Journal articles: 'Phenomenal intentionality'

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Sheredos, Ben. "Phenomenal Intentionality." Philosophical Psychology 28, no. 6 (March 25, 2014): 924–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2014.894907.

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Horgan, Terence. "Original Intentionality is Phenomenal Intentionality." Monist 96, no. 2 (2013): 232–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/monist201396212.

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Georgalis, Nicholas. "The fiction of phenomenal intentionality." Consciousness & Emotion 4, no. 2 (December 31, 2003): 243–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/ce.4.2.06geo.

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This paper argues that there is no such thing as “phenomenal intentionality”. The arguments used by its advocates rely upon an appeal to “what it is like” (WIL) to attend on some occasion to one’s intentional state. I argue that there is an important asymmetry in the application of the WIL phenomenon to sensory and intentional states. Advocates of “phenomenal intentionality” fail to recognize this, but this asymmetry undermines their arguments for phenomenal intentionality. The broader issue driving the advocacy of phenomenal intentionality is the belief that consciousness must somehow be implicated in intentionality. With this I agree. But because of the asymmetry of application of WIL, the path chosen by advocates of phenomenal intentionality to secure this conclusion cannot succeed. A brief overview of recent philosophy of mind explains the temptation to take this wrong path. Fortunately, there are other routes that implicate consciousness in intentionality. In consequence, though there is no phenomenal intentionality, there is a phenomenology of intentionality.

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Farkas, Katalin. "Phenomenal Intentionality Without Compromise." Monist 91, no. 2 (2008): 273–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/monist20089125.

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Woodward, Philip. "Phenomenal intentionality: reductionism vs. primitivism." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49, no. 5 (August 2019): 606–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1463801.

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AbstractThis paper explores the relationship between phenomenal properties and intentional properties. In recent years a number of philosophers have argued that intentional properties are sometimes necessitated by phenomenal properties, but have not explained why or how. Exceptions can be found in the work of Katalin Farkas and Farid Masrour, who develop versions of reductionism regarding phenomenally-necessitated intentionality (or ‘phenomenal intentionality’). I raise two objections to reductive theories of the sort they develop. Then I propose a version of primitivism regarding phenomenal intentionality. I argue that primitivism avoids the pitfalls of reductionism while promising broad explanatory payoffs.

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Mendelovici, Angela, and David Bourget. "Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories." Philosophy Compass 9, no. 5 (April 7, 2014): 325–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12123.

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Kriegel, Uriah. "INTENTIONAL INEXISTENCE AND PHENOMENAL INTENTIONALITY." Philosophical Perspectives 21, no. 1 (December 6, 2007): 307–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00129.x.

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Matey, Jennifer. "Phenomenal Intentionality and Color Experience." Topics in Cognitive Science 9, no. 1 (October 31, 2016): 241–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/tops.12223.

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Horgan, Terry, and Uriah Kriegel. "Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind." Monist 91, no. 2 (2008): 347–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/monist20089128.

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Levine, Joseph. "Phenomenal Intentionality, edited by Uriah Kriegel." Mind 124, no. 495 (June 18, 2015): 924–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv049.

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Kriegel, Uriah. "Phenomenal intentionality past and present: introductory." Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12, no. 3 (April 25, 2013): 437–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11097-013-9308-0.

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Walsh, Philip J. "Motivation and Horizon." Grazer Philosophische Studien 94, no. 3 (August 8, 2017): 410–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-09403007.

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This paper argues for a Husserlian account of phenomenal intentionality. Experience is intentional insofar as it presents a mind-independent, objective world. Its doing so is a matter of the way it hangs together, its having a certain structure. But in order for the intentionality in question to be properly understood as phenomenal intentionality, this structure must inhere in experience as a phenomenal feature. Husserl’s concept of horizon designates this intentionality-bestowing experiential structure, while his concept of motivation designates the unique phenomenal character of this structure as it is experientially lived through. The way experience hangs together is itself a phenomenal feature of experience.

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OTT, WALTER. "Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Representation." Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2, no. 1 (2016): 131–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2016.4.

