Relevant bibliographies by topics / Phenomenal intentionality

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers

Academic literature on the topic 'Phenomenal intentionality'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 1 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Phenomenal intentionality"

1

Sheredos, Ben. "Phenomenal Intentionality." Philosophical Psychology 28, no. 6 (March 25, 2014): 924–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2014.894907.

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Horgan, Terence. "Original Intentionality is Phenomenal Intentionality." Monist 96, no. 2 (2013): 232–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/monist201396212.

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Georgalis, Nicholas. "The fiction of phenomenal intentionality." Consciousness & Emotion 4, no. 2 (December 31, 2003): 243–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/ce.4.2.06geo.

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This paper argues that there is no such thing as “phenomenal intentionality”. The arguments used by its advocates rely upon an appeal to “what it is like” (WIL) to attend on some occasion to one’s intentional state. I argue that there is an important asymmetry in the application of the WIL phenomenon to sensory and intentional states. Advocates of “phenomenal intentionality” fail to recognize this, but this asymmetry undermines their arguments for phenomenal intentionality. The broader issue driving the advocacy of phenomenal intentionality is the belief that consciousness must somehow be implicated in intentionality. With this I agree. But because of the asymmetry of application of WIL, the path chosen by advocates of phenomenal intentionality to secure this conclusion cannot succeed. A brief overview of recent philosophy of mind explains the temptation to take this wrong path. Fortunately, there are other routes that implicate consciousness in intentionality. In consequence, though there is no phenomenal intentionality, there is a phenomenology of intentionality.
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Farkas, Katalin. "Phenomenal Intentionality Without Compromise." Monist 91, no. 2 (2008): 273–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/monist20089125.

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Woodward, Philip. "Phenomenal intentionality: reductionism vs. primitivism." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49, no. 5 (August 2019): 606–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1463801.

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AbstractThis paper explores the relationship between phenomenal properties and intentional properties. In recent years a number of philosophers have argued that intentional properties are sometimes necessitated by phenomenal properties, but have not explained why or how. Exceptions can be found in the work of Katalin Farkas and Farid Masrour, who develop versions of reductionism regarding phenomenally-necessitated intentionality (or ‘phenomenal intentionality’). I raise two objections to reductive theories of the sort they develop. Then I propose a version of primitivism regarding phenomenal intentionality. I argue that primitivism avoids the pitfalls of reductionism while promising broad explanatory payoffs.
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Mendelovici, Angela, and David Bourget. "Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories." Philosophy Compass 9, no. 5 (April 7, 2014): 325–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12123.

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Kriegel, Uriah. "INTENTIONAL INEXISTENCE AND PHENOMENAL INTENTIONALITY." Philosophical Perspectives 21, no. 1 (December 6, 2007): 307–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00129.x.

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Matey, Jennifer. "Phenomenal Intentionality and Color Experience." Topics in Cognitive Science 9, no. 1 (October 31, 2016): 241–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/tops.12223.

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Horgan, Terry, and Uriah Kriegel. "Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind." Monist 91, no. 2 (2008): 347–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/monist20089128.

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Levine, Joseph. "Phenomenal Intentionality, edited by Uriah Kriegel." Mind 124, no. 495 (June 18, 2015): 924–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv049.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Phenomenal intentionality"

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Bell, Jordan. "The relationship between consciousness and intentionality." Honors in the Major Thesis, University of Central Florida, 2013. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETH/id/818.

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Within the Philosophy of Mind two features of our mental life have been acknowledged as the most perplexing - consciousness, the phenomenal "what it is likeness" of our mental states, and intentionality, the aboutness or directedness of our mental states. As such, it has become commonplace to develop theories about these phenomena which seek to explain them naturalistically, that is, without resort to magic or miracles. Traditionally this has been done by analyzing consciousness and intentionality apart from one another. However, in more recent years the tide has turned. In contemporary theories these phenomena are typically analyzed in terms of the other. This results in two competing views: Representationalism, which seeks to ground consciousness in intentionality, and Phenomenalism, which seeks to ground intentionality in consciousness. David Chalmers has proposed an alternative view to these which takes consciousness and intentionality as essentially interdependent, neither more fundamental than the other. This thesis explores the motivations for Representationalism and Phenomenalism, outlines their extraneous commitments, and analyzes their merits - as well as assessing whether Chalmers' view is a defensible middle ground. This involves an analysis of the metaphysical doctrine of physicalism, phenomenal consciousness, intentionality, and the nature of mental content. I argue that the view which Chalmers advocates is the best supported. Yet, I argue, it could benefit by adopting a thoroughgoing externalism of mental content.
B.A.
Bachelors
Arts and Humanities
Philosophy
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2

Julien, Maxime. "La psychologie descriptive de Franz Brentano face aux débats contemporains sur la conscience." Phd thesis, Université de Grenoble, 2013. http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00968004.

