Journal articles on the topic 'Permanent state sovereignty over natural resourse'

Principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources (PSNR) in international law are regulated in UN General Assembly Resolution Number 1515 (XV) 15 December 1960, and Resolution Number 1803, 14 December 1962, which recognizes permanent sovereignty over natural resources. The fact is that Indonesia which is rich in natural resources is not fully sovereign of its natural resources. This is influenced by limited capital ownership and also limited human resources. Because permanent sovereignty over natural resources should be directly proportional to the welfare of the people of Indonesia. This paper uses normative research methods with a database in the form of library data, online surveys, and several related legal materials, then described descriptively, and interpreted comprehensively. In this context, the importance of management and management of natural resources by the state. Because it is closely related to the risks posed by the exploitation and exploration of natural resources on geological and political aspects. For this reason, it is very important for Indonesia to adopt principles in supporting the rule of law at regional, international and national levels and protect the sovereignty and interests of the country.

Despite the fact of moving gradually away from the traditional energy sources, and reducing the share of the energy from the coal-fired power stations in the energy production, extraction of minerals other than hard coal remains crucial for human existence. It is enough to mention natural gas, metal ores, metals, gypsum, sand, precious stones, or thermal waters. However, it is necessary to keep in mind that geology and nature do not recognise the national boundaries, which results in the fact that some mineral deposits can be divided between two or more state territories. This leads to the situation when they are subject to the varied legal regimes. There is also a possibility of them being located outsidethe sovereignty or jurisdiction of any state. There are still under-researched topics connected with mining. The aim of this study is to define legal issues related to cross-border mining, the so-called shared natural resources, and to present solutions to problems identified respectively. The second step, after analysis of the terms natural resources and shared natural resources, will involve an analysis of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources in rulings of international courts.

This work came up against the background of the contentious question and multiplicity of claims of ownership of natural resources located within a given state territory. The paper has addressed the question whether this claim legitimately inheres in the state as a sovereign or in the native inhabitants of the land area where the mineral resources are domiciled pursuant to the international right to self-determination. It is the finding that, among other things, the right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources is a legitimate one in international law. Notwithstanding, as the paper has concluded, only the legislature and the courts in any particular domestic jurisdiction can determine with finality the specific entity, institution, or unit within a state sovereign in whom this ultimate ownership resides.

In 1962, newly independent African states voted overwhelming in support of United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) on ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources’ (PSNR). This resolution emerged mainly in response to concerns about the protection of foreign direct investment (FDI) and economic development in developing countries. Although substantial legal scholarship has focused on PSNR, few studies have focused on conceptualising PSNR and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in Africa. This paper intends to fill this important research gap, by conceptualising PSNR as a threepronged principle that protects the rights of the state, investors and citizens. This paper examines the evolution of PSNR in the context of investment law in Africa through a textual analysis of treaty language in African investment treaties and as interpreted in natural resource-related investor-state disputes. This paper also examines the significance of Tanzania’s recently enacted Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act, 2017 (Sovereignty Act). The paper’s textual analysis reveals that unlike what is envisaged under Resolution 1803, dispute settlement clauses in treaties signed by African states do not provide for the exhaustion of local remedies. This paper argues that to attain ‘sustainable sovereignty’ over natural resources, African states must recognise the core of foreign investment protection law: pacta sunt servanda. Although the ‘new generation’ treaties constitute positive steps, to fully attain transformed development through the sustainable use of natural resources (as envisaged in Agenda 2063) treaty reform must be backed by good governance, informed natural resource investment contracts, the rule of law, and intra-regional investment. En 1962, les États africains nouvellement indépendants ont favorablement et massivement voté la Résolution 1803 (XVII) de l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies (ONU), sur la « souveraineté permanente des ressources naturelles » (SPRN). Cette Résolution a été adoptée en réponse aux préoccupations concernant la protection des investissements directs étrangers (IDE) et le développement économique des pays en voie de développement. Bien que le SPRN ait fait l’objet d’importantes études juridiques, peu d’études ont porté sur la conceptualisation des SPRN et les accords sur les différends entre investisseurs et États (ADIE) en Afrique. Cet article vise à combler cet important vide dans la recherche en conceptualisant les SPRN comme un principe à trois volets qui protège les droits de l’État, des investisseurs et des citoyens. Cet article analyse l’évolution des SPRN dans le contexte du droit à l’investissement en Afrique par une analyse textuelle du langage des traités dans les traités d’investissement africains et tel qu’interprété dans les différends entre investisseurs et États en relation avec les ressources naturelles. Cet article examine également l’importance de la récente promulgation en Tanzanie de la loi sur les Richesses et Ressources Naturelles (Souveraineté Permanente) de 2017 (Loi sur la Souveraineté). L’analyse textuelle de cet article révèle que contrairement à ce qui est envisagé dans la Résolution 1803, les clauses de règlement des différends contenues dans les traités signés par les États africains ne prévoient pas l’épuisement des recours internes. Cet article soutient que pour parvenir à la « souveraineté durable » sur les ressources naturelles, les États africains doivent reconnaître l’essence de la loi sur la protection des investissements étrangers : pacta sunt servanda. Bien que les traités de la « nouvelle génération » constituent des étapes positives pour parvenir à un développement pleinement transformé grâce à l’utilisation durable des ressources naturelles (comme prévu dans l’Agenda 2063), la réforme des traités doit être soutenue par une bonne gouvernance, des contrats réfléchis relatifs aux ressources naturelles, l’État de droit et les investissements intra régionaux.

This article examines the legal connections between the modern phenomenon of ‘land grabbing’ – large-scale acquisitions of land rights by foreign investors – and the human right to self-determination. It is argued that the right to self-determination and in particular the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources cannot only be invoked by one State against another, but also by the people against its own government, thus legally binding all States involved in the process. The basic premise shall not be that land grabbing is per se illegal; it depends on how it is performed. The right to self-determination and the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources bring along important restrictions that States have to honour. Governments should develop their foreign investment relations in a way that ensures the human rights of their populations, especially given the fact that in this respect business corporations are not bound by any hard international law. The regulation of the investment is an important factor: transparency and involvement of local authorities at the planning stage, as well as the participation in the investment’s benefits help to ensure that a people is not deprived of its own means of subsistence.

AbstractThis article makes the case for the obligation to conserve plant biodiversity to be classified as a common concern of humankind, to justify and indeed prescribe limitations on private intellectual property rights over plants and related processes. Within the biodiversity regime, the notion of ‘common concern of humankind’ subjects the permanent sovereignty of states over natural resources to the interests of humanity. It shifts the obligations of states from managing their own plant biodiversity towards conserving it on behalf of humankind. In contrast, TRIPS requires states to protect private intellectual property rights with little discretion to adequately balance them with public interests. This creates a dichotomy. This article argues that rather than mobilizing state sovereignty as rhetoric to distract from addressing common concerns of humankind, it should be constructed as a concept capable of facilitating these very concerns.