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ABSTRACT:According to the phenomenal intentionality research program, a state's intentional content is fixed by its phenomenal character. Defenders of this view have little to say about just how this grounding is accomplished. I argue that without a robust account of representation, the research program promises too little. Unfortunately, most of the well-developed accounts of representation—asymmetric dependence, teleosemantics, and the like—ground representation in external relations such as causation. Such accounts are inconsistent with the core of the phenomenal intentionality program. I argue that, however counterintuitive it may seem, the best prospect for explaining how phenomenal character represents is an appeal to resemblance.

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Eilan, Naomi. "Perceptual Intentionality. Attention and Consciousness." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43 (March 1998): 181–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100004367.

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A representative expression of current thinking on the ‘problem of consciousness’ runs as follows. There is one, impenetrably hard problem; and a host of soluble, and in this sense easy problems. The hard problem is: how could a physical system yield subjective states? How could there be something it is like to be a physical system? This problem corresponds to a concept of consciousness invariably labelled ‘phenomenal consciousness’. It is here, with respect to phenomenal consciousness, that we encounter an ‘explanatory gap’, where it is this gap that makes the problem so hard. Nothing we can say about the workings of a physical system could begin to explain the existence and nature of subjective, phenomenal feel.

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Bordini, Davide. "Is there introspective evidence for phenomenal intentionality?" Philosophical Studies 174, no. 5 (July 19, 2016): 1105–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0745-9.

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Gulick, Robert Van. "How Should We Understand the Relation between Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness?" Philosophical Perspectives 9 (1995): 271. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2214222.

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Mendelovici, Angela. "Reply to Philip Woodward’s review of The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality." Philosophical Psychology 32, no. 8 (November 17, 2019): 1261–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1692131.

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Leclerc, André. "Intentionality and Continuity of Experience." Principia: an international journal of epistemology 21, no. 2 (December 14, 2017): 235–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2017v21n2p235.

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My aim is to provide an analysis of cognitive experience from the point of view of philosophy of mind, by identifying and describing different components or features present in it. But different things are called ‘experience’ and some are more complex than other. I will first examine different uses of the word ‘experience’ to clear the way and to avoid cases of circularity. Then I try to restrict the investigation and introduce the mode (character) and content of experience, and take BonJour’s suggestion of what cognitive experience is as a starting point. In my view, the two main features of experience are Horizontal Intentionality (which produces Phenomenal Continuity) and Vertical Intentionality. The first is the most striking and fundamental; it constitutes the continuity of experience. Vertical Intentionality selects objects of experience, so that our experience is always experience of something. In Perception, something is identified and recognized by the application of concepts. Attention is required, especially when we get involved in complicated operations or manipulations. Finally, the last feature is constituted by a huge set of dispositions, particularly abilities to keep track our thoughts and former experiences. Cognitive Experience in the full sense is the result of the interaction and mutual support of these features.

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Dewalque, Arnaud. "Brentano and the parts of the mental: a mereological approach to phenomenal intentionality." Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12, no. 3 (January 10, 2013): 447–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11097-012-9293-8.

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Woodward, Philip. "Primer, proposal, and paradigm: A review essay of Mendelovici’s The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality." Philosophical Psychology 32, no. 8 (November 1, 2019): 1246–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1682133.

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Banick, Kyle. "What is it like to think about oneself? De Se thought and phenomenal intentionality." Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18, no. 5 (November 24, 2018): 919–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11097-018-9607-6.

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Zahavi, Dan. "Intentionality and Phenomenality: A Phenomenological Take on the Hard Problem." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 29 (2003): 63–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2003.10717595.

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In his bookThe Conscious MindDavid Chalmers introduced a now-familiar distinction between the hard problem and the easy problems of consciousness. The easy problems are those concerned with the question of how the mind can process information, react to environmental stimuli, and exhibit such capacities as discrimination, categorization, and introspection (Chalmers 1996, 4; 1995, 200). All of these abilities are impressive, but they are, according to Chalmers, not metaphysically baffling, since they can all be tackled by means of the standard repertoire of cognitive science and explained in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. This task might still be difficult, but it is within reach. In contrast, the hard problem — also known astheproblem of consciousness (Chalmers 1995, 201) — is the problem of explaining why mental states have phenomenal or experiential qualities. Why is it like something to ‘taste coffee,’ to ‘touch an ice cube,’ to ‘look at a sunset,’ etc.? Why does it feel the way it does? Why does it feel like anything at all?

