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1
Alves, Pedro M. S. "Tempo objectivo e experiência do tempo--A Fenomenologia husserliana do Tempo perante a Relatividade Restrita de A. Einstein." Phainomenon 14, no. 1 (April 1, 2007): 115–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2007-0018.
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Abstract In this paper, I start with the opposition between the husserlian project of a phenomenology of the experience of time, started in 1905, and the mathematical and physical theory of time, as it comes out from the special theory of relativity, by Einstein, in the same year. Although the contrast between the two approaches is apparent, my aim is to show that the original program of Husserl’s time theory is the constitution of an objective time and a time of the world, starting from the intuitive giveness of time, i.e., from time as it appears. To show this, I stress the structural similarity between the original question of time, by Husserl, and the problem of a phenomenology of the space constitution, as it was first developed in the husserlian manuscripts of the XIX century, in which we find the threefold question of the origin of our space representation, of the geometrization of intuitive space and the constitution of transcendent world space. Finally, I reconsider some of Husserl’s main theses about the phenomenological constitution of objective time in the light of the main results of special relativity time-theory, introducing several corrections to central assumptions that underlie Husserl’s theory of time.
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Somphong Unyo, Phramaha. "An Analytical Study of Ideally Inherent Operative Transformation of the Original Mental Process in Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology." Psychology and Education Journal 58, no. 1 (January 15, 2021): 4410–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.17762/pae.v58i1.1521.
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This research paper entitled “An Analytical Study of Ideally inherent Operative Transformations of the Original Mental Process in Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology” has three objectives: 1) to study the mental process of reflection and modification in which that mind is directed towards the intended object including the mental objects regarding Western philosophical thought, Edmund Husserl, 2) to study of the way to operative transformation of original mental process and, 3) to analyze various forms of transformed reproduction and a problem of the reproduction. It is found that the transformation of the original mental process in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology is the ideally inherent process of reproduction of mental process in which the mental process passed through the modificative process together with its contents so as to produce a novel knowledge. The transformative process as such is systematically operated with main following aspects: (1) The mode of giveness (the immanent essence of a concrete sensation-content such as a visual sensation-content in the field of visual sensation-Data that is continually adumbrated from the visual physical objects), (2) the temporal mental processes are to be unified as one stream of mental process, (3) the phase or the temporal horizon which is cosmic time in other ways such as horizon of Now, horizon of Before, and horizon of After, and (4) pure ego, the function of which is to direct its regards to the temporal modes of giveness (immanent essences). By its transformative operation, it is effectively proceeded with three steps. The first is a step of a physical perception of the mental process in which the perceived physical things is used as an essential content for all mental process as they are kept in a memory. The second step is succeeded from the first step which is called a retention or a primary memory; the process of a modification using the immanent object kept in a retention as the initial part of the constitution of an identical object. Then, comes the third step which is the step of a recollection or a second memory; it is to recall the remembered or represented for the perception again. After the whole process has fully accomplished, the remembered or represented is afresh reproduced. However, the reproduction of the remembered or the represented can emerge with two possibilities; one is the vague-reproduced information as without repeating while looking at the reproduced flash; other is afresh one as it is repeated resulting in further perception. However, the reproduction of the remembered can be accurate and perfect depending on two conditions; one is the condition of the perception of physical things and the condition of either clarity or obscurity of the whole object that is re-presented with the mode of mental process.
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Trabbic, Joseph G. "Jean-Luc Marion and the Phénoménologie de la Donation as First Philosophy." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 95, no. 3 (2021): 389–409. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/acpq2021610232.
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Jean-Luc Marion proposes what he calls the “phenomenology of givenness” (phénoménologie de la donation) as the true “first philosophy.” In this paper I consider his critique of previous first philosophies and his argument for the phenomenology of givenness as their replacement. I note several problems with the phenomenology of givenness and conclude that it does not seem ready yet to assume the title of “first philosophy.”
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BELOUSOV, MIKHAIL. "GIVENNESS AS PROBLEM OF PHENOMENOLOGY." HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES 8, no. 2 (2019): 536–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-2-536-572.
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Terzi, Roberto. "The event and the (non-)phenomenon: Marion/Derrida." Phainomenon 26, no. 1 (October 1, 2017): 155–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2017-0009.
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Abstract The issue of the event and its relation to the concept of phenomenon has been widely spread in the French phenomenology of the last decades. Firstly, this article aims at retracing some general aspects of the role of the event in what has been called the “New phenomenology in France” and raises the problem of a distinction between different uses of this concept. Secondly, it analyses in two phases the presence of this topic in Marion’s phenomenology. On the one hand, it has to be shown that the concept of the event occupies an increasingly important role in Marion’s thinking, for it characterises givenness and phenomenality as such. On the other hand, I intend to problematize the position of Marion, in so far as it leads to an integral givenness and unfolds on the basis of an ambiguous overlap of the themes of givenness and intuition. Finally, Marion’s analysis will be contrasted to Derrida’s thinking, which allows us to think at the event as an impossible that happens, as a constitutive non-givenness and therefore as an essential limitation for phenomenology.
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Zhang, Wie. "An introduction to Scheler’s Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity." Phänomenologische Forschungen 2017, no. 1 (2017): 117–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.28937/1000107751.
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The phenomenological reflection of „deception“ and „self-deception“ occupies a central place in Max Scheler’s whole phenomenological period. In contrast with „self-givenness“, „deception“ essentially means an inappropriate way of givenness, and „self-deception“ indicates an inappropriate way of givenness of the „self“. Based on the further criticisms and reflections on F. Brentano’s and E. Husserl’s related thoughts, Scheler distinguished „self-perception“ from „inner perception“, and attributed the primordial position to the „inner perception of the other“ via criticizing the „deception of self-perception“. He then obtained an account of a truly primary way of grasping the other, namely, the primary „self-givenness“ of „the other’s person“. This contributes to the possibility of Scheler’s „phenomenology of intersubjectivity“. In this paper, I will argue that Scheler’s phenomenological criticism of „self-deception“ and his phenomenological analysis of „inner perception of the other“ function as an „introduction“ to his „phenomenology of intersubjectivity“.
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Heffernan, George. "From the Essence of Evidence to the Evidence of Essence." History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis 16, no. 1 (April 5, 2013): 192–219. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/26664275-01601009.
