to stability, security, and security sector reform in Africa, and expand its regional multilateral military cooperation, all of which raises the prospects for China to become more integrated in the international community and a responsible, and responsive, major power. Given these important developments and their implications for the future of peacekeeping in Africa, this paper seeks to: identify the key determinants that undergird China’s evolving foreign policy approach toward peacekeeping principles and praxis in Africa; ascertain the degree and trace the process in which increasing interactions between China, the African Union, and the broader international community have led Chinese policy elites to consider greater flexibility in their views toward sovereignty and the changing nature of peacekeeping; assess how a rising China may exert its influence through its expanding role in peacekeeping; and analyze the strategic implications of these security developments for Africa.

Suddenly, in the summer of 1988, the United Nations was in the news. Positively. The process had got under way earlier in the year with the little-noticed (at the time) provision of UN military observers to watch over the Afghan-Pakistani agreements and the associated withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. Then it was discovered that, after a ten-year hiatus, the UN might soon be called upon to implement the plan for its involvement in the accession to independence of Namibia, as South Africa seemed to be preparing to leave. There had been too many false all-clears on this particular front for it to be confidently assumed that the South Africans would in fact go.

The defence and foreign policy communities in the Global South should learn from the lessons of security governance that followed the 13-year United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). To better inform the academic and policy debate, this article extrapolates ideas from the case study of Chile, one of the ‘big four’ Latin American peacekeeping providers in Haiti, along with Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. The article examines Chile’s finished compromise with the MINUSTAH in order to shed light on conflict intervention strategies and its peace operations in Colombia and the Central African Republic. It argues that military policies for peace intervention purposes should undergo a critical reassessment in light of the state steering away from the past use of long-term brute force. Today’s changing security environment favours a set of different human security policies that have become more prevalent for peacekeeping policymaking. Engaging in scenarios of war and peace thus demands a more focused, experienced and tactical use of military and diplomatic resources than governments in the developing countries currently possess.

The role of Nigeria in conflict resolution and peacekeeping efforts in Africa and other parts of the world cannot be overemphasised. The country has contributed more than 200,000 soldiers to peacekeeping missions around the world since independence. These efforts have earned it much respect in the council of nations and the recognition as being the ‘giant of Africa’. Also, Nigeria has been regarded as a ‘regional hegemon’ by some scholars because of its population size, comparatively large economic and human resources, and a bigger and well-equipped armed forces, equal in numerical strength to the armed forces of all the other countries in West Africa combined. The country played a very important role at spearheading the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in the 1990s. It has contributed the highest fund in defraying the costs of ECOMOG deployment to Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Cote d’Ivoire and Mali. This study analyses the hegemonic tendencies of Nigeria in the sub-region of West Africa. It argues that although the country is the most populous and the biggest economy in the sub-region but it does not possess the military, economic and the international support to function as a hegemonic power in West Africa.

The article highlights the activities of the UN in the African area: promoting the economic development of the UN states; combating international terrorism and organized crime; ensuring international security; preventing armed confl icts; strengthening cooperation of Member States in the fi ght against infectious and other dangerous diseases. The close attention of the UN Security Council to the political processes taking place on the African continent yields tangible results. Peacekeeping missions are being sent to hot spots in Africa. The military contingents of these missions, together with the army units of states, participate in the fi ght against militants of illegal armed formations, reduce the intensity of confl icts, help the civilian population to survive in a diffi cult military-political situation, as well as assist in the post-confl ict reconstruction of countries. Given the weakness and imperfection of the local armies, UN member states help to train the peacekeeping forces of African states. Russia, along with other states, is preparing Africans for peacekeeping activities through the Ministry of Internal Aff airs and the Ministry of Defense.

This is an examination of the political, economic and cultural ties between a member of NATO, sometimes at odds with the Western Alliance (Turkey) and a prominent country in the Non-Aligned Movement (South Africa) from the late 1980s up to the present. Turkey regards South Africa as a key state in the continent in its more recent engagement in Africa, while South Africa sees Turkey as an essential relationship in the Middle East. They share some common concerns regarding the respective regions of sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, respectively, like peacekeeping and development in Africa and the politics of the Israel–Palestine situation. Turkey has maintained cultural ties with South Africa’s Muslim population, but is concerned about the Gülenist presence in South Africa. While the two countries have cooperated in political endeavors, trade and investment seem most prominent in their relationship. In recent years, there have been several reciprocal visits by leaders of both countries underlining the importance of the relationship.