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Banick, Kyle. "Subjective Character as the Origo a Quo of Phenomenal Consciousness." Grazer Philosophische Studien 98, no. 2 (June 17, 2021): 222–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000133.

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Abstract This article contributes to the debate on self-consciousness, inner awareness, and subjective character. Philosophers puzzle over whether subjective character has a monadic or a relational form. But the present article deploys formal ontology to show that this is a false dichotomy. From this vantage, a common objection to non-relational views is deflated. The common objection is that one-level, non-relational views are either unexplanatory or smuggle in resources from higher-order and/or relational views. The author uses an argument from formal ontology to suggest that such objections stem from a category error. The result is that first-order non-relational views need not lapse into higher order or relational views – subjective character can be a structured and intrinsic feature involved in the ontological constitution of mental acts. Ultimately, the author emphasizes the need to conceive of subjective character as the source of intentionality, and not the result of a prior intentional relation.

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Siewert, Charles. "The Phenomenal basis of intentionality, by Angela A.Mendelovici. Oxford University Press, 2018. 296 pages. ISBN:9780190863807." European Journal of Philosophy 27, no. 4 (December 2019): 1097–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12507.

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Lemanek, Kamil. "Habit, Bodyhood, and Merleau-Ponty." Diametros, no. 60 (June 25, 2019): 52–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.33392/diam.1184.

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The phenomenal body is an intriguing concept, and Merleau-Ponty’s notion of habit, coupled with motor intentionality, provides a novel perspective on its inner workings. I contend that his portrayal of habit tacitly bears two faces – motoric habit and instrumental habit respectively. The former is an attunement to some bodily possibilities that are already at our disposal while the latter is an explicit relation to external objects and a process of incorporating those objects into our own bodies. These two notions play into each other, creating a mechanism that offers an intuitive illustration and simple productive definition for a dynamic picture of bodyhood. Furthermore, it carries an internal delimitation that marks the boundaries of its application. The result is a view that provides something new to current interpretations of Merleau-Ponty, as well as potential applications in areas that derived from his appeals to motor intentionality.

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Horgan, Terry. "Phenomenal intentionality and the evidential role of perceptual experience: comments on Jack Lyons, Perception and Basic Beliefs." Philosophical Studies 153, no. 3 (September 2, 2010): 447–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9604-2.

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Stratman, Christopher M. "The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality by Angela Mendelovici, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, ISBN 9780190863807, 275 Pages." Philosophia 49, no. 4 (January 31, 2021): 1805–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00320-4.

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Mitchell, Jonathan. "Understanding Meta-Emotions: Prospects for a Perceptualist Account." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50, no. 4 (November 29, 2019): 505–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/can.2019.47.

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AbstractThis article clarifies the nature of meta-emotions, and it surveys the prospects of applying a version of the perceptualist model of emotions to them. It first considers central aspects of their intentionality and phenomenal character. It then applies the perceptualist model to meta-emotions, addressing issues of evaluative content and the normative dimension of meta-emotional experience. Finally, in considering challenges and objections, it assesses the perceptualist model, concluding that its application to meta-emotions is an attractive extension of the theory, insofar as it captures some distinctive features of meta-emotions—specifically their normative dimension—while locating them within the domain of occurrent affective experiences.

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Lloyd, Dan. "Functional MRI and the Study of Human Consciousness." Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 14, no. 6 (August 1, 2002): 818–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/089892902760191027.

