Journal articles on the topic 'Phenomenological monism'

La crítica de la ontología ocupa un lugar preponderante en la filosofía de Michel Henry. No obstante, los términos en que se expresa son diversos según los contextos argumentales en que se despliegan. En este trabajo distingo tres argumentos con los que Henry cuestiona la ontología en distintas obras y períodos de su filosofía; a saber: (1) la crítica del monismo ontológico; (2) la crítica del monismo fenomenológico; (3) la crítica de la ontología. Una vez expuestos, indago el modo en que estos argumentos han sido tratados en la bibliografía secundaria. Concluyo con algunas reflexiones en cuanto al alcance de las variaciones terminológicas y argumentativas propias de estos tres argumentos y expresando una preferencia personal por la tercera y última formulación.The critique of ontology is preponderant in the philosophy of Michel Henry. However, the terms in which it is expressed are diverse according to the different lines of argument. In my paper I distinguish three arguments with which Henry challenges ontology in three different works and periods of his philosophy; namely: (1) the critique of ontological monism; (2) the critique of phenomenological monism; (3) the critique of ontology. Once exposed those arguments, I describe how they have been received in the secondary literature. I conclude with some reflections on the terminological and argumentative variations characteristic of these three arguments and I express my personal preference for the third, last formulation.

AbstractThe phenomenological conception of “life-world” lays the theoretical foundation for the openness of the world. The founding relationship between the individual and the world, the interactive relationship among different cultural worlds on the intersubjective level, the free nature of truth and its presence in the open world, the “ek-sistent” characteristics of the human-being, the structural constitution of the life-world – all these topics demonstrate the open nature of the world in a phenomenological way. Based on these ideas, “reflective judgment” as “phronesis” and “fear” as ethic sentiment based on family experience become the practical stance, which is consistent with the “life-world” conception of phenomenology; the characteristics of publicness and intersubjectivity of the open world are thus maintained. In the face of the multicultural world, this attitude presents as a brand-new practice of intercultural philosophy, which is different from the centralism found under the framework of monism and the comparative philosophy under the framework of dualism. Such a practice of intercultural philosophy is “polylog”, i.e. based on the principles of difference and equality and searching for the “overlapping consensus” in full multi-participatory discussion. Through polylog, a harmonious life of human community is constructed. This paper attempts to derive a set of practical principles for maintaining the openness of the world and intercultural polylog in the era of globalization from the theoretical view of the phenomenological life-world.

This paper refers to the connection between the metaphysical duality of ground and existence and inner dynamic of the particular will of man. We will analyse how the metaphysical monism, which Schelling attributes to Spinoza and later to Hegel, is responsible for the abolition of the freedom of the human individual, because it does not account for the existence of evil, and consequently reduces it to the existence of a higher order reference system that over and predetermines the individual (1). We will first scrutinise the principles of separation and union, ground and understanding from the human point of view, namely as the will of ground and love, as particular and universal will (2). The will of man reveals itself as the culmination and model of the will that permeates nature, an essential aspect of the process of God’s revelation and becoming. The link between the principles of separation and union shows us the difference that Schellingian thought establishes between man and God, the real and the ideal. While God, or the purely ideal principle, precedes the separation in a logical-ontological sense, the will of man remains always in an indissoluble tension between the principles, since it is unable to overcome the opposition between good and evil that is characteristic of freedom. The good remains one of the results of human freedom and thus of the particular will of man. The good lies for Schelling not in the simple actualization of the general, but in the moment ineradicable particularity needed for the attainment of a real and effective principle (3). It is to this insurmountability of the particular will in the process of the constitution of man that our proposal of Schelling’s libertarian anarchism refers. The connection of this thesis with the critique of the State is also discussed (4).

Plato?s ?Phaedo? has taken up its position in European culture primarily thanks to its philosophical arguments for the immortality of the soul and the statement that for a true philosopher it is not enough to be free from the fear of death: one should strive for it. Christian theology adjusted these views so that they correspond to biblical eschatology and reproduced them repeatedly. However, there have always been and still are Christian theologians (including Orthodox Christian ones) who deny Platonic dualism as a world-view completely alien to Holy Scripture. It should be noted that criticism of the ?Phaedo? was always wider than the metaphysical question of monism or dualism in the comprehension of human nature; it gave rise to a certain existential philosophy focusing on the attitude towards death. In the Old and New Testament, death is never represented as some wonderful liberation from bodily existence that a philosopher should strive for: it is always horrible. The author of the article considers this problem of attitude to death across three dimensions: metaphysical, phenomenological, and syntactic. Syntactically, death imparts a character of logical sequence to our life, turning the totality of ?atomic facts? into fate. The image of fate makes our existence in time meanin?gful, and therefore becomes an existential phenomenology of the finitude of our existence. But eternal life does not depend on time, it is neither ?before? nor ?after?, and, hence, it is here in every tiniest moment of the present. Thus, the ?syntax of fate? determines the phenomenology of death, and the phenomenology of death determines the metaphysics of Eternity.

Abstract Despite recent interest in his work, little has been written about Løgstrup’s relation to phenomenology—what he thinks phenomenology is, how it informs his approach to ethics, and what he believes it can accomplish. Here I hope to stimulate further discussion of these matters. In this, consideration of Levinas’s understanding of phenomenology will be useful. While sharing many of Løgstrup’s concerns, Levinas insists on a distinction between phenomenological ontology and “metaphysics,” one that Løgstrup tends to blur in support of his argument that “absolute nihilism is an impossibility.” After showing why this distinction matters, I will argue that Løgstrup’s goal is better achieved if we embrace Heidegger’s transcendental version of phenomenology rather than follow Løgstrup or Levinas, despite much that remains phenomenologically valuable in both.

Three fundamental problems are connected with modern philosophy of subjectivity: first, the irreflexivity and immediacy of self-consciousness, second, the temporality and, third, the being of the finite self. The text will discuss the first problem in an introductory way by a reconstruction of the positions of Henrich and Frank. The second and third problem will be presented by an investigation of the phenomenological approaches of Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre. It will be argued that none of these approaches are able to solve the problems mentioned above in a satisfying way. Therefore, Henrich’s critical thesis will be discussed that an appropriate philosophical discussion of subjectivity cannot consist in phenomenological inquiry, but has to re-integrate the monist theories of the Classical German Philosophy. This thesis finally will be rejected in favour of a non-monist metaphysics of personal selfhood.

Abstract: To establish The Texture of Time as a notable philosophical achievement, this essay puts it in the context of transcendental phenomenology and elucidates "Veen's Time" by way of comparison to Husserl's theory of time-consciousness. Despite Nabokov's apparent disinterest in phenomenology, the monist stance, descriptive method and de facto epoché in The Texture of Time all point to it being a piece of phenomenological analysis. Veen's conception of the Present as a hollow is analogous to Husserl's notion of the absolute flow of time-constituting consciousness; by emphasizing the stillness of the Present, Veen even irons out a couple of rough edges in Husserl's account. The Past is not a mere extension of the Present, but an equally important panel of "Veen's Time" with its own structure that centers on the subject and the object as two identity poles. Finally, drawing on the concept of "protention," the future-facing element of the Present, Veen's dismissal of the Future as "a quack at the court of Chronos" is interpreted as attacking the conventional tripartite image of Time instead of the Future per se.

