Academic literature on the topic 'Permanent state sovereignty over natural resourse'

Principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources (PSNR) in international law are regulated in UN General Assembly Resolution Number 1515 (XV) 15 December 1960, and Resolution Number 1803, 14 December 1962, which recognizes permanent sovereignty over natural resources. The fact is that Indonesia which is rich in natural resources is not fully sovereign of its natural resources. This is influenced by limited capital ownership and also limited human resources. Because permanent sovereignty over natural resources should be directly proportional to the welfare of the people of Indonesia. This paper uses normative research methods with a database in the form of library data, online surveys, and several related legal materials, then described descriptively, and interpreted comprehensively. In this context, the importance of management and management of natural resources by the state. Because it is closely related to the risks posed by the exploitation and exploration of natural resources on geological and political aspects. For this reason, it is very important for Indonesia to adopt principles in supporting the rule of law at regional, international and national levels and protect the sovereignty and interests of the country.

Despite the fact of moving gradually away from the traditional energy sources, and reducing the share of the energy from the coal-fired power stations in the energy production, extraction of minerals other than hard coal remains crucial for human existence. It is enough to mention natural gas, metal ores, metals, gypsum, sand, precious stones, or thermal waters. However, it is necessary to keep in mind that geology and nature do not recognise the national boundaries, which results in the fact that some mineral deposits can be divided between two or more state territories. This leads to the situation when they are subject to the varied legal regimes. There is also a possibility of them being located outsidethe sovereignty or jurisdiction of any state. There are still under-researched topics connected with mining. The aim of this study is to define legal issues related to cross-border mining, the so-called shared natural resources, and to present solutions to problems identified respectively. The second step, after analysis of the terms natural resources and shared natural resources, will involve an analysis of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources in rulings of international courts.

This work came up against the background of the contentious question and multiplicity of claims of ownership of natural resources located within a given state territory. The paper has addressed the question whether this claim legitimately inheres in the state as a sovereign or in the native inhabitants of the land area where the mineral resources are domiciled pursuant to the international right to self-determination. It is the finding that, among other things, the right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources is a legitimate one in international law. Notwithstanding, as the paper has concluded, only the legislature and the courts in any particular domestic jurisdiction can determine with finality the specific entity, institution, or unit within a state sovereign in whom this ultimate ownership resides.

In 1962, newly independent African states voted overwhelming in support of United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) on ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources’ (PSNR). This resolution emerged mainly in response to concerns about the protection of foreign direct investment (FDI) and economic development in developing countries. Although substantial legal scholarship has focused on PSNR, few studies have focused on conceptualising PSNR and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in Africa. This paper intends to fill this important research gap, by conceptualising PSNR as a threepronged principle that protects the rights of the state, investors and citizens. This paper examines the evolution of PSNR in the context of investment law in Africa through a textual analysis of treaty language in African investment treaties and as interpreted in natural resource-related investor-state disputes. This paper also examines the significance of Tanzania’s recently enacted Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act, 2017 (Sovereignty Act). The paper’s textual analysis reveals that unlike what is envisaged under Resolution 1803, dispute settlement clauses in treaties signed by African states do not provide for the exhaustion of local remedies. This paper argues that to attain ‘sustainable sovereignty’ over natural resources, African states must recognise the core of foreign investment protection law: pacta sunt servanda. Although the ‘new generation’ treaties constitute positive steps, to fully attain transformed development through the sustainable use of natural resources (as envisaged in Agenda 2063) treaty reform must be backed by good governance, informed natural resource investment contracts, the rule of law, and intra-regional investment. En 1962, les États africains nouvellement indépendants ont favorablement et massivement voté la Résolution 1803 (XVII) de l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies (ONU), sur la « souveraineté permanente des ressources naturelles » (SPRN). Cette Résolution a été adoptée en réponse aux préoccupations concernant la protection des investissements directs étrangers (IDE) et le développement économique des pays en voie de développement. Bien que le SPRN ait fait l’objet d’importantes études juridiques, peu d’études ont porté sur la conceptualisation des SPRN et les accords sur les différends entre investisseurs et États (ADIE) en Afrique. Cet article vise à combler cet important vide dans la recherche en conceptualisant les SPRN comme un principe à trois volets qui protège les droits de l’État, des investisseurs et des citoyens. Cet article analyse l’évolution des SPRN dans le contexte du droit à l’investissement en Afrique par une analyse textuelle du langage des traités dans les traités d’investissement africains et tel qu’interprété dans les différends entre investisseurs et États en relation avec les ressources naturelles. Cet article examine également l’importance de la récente promulgation en Tanzanie de la loi sur les Richesses et Ressources Naturelles (Souveraineté Permanente) de 2017 (Loi sur la Souveraineté). L’analyse textuelle de cet article révèle que contrairement à ce qui est envisagé dans la Résolution 1803, les clauses de règlement des différends contenues dans les traités signés par les États africains ne prévoient pas l’épuisement des recours internes. Cet article soutient que pour parvenir à la « souveraineté durable » sur les ressources naturelles, les États africains doivent reconnaître l’essence de la loi sur la protection des investissements étrangers : pacta sunt servanda. Bien que les traités de la « nouvelle génération » constituent des étapes positives pour parvenir à un développement pleinement transformé grâce à l’utilisation durable des ressources naturelles (comme prévu dans l’Agenda 2063), la réforme des traités doit être soutenue par une bonne gouvernance, des contrats réfléchis relatifs aux ressources naturelles, l’État de droit et les investissements intra régionaux.