Abstract Development programs in many African countries include the reallocation of land and the nationalization of mineral resources for the benefit of less privileged communities in those countries. Implementing these programs is, however, quite complicated. This paper pays special attention to the confiscation of the land of white farmers in Zimbabwe as part of a development program, and the rapid decline of the economy of that country in consequence of this program. It serves as a reminder that depriving landowners of their property rights is counterproductive and is therefore not a feasible development strategy. As far as the right to explore natural resources is concerned, the paper highlights the repeated resolutions of the United Nations proclaiming the “inalienable right of all states freely to dispose of their natural resources in accordance with their national interests” as an inherent aspect of sovereignty [e.g. G.A. Res. 626, 7 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20), at 18, U.N. Doc. A/2361 (1952).], with occasional reminders that developing countries were in need of encouragement “in the proper use and exploitation of their natural wealth and resources” [e.g. E.S.C. Res. 1737, 54 U.N. ESCOR, Supp., No. 1 (1973).]. These resolutions were adopted in the context of the decolonization policy of the United Nations and were mainly aimed at denouncing the exploitation of the mineral resources of African countries by colonial powers [G.A. Res. 2288, 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16), at 48, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967)., para 3]. The emphasis of international law relating to the natural resources over time also emphasized the right to self-determination of peoples. As early as 1958, the General Assembly, in a resolution through which the Commission on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources was established, stated that the “permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources” of states is “a basic constituent of the right to self-determination” [G.A. Res. 1314, 13 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18), at 27, U.N. Doc. A/4090 (1958).]. The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights similarly provides “All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people be deprived of it” [Art 21(1)]. This provision featured prominently in several judgments of courts of law, such as the one of the South African Constitutional Court in the case of Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd & Others v Gemorah Resources (Pty) Ltd & Others [2011] (3) BCLR 229 (CC) (3) BCLR 229 (CC) and of the African Court of Human and People’s Rights in the case of Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) v Nigeria (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001), Communication 155/96, 15th Annual Report. AHRLR 60 (Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) v Nigeria (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001), Communication 155/96, 15th Annual Report.) Communication 155/96. In view of these directives of international law, the paper will critically analyze the South African Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002, which deprived landowners of the ownership of unexplored minerals and petroleum products and proclaimed mineral and petroleum resources to be “the common heritage of all the people of South Africa” with the state as the custodian thereof.

Nigeria is endowed with a wide variety of economic minerals which are spread across all the geopolitical zones of the nation. The ownership, management and control of natural resources in Nigeria is enshrined in the Constitution, and recognized by the United Nations Organization (UN). In 1962, the General Assembly of the United Nations deliberated and adopted Resolution 1803, (xvii) titled “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources”. This resolution changed the ownership structure of natural resources from investor ownership to State control of natural resources. The Federal Government of Nigeria, being the owner of natural resources in Nigeria, by virtue of being a member of the United Nations, and a signatory to the treaty which has been transmuted into municipal law, formulates policies which guarantee it receives some compensation for allowing the extraction of these resources. Chief among these policies is the fiscal policy, which is aimed at ensuring that government acquires benefits from the mining of these resources, or simply referred to as taxation or the levying of tax. The legal regime of these fiscal policies is what this presentation seeks to examine, and shall be considered against the backdrop of the obstacles and challenges that mitigate the optimal realization of benefits to be accrued in its implementation, which may be parliamentary or judicial in nature. In doing this, the various extant tax laws on are examined. For clarity, Nigeria operates a presidential system of government and not a parliamentary one, and any reference to parliamentary here strictly means the legislative segment of the government.

Abstract In the post-colonial era, the newly emerging and independent states of Asia and Africa, supported by the developing world in South America, questioned the validity and legitimacy of norms of international law. Those norms were perceived to serve only the interests of the developed Western nations and were alien to the aspirations of the developing countries. International law has evolved over time, with a willingness to accept the viewpoint of new participants in the global process in a variety of contexts. These include the international protection of human rights and international law regarding the permanent sovereignty of nations over their natural wealth and resources. The interests of developing countries have been assimilated, though the extent to which this is done varies. A central message advanced is that the ultimate integrity of international law is the commonality and synthesis of the interests of all states, rich and poor, agricultural and industrial. The continuing contribution of developing countries, through their participation in conferences, negotiation of treaties and soft law texts, adds immeasurable strength to the current state and future development of international environmental law.

PT Freeport Indonesia (PT FI) has a Contract of Work (KK) to undertake mining materials in Grasberg and Ertsberg mining areas which has begun in 1967 and will end in 2021. Since the promulgation of Law No. 4 of 2009 on Mineral and Coal Mining (UU Minerba), regulation on mineral and coal undertaking has been in accordance with Pancasila (State Ideology) and the 1945 Constitution, however, because UU Minerba can only be effective for legal actions after its promulgation therefore items related to KK before the existence of that law cannot be regulated. On the other hand, the existence of KK of PT FI is considered to be in violation with Pancasila namely The Fifth Principle “Social Justice for The Whole People of Indonesia”, and Article 33 (3) of 1945 Constitution concerning the substance of land, water, and natural wealth ‘shall be controlled by the State’ and ‘for maximum use for people’s welfare’. This article shall discuss on whether KK of PT FI has been in accordance with Pancasila and the1945 Constitution? And what should Government do in order KK of PT FI can be regulated within the frame of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution? The method used in this writing is juridical normative. Based on the writer’s analysis, KK of PT FI is violating Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. The effort to adjust it to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution shall be conducted through renegotiation of KK of PT FI based on “hardship” principle in UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and principle of natural resources for national interest and people’s welfare in the Resolution of General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, “Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources.