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Depuis une décennie, les études sur la pensée de Brentano connaissent un souffle de renouveau. De sa doctrine, on retient le fameux thème de l'intentionnalité qui a soulevé un certain nombre de discussions sur ce que signifie réellement ce concept et ce que Brentano a voulu dire lorsqu'il l'a réintroduit. Dans la philosophie contemporaine, le passage en question qui décrit ce concept l'interprète le plus souvent comme la marque d'une irréductibilité du mental au physique, l'idée qu'il existerait un idiome ou vocable particulier pour décrire les états mentaux et l'esprit en général (intensionnalité). Récemment dans les contributions en philosophie de l'esprit, sa conception de l'esprit a connu un accueil favorable qui se distingue nettement de la première reception de son concept d'intentionnalité dans la philosophie du langage. D'une manière significative, sa théorie de la conscience s'est vu associée à différentes conceptions rivales de l'esprit : théories d'ordre supérieur, autoreprésentationnalisme et différentes autres variétés de représentationnalisme et d'intentionnalisme qui se réclame d'un aspect ou un autre de la conception de l'esprit de Brentano. L'objectif de cette thèse est d'explorer le thème du néo-brentanisme en identifiant dans la littérature contemporaine les théories dîtes "néobrentaniennes".
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Petry, Ana Maris. "Franz Brentano: o conceito, o objeto e o método de uma "psicologia do ponto de vista empírico"." Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2012. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/11609.

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Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ana Maris Petry.pdf: 721205 bytes, checksum: cc064bb634f036d7337e7d9b3094db0d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-09-03
This work aims to present the program of an empirical psychology of Franz Brentano, identifying the author's fundamental contributions to the foundation of a psychological science. When psychology sought autonomy of the philosophy and recognition as a positive science, it was necessary to: distinguish psychic phenomena of physical phenomena, to justify the distinction of the psychology of physiology; to clarify the concept of psyche, to justify an autonomy of psychology in relation to the philosophy; and also, identify a methodological access such research objects as an alternative to introspection, a possibility strongly opposed not only by positivism, but also by Hume and Kant. Without a clear and distinct definition of such concepts a psychological science would not be possible. Starting from the 19th century scientific historical context, this text introduces the concept of an empirical psychology, the research object of this discipline and the method established for such study as were defined by Brentano. The text follows the development of work Psychology from an empirical standpoint, published in 1874. This is a review of this crucial work of Brentano, showing its key concepts. The particular Brentano s conception of phenomenon and the identification of intentionality as fundamental characteristic of psychic phenomena enable Brentano to define the project of a psychological science that follows the science positivist criteria and, at the same time to avoid a mere phenomenical psychology
Este trabalho tem por objetivo apresentar o programa de uma psicologia empírica de Franz Brentano, identificando as fundamentais contribuições do autor para a fundação de uma ciência psicológica. Quando a psicologia buscava autonomia da filosofia e reconhecimento como ciência positiva, era necessário: distinguir fenômenos psíquicos de fenômenos físicos, para justificar a distinção da psicologia da fisiologia; clarificar o conceito de psique, para justificar uma autonomia da psicologia em relação à filosofia; e ainda, identificar um acesso metodológico a tais objetos de investigação como alternativa à introspecção, possibilidade fortemente combatida não só pelo positivismo, mas também por Hume e Kant. Sem uma clara e distinta definição de tais conceitos uma ciência psicológica não seria possível. Partindo do contexto histórico científico do século XIX, esse texto apresenta o conceito de uma psicologia empírica, o objeto de investigação dessa disciplina e o método estabelecido para tal estudo como foram definidos por Brentano. O texto segue o desenvolvimento da obra Psicologia do ponto de vista empírico, publicada em 1874. Trata-se de uma revisão desta fundamental obra de Brentano, explicitando seus principais conceitos. A particular concepção brentaniana de fenômeno e a identificação da intencionalidade como fundamental característica dos fenômenos psíquicos possibilitou a Brentano delinear o projeto de uma ciência psicológica que atendesse aos critérios positivistas de cientificidade e, ao mesmo tempo, evitasse uma psicologia meramente fenomênica
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Millar, Boyd. "A Defence of Separatism." Thesis, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/1807/26306.

