Relevant bibliographies by topics / Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers

Academic literature on the topic 'Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 9 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium"

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Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. "Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium." Journal of Economic Theory 53, no. 2 (April 1991): 236–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90155-w.

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Bajoori, Elnaz, János Flesch, and Dries Vermeulen. "Behavioral perfect equilibrium in Bayesian games." Games and Economic Behavior 98 (July 2016): 78–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.002.

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González-Díaz, Julio, and Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez. "On the notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium." TOP 22, no. 1 (November 6, 2011): 128–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11750-011-0239-z.

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Bonanno, Giacomo. "Exploring the Gap between Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium." Games 7, no. 4 (November 10, 2016): 35. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g7040035.

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Qin, Cheng-Zhong, and Xintong Yang. "On the equivalence of rational expectations equilibrium with perfect Bayesian equilibrium." Economic Theory 69, no. 4 (April 11, 2019): 1127–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01192-w.

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Gibbons, Robert. "An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory." Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, no. 1 (February 1, 1997): 127–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.11.1.127.

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This paper offers an introduction to game theory for applied economists. The author gives simple definitions and intuitive examples of four kinds of games and their corresponding solution concepts: Nash equilibrium in static games of complete information; subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in dynamic games of complete information; Bayesian Nash equilibrium in static games with incomplete (or 'private') information; and perfect Bayesian (or sequential) equilibrium in dynamic games with incomplete information. The main theme of the paper is that there are important differences among the games but important similarities among the solution concepts.
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Clark, Daniel, and Drew Fudenberg. "Justified Communication Equilibrium." American Economic Review 111, no. 9 (September 1, 2021): 3004–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201692.

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Justified communication equilibrium (JCE) is an equilibrium refinement for signaling games with cheap-talk communication. A strategy profile must be a JCE to be a stable outcome of nonequilibrium learning when receivers are initially trusting and senders play many more times than receivers. In the learning model, the counterfactual “speeches” that have been informally used to motivate past refinements are messages that are actually sent. Stable profiles need not be perfect Bayesian equilibria, so JCE sometimes preserves equilibria that existing refinements eliminate. Despite this, it resembles the earlier refinements D1 and NWBR, and it coincides with them in co-monotonic signaling games. (JEL C70, D82, D83, J23, M51)
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Bonanno, Giacomo. "AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part II: from PBE to sequential equilibrium." International Journal of Game Theory 45, no. 4 (September 29, 2015): 1071–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0506-6.

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Glycopantis, Dionysius, Allan Muir, and Nicholas C. Yannelis. "Non-implementation of rational expectations as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium." Economic Theory 26, no. 4 (November 2005): 765–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0585-2.

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Bonanno, Giacomo. "AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part I: definition and properties." International Journal of Game Theory 42, no. 3 (July 27, 2011): 567–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0296-4.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium"

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Lee, Dongwoo. "Essays on Economic Decision Making." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/89564.

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This dissertation focuses on exploring individual and strategic decision problems in Economics. I take a different approach in each chapter to capture various aspects of decision problems. An overview of this dissertation is provided in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 studies an individual's decision making in extensive-form games under ambiguity when the individual is ambiguous about an opponent's moves. In this chapter, a player follows Choquet Expected Utility preferences, since the standard Expected Utility cannot explain the situations of ambiguity. I raise the issue that dynamically inconsistent decision making can be derived in extensive-form games with ambiguity. To cope with this issue, this chapter provides sufficient conditions to recover dynamic consistency. Chapter 3 analyzes the strategic decision making in signaling games when a player makes an inference about hidden information from the behavioral hypothesis. The Hypothesis Testing Equilibrium (HTE) is proposed to provide an explanation for posterior beliefs from the player. The notion of HTE admits belief updates for all events including zero-probability events. In addition, this chapter introduces well-motivated modifications of HTE. Finally, Chapter 4 examines a boundedly rational individual who considers selective attributes when making a decision. It is assumed that the individual focuses on a subset of attributes that stand out from a choice set. The selective attributes model can accommodate violations of choice axioms of Independence from Irrelevant Alternative (IIA) and Regularity.
Doctor of Philosophy
This dissertation focuses on exploring individual and strategic decision problems in Economics. I take a different approach in each chapter to capture various aspects of decision problem. An overview of this dissertation is provided in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 studies an individual’s decision making in extensive-form games under ambiguity. Ambiguity describes the situation in which the information available to a decision maker is too imprecise to be summarized by a probability measure (Epstein, 1999). It is known that ambiguity causes dynamic inconsistency between ex-ante and interim decision making. This chapter provides sufficient conditions under which dynamic consistency is maintained. Chapter 3 analyzes the strategic decision making in signaling games in which there are two players: informed sender and uninformed receiver. The sender has a private information about his type and the receiver makes an inference about hidden information. This chapter suggests a notion of the Hypothesis Testing Equilibrium (HTE), which provides an alternative explanation for the receiver’s beliefs. The idea of the HTE can be used as a refinement of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in signaling games to cope with the known limitations of PBE. Finally, Chapter 4 examines a boundedly rational individual who considers only salient attributes when making a decision. The individual considers an attribute only when it stands out enough in a choice set. The selective attribute model can accommodate violations of choice axioms of Independence from Irrelevant Alternative (IIA) and Regularity.
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Ming, Hui Yang, and Zhang Lei. "The Audit Pricing Decisions for Accounting Firms in China : A Case Study from RSM China." Thesis, Umeå universitet, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, 2011. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-45314.