Modernity unfolds through the unrelenting exploitation, appropriation, and dispossession of human and natural substance; through the radical devaluation of nature, both human and extra-human; on hierarchy, racism, patriarchy, all in service to capitalist accumulation. A grasp of what lies at the base of one of the most important world-historical mechanisms of power formation and systemic reproduction that has hitherto kept the capitalist world-system/ecology going, hegemony, can be relevant for the formulation of new strategies of contention and practices of anti-systemic movements against this perverse mode of life organization. Such a grasp, thus, can be regarded as part of the anti-systemic program towards a more just society and ecologically-devoted humanity. Understanding how a hegemon can form and produce power can be conducive to the comprehension of how to jam or confront such a world-systemic mechanism, which is pivotal for the unabated expansion and reproduction of capitalism. This investigation endeavors to shed some light on this agency of world-historical power and systemic re/production. More to the point, it will posit a methodological way of reading and understanding the inner source and morphology of the hegemonic power. This paper, however, represents the spadework for further research. As we shall see, the complexity of the argument imposed a provisional “ecological expurgation”. As a consequence, nature will be silenced in Part I. The reasons for such a painful expurgation will be clear once we delve into the articulation of analysis and narrative. Such methodological and conceptual weakness is to be overcome through further research in Part II. It shall posit a complete hegemon’s perspective, namely, a world-ecological perspective on the hegemonic power. Part I, hence, will explore part of the material relational complexity that spawns hegemony in reality. On the present groundwork indeed, an understanding of the hegemonic power through post-Cartesian, that is, a world-ecological lens, could be unfolded to the fullest, both methodologically and historically. Provisional and fictional separation calls for permanent and lifelike reconstitution —which is the final aim of the research—. Part I will not engage in a traditional analysis of hegemony as a projection of power towards and onto world space. By contrast, it will deal with how a hegemon succeeds in projecting such power; that is, how the hegemon manages to internally generate power enough to make masses and states throughout the world captive and legible to the hegemon’s project of world leadership and historical development. What is seldom acknowledged is that a hegemon, before projecting power outward, must develop an internal formula. Hence, through this (provisional) methodological frame it will be argued that it is not simply an overt power that defines a hegemon, but its infra-structural power. More to the point, in Part I will posit the hegemon as a regime of power accumulation wherein state, capital and society work hand in glove with a particular degree of coherence developed within the established, or legal, boundaries of its territorial sovereignty. The internal organization of power that originates from this “coherent work” breeds hegemony, that is, the capacity to project power towards and onto world space. Part I purports to provide a way to explain analytically the hegemon’s organization, control, and logistics in order to understand sociospatial capacity for infrastructural power — a mode for investigating the tangled whole of powers, relations and networks that makes and permeates the fabric of the hegemon itself -. I would here hint at the world-ecological reading of the hegemon. In short: the world-ecological perspective of the Hegemon thinks of hegemonic power not solely as infra-structural power but as infra-relational power —meaning the capacity to historically design first, and then organize the project of power, science and nature by activating operations to harness the relational forces between humans and nature (as well as within both and their own inextricable intertwining) in service of capitalist power—. The hegemon is thus an organization of human-and-extra-human space that extensively and intensively re/produces, organizes, mobilizes and maximizes human-and-extra-human wealth, knowledge and interaction better than any other organization in the modern world-ecology. In short: before projecting power outward, the hegemon must develop a socioecological formula. Thus, from a complete hegemon’s perspective, hegemony is firstly an inner actual world-ecological design of the world. This is the idea behind the methodological and historical investigation of world-ecology to be carried out. Part I maintains that hegemonic power is the product of a trialectic unity of state, capital and society in which multiple overlapping and intersecting spatial networks of power, and the attendant immanent relations, are viewed as constitutive of the working totality. A hegemon deploys the most coherent – efficient and effective – design and operationalization of infrastructural power. Complementary then, hegemonic infrastructural power is to be also seen as the specifically-organic product and conflation of extensive and intensive power – firstly, within its own legal space and borders. The hegemon is a regime of power accumulation that extensively and intensively re/produces, organizes, mobilizes, and maximizes wealth, knowledge and interaction better than any other organization in the modern world-system. Hence, compared to any other jurisdiction that vies with it, a hegemonic regime manages to generate and combine the highest organizational cooperation (put simply: cooperation among the largest number of people with and through the most expansive management of resources – extensive power) with the greatest organizational command (put simply: the highest level of commitment from participants and utilization of resources – intensive power). The investigation of networks and relations, (bundled by) extensive and intensive power, is, in short, the method being argued for. As a whole, this will allow us to see the socio-spatial dynamic of infrastructural power production and to account for (the coherence of) the hegemon’s structure – the hegemony’s source. Finally, this is to prepare the ground, on the one hand, for the factual analysis of the hegemons’ historical development, since it purports to provide a useful framework to investigate the hegemons’ historical organization as well as the manifold web of power relations contained within it. On the other, it provides, as a whole, the springboard through which to unfold the world-ecological perspective on the hegemon, both methodologically and historically.

This article aims to discuss the relationship between the Supreme Court of Brazil and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, especially in Belo Monte Dam Case, bearing in mind that whendisagreements occur States must cooperate to avoid transboundary or global environmental problems. The classic concepts of nation-state sovereignty resulted from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources based on territorial integrity and the right to self-determination and non-intervention of theStates is guaranteed by the main international instruments. Similarly, the International Environmental Law, structured on the unquestionableright of an ecological balance, is a standard to be followed by the international community to guarantee that environmental damages do not cause harm to areas beyond the limits of the State. Thus theStates have the sovereign right over it owns resources, but have also the responsibility to ensure the environment protection. Therefore, this essay intends to demonstrate, particularly under the influence of Jeremy Waldron, Rosalind Dixon, John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas conceptions, that in the Belo Monte Dam Case, the dialogue betweenDomestic and International institutions according to the international cooperation is mandatory to guarantee coherence and unity to the new millennium international system.

AbstractTen states have created natural-resource-based Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) to allow a fraction of the wealth derived from the extraction of non-renewable resources to be available for future use. Minnesota does not have a SWF, even though companies have been mining in the state for over 100 years. Herein, we present backward and forward-looking scenarios to estimate the potential magnitude of a “what-if” extraction-based fund. A 1.5% of value tax is suggested as an SWF funding mechanism. Based on historical extraction, prices, and investment returns, a large SWF could already exist. In the forward-looking section, we begin by econometrically estimating the supply and demand of US iron ore production to better understand how an increase in mining taxes would likely effect mining output (i.e., the production effect). After accounting for an estimated 4% production loss, results suggest enough minerals could still be extracted to create a permanent fund with between $930 million (US) and $1.6 billion dollars (US) in direct contributions by 2050 (depending on price). Using reasonable assumptions of a 2% inflation rate and a 5% annual investment return, the fund size could range from $3 billion to $5 billion by 2050.