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This paper poses a problem with respect to Husserl’s concept of evidence in The Idea of Phenomenology. In the beginning, Husserl approaches phenomenology as theory of knowledge, focuses on the essence of knowledge, and defines it in terms of evidence. In the middle, he shifts his attention to the definition of evidence as “self-givenness” but gets carried away by the search for a preferred kind of evidence, namely, the evidence of essences. In the end, he remains preoccupied with eidetic knowledge and describes “evidence in the pregnant sense” as absolute, adequate, and apodictic “self-givenness”. The paper shows that these developments have serious consequences for an interpretation of The Idea of Phenomenology as a reliable introduction to Husserl’s phenomenological epistemology and important implications for the phenomenology of evidence beyond this work.
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Rivera, Joseph. "The Myth of the Given?" Philosophy Today 62, no. 1 (2018): 181–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtoday201837207.
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The theological turn in phenomenology continues to generate cross-disciplinary discussion among philosophers and theologians concerning the scope and boundaries of what counts as a “phenomenon.” This essay suggests that the very idea of the given, a term so important for Husserl, Heidegger, Henry and Marion, can be reassessed from the point of view of Wilifred Sellars’s discussion of the myth of the “immediate” given. Sometimes phenomenology is understood to involve the skill of unveiling immediate data that appear as “phenomena” to a conscious and wakeful ego. In conversation with Jean-Luc Marion’s volume Givenness and Revelation, I challenge the assumption that phenomena are immediate in their givenness. The final remarks concern the “how” of the givenness of theological data, and in particular, the phenomenon of the Trinity.
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Urbaniak, Szczepan. "Phenomenology as Apologetics." Forum Philosophicum 27, no. 2 (December 27, 2022): 193–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2022.2702.12.
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In this article, we analyse the relation of philosophy and theology in the work of Jean‑Luc Marion in order to be able to see not only how the phenomenology of givenness can serve as a “new apologetics” for theology, but also how Marion’s phenomenology itself, in its historical development and in its core principle and method, is influenced and changed by theological phenomena. We present three ways of describing the relation, tension, mutual influence and separation of philosophy and theology: firstly, in line with Pascal’s distinction between the orders of reason and of the heart; secondly, in phenomenology, in terms of indications to the effect that there can be a phenomenon of revelation in the mode of possibility that is distinguished from the phenomenon of Revelation in theology in the mode of historicity; and thirdly, by analogy with Christian apologetics. In particular, we analyse this third dimension, putting forward the thesis that Marion’s phenomenology itself has some characteristics of the Christian apologetics he describes. We try to demonstrate this interpretation of his phenomenology in its key dimensions, such as the counter-method and descriptions of the phenomena of love and revelation, which constitute the culmination of the phenomenology of givenness, although at the same time, as it were, its limit, crossing over into the theological order.
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Szegedi, Nóra. "The Renewal of Phenomenology in France: Levinas and Marion." Phänomenologische Forschungen 2019, no. 1 (2019): 173–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.28937/1000108311.
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Starting from Hans-Dieter Gondek’s and L/szl7 Tengelyi’s statement concerning the recent development of French phenomenology, I examine the relation between Marion’s phenomenology of givenness and Levinas’ ethics. Focusing on their common concept of the call (appeal), I demonstrate, first, that Marion’s general concept of the phenomenon is based on Levinas’ idea of the manifestation of the Other, which he deprives of its original ethical meaning. In the second part I criticize Marion’s anti-ethical reading of Levinas, while trying to give a tenable interpretation of the meaning of the ethical. Taking into consideration the results of the second section, in the third part, I look into the possibility of a different general phenomenology starting from Levinas’ ethics. By this rather sketchy idea I intend to provide a possible alternative to Marion’s general phenomenology of givenness, which maintains the privilege of the Other and, consequently, the primacy of ethics
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Nielsen, Cynthia R. "Being Given: Towards a Phenomenology of Givenness." Ars Disputandi 5, no. 1 (January 2005): 41–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15665399.2005.10819861.
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Pearl, J. Leavitt. "After Finitude and the Question of Phenomenological Givenness." PhaenEx 12, no. 2 (January 29, 2018): 13–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.22329/p.v12i2.5028.
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Quentin Meillassoux’s 2006 After Finitude offered a sharp critique of the phenomenological project, charging that phenomenology was one of the “two principal media” of correlationism—ultimately reducible to an “extreme idealism.” Meillassoux grounds this accusation in an account of givenness that presupposes that “every variety of givenness” finds its genesis within the positing of the subject. However, this critique fails to hit its mark precisely because it presupposes an account of intuitive givenness that is entirely foreign to the phenomenological project. Quite against Meillassoux’s conflation of givenness, the world-for-us, and the positing subject—the very centre of the phenomenological project is the recognition that intuitive givenness cannot be reduced to the constructive activity of the subject. Givenness is marked by a heterogeneity; givenness refers to what is given to us, not to what emerges from us.
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Woody, William C. "Givenness, Saturation, and the Self: A Phenomenology of Christian Initiation." Religions 12, no. 8 (August 13, 2021): 642. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel12080642.
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Phenomenology holds great promise yet underdeveloped potential for ritual studies and liturgical theology. As phenomenology has indeed taken a “theological turn” and the contentiousness of such an approach abates, questions remain as to what insights, concepts, and language phenomenology can offer to deepen our understanding of Christian ritual practices. Specifically with respect to rituals of initiation, does phenomenology open new avenues of appreciation for the sacrament of baptism, to enrich and to deepen the faithful’s experience of these rituals? This article considers insights afforded by a phenomenological approach to the sacrament, in particular with regard to adult baptism and the catechumenate in the Rite of Christian Initiation for Adults (RCIA), the rite of reception and sacramental initiation into the Roman Catholic Church. Considered through such lenses, a phenomenology of baptism promises to open new avenues of ritual understanding, theological appreciation, and depth of prayer. Drawing primarily from the work of Jean-Luc Marion, this article also considers prominent critiques of his work to articulate a phenomenology of baptism as an experience of givenness and reception, of identity formation within and through an ecclesial community, and of prayerful preparation for Christian neophytes.