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Functional brain imaging offers new opportunities for the study of that most pervasive of cognitive conditions, human consciousness. Since consciousness is attendant to so much of human cognitive life, its study requires secondary analysis of multiple experimental datasets. Here, four preprocessed datasets from the National fMRI Data Center are considered: Hazeltine et al., Neural activation during response competition; Ishai et al., The representation of objects in the human occipital and temporal cortex; Mechelli et al., The effects of presentation rate during word and pseudoword reading; and Postle et al., Activity in human frontal cortex associated with spatial working memory and saccadic behavior. The study of consciousness also draws from multiple disciplines. In this article, the philosophical subdiscipline of phenomenology provides initial characterization of phenomenal structures conceptually necessary for an analysis of consciousness. These structures include phenomenal intentionality, phenomenal superposition, and experienced temporality. The empirical predictions arising from these structures require new interpretive methods for their confirmation. These methods begin with single-subject (preprocessed) scan series, and consider the patterns of all voxels as potential multivariate encodings of phenomenal information. Twenty-seven subjects from the four studies were analyzed with multivariate methods, revealing analogues of phenomenal structures, particularly the structures of temporality. In a second interpretive approach, artificial neural networks were used to detect a more explicit prediction from phenomenology, namely, that present experience contains and is inflected by past states of awareness and anticipated events. In all of 21 subjects in this analysis, nets were successfully trained to extract aspects of relative past and future brain states, in comparison with statistically similar controls. This exploratory study thus concludes that the proposed methods for “neurophenomenology” warrant further application, including the exploration of individual differences, multivariate differences between cognitive task conditions, and exploration of specific brain regions possibly contributing to the observations. All of these attractive questions, however, must be reserved for future research.

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Gasparyan, Diana E. "Key Aspects of Analytical and Transcendental Phenomenology within the Framework of Modern Philosophy of Consciousness." Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences 62, no. 5 (August 21, 2019): 97–123. http://dx.doi.org/10.30727/0235-1188-2019-62-5-97-123.

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The article discusses the peculiarities and specific features of phenomenological approach developed in contemporary analytical philosophy. Despite the fact that the trust in phenomenological approaches continue to grow in analytical philosophy, it is necessary to recognize the presence of noticeable divergence between the classical transcendental phenomenology of E. Husserl and contemporary versions of phenomenology in analytical philosophy. The article examines some of these divergences. It is shown that, unlike the skepticism of transcendental phenomenology in relation to scientific methodology in the research of consciousness, the analytical tradition of phenomenology is oriented toward cooperative dialogue with science. Phenomenology in analytical philosophy places great hopes on the possibility of making consciousness a subject of joint research of neuroscientists and phenomenologists. The article claims that in the course of realization of this task, phenomenology in analytical tradition often starts to be interpreted from realistic and partly from naturalistic positions, and that does not meet the project of transcendental phenomenology. As an illustration of this idea, certain approaches of analytical phenomenology are considered, in particular: phenomena are interpreted from the point of view of logical and linguistic analysis, intentionality is connected with the activity of the brain and is located in the natural world, phenomenal consciousness is interpreted as the awareness of a high order, and the phenomena have a gradual nature and are often identified only with sensual experience, which implies a correlative correspondence of the substrate data of brain physiology. In that regard, there are reasons to interpret phenomenological theories that are funded by analytical tradition as an example of a specific phenomenology of non-transcendental origin.

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Simons, Peter. "Pointers." Grazer Philosophische Studien 94, no. 3 (August 8, 2017): 381–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-09403005.

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Reference can fail in a way that intentionality cannot. Though the stream of phenomenal experience typically does not fail to target (be about, refer to) objects outside, it may do. How does the mind go about targeting objects beyond itself? The speculative conjecture of this paper is that it does so by a type of process which can be called pointing, and that the acts or act-aspects of pointing can be called pointers. The notion of a pointer has several suggestive roots. One is the familiar physical gesture of pointing. Another is the existence of directional signs such as on roads. The third is the software data types making direct reference to memory locations in computers, also called ‘pointers’. A final source is demonstrative pronouns and other deictic expressions in language, of which Peter Geach wrote, “a demonstrative pronoun … works like a pointer, not like a label”. I suggest that there is in the mental cognitive repertoire a structurally and semantically analogous type of act which pierces the passivity of perception, directs us outside the machine, and prepares the way for drawing others’ minds to the same thing.

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Verschure, Paul F. M. J. "Synthetic consciousness: the distributed adaptive control perspective." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 371, no. 1701 (August 19, 2016): 20150448. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2015.0448.