IntroductionTasmania hangs from the map of Australia like a drop in freefall from the substance of the mainland. Often the whole state is mislaid from Australian maps and logos (Reddit). Tasmania has, at least since federation, been considered peripheral—a region seen as isolated, a ‘problem’ economically, politically, and culturally. However, Tasmania not only cleaves to the ‘north island’ of Australia but is also subject to the gravitational pull of an even greater land mass—Antarctica. In this article, we upturn the political conventions of map-making that place both Antarctica and Tasmania in obscure positions at the base of the globe. We show how a changing global climate re-frames Antarctica and the Southern Ocean as key drivers of worldwide environmental shifts. The liquid and solid water between Tasmania and Antarctica is revealed not as a homogenous barrier, but as a dynamic and relational medium linking the Tasmanian archipelago with Antarctica. When Antarctica becomes the focus, the script is flipped: Tasmania is no longer on the edge, but core to a network of gateways into the southern land. The state’s capital of Hobart can from this perspective be understood as an “Antarctic city”, central to the geopolitics, economy, and culture of the frozen continent (Salazar et al.). Viewed from the south, we argue, Tasmania is not a problem, but an opportunity for a form of ecological, cultural, economic, and political sustainability that opens up the southern continent to science, discovery, and imagination.A Centre at the End of the Earth? Tasmania as ParadoxThe islands of Tasmania owe their existence to climate change: a period of warming at the end of the last ice age melted the vast sheets of ice covering the polar regions, causing sea levels to rise by more than one hundred metres (Tasmanian Climate Change Office 8). Eleven thousand years ago, Aboriginal people would have witnessed the rise of what is now called Bass Strait, turning what had been a peninsula into an archipelago, with the large island of Tasmania at its heart. The heterogeneous practices and narratives of Tasmanian regional identity have been shaped by the geography of these islands, and their connection to the Southern Ocean and Antarctica. Regions, understood as “centres of collective consciousness and sociospatial identities” (Paasi 241) are constantly reproduced and reimagined through place-based social practices and communications over time. As we will show, diverse and contradictory narratives of Tasmanian regionality often co-exist, interacting in complex and sometimes complementary ways. Ecocritical literary scholar C.A. Cranston considers duality to be embedded in the textual construction of Tasmania, writing “it was hell, it was heaven, it was penal, it was paradise” (29). Tasmania is multiply polarised: it is both isolated and connected; close and far away; rich in resources and poor in capital; the socially conservative birthplace of radical green politics (Hay 60). The weather, as if sensing the fine balance of these paradoxes, blows hot and cold at a moment’s notice.Tasmania has wielded extraordinary political influence at times in its history—notably during the settlement of Melbourne in 1835 (Boyce), and during protests against damming the Franklin River in the early 1980s (Mercer). However, twentieth-century historical and political narratives of Tasmania portray the Bass Strait as a barrier, isolating Tasmanians from the mainland (Harwood 61). Sir Bede Callaghan, who headed one of a long line of federal government inquiries into “the Tasmanian problem” (Harwood 106), was clear that Tasmania was a victim of its own geography:the major disability facing the people of Tasmania (although some residents may consider it an advantage) is that Tasmania is an island. Separation from the mainland adversely affects the economy of the State and the general welfare of the people in many ways. (Callaghan 3)This perspective may stem from the fact that Tasmania has maintained the lowest Gross Domestic Product per capita of all states since federation (Bureau of Infrastructure Transport and Regional Economics 9). Socially, economically, and culturally, Tasmania consistently ranks among the worst regions of Australia. Statistical comparisons with other parts of Australia reveal the population’s high unemployment, low wages, poor educational outcomes, and bad health (West 31). The state’s remoteness and isolation from the mainland states and its reliance on federal income have contributed to the whole of Tasmania, including Hobart, being classified as ‘regional’ by the Australian government, in an attempt to promote immigration and economic growth (Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development 1). Tasmania is indeed both regional and remote. However, in this article we argue that, while regionality may be cast as a disadvantage, the island’s remote location is also an asset, particularly when viewed from a far southern perspective (Image 1).Image 1: Antarctica (Orthographic Projection). Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons, Modified Shading of Tasmania and Addition of Captions by H. Nielsen.Connecting Oceans/Collapsing DistanceTasmania and Antarctica have been closely linked in the past—the future archipelago formed a land bridge between Antarctica and northern land masses until the opening of the Tasman Seaway some 32 million years ago (Barker et al.). The far south was tangible to the Indigenous people of the island in the weather blowing in from the Southern Ocean, while the southern lights, or “nuyina”, formed a visible connection (Australia’s new icebreaker vessel is named RSV Nuyina in recognition of these links). In the contemporary Australian imagination, Tasmania tends to be defined by its marine boundaries, the sea around the islands represented as flat, empty space against which to highlight the topography of its landscape and the isolation of its position (Davies et al.). A more relational geographic perspective illuminates the “power of cross-currents and connections” (Stratford et al. 273) across these seascapes. The sea country of Tasmania is multiple and heterogeneous: the rough, shallow waters of the island-scattered Bass Strait flow into the Tasman Sea, where the continental shelf descends toward an abyssal plain studded with volcanic seamounts. To the south, the Southern Ocean provides nutrient-rich upwellings that attract fish and cetacean populations. Tasmania’s coast is a dynamic, liminal space, moving and changing in response to the global currents that are driven by the shifting, calving and melting ice shelves and sheets in Antarctica.Oceans have long been a medium of connection between Tasmania and Antarctica. In the early colonial period, when the seas were the major thoroughfares of the world and inland travel was treacherous and slow, Tasmania’s connection with the Southern Ocean made it a valuable hub for exploration and exploitation of the south. Between 1642 and 1900, early European explorers were followed by British penal colonists, convicts, sealers, and whalers (Kriwoken and Williamson 93). Tasmania was well known to polar explorers, with expeditions led by Jules Dumont d’Urville, James Clark Ross, Roald Amundsen, and Douglas Mawson all transiting through the port of Hobart. Now that the city is no longer a whaling hub, growing populations of cetaceans continue to migrate past the islands on their annual journeys from the tropics, across the Sub-Antarctic Front and Antarctic circumpolar current, and