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Tandyanto, Yulius. "Jean-Luc Marion: Pengantar atas ‘Keterberian’ dan ‘Fenomen yang Melimpah’." MELINTAS 30, no. 2 (August 1, 2014): 169. http://dx.doi.org/10.26593/mel.v30i2.1288.169-191.
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<p>For some contemporary thinkers, traditional and modern metaphysical systems were not considered as an adequate account, for they might have abolished the ontological difference. Such circumstances might have taken place because metaphysics was thought of as circumscribing by considering the whatness of any phenomena in form of, or oder of, the same, i.e. substance, essence or first cause. Jean-Luc Marion moves further and suggests phenomenological accounts that culminate in the givenness and the saturated phenomenon – ideas which open the possibilites to overcome the inadequacy of metaphysics. With the phenomenological third reduction, Marion shows that givenness already presents itself which is anterior to the dichotomy between essence and existence. This phenomenology of givenness enables phenomena to appear by itself in the saturated phenomena. In a paradoxical way, he shows that the constituting subject had already been constituted. Phenomenology, therefore, allows the subject to describe any phenomena in the form of, or order of, the other such as Marion proposed. Considering the contexts, this article may serve as an introduction to the notion of givenness and the saturated phenomenon.</p>
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Loidolt, Sophie. "Order, experience, and critique: The phenomenological method in political and legal theory." Continental Philosophy Review 54, no. 2 (March 1, 2021): 153–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11007-021-09535-y.
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AbstractThe paper investigates phenomenology’s possibilities to describe, reflect and critically analyse political and legal orders. It presents a “toolbox” of methodological reflections, tools and topics, by relating to the classics of the tradition and to the emerging movement of “critical phenomenology,” as well as by touching upon current issues such as experiences of rightlessness, experiences in the digital lifeworld, and experiences of the public sphere. It is argued that phenomenology provides us with a dynamic methodological framework that emphasizes correlational, co-constitutional, and interrelational structures, and thus pays attention to modes of givenness, the making and unmaking of “world,” and, thereby, the inter/subjective, affective, and bodily constitution of meaning. In the case of political and legal orders, questions of power, exclusion, and normativity are central issues. By looking at “best practice” models such as Hannah Arendt’s analyses, the paper points out an analytical tool and flexible framework of “spaces of meaning” that phenomenologists can use and modify as they go along. In the current debates on political and legal issues, the author sees the main task of phenomenology to reclaim experience as world-building and world-opening, also in a normative sense, and to demonstrate how structures and orders are lived while they condition and form spaces of meaning. If we want to understand, criticize, act, or change something, this subjective and intersubjective perspective will remain indispensable.
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Șandru, Adrian-Răzvan. "Hermeneutics of Resistance in Marion’s Phenomenology of Givenness." Open Theology 4, no. 1 (October 1, 2018): 450–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/opth-2018-0035.
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AbstractMy goal in this paper is to investigate the role of the subject in Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology aided by his interpretation of the Kantian categories in ‟Being Given” and ‟In Excess”. I shall relate Marion’s hypothetical saturation of the Kantian categories to the suspension of the I-identity. The inner mechanism of this suspension will be shown to consist in a critical resistance to an excessive intuition that is defined by a failed attempt at the conceptualizing of intuitions. This failure shall manifest the saturated phenomenon as a counter-experience. The critical resistance to an excessive intuition acts as a temporary activity of the subject leading to its role as interpreter inscribed in an infinite hermeneutic. Based on this I argue that Marion’s subject is not destroyed by an excessive intuition but is only called upon to investigate a phenomenon from a multitude of perspectives. I hold this to be of the essence for Marion, as it explains the possibility of interpreting and experiencing the given as a given during the encounter with the given in which both the subject as well as the given become manifest. I shall argue thus that the recourse to Kant further clarifies Marion’s account of a critical, resistant subject. However, this does not mean that I am arguing for Kant’s categories, but that I hold them to have an important explanatory role for Marion’s phenomenology.
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DeLay, Steven. "God and givenness: towards a phenomenology of mysticism." Continental Philosophy Review 47, no. 1 (February 4, 2014): 87–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11007-014-9285-1.
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Klun, Branko. "Transcendence and Acknowledgment. Questioning Marion's Reversal in Phenomenology." Bogoslovni vestnik 79, no. 2 (2019): 367–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.34291/bv2019/02/klun.
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Marion gives a new interpretation to the phenomenological notion of givenness (of a phenomenon) by attributing to this phenomenon a »self« which is, in a certain sense, independent from and prior to its reception by the subject (as »the gifted one«, adonné). In this way, Marion pleads for a phenomenological turn which can also be described in terms of counter-intentionality and counter-method. However, this turn is not a logical necessity, but a (rationally grounded) decision which the subject, or adonné has to make. In this paper I would like to interrelate this decision to the notion of acknowledgement. The adonné, by acknowledging the priority of givenness over its own receiving capacities, adopts the attitude of humility in every relation to reality (not understood ontologically, but in its »saturated« phenomenality). This attitude is of fundamental importance with regard to (the possibility of) the phenomenon of revelation.
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VASSILEV, CHRISTIAN. "THE PHENOMENON OF MUSICAL IDENTIFICATION. A VIEW FROM HEIDEGGER’S EARLY PHENOMENOLOGY." HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES 11, no. 2 (2022): 584–606. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2022-11-2-584-606.
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The starting point of the following article are statements by various prominent musical performers of the 20th century who have testified to the life-experience of musical identification, i.e. the experience of unity and oneness with music. The purpose of the article is to explore the phenomenological implications of this experience on the basis of Martin Heidegger’s early phenomenological work. The article compares Heidegger’s early view of phenomenal givenness with that of Edmund Husserl. While Husserl sees phenomenal givenness as constituted by (transcendental) consciousness, Heidegger finds primary givenness in the resonance (Mitschwingen) between the I and its lifeworld. I argue that in Heidegger’s early phenomenology it is not the subject, but rather the relatio between I and world, which “constitutes” givenness. This viewpoint allows for the exploration of musical identification as a life-experience. Musical identification suspends the difference between subject and object. In musical identification, it is the relation between “I” and music, which is constitutive of both. Thus, music cannot be adequately grasped in phenomenological terms if it is regarded simply as an object, which is the premise of more traditional phenomenological approaches to music such as Roman Ingarden’s and Mikel Dufrenne’s. Ingarden and Dufrenne both position music at a distance from the subject, as something to be explored in its objective characteristics, without presupposing the constitutive relation between them. Contrary to them, Hans-Heinrich Eggebrecht, Günther Anders and Ilya Yonchev all recognize that the subject-object divide is insufficient for the exploration of musical experience. However, while Eggebrecht ultimately remains within the subject-object-dichotomy, Anders and Yonchev both develop the idea of musical Mitsein, or Being-with-music, which dispenses with the subject-object premise altogether and interprets musical life-experience as a mode of Being within which the sense of the I and musical sense coincide.