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Philosophers commonly distinguish between an experience’s intentional content—what the experience represents—and its phenomenal character—what the experience is like for the subject. Separatism—the view that the intentional content and phenomenal character of an experience are independent of one another in the sense that neither determines the other—was once widely held. In recent years, however, separatism has become increasingly marginalized; at present, most philosophers who work on the issue agree that there must be some kind of necessary connection between an experience’s intentional content and phenomenal character. In contrast with the current consensus, I believe that a particular form of separatism remains the most plausible view of the relationship between an experience’s intentional content and phenomenal character. Accordingly, in this thesis I explain and defend a view that I call “moderate separatism.” The view is “moderate” in that the separatist claim is restricted to a particular class of phenomenal properties: I do not maintain that all the phenomenal properties instantiated by an experience are independent of that experience’s intentional content but only that this is true of the sensory qualities instantiated by that experience. I argue for moderate separatism by appealing to examples of ordinary experiences where sensory qualities and intentional content come apart. First I argue that an experience’s intentional content does not determine the sensory qualities it instantiates by appealing to cases where two experiences share the same intentional content but instantiate different sensory qualities. Then I argue that the sensory qualities instantiated by an experience do not determine its intentional content by appealing to cases where two experiences that instantiate the same sensory qualities differ with regard to intentional content. I consider a number of alternatives to my account of the intentional content and phenomenal character of the experiences at issue and argue that none is plausible. If so, it follows that the intentional content and sensory qualities instantiated by an experience are independent of one another.
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Tison, Rémi. "Conscience et intentionnalité : une évaluation critique des théories de l’intentionnalité phénoménale." Thèse, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/1866/23808.

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Les états mentaux peuvent essentiellement avoir deux types de propriétés : des propriétés intentionnelles, qui font en sorte que les états mentaux ont un contenu, et des propriétés phénoménales, qui font en sorte que les états mentaux sont consciemment vécus. L’instanciation de chacun de ces deux types de propriétés constitue respectivement ce qu’on appelle l’intentionnalité et la conscience phénoménale. Une question cruciale en philosophie de l’esprit contemporaine consiste à se demander quelle est la relation entre l’intentionnalité et la conscience phénoménale. Les théories de l’intentionnalité phénoménale, qui ont gagné en popularité dans les dernières années, soutiennent que l’intentionnalité dépend fondamentalement de la conscience phénoménale. Comme ces théories représentent aujourd’hui une des principales conceptions de l’intentionnalité disponibles, il est crucial d’évaluer leur plausibilité, ce que je me propose de faire dans le présent mémoire. Or, comme je tenterai de le montrer, les propriétés intentionnelles ne dépendent pas des propriétés phénoménales au sens où l’entendent les défenseurs des théories de l’intentionnalité phénoménale. En effet, les théories de l’intentionnalité phénoménale ne sont pas en mesure d’expliquer une des caractéristiques fondamentales de l’intentionnalité, à savoir le fait que les états intentionnels s’accompagnent de conditions de satisfaction, et si elles y parviennent ce n’est qu’en présupposant l’intentionnalité en attribuant des caractéristiques intentionnelles aux états phénoménaux. Ce résultat nous contraint à nous tourner vers une autre conception de la relation entre l’intentionnalité et la conscience phénoménale.
Mental states can essentially have two types of properties: intentional properties, in virtue of which mental states have content, and phenomenal properties, in virtue of which mental states are consciously experienced. The instantiation of each of these two types of properties constitutes respectively what is called intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. A crucial question in contemporary philosophy of mind is to ask what the relationship between intentionality and phenomenal consciousness is. The phenomenal intentionality theories, which have gained popularity in recent years, argue that intentionality is fundamentally dependent on phenomenal consciousness. Since these theories now represent one of the main conceptions of intentionality available, it is crucial to assess their plausibility, which I propose to do in this master’s thesis. As I will try to show, intentional properties do not depend on phenomenal properties as understood by the advocates of the phenomenal intentionality theories. Indeed, the phenomenal intentionality theories are not able to explain one of the fundamental characteristics of intentionality, namely the fact that intentional states are accompanied by conditions of satisfaction, and that if they succeed in doing so, it is only by presupposing intentionality by assigning intentional characteristics to phenomenal states. This result forces us to turn to another conception of the relationship between intentionality and phenomenal consciousness.
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Huang, Linus Ta-Lun, and 黃大倫. "THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EMOTION: A DEFENSE OF PHENOMENALIM AGAINST INTENTIONALISM." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/88573206529350817781.