into the south polar region, while southern species such as leopard seals are occasionally seen around Tasmania (Tasmania Parks and Wildlife). Although the water surrounding Tasmania and Antarctica is at times homogenised as a ‘barrier’, rendering these places isolated, the bodies of water that surround both are in fact permeable, and regularly crossed by both humans and marine species. The waters are diverse in their physical characteristics, underlying topography, sea life, and relationships, and serve to connect many different ocean regions, ecosystems, and weather patterns.Views from the Far SouthWhen considered in terms of its relative proximity to Antarctic, rather than its distance from Australia’s political and economic centres, Tasmania’s identity undergoes a significant shift. A sign at Cockle Creek, in the state’s far south, reminds visitors that they are closer to Antarctica than to Cairns, invoking a discourse of connectedness that collapses the standard ten-day ship voyage to Australia’s closest Antarctic station into a unit comparable with the routinely scheduled 5.5 hour flight to North Queensland. Hobart is the logistical hub for the Australian Antarctic Division and the French Institut Polaire Francais (IPEV), and has hosted Antarctic vessels belonging to the USA, South Korea, and Japan in recent years. From a far southern perspective, Hobart is not a regional Australian capital but a global polar hub. This alters the city’s geographic imaginary not only in a latitudinal sense—from “top down” to “bottom up”—but also a longitudinal one. Via its southward connection to Antarctica, Hobart is also connected east and west to four other recognized gateways: Cape Town in South Africa, Christchurch in New Zealand; Punta Arenas in Chile; and Ushuaia in Argentina (Image 2). The latter cities are considered small by international standards, but play an outsized role in relation to Antarctica.Image 2: H. Nielsen with a Sign Announcing Distances between Antarctic ‘Gateway’ Cities and Antarctica, Ushuaia, Argentina, 2018. Image Credit: Nicki D'Souza.These five cities form what might be called—to adapt geographer Klaus Dodds’ term—a ‘Southern Rim’ around the South Polar region (Dodds Geopolitics). They exist in ambiguous relationship to each other. Although the five cities signed a Statement of Intent in 2009 committing them to collaboration, they continue to compete vigorously for northern hemisphere traffic and the brand identity of the most prominent global gateway. A state government brochure spruiks Hobart, for example, as the “perfect Antarctic Gateway” emphasising its uniqueness and “natural advantages” in this regard (Tasmanian Government, 2016). In practice, the cities are automatically differentiated by their geographic position with respect to Antarctica. Although the ‘ice continent’ is often conceived as one entity, it too has regions, in both scientific and geographical senses (Terauds and Lee; Antonello). Hobart provides access to parts of East Antarctica, where the Australian, French, Japanese, and Chinese programs (among others) have bases; Cape Town is a useful access point for Europeans going to Dronning Maud Land; Christchurch is closest to the Ross Sea region, site of the largest US base; and Punta Arenas and Ushuaia neighbour the Antarctic Peninsula, home to numerous bases as well as a thriving tourist industry.The Antarctic sector is important to the Tasmanian economy, contributing $186 million (AUD) in 2017/18 (Wells; Gutwein; Tasmanian Polar Network). Unsurprisingly, Tasmania’s gateway brand has been actively promoted, with the 2016 Australian Antarctic Strategy and 20 Year Action Plan foregrounding the need to “Build Tasmania’s status as the premier East Antarctic Gateway for science and operations” and the state government releasing a “Tasmanian Antarctic Gateway Strategy” in 2017. The Chinese Antarctic program has been a particular focus: a Memorandum of Understanding focussed on Australia and China’s Antarctic relations includes a “commitment to utilise Australia, including Tasmania, as an Antarctic ‘gateway’.” (Australian Antarctic Division). These efforts towards a closer relationship with China have more recently come under attack as part of a questioning of China’s interests in the region (without, it should be noted, a concomitant questioning of Australia’s own considerable interests) (Baker 9). In these exchanges, a global power and a state of Australia generally classed as regional and peripheral are brought into direct contact via the even more remote Antarctic region. This connection was particularly visible when Chinese President Xi Jinping travelled to Hobart in 2014, in a visit described as both “strategic” and “incongruous” (Burden). There can be differences in how this relationship is narrated to domestic and international audiences, with issues of sovereignty and international cooperation variously foregrounded, laying the ground for what Dodds terms “awkward Antarctic nationalism” (1).Territory and ConnectionsThe awkwardness comes to a head in Tasmania, where domestic and international views of connections with the far south collide. Australia claims sovereignty over almost 6 million km2 of the Antarctic continent—a claim that in area is “roughly the size of mainland Australia minus Queensland” (Bergin). This geopolitical context elevates the importance of a regional part of Australia: the claims to Antarctic territory (which are recognised only by four other claimant nations) are performed not only in Antarctic localities, where they are made visible “with paraphernalia such as maps, flags, and plaques” (Salazar 55), but also in Tasmania, particularly in Hobart and surrounds. A replica of Mawson’s Huts in central Hobart makes Australia’s historic territorial interests in Antarctica visible an urban setting, foregrounding the figure of Douglas Mawson, the well-known Australian scientist and explorer who led the expeditions that proclaimed Australia’s sovereignty in the region of the continent roughly to its south (Leane et al.). Tasmania is caught in a balancing act, as it fosters international Antarctic connections (such hosting vessels from other national programs), while also playing a key role in administering what is domestically referred to as the Australian Antarctic Territory. The rhetoric of protection can offer common ground: island studies scholar Godfrey Baldacchino notes that as island narratives have moved “away from the perspective of the ‘explorer-discoverer-colonist’” they have been replaced by “the perspective of the ‘custodian-steward-environmentalist’” (49), but reminds readers that a colonising disposition still lurks beneath the surface. It must be remembered that terms such as “stewardship” and “leadership” can undertake sovereignty labour (Dodds “Awkward”), and that Tasmania’s Antarctic connections can be mobilised for a range of purposes. When Environment Minister Greg Hunt proclaimed at a press conference that: “Hobart is the gateway to the Antarctic for the future” (26 Apr. 2016), the remark had meaning within discourses of both sovereignty and economics. Tasmania’s capital was leveraged as a way to position Australia as a leader in the Antarctic arena.From ‘Gateway’ to ‘Antarctic City’While discussion of Antarctic ‘Gateway’ Cities often focuses on the economic and logistical benefit of their Antarctic connections, Hobart’s “gateway” identity, like those of its counterparts, stretches well beyond this, encompassing geological, climatic, historical, political, cultural