AbstractAre UN peacekeepers effective in protecting civilians from violence? Existing studies examine this issue at the country level, thereby making it difficult to isolate the effect of peacekeepers and to assess the actual mechanism at work. We provide the first comprehensive evaluation of UN peacekeeping success in protecting civilians at the subnational level. We argue that peacekeepers through their sizable local presence can increase the political and military costs for warring actors to engage in civilian targeting. Since peacekeepers’ access to civilian populations rests on government consent, peacekeepers will primarily be effective in imposing these costs on rebel groups, but less so for government actors. To test these conjectures we combine new monthly data on the location of peacekeepers with data on the location and timing of civilian killings in Africa. Our findings suggest that local peacekeeping presence enhances the effectiveness of civilian protection against rebel abuse, but that UN peacekeeping struggles to protect civilians from government forces.

This updated issue of the professional publication Bulletin of the Slovenian Armed Forces is dedicated to the question of the Slovenian commitment to finding peaceful solutions to conflicts. As Commander­in­Chief of the Defence Forces of the Republic of Slovenia, I find this subject not only necessary but also entirely essential. There are many reasons for this. The historical experience of the Slovenian people has not always been pleasant regarding the preservation of national identity, manifested in the language as well as in the cultural and national tradition. Despite different repressive and denationalising measures taken by many foreign authorities, our ancestors managed to preserve the Slovenian nation through much wisdom, deep national awareness and political skill. The importance of consistent compliance with the provisions of international law in crisis situations, including wars, was seen in 1991. Slovenia won the war, not only in a military sense but also by complying with all legal norms, thus soon becoming recognised as a young European democratic country founded on high legal and moral principles. The lessons of war in 1991 increased the resolve of the Slovenian people for clear rejection of the use of force in finding solutions to any kind of conflict. For this reason, my pleasure at being invited to write about the topic of Slovenian people in the service of peace is that much greater, in part also due to the fact that I spent a large part of my professional life, from 1992 to 2005, working in the United Nations, first as the ambassador of the Republic of Slovenia, later as UN Assistant Secretary­General. In both functions I dealt with peacekeeping operations to a considerable extent. United Nations peacekeeping operations were in full swing at that time and underwent great development on the one hand, but also bitter disappointment and moments of deep doubt on the other. However, they continued to develop to the current extent. The topic of the Bulletin is presented in truly deep, scientific, theoretical and practical ways, from strategic and tactical levels, considering the evolutionary and transformational characteristics of peacekeeping operations, and deriving from historical experience. The most respected authors in the Slovenian professional field have thrown light upon important conceptual changes in the area of peacekeeping operations, which result from numerous factors, in particular from important geopolitical changes in the world. We must not disregard the increasing cooperation of regional organisations in the implementation of peacekeeping operations, which has indirectly brought about a different understanding of the term “peacekeeping operation” and opened technical discussions in the area of terminology as well as in the technical fulfilment of obligations, all the way to the question of the necessity of a preliminary UN mandate. These deficiencies can also be seen in Slovenia and point to the need for conducting a deep technical discussion as soon as possible and unifying the understanding of both the structure of the Slovenian Armed Forces and the broader defence and security system. The introductory and in particular the more theoretical parts of the Bulletin may be taken as important contributions in this regard. Some of the articles offer interesting historical insight into the cooperation of Slovenian men, and later women, in various endeavours for peace launched by individual great powers and international organisations. Although it is difficult to understand the military intervention of European forces on the island Crete in 1897 as a peacekeeping operation, the objective which is still in the forefront of contemporary efforts of the international community in this area was achieved for at least some time. This intervention ensured an armistice between the parties involved in the conflict and enabled a diplomatic solution on the island without unnecessary victims. The confidence that the highest political and military authorities in the Austro­Hungarian Empire had in the 2nd Battalion of the 87th Infantry Regiment from Celje was truly special. This was particularly the case because the military unit was mainly composed of Slovenes, and at the time of deployment in Crete its commander was a Slovene as well. However, we need to emphasise that such thinking is unconventional. By studying the literature on peacekeeping operations we see that such operations were first mentioned around 1919 in connection with peace conferences after the end of World War I and with managing various border issues in Europe, different plebiscites and other situations which, besides political and other diplomatic action, also required the protection of security and were followed by military operations intended for this particular purpose. History tells us much about peacekeeping operations intended to maintain truces. In these operations, coalition forces were deployed to an area in which a truce already existed and had to be maintained among well organised and disciplined armed forces. Today, the status of armed forces is quite different. We have to look at all of history and every aspect of international military engagement which is not armed combat by nature but a military presence with various aspects of employment of military force and the constant readiness and capability of peace forces to defend themselves effectively and be prepared to use weapons to fulfil their mandate. If today we see peacekeeping operations as valid in this respect, it is clear that we have to be familiar with history and evaluate what we can learn from past experience and how we are obliged to consider the present. Of course, we must consider the present. If we look at the status of peacekeeping operations today, we see how important this military activity is for the modern world. I will only dwell upon the United Nations, which from the standpoint of peacekeeping operations is the most important organisation operating today. Approximately 140,000 soldiers participate in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the United Nations. No other military force has that number of uniformed personnel operating abroad. These people are assigned to eighteen currently active peacekeeping operations, each costing the organisation about seven billion dollars. This is the largest component of the budget of the United Nations. However, this expenditure is small in comparison to other kinds of military deployment outside the UN, to operations which are not peacekeeping operations by nature. Peacekeeping operations have become very multidimensional. The latest such operations, established in Africa (Darfur, Chad, Central African Republic), have been among the most demanding from the very beginning. We can thus conclude that peacekeeping operations are becoming increasingly more