Academic literature on the topic 'People's United Party (Belize)'

An important feature of populist political forces in the United States is the desire for widespread use of direct democracy mechanisms, such as referendums, local and national elections, direct elections, etc. It was mentioned above that the People's (Populist) Party already included relevant requirements in its program (in particular, the introduction of direct elections of senators, which was later implemented). In the political tradition of the United States, the roots of the plebiscitary, as opposed to representative, vision of democracy go back to the very founding of this country.

Abstract The article aims to verify whether, in the 1980s, there was a significant decrease in the involvement of the regional communist party structures in charge of economic affairs in Poland. The analysis is made on the case of the Warsaw Committee (KW) of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP). Archival documents gathered in the State Archive in Warsaw were used to perform the analysis. The protocols of the meetings of the Executive and Secretariat 1970–1989 were collected, described and analysed. Moreover, the analysis was supplemented by the Statistical Yearbooks of Warsaw (GUS, 1957–1974), the Statistical Yearbooks of the Capital City of Warsaw (GUS, 1976–1981) and the Journal of Laws of the People's Republic of Poland 1970–1989. A statistical analysis of economic activity of the KW of the PUWP in the context of macroeconomic variables and economic activity of central authorities was performed. The correlation coefficient between macroeconomic performance and Party activity indicates the convergence of both trends in the 1970s and the lack of correlation in the 1980s. The decline in engagement after 1978 was unprecedented. In this period, there was a discrepancy between the activities of the central government and the Party apparatus, which remained in place until the end of the system. Institutional mechanisms in the Principal–Agent relation weakened significantly in 1980s.

The aim of this research is to look at the role of women in political patronage relationships which resulted in a political alliance between the community organization Joxzin (Jogjakarta Islamic Never Die) and the political party United Development Party (PPP) in the 2019 elections in 2019. Sleman Regency, Special Region of Yogyakarta , Indonesia. Joxzin is a community organization consisting of male and female members. This research uses a convergent method of mixing qualitative and quantitative data which is then analyzed using the NVivo 12 Plus application. The findings obtained in this research are that Joxzin has political patronage ties. Joxzin has resources and power compared to patrons because Joxzin as a client can appoint Ahmad Zahran to be Chairman of the Branch Leadership Council of the Yogyakarta City Development United Party. With Joxzin's strong political alliance, Muhammad Yazid from the Sleman Regency Pilkada became a legislative member of the Yogyakarta Special Region People's Representative Council for the 2019-2024 period. Keywords: Political patronage, political alliances, Woman, Joxzin, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP).

On 1 October 1949 the People's Republic of China was formally established in Beijing. On 7 December Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), who had earlier moved to Taiwan to secure a final base of resistance in the civil war, ordered the Kuomintang (KMT) regime to withdraw to the island from Chengdu, Sichuan, its last seat on the mainland. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) declared its commitment to the goal of unifying the nation under the People's Republic, and thus called for the “liberation” of Taiwan. Although Taiwan represented the final phase of the still unfinished civil war, it was the strategic significance of the island that became of paramount concern to the CCP, the KMT and the United States.

The landslide victory by the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) in the 2002 elections was due not to any ideological or policy differences with opposition parties, but to the perception among a plurality of voters that the party delivered on its promise to end the war and therefore deserved re-election. The elections were in effect a referendum on the incumbent president and his ruling SLPP, with voters overwhelmingly concluding that Ahmad Tejan Kabba, the SLPP leader, was preferable to the legion of certified scoundrels seeking to replace him. Signs of the All Peoples Congress (APC), the party that was in power from 1968–92, making a political comeback galvanised otherwise unenthusiastic voters into supporting Kabba and the SLPP. In contrast to the APC, against whom the rebel war was launched, or the Revolutionary United Front Party (RUFP), which initiated and prosecuted the insurgency, or the People's Liberation Party (PLP), whose earlier incarnation prolonged the war by colluding with rebels, Kabba and the SLPP claimed to have ended a war that was caused, launched and sustained by assorted elements of the political opposition. The SLPP, however, can ill-afford to bask in electoral triumph or ignore the festering problems of rampant official corruption and mass poverty that led to armed conflict in the 1990s. Tackling the problem of corruption and mass deprivation may hold the key to democratic consolidation, but it is doubtful whether the SLPP, as presently constituted, is capable of leading the fight against these scourges. The SLPP may be reaching out to become a national party but it still remains an unreconstructed patronage outfit that is unresponsive to popular currents and mass aspirations.