and scientific links. Even the southerly wind, according to cartoonist Jon Kudelka, “has penguins in it” (Image 3). Hobart residents feel a high level of connection to Antarctica. In 2018, a survey of 300 randomly selected residents of Greater Hobart was conducted under the umbrella of the “Antarctic Cities” Australian Research Council Linkage Project led by Assoc. Prof. Juan Francisco Salazar (and involving all three present authors). Fourteen percent of respondents reported having been involved in an economic activity related to Antarctica, and 36% had attended a cultural event about Antarctica. Connections between the southern continent and Hobart were recognised as important: 71.9% agreed that “people in my city can influence the cultural meanings that shape our relationship to Antarctica”, while 90% agreed or strongly agreed that Hobart should play a significant role as a custodian of Antarctica’s future, and 88.4% agreed or strongly agreed that: “How we treat Antarctica is a test of our approach to ecological sustainability.” Image 3: “The Southerly” Demonstrates How Weather Connects Hobart and Antarctica. Image Credit: Jon Kudelka, Reproduced with Permission.Hobart, like the other gateways, activates these connections in its conscious place-branding. The city is particularly strong as a centre of Antarctic research: signs at the cruise-ship terminal on the waterfront claim that “There are more Antarctic scientists based in Hobart […] than at any other one place on earth, making Hobart a globally significant contributor to our understanding of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean.” Researchers are based at the Institute for Marine and Antarctic Studies (IMAS), the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), and the Australian Antarctic Division (AAD), with several working between institutions. Many Antarctic researchers located elsewhere in the world also have a connection with the place through affiliations and collaborations, leading journalist Jo Chandler to assert that “the breadth and depth of Hobart’s knowledge of ice, water, and the life forms they nurture […] is arguably unrivalled anywhere in the world” (86).Hobart also plays a significant role in Antarctica’s governance, as the site of the secretariats for the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) and the Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels (ACAP), and as host of the Antarctic Consultative Treaty Meetings on more than one occasion (1986, 2012). The cultural domain is active, with Tasmanian Museum and Art Gallery (TMAG) featuring a permanent exhibit, “Islands to Ice”, emphasising the ocean as connecting the two places; the Mawson’s Huts Replica Museum aiming (among other things) to “highlight Hobart as the gateway to the Antarctic continent for the Asia Pacific region”; and a biennial Australian Antarctic Festival drawing over twenty thousand visitors, about a sixth of them from interstate or overseas (Hingley). Antarctic links are evident in the city’s natural and built environment: the dolerite columns of Mt Wellington, the statue of the Tasmanian Antarctic explorer Louis Bernacchi on the waterfront, and the wharfs that regularly accommodate icebreakers such as the Aurora Australis and the Astrolabe. Antarctica is figured as a southern neighbour; as historian Tom Griffiths puts it, Tasmanians “grow up with Antarctica breathing down their necks” (5). As an Antarctic City, Hobart mediates access to Antarctica both physically and in the cultural imaginary.Perhaps in recognition of the diverse ways in which a region or a city might be connected to Antarctica, researchers have recently been suggesting critical approaches to the ‘gateway’ label. C. Michael Hall points to a fuzziness in the way the term is applied, noting that it has drifted from its initial definition (drawn from economic geography) as denoting an access and supply point to a hinterland that produces a certain level of economic benefits. While Hall looks to keep the term robustly defined to avoid empty “local boosterism” (272–73), Gabriela Roldan aims to move the concept “beyond its function as an entry and exit door”, arguing that, among other things, the local community should be actively engaged in the Antarctic region (57). Leane, examining the representation of Hobart as a gateway in historical travel texts, concurs that “ingress and egress” are insufficient descriptors of Tasmania’s relationship with Antarctica, suggesting that at least discursively the island is positioned as “part of an Antarctic rim, itself sharing qualities of the polar region” (45). The ARC Linkage Project described above, supported by the Hobart City Council, the State Government and the University of Tasmania, as well as other national and international partners, aims to foster the idea of the Hobart and its counterparts as ‘Antarctic cities’ whose citizens act as custodians for the South Polar region, with a genuine concern for and investment in its future.Near and Far: Local Perspectives A changing climate may once again herald a shift in the identity of the Tasmanian islands. Recognition of the central role of Antarctica in regulating the global climate has generated scientific and political re-evaluation of the region. Antarctica is not only the planet’s largest heat sink but is the engine of global water currents and wind patterns that drive weather patterns and biodiversity across the world (Convey et al. 543). For example, Tas van Ommen’s research into Antarctic glaciology shows the tangible connection between increased snowfall in coastal East Antarctica and patterns of drought southwest Western Australia (van Ommen and Morgan). Hobart has become a global centre of marine and Antarctic science, bringing investment and development to the city. As the global climate heats up, Tasmania—thanks to its low latitude and southerly weather patterns—is one of the few regions in Australia likely to remain temperate. This is already leading to migration from the mainland that is impacting house prices and rental availability (Johnston; Landers 1). The region’s future is therefore closely entangled with its proximity to the far south. Salazar writes that “we cannot continue to think of Antarctica as the end of the Earth” (67). Shifting Antarctica into focus also brings Tasmania in from the margins. As an Antarctic city, Hobart assumes a privileged positioned on the global stage. This allows the city to present itself as central to international research efforts—in contrast to domestic views of the place as a small regional capital. The city inhabits dual identities; it is both on the periphery of Australian concerns and at the centre of Antarctic activity. Tasmania, then, is not in freefall, but rather at the forefront of a push to recognise Antarctica as entangled with its neighbours to the north.AcknowledgementsThis work was supported by the Australian Research Council under LP160100210.ReferencesAntonello, Alessandro. “Finding Place in Antarctica.” Antarctica and the Humanities. Eds. Peder Roberts, Lize-Marie van der Watt, and Adrian Howkins. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. 181–204.Australian Government. Australian Antarctic Strategy and 20 Year Action Plan. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2016. 15 Apr. 2019. <http://www.antarctica.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/180827/20YearStrategy_final.pdf>.Australian Antarctic Division. “Australia-China Collaboration Strengthens.” Australian Antarctic Magazine 27 Dec. 2014. 