As a result of many years of discussions about what exactly culturology studies and whether it is a separate science at all, it has become, by and large, the conventional agreement of scientists to consider, following the post-positivist Popper, that there are as many sciences as there are scientists. In a sense, this is convenient, since it allows any available methods to be used for the study of culture with an equal degree of acceptability. The problem is not that they cannot be applied at all, but in their equivalence, lack of causal subordination, hierarchy. It is this position that follows from the impossibility (or unwillingness) to strictly limit the subject of cultural studies because if culturology studies “... any types and forms of human life” (A. Flier), then any method for studying them can be chosen. After Hegel, attempts to comprehend the general laws of the development of culture (and this is the task of culturology as a science) become increasingly rare, and the work of a culturologist is reduced to a phenomenological description of individual cultural phenomena, which are essentially unknowable without their generalization. The substance of culture has dissolved in all the infinite variety of its accidents. Human activities depend on living conditions, but it also creates new conditions, a new “context”, which in turn mediates new forms of activity, and these create a new culture, a new social experience materialized in artifacts, norms of behavior and language and so on ad infinitum. A person constantly creates culture and a new oneself with it, he himself becomes the result of his creation. “The circle of culture”, its development from person to person, i.e. from oneself to oneself, with each circle at an ever-higher level of social progress - conceptually, such a movement can be comprehended only with the help of Hegelian dialectics. Logic reflects the movement of the world in the movement of concepts, thereby becoming a theoretical reflection of scientific thinking. The principle of the dialectical method lies in the identity of thinking and the thinkable, i.e. in that the movement of the scientist's thought coincides with the movement of the development of science. This conclusion does not imply that other methods are inapplicable in cultural studies. On the contrary, the diversity of different approaches to the study of culture is also objectively necessary, as is the objective existence of the diversity of cultural phenomena. But as an individual presupposes the universal, so the manifold presupposes the one. This connection is cognized with the help of Hegelian dialectics, dialectical monism, a universal method for social sciences, including cultural studies; universal, not in the sense of the only one, but in the sense of a single, systemically uniting various particular methods, a kind of logical “compass” that does not allow one to stray from the right direction of movement of any science - movement to truth.

Between March and June 2008, a group of fifteen Performance Studies and Communications students at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia undertook a course on comedy based on a series of six lectures by Agnes Heller in which she outlined ideas from her book, Immortal Comedy. Subsequently, the students attended a number of comedy shows and other events to perform practical group phenomenological research with an aim to activate the ground opened by Heller’s theories through description of actual comic phenomena. The outcomes—theoretical, experiential and, most surprisingly, pedagogical—were remarkable in their demonstration of the efficacy of group phenomenology as a method of intertwined practice, research and learning.

Physical literacy, a concept introduced by Britain’s physical education and phenomenological scholar, Margaret Whitehead, who aligned the term with her monist view of the human condition and emphasis that we are essentially embodied beings in-the-world, is a foundational hub of recent physical education curricular revision. The adoption of the term serves a political purpose as it helps stakeholders advocate for the educational, specifically literacy, rights of the whole child. Yet, one might wonder what impact conceptual shifts of becoming “physically literate” in lieu of becoming “physically educated” have on physical education research and practice. Terms such as “reading” the game and metaphors that describe the body as an “instrument of expression” are entering the lexicon of physical education but from a seemingly cognitive frame of reference. Arguably, the extent to which the adoption of physical literacy has on dissolving Cartesian views of the body and the mechanization of movement it performs has yet to be questioned. This article thus acts as an invitation to explore physical literacy in a Merleau-Pontian inspired act of inscribing the world through movement and how a reading of a reversible imprint might awaken a more fluent sense of what it means to become physically literate as new curricular pathways in the field of physical education emerge.

The idea that we can understand key aspects of the metaphysics of consciousness by understanding conscious states as having a presentational character plays an essential role in the phenomenological tradition beginning with Brentano and Husserl. In this paper, the author explores some potential consequences of this connection for contemporary discussions of the ontology of consciousness in the world. Drawing on Hintikka’s analysis of epistemic modality, the author argues that the essential presentational character of consciousness can be seen as accounting for the familiar failure of substitutivity of identicals in intensional contexts of conscious presentation and further provides for an ontology of conscious presentation that avoids metaphysically problematic commitments to “special” intentional objects. The author next considers how the irreducibility of intensional contexts, if grounded in the presentational character of consciousness, also may provide for a kind of irreducibility of the “first-person” perspective to third-person or objective description across possible worlds. Finally, drawing on Chalmers’ “two-dimensionalist” semantic framework, the author argues that attention to the presentational aspect of consciousness as thus understood, while it provides significant motivation for the existence of the “hard problem” of the irreducibility of consciousness to physical and structural description, is nevertheless consistent with a globally monist, rather than dualist, ontology.

IntroductionChronic conditions are associated with over one-third of potentially avoidable hospitalisations. Integrated care programmes aim to help people with chronic conditions to self-manage their health, thus avoiding hospital admissions. While founded on principles of person-centred care, the experiences of people with multiple chronic conditions in integrated care programmes are not widely known. Our study will explore how person-centred care is incorporated into an integrated care programme for people with multiple chronic conditions.Methods and analysisThis is a qualitative phenomenological study being conducted from March 2018 to June 2019, in a large metropolitan health service in Melbourne, Australia. Participants will be programme clients (and/or their carers) and staff working in the programme. We will interview staff about their experiences of the programme. Recruited staff will assist with recruitment of clients who recently completed an episode of care, to participate in a semistructured interview in their home. We will also analyse the medical records of interviewed clients, and observe outpatient clinics connected to the programme, based on the findings of the interviews. We will analyse all data using thematic analysis, with overarching themes representing staff and client perspectives of person-centred care.Ethics and disseminationEthical approval was granted by Monash Health (HREC/18/MonH/33) and Monash University (12260) Human Research Ethics Committees. Our study will provide a comprehensive exploration of person-centred care in an integrated care programme. It will add information to person-centred care literature on participants’ perceptions of what works and why, including barriers and enablers to person-centred care in a complex environment. Findings of this study will be disseminated via publications, conferences and presentations to the health service participants.

Abstract We discuss the torsion geometries as the universal dynamical setting for the five-fold symmetry and its relation to nonorientable surfaces of selfreference embodying a supradual logophysics, rooted in the Möbius strip and Klein Bottle. We frame the discussion in terms of image-schemas in cognitive semantics and their disruption stemming from supraduality and nonorientability. We present the relation with anholonomic phases, chaos and the brain-mind as an integrated dynamical system. We discuss nonorientability as the characteristic transcendental metapattern of resonant connection, pattern formation and recognition. We present the torsion geometry and nonorientability in psychophysics and the neurosciences. We discuss the homology of the torsion geometry of physical space or spacetime with that of the unconscious modelization by the brain-mind of the kinematics of objects in physical space and in the perception of music, elaborating on the Principle of Complementarity of cognitive psychology due to Shepard. We elaborate on the phenomenological construal of experience, the world as experience. We discuss the supraduality of the liminal states of consciousness and the basis of awareness in memory. We introduce the cognitive psychology foundations of memory on nonorientability and its relations to the short-memory space and its quantumlike nature, and the hyperbolicity of the psychophysics of vision. We discuss the chaotic behaviour of dynamical systems as a manifestation of supraduality as their nonorientability. We propose a basis for the source of consciousness, the Hard Problem, given by the principles of selfreference and hetero-reference which generate the Klein Bottle supradual logophysics. We present the supradual logophysics of neuron cytoskeletal structures, its relation to torsion, resonances, topological and geometrical phases and the microtubule dynamics in terms of nonlinear buckling patterns and nonorientability, and still the torsion geometry of the irreversible thermodynamical processes supporting interactions-at-a-distance. We discuss the primal relation of torsion, nonorientability and memory, particularly arising in the buckling of microtubules. We discuss the primal morphogenesis of the cell as a tensegrity structure, torsion and the indiscernibility of elastodynamics, electromagnetic and gravitational wavefronts as morphogenetic fields. We discuss nonorientability as the metaform pattern of connection and resonance, particularly of interaction-at-a-distance. We apply it to a topological allosteric effect mediated by electromagnetic fields. We discuss the topological chemistry paradigm, particularly of organic chemistry where conformation superposition is crucial, its relation to anaesthetics and its application to the ORC OR theory of Penrose and Hameroff for consciousness as arising from the collapse of the wave function which we relate to the multiconformation in the topological chemistry paradigm. We propose a model of continuous signal processing in digital terms which allows an optimal reconstruction -from digital to continuous-in terms of the Nyquist-Shannon theorem whose constraints on frequencies and bandwidths is naturally interpreted in the terms of the 2:1 harmonics of nonorientability in the Möbius strip or Klein Bottle. We discuss the non-dual logic of the tubulin code and the resonator nature of the neuronal cytoskeleton. We propose that the topological phases appearing in the cytoskeleton may correspond to the topological anholonomity, namely, nonorientability, as was elicited empirically by the Bandyopadhyay group, the existence of anholonomity corresponding to the 360° rotation characteristic of the topological anholonomity, Möbius strip. We propose the Matrix Logic representation of the Klein Bottle logic as the basis for microtubule computations, and discuss the relation to quantum computation, topological entanglement and the topological coherence/decoherence Klein Bottle cycle. We also relate it to holography, the brain’s integration and Velmans’ Reflexive Monism extended by Rapoport. We discuss the multiconformation orientable and nonorientable resonators electronic devices and antennas as classical-quantum realisations of microtubule coherent behaviour. We discuss the relation of life and consciousness and the topological nonorientable embodiment of memory. We introduce the dynamical reduction program for the collapse of the quantum state in terms of the torsion stochastic differential geometry of the quantum geometry of Quantum Mechanics as projective space, and particularly the stochastic extension of the Schroedinger equation to account for the coupling of quantum system and environment, say a measurement apparatus. Thus we identify a realisation of the dynamical reduction program which is based on the torsion geometry, yet supports an agent-free collapse of the quantum state, as an objective albeit random process due to quantum fluctuations. We shall discuss the present supradual logophysics in several aspects such as 1) microtubule structure and dynamics, 2) the orientable and nonorientable conformations of organic molecules, 3) the relation with anaesthetics and the altered states of consciousness and 4) confront them with the tenets of Penrose & Hameroff ORC OR theory for the origin of consciousness, not only the topological chemistry but their choice of a superposition of null torsion as in General Relativity, which renders a trivial selfreferentiality, with the topological chemistry multiconformations which requires non-null torsion. The nontrivial selfreferentiality is both proper to the mind and the torsion geometry, be that on the physical, chemical, perceptual or cognitive domains. All in all, we propose that consciousness is neither based on panpsychism nor the collapse of quantum states, nor exclusively on the control of superposition of conformations of organic chemistry, but rather on the torsion-nonorientable geometry-topology based on the principles of selfreference and hetero-reference, operating in all domains: that of meaning, the mental-anatomical-physiological domain, structural processes of matter energy and in-formation, be that physical, chemical, biological, cognitive and perception. We present a remarkable connection between them. Our approach rather than multidisciplinary will be transdisciplinary, a possibility supported on supraduality - transcending the dual-logic based logophysics-from which the theory will follow in a rather smooth way.