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Hennigfeld, Iris. "From Phenomenological Self-Givenness to the Notion of Spiritual Freedom." PhaenEx 13, no. 2 (April 2, 2020): 38–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.22329/p.v13i2.6217.
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In my paper, I want to focus not only on the notions of givenness and evidence in Husserl’s phenomenology, but also on phenomenological work “after” Husserl. I will elaborate on how these phenomenological key ideas can methodologically be made fruitful, especially for an investigation into religious phenomena. After giving an outline of Husserl’s notions of (self-)givenness, evidence, and original intuition (I), I want to portray key elements of Steinbock’s discovery of a generative dimension in Husserl’s phenomenology and show how this approach correlates to the field of religious experiences (II). Subsequently, I want to focus on Steinbock’s book Phenomenology of Mysticism: The Verticality of Religious Experience (2007), and elucidate how for Steinbock different historical examples of mystical experiences can serve as leading clues for the revelation of the essential, eidetic structures of “vertical experiences”—or, phenomenologically speaking, the eidos of religious experience, which turns out to be “epiphany” (III). The expression “verticality,” as opposed to “horizontality,” denotes the existential and dynamic dimension of experiences which are oriented toward a new height (religiously or morally) “beyond” ourselves.
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Cassara, Bruno. "Phenomenology and Transcendence: On Openness and Metaphysics in Husserl and Heidegger." Religions 13, no. 11 (November 21, 2022): 1127. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel13111127.
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In this paper I examine the relationship between phenomenology and metaphysics by reassessing the relationship between phenomenological and metaphysical transcendence. More specifically, I examine the notion of phenomenological transcendence in Husserl and the early Heidegger: Husserl defines transcendence primarily as the mode of givenness of phenomena that do not appear all at once, but must be given in partial profiles; Heidegger defines transcendence primarily as Dasein’s capacity to go beyond entities toward being. I argue that these divergent understandings of phenomenological transcendence have resulted in a significant difference in reception among French phenomenologists of religion. These thinkers assert that phenomenology, when properly conceived and utilized, can make room for the divine and its revelation, i.e., for a metaphysical transcendence. I further argue that these thinkers prefer Heidegger’s phenomenology to Husserl’s because they understand Heidegger’s transcendence as the subject’s openness to being, while they understand Husserl’s transcendence as a limit, as the inability to capture worldly objects. I take up Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of givenness as a “case study” to illustrate this point. Finally, I argue that this preference for Heidegger over Husserl is misplaced and should be reversed. A close reading of Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Religious Life shows that Dasein is confined to its own possibilities and cannot be open to a relationship with the divine. By contrast, Husserl’s phenomenology provides the radical openness necessary to welcome revelation. While Husserl cannot envision a “worldly God,” the structures of horizonality and temporality characterize a subject capable of an authentic openness to revelation.
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Alves, Pedro M. S. "Perception and Passivity Can the Passive Pre-Givenness Be Phenomenalized?" Phainomenon 26, no. 1 (October 1, 2017): 13–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2017-0003.
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Abstract In what follows, I intend to address an issue which is at the boundaries of the phenomenological method of reflective explication, and that, in this sense, points to some limitations of the phenomenological approach to consciousness and mind. I am referring to an aporetic situation that is at the heart of the phenomenological analysis of passivity. On the one hand, phenomenology shows, at least indirectly, a passive life that is beyond the first steps of the activity of the ego in the receptive, affective life. This is something that is beyond the rising of an ego, and from which a phenomenology of the ego-form of subjective life could be addressed. On the other hand, the analytic and conceptual tools of the phenomenological method have no grips on this basic realm of subjective life. As a result, Husserl’s analysis of passivity starts with the evidence of a pre-affective, pre-egoic realm, from which a phenomenology of the ego could be developed. However, Husserl’s analyses end up with the denegation of this dimension, as if it was invisible for the phenomenological method. As a consequence, the starting point of the analysis is not passivity proper, but rather the primitive forms of receptivity, which is already a first layer of the activity of the ego. Instead of an analysis of the ego-polarization (the “birth” of the ego), the egoic layer of conscious life is simply presupposed. A phenomenology of the ego-form is, thus, at the same time promised and denied. This aporetic situation is visible in the alteration of the concept of a passive pre-givenness in Husserl’s Analysis Concerning Passive Synthesis.
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Barbaras, Renaud. "Life and Perceptual Intentionality." Research in Phenomenology 33, no. 1 (2003): 157–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15691640360699654.
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AbstractHusserl is the first philosopher who has managed to account for the specificity of perception, characterized as givenness by sketches (Abschattungen); but neither Husserl nor Merleau-Ponty have given a satisfying definition of the subject of perception. This article tries to show that the subject of perception must be conceived as living being and that, therefore, the phenomenology of perception must lead to a phenomenology of life. Here, life is approached from an existential point of view, that is to say, as a specific relationship to the world. However, life cannot be characterized from human existence in a privative way, as in Heidegger's philosophy: on the contrary, human existence, and particularly perception itself, must be understood from vital existence, and accordingly, an "additive" anthropology must replace the privative zoology. The hypothesis of this article is that it is by characterizing life as desire, we are able to account for perception as givenness by sketches.
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Sharov, Anatolii S. "Affective Pre-Givenness and Accumulation of Oneself." Review of Omsk State Pedagogical University. Humanitarian research, no. 30 (2021): 45–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.36809/2309-9380-2021-30-45-49.