This article examines the legal connections between the modern phenomenon of ‘land grabbing’ – large-scale acquisitions of land rights by foreign investors – and the human right to self-determination. It is argued that the right to self-determination and in particular the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources cannot only be invoked by one State against another, but also by the people against its own government, thus legally binding all States involved in the process. The basic premise shall not be that land grabbing is per se illegal; it depends on how it is performed. The right to self-determination and the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources bring along important restrictions that States have to honour. Governments should develop their foreign investment relations in a way that ensures the human rights of their populations, especially given the fact that in this respect business corporations are not bound by any hard international law. The regulation of the investment is an important factor: transparency and involvement of local authorities at the planning stage, as well as the participation in the investment’s benefits help to ensure that a people is not deprived of its own means of subsistence.

AbstractThis article makes the case for the obligation to conserve plant biodiversity to be classified as a common concern of humankind, to justify and indeed prescribe limitations on private intellectual property rights over plants and related processes. Within the biodiversity regime, the notion of ‘common concern of humankind’ subjects the permanent sovereignty of states over natural resources to the interests of humanity. It shifts the obligations of states from managing their own plant biodiversity towards conserving it on behalf of humankind. In contrast, TRIPS requires states to protect private intellectual property rights with little discretion to adequately balance them with public interests. This creates a dichotomy. This article argues that rather than mobilizing state sovereignty as rhetoric to distract from addressing common concerns of humankind, it should be constructed as a concept capable of facilitating these very concerns.

Abstract Development programs in many African countries include the reallocation of land and the nationalization of mineral resources for the benefit of less privileged communities in those countries. Implementing these programs is, however, quite complicated. This paper pays special attention to the confiscation of the land of white farmers in Zimbabwe as part of a development program, and the rapid decline of the economy of that country in consequence of this program. It serves as a reminder that depriving landowners of their property rights is counterproductive and is therefore not a feasible development strategy. As far as the right to explore natural resources is concerned, the paper highlights the repeated resolutions of the United Nations proclaiming the “inalienable right of all states freely to dispose of their natural resources in accordance with their national interests” as an inherent aspect of sovereignty [e.g. G.A. Res. 626, 7 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20), at 18, U.N. Doc. A/2361 (1952).], with occasional reminders that developing countries were in need of encouragement “in the proper use and exploitation of their natural wealth and resources” [e.g. E.S.C. Res. 1737, 54 U.N. ESCOR, Supp., No. 1 (1973).]. These resolutions were adopted in the context of the decolonization policy of the United Nations and were mainly aimed at denouncing the exploitation of the mineral resources of African countries by colonial powers [G.A. Res. 2288, 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16), at 48, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967)., para 3]. The emphasis of international law relating to the natural resources over time also emphasized the right to self-determination of peoples. As early as 1958, the General Assembly, in a resolution through which the Commission on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources was established, stated that the “permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources” of states is “a basic constituent of the right to self-determination” [G.A. Res. 1314, 13 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18), at 27, U.N. Doc. A/4090 (1958).]. The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights similarly provides “All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people be deprived of it” [Art 21(1)]. This provision featured prominently in several judgments of courts of law, such as the one of the South African Constitutional Court in the case of Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd & Others v Gemorah Resources (Pty) Ltd & Others [2011] (3) BCLR 229 (CC) (3) BCLR 229 (CC) and of the African Court of Human and People’s Rights in the case of Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) v Nigeria (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001), Communication 155/96, 15th Annual Report. AHRLR 60 (Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) v Nigeria (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001), Communication 155/96, 15th Annual Report.) Communication 155/96. In view of these directives of international law, the paper will critically analyze the South African Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002, which deprived landowners of the ownership of unexplored minerals and petroleum products and proclaimed mineral and petroleum resources to be “the common heritage of all the people of South Africa” with the state as the custodian thereof.