15 Apr. 2019. <http://www.antarctica.gov.au/magazine/2011-2015/issue-27-december-2014/in-brief/australia-china-collaboration-strengthens>.Baker, Emily. “Worry at Premier’s Defence of China.” The Mercury 15 Sep. 2018: 9.Baldacchino, G. “Studying Islands: On Whose Terms?” Island Studies Journal 3.1 (2008): 37–56.Barker, Peter F., Gabriel M. Filippelli, Fabio Florindo, Ellen E. Martin, and Howard D. Schere. “Onset and Role of the Antarctic Circumpolar Current.” Deep Sea Research Part II: Topical Studies in Oceanography. 54.21–22 (2007): 2388–98.Bergin, Anthony. “Australia Needs to Strengthen Its Strategic Interests in Antarctica.” Australian Strategic Policy Institute. 29 Apr. 2016. 21 Feb. 2019 <https://www.aspi.org.au/index.php/opinion/australia-needs-strengthen-its-strategic-interests-antarctica>.Boyce, James. 1835: The Founding of Melbourne and the Conquest of Australia. Melbourne: Black Inc., 2011.Burden, Hilary. “Xi Jinping's Tasmania Visit May Seem Trivial, But Is Full of Strategy.” The Guardian 18 Nov. 2014. 19 May 2019 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/18/xi-jinpings-tasmania-visit-lacking-congruity-full-of-strategy>.Bureau of Infrastructure Transport and Regional Economics (BITRE). A Regional Economy: A Case Study of Tasmania. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2008. 14 May 2019 <http://www.bitre.gov.au/publications/86/Files/report116.pdf>.Chandler, Jo. “The Science Laboratory: From Little Things, Big Things Grow.” Griffith Review: Tasmania: The Tipping Point? 29 (2013) 83–101.Christchurch City Council. Statement of Intent between the Southern Rim Gateway Cities to the Antarctic: Ushuaia, Punta Arenas, Christchurch, Hobart and Cape Town. 25 Sep. 2009. 11 Apr. 2019 <http://archived.ccc.govt.nz/Council/proceedings/2009/September/CnclCover24th/Clause8Attachment.pdf>.Convey, P., R. Bindschadler, G. di Prisco, E. Fahrbach, J. Gutt, D.A. Hodgson, P.A. Mayewski, C.P. Summerhayes, J. Turner, and ACCE Consortium. “Antarctic Climate Change and the Environment.” Antarctic Science 21.6 (2009): 541–63.Cranston, C. “Rambling in Overdrive: Travelling through Tasmanian Literature.” Tasmanian Historical Studies 8.2 (2003): 28–39.Davies, Lynn, Margaret Davies, and Warren Boyles. Mapping Van Diemen’s Land and the Great Beyond: Rare and Beautiful Maps from the Royal Society of Tasmania. Hobart: The Royal Society of Tasmania, 2018.Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development. Guidelines for Analysing Regional Australia Impacts and Developing a Regional Australia Impact Statement. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2017. 11 Apr. 2019 <https://regional.gov.au/regional/information/rais/>.Dodds, Klaus. “Awkward Antarctic Nationalism: Bodies, Ice Cores and Gateways in and beyond Australian Antarctic Territory/East Antarctica.” Polar Record 53.1 (2016): 16–30.———. Geopolitics in Antarctica: Views from the Southern Oceanic Rim. Chichester: John Wiley, 1997.Griffiths, Tom. “The Breath of Antarctica.” Tasmanian Historical Studies 11 (2006): 4–14.Gutwein, Peter. “Antarctic Gateway Worth $186 Million to Tasmanian Economy.” Hobart: Tasmanian Government, 20 Feb. 2019. 21 Feb. 2019 <http://www.premier.tas.gov.au/releases/antarctic_gateway_worth_$186_million_to_tasmanian_economy>.Hall, C. Michael. “Polar Gateways: Approaches, Issues and Review.” The Polar Journal 5.2 (2015): 257–77. Harwood Andrew. “The Political Constitution of Islandness: The ‘Tasmanian Problem’ and Ten Days on the Island.” PhD Thesis. U of Tasmania, 2011. <http://eprints.utas.edu.au/11855/%5Cninternal-pdf://5288/11855.html>.Hay, Peter. “Destabilising Tasmanian Politics: The Key Role of the Greens.” Bulletin of the Centre for Tasmanian Historical Studies 3.2 (1991): 60–70.Hingley, Rebecca. Personal Communication, 28 Nov. 2018.Johnston, P. “Is the First Wave of Climate Migrants Landing in Hobart?” The Fifth Estate 11 Sep. 2018. 15 Mar. 2019 <https://www.thefifthestate.com.au/urbanism/climate-change-news/climate-migrants-landing-hobart>.Kriwoken, L., and J. Williamson. “Hobart, Tasmania: Antarctic and Southern Ocean Connections.” Polar Record 29.169 (1993): 93–102.Kudelka, John. “The Southerly.” Kudelka Cartoons. 27 Jun. 2014. 21 Feb. 2019 <https://www.kudelka.com.au/2014/06/the-southerly/>.Leane, E., T. Winter, and J.F. Salazar. “Caught between Nationalism and Internationalism: Replicating Histories of Antarctica in Hobart.” International Journal of Heritage Studies 22.3 (2016): 214–27. Leane, Elizabeth. “Tasmania from Below: Antarctic Travellers’ Accounts of a Southern ‘Gateway’.” Studies in Travel Writing 20.1 (2016): 34-48.Mawson’s Huts Replica Museum. “Mission Statement.” 15 Apr. 2019 <http://www.mawsons-huts-replica.org.au/>.Mercer, David. "Australia's Constitution, Federalism and the ‘Tasmanian Dam Case’." Political Geography Quarterly 4.2 (1985): 91–110.Paasi, A. “Deconstructing Regions: Notes on the Scales of Spatial Life.” Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space 23.2 (1991) 239–56.Reddit. “Maps without Tasmania.” 15 Apr. 2019 <https://www.reddit.com/r/MapsWithoutTasmania/>.Roldan, Gabriela. “'A Door to the Ice?: The Significance of the Antarctic Gateway Cities Today.” Journal of Antarctic Affairs 2 (2015): 57–70.Salazar, Juan Francisco. “Geographies of Place-Making in Antarctica: An Ethnographic Epproach.” The Polar Journal 3.1 (2013): 53–71.———, Elizabeth Leane, Liam Magee, and Paul James. “Five Cities That Could Change the Future of Antarctica.” The Conversation 5 Oct. 2016. 19 May 2019 <https://theconversation.com/five-cities-that-could-change-the-future-of-antarctica-66259>.Stratford, Elaine, Godfrey Baldacchino, Elizabeth McMahon, Carol Farbotko, and Andrew Harwood. “Envisioning the Archipelago.” Island Studies Journal 6.2 (2011): 113–30.Tasmanian Climate Change Office. Derivation of the Tasmanian Sea Level Rise Planning Allowances. Aug. 2012. 17 Apr. 2019 <http://www.dpac.tas.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/176331/Tasmanian_SeaLevelRisePlanningAllowance_TechPaper_Aug2012.pdf>.Tasmanian Government Department of State Growth. “Tasmanian Antarctic Gateway Strategy.” Hobart: Tasmanian Government, 12 Dec. 2017. 21 Feb. 2019 <https://www.antarctic.tas.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/164749/Tasmanian_Antarctic_Gateway_Strategy_12_Dec_2017.pdf>.———. “Tasmania Delivers…” Apr. 2016. 15 Apr. 2019 <https://www.antarctic.tas.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/66461/Tasmania_Delivers_Antarctic_Southern_Ocean_web.pdf>.———. “Antarctic Tasmania.” 17 Feb. 2019. 15 Apr. 2019 <https://www.antarctic.tas.gov.au/about/hobarts_antarctic_attractions>.Tasmanian Polar Network. “Welcome to the Tasmanian Polar Network.” 28 Feb. 2019 <https://www.tasmanianpolarnetwork.com.au/>.Terauds, Aleks, and Jasmine Lee. “Antarctic Biogeography Revisited: Updating the Antarctic Conservation Biogeographic Regions.” Diversity and Distributions 22 (2016): 836–40.Van Ommen, Tas, and Vin Morgan. “Snowfall Increase in Coastal East Antarctica Linked with Southwest Western Australian Drought.” Nature Geoscience 3 (2010): 267–72.Wells Economic Analysis. The Contribution of the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Sector to the Tasmanian Economy 2017. 18 Nov. 2018. 15 Apr. 2019 <https://www.stategrowth.tas.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/185671/Wells_Report_on_the_Value_of_the_Antarctic_Sector_2017_18.pdf>.West, J. “Obstacles to Progress: What’s Wrong with Tasmania, Really?” Griffith Review: Tasmania: The Tipping Point? 39 (2013): 31–53.