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Based on the analysis of the previously unpublished heritage of Eh. Husserl, the so-called “Bernau-manuscripts” in the horizon of genetic phenomenology, a holistic consideration of subjectivity from the affectively pre-given to the Self as a collection of the self is outlined. Passive synthesis and passive genesis are analysed at the level of sensuality, which refers to the pre-predicative experience of affеction and genetically precedes the thematic correlation between the subject and the world. The accumulation of one’s own Self takes place in onto-reflexive processes through effective communication. Where the Self itself is the identical center, the pole with which the entire content of the stream of experiences is correlated.
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Marín-Ávila, Esteban. "A Broader Concept of Experience?" PhaenEx 13, no. 2 (April 2, 2020): 52–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.22329/p.v13i2.6219.
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The work of Anthony J. Steinbock on emotions―particularly moral emotions―and on religious experience is closely related to a methodological claim. This claim is that the concepts of “experience” and “manifestation” should be understood in a broader manner than that of classical phenomenology, particularly Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. In this paper, I examine the way in which Steinbock understands and conceptualizes the kind of givenness to which he refers with the notion of “vertical experience”. I focus on his claim that vertical experiences are irreducible to the kind of experiences that can be described in terms of what he calls “provocation”, “presentation” and the “noesis-noema structure”. Even though I make a criticism of his assertion that the latter implies that they should not be understood as forms of givenness founded on the above-mentioned structure, I agree with some major implications that he draws from them. In the last part of the paper, I discuss his suggestion that the Husserlian conceptualization of emotional givenness should be revised to set forward their structure in terms of what he calls “evocation” and try to give additional reasons, drawn from Husserl himself, to support this claim. The paper comes concludes by stressing the relevance of Steinbock’s analyses concerning what he calls “idolatry”. I argue that his analyses of attitudes that negate the vertical dimension of experience have far reaching implications that go beyond the field of philosophy of religion and open new, promising paths for phenomenological research on social and moral problems.
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Saieg, Paul. "Reading the Phenomenology of Origen's Gospel: Toward a Philology of Givenness." Modern Theology 31, no. 2 (April 2015): 235–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/moth.12149.
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Авдеев, Иван Александрович. "NON-INTENTIONAL COMPONENTS OF INTENTIONAL PHENOMENOLOGY." Вестник Тверского государственного университета. Серия: Философия, no. 3(57) (December 10, 2021): 231–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.26456/vtphilos/2021.3.231.
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В статье проблематизируются аспекты гуссерлевской феноменологии, которые становятся отправной точкой для новых феноменологических теорий. Эти теории преодолевают затруднения, с которыми сталкивается классическая феноменология, такие как данность истины, историчность субъекта и «пустые» интенции. Неклассические теории предлагают свое дополнительное поле рассмотрения, в котором данность феномена необязательно носит интенциональный характер. Наиболее значимыми из них являются концепция «Другого» Э. Левинаса и «насыщенный феномен» Ж-Л. Мариона. Показано, что данные проекты позволяют работать с новыми классами феноменов. The paper questions some aspects of Husserlian phenomenology which have become a starting point for new phenomenological theories. These theories overcome difficulties of the classic phenomenology, such as: the givenness of the truth, historicity of the subject and «empty» intentions. Non-classical theories offer their own additional field of inquiry, where the given of the phenomenon isn't necessarily of intentional character. Among them, most substantial are conceptions of «The Other» by E. Levinas and «saturated phenomenon» by J.-L. Marion. The paper shows that these projects allow us to work with new kinds of phenomena.
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Laferté-Coutu, Mérédith. "What is Phenomenological about Critical Phenomenology? Guenther, Al-Saji, and the Husserlian Account of Attitudes." Puncta 4, no. 2 (December 2021): 89–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.5399/pjcp.v4i2.6.
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Since Gayle Salamon’s 2018 article “What is Critical about Critical Phenomenology?”, phenomenologists and critical theorists have offered various responses to the question this title poses. In doing this, they articulated the following considerations: is renewed criticality targeting the phenomenological method itself, does it expand its subject matter to marginalized experiences, does it retool key phenomenological concepts? One aspect of this debate that has been left under-interrogated, however, is the word “phenomenology” itself. There is after all another question to ask in this context: what is phenomenological about critical phenomenology? Many avenues of response are of course possible. Phenomenology could most broadly be meant as an approach that concerns itself with what is given in experience in order to describe the structures of that givenness. From a Husserlian perspective, pure phenomenology is the science which concerns itself with phenomena in the full and diverse sense of the word—not as understood by specific natural or human sciences. What is distinctive of phenomenology is thus not what subset or type of phenomena it is interested in but how it relates to them, which, as Husserl introduces Ideas I, happens “in a completely different attitude.”
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Belousov, Mikhail A. "To the question of evidence in Husserl’s phenomenology: the givenness and the horizon." Philosophy Journal 14, no. 2 (2021): 66–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2021-14-2-66-81.
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The article deals with the initial context of introduction and subsequent transformation of the concept of evidence in Husserlian phenomenology. It shows that the initial context is composed of the basic differences drawn in the theory of meaning of Logical Investigations. These differences include the difference between experience, meaning and object as well as the correlative differences between meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment, on the one hand, and meaning and fulfilling sense, on the other. The proposed analysis of these distinctions allows the author to explicate the two main interpretations of the notion of evidence: the strict and the lax meaning. The second section reveals the distinction between the horizon and the givenness. This distinction plays a key role in the treatment of evidence in transcendental phenomenology as a mere result of a methodical interpretation of the differences drawn in the theory of meaning and the theory of evidence in Logical Investigations. It is demonstrated that these differences imply key methodical intuitions of Husserlian phenomenology. In conclusion, the naïve origins of the principle of evidence in phenomenology are thematized.
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van Manen, Max. "Phenomenology in Its Original Sense." Qualitative Health Research 27, no. 6 (April 2, 2017): 810–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1049732317699381.