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碩士
國立陽明大學
神經科學研究所
94
Brentano’s Thesis, “Intentionality as the mark of the mental”, has enjoyed resurgence in philosophy of mind. This thesis posits intentionality as the fundamental feature of mental phenomena, and as a result, all mental states are intentional states. Intentionalism, following this tradition, is a view according to which (a) intentional contents are fundamental to the mental realm and (b) phenomenal character of a state can reduce to its intentional content. As I shall argue, both theses are false, because consciousness is the fundamental feature of the mental realm, and intentionality supervenes on consciousness and sensory-motor structures. In this thesis, I will first review the debates of intentionalism and phenomenalism, arguing that no arguments have successfully established either of them. Second, I will present my own argument for phenomenalism, that emotion feelings are phenomenal states that have no intentional contents. Third, I will argue that consciousness is necessary but not sufficient for intentionality. Finally, I will present a sketch of a phenomenalist theory of consciousness and intentionality: intentionality supervenes on consciousness and sensory-motor structures.
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Toráčová, Pavla. "Naturalizace vědomí a smysl subjektivity." Doctoral thesis, 2014. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-342311.

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The thesis deals with the problem of the existence of consciousness in the physical world. It denies the approach that is prevailing in the contemporary philosophy of mind that treats the phenomenal consciousness and intentionality separately. The position held in this thesis is to claim that the phenomenal character of consciousness and intentionality are inseparable and that it is impossible to understand the former without understanding the latter, and vice versa. The problem of the existence of consciousness in the physical world is viewed as the problem of the existence of (conscious) intentionality in the physical world. With the aim to achieve an analysis of intentionality that would keep its phenomenal character and the first person point of view, and, at the same time, shed light on its realization in the physical world, thoughts of Peter Strawson, G. E. M. Anscombe, Tim Crane, Colin McGinn and John Searle are discussed. The result is an outline of intentionality that allows to explain the fundamental level of intentionality as a physical process and the higher levels of intentionality as a development of the fundamental level. Two principles are crucial for this approach: the development of intentionality from the fundamental level to the higher level is comprehensible only if we keep the...
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Books on the topic "Phenomenal intentionality"

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Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger: The problem of original method and phenomenon of phenomenology. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993.

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Kriegel, Uriah, ed. Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.001.0001.

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Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press, 2013.

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Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality. Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2018.

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Mendelovici, Angela. The Phenomenal Intentionality Theory. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0005.

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This chapter introduces the phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT), on which all original intentionality arises from phenomenal consciousness. It argues that PIT succeeds precisely where its main competitors, the tracking and functional role theories discussed in previous chapters, fail. The version of PIT that this chapter and the remainder of the book defends is strong identity PIT, on which all intentionality arises from phenomenal consciousness (strong PIT), and (roughly) phenomenal states give rise to intentional states simply by being identical to them (identity PIT). In short, according to strong identity PIT, every intentional state is identical to a phenomenal state. This chapter closes by previewing how later chapters handle certain challenging cases for PIT, including those of thoughts, states with broad or object-involving contents, standing states, and nonconscious occurrent states. The recommended treatment rejects derived intentionality and so qualifies as a version of strong PIT.
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Mendelovici, Angela. The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.001.0001.

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Some mental states seem to be "of" or "about" things or to "say" something. For example, a thought might represent that grass is green, and a visual experience might represent a blue cup. This is intentionality. The aim of this book is to explain this phenomenon. Once we understand intentionality as a phenomenon to be explained, rather than a posit in a theory explaining something else, we can see that there are glaring empirical and in-principle difficulties with currently popular tracking and functional role theories of intentionality, which aim to account for intentionality in terms of tracking relations and functional roles. This book develops an alternative theory, the phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT), on which the source of intentionality is none other than phenomenal consciousness, the subjective, felt, or qualitative aspect of mental life. While PIT avoids the problems that plague tracking and functional role theories, it faces its own challenges in accounting for the rich and complex contents of thoughts and the contents of nonconscious states. In responding to these challenges, this book proposes a novel version of PIT, one on which all intentionality is phenomenal intentionality, though we in some sense represent many non-phenomenal contents by ascribing them to ourselves. This book further argues that phenomenal consciousness is an intrinsic feature of mental life, resulting in a view that is radically internalistic in spirit: Our phenomenally represented contents are literally in our heads, and any non-phenomenal contents we in some sense represent are expressly targeted by us.
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Kriegel, Uriah. Intentionality. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198791485.003.0003.

