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Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Philosohy of mind'
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Goodsell, Thea. "Mental files." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2013. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:7d7a1146-f770-4951-81a2-2b5dc42d2ecc.
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It is often supposed that we can make progress understanding singular thought about objects by claiming that thinkers use ‘mental files’. However, the proposal is rarely subject to sustained critical evaluation. This thesis aims to clarify and critique the claim that thinkers use mental files. In my introductory first chapter, I motivate my subsequent discussion by introducing the claim that thinkers deploy modes of presentation in their thought about objects, and lay out some of my assumptions and terminology. In the second chapter, I introduce mental files, responding to the somewhat fragmented files literature by setting out a core account of files, and outlining different ways of implementing the claim that thinkers use mental files. I highlight pressing questions about the synchronic and diachronic individuation conditions for files. In chapters three and four, I explore whether ‘de jure coreference’ can be used to give synchronic individuation conditions on mental files. I explore existing characterisations of de jure coreference before presenting my own, but conclude that de jure coreference does not give a useful account of the synchronic individuation conditions on files. In chapter five, I consider the proposal that thinkers must sometimes trade on the coreference of their mental representations, and argue that we can give synchronic individuation conditions on files in terms of trading on coreference. In chapter six, I bring together the account of files developed so far, compare it to the most developed theory of mental files published to date, and defend my account from the objection that it is circular. In chapter seven, I explore routes for giving diachronic individuation conditions on mental files. In my concluding chapter, I distinguish the core account of files from the idea that the file metaphor should be taken seriously. I suggest that my investigation of the consequences of the core account has shown that the file metaphor is unhelpful, and I outline reasons to exercise caution when using ‘files’ terminology.
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Walters, Daniel Dewi. "Understanding other minds : an interrogation of the theory of mind debate." Thesis, University of Hull, 2014. http://hydra.hull.ac.uk/resources/hull:11523.
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Nichols, Ryan Tate. "Reid's Philosophy of Mind." Connect to this title online, 2002. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1039111436.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2002.Document formatted into pages; contains vii, 369 p. Includes bibliographical references. Abstract available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center; full text release delayed at author's request until 2005 Dec. 5.
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Allen, Sophie Rebecca. "Causation and the mind : metaphysical presuppositions in the philosophy of mind." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.392097.
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Abramson, Darren. "Computability and mind." [Bloomington, Ind.] : Indiana University, 2006. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:3230538.
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, Dept. of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, 2006."Title from dissertation home page (viewed July 5, 2007)." Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-08, Section: A, page: 3005. Adviser: D. C. McCarty.
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O'Conaill, Donnchadh. "Phenomenology, philosophy of mind and the subject." Thesis, Durham University, 2010. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/338/.
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I propose to develop a phenomenologically-informed ontological model of the subject of experiences. This model will attempt to explain how it is possible for a subject to have experiences with a subjective character, which are like something for their subject. It will also address how the subject can have experiences whose subjective character plays an intentional role, making the subject aware of objects. The subjective character of experiences and their intentionality have both been widely discussed in the philosophy of mind. However, these discussions have focused on whether or not these features can be explained in naturalistic or physicalistic terms. As a result, there has been relatively little detailed description of the subjective character of experiences. In particular, complex experiential states such as those involving a combination of different kinds of experience have been neglected in the recent literature. There has also been little discussion of how we can be aware, not just of individual objects, but of situations, and indeed how our everyday awareness of objects involves an awareness of the world as the background to all our activities. In order to provide detailed descriptions of the subjective character and the intentionality of experiences, I shall turn to the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. Husserl developed concepts and techniques for studying the subjective character of intentional experiences independently of their non-experiential aspects. I shall use these techniques to focus on the subject qua experiencer, and on experiences as states or episodes which are like something for the subject. By studying the subject in this way, I shall provide a model of subjectivity, the ontological relation holding between a subject and its experiences. I shall argue that subjectivity can be explained by appealing to the temporality of experiences, the way they flow in a stream of consciousness. Every subject has a temporal structure which is the form of its particular stream of consciousness. What it is for a subject to have an experience is for that experience to pass through this temporal structure. I shall also examine how a subject can have experiences which are objective, that is, which make the subject aware of objects as having more than the features directly presented to the subject. One view is that to explain objectivity, we must adopt a special perspective on the world, allowing us to compare how objects appear to us with how they really are. I argue that we do not need to appeal to such a special perspective. Our everyday awareness of objects and of the world is essentially structured by a sense of objectivity. Lastly, I shall address a problem that arises for any transcendental study of the conditions for the possibility of our awareness of the world. This is the paradox of subjectivity, the problem of understanding how the one subject can be both a part of the world and that which makes sense of the entire world. I shall argue that applying phenomenological techniques can help us to understand how the one subject can answer to both of these descriptions. This thesis will thus use phenomenological methods to develop an ontological model which can explain certain key features of the subject. In doing so, it will serve both as a contribution to the philosophy of mind, and as an illustration of what can be gained by applying phenomenological methods in this area.