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In this article, I try to think through the question, “What distinguishes phenomenology in its original sense?” My intent is to focus on the project and methodology of phenomenology in a manner that is not overly technical and that may help others to further elaborate on or question the singular features that make phenomenology into a unique qualitative form of inquiry. I pay special attention to the notion of “lived” in the phenomenological term “lived experience” to demonstrate its critical role and significance for understanding phenomenological reflection, meaning, analysis, and insights. I also attend to the kind of experiential material that is needed to focus on a genuine phenomenological question that should guide any specific research project. Heidegger, van den Berg, and Marion provide some poignant exemplars of the use of narrative “examples” in phenomenological explorations of the phenomena of “boredom,” “conversation,” and “the meaningful look in eye-contact.” Only what is given or what gives itself in lived experience (or conscious awareness) are proper phenomenological “data” or “givens,” but these givens are not to be confused with data material that can be coded, sorted, abstracted, and accordingly analyzed in some “systematic” manner. The latter approach to experiential research may be appropriate and worthwhile for various types of qualitative inquiry but not for phenomenology in its original sense. Finally, I use the mythical figure of Kairos to show that the famous phenomenological couplet of the epoché-reduction aims for phenomenological insights that require experiential analysis and attentive (but serendipitous) methodical inquiry practices.
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Zalewski, Wojciech. "The concept of reduction in the Edmund Husserl’s The Idea of Phenomenology." Prace Naukowe Akademii im. Jana Długosza w Częstochowie. Filozofia 15 (2018): 73–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.16926/fil.2018.15.04.
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This article presents the concept of phenomenological reduction Edmund Husserl’s “Idea of phenomenology”. In the first part I present the specifics of the phenomenological method compared to natural sciences. In the next part I characterize the fundamental assumptions about Husserl's understanding of the concept of phenomenological reduction. Next, I emphasize and explain the issues of the main epistemological principle. In the last part I interpret the reduction as a procedure leading to the essence of the phenomenon, but also what constitutes its basis, to “givenness “, what Jean-Luc Marion calls donation.
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Walton, Roberto J. "El papel de la darse-previo en la fenomenología trascendental." Phainomenon 7, no. 1 (October 1, 2003): 23–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2003-0045.
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Abstract This article is an attempt to clarify the role of pregivenness by drawing on the accounts afforded by Eugen Fink both in the Sixth Cartesian Meditation and in the complementary writings to this study. Pregivenness is first situated, along with givenness and non-givenness, within the framework of the system of transcendental phenomenology. As a second step, an examination is undertaken of the dimensions of pregivenness in the natural attitude. Next, nonpregivenness in the transcendental sphere is examined with a focus upon the way in which indeterminateness does not undermine the possibility of a transcendental foreknowledge in the natural attitude, and on the other hand implies the productive character of phenomenological knowledge. After showing how, with the reduction, the pregivennes of the world turns into the pregivenness of world-constitution, the paper addresses the problems raised by the nonpregivenness both of the depth-levels and the reach of transcendental life. By unfolding these lines of inquiry, transcendental phenomenology surmounts the provisional analysis of constitution at the surface level as well as the limitation of transcendental life to the egological sphere. Finally, it is contended that Fink’s account of pregivenness overstates apperceptive or secondary pregivenenness because is does not deal with the pregivenness that precedes acts and is the condition of possibility for primary passivity. Reasons for the omission of impressional or primary pregivenness are suggested.
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Pizzi, Matías Ignacio. "Nicholas of Cusa’s Mystical Theology in Jean-Luc Marion’s Phenomenology of Affectivity." Journal for Continental Philosophy of Religion 4, no. 1 (April 8, 2022): 41–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/25889613-bja10025.
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Abstract The main goal of this paper is to analyze Nicholas of Cusa’s reading on the dispute of Mystical Theology through Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of givenness. To do this, first of all, we will address the analyses offered by Jean-Luc Marion on the problem of affectivity. Secondly, we examine Nicholas’ interpretation of Mystical Theology through the aenigma of the eicona dei in De visione dei (1453). Thirdly, we present Jean-Luc Marion’s interpretation of Cusanus eicona dei as an antecedent of his phenomenological conception of Icone as “saturated phenomenon.” Finally, we suggest that Cusanus eicona dei appears in Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology as a precedent of his strategy when approaching the field of affectivity. Both authors try to show an instance preceding the distinction between affectivity and rationality.
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Marion, Jean-Luc. "The borders of phenomenality." Filozofija i drustvo 27, no. 4 (2016): 777–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1604777m.
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This text is based on the lecture held by Jean-Luc Marion at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory (University of Belgrade), on December 4., 2015. By thematizing the ?limits of phenomenality?, Marion analyzes what exceeds the horizon of objectivity and the framework of subjectivity. By relying on some of the most important philosophers of the history of (post)metaphysics (Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Nietzsche, Husserl and Heidegger), Marion offers an alternative way, namely, a phenomenology of givenness that focuses on saturated phenomena.
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Compaan, Auke. "The revelation of Christ as an impossible impossibility: a critical reading of Jean-Luc Marion’s contribution to the post-modern debate in phenomenology, philosophy of religion and theology." STJ | Stellenbosch Theological Journal 1, no. 1 (July 31, 2015): 57. http://dx.doi.org/10.17570/stj.2015.v1n1.a3.
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This article is an attempt to establish the phenomenological and theological value of the concept of Revelation in the work of the French philosopher Jean-Luc Marion in a post-modern cultural and intellectual context. Is it possible to speak of revelation in a phenomenological sense and more radically, about the Revelation of God, after the critique of metaphysics and phenomenology by Derrida, Caputo and others? Marion argues that by overcoming metaphysics and broadening the limits of traditional phenomenology to include phenomena of Revelation, the Revelation of Christ is a phenomenological impossible impossibility. Using Marion’s reinterpretation of Husserl and Heidegger`s understanding of “givenness”, “the given” and the “gift” and his concept of Revelation as a saturated phenomenon, I want to critically illuminate his contribution to the concept of r/Revelation as a post-metaphysical and theological possibility.
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Vinolo, Stéphane, and Brian Becker. "Jean-Paul Sartre and Jean-Luc Marion." Journal for Continental Philosophy of Religion 4, no. 1 (April 8, 2022): 25–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/25889613-bja10023.
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Abstract Jean-Paul Sartre is not an influential author in the work of Jean-Luc Marion. Yet, as is the case for the phenomenology of givenness, Sartre thinks love in terms of God. However, for Marion, Sartre is exemplary of those authors who have remained prisoner to metaphysics and to thinking God as the causa sui. By comparing the Sartrean and Marionian conceptions of love, the author shows that both are based on radically different conceptions of divinity, demonstrating at the same time how the link between God and being determines human love.