Nigeria is endowed with a wide variety of economic minerals which are spread across all the geopolitical zones of the nation. The ownership, management and control of natural resources in Nigeria is enshrined in the Constitution, and recognized by the United Nations Organization (UN). In 1962, the General Assembly of the United Nations deliberated and adopted Resolution 1803, (xvii) titled “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources”. This resolution changed the ownership structure of natural resources from investor ownership to State control of natural resources. The Federal Government of Nigeria, being the owner of natural resources in Nigeria, by virtue of being a member of the United Nations, and a signatory to the treaty which has been transmuted into municipal law, formulates policies which guarantee it receives some compensation for allowing the extraction of these resources. Chief among these policies is the fiscal policy, which is aimed at ensuring that government acquires benefits from the mining of these resources, or simply referred to as taxation or the levying of tax. The legal regime of these fiscal policies is what this presentation seeks to examine, and shall be considered against the backdrop of the obstacles and challenges that mitigate the optimal realization of benefits to be accrued in its implementation, which may be parliamentary or judicial in nature. In doing this, the various extant tax laws on are examined. For clarity, Nigeria operates a presidential system of government and not a parliamentary one, and any reference to parliamentary here strictly means the legislative segment of the government.

Abstract In the post-colonial era, the newly emerging and independent states of Asia and Africa, supported by the developing world in South America, questioned the validity and legitimacy of norms of international law. Those norms were perceived to serve only the interests of the developed Western nations and were alien to the aspirations of the developing countries. International law has evolved over time, with a willingness to accept the viewpoint of new participants in the global process in a variety of contexts. These include the international protection of human rights and international law regarding the permanent sovereignty of nations over their natural wealth and resources. The interests of developing countries have been assimilated, though the extent to which this is done varies. A central message advanced is that the ultimate integrity of international law is the commonality and synthesis of the interests of all states, rich and poor, agricultural and industrial. The continuing contribution of developing countries, through their participation in conferences, negotiation of treaties and soft law texts, adds immeasurable strength to the current state and future development of international environmental law.

PT Freeport Indonesia (PT FI) has a Contract of Work (KK) to undertake mining materials in Grasberg and Ertsberg mining areas which has begun in 1967 and will end in 2021. Since the promulgation of Law No. 4 of 2009 on Mineral and Coal Mining (UU Minerba), regulation on mineral and coal undertaking has been in accordance with Pancasila (State Ideology) and the 1945 Constitution, however, because UU Minerba can only be effective for legal actions after its promulgation therefore items related to KK before the existence of that law cannot be regulated. On the other hand, the existence of KK of PT FI is considered to be in violation with Pancasila namely The Fifth Principle “Social Justice for The Whole People of Indonesia”, and Article 33 (3) of 1945 Constitution concerning the substance of land, water, and natural wealth ‘shall be controlled by the State’ and ‘for maximum use for people’s welfare’. This article shall discuss on whether KK of PT FI has been in accordance with Pancasila and the1945 Constitution? And what should Government do in order KK of PT FI can be regulated within the frame of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution? The method used in this writing is juridical normative. Based on the writer’s analysis, KK of PT FI is violating Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. The effort to adjust it to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution shall be conducted through renegotiation of KK of PT FI based on “hardship” principle in UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and principle of natural resources for national interest and people’s welfare in the Resolution of General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, “Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources.