IntroductionGlobally, studies have consistently demonstrated the harmful mental and physical health impacts of immigration detention, with high levels of distress documented among detained asylum seekers and refugees (ASR). However, the consequences of immigration detention over time on the psychological and physical health of ASR are unclear and poorly quantified.Methods and analysisThis prospective, mixed-methods cohort study will recurrently assess and describe the health profiles of adult ASR with an experience of Australian Government-sponsored immigration detention greater than 28 days. ASR ≥18 years old released from immigration detention will be assessed at 0, 3, 6 and 12 months and annually thereafter for up to 10 years, contingent on resourcing. Five self-report scales and a structured psychiatric interview will assess the primary outcome of depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress, pain intensity and severity, somatic symptoms, functional impairment, physical health conditions associated with detention and engagement in available treatment of this cohort. Additionally, pre-existing health records will be accessed to identify current and previous health status and assess changes in these health indices. Quantitative findings will be triangulated with a qualitative phenomenological thematic analysis of interviews to determine additional psychosocial factors associated with the outcomes.Ethics and disseminationThe study protocol was approved by the Monash Health Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC/73614/MonH-2021-251322). Results will be reported at conferences, in peer-reviewed publications and to all relevant stakeholder groups.

This research activity is motivated by the lack of optimal marketing of hydroponic products produced by PKM partner, PKM Program of Kemenristek Dikti Grant 2017, Pokja 4 TPPKK and Menur Posyandu, Blabak Village, Pesantren District, Kediri City, East Java Province. The success of hydroponic cultivation has not been followed by the ability to market. The accuracy of the marketing concept is expected to be able to maximize profits, when pranoto mongso consept in the limited land, and the minimum planting point can be done by partners. Based on this background, the formulation of the problem in this study is "What is the marketing concept that is applied to new hydroponic businesses ?, which is done by partners, namely Working Group 4 TPPKK and Menur Posyandu Blabak Village, Kediri City Islamic Boarding School District. The purpose is to find out the right and effective marketing concept for the optimal sale of hydroponic products with limited planting point conditions. Using qualitative research methods with a phenomenological approach, it is expected that direct observation and in-depth interviews with partners as informants. The selected informants have met criteria 5 R (relevance, recommendation, rapport, readiness, and reassurance). From in-depth interviews and observations, the data is validated through tests of internal validity (credibility), external validity (transferability), reliability (dependability) and triangulation techniques. The phenomenological analysis technique applied in this research is trancendental phenomenology analysis. The results of the study show that there is an application of the marketing concept, which is then referred to as the concept of social and relational marketing, which emphasizes networking, personal selling and direct selling with marketing media in the form of social media such as Facebook, Whatsapp, Instagram. Kegiatan penelitian ini dilatarbelakangi kurang optimalnya pemasaran produk hidroponik yang dihasilkan mitra program PKM Hibah Kemenristek Dikti Tahun 2017 yaitu Pokja 4 TPPKK dan Posyandu Menur Kelurahan Blabak Kecamatan Pesantren Kota Kediri Propinsi Jawa Timur. Keberhasilan budidaya tanaman hidroponik belum diikuti kemampuan memasarkan. Ketepatan konsep memasarkan diharapkan mampu memaksimalkan laba, ketika pranoto mongso pada lahan terbatas dengan titik tanam minimum dapat dilakukan oleh mitra. Berdasarkan latar belakang tersebut, maka rumusan masalah pada penelitian ini adalah “Bagaimana konsep pemasaran yang diterapkan pada usaha baru hidroponik?, yang dilakukan.oleh mitra yaitu Pokja 4 TPPKK dan Posyandu Menur Kelurahan Blabak Kecamatan Pesantren Kota Kediri. Adapun tujuannya adalah untuk mengetahui konsep pemasaran yang tepat dan efektif untuk penjualan produk hidroponik yang optimal dengan kondisi titik tanam yang terbatas. Menggunakan metode penelitian kualitatif dengan pendekatan fenomenologi, diharapkan dengan pengamatan secara langsung dan wawancara mendalam kepada mitra sebagai informannya. Informan yang dipilih telah memenuhi kriteria 5 R (relevance, recomendatioan, rapport, readiness, dan reassurance). Dari wawancara mendalam dan pengamatan, data divalidasi melaui uji validitas internal (credibility), validitas eksternal (transferability), reliabilitas (dependability) dan confirmability dengan teknik triangulasi. Teknik analisis fenomenologi yang diterapkan dalam penelitian ini adalah analisis fenomenologi trancendental. Adapun hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa terdapat penerapan konsep pemasaran yang selanjutnya konsep pemasaran tersebut disebut sebagai konsep pemasaran sosial dan relasional, yang menekankan pada networking, personal selling dan direct selling dengan media pemasaran berupa media sosial seperti facebook, whats app, instagram.