Since 1949, China has adopted nine national military strategies, known as “strategic guidelines.” The strategies adopted in 1956, 1980, and 1993 represent major changes in China's military strategy, or efforts by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to wage war in a new way. Shifts in the conduct of warfare in the international system offer one explanation for why China, a developing country for most of this period, pursued major change in its military strategy. Such shifts in the conduct of warfare should be especially powerful if a gap exists between a state's current strategy and the requirements of future warfare. The PLA has only been able to change strategy, however, when the Chinese Communist Party leadership is united and agrees on basic policies and the structure of authority. When the party is united, it delegates substantial responsibility for military affairs to the PLA leadership, which changes or adjusts military strategy in response to changes in China's security environment.

The overthrow of the monarchy in Afghanistan in 1973 was a seminal moment in the country's history and in U.S. policy in Central Asia. The return of Mohamed Daoud Khan to power was aided by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA, the Communist party) and military officers trained in the Soviet Union. Even as Communism was making its first substantive gains in Afghanistan, the United States was wrestling with how best to pursue its strategy of containment. Stung by the experience of Vietnam, President Richard Nixon concluded that the United States could not unilaterally respond to every instance of Communist expansion. In the turbulent years that followed, U.S. diplomacy and Daoud's desire for nonalignment combined to mitigate Soviet influence in Afghanistan. However, the U.S. triumph was fleeting insofar as Daoud's shift toward nonalignment triggered the erosion of Soviet-Afghan relations, culminating in the overthrow of his government and the final ascension of the PDPA.

With its first internationally endorsed local election in decades, first rotational chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and financial assistance pledged from donor countries and multilateral institutions, Cambodia made significant progress in 2002. Prime Minister Hun Sen's Cambodian People's Party swept to victory in local elections, but for the first time it will have to share power at the local level. The Royalist FUNCINPEC Party underwent further decline and infighting. Cambodia received $615 million in financial pledges from international donors, and economic growth increased by a modest 4.5%% to 5%%. In February, the United Nations withdrew from negotiations for a trial of surviving leaders of Pol Pot's regime in the 1970s, but late in the year the possibility of further discussions emerged.

Newly available archival sources in China illuminate how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) used transnational initiatives to advance its aims. This article explores Chinese interaction with the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs from 1957 to 1964 and discusses how the People's Republic of China (PRC) made deliberate use of transnational initiatives to further its own Cold War strategy and foreign policy. High-ranking CCP officials were directly involved in selecting China's scientific participants, shaping their message, and determining their objectives at the conferences, including winning over potentially sympathetic foreign scientists, demonstrating Sino-Soviet solidarity and, in 1960, potentially establishing back-channel communications with the incoming Kennedy administration in the United States. Chinese scientists’ involvement in Pugwash shows that transnational relations mattered to the PRC during the Cold War and, more broadly, underscores the importance of governments in transnational relations.

La course aux armements navals anglo-allemande fut un des facteurs clés dans le déclenchement de la Première Guerre mondiale. En particulier, les années comprises entre 1906 et 1912 ont vu une compétition intense entre les deux pays dans la construction de vaisseaux de ligne modernes - des croiseurs lourds blindés - après que le Dreadnought fut lancé par les Britanniques. Tant que l'Allemagne n'était pas prête à accepter la suprématie navale britannique et que la Grande-Bretagne ne voulait pas la céder, la compétition dura jusqu'à ce qu'une des deux parties cède par essoufflement économique. L'Allemagne a essayé de traduire son pouvoir économique en force militaire mais échoua à cause de son système de fiscalité moins efficace qu'en Grande-Bretagne. Le fait que le trésor britannique pouvait imposer et augmenter aussi bien des impôts directs qu'indirects tandis qu'en Allemagne seuls les états fédéraux pouvaient le faire, démontre que le système constitutionnel britannique était plus flexible que l'allemand, permettant au gouvernement de Londres de mobiliser plus de ressources financières pour contrer l'Allemagne dans les dépenses navales
The Anglo-German naval race was one of the decisive factors in the outbreak of World War I. In particular, the years between 1906 and 1912 witnessed an intense head-to-head competition between the two powers in the building of modern capital ships, that is, battleships and large armoured cruisers, after Dreadnought had been launched by the British. So long as Germany was not prepared to accept British naval supremacy and Britain was not prepared to yield it, the competition was bound to go on until economic exhaustion compelled one side to give up. Germany tried to translate its wealth into military power, but the inefficient nature of its taxation system prevented it from doing so. The fact that Britain's Treasury had the power to both levy and increase direct and indirect taxes, while in Germany only state governments had it shows that Britain's more democratic constitutional system meant that London could react to Germany's naval challenge by punishment, mobilizing a greater share of financial resources for naval spending than Berlin