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Yang, Tsung-Han. "Essays on Applied Game Theory and Public Economics." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/82963.

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The first chapter presents a theoretical model of electoral competition where two parties can increase campaign contributions by choosing policies benefiting a significant interest group. However, such decision will shrink their hardcore vote base where voters are well informed about the policy. The parties can then allocate the funds between campaigning and personal wealth. Different from the core voters, independent voters can be attracted by advertisements funded by campaign spending. Using a multi-stage extensive form game, I investigate how electoral competition interacts with diversions and policy distortions. My result shows that a higher level of electoral competition helps mitigate policy distortions but prompts the parties to divert more funds. Perfectly informed signal senders need to communicate their true type (productivity or ability) which is often private information to potential receivers. While tests are commonly used as measures of applicants' productivity, the accuracy of them has been questioned. Beginning with the framework of a two-type labor market signaling game, the second chapter investigates how tests of limited reliability affect the nature of equilibria in signaling games with asymmetric information. Our results show that, if a test is inaccurate and costly, only pooling PBE exists given certain conditions. Different forms of test inaccuracy may allow a separating PBE to exist. We also study the case of three types and find different PBEs. The central issue of siting noxious facilities is that the host community absorbs potential costs, while all others can share the benefits without paying as much. The third chapter presents a modified Clarke mechanism to facilitate the siting decision, taking into account all residents' strategies. Suppose that the social planner is able to reasonably estimate the possible costs, depending on the host location, to each resident created by the facility. Our proposed Clarke mechanism is characterized by strategy-proofness and yields an efficient siting outcome. The issue of budget imbalance is mitigated when the compensation scheme is fully funded with the tax revenue based on the benefits. We then use a simple example to show that a weighted version of the Clarke mechanism may yield a different outcome.
Ph. D.
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liu, Chen-ming, and 劉鎮銘. "Herding and Anti-Herding：A Case of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium." Thesis, 2004. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/19002902273289764439.

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碩士
國立雲林科技大學
財務金融系碩士班
92
Herding behavior is an interesting phenomenon in financial markets. We build a two-period model based on the consideration of reputation and compensation to analyze herding behavior. In our model there are two players with two prior types, including smart and dump. In the beginning of the first period, each player has private information and then players will adopt their behavior strategies to maximize their second period compensations. Our study findings include: (1) there doesn’t exist the equilibrium in which both player tell the truth; (2) no matter what the private information that the second player got, the herding behavior emerges as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if the payoff of the only winner in the second period is not enough to compensate the loss of giving up his private information; and (3) on the contrary, if the only winner gains is high enough for the loss of information, then anti-herding prevails as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in our model.
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Kang, Ming-Ren, and 康銘仁. "Interest Rate Swaps, Debt Maturity Choices and Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium." Thesis, 1996. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/14785477524147046328.

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Li, Cheng-Hung, and 李政弘. "Actual execution ratio of open market repurchase－A case of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium." Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/62030847152942058701.