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Davies, Mark. "Narrow content in the philosophy of mind." Thesis, Swansea University, 2009. https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa43049.
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My thesis examines the notion of narrow content in the philosophy of mind. Narrowcontent is defined as a type of mental state that is shared between internal physicalduplicates in Twin Earth-type thought experiments. In these thought experiments,changes in the physical and/or social environments of the duplicates are usually takento have the result that the contents of certain of the duplicates’ mental states, e.g.,beliefs, etc., are different. The upshot of this is that intemalism with regards tomental content seems to be refuted, as the duplicates concerned share an identity ofinternal physical properties, then if intemalism about mental content is true, theirmental states should also be content-identical. However, despite this possibility, itseems to me that there is still a strong intuition that the duplicates in these TwinEarth-type situations do share type-identical mental states which can be individuatedby the states’ narrow content. The aim of the thesis is to examine several of the mostpopular construals of narrow content in the literature, to ascertain whether there is aconstrual that provides an adequate narrow content. To help with this task I suggestthree conditions of adequacy that a narrow content must satisfy in order to beconsidered adequate. I then choose my favoured construal and give a version of itwhich will hopefully be seen as an improvement on the other construals (by satisfyingall the adequacy conditions). It will be argued that my version of the narrow contentconstrual will provide, not just an adequate narrow content, at least in relation to asubject’s perceptual experience, but perhaps also necessary and sufficient conditionsfor a mental state, such as a perceptual belief, to have the specific content that it has.
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Uings, David John. "Mind, meaning and miscommunication." Connect to e-thesis, 2008. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/355/.
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Thesis (M.Phil.) - University of Glasgow, 2008.M.Phil. thesis submitted to the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, University of Glasgow, 2008. Includes bibliographical references. Print version also available.
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Bruno, Michael George. "The Extended Conscious Mind." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/311472.