Tematem rozprawy jest socjalizacja polityczna polskich komunistów na przykładzie 214 osób należących do ruchu komunistycznego w okresie II RP, a w latach 1948–1956, zajmujących najwyższe stanowiska w PZPR oraz aparacie państwowym (w elicie partyjno-państwowej, EPP). Praca stawia pytania o biograficzne doświadczenia kształtujące habitusy członków badanej grupy oraz o sposób, w jaki przekładały się one na postawy w okresie polskiego stalinizmu (1948–1953/4) oraz destalinizacji (1953/4–1956). W przeciwieństwie do dotychczasowych ujęć, uwaga jest tu skupiona nie tyle na strukturach bądź ideologii, co na jednostkach – aktywnych podmiotach z własnymi poglądami, postawami, emocjami etc. Ich doświadczenia interesują mnie w wymiarze obiektywnym (co zaszło) oraz subiektywnym (w jaki sposób zostało zinterpretowane). Analiza oparta jest na autorskim wyróżnieniu trzech etapów socjalizacji politycznej komunistów i odpowiadających im habitusów: 1) do-ruchu: okresu od dzieciństwa do wstąpienia do organizacji komunistycznej (habitus buntownika); 2) w-ruchu: czasu między akcesem do organizacji a końcem drugiej wojny światowej (habitus rewolucjonisty-konspiratora); 3) do-władzy, procesów zachodzących po uzyskaniu przez komunistów władzy politycznej w Polsce w 1944/45 r. (habitus rewolucjonisty-kreatora). Drugim autorskim podziałem jest typologia sześciu rodzajów komunistycznych biografii (takich jak „dołowi” albo „legalni”). W rozdziale I przedstawiam charakterystykę społeczną polskiego ruchu komunistycznego 1918–1938 oraz motywacje i ścieżki, które prowadziły doń jednostki. Rozdział II rozpoczyna szkic historii Komunistycznej Partii Polski; następnie charakteryzuję najważniejsze doświadczenia uczestnictwa w ruchu komunistycznym. Osobno przedstawiam doświadczenie pokoleniowe decymacji polskich komunistów w ZSRR, a także doświadczenia drugiej wojny światowej. W rozdziale III zajmuję się problemem władzy: przedzierzgnięciem się wywrotowców w kreatorów, postawami wobec społeczeństwa, obiektywnym i subiektywnym wymiarem uprzywilejowania etc. W każdym z tych rozdziałów po części kontekstowej przedstawione zostają konkretne doświadczenia członków EPP w danej fazie socjalizacji oraz w ramach odpowiednich typów biografii. Rozdział IV, dotyczący okresu między powstaniem PZPR (XII 1948) a przełomowym VIII plenum KC (X 1956), przedstawia konsekwencje dotychczasowej socjalizacji komunistów z EPP ujawniające się w procesie stalinizacji polskiej rzeczywistości, a także zagadnienie stałości/zmiany komunistycznego habitusu po śmierci Stalina. Praca ukazuje, jak ważna dla zrozumienia postaw komunistów – oraz polskiej rzeczywistości powojennej, na którą wpływały ich działania – przyjmowanych w latach sprawowania władzy jest analiza ich doświadczeń biograficznych. Szczególnie kluczowy jest tu socjalizacja-w-ruchu oraz dyspozycje rewolucjonisty-konspiratora. Na każdym etapie przeanalizowałem różnego rodzaju napięcia, np.: między zróżnicowaniem (widocznym dzięki analizie sześciu typów komunistycznych biografii) a ujednoliceniem albo między internalizacją norm a przystosowaniem się do nich. Dzięki wykorzystaniu kategorii habitusu udało się natomiast ukazać zarówno wpływ ucieleśnionych struktur społecznych na praktyki jednostek – jak i indywidualne praktyki, które kształtowały struktury, w których jednostki były zanurzone.