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This chapter argues for two main claims. First, it is argued that, unlike the notion of intentionality central to modern philosophy of mind, Brentano’s notion of intentionality has nothing to do with mental states’ capacity to track elements in the environment; rather, it has to do with a phenomenal feature in virtue of which conscious experiences present something to the subject. Secondly, it is argued that, contrary to common wisdom in Brentano scholarship, there is no real evidence that Brentano took intentionality to be a relation to immanent objects; rather, his mature theory clearly casts intentionality as an intrinsic, non-relational property, and a property in the first instance of subjects (rather than of subjects’ internal states).
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Mendelovici, Angela. Conclusion: Intentionality and Other Related Phenomena. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0010.

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This concluding chapter reviews the view of intentionality argued for in this book, which is an aspect-theoretic version of strong identity PIT. On this view, roughly, every intentional state is identical to some non-relational phenomenal state. Chapter 1 rejected various ways of fixing reference on intentionality via its role in folk psychological or scientific theories, helping us navigate the world, or securing conditions of truth and reference, arguing that it might turn out that something other than intentionality plays these roles. This chapter returns to these ways of fixing reference on intentionality and argues that the arguments presented in this book suggest that what plays these roles is either intentionality together with further ingredients or something else entirely. The chapter closes by articulating a core intuition behind internalism and suggesting that the view developed in this book, despite being compatible with externalism, is radically internalistic.
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Mendelovici, Angela. Nonconscious States. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0008.

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Nonconscious states, like standing beliefs and nonconscious states involved in early visual processing, pose a challenge for PIT: They seem to be intentional but not phenomenal. This chapter addresses this challenge. It begins by considering versions of PIT that take nonconscious states to have derived intentionality, arguing that none of the suggested derivation mechanisms is up to the task of generating new instances of intentionality. This chapter then recommends an alternative treatment of nonconscious states on which neither standing states nor most nonconscious occurrent states are genuinely intentional, though the self-ascriptivist view described in Chapter 7 might be extended to accommodate some standing state contents, and perhaps even standing states in their entirety. This chapter also suggests that some nonconscious occurrent states might have phenomenal properties we are not aware of and so might have phenomenal intentionality we are also not aware of.
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Carman, Taylor. Phenomenology. Edited by Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler, and John Hawthorne. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.013.31.

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This article explores the role of phenomenology in philosophical inquiry. It begins by discussing Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological reductions (the “transcendental” and the “eidetic”), the sharp distinction he draws between consciousness and reality, and his intuitive claims about intentionality. It then considers Martin Heidegger’s conceptions of phenomenon and phenomenology in relation to hermeneutics before returning to Husserl’s argument that we have a direct intuition, not just of entities, but of the phenomenal appearance of their being (and nonbeing). It also examines Heidegger’s claim that “ontology is possible only as phenomenology” and concludes by assessing phenomenology’s legacy and relevance to philosophy.
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Book chapters on the topic "Phenomenal intentionality"

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Stoltz, Jonathan. "Cognition, Phenomenal Character, and Intentionality in Tibetan Buddhism." In A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy, 405–18. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118324004.ch26.

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Hopkins, Burt C. "Intentionality: An Original or Derived Phenomenon?" In Contributions to Phenomenology, 189–214. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8145-5_11.

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Searle, John R. "Individual intentionality and social phenomena in the theory of speech acts." In Foundations of Semiotics, 3. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/fos.18.03sea.

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Masrour, Farid. "Phenomenal Objectivity and Phenomenal Intentionality." In Phenomenal Intentionality, 116–34. Oxford University Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.003.0007.

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Frey, Christopher. "Phenomenal Presence." In Phenomenal Intentionality, 71–92. Oxford University Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.003.0004.

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Kroon, Frederick. "Phenomenal Intentionality and the Role of Intentional Objects." In Phenomenal Intentionality, 137–52. Oxford University Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.003.0008.

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McGinn, Colin. "Consciousness and Synthesis." In Phenomenal Intentionality, 93–98. Oxford University Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.003.0005.

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Farkas, Katalin. "Constructing a World for the Senses." In Phenomenal Intentionality, 99–114. Oxford University Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.003.0006.

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Crane, Tim. "Unconscious Belief and Conscious Thought." In Phenomenal Intentionality, 156–73. Oxford University Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.003.0009.

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Chudnoff, Elijah. "Intellectual Gestalts." In Phenomenal Intentionality, 174–93. Oxford University Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.003.0010.

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Conference papers on the topic "Phenomenal intentionality"

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"This page intentionally left blank." In 2012 13th IEEE Intersociety Conference on Thermal and Thermomechanical Phenomena in Electronic Systems (ITherm). IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/itherm.2012.6231557.