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Do minds ever extend spatially beyond the boundaries of the bodies of their subjects? I argue that they do. More precisely, I argue that some of our visual experiences are constitutively grounded by events that include parts of the world that are not parts of any subject's body. After surveying the development of externalist theories in the philosophy of mind, I present some of the motivations common to ecological, enactive, dynamic sensorimotor and two-level interdependence accounts of perception and explain how some of these accounts support the case for active vehicle externalism about consciousness. I then discuss and respond to three well-known objections. The first concerns whether the extended mind thesis implies that there extended selves, the second concerns what exactly demarcates mental events from non-mental events, and the last concerns what is required to demonstrate constitutive dependence. To address what distinguishes constitutive from nomological or causal forms of dependence, I develop an account of constitutive grounding. My account draws on recent work in analytic metaphysics on the notion of ontological dependence or grounding, where grounding is taken to be a non-causal relation of ontological priority. After showing how this notion is different than any kind of nomological dependence and how it can be constructively used to decipher the spatiotemporal extent of events, I argue positively that the grounds of visual experiences are always temporally extended and often include parts of the world external to the seeing subject's body. My argument for temporally extended vision begins by considering three different models of the temporal structure of consciousness: cinematic, retentional, and extensional. I then draw on the dynamic sensorimotor theory to object to the cinematic model and explore whether enactivists are really committed to retentionalism. I end up arguing that any account one gives of the intentional contents or phenomenal characters of individual conscious visual events will have to make reference to a briefly enduring process and not just an instantaneous event involving the subject. Lastly, I argue as follows: (P1) in the explanation of visual experience, the brain internal parts of the temporally extended events that constitutively ground visual experiences often cannot be decoupled from parts of the non-bodily world; (P2) if event A is a constitutive ground of event E and event B cannot be decoupled from A in the explanation of E, then B is also a constitutive ground of E; therefore, (C) some visual experiences are constitutively grounded by events that include parts of the non-bodily world. I call this conclusion the extended visual consciousness thesis. If my argument for it is sound, our conscious minds do, in some cases, extend beyond our bodies.
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Botterell, Andrew (Andrew John) 1968. "Analysis in mind." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1998. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/9670.
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 1998.Includes bibliographical references (p. 111-114).
From the time of Descartes to about the 1960s, a certain epistemological idea dominated the philosophy of mind, namely the idea that theses about the relation between mind and body are, if true, a priori truths. Much of recent philosophy of mind is devoted to the question whether that idea is right. My research is largely an attempt to argue that some recent defenses of it are unsuccessful. For example, Physicalism is the metaphysical thesis that every actual psychological event, property, or process is necessitated by some actual physical event, property, or process. Many philosophers believe that Physicalism is true. Until about the 1960s, those who believed it true typically believed that statements relating mind and body were a priori truths. Let us call this thesis A Priori Physicalism. Many philosophers nowadays believe, instead, that statements relating mind and body are only a posteriori truths. Let us call this thesis A Posteriori Physicalism. A number of philosophers have argued in recent years that A Posteriori Physicalism is unacceptable; on their view, Physicalists had better be A Priori Physicalists. My thesis examines the question whether that view is correct. I begin with a discussion of two influential arguments for the conclusion that Physicalists must be A Priori Physicalists. Chapter 1 addresses itself to an argument for the conclusion that if physicalism is true, every referring psychological expression is coreferential a priori with some referring physical expression. This argument is commonly called the Property Dualism Argument against Physicalism. I argue that the Property Dualism Argument rests on an ambiguous premise: on one reading it begs the question against A Posteriori Physicalism, on the other reading the conclusion of the Property Dualism Argument does not follow. Chapter 2 addresses itself to an argument of Frank Jackson's for the conclusion that Physicalists must have an a priori story to tell about how the physical nature of the actual world makes true the psychological nature of the actual world. I distinguish two ways in which this claim might be understood, and I argue that on neither way of understanding it does Jackson have a compelling argument for A Priori Physicalism. Finally, in Chapter 3 I turn to a more general discussion of the relation between conceivability and possibility, and its bearing on the dispute between A Priori and A Posteriori Physicalists. I focus in particular on a recent argument of David Chalmers' from the conceivability of so-called zombies to the conclusion that A Posteriori Physicalism is false. I argue that this argument fails to provide compelling reasons for rejecting A Posteriori Physicalism. I argue, first, that it misconstrues the relation between conceivability and possibility, and second, that it fails to establish that zombies are conceivable in the relevant sense.
by Andrew Botterell.
Ph.D.
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Arikan, Pakize. "The Explanatory Gap Problem In Philosophy Of Mind." Master's thesis, METU, 2007. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12608178/index.pdf.