The subject of this thesis is the political socialization of Polish communists on the example of 214 people belonging to the communist movement during the Second Polish Republic, and in the period 1948–1956 occupying the highest positions in the PUWP and the state apparatus (in the party and state elite, PSE). The dissertation asks questions about biographical experiences shaping the habitus of members of the group studied and the way they translated into their attitudes during the period of Polish Stalinism (1948–1953/4) and de-Stalinization (1953/4–1956). Contrary to previous approaches, the focus here is not so much on structures or ideology as on individuals: active entities with their own views, attitudes, emotions etc. Their experiences interest me in the objective (what happened) and subjective (how it was interpreted) dimensions. The analysis is based on the author's distinction of three stages of political socialization of communists and their corresponding habituses: 1) to-the-movement: the period from childhood to joining a communist organization (rebel habitus); 2) in-movement: the time between joining the organization and the end of World War II (habitus of the revolutionary-conspirator); 3) to-power: the processes taking place after the communists gained power in Poland in 1944/45 (habitus of the revolutionary-creator). The second authorial division is the typology of six kinds of communist biographies (such as "bottom" or "legal"). In Chapter One I present the social characteristics of the Polish communist movement 1918–1938, as well as the motivations and paths that led individuals into it. Chapter Two begins with a sketch of the history of the Communist Party of Poland; then I characterise the most important experiences of participation in the communist movement. Separately, I present the generational experience of the decimation of Polish communists in the USSR, as well as the experience of the Second World War. In Chapter Three I deal with the problem of post-war power: the transformation of subversives into builders, attitudes towards society, the objective and subjective dimension of privileges etc. In each of these chapters, after the contextual sections, the concrete experiences of the PSE members are presented, related to a given phase of socialization and within the appropriate types of the communist biographies. Chapter Four, concerning the period between the creation of the Polish United Workers' Party (December 1948) and the decisive 8th session of the Central Committee (October 1956), presents the consequences of the socialization of the communists of the PSE to date, revealed in the process of Stalinization of Polish reality, as well as the issue of the stability / change of the communist habitus after Stalin's death. The dissertation shows the importance of the analysis of the biographical experiences for the understanding of the attitudes of the communists adopted in the years of exercising power, and the Polish post-war reality influenced by their actions. Particularly crucial here is socialization-in-movement and the dispositions of the revolutionary-conspirator. At each stage, I analysed various types of tension, e.g. between differentiation (visible thanks to the analysis of six types of communist biographies) and unification, or between the internalization of norms and adaptation to them. Using the habitus category, it was possible to show both the impact of embodied social structures on the practices of individuals, and individual practices that shaped the structures in which individuals were immersed.