Cuando se habla de filosofía se habla de antropología. Del mismo modo, cuando se habla de antropología también se debería de hablar de la afectividad. Sin embargo, hasta hoy, pienso que muchos filósofos han comprendido mal la afectividad en la persona humana, pues han caído en dos reduccionismos: uno considera la afectividad como un componente irracional, es el caso del dualismo; el otro la asocia a un monismo, como se puede verificar en el sentimentalismo y en el psicologismo. De igual modo, aquellos que permanecen en una posición intermedia también la han comprendido mal, como se puede ver, por ejemplo, en la perspectiva aristotélico- tomista. Para estos, la afectividad es siempre pre- moral y debe ser siempre subordinada a la razón y a la voluntad. De esta forma, no han comprendido que la afectividad tiene también un ámbito espiri-tual y que, así, es ella quien muchas veces debe integrar la razón y la voluntad, a fin de garantizar la autorrea-lización de la persona humana. En este sentido, tampoco han visto que la afectividad puede ser valorada desde el punto de vista moral. Debido sobre todo a estos errores que se han cometido en el ámbito filosófico con relación a la afectividad, he visto que sería bueno repensar la noción de afectividad de la persona humana. Así, de entre todos los autores que he conocido y estudiado, he visto que la propuesta de Dietrich von Hildebrand con relación a la afectividad podría proporcionar muchas respuestas y herramientas para poder solventar estas inquietudes filosóficas y poder evitar reduccionismos, proporcionando interpretaciones más completas. El filósofo, fenomenólogo-realista, Dietrich von Hildebrand se ha distinguido en muchas áreas de la filosofía, como en la metafísica, en la gnoseología, en la ética, en la antropología, en la religión, etc.. “Casi quiero decir que el genio (artístico) de Adolf von Hildebrand ha sido heredado por su hijo (...) como un genio filo-sófico” (Husserl: H. Sepp; L. Embree, Handbook of Phenomenological Aesthetics, Springer, London, 2010, p. 145 (Traducción del autor). No obstante, sin duda alguna, la principal área, aquella en la que con mayor prominencia ha destacado, creemos que fue en el ámbito de la afectividad, aportando, así, contribuciones que hasta hoy no hubieran sido tenidas en consideración. Husserl lo comprueba. Cuando ha dirigido la tesis de doctorado de Hildebrand ha decido: “Sin embargo, su verdadera fuerza y sus significativos y originales resul-tados residen principalmente en la esfera emocional, en los análisis que llenan los capítulos 3o a 8o, de la parte II, y que sorprenden con un conocimiento íntimo sin precedentes de las múltiples formas de la conscien-cia emocional y sus correlatos representativos. Dicho esto, sólo puedo solicitar el título de opus eximium para esta importante obra” [E. Husserl, Urteil Über Hildebrands Doktorarbeit, Ed. K. Schuhmann, Aletheia, V, 1992, p. 5 (Traducción al español del autor)]. El mapa afectivo en Hildebrand es muy vasto. Por esto, he decidido presentar directamente un solo tema, o sea de que modo la afectividad se relaciona con la libertad y así, en este sentido, como ella puede ser valorada moralmente. Para atingir este objetivo, inicialmente me propongo analizar como Hildebrand entiende y concibe la afectividad en la persona humana. Posteriormente analizaré la libertad humana y su relación con la moralidad. Finalmente relacionaré los distintos tipos de libertad en la persona humana con la afectividad, demostrando así al mismo tiempo como la afectividad puede ser moralmente evaluada.

Background One in 5 young people grow up in a family where one parent has experienced a mental health problem or substance use concern. Compared with their same-aged peers, these youth are at a higher risk of academic failure and acquiring a substance abuse and/or mental health issue. There is a paucity of accessible, age-appropriate interventions that address their needs. Objective A 6-week, web-based intervention, “mental illness: supported, preventative, online, targeted” (mi.spot), was developed based on previous research and the competence enhancement model. This paper describes the protocol for a randomized controlled trial and details how the usage, safety, acceptability, and feasibility of the intervention will be determined. Methods Participants will be recruited through social media and clinician referral. A total of 70 Australians, aged 18 to 25 years, who grew up with parents with a mental illness or substance use concern will participate in a 2-arm parallel randomized controlled trial. The assessment will consist of a baseline measurement and 2 follow-up periods, posttest and 6-week follow-up, using the Mental Health Continuum short form; the Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale; the Coping Orientation to Problems Experienced inventory; the General Help Seeking Questionnaire; the Social Connectedness Scale; the Mental Health Literacy Scale; the General Self-Efficacy Scale; and the Attribution of Responsibility for Parental Mental Illness Measure. Impact will be examined at pre, post, and follow-up time periods using analyses of variance that will include a within-subjects factor (time) and a between-subjects factor (intervention/control). Facilitator interviews will ascertain intervention feasibility. Participant interviews will ascertain intervention acceptability. Interview data will be analyzed within a qualitative framework. Usage (data analytics) across site features and several indicators of clinical safety will also be reported. Results The impact of mi.spot will be examined at pre, post, and follow-up time periods using analyses of variance on each of the measures outlined above. There will be a within-subjects factor (time) and a between-subjects factor (intervention/control). Data analysis will employ the intention-to-treat principle by including all participants in the analyses. Qualitative interview data will be analyzed using interpretative phenomenological analysis along with respondent validation. The Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee (reference number: 2019-18660-30434) approved the trial on April 17, 2019. As of October 2, 2019, 30 participants were enrolled in the control group and 34 participants were enrolled in the intervention group. Result are expected to be submitted for publication in December 2020. Conclusions Study results will provide reliable evidence on a web-based intervention that has the potential to make a difference to the lives of many vulnerable young adults. Implementation guidelines are needed to embed the intervention in different service sectors. Trial Registration Australian New Zealand Clinical Trials Registry ACTRN12619000335190; https://anzctr.org.au/Trial/Registration/TrialReview.aspx?ACTRN=12619000335190 International Registered Report Identifier (IRRID) DERR1-10.2196/15626

In this article, I deal with Henri Bergson’s concept of memory and consciousness, examining the relationship between these two concepts. Although Bergson often seems to identify them with each other, this analysis leads me to the conclusion that consciousness is only a possibility invoked by memory. Bergson assumes the existence of unconscious memory, which is, according to him, already spiritual and potentially conscious. It is illustrated in Bergson’s metaphor of the cone, which I analyze. There is also a corporeal memory‑habit, conscious to a limited extent. I show how these memories are connected with each other and what is the share of consciousness in each of them. I also consider the relationship between memory, both corporeal and spiritual, and sensory perception. I am led to believe that the relationship between them is in some way dialectical. Ultimately, Bergson’s entire conception of the relationship between matter and spirit, oscillating between the poles of dualism and monism, is a version of dialectical metaphysics. This metaphysics, as I try to show, is in many ways contemporary, inspiring in particular the so‑called new materialism. What seems especially up‑to‑date is Bergson’s analysis of consciousness which I compare with the phenomenological conception and with the non‑reductionist analytic philosophy of mind.

The classification of mindsports such as the card game of bridge within sport and society continues to be keenly debated. The concept of ‘physicality’ is often cited as being a prerequisite for an activity to be classed as a ‘sport’, a characteristic typically seen as lacking in mindsports. However, by drawing upon monist conceptualisations of the mind, body and world being intertwined, it is possible to problematise such arguments by highlighting the interconnected sensations experienced when participating in bridge. This article explores such a notion through phenomenologically-inspired analysis of 52 interviews with elite-level bridge players. The findings detail the importance players placed upon aspects of kinaesthesia, physical presence within the competitive environment, and the role of other social actors within their own understandings of their competition experience. These sensorial, emotional and embodied accounts of elite-level bridge shed light on the physical negotiations and socio-cultural influences involved in mindsport, which allude to a greater degree of ‘physicality’ than has previously been discussed.

Abstract We present NNPDF4.0MC, a variant of the NNPDF4.0 set of parton distributions (PDFs) at LO, NLO and NNLO, with and without inclusion of the photon PDF, suitable for use with Monte Carlo (MC) event generators, which require PDFs to satisfy additional constraints in comparison to standard PDF sets. These requirements include PDF positivity down to a low scale Q ~ 1 GeV, smooth extrapolation in the very small and large x regions, and numerically stable results even in extreme regions of phase space for all PDFs. We compare the NNPDF4.0MC PDFs to their baseline NNPDF4.0 counterparts, and to the NNPDF2.3LO set entering the Monash tune of the Pythia8 event generator. We briefly assess the phenomenological impact of these PDFs on the cross-sections for hard and soft QCD processes at the LHC.

Australia has a diverse, multilayered society that reflects its rich musical life. There are many community choirs formed by various cultural and linguistically diverse groups. This article is part of an ongoing project, Well-being and ageing: community, diversity and the arts (since 2008), undertaken by Deakin University and Monash University, that explores the cultural diversity within Australian society and how active music engagement fosters well-being. The singing groups selected for this discussion are the Skylarkers, the Bosnian Behar Choir, and the Coro Furlan. The Skylarkers and the Bosnian Behar Choir are mixed groups who respectively perform popular music from their generation and celebrate their culture through music. The Coro Furlan is an Italian male choir who understand themselves as custodians of their heritage. In these interpretative, qualitative case studies semi-structured interviews were undertaken and analyzed using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. In this approach there is an exploration of participants’ understanding of their lived experiences. The analysis of the combined data identified musical and social benefits that contribute to participants’ sense of individual well-being. Musical benefits occurred through sharing, learning and singing together. Social benefits included opportunities to build friendships, overcome isolation and gain a sense of validation. Many found that singing enhanced their health and happiness. Active music making in community choirs and music ensembles continues to be an effective way to support individuals, build community, and share culture and heritage.