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A given qualitative mental experience possesses qualitative aspects, or qualia, that identify and distinguish it from other qualitative mental states. While some philosophers explained the mental phenomena by positing nonphysical kinds of entities, some others propose wholly physical explanations. Even if those physicalistic explanations of the mental shed some light on the issue of body-mind relation, Joseph Levine claims that there still exists an explanatory gap between a qualitative mental state and the physical state supposedly responsible for it, since there is no explanation of how and why a certain kind of physical state gives rise to a specific kind of quale.This thesis is an exploration of this problem and evaluation of some of the views that interpret the gap as either ontological or epistemological in order to find out whether the gap is compatible with physicalism or not. The focus is on the Phenomenal Concept Strategy that proposes a physicalistic account for the existence of the gap that is based on the character of phenomenal concepts. I examine whether this strategy is satisfactory or not and propose a possible physicalist account to the special character of phenomenal concepts.
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Bennett, Laura Jane. "Realism and evidence in the philosophy of mind." Thesis, University of Warwick, 1992. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/50789/.
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This thesis evaluates a variety of important modern approaches to the study of the mind/brain in the light of recent developments in the debate about how evidence should be used to support a theory and its constituent hypotheses. Although all these approaches are ostensibly based upon the principles of scientific realism, this evaluation will demonstrate that all of them fall well short of these requirements. Consequently, the more modern, co-evolutionary theories of the mind/brain do not constitute the significant advance upon more traditional theories that their authors take them to be. There are two fundamental elements within my discussion of the relationship between evidence and the constituent hypotheses of a theory. Firstly, I shall demonstrate that the traditional veil-of-perception issue has a wider relevance than that which has historically been attributed to it, since it is the paradigm case of an attempt to construct a two level theory on the basis of evidence tha~ does not adequately support either hypothesis. This interpretation of the issue can be represented by constructing a semantically inconsistent tetrad. It is shown that similar tetrads can be constructed for each of the theories of the mind/brain discussed in this thesis. Secondly, I shall argue that the theories discussed all employ a variety of the bootstrap strategy. This strategy is a relatively recent development in the philosophy of science, which suggests a way in which the same evidence can be used to generate both a general and a specific hypothesis within a theory without violating the constraints of scientific realism. However, I contend that recent use of this strategy in the investigation of mind is largely unsatisfactory as a result of a neglect of structural as well as more informal influences upon the kinds of evidence employed to support the hypotheses contained in the theories. The thesis is divided into three major sections. The first (Section A) discusses the influence of the motivations of the individual theorists upon their arguments and provides a critical discussion of the issues of the veil-of-perception and bootstrapping. The second section (Section B) comprises a detailed examination of a range of modern theories of the mind/brain and critically analyses their success. The final section (Section C) draws together general conclusions and methodological consequences of the detailed analysis of the nature of realism and evidence in the philosophy of mind.
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Steward, Helen. "The philosophy of mind : events, processes, and states /." Oxford : Clarendon press, 1997. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb37057450q.
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Jia, Han. "On "Thinking Outside the Box"." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2017. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1470.
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This paper examines a computational account about higher-level creativity proposed by Margaret A. Boden, a female psychologist and philosopher. She uses an interesting computational concept the “conceptual space” – known as “the box” in our everyday language – to measure levels of creativeness and to explain how higher-level creativity is achieved.
In this paper, I mainly seek to look into detail and analyze her answers to the following two questions: “What does Boden mean by the ‘conceptual space?” and “How is it possible to think outside of the ‘conceptual space?”
To that end, I have researched papers that commented on Boden’s computational account, and have come up with hypothetical cases to flesh out my arguments and to appeal to the readers’ intuitions.
The conclusion of this paper is that the knowledge of yourself being inside particular boxes and the knowledge of what limits and potential a given conceptual space has are neither sufficient nor necessary for producing the kind of rule-breaking “outside-the-box” ideas, but the idea of a “conceptual space” remains useful in evaluating the quality of ideas after their generation.