This study which is the product of library research and fieldwork seeks, on account of the persistent marginalisation of African Traditional Religion (ATR) in Sierra Leone by Islam and Christianity, to investigate the place of ATR in inter-religious encounters in the country since the advent of Islam and Christianity. As in most of sub-Saharan Africa, ATR is the indigenous religion of Sierra Leone. When the early forebears and later progenitors of Islam and Christianity arrived, they met Sierra Leone indigenes with a remarkable knowledge of God and a structured religious system. Successive Muslim clerics, traders, and missionaries were respectful of and sensitive to the culture and religion of the indigenes who accommodated them and offered them hospitality. This approach resulted in a syncretistic brand of Islam. In contrast, most Christian missionaries adopted an exclusive and insensitive approach to African culture and religiosity. Christianity, especially Protestantism, demanded a complete abandonment of African culture and religion, and a total dedication to Christianity. This attitude has continued by some indigenous clerics and religious leaders to the extent that Sierra Leone Indigenous Religion (SLIR) and it practitioners continue to be marginalised in Sierra Leone's inter-religious dialogue and cooperation. Although the indigenes of Sierra Leone were and continue to be hospitable to Islam and Christianity, and in spite of the fact that SLIR shares affinity with Islam and Christianity in many theological and practical issues, and even though there are many Muslims and Christians who still hold on to traditional spirituality and culture, Muslim and Christian leaders of these immigrant religions are reluctant to include Traditionalists in interfaith issues in the country. The formation and constitution of the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone (IRCSL) which has local and international recognition did not include ATR. These considerations, then beg the questions: * Why have Muslim and Christian leaders long marginalised ATR, its practices and practitioners from interfaith dialogue and cooperation in Sierra Leone? * What is lacking in ATR that continues to prevent practitioners of Christianity and Islam from officially involving Traditionalists in the socio-religious development of the country? Muslim and Christians have given several factors that are responsible for this exclusion: * The prejudices that they inherited from their forebears * ATR lacks the hallmarks of a true religion * ATR is primitive and economically weak * The fear that the accommodation of ATR will result in syncretism and nominalism * Muslims see no need to dialogue with ATR practitioners, most of whom they considered to be already Muslims Considering the commonalities ATR shares with Islam and Christianity, and the number of Muslims and Christians who still hold on to traditional spirituality, these factors are not justifiable. Although Islam and Christianity are finding it hard to recognise and include ATR in interfaith dialogue and cooperation in Sierra Leone, ATR continues to play a vital role in Sierra Leone's national politics, in the search and maintenance of employment, and in the judicial sector. ATR played a crucial part during and after the civil war. The national government in its Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) report acknowledged the importance and contribution of traditional culture and spirituality during and after the war. Outside of Sierra Leone, the progress in the place and level of the recognition of ATR continues. At varying degrees, the Sociétié Africaine de Culture (SAC) in France, the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC), the Vatican, and the World Council of Churches, have taken positive steps to recognise and find a place for ATR in their structures. Much about the necessity for dialogue and cooperation with ATR can be learnt in the works and efforts of these secular and religious bodies. If nothing else, there are two main reasons why Islam and Christianity in Sierra Leone must be in dialogue with ATR: * Dialogue of life or in community. People living side-by-side meet and interact personally and communally on a regular basis. They share common resources and communal benefits. These factors compel people to be in dialogue * Dual religiosity. As many Muslims and Christians in Sierra Leone are still holding on to ATR practices, it is crucial for Muslims and Christians to dialogue with ATR practitioners. If Muslims and Christians are serious about meeting and starting a process of dialogue with Traditionalists, certain practical issues have to be considered: * Islam and Christianity have to validate and accept ATR as a true religion and a viable partner in the socio-religious landscape of Sierra Leone * Muslims and Christians must educate themselves about ATR, and the scriptures and teachings of their respective religious traditions in order to relate well with Traditionalists These are starting points that can produce successful results. Although at present Muslims and Christians in Sierra Leone are finding it difficult to initiate dialogue and cooperation with Traditionalists, all hope is not lost. It is now the task of the established IRCSL to ensure the inclusion of ATR. Islam and Christianity must remember that when they came as strangers, ATR, played host to them and has played and continues to play a vital role in providing hospitality, and allowing them to blossom on African soil.
Religious Studies and Arabic
D.Litt. et Phil. (Religious Studies)