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Gu, Peiwen, Guobao Shi, Kemei Cao, and Jiayun Wang. "Research on IVR-Relevant Phenomena of Material Thermodynamic Interaction and Corium Pool Configuration." In 2017 25th International Conference on Nuclear Engineering. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/icone25-66969.

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In-Vessel Retention (IVR), which arrests relocated molten core materials in the vessel during severe accident, has been singled out as an appealing accident management approach to many reactors. The heat transfer imposed by in-vessel corium is a vital part for IVR success considering the difficulty of significantly altering ex-vessel CHF. For a given decay power, corium pool configuration determines the heat flux profile along the vessel wall, which may produce uncertainties associated with IVR strategy. In this paper, a thermodynamic tool is employed to study the corium pool configurations by analyzing the possible interaction among relocated corium, zircalloy cladding and core internals. The results reveal the immiscibility gap phenomena under high temperature which separates molten materials into oxidic and metal phase in the lower head. The oxidic phase is quite stable and its density is only slightly changed by various accident scenarios. The metal phase is relatively unstable and its density is susceptible to the condition of cladding oxidation degree and crust integrity. The corium pool configurations in the lower head are determined based on the results of thermodynamic analysis and phase density comparison. Both two-layer and three-layer corium pools are likely to be formed under different accident scenarios. CAP1400 has intentionally increased the mass of lower core support plate, which is a beneficial design change to prevent possible focusing effect if material infiltration through crust is assumed to be impossible.
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Leadenham, Stephen, and Alper Erturk. "Harmonic Balance Analysis and Experimental Validation of a Nonlinear Broadband Piezoelectric Energy Harvester for Low Ambient Vibrations." In ASME 2015 International Design Engineering Technical Conferences and Computers and Information in Engineering Conference. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/detc2015-47775.

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It has been shown by several research groups over the past few years that vibration energy harvesters with intentionally designed nonlinear stiffness components can be used for frequency bandwidth enhancement under harmonic excitation for sufficiently strong vibration amplitudes. In order to overcome the need for high excitation intensities that are required to exploit nonlinear dynamic phenomena, we have developed an M-shaped piezoelectric energy harvester configuration that can exhibit a nonlinear frequency response under low vibration levels. This configuration is made from a continuous bent spring steel with piezoelectric laminates and a proof mass, and no magnetic components. Careful design of this nonlinear architecture that minimizes piezoelectric softening further enables the possibility of achieving the jump phenomenon in hardening at base acceleration levels on the order of a few milli-g. In the present work, such a design is explored for both primary and secondary resonance excitations at different vibration levels and for different electrical loads. Following the primary resonance excitation case that offers more than 600 % increase in the half-power bandwidth as compared to the linear system at a root-mean-square excitation level as low as 0.04g, secondary resonance behavior is investigated with a focus on 1:2 and 1:3 superharmonic resonance neighborhoods. A multi-term harmonic balance formulation is employed for a computationally effective yet high-fidelity analysis of this high-quality-factor system with quadratic and cubic nonlinearities. In addition to primary resonance and secondary (superharmonic) resonance cases, multi-harmonic excitation is modeled and experimentally validated.
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Guzel, Birhan U., Mahesh Prakash, Eren Semercigil, and Ozden Turan. "Energy Dissipation with Sloshing for Absorber Design." In ASME 2005 International Mechanical Engineering Congress and Exposition. ASMEDC, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/imece2005-79838.

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Sloshing is the low frequency oscillation of the free surface of a liquid in a partially full container. Due to its detrimental effects, efforts are usually made in the direction of suppressing sloshing. In addition, intentionally induced sloshing may be employed as an effective energy sink to provide protection for resonant structures exposed to excessive vibration levels. It is generally reported that sloshing absorbers with shallow levels of liquid are more effective energy dissipators than those with deep levels. However, there has not yet been a study to reveal the mechanism of energy dissipation for practical applications, although there has been ample empirical proof for effectiveness. One of the limitations from a numerical perspective lies with the difficulty in predicting extreme free surface behaviour by traditional grid based computational methods. The objective of this paper is to report initial observations in this direction using Smoothed Particle Hydrodynamics (SPH). SPH is a Lagrangian method of solving the equations for fluid flow, that is suitable for modeling free surface phenomena such as sloshing due to its grid-free nature. Results are reported in this paper in the form of numerical case studies.
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Harris, Kirsilyn C., and Jesse M. Redlo. "Emergence of Digitized Gamification as an Educational Tool and the Implications on Digital Literacy and Equity." In International Conference on Women Researchers in Electronics and Computing. AIJR Publisher, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.21467/proceedings.114.48.