Le patriotisme économique, souvent brandi comme un étendard afin de justifier l'intervention de l’État dans la sphère économique, est en cela une expression d'origine essentiellement politique. Ainsi ressort-il de manière régulière sur la scène médiatique française au gré d'offres publiques d'achat faites sur des fleurons nationaux. La traduction dans la sphère juridique de ce concept passe alors nécessairement par l'identification des instruments juridiques permettant sa mise en œuvre. Cette traduction se voit alors encadrée et dans une certaine mesure orientée par un impératif tenant à la détermination des limites du concept. Celui-ci n'a de sens, de manière autonome, que s'il parvient à se distinguer du protectionnisme. Dans cette optique, l'arsenal juridique du patriotisme économique désigne ainsi plus spécifiquement les moyens permettant à L’État de détenir un contrôle sur les entreprises qu'il juge « stratégiques » ou « essentielles » afin de veiller à garantir les intérêts nationaux vis-à-vis de prises de participation étrangères. De cette façon, le patriotisme économique s'affirme tant par son champ d'application, la protection de secteurs économiques stratégiques, que par son objet, en étant conçu à la lumière d'un élément tenant à l'extranéité, les capitaux étrangers. Dès lors, les instruments juridiques auxquels renvoie ce concept sont loin d'être propres à un État en particulier, bien au contraire. Étant donné qu'ils s'entendent sous le prisme de la souveraineté étatique, il s'agit même de se demander si leur mise en œuvre n'est pas inhérente à l’État. Parallèlement, la conception internationale de la souveraineté de l’État implique que celui-ci est libre de se limiter par la conclusion d'engagements internationaux. La construction européenne, caractérisant le processus dynamique d'édification d'une organisation d'intégration, est le fruit de l'exercice de cette souveraineté internationale. À mesure des transferts de compétences des États membres vers l'Union européenne, un point de jonction entre le patriotisme économique pratiqué par les États membres et la construction européenne s'est créé. Cette étude a donc pour objet d'étudier la dialectique entre le concept de patriotisme économique et la construction européenne, sous la forme d'une exigence de compatibilité. Cette dialectique doit alors s'analyser en miroir de la souveraineté de L’État. Si le patriotisme économique ne fait qu'exprimer la souveraineté territoriale et in fine la souveraineté interne de l’État, il porte en lui une certaine opposition au mouvement de libéralisation des échanges et des investissements, auquel l’État membre de l'Union européenne a lui-même consenti par le biais d'engagements internationaux. En cela des tensions peuvent être perceptibles entre la souveraineté interne et la souveraineté externe de l’État<br>On the one hand, economic patriotism is often merely a ploy, flourished to justify State intervention in the economy. That is why it is first of all a political expression. Therefore, the matter routinely appears in the French media through the takeover bids made on national champions. The expression into the legal sphere of this concept requires an identification of legal instruments, which will make possible its implementation. This definition is framed and coloured by the necessity to distinguish economic patriotism from protectionism. As a result, the legal definition of economic patriotism refers to the means for the State to keep some control over the companies that it considers "strategic" or "essential" to ensure national interests are not jeopardized by foreign ownership. Therefore economic patriotism is asserted both through its scope, the protection of strategic economic sectors, and through its purpose, as an answer to an external threat: foreign capital. In this way the legal instruments to which this concept refers are far from being specific to a particular State. Since they are understandable through the State sovereignty, one even wonders if their implementation is not inherent to the State. On the other hand, external sovereignty implies that the State is free to restrict itself by entering into international commitments. European construction characterizes the dynamic process, which aims to build an integration organization and therefore it is the result of the exercise by the State of this international sovereignty. Even as jurisdictions have been transferred from member states to the European Union, economic patriotism practiced by the member states gradually fell into European integration realm. This study aims to explore the dialectic between the concept of economic patriotism and European integration as a compatibility requirement. This dialectic must be analysed from the State sovereignty point of view. Economic patriotism expresses the State territorial sovereignty whereas European integration is the result of its external sovereignty, which notably led to liberalize trade and investments. Therefore, tensions may appear between internal and external State sovereignty

The resource curse is a defining feature of the African content. Despite vast resource wealth, Africa remains the poorest and most underdeveloped continent in the world. The aim of this study is to conduct a comparative analysis of the primary laws regulating of oil and gas exploration and product activities in Angola, Nigeria and South Africa in order to determine their effectiveness in protecting the continent's depleting petroleum resources. Different regulatory models apply to Angola, following the Norwegian carried-interest model, Nigeria, where a British discretionary model has been retained, an a South africa, where a unique model has been developed. The comparison is conducted by analysing and comparing these different regulatory systems in terms of legal frameworks; the legal nature of the regulatory systems; ownership of the oil and gas resources; legal nature of licenses; organisational or institutional structures; fiscal systems; local communities benefits from these proceeds of oil and gas resources; local content; state/government participation arrangements; and environmental challenges. The study evaluates the effectiveness of these regimes by examining the extent to which they recognise and enforce state ownership of he oil and gas resourcs in situ; recognise and enforce the doctrine of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSNR); protect the environment; how they provide for institutional capacities for the management of resources; and the protection of local communities from exploitation and abuse by recognising their rights to benefit from revenues derived from these resources. An overall assessment of the three systems reveals that there is no ideal model for oil and gas regulation in Africa. The Norwegian model might well be considered an ideal model if it was applied with care and correctly in Angola. The study hopes to gain practical importance for the proper regulationof the oil and gas industries' upstream activities in Africa and assist governments of the selected jurisdictions in their policy revisions, as some recommendations are made.<br>Economics<br>LLD.