AbstractAlthough it was Herrnstein’s writing in the early 1970s that began widespread discussion of the concept, and The Bell Curve, which he co-authored with Murray that continued it, the truth is that the notion of a “meritocracy” has become an abiding conviction across much of the political spectrum in the United States. The belief that society’s “winners” deserve their hugely disproportionate share of resources because they are better—i.e., smarter—than others is not unique to conservatives and libertarians like Murray; it is also an article of faith for much of the so-called “New Democratic” establishment that has controlled the party from the Clintonthrough the Obama administrations. For both conservatives and many liberals, the meritocratic faith is not so much a way to explain inequality as to rationalize it; high-ranking officials involved in economic policy in both Republicanand Democratic administrations have considered inequality not only inevitable but the appropriate reflection of people’s economic value.

Abstract The war years were indelibly etched by the interplay of two seemingly opposite tendencies. There was, on the one hand, the dynamic unleashed by a powerful fantasy of national cross-class unity, coupled with the belief that the war was or would be a levelling influence. And, on the other hand, there were persistent expressions of class antagonism. This combination of desire for singularity and incessant conflict contributed to an unprecedented focus on the deep rents in the social fabric produced by economic inequalities. This chapter will suggest that discourses about the nation as one in which sharp class differences were vanquished through a united war effort fed heightened sensitivity on the part of the British public to issues of economic and social inequality.

Orthodox beliefs, alternative beliefs, and religious experience, as evidenced by sample surveys, are the focus of this chapter. Belief in God, particularly in a personal God, has declined significantly, as has belief in Jesus Christ as the Son of God. Belief in an afterlife, which was stable until the 2000s, is also now falling; so, too, is belief in heaven, hell, and reincarnation. However, a myriad of alternative beliefs, stoked nowadays by social media and fake news, remain pervasive, including among young people and orthodox believers, but they are often highly individualized, rather than forming a coherent intellectual system. Moreover, the extent to which, collectively or severally, they can be considered as ‘religious’ is a matter of debate (especially with imported beliefs that have tended to secularize in the United Kingdom). A similar consideration applies to religious experience, an active field of quantitative research before the millennium, albeit, regrettably, not since.

This chapter examines an aspect of myth building about law that is often overlooked, namely the role of Parliamentarians in shaping public beliefs about the European Court of Human Rights. Through an examination of recent debates in both Houses of Parliament about what became the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, the chapter illustrates how current public mistrust of the Court stems in part from ideas propagated by politicians during the course of Parliamentary debates. Specifically, the author shows the process by which two different myths about the Court have been created: first, that the Court poses a risk to the rights and freedoms of a significant group of people that national legislators, regardless of the laws that they pass, are unable to defend; second, that the Court has an inherent bias against religious groups and their adherents. The chapter demonstrates how seemingly factual legal arguments are used to strengthen and promulgate these myths. Ultimately, it shows how even at the heart of law, in the very places where law itself is made, myths about law are created and retained.

Abstract We are accustomed to finding that we have been lied to. To insure ourselves against such deceptions we repeat the mantra that we don’t believe everything we read in the newspapers. There have been, and must still be, parts of the world where the reputation of the press is such that people don’t believe anything they read in their newspapers: I recall that in Czechoslovakia in the 1960s nobody believed that United States aircraft were dropping cluster-bombs and napalm on Vietnam because the official newspaper, piquantly named Pravda (Truth), reported daily that they were. Because our experience in the United Kingdom is less uniformly bad, we tend to give initial credence to what we are told. Yet repeated revelations over recent years that people in whom the public pur its trust have been lying not only to the media but to Parliament and the courts have shaken our confidence in our own scepticism.

This chapter starts with the introduction of Thanh Niên dissolution as a coherent organization, leaving in its wake a welter of new groupings: an Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), a rival Annamese Communist Party in Cochinchina, and the Annam-based Tân Việt (New Việtnam). The chapter demonstrates the onset, unfolding, and ultimate outcomes of the Việtnamese Revolution, which were shaped by World War II, successive seismic shifts in neighboring China, from the overthrow of the Qing and the warlord era to the rise and fall of the KMT (Kuomintang)-CCP (Chinese Communist Party) United Front, the Japanese invasion and occupation, the civil war, and the establishment of the People's Republic of China. The chapter also highlights the establishment of an armed united front effectively under ICP control but aimed to encompass — or overshadow — a broader array of groups active in southern China, the Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh (Việtnam Independence League, or Việt Minh). Ultimately, the chapter exemplifies the broader importance of China's role in enabling Việtnamese revolutionary mobilization, from the heyday of Phan Bội Châu through Thanh Niên, and the ICP and the Việt Minh.

This chapter examines the Sino-Soviet split and its implications for the United States' policies in Asia, Europe, and the Americas during the period 1956–1964. Coordination and comity in the communist camp peaked between 1953 and 1957, but alliance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) was relatively short-lived. This was caused by ideological differences, distrust, and jealous rivalries for international leadership between Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong. The chapter explains what caused the strain in Sino-Soviet relations, and especially the collapse of Sino-Soviet military and economic cooperation. It also considers the effects of the Sino-Soviet disputes on third-party communists in Asia, China's foreign policy activism, and the catalytic effect of the Sino-Soviet split on Soviet foreign policy.