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Understanding the nature of consciousness is one of the grand outstanding scientific challenges. The fundamental methodological problem is how phenomenal first person experience can be accounted for in a third person verifiable form, while the conceptual challenge is to both define its function and physical realization. The distributed adaptive control theory of consciousness (DACtoc) proposes answers to these three challenges. The methodological challenge is answered relative to the hard problem and DACtoc proposes that it can be addressed using a convergent synthetic methodology using the analysis of synthetic biologically grounded agents, or quale parsing. DACtoc hypothesizes that consciousness in both its primary and secondary forms serves the ability to deal with the hidden states of the world and emerged during the Cambrian period, affording stable multi-agent environments to emerge. The process of consciousness is an autonomous virtualization memory, which serializes and unifies the parallel and subconscious simulations of the hidden states of the world that are largely due to other agents and the self with the objective to extract norms. These norms are in turn projected as value onto the parallel simulation and control systems that are driving action. This functional hypothesis is mapped onto the brainstem, midbrain and the thalamo-cortical and cortico-cortical systems and analysed with respect to our understanding of deficits of consciousness. Subsequently, some of the implications and predictions of DACtoc are outlined, in particular, the prediction that normative bootstrapping of conscious agents is predicated on an intentionality prior. In the view advanced here, human consciousness constitutes the ultimate evolutionary transition by allowing agents to become autonomous with respect to their evolutionary priors leading to a post-biological Anthropocene. This article is part of the themed issue ‘The major synthetic evolutionary transitions’.

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Crane, Tim. "Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43 (March 1998): 229–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100004380.

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‘It is of the very nature of consciousness to be intentional’ said Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘and a consciousness that ceases to be a consciousness of something wouldipso factocease to exist.’ Sartre here endorses the central doctrine of Husserl's phenomenology, itself inspired by a famous idea of Brentano's: that intentionality, the mind's ‘direction upon its objects’, is what is distinctive of mental phenomena. Brentano's originality does not lie in pointing out the existence of intentionality, or in inventing the terminology, which derives from scholastic discussions of concepts orintentiones. Rather, his originality consists in his claim that the concept of intentionality marks out the subject matter of psychology: the mental. His view was that intentionality ‘is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon manifests anything like it.’ This isBrentano's thesisthat intentionality is the mark of the mental.

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Langsam, Harold. "Why Intentionalism Cannot Explain Phenomenal Character." Erkenntnis 85, no. 2 (July 10, 2018): 375–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0031-7.

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McCulloch, Gregory. "Intentionality and Interpretation." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43 (March 1998): 253–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100004392.

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According to Brentano in a much-quoted passage,Every psychological phenomenon is characterized by…intentional inherent existence of … an object… In the idea something is conceived, in the judgement something is recognized or discovered, in loving loved, in hating hated, in desiring desired, and so on.

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Ferraris, Maurizio. "Collective intentionality or documentality?" Philosophy & Social Criticism 41, no. 4-5 (April 9, 2015): 423–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453715577741.

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In this article I defend two theses. The first is that the centrality of recording in the social world is manifested through the production of documents, a phenomenon which has been present since the earliest phases of society and which has undergone an exponential growth through the technological developments of the last decades (computers, tablets, smartphones). The second is that the centrality of documents leads to a view of normativity according to which human beings are primarily passive receptors of rules manifested through documents. We are not intentional producers of values. The latter, as I shall suggest in my conclusion, should be viewed as being ‘socially dependent’ rather than ‘socially constructed’.

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Kiverstein, Julian. "Making Sense of Phenomenal Unity: An Intentionalist Account of Temporal Experience." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 67 (July 7, 2010): 155–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246110000081.

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AbstractOur perceptual experiences stretch across time to present us with movement, persistence and change. How is this possible given that perceptual experiences take place in the present that has no duration? In this paper I argue that this problem is one and the same as the problem of accounting for how our experiences occurring at different times can be phenomenally unified over time so that events occurring at different times can be experienced together. Any adequate account of temporal experience must also account for phenomenal unity. I look to Edmund Husserl's writings on time consciousness for such an account.