The philosophy of creativity is such an intriguing topic to me – we all value creativity as a society and have put “outside-the-box” type of thinking on the pedestal since the age of Plato. Yet when we think more about the idea of “outside-the-box” thinking, much ambiguity arises. This topic greatly sparks my interest in the philosophy of mind, and through research and self-introspection, I have not only learned more about the concept of creativity, but also discovered more about my own thinking style.
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Matier, Colin Paul. "The mind-independence of truth." Thesis, Queen's University Belfast, 1990. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.335453.
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McIntosh, Jillian Scott. "Teleological functionalism, normativity, explanation, and the philosophy of mind." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp04/nq25111.pdf.
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Faith, Joe. "Emergent representations : dialectical materialism and the philosophy of mind." Thesis, University of Sussex, 2000. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.313968.
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Buttars, Simon. "The epiphenomenal mind." Thesis, University of Warwick, 2003. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/58425/.
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The Epiphenomenal Mind is both a deflationary attack on the powers of the human mind and a defence of human subjectivity. It is deflationary because in the thesis I argue that consciousness is an epiphenomenal consequence of events in the brain. It is a defence of human subjectivity because I argue that the mind is sui generis real, irreducible, and largely an endogenous product (i.e. not dependent on society or its resources). Part I is devoted to arguing that the conscious mind is epiphenomenal. Arguing from, the irreducibility of mental states, the causal closure of the physical domain, and the principle of causal explanatory exclusion, I seek to demonstrate that all theories of mental causation necessarily violate one or more of these premises. Contemporary approaches to mental causation come under two broad categories, those that argue that mental events are supervenient on physical events (such as Davidson, Kim and Horgan) and those (like Haskar) who argue that the mind is an emergent property of the brain. Supervenience based theories, I argue, end up reducing mental states in their search for a theory of mental causation and emergence based theories end up violating the principle of the causal closure of the physical. In part II, I explore some of the consequences of epiphenomenalism for social theory. This exploration comes in the context of a defence of human subjectivity against (i.) those sociological imperialists who view the mind and self as a 'gift of society', and (ii.) social situationalists who have abandoned the concept of action and an interest in 'what's in the head' of the actor, in favour of a concept of social action which views behaviour as action only to the extent that it is socially meaningful. The conclusion is that the social sciences should return to an interpretative style (Weberian) methodology.
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Kishino, Andrew D. "Does the Mind Extend Out into the World." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2011. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/98.
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The extended mind debate juggles the possibilities of whether or not the mind extends out into the world. Today, with the rise in technology, we have an additional claim that our tools are responsible for extending our minds. The internet, smart phones, and other tools give us a foothold in the extended mind debate by providing real world examples of how our mind is perceived as extending out into the world. In discovering where the divide between mind and environment exists we can come up with a conclusion whether or not the mind truly extends out into the world.
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Tanabe, Juichiro. "Buddhist philosophy and the epistemological foundations of conflict resolution." Thesis, University of Bradford, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10454/4910.
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The aim of this research is to expand the framework of contemporary conflict resolution by constructing a complementary relationship between Western epistemologies and a Buddhist epistemology. Despite its evolution and development through self-reflexivity and self-critique, contemporary conflict resolution established upon Western epistemologies has confined the understanding of human mind to social/cultural orientations and left a comprehensive and qualitative analysis of the potential of individual human mind underdeveloped. Buddhist epistemology, the central theme of which is to address human suffering that is mainly psychological and subjective, makes a critical analysis of human subjectivity in terms of how it can be become a root cause of suffering including conflict and how it can be addressed by gaining an insight into the social/cultural construction of human subjectivity. The argument of the thesis is that when a socially/culturally-oriented view of human mind and a deeper and more profound view of human mind are combined together, we can engage in a qualitatively richer and deeper analysis of the psychological and subjective dynamics of conflict resolution.
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Yang, Marcia. "In the Mind of the Machine." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2018. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1962.