This chapter examines efforts by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the very early months and years of the People's Republic of China to consolidate its control over Amdo's vast terrain and attract the support of its diverse inhabitants. Far from a comprehensive history of Qinghai during this transitional period, it focuses on the CCP's immediate motives and methods for wooing Tibetan elites—who not only were members of Amdo's “feudal ruling class” but with few exceptions had been implicated in the Ma regime—into a “patriotic United Front.” In doing so, CCP leaders made a distinction between hardline “bandits and spies” and Tibetan and Mongol chieftains and religious leaders. Even in the case of headmen “hoodwinked” into taking up arms against the CCP, Party leaders insisted that open resistance should not be treated as a manifestation of class struggle but as the residual effect of centuries of nationality exploitation. The chapter then considers the responses of several members of the Tibetan elite to the Party's United Front overtures.

"Humanity has known (forced displacement) as one of the inhuman phenomena, and international law considers it a war crime, and the forcibly displaced area is subjected to various types of psychological, physical, cultural and ethnic torture. Khanaqin has been subjected to more displacement compared to the rest of Iraq's cities, and forced displacement is a systematic practice carried out by governments or armed groups intolerant towards groups that differ from them in religion, sect, nationalism, belief, politics, or race, with the aim of evacuating lands and replacing groups other population instead. Forced displacement is either direct, i.e. forcibly removing residents from their areas of residence, or indirect, such as using means of intimidation, persecution, and sometimes murder. This phenomenon varies in the causes and motives that depend on conflicts and wars, and greed, as well as dependence on cruelty in dealing and a tendency to brutality and barbarism. With regard to forced displacement in Iraq before the year 2003 AD, it was a systematic phenomenon according to a presidential law away from punishment, and it does not constitute a crime, as evidenced by the absence of any legal text referring to it in the Iraqi Penal Code, but after the year 2003 AD, criminal judgments were issued against the perpetrators of forced displacement. For the period between 17/7/1967 to 1/5/2003 CE, displacement cases were considered a terrorist crime, and consideration of them would be the jurisdiction of the Iraqi Central Criminal Court. The deportations from the city of Khanaqin were included in the forced displacement, by forcibly transferring the civilian population from the area to which they belong and reside to a second area that differs culturally and socially from the city from which they left. Al-Anbar governorate identified a new home for the displaced residents of Khanaqin, first, and then some of the southern governorates. We find other cases of forced displacement, for example, what happened to the Faili Kurds. They were expelled by a presidential decision, and the decision stated: (They were transferred to Nakra Salman, and then they were deported to Iran). These cases of deportation or displacement have led to the emergence of psychological effects on the displaced, resulting from the feeling of persecution and cultural extermination of the traditions of these people, and the obliteration of their national identity, behavior and practices. After the year 2003 AD, the so-called office for the return of property appeared, and there was a headquarters in every governorate, Except in Diyala governorate, there were two offices, the first for the entire governorate, and the second for Khanaqin district alone, and this indicates the extent of injustice, displacement, deportation, tyranny, and extermination that this city was subjected to. The crimes of forced displacement differ from one case to another according to their causes, origins, goals and causes - as we mentioned - but there are expansive reasons, so that this reason is limited to greed, behavior, cruelty, brutality and barbarism. But if these ideas are impure and adopted by extremists, then they cause calamity, inequality and discrimination, forcing the owners of the land to leave. In modern times, the crime of forced displacement has accompanied colonial campaigns to control other countries, so that displacement has become part of the customs of war, whether in conflicts external or internal. Forced displacement has been criminalized and transformed from an acceptable means of war to a means that is legally and internationally rejected by virtue of international law in the twentieth century, especially after the emergence of the United Nations charter in 1945 AD And the two Additional Protocols attached to the Geneva Conventions of 1977 AD, as well as declarations, , conventions and international conferences that included explicit legal texts criminalizing forced displacement as a universal principle of genocide. My approach in this study is a field-analytical approach, as I present official data and documents issued by the competent authorities and higher government agencies before the year 2003 AD, and indicate the coordinates and modalities of the process of displacement and deportation, as well as an interview with the families of the displaced, taking some information and how to coexist with their new imposed situation. forcibly on them."