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Andjelkovic, Miroslava. "Intentionality and the stream of thought: Brentano and James." Theoria, Beograd 51, no. 3 (2008): 15–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo0803015a.

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Philosophers have not done much research on the connection between philosophical and psychological views of Franz Brentano and William James. This connection is of particular historical interest because their views influenced Edmund Husserl, but it also bears philosophical importance as one can show why in James' philosophy of mind there is no correlate to Brentano's notion of intentionality which designates the relationship between mental and physical phenomena. Given this, intentionality, if there is room for it in James' psychology, would be the relation which holds between the correlates of these phenomena in his analysis of consciousness. I am trying to show that there is such a correlation between mental phenomena and James' notion of transitive segments, as well as between physical phenomena and James' notion of substantive segments of consciousness. The question is whether the segments of consciousness stand in the relationship of intentionality and I argue that this is not the case.

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Rosińska, Zofia, and Grzegorz Czemiel. "The Phenomenon of Fanaticism." Dialogue and Universalism 30, no. 2 (2020): 159–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/du202030223.

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The paper describes the model shape of fanaticism. It defines fanaticism as a willing enslavement of personality and analysed the following features of it: intentionality, missionary attitude, being in love, intolerance, ability to satisfy ambivalent desires for objectivization and for subjectivization, and ability to evoke ambivalent feelings: moral condemnation and the feeling of admiration.

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Goryacheva, Elena Dmitrievna. "Intentionality of Precedent Phenomena in Literary Discourse of the Silver Age." Filologičeskie nauki. Voprosy teorii i praktiki, no. 8 (July 2021): 2573–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.30853/phil210366.

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Gintis, Herbert. "Modalities of word usage in intentionality and causality." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33, no. 4 (August 2010): 336–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x10001731.

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Dolidze, Mamuka. "Some Phenomenological and Metaphisycal Aspects of Human Creativity." Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, no. 4-I (January 15, 2014): 119. http://dx.doi.org/10.5944/rif.4-i.2013.29741.

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The author gets human creativity to bridge phenomenology and metaphysics. He examines closely the poetical principle of Edgar Allan Poe and considers the artwork (poem) as a phenomenon appealing to the metaphysical beauty. He also considers the problem of free-dom in phenomenological and metaphysical aspects of creativity. To harmonize the freedom and phenomenology the author offers to differentiate two kinds of intentionality: “intentionality to” and “intentionality from”. The first is reducible to the purposefulness of events and refers to the constitutive function of consciousness, the latter implies the human creativity and freedom as an act of differentiation of phenomenon from its previous limits. The incipient point of the second form of intentionality seems to be a metaphysical object, which is worth considering as an inexhaustible source of the world of phenomena.El autor considera la creatividad humana pare tender un puente entre fenomenología y metafísica. Examina de cerca el principio poético de Edgar Allan Poe y considera la obra de arte (el poema) como un fenómeno que apela a la belleza metafísica. Considera el problema de la libertad en relación a los aspectos fenomenológicos y metafísicos de la creatividad. Para armonizar la libertad y la fenomenología, el autor propone diferenciar dos tipos de intencionalidad: “intencionalidad a” y “intencionalidad de (desde)”. La primera es reducible a la intencionalidad (purposefulness) de los hechos y se refiere a la función constitutiva de la conciencia; la segunda implica la creatividad humana y la libertad como un acto de diferenciación del fenómeno de sus límites anteriores. El punto de partida de la segunda forma de intencionalidad parece ser un objeto metafísico, el cual merece la pena considerar como una inagotable fuente del mundo de los fenómenos.

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Thompson, Michael J. "Collective Intentionality, Social Domination, and Reification." Journal of Social Ontology 3, no. 2 (June 7, 2017): 207–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jso-2016-0017.

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AbstractThis paper addresses the way that social power and domination can be understood in terms of collective intentionality. I argue that the essence of stable forms of rational power and domination must be understood as the functional influence of material resource control and the power to control the norms and collective-intentional, constitutive rules that guide institutions. As a result, the routinization and internalization of these rules by subjects becomes the criterion of success for any system of social power and social domination. I then consider how this relates the phenomenon of reification, which I proceed to show is when consciousness has been shaped by constitutive rules and group collective intentionality that sustain relations of domination and control and accept them as basic social facts, as second nature. I then go on to show parallels between Searle and Lukács before outlining the distinction between descriptive and critical social ontology.