Abstract A study of strange hadron production associated with hard scattering processes and with the underlying event is conducted to investigate the origin of the enhanced production of strange hadrons in small collision systems characterised by large charged-particle multiplicities. For this purpose, the production of the single-strange meson $$ {\textrm{K}}_{\textrm{S}}^0 $$ K S 0 and the double-strange baryon Ξ± is measured, in each event, in the azimuthal direction of the highest-pT particle (“trigger” particle), related to hard scattering processes, and in the direction transverse to it in azimuth, associated with the underlying event, in pp collisions at $$ \sqrt{s} $$ s = 5.02 TeV and $$ \sqrt{s} $$ s = 13 TeV using the ALICE detector at the LHC. The per-trigger yields of $$ {\textrm{K}}_{\textrm{S}}^0 $$ K S 0 and Ξ± are dominated by the transverse-to-leading production (i.e., in the direction transverse to the trigger particle), whose contribution relative to the toward-leading production is observed to increase with the event charged-particle multiplicity. The transverse-to-leading and the toward-leading Ξ±/$$ {\textrm{K}}_{\textrm{S}}^0 $$ K S 0 yield ratios increase with the multiplicity of charged particles, suggesting that strangeness enhancement with multiplicity is associated with both hard scattering processes and the underlying event. The relative production of Ξ± with respect to $$ {\textrm{K}}_{\textrm{S}}^0 $$ K S 0 is higher in transverse-to-leading processes over the whole multiplicity interval covered by the measurement. The $$ {\textrm{K}}_{\textrm{S}}^0 $$ K S 0 and Ξ± per-trigger yields and yield ratios are compared with predictions of three different phenomenological models, namely Pythia8.2 with the Monash tune, Pythia8.2 with ropes and EPOS LHC. The comparison shows that none of them can quantitatively describe either the transverse-to-leading or the toward-leading yields of $$ {\textrm{K}}_{\textrm{S}}^0 $$ K S 0 and Ξ±.

Background Australia faces a critical shortage of nurses, yet international nursing graduates (INGs) encounter significant barriers to securing employment after graduation. Current policies often prioritize domestic graduates, creating systemic disadvantages for INGs, particularly those on temporary visas. This inequity raises ethical concerns and undermines Australia’s ability to fully utilize its nursing workforce, potentially compromising the quality of healthcare services. Aim This study explores the lived experiences of INGs regarding employment challenges in Australia, critically examining the ethical and equity implications of existing practices. Research Design A qualitative study employing a combined phenomenological and exploratory approach was conducted. Data were analyzed using a thematic analysis framework. Participants and Research Context Twelve international nursing students in their final semester of the Bachelor of Nursing program at two metropolitan universities in Australia participated in semi-structured interviews. Ethical Considerations Ethical approval was obtained from the Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee (MUHREC-44400) and the University of Technology Sydney (ETH24-10028). Informed consent was obtained from all participants, who were assured of their right to confidentiality and to withdraw from the study at any time. Results Five overarching themes emerged: (1) Economic Disparity and Ethical Considerations, (2) Systemic Discrimination and Inequality, (3) Mental Health and Well-being, (4) Policy and Regulatory Barriers, and (5) Lack of Cultural Inclusion and a Sense of (Un)Belongingness. Conclusions The findings highlight urgent ethical concerns and equity challenges that demand comprehensive reforms to create a more inclusive and ethically sound environment for INGs in Australia. These reforms necessitate policy changes to address discriminatory practices and visa restrictions, enhanced institutional support to facilitate INGs’ transition into the workforce, and a commitment to cultural competence and inclusion at all levels of the healthcare system. Addressing these systemic barriers is not only a matter of fairness and justice but is also crucial for ensuring a robust and ethically sustainable healthcare workforce in Australia.

The work intends to reconstruct Theodor Adorno’s critique of Edmund Husserl’s transcendental idealism. The intended goal of Husserl’s phenomenology was to continue the Cartesian project of attaining certitude, and in the process, dismantle the alleged arbitrary division between subject and object. Despite sharing the latter’s goal of effecting a radical turn against traditional epistemology, Adorno, however, criticizes Husserl’s idealist position. The latter’s position asserts that objectivity is laden not only within the object, but is also reliant within the internal structures of consciousness, and its relation with the object. By virtue of the a priori, and transcendent nature of the Husserlian eidos, Adorno asserts that this idealism merely posits an abstract “philosophical First” that reveals nothing concrete about the object itself. Consequently, instead of taking a revolutionary approach, as Husserl would have it, it instead becomes an affirmation of the totalitarian nature of the classical notion of subjectivity. The paper will demonstrate how the abstract and dominating nature of Husserl’s philosophy fashions objectivity as its necessary instrument. Objectivity for Husserl only occurs once the transcendental subject exhausts the horizons of meaning of an object thereby implying the necessity of the subject’s participation in the creation of meaning for an object. Following this, I will demonstrate Adorno’s critique of objectivity in the backdrop of his confrontation of the crisis of philosophy, vis-à-vis his own proposed materialist dialectic method. References Primary Sources Books Adorno, Theodor. Against Epistemology: A Metacritique. Translated by Willis Domingo Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013. __________. Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords. Translated by Henry W. Pickford with an Introduction by Lydia Goehr. New York: Colombia University Press, 2005. Husserl, Edmund. Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology. Translated by Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977. __________. Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Volume I. Translated by W.R. Boyce Gibson. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952. __________. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology: From the Lectures, Winter Semester, 1910-1911. Translated by Ingo Farin and James Hart. Dordrecht: Springer, 2006. __________. The Idea of Phenomenology. Translated and with an introduction by Lee Hardy. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999. Essays Adorno, Theodor. “A Metacritique of Epistemology.” Telos 38 (Winter 1978-79): 77- 103. __________. “Husserl and the Problem of Idealism.” The Journal of Philosophy 37, no. 1 (1940): 5-18. __________. “Subject and Object” in Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords. Translated by Henry W. Pickford and an Introduction by Lydia Goehr. New York: Colombia University Press, 2005. __________ “The Actuality of Philosophy.” Telos 1997, no. 31 (1997): 120-133. __________ “The Idea of Natural History,” Telos, no. 60 (1984), 111-124. Secondary Sources Books Bryers, Damian. Intentionality and Transcendence: Closure and Openness in Husserl’s Phenomenology. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2002. Cambridge University Press. The Cambridge Companion to Husserl. Edited by Berry Smith and David Woodruff Smith. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Drummord, John. Historical Dictionary of Husserl’s Philosophy. Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2007. Gordon, Peter E. Adorno and Existence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016. Hermberg, Kevin. Husserl’s Phenomenology: Knowledge, Objectivity and Others. London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006. Jarvis, Simon. Adorno: A Critical Introduction. New York: Routledge, 1998. Zahavi, Dan. Husserl’s Phenomenology. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003. Articles Aoyagi, Masafumi. “Phenomenological Antinomy and Holistic Idea: Adorno’s Husserl- Studies and Influences from Cornelius.” Investigaciones Fenomenologicas 4, no. 2 (2013): 23-38. Dallmayr, Fred. “Phenomenology and Critical Theory: Adorno*.” Cultural Hermeneutics 3 (1976): 367-405. Follesdal, Dagfinn. “Noema and Meaning in Husserl.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50, Supplement (1990): 263-271. Gibson, W.R. Boyce. “The Problem of Real and Ideal in the Phenomenology of Husserl.” Mind 34, no. 135 (1925): 311-333.3 McIntyre, Ronald and Smith, David Woodruff. “Husserl’s Identification of Meaning and Noema.” The Monist 59, no. 1, The Philosophy of Husserl (1975): 115-132. Molts, Andreas. “Adorno and the Myth of Subjectivity.” Contempts 3 (2002): 109-121. Soffer, W. “Husserl’s Neo-Cartesianism.” Research in Phenomenology 11 (1981): 141- 158.