complex, which also results in a higher degree of risk. In 2007, 67 members of UN peacekeeping operations lost their lives. Looking at individual operations we see that six people died in Lebanon alone that year. Ever since peacekeeping operations have been in existence, Lebanon has been one of the most dangerous areas. Today, however, it is somewhat outside the sphere of interest. This may be due to the fact that there is a peacekeeping operation active in the area, on account of which a state of relative peace can be better maintained. Peacekeeping operations are both dangerous and multidimensional, multidimensional because they are no longer focused merely on keeping belligerent parties apart. Modern peacekeeping operations include both standard and supplemental functions. Providing a secure environment for political normalisation, humanitarian activity and development is a comprehensive task, requiring the engagement of peacekeeping forces in operations that are far from being common types of military deployment. This raises different questions about the training and competence of peacekeeping forces. We also have to ask ourselves how we can fully consider the lessons learned from previous peacekeeping operations and organise a system of command, particularly in organisations such as the United Nations, while at the same time making sure that national contingents do not lose their identity. There are thus two lines of communication, one through channels established by international organisations and the other through those established by national systems of armed forces. How to balance this and achieve efficient functioning? How to ensure the operation of different cultures, members and levels of competence in a way that facilitates the success of peacekeeping operations? These are always important questions to consider. In recent years the question of interest has pointed to the complexity of modern peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping operations are frequently required to facilitate an environment in which elections can be conducted and assist in the establishment of a legal order and institutions to maintain that order. Both tasks are extremely demanding. The establishment of a safe environment for conducting elections in a country with poor communications, with no tradition of elections and with violence linked to every political event, is an extremely difficult task. The establishment of a legal order in areas with no such tradition or adequate infrastructure is even harder. There is often a need to include the civilian police, whose tasks in peacekeeping operations are very demanding. Civilian police have a number of other particularities besides problems connected to the aforementioned multidimensionality. It is necessary to adapt to the local environment in order to facilitate effective police performance. How to facilitate this in an environment such as Haiti, for example, with its difficult past? How to facilitate this in linguistically demanding environments such as East Timor until recently and in other difficult circumstances? These are all extremely demanding tasks. However, there is not much understanding with regard to all the details and problems arising from their implementation. The international political community is often satisfied merely by defining the mandate of a peacekeeping operation. For many people this signifies the solution to the problem, considering that the mandate is defined and that the deployment of forces will occur. However, this is where real problem solving only begins. Only then does it become obvious what little meaning general resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and other acts by which mandates are defined have in the context of actual situations. Therefore, I am of the opinion that we have to take a detailed look at experience from the distant past as well as the present. When speaking of the civilian police we also have to consider the fully human aspects that characterise every peacekeeping operation. Once I spoke to a very experienced leader of civilian police operations about the need to send additional police officers to the mission in Kosovo in the spring, when winter is over and people become more active, which also results in a higher crime rate. He explained that this is not only a problem in the area of this mission but elsewhere in Europe. In spring, the crime rate rises everywhere. Therefore it is difficult to find police officers during this time who are willing to leave their homeland, where they are most needed, and go to a mission area which is just then facing increased needs. I mention this to broaden understanding of the fact that the deployment of peacekeeping forces, both military and civilian police, is not only a matter of mandates and military organisation, but sometimes of the purely elementary questions that accompany social development. I have already mentioned that memory of the past is a very important component of considering present peacekeeping operations. I would like to conclude with another thought. I believe the manner of organising the knowledge of peacekeeping operations is of great importance to all countries, especially those that are new to cooperating in peacekeeping operations. This knowledge cannot be gained from books written at universities, but only from monitoring and carefully analysing the previous experiences of others. It is very important that this knowledge be carefully organised, that these experiences be carefully gathered and analysed, and that a doctrine be developed gradually. This doctrine is required for a country like Slovenia, which is new at conducting peacekeeping operations, to be able to manage well and define its role in international peacekeeping operations properly. To achieve this objective, a new country must cooperate with those countries which have been conducting peacekeeping operations for a long time and therefore have a richer experience. The neighbouring Austria is known to have one of the longest and most interesting systems of experience in peacekeeping operations within the United Nations. Ever since it joined the UN, Austria has been active in numerous activities linked to peacekeeping operations. Its soldiers and the civilian police have participated in a number of peacekeeping operations. Experience gained in this way is of great value, and using this experience is necessary for successful planning of and operating in future peacekeeping operations. The future will be complicated! At one time, when the members of peacekeeping operations numbered approximately 80,000, the United Nations thought that nothing more could be done, and a larger number of members was unthinkable. Today the number of members is significantly larger, development will most likely still continue and conditions will become even more demanding. I do not wish to forecast events which have not yet taken place. However, I would like to strongly emphasise that the history of peacekeeping operations is not over yet and that the future will be full of risks and challenges. I would also again like to stress the importance of this issue of the Bulletin of the Slovenian Armed Forces, which is entering a new decade, and express my pleasure at being able to note down a few thoughts. Let me particularly emphasise that as Commander­in­Chief of the Slovenian Defence Forces I will continue to devote special attention to achievements in the area of cooperation in peacekeeping operations in the future, having a special interest in these experiences. I thank the authors of the articles of this important issue of the Bulletin for their scientific and professional contributions – and I greatly respect those who have already done important work in the name of the Republic of Slovenia with the Slovenian flag on their shoulders, with the hope that they continue to fulfil their obligations in accordance with the rules.