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The phenomenon of gamification has developed into a widely used educational tool over the last sixty years. In that time gamification has evolved from serious games, used to educate military personnel and medical workers, to a tool used to teach a variety of disciplines. The proliferation of gamification is particularly prevalent due to the ease of access and production of games in a digital format. Whether being used in the classroom or being used in daily life as a non-traditional learner, the common man is inundated with information and games that teach. Some games intentionally teach skills, however, even those that aren’t geared towards teaching can teach peripheral skills and values that aren’t easily taught in the classroom. Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine which games and content are going to be positive and helpful to growth and development, and which will not be. One such skill that would be invaluable to teach would be digital literacy, especially in such a digitized world. Thus the question posed here is whether gamification will be a reliable tool to teach digital literacy due to its success being implemented in other disciplines.
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Tajika, Hisakazu, Satoshi Igi, Takahiro Sakimoto, Shigeru Endo, Seishi Tsuyama, Ryuji Muraoka, Takekazu Arakawa, and Nobuhisa Suzuki. "Compressive and Tensile Strain Capacities of 48” X80 Line Pipes." In 2012 9th International Pipeline Conference. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/ipc2012-90410.

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This paper presents the results of experimental studies focused on the strain capacity of X80 linepipe. A full-scale bending tests of X80 grade, 48″ high-strain linepipes pressurized to 60% SMYS were conducted to investigate the compressive strain limit and tensile strain limit. The tensile properties Y/T ratios and uniform elongation of the pipes had variety. Three of four pipes are high strain pipes and these Y/T ratios are intentionally low with manufacturing method. One of these high-strain pipe was girth welded in its longitudinal center to investigate the effect of girth weld to strain capacity. The other was set as a conventional pipe that have higher Y/T ratio to make comparative study. The compressive strain limit focused on the critical strain at the formation of local buckling on the compression side of bending. After pipe reaches its endurable maximum moment, one large developed wrinkle and some small wrinkles on the pipe surface during bending deformation were captured relatively well from observation and strain distribution measurement. The tensile strain limit is discussed from the viewpoint of competition of two fracture phenomena: ductile crack initiation/propagation from an artificial notch at the HAZ of the girth weld, and strain concentration and rupture in the base material at the tension (opposite) side of the local buckling position.
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Förster, Alwin, and Lars Panning-von Scheidt. "Calculation of Nonlinear Systems Under Narrow Band Excitation Using Equivalent Linearization and Path Continuation." In ASME Turbo Expo 2021: Turbomachinery Technical Conference and Exposition. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/gt2021-58437.

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Abstract Turbomachines experience a wide range of different types of excitation during operation. On the structural mechanics side, periodic or even harmonic excitations are usually assumed. For this type of excitation there are a variety of methods, both for linear and nonlinear systems. Stochastic excitation, whether in the form of Gaussian white noise or narrow band excitation, is rarely considered. As in the deterministic case, the calculations of the vibrational behavior due to stochastic excitations are even more complicated by nonlinearities, which can either be unintentionally present in the system or can be used intentionally for vibration mitigation. Regardless the origin of the nonlinearity, there are some methods in the literature, which are suitable for the calculation of the vibration response of nonlinear systems under random excitation. In this paper, the method of equivalent linearization is used to determine a linear equivalent system, whose response can be calculated instead of the one of the nonlinear system. The method is applied to different multi-degree of freedom nonlinear systems that experience narrow band random excitation, including an academic turbine blade model. In order to identify multiple and possibly ambiguous solutions, an efficient procedure is shown to integrate the mentioned method into a path continuation scheme. With this approach, it is possible to track jump phenomena or the influence of parameter variations even in case of narrow band excitation. The results of the performed calculations are the stochastic moments, i.e. mean value and variance.
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Washiya, Tadahiro, Toshimitsu Tayama, Kazuhito Nakamura, Kimihiko Yano, Atsuhiro Shibata, Kazunori Nomura, Takahiro Chikazawa, Masanobu Nagata, and Toshiaki Kikuchi. "Continuous-Operation Test at Engineering Scale Uranium Crystallizer System." In 17th International Conference on Nuclear Engineering. ASMEDC, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/icone17-75339.