The impetus for this issue dates from a symposium on Embodied Knowledges held at Edith Cowan University in Perth in 2011. The Symposium arose from the shared interests of a diverse group, many of them practice-led researchers, and should have been a clue that the call for papers for this issue would attract different conceptions of the body. Nevertheless we were surprised by the many kinds of bodies implied in the 17 papers received and are pleased to offer a selection in the 'embody' issue of M/C Journal.Part of the difficulty of talking about the body as a source of knowledge, and also as a product of culture and history, is the backdrop of unproblematic representation of the body in popular culture. The linkage of the body to the brain, and by implication the mind, is particularly hard to escape. Through a scientific/medical lens, viewers of medical documentaries like The Human Body have learned to interpret representations of the brain. “Slices” of the brain are instantly recognisable through technologies such as Positron Emission Tomography (PET) scans. The metaphor of the brain lighting up due to thought and activity, derived from mediated brain imaging technology, has entered common usage. Such images are understood even by non-scientists as different parts of the brain at work, running the body. Brains, bodies and thinking seem well connected in popular culture.In the academic realm, the relationship of the brain to the mind is contested, as is the place of the body. In Western culture a dualist mind/body division has contributed to a particular understanding of the body, and of knowledge making, in which objective, propositional knowledge has been privileged. An alternative monist view has variously been used by theorists of the body from Nietsche to Deleuze but also by contemporary neurophysiologists such as Damasio. Using these philosophical positions, the body is either the weaker side of a partnership, or subsumed into a whole which does not acknowledge the specificity of actual bodies, or their potential as sites of knowledge making.Merleau-Ponty posited the body as both object and subject and that access to knowledge could only be obtained by the lived experience of the body. He suggested that we can only know other objects and perceive space and time through our own bodies. The phenomenological approaches resulting from this stance have, to some extent, recovered the status of bodily knowledge. Psychoanalytical thought has contributed to the extension of what we consider to be the boundaries of the body and blurred the articulation of mind through concepts like body image and body schema (see Weiss) and later neural maps (e.g. Damasio). However, Elizabeth Grosz went further when she issued a challenge in the early 90s “that all the significant facets and complexities of subjects, can be as adequately explained using the subject’s corporeality as a framework as it would be using consciousness or the unconscious” (vii). The body has been shown to be plastic when considered within lived physical and cultural spaces (Giblett; Grosz). Regardless of where one positions the body on a continuum from pure nature to a surface overwritten by culture and history, it seems foolish to disregard it as a source of knowledge.The authors of the papers presented in this issue attempt to show that knowledge resides in, can be acquired through, and flows out from, the body. Many of them see a connection between how and what can be known and their practice as artists, performers, researchers and writers. This way of knowing – through the thinking body – is connected to a developing family of methodologies called practice-based or practice-led research. It is research that aims to add to knowledge and understanding by carrying out an original investigation “in and through the acts of creating and performing” (Borgdorff 46). While many art practices clearly involve the body, Mercer and Robson point out that practice-led researchers often put the body at the centre of the inquiry and that “corporeal attention and information completes an otherwise insufficient way of theorising and philosophising” (18).Jo Taylor’s feature article on embodied trauma traverses 118 years between Jean-Martin Charcot and Robert Scaer. It captures both the problem of separating mind and body and the importance to recovery, of acknowledging knowledge held in the body. In the accounts of two physicians working in different times, cultures and places of access to scientific knowledge, it is the knowledge available through their patients’ bodies that is common. The image of the body arched in hysteria, the experience of trauma locked inside, will perhaps ensure that the body is not lost in this selection of writings.Ffion Murphy and Richard Nile also address trauma but with respect to the lost body in relation to an imagined community. Both the personal trauma of war and the communal experience of war can be sensed in the lost literature of the First World War. These attempts to represent or resurrect the war dead through writing can be considered acts of grief for embodiment. Karina Quinn and Kirsten Hudson ignore the spectre of the hysterical in examining maternal embodiment. Quinn takes up Julia Kristeva’s challenge to write from the body, providing a visceral account. Hudson also writes her lived experience, and offers her embodied art practice as site of resistance to cultural expectations of Australian motherhood.The bodily experience of art by the viewer is addressed by Prue Gibson, while Roz Drummond, Jondi Keane and Patrick West consider the interaction between embodiment and place from three different artistic practices. Chaim Noy’s detailed discussion conveys the kinaesthetic skill of the martial arts practitioner within a community of practice. His autoethnographic narrative highlights the knowledge of the body-in-motion against his written reflection.Vanessa Bradshaw, Cynthia Witney, Lelia Green and Leesa Costello show that embodied knowledge can be shared in a community even when that community is a virtual one. Whilst being diagnosed and treated within a dominant scientific/medical discourse, which prescribes one way of knowing breast cancer, women’s embodied experiences can be exchanged through an online support site to provide an alternative source of knowledge. Re-enactment and embodiment of cultural memory is explored by Michaela Callaghan in her work on the carnival dances of the displaced campesinos of the Andes. Within an urban setting, the campesinos collectively dance into being their ancestral place using physical memory. Her description of the body within place implies movement, perhaps showing that writing need not take us away from the body.The bodies represented in this issue feel like living bodies, they are not the bodies without organs of Deleuze and Guattari or the flesh of later Merleau-Ponty. They are bodies of sexual difference, bodies interacting with, and reacting to, other bodies, within particular spaces. Even the ghostly dead bodies of the war poetry, reported by Murphy and Nile, exert a powerful influence over the living.In using the term embodied knowledge we affirm that knowledge making includes the body. This 'embody' issue of M/C Journal is not about rejecting the mind in favour of the body. It is about the richness of knowledge and practice, grounded in our bodies-in-the world. As Grosz (vii) would have it: “Bodies have all the explanatory power of minds”.ReferencesBorgdorff, Henk. “The Production of Knowledge in Artistic Research”. The Routledge Companion to Research in the Arts. Eds. Michael Biggs and Henrik Karlsson. London: Routledge, 2010. 44-63.Damasio, Antonio. Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow and the Feeling Brain. London: Vintage, 2004.Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987.Giblett, Rodney. The Body of Nature and Culture. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.Grosz, Elizabeth. Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism. St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1994.Kristeva, Julia, and Arthur Goldhammer (Trans.). "Stabat Mater." Poetics Today 6.1-2 (1985): 133-52.Mercer, Leah, and Julie Robson. “The Backbone of Live Research: A Synthesis of Method in Performance Based Inquiry”. Live Research: Methods of Practice-led Inquiry in Performance. Eds. Leah Mercer, Julie Robson and David Fenton. Nerang, QLD: Ladyfinger, 2012. 11-19.Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception. Trans. Colin Smith. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962.---. The Visible and the Invisible. Trans. Alphonso Lingis. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968.The Human Body. Prod/Dir. Richard Dale. BBC, 1998.Weiss, Gail. Body Images: Embodiment as Intercorporeality. New York and London: Routledge, 1999.