Based on an analysis of print media and journalists’ interviews, this article examines the representation of atrocity and mass violence in Africa. It specifically focuses on the atrocities in Darfur and Rwanda and compares African and Western coverage of them. It argues that since representations (just as the knowledge that anchors them) are highly dependent on one’s social location, it is necessary to understand multiple representations of the same atrocity. Although the literature on representation of Africa has been critical of Western representations of Africa, this article argues that including African representations of the same provides for a more nuanced understanding. It uses interview data from Kenya and South Africa, both of which have had peacekeeping engagements in Sudan. Kenya and South Africa also have media fields that are more robust and freer than many other countries in the continent.

AbstractChina's increasing participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations reached a milestone in 2013 when Beijing agreed to send a large detachment of personnel, including combat forces for the first time, to support UN peacekeeping operations in Mali after that country fell into civil war. This commitment was also distinct in that unlike other African countries where Beijing has supplied peacekeepers, Mali is not a major trading partner with China. However, this mission has both cemented Beijing's greater commitment to building African partnerships as well as demonstrating its determination to move beyond “resource diplomacy” and towards a more comprehensive approach to engaging the continent. Although China has warmed to the principles of humanitarian intervention in civil conflicts, Mali has been a critical test of China's ability to participate in UN operations in a country which is still facing ongoing violence. The Mali mission is an important step in Beijing's turn towards greater realpolitik in Chinese Beijing's peacekeeping policies in keeping with its great power status. At the same time, participation in the Mali mission has been beneficial for China, not only in helping to build the country's peacekeeping credentials in Africa but also in underscoring China's increasingly distinct views on addressing intervention in civil conflicts.