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Uranium crystallization based on solubility difference is one of the remarkable technologies which can provide simple process to separate uranium in nitric acid solution since the process is mainly controlled by temperature and concentration of solute ions. Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and Mitsubishi Materials Corporation (MMC) are developing the crystallization process for elemental technology of FBR fuel reprocessing.[1–3] The uranium (U) crystallization process is a key technology for New Extraction System for TRU Recovery (NEXT) process that was evaluated as the most promising process for future FBR reprocessing.[4–6] We had developed an innovative crystallizer and carried out several fundamental investigations. On the basis of the results, we fabricated an engineering-scale crystallizer and have carried out continuous operation test to investigate the stability of the equipment at steady and non-steady state conditions by using depleted uranium. As for simulating typical failure events in the crystallizer, crystal accumulation and crystal blockage were occurred intentionally, and monitoring method and resume procedure were tried and selected in this work. As the test results, no significant phenomenon was observed in the steady state test. And in the non-steady state test, process fluctuation could be detected by monitoring of screw torque and liquid level in the crystallizer, and all failure events are proven to be recovered by appropriate resumed procedures.
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Tian, Binyu, Felix Juefei-Xu, Qing Guo, Xiaofei Xie, Xiaohong Li, and Yang Liu. "AVA: Adversarial Vignetting Attack against Visual Recognition." In Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-21}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/145.

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Vignetting is an inherent imaging phenomenon within almost all optical systems, showing as a radial intensity darkening toward the corners of an image. Since it is a common effect for photography and usually appears as a slight intensity variation, people usually regard it as a part of a photo and would not even want to post-process it. Due to this natural advantage, in this work, we study the vignetting from a new viewpoint, i.e., adversarial vignetting attack (AVA), which aims to embed intentionally misleading information into the vignetting and produce a natural adversarial example without noise patterns. This example can fool the state-of-the-art deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs) but is imperceptible to human. To this end, we first propose the radial-isotropic adversarial vignetting attack (RI-AVA) based on the physical model of vignetting, where the physical parameters (e.g., illumination factor and focal length) are tuned through the guidance of target CNN models. To achieve higher transferability across different CNNs, we further propose radial-anisotropic adversarial vignetting attack (RA-AVA) by allowing the effective regions of vignetting to be radial-anisotropic and shape-free. Moreover, we propose the geometry-aware level-set optimization method to solve the adversarial vignetting regions and physical parameters jointly. We validate the proposed methods on three popular datasets, i.e., DEV, CIFAR10, and Tiny ImageNet, by attacking four CNNs, e.g., ResNet50, EfficientNet-B0, DenseNet121, and MobileNet-V2, demonstrating the advantages of our methods over baseline methods on both transferability and image quality.
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Carpenter, Katherine, and Vaibhav Bahadur. "Influence of Electric Fields and Surface Chemistry on Ice Nucleation Kinetics." In ASME 2015 International Mechanical Engineering Congress and Exposition. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/imece2015-51482.

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The majority of studies on ice formation have attempted to prevent or reduce ice build-up; very few studies have focused on promoting ice nucleation which would have applications in appliances, cryopreservation, and pharmaceutical freeze-drying. Such studies are also relevant to the synthesis of methane hydrates for natural gas transportation. This paper details a fundamental study on the influence of interfacial electric fields on ice nucleation promotion. Electrofreezing, i.e. applying an electric field has been shown to electrically induce nucleation of supercooled water. The freezing temperatures of supercooled water can thus be increased via electrofreezing. However, the mechanisms responsible for elevating the freezing temperature are unclear. Typically, bare electrodes are submerged in water, which creates a volumetric electric field in water. With this type of electric field, the application of a voltage can result in multiple phenomena such as current flows, chemical reactions and gas bubble formation or growth. It is unclear whether electrofreezing is the result of the electric field or the current flow-related secondary phenomena. In the present work, the role of electric fields and surface charge on electrofreezing is isolated by studying electrofreezing of water droplets on a dielectric layer. This dielectric layer blocks current and creates an interfacial electric field with a build-up of electric charge at the solid-fluid interface. Ultra-high electric fields of up to 80 V/μm were applied, which is one order of magnitude higher than in previous studies. Infrared (IR) thermography was used to capture ice nucleation and determine the electrofreezing temperature. The results show that the electric fields alone can elevate the freezing temperature of water by as much as 15 °C; however, this effect saturates at electric fields of approximately 20–40 V/μm. Also, the electrofreezing effect was found to be polarity independent. Therefore, it is hypothesized that the mechanism underlying electrofreezing is a reduction in the Gibbs free energy for ice crystal nucleation. Furthermore, by intentionally creating pinholes in the dielectric layer, which creates current paths, the influence of electric current on electrofreezing was also studied. It was observed that electric currents and/or other secondary effects, such as bubble generation, further increased the electrofreezing temperatures. Overall, this work fills many existing gaps in the current understanding of electrofreezing. It is seen that both the electric field and electric current influence electrofreezing; however, the physical mechanisms are different.
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