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Jonkus, Dalius. "INTENCIONALUMO STRUKTŪRA IR GENEZĖ HUSSERLIO FENOMENOLOGIJOJE." Problemos 73 (January 1, 2008): 60–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/problemos.2008.0.2018.

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Straipsnyje analizuojama fenomenologinė intencionalumo samprata Husserlio Loginiuose tyrinėjimuose ir vėlesniuose jo raštuose. Siekiama parodyti, jog pačioje statiškoje intencionalumo sampratoje jau yra implikuotos jos genetinio pratęsimo galimybės. Fenomenologinė intencionalumo samprata negali būti redukuota į teorinį santykį su pažinimo objektu, nes joje išryškėja praktinis ir tranzityvus judesio link tikslo realizavimo pobūdis. Fenomenologija atmeta neintencionalių išgyvenimų sampratą, nes tokie išgyvenimai negali būti aprašomi kaip fenomenai, tačiau pripažįsta, jog nė vienas intencionalus išgyvenimas ar jo suponuojamas tikslas negali būti realizuojamas galutinai. Kitaip sakant, kiekvienam išgyvenimui būdingas ne tik universalaus sąmoningumo siekis, bet ir neįsisąmonintas arba nerealizuotas patyrimas. Patyrime patiriame ne tik tai, kas esama, bet ir tai, kas patiriama sykiu kaip kita. Pagrindiniai žodžiai: fenomenologija, intencionalumas, sąmonė, fenomenas, tranzityvumas.The Structure and the Genesis of Intentionality in Husserl’s PhenomenologyDalius Jonkus SummaryThe article discusses the concept of intentionality in Husserl’s phenomenology. The task of investigation is to show that static structure of intentionality can have prolongation in the genetic concept of intentionality. The concept of intentionality cannot be reduced to theoretical relation with object of cognition. Intentionality is practical realization, transitive movement and teleological process. Intentionality is a process of transition from one act to another. Phenomenological analysis cannot limit itself to only one separate act since every separate act posses the potential transition to another act, while every separate act preserves the interconnection with the integral intentional life. Phenomenology reject concept of nonintentional consciousness, because nonintentional acts of consciousness cannot be described like phenomena. From the other side Husserl affirm that not every act of consciousness can to reach a last goal. With other words, every act of consciousness implicate not only requirement for a plenitude of fulfillment, but in the same time implicate unconscious or unrealizable experience. Keywords: phenomenology, intentionality, consciousness, phenomena, transition.height: 115%; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;">

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Niel, Luis. "Intentionality and the Logico-Linguistic Commitment." Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea 8, no. 2 (December 31, 2020): 119–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.26512/rfmc.v8i2.35865.

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The aim of this article is to analyze and criticize Roderick Chisholm’s conception of intentionality, which has, historically, served as the point of departure for most accounts of intentionality in analytic philosophy. My goal is to highlight the problematic ‘logico-linguistic commitment’ presupposed by Chisholm, according to which mental concepts should be interpreted by means of semantic concepts. After addressing Chisholm’s differentiation between the ontological thesis (the idea that the intentional object might not exist) and the psychological thesis (the conception that only mental phenomena are intentional), as well as his defining criteria for intentionality (non-existential implication, independency of truth-value, and indirect reference), I focus on the manifold problems presented by his theory. First, the two initial criteria entail a conceptual confusion between the semantic concept of ‘intensionality’ and the mental concept of ‘intentionality’. Second, according to these criteria””and against Chisholm’s explicit intention””perception and other cognitive activities should not be considered intentional. Third, there are no grounds for the artificial conflation of intentionality and the concept of ‘propositional attitudes’””an equation which is an explicit tenet of the logico-linguistic commitment. In general, I argue that an interpretation of intentionality based on this commitment obscures the true meaning of the concept of intentionality, as it is presented, for instance, by phenomenology.