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Santana, Wellington José. "IS LOVE A GIFT? A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY ABOUT GIVENNESS." Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 57, no. 134 (August 2016): 441–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0100-512x2016n13404wjs.
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ABSTRACT The contemporary philosophical debate about "gift" brought into light above all by French philosophers Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion, brought about new and live discussions regarding what gift is and what is its nature. The present article analyses whether or not love can be regarded as a gift or, rather, follow the same problem showed by Derrida. According to him, every gift carries an internal contradiction and can never be and, therefore, will never be gift. A gift is impossible. What is as gift to people (someone freely gives something to someone), is, actually a commodity, an economical circle for Derrida. This article seeks to inquire whether can or cannot love follow the same gift pattern or if it, rather, builds his own path and follows its own internal logic. Is it possible to analyze love following on the footsteps of phenomenology? If love can be analyzed in a phenomenological fashion - reduction of love - then a new horizon will be opened.
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SON, Yeong-Chang. "A study on the phenomenology of givenness in the Jean-Luc Marion’s thought." Journal of the Daedong Philosophical Association 80 (September 30, 2017): 97–124. http://dx.doi.org/10.20539/deadong.2017.80.05.
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Schunke, Matthew. "Revealing Givenness: The Problem of Non-Intuited Phenomena in Jean-Luc Marion’s Phenomenology." Studia Phaenomenologica 15 (2015): 473–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/studphaen20151524.
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Staiti, Andrea. "A grasp from afar: Überschau and the givenness of life in Husserlian phenomenology." Continental Philosophy Review 46, no. 1 (March 23, 2013): 21–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11007-013-9244-2.
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Shiyan, A. A. "Yakovenko’s Transcendentalism in the Philosophical Context of his Time: Phenomenology and/or Neo-Kantianism." RUDN Journal of Philosophy 23, no. 4 (December 15, 2019): 443–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2313-2302-2019-23-4-443-460.
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The article discusses the work of Boris Valentinovich Yakovenko, one of the most prominent representatives of Russian neo-Kantianism. The philosophy of Yakovenko is analyzed in the context of the German and Russian philosophical traditions of the early twentieth century - phenomenology and neo-Kantianism. Being a supporter of neo-Kantianism, Yakovenko devoted most of his research to questions of cognition . The article examines the foundations of criticism, directed by Yakovenko against modern gnosiological approaches. The unacceptability of these approaches consists in mixing different types of being by Yakovenko. Yakovenko believes that Husserl's phenomenology focuses on the study of the process of psychological cognition, and it is impossible based on subjectivity to achieve objective knowledge. Cohen, in the opinion of Yakovenko, denying the possibility of a pure givenness of sensations, relativizes the very idea of existence, implying only science under it. Yakovenko calls his own ontological attitude transcendental pluralism. Transcendental pluralism recognizes the self-sufficiency and independence of each kind of Being, between which there is no connection. The cognition of this plurality of identities must be non-presumability and absolute and is possible, according to Yakovenko, in a special kind of intuition. This intuition Yakovenko called mystical, however, does not give its detailed description and justification. Nevertheless, an appeal to his philosophy allows us to actualize theoretical-cognitive problems that are of interest to us today: the problem of subjectivity and objectivity, the problem of non-presumability of knowledge, “pure givenness”, transcendence and immanence, the ratio of various types of intuitions in cognition, etc.
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Wallner, Michael. "Is Perception Essentially Perspectival?" History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 24, no. 2 (October 26, 2021): 351–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/26664275-bja10052.
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Abstract Husserl famously argues that it is essential to perception to present the perceived object in perspectives. Hence, there is no – and there cannot be – perception without perspectival givenness. Yet, it seems that there are counterexamples to this essentialist claim, for we seem to be able to imagine beings that do not perceive in perspectives. Recently, there have been some accounts in the literature that critically discuss those counterexamples and assess to what extent they succeed in challenging Husserl’s essentialist claim. In this paper I discuss three different answers to these counterexamples, all of them are found wanting. I offer a novel solution, taking into account some crucial findings of the contemporary debate about imagination and modality. I argue that this new solution is capable of fully vindicating Husserl’s essentialist claim. Finally, I reconstruct Husserl’s own way to treat such counterexamples, in order to showcase the notion of modality Husserlian phenomenology relies on. I argue for the hitherto widely underappreciated point that Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology cannot appeal to strictly absolute modality but that the kind of modality in Husserlian phenomenology is conditional on the facticity that we have the transcendental structure we do in fact have.
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Mitchell, Philip Irving. "Being Given Orthodoxy." Religion and the Arts 20, no. 3 (2016): 290–314. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685292-02003002.
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In the following, I argue that approaches from Jean-Luc Marion’s recent phenomenology unpack Chesterton’s autobiography account in Orthodoxy. I examine how the arrival of an event or a revelation tasks him with a response, even if an unintegrated one, and how Chesterton’s undertaking illustrates this manifestation of converting events by virtue of gradual transformation. To do this, I look at how the phenomenologically rich givenness of an event overcomes the limits of the Kantian imperial ego, and in its place, offers paradoxical and thick experience of that which saturates the one who is given the revelation.
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Barbaras, Renaud. "The Subject’s Life and the Life of Manifestation: Towards a Privative Biology." Research in Phenomenology 43, no. 2 (2013): 161–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15691640-12341252.
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Abstract The universal a priori of the correlation between transcendental being and its subjective modes of givenness constitutes the minimal framework for any phenomenological approach. The proper object of phenomenology is then to characterize both the exact nature of the correlation and the sense of being of the terms in relation, that is to say, of subject and world. It involves demonstrating that a rigorous analysis of the correlation unfolds necessarily on three levels and that phenomenology is thus destined to move beyond itself towards a cosmology and metaphysics. The phenomenological correlation that we will establish is essentially a relation between a subject that is desire and a world that is pure transcendence and assumes their common belonging to a φύσίς whose description stems from a cosmology. But the difference of the subject, without which there is no correlation, refers itself to a more originary split that affects the very process of the manifestation and opens the space of metaphysics.