The resource curse is a defining feature of the African content. Despite vast resource wealth, Africa remains the poorest and most underdeveloped continent in the world. The aim of this study is to conduct a comparative analysis of the primary laws regulating of oil and gas exploration and product activities in Angola, Nigeria and South Africa in order to determine their effectiveness in protecting the continent's depleting petroleum resources. Different regulatory models apply to Angola, following the Norwegian carried-interest model, Nigeria, where a British discretionary model has been retained, an a South africa, where a unique model has been developed. The comparison is conducted by analysing and comparing these different regulatory systems in terms of legal frameworks; the legal nature of the regulatory systems; ownership of the oil and gas resources; legal nature of licenses; organisational or institutional structures; fiscal systems; local communities benefits from these proceeds of oil and gas resources; local content; state/government participation arrangements; and environmental challenges. The study evaluates the effectiveness of these regimes by examining the extent to which they recognise and enforce state ownership of he oil and gas resourcs in situ; recognise and enforce the doctrine of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSNR); protect the environment; how they provide for institutional capacities for the management of resources; and the protection of local communities from exploitation and abuse by recognising their rights to benefit from revenues derived from these resources. An overall assessment of the three systems reveals that there is no ideal model for oil and gas regulation in Africa. The Norwegian model might well be considered an ideal model if it was applied with care and correctly in Angola. The study hopes to gain practical importance for the proper regulationof the oil and gas industries' upstream activities in Africa and assist governments of the selected jurisdictions in their policy revisions, as some recommendations are made.<br>Public, Constitutional and International Law<br>LL. D.

The status quo within international politics is that individual nation-states enjoy extensive and for the most part exclusive rights over the resources falling within their borders. Egalitarians have often assumed that such a situation cannot be defended, but perhaps some sophisticated defences of state or national rights over natural resources which have been made in recent years prove otherwise. This chapter critically assesses these various arguments, and shows that they are not sufficient to justify the institution of ‘permanent sovereignty’ over resources. Even insofar as those arguments have some weight, they are compatible with a significant dispersal of resource rights away from individual nation-states, both downwards towards local communities, and upwards towards transnational and global agencies.

The issue of sovereignty over natural resources has been a key element in the development of international law, notably leading to the emergence of the principle of States’ permanent sovereignty over their natural resources. However, concomitant to this focus on States’ sovereignty, international human rights law proclaims the right of peoples to self-determination over their natural resources. This has led to a complex and ambivalent relationship between the principle of States’ sovereignty over natural resources and peoples’ rights to natural resources. This chapter analyses this conflicting relationship and examines the emergence of the right of peoples to freely dispose of their natural resources and evaluates its potential role in contemporary advocacy. It notably explores how indigenous peoples have called for the revival of their right to sovereignty over natural resources, and how the global peasants’ movement has pushed for the recognition of the concept of food sovereignty.

Among the territorial rights states claim is the exclusive right to control, regulate, and manage the natural resources found within their territories, and sometimes to profit from their sale or taxation. This chapter investigates states’ sovereignty claims over natural resources. It defends a resource-sovereignty principle different from the permanent sovereignty doctrine as it exists in international law. The proposed alternative principle is primarily about jurisdiction, not ownership: it is a right to control resource management decisions. By investigating the case of forest conservation, the chapter also argues that in the case of certain global systemic resources, resource sovereignty should be constrained by duties of environmental justice that require cooperation in international institutions.

This chapter queries the history of the principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSNR), often heralded as a watershed moment of the push to decolonise international law. It shows that the principle has a much longer and more complicated history that places this principle’s origins in Latin America in the interwar period. While predating the movement for decolonisation in Africa and Asia, many of the same aspirations existed in the Americas: the push to control economic development through natural resources; protection against (neo)imperial forces; and an aspiration for international (economic law) world-making. Our counterfactual is that pre-PSNR pivotal moments in international legal history, such as the 1933 London Monetary and Economic Conference, and the Bogotá Economic Agreement of the Organization of American States, had they come into force, would have precluded the need for PSNR in the form we know today, and achieved the same objectives, but as an integral part of economic legal architecture, rather than the exception to it that PSNR is. Posing this counterfactual helps us query contingency by revealing the strength of path dependencies in international law, and that the precise formulation of ideas is incidental to their context and what is achievable, while closing down the possibilities of what international law can be. Therefore, shedding light on the baselines we take for granted in international law-making through (alternative or revisionist) history allows us to rescue functional equivalence and the creative possibilities of the field.