The article describes and debates main points and recommendations of the Report-2015 of the Independent High Level Group on the UN Peace Operations. The author analyses doctrinal innovations and practical guidelines suggested by the Group and debates consequences of the recommended “politicizing” of the UN operations (assuring the leading role for the UN in any political peace process supported by UN peacekeepers, and avoiding operations where the UN role is limited to passive disengagement of conflict sides). Necessity for and limits of reconsidering traditional principles of peacekeeping, such as impartiality, consent of conflict parties, and use of force for self-defence are questioned. Trends in UN operations are compared with trends in operations related to conflicts in the Post-Soviet space (South Ossetia/Georgia, Abkhazia/Georgia, Tajikistan, Transnistria/Moldova, etc.). The author advocates timeliness for an extended interpretation of the “defence of the mandate” formula instead of the classical “self-defence of the contingent”. It is suggested to practically erase the dividing line between operations of the “peacekeeping” type under the UN DPKO, and “political missions” under the UN Political Department. The arsenal of the UN instruments for conflict resolution must be widened from non-intrusive observation missions, conflict prevention and mediation, through support of ceasefire agreements and implementation of peace accords, down to coercive peace enforcement, offensive elements, and UN Charter Chapter VII-based collective operations against aggressive regimes and states. Poorly defined functions and insufficiently clarified use of force limits for the SC-mandated “UN Intervention Brigade” in Democratic Republic of Congo lead to unnecessary involvement of the UN into coercive actions. The experience of the UN “infrastructural hubs” establishing, like the one in Entebbe (Uganda) used for supplying eight African UN operations, is described. New technology for peacekeeping, like the use of unpiloted flying drones, opens new opportunities, but creates legal and practical problems. A distinction of functions between “blue helmets” (specially trained multinational UN contingents) and “green helmets” (regular national armies used by states in foreign conflicts) is recommended, including avoidance of counter-terrorism tasks and strong coercive tasks for the UN peacekeepers. Parallel and interfaced “partnerships” between the limited UN operations and more forceful national/coalition operations in the same areas are suggested instead.

The South African government’s socially based policy of segregation and discrimination, or “apartheid,” has caused tremendous external, as well as internal, pressures to reverse the government’s inhumane treatment of its repressed populace. Until recently none of the pressures have been more forceful than those evoked by the sporting world and the United Nations. Since 1960, these forces have served to isolate South Africa from most international sports competitions, including the Olympic Games. At one juncture, various leanings in apartheid policy seemed to point toward a tilt in attitudinal posture not only in regard to sport but to various related apartheid conduct. Recent events, however, have elucidated a continued dominant posture concerning South Africa’s all-encompassing socially repressive apartheid practice. It appears that, unless the South African government initiates swift and salient apartheid expiration, the perilous game they are playing may get out of hand.

In a Compelling Reading of Sol Plaatje's Native Life in South Africa, Bhekizizwe Peterson Remarks on the Work's Inscription of multiple imagined readers with different investments in the narrative (79). Quoting from Jean-Paul Sartre's reflections on the intricacies of addressing fractured, and sometimes future, publics, Peterson writes:[T]he works of writers who find themselves on the “margin of the privileged class” contain a “double simultaneous postulation,” a consequence of the “fracture” in the “actual public” in which their art is produced and consumed. Because the “real public” consists largely of the conservative forces that compose the dominant class and ideology, the marginal writer is compelled to address “the progressive forces, or the virtual public” even if “the oppressed classes have neither the leisure nor the taste for reading.” In engaging the future and its virtual public—“an emptiness to be filled in, an aspiration”—the writing exceeds its actual limits and extends itself step by step to the infinite. (81)