IntroductionThis paper explores the different meanings that individuals from diverse ethnic backgrounds associate with being authentic. It builds on previous research (Menendez 11) that found quantitative differences in terms of the meanings individuals from Eastern and Western backgrounds tend to associate with being authentic. Using qualitative analysis, it describes in more detail how individuals from these two backgrounds construct their different meanings of authenticity.Authenticity has become an overriding moral principle in contemporary Western societies and has only recently started to be contested (Feldman). From cultural products to individuals’ discourses, authenticity pervades Western culture (Lindholm; Potter; Vannini and Williams). On an individual level, the ideal of authenticity is reflected in the maxim “be true to yourself.” The social value of authenticity has a relatively recent history in the Western world of approximately 200 years (Trilling). It started to develop alongside the notion of individuality during modernity (Taylor, Sources; Trilling). The Romantic movement consolidated its cultural influence (Taylor, Sources). In the 1960s, the Hippy movement revived authenticity as a countercultural discourse, although it has progressively become mainstream through consumer culture and therapeutic discourses (Binkley).Most of the studies in the literature on authenticity as a cultural phenomenon are theoretical, conducted from a philosophical perspective (Ferrara; Guignon; Taylor, Ethics), but few of them are empirical, mostly from sociology (Erickson; Franzese, Thine; Turner, Quest; Vannini, Authenticity). Part of this dearth of empirical research on authenticity is due to the difficulties that researchers encounter in attempting to define what it means to be authentic (Franzese, Authenticity 87). Sociologists study the phenomenological experience of being true to oneself, but are less attentive to the metaphysical notion of being a “true self” (Vannini, Dead 236–37). Trying to preserve this open approach, without judging individuals on how “authentic” they are, is what makes defining authenticity difficult. For this reason, sociologists have defined being authentic in a broad sense as “an individual’s subjective sense that their behaviour, appearance, self, reflects their sense of core being. One’s sense of core being is composed of their values, beliefs, feelings, identities, self-meanings, etc.” (Franzese, Authenticity 87); this is the definition of authenticity that I use here. Besides being scarce, the sociological empirical studies on authenticity have been conducted with individuals from Western backgrounds and, thus, have privileged authenticity as a Western cultural construct. This paper tries to contribute to this field of research by: (1) contributing more empirical investigation and (2) providing cross-cultural comparison between individuals from Eastern and Western backgrounds.The literature on cross-cultural values associates Eastern societies with collective (Hofstede, Hofstede and Mirkov 95–97; 112–17) and material or survival (Inglehart and Welzel 51–57; 61–65) values, while Western societies tend to be linked to the opposite kind of values: individual, post-material or self-expression (WVS). For example, societies that score high in survival values are likely to be African (e.g., Zimbabwe) Middle Eastern (e.g., Morocco and Jordan) or Asian (e.g., Bangladesh) countries, while societies that score high in self-expression values tend to be European (e.g., Sweden) or English speaking (e.g., Australia) countries. Nevertheless, there are some exceptions, the case of Japan, for example, which tends to score high in self-expression values despite being an “Eastern” society (WVS). These differences also tend to be reflected among Eastern minorities living in Western countries (Chua and Rubenfeld). Collective values emphasise harmony in relations and prioritise the needs of the group over the individual; on the other hand, individual values emphasise self-expression. Material or survival values accentuate the satisfaction of “basic” needs, in Abraham Maslow’s terms (21), such as physiological or security needs, and imply practising thrift and delaying immediate gratification; by contrast, post-material or self-expression values stress the satisfaction of “higher” needs, such as freedom of speech, equality, or aesthetic needs.The sociologist Ralph Turner (Real) created a theoretical framework to organize individuals’ discourses around authenticity: the “impulsive” and “institutional” categories. One of Turner’s assumptions is particularly important in understanding the differences between these two categories: individuals tend to consider the self as an objective entity that, despite only existing in their minds, feels “real” to them. This can have consequences for the meanings they ascribe to certain internal subjective states, such as cognitions or emotions, which can be interpreted as indicators of their authentic selves (990–91).The institutional and impulsive categories are two different ways of understanding authenticity that present several differences (991–95). Two among them are most relevant to understand the differences that I discuss in this paper. The first one has to do with the individual’s locus of the self, whether the self is conceptualized as located “outside” or “inside” the individual. Impulsive interpretations of authenticity have an internal sense of authenticity as “being,” while institutional conceptualizations have an external sense of authenticity as “becoming.” For “impulsives,” the authentic self is something that must be searched for. Impulsives look within to discover their “true self,” which is often in opposition to society’s roles and its expectations of the individual. On the other hand, for “institutionals” authentic is achieved through external effort (Turner, Quest 155); it is something that individuals achieve through regular practice, often aligned with society’s roles and their expectations of the individual (Turner, Real 992).The second difference has to do with the management of emotions. For an institutional understanding of authenticity, individuals are true to their own authentic selves when they are in full control of their capacities and emotions. By contrast, from an impulsive point of view, individuals are true to themselves when they are spontaneous, accepting and freely expressing their emotions, often by breaking the internal or external controls that society imposes on them (Turner, Real 993).Although individuals can experience both types of authenticity, previous research on this topic (Menendez) has shown that institutional experiences tend to happen more frequently among Easterners, and impulsive experiences tend to occur more frequently among Westerners. In this paper, I show how Easterners and Westerners construct institutional and impulsive meanings of authenticity respectively; what kind of authenticity work individuals from these two backgrounds do when they conceptualize their authentic selves; how they interpret internal subjective states as expressions of who they are; and what stories they tell themselves about who they are.I suggest that these stories, although they may look purely individual, can also be social. Individuals from Western backgrounds tend to interpret impulsive experiences of authenticity as expressing their authentic selves, as they are informed by the individual and post-material values of Western societies. In contrast, individuals from Eastern backgrounds tend to interpret institutional experiences of authenticity as expressing their authentic selves, as they have been socialized in the more collective and material values of Eastern societies.Finally, and before I proceed to the analysis, I would like to acknowledge a limitation of this study. The dichotomies that I use to explain my argument, such as the Western and Eastern or the impulsive and institutional categories, can constitute a limitation for this paper because they cannot reflect nuances. They can be easily contested. For example, the division between Eastern and Western societies is often seen as ideological and Turner’s distinction between institutional and impulsive experiences of authenticity can create artificial separations between the notions of self and society or reason and passion (Solomon 173). However, these concepts have not been used for ideological or simplifying purposes, but to help explain distinguishable cultural orientations towards authenticity in the data.MethodologyI completed 20 interviews (from 50 minutes to 2 hours in length) with 20 students at La Trobe University (Australia), between September 2012 and April 2013. The 20 interviewees (9 females and 11 males), ranged from 18 to 58 years old (the median age was 24 years old). The sample was theoretically designed to cover as many diverse cultural backgrounds as possible. I asked the interviewees questions about: moments they had experienced that felt either authentic and inauthentic, what constitutes a life worth-living, and the impact their cultural backgrounds might have had on their conceptions of their true selves.The 20 interviewees were born in 13 different countries. According to the extensive dataset on cultural values, the World Values Survey (WVS), these 13 countries have different percentages of post-materialists—individuals who choose post-material instead of material values (Inglehart and Welzel 54–56). Table 1 shows the percentages of post-materialists in each of the interviewees’ countries of birth. Table 1: Percentages of post-materialists in the interviewees’ countries of birth Country % of post-materialists WVS Wave United Kingdom 22.8 2005 – 2009 Australia 20.5 2010 – 2014 United States 16.7 2010 – 2014 Israel 11.6 2000 – 2004 Finland 11.3 2005 – 2009 Greece (Turkey) 10.7 2010 – 2014 South Africa 7.7 2005 – 2009 Malaysia 5.6 2010 – 2014 Ghana 4.2 2010 – 2014 India 4 2005 – 2009 China 2.5 2010 – 2014 Egypt 1.1 2010 – 2014 Note: These data are based on the 4-item post-materialism index question (Y002) of World Values Survey (WVS). I use three different waves of data (2000–2004, 2005–2009, and 2010–2014). Greece did not have any data in World Values Survey, so its data have been estimated considering the results from Turkey, which is the most similar country in geographical and cultural terms that had data available.In my model, I consider “Western” societies as those that have more than 10% post-materialists, while “Eastern” societies have less than 10% post-materialists. As shown in Table 1 and mentioned earlier, Western countries (English speaking or European) tend to have higher percentages of post-materialists than Eastern societies (African, Asian and Middle Eastern).Thus, as Table 2 shows, the interviewees who were born in a Western society are ascribed to one group, while individuals born in an Eastern society are ascribed to another group. Although many overseas-born interviewees have lived in Australia for periods that range from 6 months to 10 years, they were ascribed to the “East” and “West” groups solely based on their country of birth. Even though these individuals may have had experiences of socialization in Australia, I assume that they have been primarily