(Views of Major General S B Asthana,SM,VSM, (Veteran), Questioned by Jiangtao Shi of South China Morning Post on 29 August 2017.Question 1 (SCMP)Are you surprised that the over 70-day military standoff ended all of a sudden just days ahead of PM Narendra Modi’s trip to China for the BRICS summit? The deliberate ambiguity in both sides’ statements seems to indicate that both sides were willing to make some kind of concessions in a bid to end the dispute in a mutually acceptable face-saving manner. What are the main reasons and factors behind the seemingly peaceful solution for China and India respectively? (For China , BRICS and the 19th party congress? For India, domestic political support and economic reform?)Answer 1 by Major General S B AsthanaI am not really surprised that the over 70-day military standoff ended all of a sudden just days ahead of PM Narendra Modi’s trip to China for the BRICS summit. As you have rightly pointed out, both sides (China and India) were looking for an opportunity for a face saving resolution, without appearing to be weak domestically. The likelihood of absence of PM Modi in BRICS Summit, and its resultant political and diplomatic cost, triggered that opportunity. In my opinion, the main reasons behind such a sudden resolution were:-Any escalation beyond the point of standoff as on 28 August could have been cost prohibitive in terms of economical engagement, political and diplomatic cost, human casualties, without any worthwhile gains for both sides. Prolonging it was not in the national interest of either of the country.Success of BRICS is important for all member countries including China. China refusal to talk without precondition of Indian withdrawal and repeated provocative statements was exhibiting its arrogance. This wasn’t going well with global community, besides giving an indirect message to all including BRICS, about its hegemonic intentions and poor diplomatic acumen. Even US and Japan, who were not involved with Doklam, chose to state that both must talk to resolve it. The fact that China did not accept ICA verdict, continued aggressive posturing in South China Sea, violated 2012 Agreement in Doklam Triangle, and was seen as not doing enough to implement UN obligation against North Korea. It was affecting its global image adversely, hence some midcourse correction was needed, which has been done through this adjustment.An India China conflict, besides shattering dreams of economic prosperity of both countries, could have escalated to international dimensions, more so with ongoing problems of North Korea and South China Sea, and turbulence in Af- Pak Region. The fact that both are nuclear states cannot be discounted in strategic calculus of escalation dynamics.Militarily the escalation dynamics was not thought through. If war gamed properly, the escalation would have resulted in stalemate, which would have damaged the image of President Xi Jinping and reduced his chances for getting favourable people in 19th Party Congress in his second term and any possible prospects of his third term.From Indian perspective also, escalation of this standoff wasn’t in its National Interest. India needs China’s market for its growth in future, even if the balance of trade is not in its favour today. Now that India is on ‘Make in India’ path, as fastest growing economy to bring prosperity to its people,it may not like to slow down due to such meaningless disruptions.There was no domestic pressure on Indian Government, as all political parties,Security forces and public were determined to check Chinese encroachment and arrogance, at any cost.Question 2(SCMP)While an “expeditious disengagement” in Doklam brought an end to the border standoff and ease tensions between the two countries, do you think it could fuel nationalist sentiment, mistrust and hostility in both nations and cast a long shadow over the longstanding border dispute between China and India and their relations? What are the immediate and long-term implications of the border standoff on bilateral relations, especially considering the strategic competition and rivalry for dominance in the region between the nuclear-armed Asian giants? Will it have a long-term impact on the regional geopolitical landscape?Answer 2 by Major General S B AsthanaDoklam standoff is neither the first, nor the last, and not even the longest standoff between India and China. Many strategists argue that Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi are strong leaders, leading their nations with patriotic sentiments. The nationalist self-confidence from both sides may ignite a heated rivalry in which bilateral relations could deteriorate, because an “expeditious disengagement” in Doklam is only a temporary answer to the bigger problem of longstanding border dispute between both.Out of 14 countries with which China had border issues, it has resolved with 12 except India and Bhutan. With India, China has been delaying settling the border issue on some pretext or the other, and with Bhutan it has been shifting its claim lines many times. I understand that permanent resolution of Border Dispute is the ultimate solution, which needs to be expedited. It is a complex problem, as both sides read history in a manner that it supports their claims. This was the reason for both countries to have signed various agreements to ensure peace and tranquillity along the borders, which have been reasonably successful, as no bullet has been fired amongst both Forces in last four decades.Even if resolution of boundary is considered to be a complex problem, the demarcation, delineation and defining of Line of Actual Control (LAC), (which is not a mutually accepted line as of now), is an inescapable necessity. This is do-able by cooperative political intent, to be followed by intense diplomatic efforts. This action cannot be postponed further if the two neighbours have to live peacefully in future without further standoffs’. It needs to be understood that with un-demarcated LAC, troops of both sides will patrol as per their own perceptions of LAC; some areas will be common which both sides will patrol to be its own. Every such patrol will be called as intrusion by the other side, hence such face-offs will continue tillit’s demarcated, and the identification of its demarcation is made known to troops manning the borders. The short term impacts of standoffs were the anxiety among people, possible temporary setback to trade, tension on borders, non attendance of important events like BRF/BRICS if not resolved. The long term impact could have been hardening of varying stand on border resolution, aggressive strategic competition, and growth of interest based strategic partnerships to balance each other.Being neighbors, most populated, developing countries and significant trading partners of future, China and India have convergence of interests in many areas.Our economical engagements, mutual cooperation can proceed with strategic divergences, and this has been demonstrated adequately in past.Question3(SCMP)What are messages for other Asian nations caught between the increasing rivalry between China and India? What are the main takeaways for countries like Bhutan , Sri Lanka , Vietnam , Myanmar , Japan , Singapore and Mongolia ?Answer 3 by Major General S B AsthanaI do not subscribe to the idea of growing rivalry between China and India. The extension of economical and strategic space by large growing countries like China and India, to fulfil their genuine needs is natural and may not necessarily be a rivalry. In case some Asian nation is caught between contradictory needs of China and India, in my opinion it should look after its own national interest.The main message which comes out loud and clear from Doklam episode is that in today’s world no country can afford to be arrogant to bully smaller sovereign nation, if the smaller Nation is determined to stand up for its national interest. If Cuba could stand up to US, Bhutan could stand up to China, Vietnam could stand up to China as well as US, then smaller countries should also look after their national interest, without worrying about the size and might of any power, trying to push them or manipulate their genuine strategic choices.In my perception, the DoklamPlateau was presumably chosen by China for road construction to violate 2012 Treaty at this point of time because:-India and Bhutan boycotted Belt and Road Forum (BRF) for International Cooperation, the Doklam ingress could embarrass both the countries simultaneously.Stressing on 1890 Treaty by China takes away the logic of Tibet, as a player in dealing with India, thus a subtle message to Dalai Lama that he is not a stake holder in Tibet.Test the depth of Indo- Bhutanese security relationship.The area being too close to Siliguri Corridor/Chicken’s Neck, India had to be concerned and had to decide whether to intervene or otherwise in India’s own national interest, thereby conveying a message of standing up or not standing up to a challenge from Beijing in future too.As the construction activity was in Bhutanese Territory, a strong Indian reaction was not expected.In case India takes action, China can proclaim itself as an innocent victim and blame India to be an aggressor.China was however surprised by an unexpectedly strong Indian reaction, and then it realized that the point chosen was such, where it had strategic and tactical disadvantages for her in escalating it. China was also surprised that in multiparty democracy like India, all parties are on the same page as far as stand on sovereignty and Doklam Issue was concerned.The end result was that China was extremely disturbed about it, and churning out fresh provocative statements almost on daily basis, launching psychological and propaganda war, war of words, and resorting to every possible means short of war to put pressure on India to withdraw its troops. The Indian side on the other side has been relatively balanced, but firm in its stance, making very few statements, and was globally appreciated for its diplomatic maturity. No one bought the idea of India being an aggressor. India proved that it could physically resist China when its national interest demands so, and it also honors the security arrangement promised to Bhutan by physical action.Chinese efforts to establish bilateral talks with Bhutan, including financial allurement (Purse Diplomacy) did not materialize. India and Bhutan stood by each other and could resist Chinese aggressive activity. Chinese efforts to involve Nepal also resulted in response from their Deputy Prime Minister expressing unwillingness to take sides. Japanese Ambassador in New Delhi also said that there should be no attempt to change status quo on the ground by force.Vietnam has stood up earlier against China as well as US for its national interest. The Doklam episode will encourage countries like, Mongolia (Visit of Dalai Lama), Singapore( trade issues), Srilanka ( Hambantota Port), Myanmar( Dam construction), and Japan( East China Sea/Senkakuislands) to stand up to China for various issues of divergences, and cause others like Philippines, to reconsider their options to give away their strategic choices.China in last few years has been on island grabbing spree using ‘Incremental Encroachment’ as part of ‘Active Defence’ Strategy’, with its economic and military clout, using ‘Purse Diplomacy’ with some countries and ‘Infrastructure Diplomacy’ with others. In some cases the disagreements amongst some countries have become quite pronounced due to unfair deals. Singaporehad a strong interest in ensuring navigation in South China Seas is not restricted. Mongolia displayed the temerity of hosting the Dalai Lama, despite Chinese opposition.The bigger lesson is that no sovereign country should be pushed to take sides, and if it is done aggressively by any stronger power, the nation which is being pushed will be forced to seek security and other interests elsewhere, in terms of various other partnerships.Question 4 (SCMP)With India insisting that China should respect the 2012 understanding on tri-junctions, which specifically said “the tri-junction boundary points between India, China and third countries will be finalised in consultation with the concerned countries,” do you think it will further delay the border talks between China and Bhutan? Does it mean India will have to be directly involved as the third party in Sino-Bhutanese border talks in the future?Answer 4 by Major General S B AsthanaAs per the lay of the ground, the resolution of border dispute of China and Bhutan especially at triangle/ junction points, is closely linked and cannot be done in isolation. At Doklam plateau the location of Tri-junction as per India supported by Bhutan is Batang La, whereas China contends it to be at Gyemochenon Jampheri Ridge, which amounts to an encroachment of 7-8 km. These issues cannot be resolved in isolation. If there is political will to resolve it, then meeting of three delegation will not take any time. The delay is only in making political decision and directing the diplomats to resolve it in time bound manner.Additional PointAlthough there is a contradiction in the manner in which each country has reported it perhaps to amuse their domestic audience, and both sides can claim it to be a diplomatic achievement. It is a welcomed step towards peace and tranquilityalong the borders, hence which side blinked first or had an upper hand is not relevant, although both will claim it. This resolution has ensured that there has been no exchange of bullets, and India and China as responsible nations have been able to resolve their differences peacefully on Doklam Standoff. It also ensured that both the countries found a peaceful solution, with a face-saving gesture to ease tension, without disturbing the core interest of either.