The contemporary Islamic resurgence and spirit of pan-lslamism thatare being experienced today throughout the world did not come aboutovernight. They are the results of two counterforces operative in any giveperiod of time. On the one hand, there was the deconstructionist force, inthe form of the colonial and imperial forces that sought to destroy theIslamic value system. On the other hand, there was the reconstructionistforce of 'ulama haqq and the Sufi shaykhs, who served as the prime stiinulatorsof the reform impusle and of change in the religiopolitical outlookof Muslims throughout the world.Islam in South AfricaSouth Africa has played a forceful role in maintaining Islam's dynamicposition for about three centuries. The picturesque activities of the earlierulama (in the broadest sense of the word)-particularly the Sufi shaykhs- andearly imams laid the foundations for the contemporary Islamic resurgencein South Africa, as seen in the Musliin Youth Movement and suchother da'wah movements as the Call of Islam. Past workers and presentmovements have been religiopolitical positivists and activists. From theoutset, Muslims needed to reconstruct Islamic education and maintain themomentum of revivalism and resurgence activities.The Dutch East India Company and English East IndiaCompany: A Deconstructionist ForceThe East India Company refers to any of a number of commercialenterprises formed in Western Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenthcenturies to further trade with the East Indies. These companies weregiven charters by their respective governments to acquire territory whereverthey could and to exercise therein various governmental functions,including legislation, the issuance of currency, the negotiation of treaties,the waging of war, and the administration of justice ...

The post–Cold War international order has promoted a “standard treatment” for civil wars involving the use of mediation to end conflicts and the deployment of peacekeeping forces to implement the resulting settlements. The United Nations has played a leading role in applying this standard treatment, which enjoys broad international support. By contrast, Western efforts to promote more robust humanitarian intervention as a standard response to civil wars remains controversial. While effective in relatively permissive postconflict environments, international mediation and peacekeeping efforts have proved insufficient to resolve harder cases of civil war, such as those in South Sudan and Syria. The UN has struggled to make the standard treatment work where governments refuse to cooperate or low-level violence is endemic. Growing major-power tensions could now undermine the post–Cold War regime for the treatment of civil wars, which, for all its faults, has made a significant contribution to international order.

The nine member-states of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (S.A.D.C.C.) – Zimbabwe, Zambia, Angola, Mozambique, Botswana, Tanzania, Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland – are notable for their collective weakness relative to South Africa, and their very wide economic and political heterogeneity.1 Only four, or at most five, have economies whose annual G.D.P. exceeds $2,000 million: two of these, Angola and Mozambique, are under more or less constant attack from South Africa or its surrogate forces, while Tanzania is actually the most remote, physically and economically. At the same time, Malawi, Swaziland, and Lesotho – who are not in the so-called ‘Frontline’, unlike the other six – have rather close political relations with Pretoria, Malawi most substantively since as early as 1966 and Swaziland since 1982.2 Botswana is more independent politically, with a modest G.D.P. and very small population.

Achievable and viable peace and security efforts in Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) have been limited by an over dependence on foreign and international peacekeeping. The aim of this article is to unpack financial imperatives and constraints towards funding the SADC standby force (SADCSF). Through this the article hopes to provide lessons towards a suitable and sustainable funding mechanism aimed at addressing the financial challenges confronting African standby forces in peace operations. In particular, this article focuses on the SADCSF since its establishment in 2007. This article uses information from existing statistical and research data to first, identify existing funding models in international (regional and continental) peace operation and stand-by forces across the globe. Second, using four critical analytical frames (financial viability, the nature of regionalism, fiscal sustainability and economic landscape), the article highlights various implications of a lack of funding mechanism for regional peace and security in Africa. Third, the article shows that the following are critical to find a sustainable funding mechanism for the SADCSF: the financially demanding variable geometric nature of regional integration in Africa; the proliferation of security agencies; the complex nature of terrorism and interventions; the cost of skill acquisition and training of the multidisciplinary personnel; payment of wounded soldiers and contingents and member state tight budget. Based on international experiences and local realities expounded, this article suggests lessons towards building a suitable and sustainable funding mechanism for African peace and security in general, and regional standby forces in particular.