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碩士
雲林科技大學
財務金融系碩士班
97
The share repurchases become more and more important recently, especially in the open market repurchase, OMR. Although OMR is used widespread, but many studies of OMR put much more emphasis on the motive of repurchase and the stock return after the repurchase announcement than on the problem between the number of shares of repurchase announcement and actual execution ratio. This paper is focus on the interaction between the actual execution ratio of manager and the behavior of investor and market after OMR announcement. The results are：(1) About the OMR announcement, if the behavior of manager causes the effect of stock price change larger than the behavior of investor, no matter the type of manager is high execution ratio or low execution ratio both type have high actual execution ratio in this OMR plan. Furthermore, the investor’s optimal reaction is believed that the manager would have high actual execution ratio and buy in the shares of this firm. (2) Assume the actual execution ratio of this OMR and actual execution ratio of former OMR, then the reaction of investor after the OMR announcement does not have a difference cause of the execution ratio high or low. Precisely, no matter the manager have high execution ratio or low execution ratio in former OMR plan, the investor have the same payoff in his strategy.
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Books on the topic "Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium"

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Fudenberg, Drew. Perfect Bayesian and sequential equilibria: A clarifying note. Cambridge, Mass: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988.

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Juillard, Michel. Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models. Edited by Shu-Heng Chen, Mak Kaboudan, and Ye-Rong Du. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199844371.013.4.

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Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models have become popular in macroeconomics, but the combination of nonlinear microeconomic behavior of the agents and model-consistent expectations raise intricate computational issues; this chapter reviews solution methods and estimation of DSGE models. Perfect foresight deterministic models can easily be solved with a great degree of accuracy. In practice, medium-sized stochastic models can only be solved by local approximation or the perturbation approach. The Bayesian approach to estimation is privileged. It provides a convenient way to communicate both the prior information available to the econo-metrician and new information revealed by the data. This chapter focuses on methods frequently used in applied work rather than aiming at being exhaustive.
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Book chapters on the topic "Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium"

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Fujiwara-Greve, Takako. "Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium." In Non-Cooperative Game Theory, 153–72. Tokyo: Springer Japan, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55645-9_7.

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Munoz-Garcia, Felix, and Daniel Toro-Gonzalez. "Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Signaling Games." In Springer Texts in Business and Economics, 257–302. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32963-5_9.

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Munoz-Garcia, Felix, and Daniel Toro-Gonzalez. "Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Signaling Games." In Springer Texts in Business and Economics, 381–457. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11902-7_9.

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Zagare, Frank C. "Game Theory and Diplomatic History." In Game Theory, Diplomatic History and Security Studies, 25–38. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198831587.003.0003.

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This chapter explores a number of issues connected with the use of game-theoretic models to organize analytic narratives. First, a causal explanation of the 1936 Rhineland crisis is developed within the confines of a game-theoretic model of asymmetric or unilateral deterrence with incomplete information. In this context, the chapter then introduces the concept of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Then, some methodological obstacles that may arise in a more complex case, such as the 1879 Austro-German alliance, are discussed, and suggestions for overcoming them are offered. Finally, the advantages of using game models to more fully understand real world events are highlighted.
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"Beliefs and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria." In Game Theory for Political Scientists, 161–87. Princeton University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvzxx9qg.10.

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"Chapter Six. Beliefs and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria." In Game Theory for Political Scientists, 161–87. Princeton University Press, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9780691213200-008.

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Conference papers on the topic "Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium"

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Sinha, Abhinav, and Achilleas Anastasopoulos. "Structured perfect Bayesian equilibrium in infinite horizon dynamic games with asymmetric information." In 2016 54th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton). IEEE, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/allerton.2016.7852238.

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Yang, Jian, Yuhui Zhou, Kaiwei Yue, Zhanyong He, Chao Cheng, and Na Liang. "The design of Intelligence Decision Support System (IDSS) based on perfect Bayesian equilibrium." In 2011 IEEE International Conference on Advanced Power System Automation and Protection (APAP). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/apap.2011.6180534.

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Liu, Renjing, Zhengwen He, and Yingluo Wang. "Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Analysis on the Investment Game of R&D Activities of Asymmetry Firms." In 2008 Fifth International Conference on Fuzzy Systems and Knowledge Discovery (FSKD). IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/fskd.2008.543.

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Chen, Weizhe, Zihan Zhou, Yi Wu, and Fei Fang. "Temporal Induced Self-Play for Stochastic Bayesian Games." In Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-21}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/14.