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Summa, Michela. "On the Role of Attention and Ascription in the Formation of Intentions within Behavior." Phänomenologische Forschungen 2018-2: Modes of Intentionality. Phenomenological and Medieval Perspectives 2018, no. 2 (2018): 177–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.28937/1000108208.

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This article explores the roots of action in behavior. Departing from the standard understanding of action as ‘intentional behavior’, we argue that this view is often based on the underestimation of the intentional structures that are already operative within behavior. Distinguishing between a broader and a narrower meaning of intentionality, we then elaborate on the processes that lead from the diffuse and operative intentionality of behavior to the focused intentionality of action. In order to properly appreciate these processes, we show that a reassessment of the phenomenon of attention – which takes into consideration its double (passive and active) nature as well as its social embedment – is required. Finally, we discuss the interplay between the obtained reframing of the genesis of intentional actions with the phenomenon of social ascription

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Cheongho Lee. "From Phenomenology to Ethics: Intentionality and the Other in Marion’s Saturated Phenomenon." Journal of Ethics 1, no. 116 (November 2017): 63–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.15801/je.1.116.201711.63.

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Hegarty, Michael J. "A dilemma for naturalistic theories of intentionality." Filosofia Unisinos 22, no. 1 (March 15, 2021): 59–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2021.221.07.

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I argue that a dilemma arises for naturalistic philosophers of mind in the naturalised semantics tradition. Giving a naturalistic account of the mind is a pressing problem. Brentano’s Thesis — that a state is mental if, and only if, that state has underived representational content — provides an attractive route to naturalising the mental. If true, Brentano’s Thesis means that naturalising representation is sufficient for naturalising the mental. But a naturalist who accepts Brentano’s Thesis thus commits to an eliminativism about the category of the mental. This is because naturalistic theories of representation are reductive, and so over-generalise by applying to patently non-mental states. According to these theories, it has been argued, phenomena like tree rings and saliva come out as representational. Only proposing further Naturalistic conditions on representation could avoid the eliminativist conclusion. But this shows that Naturalists have made only limited progress towards naturalising the mental. And if a Naturalist rejects Brentano’s Thesis, then she gives up on a clear link between representation and mentality. Hence, it is incumbent on the Naturalist to propose another, naturalistically acceptable, mark of the mental. This, again, shows that Naturalists have made only limited progress on the issue of naturalising the mental.Keywords: Intentionality, representation, physicalism, eliminativism, Brentano, materialism, naturalism.

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Aaro, Ane Faugstad. "Ricœur’s Historical Intentionality and the Great Goddess Freyja." Temenos - Nordic Journal of Comparative Religion 56, no. 1 (June 15, 2020): 75–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.33356/temenos.80350.

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The main question in this article concerns whether hermeneutic phenomenology as a methodology can address some of the problems and critiques raised in the study of religions. Inspired by Gilhus’s proposal in her article ‘The Phenomenology of Religion and Theories of Interpretation’, I investigate the possibilities in this strand of thought concerning interpretation and explanation from the perspective of Ricœur’s hermeneutic phenomenology and language theory, taking Norse mythology and the goddess Freyja as examples of how this method might work. I argue that Ricœur’s contribution to hermeneutic phenomenology is important to methodology in the study of religions, and that the historicity of the interpretation of religious phenomena is based on a lifeworldly intentionality. I also analyse the depth of understanding, the formation of ideas, and meaning in its historical context at the level of the historian’s process of interpretation, and I argue that the method may constitute a theoretical basis for an objective science.

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De Preester, Helena. "Intentionality and the inside/outside distinction in sensitive systems." Consciousness & Emotion 3, no. 1 (August 9, 2002): 65–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/ce.3.1.06dep.

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Working from both a phenomenological and a biological background, the conditions under which the emergence of intentionality occurs, are approached. This is done via two particularities of biological systems: the inside/outside distinction they exhibit and the fact that they are sensitive. The phenomenon of boundaries turns out to be a crucial issue in such an account. To start from a biological level is an indispensable preparation for a proper understanding of intentionality, phenomenologically conceived.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Phenomenal intentionality'

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