I begin with two images of African actors. The first, from Asinamali by the South African playwright Mbongeni Ngema (1985; Plate 23), shows a group pose drawn directly from protest theatre—angry men in prison khaki, with fists clenched, bodies tensed in readiness and, one can assume, voices raised against the invisible but all too palpable forces of apartheid. The second, from the centenary celebrations of the American Board Mission in South Africa (1935; Plate 24), portrays the ‘smelling-out of a fraudulent umthakathi’ (which can be translated as diviner or trickster), which were followed, on this occasion, by other scenes portraying the civilizing influence of European settlers. While the first offers an image of African agency and modernity in the face of oppression, the second, with its apparently un-mediated reconstruction of pre-colonial ritual and, in its teleological juxtaposition of ‘tribal’ and ‘civilized’ custom, seems to respond to the quite different terms set by a long history of displays, along the lines of the Savage South Africa Show (1900), in which the authenticity of the Africans on stage was derived not from their agency but by their incorporation into the representation of colonial authority.

The Management Consulting Industry (MCI) is considered to be one of the most powerful forces shaping organisational strategy. However, from its major growth phase during the late 1980s into the 1990s, and until the present time, it now appears that the industry is in a mature consolidation phase. Perhaps even an early decline. The scope and nature of the MCI is global and, consequently, the South African industry is inextricably linked to and integrated with global developments. The local industry is large in absolute terms and high in value-adding propensity. Vertical integration is limited and little advantage appears to be taken of economics of scale. The industry moves in tandem with well established international driving forces and no inflection point is expected. Nevertheless, it is considered to be under severe competitive pressures which impose a dampening effect on the overall level of industry profitability. The competitive positions and profile of rival business strategic approaches display a degree of comparability in strategic typologies. Thus, the challenge for the ‘winners’ in the MCI will be to differentiate themselves for both strategic and marketing positioning and even to consider redefining the business model in this turbulent and fragmented industry.

ABSTRACTIn this paper I attempt to show what a micro approach involving fine-grained sociolinguistic analyses has to contribute to the understanding of the causes of discrimination on grounds of race in South Africa. I present analyses of intra- and intercultural encounters involving native speakers of English and Zulu which suggest that differences in sociocultural background and discourse conventions contribute to misinterpretation of intent and misjudgement of attitude and ability. Repeated stressful encounters of this kind, I suggest, generate negative cultural stereotypes. Finally, I sketch how the larger, structural, historically given forces, which are the concern of macro studies, combine with the results of intercultural encounters to achieve a negative cycle of socially created discrimination. (Interactional sociolinguistics, culture-specific discourse conventions. intercultural communication failure and prejudice, South African English)

The economic role of the state is in the forefront of international news, following the collapse of major financial groups in some countries, and ballooning government deficits and debt in others. While the extent of government intervention, such as bailouts and takeovers, has been unprecedented elsewhere, political interference in the economy is nothing new in South Africa. This research investigates student opinions about state intervention vis vis individual freedom and the operation of market forces in the South African economy. A fourteen-item Likert scale measuring student opinion was developed based on the Economic Attitudes Survey (Soper & Walstad, 1983). Interrelationships between economic opinion and student gender, prior economics knowledge, field of study and socio-economic background are explored.

AbstractIn winter 2014, the town of Thohoyandou, South Africa was gripped with panic after a series of rapes and murders. In this area, notorious for its occult specialists and witchcraft, stories began to circulate attributing the violence to demonic forces. These stories were given credence by the young man who was charged with these crimes. In his testimony, he confirmed that he was possessed by evil forces. Taking this story as a point of departure, this article provides an empirical account of the ambivalent ways state sites of criminal justice grapple with the occult in South Africa. Drawing on twenty-two months of ethnographic fieldwork, I describe how spirit possession is not easily reconciled with legal methods of parsing criminal liability in courtrooms. And yet, when imprisoned people are paroled, the state entertains the possibility of bewitchment in public ceremonies of reconciliation. Abstracting from local stories about the occult, this article proposes mens daemonica (“demonic mind”) to describe this state of hijacked selfhood and as an alternative to the mens rea (“criminal mind”) observed in criminal law. While the latter seeks the cause of wrongdoing in the authentic will of the autonomous, self-governing subject, mens daemonica describes a putatively extra-legal idea of captured volition that implicates a vast and ultimately unknowable range of others and objects in what only appears to be a singular act of wrongdoing. This way of reckoning culpability has the potential to inspire new approaches to justice.