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One practical requirement in solving dynamic games is to ensure that the players play well from any decision point onward. To satisfy this requirement, existing efforts focus on equilibrium refinement, but the scalability and applicability of existing techniques are limited. In this paper, we propose Temporal-Induced Self-Play (TISP), a novel reinforcement learning-based framework to find strategies with decent performances from any decision point onward. TISP uses belief-space representation, backward induction, policy learning, and non-parametric approximation. Building upon TISP, we design a policy-gradient-based algorithm TISP-PG. We prove that TISP-based algorithms can find approximate Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in zero-sum one-sided stochastic Bayesian games with finite horizon. We test TISP-based algorithms in various games, including finitely repeated security games and a grid-world game. The results show that TISP-PG is more scalable than existing mathematical programming-based methods and significantly outperforms other learning-based methods.
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Guo, Qingyu, Bo An, Branislav Bošanský, and Christopher Kiekintveld. "Comparing Strategic Secrecy and Stackelberg Commitment in Security Games." In Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2017/516.

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The Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE) has drawn extensive attention recently in several security domains. However, the SSE concept neglects the advantage of defender's strategic revelation of her private information, and overestimates the observation ability of the adversaries. In this paper, we overcome these restrictions and analyze the tradeoff between strategic secrecy and commitment in security games. We propose a Disguised-resource Security Game (DSG) where the defender strategically disguises some of her resources. We compare strategic information revelation with public commitment and formally show that they have different advantages depending the payoff structure. To compute the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE), several novel approaches are provided, including a novel algorithm based on support set enumeration, and an approximation algorithm for \epsilon-PBE. Extensive experimental evaluation shows that both strategic secrecy and Stackelberg commitment are critical measures in security domain, and our approaches can efficiently solve PBEs for realistic-sized problems.
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Wen, Ying, Yaodong Yang, and Jun Wang. "Modelling Bounded Rationality in Multi-Agent Interactions by Generalized Recursive Reasoning." In Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Seventeenth Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-PRICAI-20}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2020/58.

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Though limited in real-world decision making, most multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) models assume perfectly rational agents -- a property hardly met due to individual's cognitive limitation and/or the tractability of the decision problem. In this paper, we introduce generalized recursive reasoning (GR2) as a novel framework to model agents with different \emph{hierarchical} levels of rationality; our framework enables agents to exhibit varying levels of ``thinking'' ability thereby allowing higher-level agents to best respond to various less sophisticated learners. We contribute both theoretically and empirically. On the theory side, we devise the hierarchical framework of GR2 through probabilistic graphical models and prove the existence of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Within the GR2, we propose a practical actor-critic solver, and demonstrate its convergent property to a stationary point in two-player games through Lyapunov analysis. On the empirical side, we validate our findings on a variety of MARL benchmarks. Precisely, we first illustrate the hierarchical thinking process on the Keynes Beauty Contest, and then demonstrate significant improvements compared to state-of-the-art opponent modeling baselines on the normal-form games and the cooperative navigation benchmark.
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Shen, Weiran, Weizhe Chen, Taoan Huang, Rohit Singh, and Fei Fang. "When to Follow the Tip: Security Games with Strategic Informants." In Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Seventeenth Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-PRICAI-20}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2020/52.

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Although security games have attracted intensive research attention over the past years, few existing works consider how information from local communities would affect the game. In this paper, we introduce a new player -- a strategic informant, who can observe and report upcoming attacks -- to the defender-attacker security game setting. Characterized by a private type, the informant has his utility structure that leads to his strategic behaviors. We model the game as a 3-player extensive-form game and propose a novel solution concept of Strong Stackelberg-perfect Bayesian equilibrium. To compute the optimal defender strategy, we first show that although the informant can have infinitely many types in general, the optimal defense plan can only include a finite (exponential) number of different patrol strategies. We then prove that there exists a defense plan with only a linear number of patrol strategies that achieve the optimal defender's utility, which significantly reduces the computational burden and allows us to solve the game in polynomial time using linear programming. Finally, we conduct extensive experiments to show the effect of the strategic informant and demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithm.
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Devanur, Nikhil R., Yuval Peres, and Balasubramanian Sivan. "Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in Repeated Sales." In Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms. Philadelphia, PA: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973730.67.

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Vasal, Deepanshu, and Achilleas Anastasopoulos. "A systematic process for evaluating structured perfect Bayesian equilibria in dynamic games with asymmetric information." In 2016 American Control Conference (ACC). IEEE, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/acc.2016.7525439.

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