socialized in the values of their ethnic backgrounds and the countries where they were born, via their parents’ educational values or through direct experience, during the time that they lived in their countries of birth. According to my definition of authenticity, individuals’ values inform their understanding of authenticity, therefore, the values from their ethnic backgrounds can also influence their understanding of authenticity.In the first phase of the analysis, I used Grounded Theory (Charmaz), with categories directly emerging from the data, to analyse my interviewees’ stories. In the second stage, I reviewed these categories in combination with Turner’s categories of impulsive and institutional, applying them to classify the stories.Table 2: Distribution of participants between “East” and “West” West (n=11) East (n=9) Australia (n=5) China (n=2) United Kingdom (n=2) India (n=2) United States (n=1) South Korea (n=1) Greece (n=1) South Africa (n=1) Finland (n=1) Egypt (n=1) Israel (n=1) Ghana (n=1) Malaysia (n=1) ResultsAlthough I interviewed 20 participants, due to space-constraints, I illustrate my argument with only 4 interview extracts from 4 of the interviewees: 2 interviewees from Western backgrounds and 2 from Eastern backgrounds. However, these stories are representative of the trends found for the whole sample. I show how Easterners and Westerners construct their authentic selves in institutional and impulsive senses respectively through the two key characteristics that I presented in the introduction: locus of the self and management of emotions.In the first instance, Rachel (from Australia, 24 years old), a Western respondent, shows an impulsive locus of the self as “being.” Authenticity is discovered through self-acceptance of an uncomfortable emotion, like a “bad mood:”I think the times when I want to say, ‘oh, I wasn’t myself’, I usually was. My bad moods are more ‘me’. My bad moods are almost always the ‘real me’. [So you consider that your authentic self is something that is there, inside you, that you have to discover, or it is something outside yourself, that you can achieve?] I think it is something that you have to discover for yourself. I think it is different for everyone. [But would you say that it is something that is there already or it is something that you become?] No, I think it is something that is there already.On the other hand, Rani (from China, 24 years old), an Eastern respondent, interprets authenticity as “becoming;” authenticity does not pre-exist—as in the case of Rachel—but is something “external” to her idea of self. Rani becomes herself by convincing herself that she conforms to society’s ideals of physical beauty. Unlike the process of self-acceptance that Rachel described, Rani develops authentic selfhood by “lying” to herself or, as she says, “through some lies”:I have heard this sentence, like ‘you have to be yourself to others’, but I think it is really hard to do this. I think people still need some ‘acting’ things in their life. You need to act, not to say to act as another person, but sometimes like let’s say to be polite or make other people like you, you need acting. And sometimes if you are doing the ‘acting things’ a lot, you are going to believe this is true (she laughs). [Like others will believe that you are something that you are not?] I think at the beginning, maybe that’s not, but… because some people wake up every morning and say to the mirror, ‘you are very beautiful, you are the most beautiful girl in the world’, then, you will be happy and you will actually become beautiful. I think it is not like lie to yourself, but it is just being confident. Maybe at the beginning you are not going to believe that you are beautiful… like, what is this sentence? ‘Being true to yourself’, but actually doing this everyday, then that’s true, you will become, you will be confident. [So that means you can be yourself also through…] Through some lies. [So you don’t think that there is something inside you that you have to kind of discover?] No.Eastern and Western respondents also tend to interpret emotions differently. Westerners are more likely to interpret them in more impulsive terms than Easterners, who interpret them in a more institutional light. As we can see in the following extract, Sean, a Western respondent (born in Australia, but raised in England, 41 years old), feels inauthentic because he could not express his dislike of a co-worker he did not get along with:In a six months job I had before I came to Australia, I was an occupational therapist in a community. There was a girl in the administration department who was so rude. I wanted to say: ‘look darling you are so rude. It is really unpleasant talking to you. Can you just be nice? It would be just so much better and you will get more done and you will get more from me’. That’s what I should have said, but I didn’t say it. I didn’t, why? Maybe it is that sort of culture of not saying things or maybe it is me not being assertive enough. I don’t think I was being myself. Because my real self wanted to say: ‘look darling, you are not helping matters by being a complete bitch’. But I didn’t say that. I wasn’t assertive enough.In a similar type of incident, Ben, an Eastern respondent (from Ghana, 32 years old), describes an outburst he had with a co-worker who was annoying him. Unlike Sean, Ben expressed his anger to the co-worker, but he does not consider this to be a manifestation of his authentic self. For Ben, to act authentically one must control their emotions and try help others:I don’t know if that is myself or if that is not myself, but sometimes I get angry, I get upset, and I am the open type. I am the type that I can’t keep something in me, so sometimes when you make me annoyed, I just response. There is this time about this woman, in a class, that I was in Ghana. She was an older woman, a respected woman, she kept annoying me and there was one day that I couldn’t take it any longer, so I just burst up and I just… I don’t know what I said, I just… said a lot of bad things to her. The woman, she was shocked. I also felt shocked because I thought I could control myself, so that’s me… I don’t want to hide my feelings, I just want to come out with what I think when you make me annoyed, but those times, when I come out, I don’t like them, because I think it contradicts who I really am, someone who is supposed to help or care. I don’t like that aspect. You know somebody could be bossy, so he or she enjoys shouting everybody. I don’t enjoy that, but sometimes it is something that I cannot even control. Someone pushes me to the limit, and I just can’t keep that anger, and it comes out. I won’t say that is ‘me,’ I wouldn’t say that that is me. I don’t think that is a ‘true me’. [Why?] Because the true me would enjoy that experience the way I enjoy helping people instead.Unlike the two accounts from Rachel and Rani, these two last passages from Sean and Ben describe experiences of inauthenticity, where the authentic self cannot be expressed. What is important in these two passages is not their behaviour, but how they attribute their own emotions to their sense of authentic selfhood. Sean identifies his authentic self with the “impulsive” self who expresses his emotions, while Ben identifies his authentic self with the “institutional” self who is in control of his emotions. Sean feels inauthentic because he could not express his angry feelings to the co-worker, whereas Ben feels inauthentic because he could not control his outburst. Ben still hesitates about which side of himself can be attributed to his authentic self, for example, he says that he is “the open type” or that he does not want to “hide [his] feelings”, but he eventually identifies his authentic self with his institutional self.The choices that Sean and Ben make about the emotions that they attribute to their authentic selves could be motivated by their respective ethnic backgrounds. Like Rachel, Sean identifies his authentic self with a socially unacceptable emotion: anger. Consistent with his Western background, Sean’s sense of authenticity emphasizes the needs of the individual over the group and sees suppression of emotions as repressive. On the other hand, Ben reasons that since he does not enjoy being angry as much as he enjoys helping others, expressing anger is not a manifestation of authenticity. His authentic self is linked to his institutional self. Ben’s values are infused with altruism, which reflects the collective values that tend to be associated with his Eastern background. For him, suppression of emotions might not mean repression, but can foster authenticity instead.DiscussionBoth ways of interpreting authenticity, impulsive and institutional, look for self-consistency and the need to tell a coherent story to ourselves about who we are. The results section of this paper showed how Easterners and Westerners conceptualize authenticity. Easterners understand authenticity differently to Western discourses of the authentic. These alternative understandings offer viable solutions to the self-consistency problem. They present external, rather than internal, ways of conceiving the authentic self, and regulative, rather than expressive, approaches to emotions. As I mentioned earlier, Eastern societies are associated with collective and material values, while Western ones are related to individual and post-material values. These divisions in terms of values are reflected in individuals’ self-constructs. Individuals in Western societies tend to have a more independent idea of the self, whereas individuals in Eastern societies are more likely to have an interdependent one (Kitayama). An interdependent idea of the self values connectedness and conceptualizes the self in relation to others, so it can generate an institutional approach to authenticity, where the idea of the authentic self is not something that individuals search for inside themselves, but something that individuals become through their participation in social roles. This was evident in the example of Rani, whose idea of being authentic as “becoming” seemed to be an extension of her more interdependent self-construct and the need to fit in society.A regulative approach to emotions has also been associated with Easterners (Cheung and Park), on the basis of their collective values and interdependent self-constructs. For individuals from a Western background, with a more independent sense of self, as in the case of Sean, suppressing emotions tends to be seen negatively as being inauthentic, a form of repression. However, for individuals with interdependent self-constructs, this can be not only less harmful (feeling less inauthentic), but can even be beneficial because they tend to prioritize the needs of others (Le and Impett). This is evident in the example of Ben, for whom suppressing aanger does not make him feel inauthentic because he identifies his authentic self with the self that is in control of his emotions and helps others. This understanding of authenticity is aligned with the collective values of his ethnic background.In sum, ideas of authenticity seem to vary culturally according to the repertoires and values systems that inform them. 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