South Africa is facing the challenge of creating a viable nation from a situation of interplay between diverse racial,ethnic and linguistic forces. This article discusses the implications for education of the evolving picture of languagepolicy as South Africa addresses the task of nation-building. Language policy is important because of its key role indeveloping and maintaining identity, particularly that of emerging generations. The results of a bad language policycan be violence and civil war. Language policy, particularly in education, can be instrumental therefore in building aharmonious nation.

AbstractEnergy is a fundamental requirement to sustain human life, but most people in rural areas do not have enough access to efficient and affordable energy resources. Socio-economic measures are increasingly used to determine household energy consumption patterns. The pattern of household energy consumption represents the status of welfare as well as the stage of a country’s economic development. Household energy consumption is expected to increase in the future, along with growth in the economy and a rise in per capita incomes. This study was undertaken to understand the driving forces for energy preference in rural households, while reassessing the energy ladder and multiple fuel use. Two hundred questionnaires were administered to elicit information from respondents in Altein, Botsoleni, Makhovha and Thenzheni in the Thulamela municipality of South Africa. A non-parametric test (Chi-square) was used to determine the relationships amongst the factors influencing the use of fuelwood in the study area. Cramer’s V was used to test the association of the variables, the strength and the direction of the relationship. The results indicate that household income, educational level and employment status, cultural norms and values, are among the key determinants of the energy preference scale.Keywords: rural households; energy consumption; energy ladder; energy preference

What is responsible for the decline of democratically dominant parties and the corresponding growth of competitive party systems? This article argues that, despite a ruling party's dominance, opposition forces can gain by winning important subnational offices and then creating a governance record that they can use to win new supporters. It focuses on South Africa as a paradigmatic dominant party system, tracing the increased competitiveness of elections in Cape Town and the surrounding Western Cape province between 1999 and 2010. These events show how party strategies may evolve, reflecting how party elites can learn from forming coalitions.

Much has been written about Islam’s advent, entrenchment, and spread in specific regions of South Africa, and other writings cover its advent over the entire country. And yet no sufficient academic scrutiny of factors that have contributed to its consolidation and spread in recent times has been undertaken. By researching this issue, the problems and challenges confronting Islam at present and in the foreseeable future will be better appreciated. After presenting a brief synopsis of Islam’s advent South Africa, I assess how it was consolidated and then tackle its spread while underscoring specific successes and failures. Where necessary, the names of individuals are mentioned. The divergent nature of Islamic faith and practice is constantly stressed. The topic is a fascinating field of study in which sometimes contradictory forces strive for hegemony. Finally, a possible solution to this problem is presented.

This paper discusses sexual behaviour findings collected through eleven homogenous focus group discussions conducted among women and men in a predominantly Zulu population in rural KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. The objective of this paper is to shed light on sexual behaviour in a rural community. The findings suggest that sex is a taboo subject and the discussion around it is concealed in the use of polite language, euphemisms, and gestures. There are gender and generational dimensions to the discussion of sex. The contribution of this paper lies in the identification of what rural people discuss about sex and the influence of cultural practices and urban or global forces on sexual behaviour in rural areas. The paper adds to the growing body of literature on the use of focus groups in understanding sexual behaviour in rural contexts.

Much has been written about Islam’s advent, entrenchment, and spread in specific regions of South Africa, and other writings cover its advent over the entire country. And yet no sufficient academic scrutiny of factors that have contributed to its consolidation and spread in recent times has been undertaken. By researching this issue, the problems and challenges confronting Islam at present and in the foreseeable future will be better appreciated. After presenting a brief synopsis of Islam’s advent South Africa, I assess how it was consolidated and then tackle its spread while underscoring specific successes and failures. Where necessary, the names of individuals are mentioned. The divergent nature of Islamic faith and practice is constantly stressed. The topic is a fascinating field of study in which sometimes contradictory forces strive for hegemony. Finally, a possible solution to this problem is presented.

This article first identifies the principal forces that impact on and shape entrepreneurially-oriented higher education institutions (HEIs) in South Africa, and then analyses the degree to which those institutions have succeeded in becoming entrepreneurial. The results reveal that South Africa's HEIs are still in the initial phases of entrepreneurial development. This is attributable largely to factors particular to a developing country in a social transformational phase and faced with restricted social and economic capital.