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Kaushik, Rajiv. "Literature, Ontology, and Implex in Merleau-Ponty: Writing and Finding the Concrete Limit of Phenomena." Humanities 10, no. 4 (November 10, 2021): 118. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/h10040118.
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This paper examines the ambiguous relationship between the literary uses of language in Merleau-Ponty’s own work and his ontology. It is argued that Merleau-Ponty’s critique of phenomenology—that is, his critique of an already critical philosophy—leads him to say that the limits of phenomena are inside the entire structure of the phenomena. They are, in other words, promiscuous or dehiscent and therefore are not limits that can themselves be given. Merleau-Ponty would say that such limits are silent or mute within meaning. This will have repercussions for the very method of phenomenology. It can no longer be a descriptive method, concerned with the givenness of the phenomena, but needs to be matrixed with an expressive method that shows up the impossibility of such a return. This expressive method has to do with what he calls the “implex”—the very bodily limit of the inside and the outside that cannot be thought as one or the other, or even their synthesis. In other words, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology invites us towards a concrete bodily limit that is, at the same time, a limit to philosophy. In effect, one cannot think of Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the flesh apart from language, because this ontology, its very concrete crystallization, requires expression and not just description.
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Alavi, Aurélien. "Speculative realism and Phenomenology: how does one give meaning, through Husserl and beyond Husserl, to what exceeds our intuitive capacities?" Eikasía Revista de Filosofía, no. 95 (September 1, 2020): 147–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.57027/eikasia.95.195.
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Quentin Meillassoux first book, After Finitude, argues that most of the post-Kantian philosophies, including phenomenology, are guilty of inconsistency, since none of them is able to give account of the ancestral phenomena. The incorrigible phenomenologist is accused to make it impossible to understand scientific statements about some ancient past, that would be prior to the emergence of life, and thus escaping from any kind of givenness. However, we think that this critic does not achieve its purpose, for four main reasons : the fact that signitive intentions can remain meaningful without being fulfilled by intuitions ; the gifts of the imaginative intentions which, through the example of fiction, open up possibilities, for ancestral statements, of some quasi-fulfillment ; the « thematization », by most of Husserl’s disciples, of the diachronic nature of some events, the temporality of which differs tremendously with that of the inner perception’s one, the latter sustaining the intentional correlation ; its interest for an entirely different scientific field, to which phenomenology borrows some notions, and more generally its procedures : quantum physics.
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Roggero, Jorge Luis. "LA FUNCIÓN DEL ARTE EN LA FENOMENOLOGÍA DE LA DONACIÓN DE J.-L. MARION." Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, no. 13 (February 2, 2021): 173. http://dx.doi.org/10.5944/rif.13.2016.29620.
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Este artículo se propone indagar en la función del arte en la fenomenología de la donación de Jean-Luc Marion y su relación con la hermenéutica. La pintura desempeña un papel fundamental pues constituye el “modelo” que permite entender el carácter radicalmente pasivo de la administración hermenéutica de la distancia entre lo que se da y lo que se muestra.This article aims to investigate the role of art in Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of givenness and its relationship with hermeneutics. Painting plays a fundamental role because it constitutes the “model” that facilitates understanding the radically passive character of the hermeneutic management of the gap between what gives itself and what shows itself.
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Ma, Ming-Qian. "From Blind to Blinding: Saturated Phenomena and the Speculative Lyric of the Invisible in Andrew Joron’s Poetry." Word and Text - A Journal of Literary Studies and Linguistics 12 (2022) (December 30, 2022): 47–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.51865/jlsl.2022.04.
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This essay presents a critical reading of Andrew Joron’s speculative oeuvre from a phenomenological standpoint. Proceeding from the poet’s cosmic perspectives, it focuses on the central issue of language in relation to the emergence of meaning and the world. Through a close reading of both Joron’s poetry and poetics, this essay demonstrates his conceptual affinity with the work of contemporary French philosopher Jean-Luc Marion, arguing that both Joron’s poetry and Marion’s phenomenology of givenness postulate an emergence of meaning and the world that is absolutely unconditioned and unconditional, an emergence characterized by an intuitively blinding richness that saturates the phenomenon over and beyond any limit and, hence, makes the phenomenon invisible.
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Tedjoworo, Hadrianus. "Kontribusi Fenomenologi Post-Subjek pada Metodologi Filosofis dan Teologis." MELINTAS 34, no. 1 (November 29, 2018): 60–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.26593/mel.v34i1.3085.60-79.
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Givenness is probably an odd term in methodology, but not in phenomenology. The long history of subjectivism in philosophy faces confrontations from Derrida's deconstruction. This history also results in a sort of mutual exclusion between philosophy and theology. The concept of the subject becomes a problem for both, but frequently it is safeguarded for the sake of a more universal 'objectivity'. The phenomenological tendency towards phenomenon, more than towards the experiencing subject and more than anything regarded as object, provokes some philosophical focus on the emancipation of the phenomena. Marion pushes phenomenology to its limits, to the extent that he is suspected of undermining the role of the subject in contemporary philosophical discourse. He reacts to Derrida's deconstruction, which was also criticised for not offering a way out of the labyrinth from the collapse of traditional thoughts. Marion is quite consistent with his phenomenology, namely in offering a way out for the subject to be a witness, and reminds that philosophy should be more appreciative of phenomena. The term saturated phenomenon represents his philosophical thinking that can be regarded as a methodological approach to respect, and not to dominate, reality. Being a witness is not the same as playing a critic on reality. This could be a useful stance for philosophers as well as theologians in the presence of the phenomena they cannot master, namely, the given phenomena.
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Radinkovic, Zeljko. "Daseinsanalyse and the question of being in the early Heidegger. Destruction of Husserl‘s concept of consciousness as the absolute being in the sense of the absolute givenness." Filozofija i drustvo 28, no. 3 (2017): 613–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1703613r.
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The text deals with a certain phase of the Heideggerian way of thinking, which had precedes the emergence of ?Being and Time? (1927). Heidegger?s reception, criticism, and transformation of some of the central concepts of Husserlian phenomenology (intentionality, a priori, categorial intuition) is the focus of the reflections. This article shows how this radical transformation of Husserlian phenomenology goes beyond the formal coincidence of the phenomenological principle ?to the things themselves? and points to the essential connection of the question of being and its phenomenological demetalization.