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As technology becomes more sophisticated, it becomes increasingly important to understand how we should ethically use technology. One question within this area of study is whether we should treat certain types of technology, like artificial intelligence, with more respect. If we do owe these machines some sort of moral status, another question is what level of moral status they have. In order to answer these questions, I argue that machines can be considered as minds under the view of machine functionalism. A significant problem for machine functionalism is whether it can account for emotions within the system it suggests. First, I argue that emotions are able to fit within the system using Martha Nussbaum’s framework for emotions. Second, I address Craig Delancey’s objections to Nussbaum’s view, and I suggest friendly amendments to Nussbaum’s framework. Third, I look at how Nussbaum’s view fits within the theory of machine functionalism. And finally, I consider the implications of the view that machines can have minds like humans can, and how we should treat machines in light of this argument.
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Benson, Martin L. "Beginner's Mind." ScholarWorks@UNO, 2017. http://scholarworks.uno.edu/td/2365.
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My art distills my relationship to spirituality, digital culture, and the practices and side-effects therein, into a simplified visual language. The work manifests in the form of paintings, drawings, and light sculptures. Meditation and mindfulness training are a large part of my influence and interests. I often wonder how mindfulness practice can be mirrored in my artwork, not only in my process for creating the work, but also with what the resulting imagery does for the viewer. My intention is to provide an art form that invites one to look and experience one’s own capacity to observe, without the need for immediate intellectualization. I wish to offer people an opportunity to focus their attention on the phenomenological sensations that emanate from the art, to take a step back from the conceptual part of the mind, and step into a part that’s more fundamental to our moment to moment reality.
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Blitz, David. "Evolution, emergence and mind." Thesis, McGill University, 1985. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=66021.
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Holt, Jason. "Blindsight, an essay in the philosophy of psychology and mind." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape9/PQDD_0012/NQ40264.pdf.
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Child, Timothy William. "Causation and interpretation : some questions in the philosophy of mind." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1989. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.305758.
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Murris, Karin Saskia. "Metaphors of the child's mind : teaching philosophy to young children." Thesis, University of Hull, 1997. http://hydra.hull.ac.uk/resources/hull:3484.
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VAZ, RAFAEL DE OLIVEIRA. "CAUSATION, IDENTITY AND SUPERVENIENCE IN THE CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY OF MIND." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2006. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=9108@1.
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PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIROProcurando formular o conceito de mente, a Filosofia da Mente se baseou em três noções fundamentais: causação, identidade e superveniência. A crença na dicotomia entre aspectos físicos e aspectos inextensos de nossa experiência permanece um problema de considerável dificuldade. A possibilidade de diálogo tanto em uma teoria monista quanto dualista é dificultada porque cada abordagem demanda por um princípio, uma relação ou operação que solucione o problema da ligação entre corpo, mente e mundo. Noções subseqüentes, como intencionalidade, consciência ou qualia, permanecerão fechadas em seus próprios escopos conceituais. Por este motivo, analisar como cada noção fundamental é empregada auxilia na compreensão de restrições e avanços, permitindo desde a definição dos métodos apropriados de tratamento aos problemas de cada domínio às teorias que melhor se adequarão às suas possíveis resoluções.
Trying to formulate the concept of mind, the Philosophy of the Mind has based itself on three fundamental notions: causation, identity and supervenience. The belief in the dichotomy between physical aspects and inextense aspects of our experience remains a problem of considerable difficulty. The possibility of dialogue as much in a dualist as in a monist theory is hardened because each boarding demands for a principle, a relation or operation to solve the problem of linking body, mind and world. Subsequent notions, as intentionality, consciousness or qualia, will remain closed in its proper conceptual scopes. For this reason, to analyze as each fundamental notion is used assists in the understanding of restrictions and advances, allowing since the definition of appropriate methods of treatment to the problems of each domain to the theories that will suit better to its possible resolutions.
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Botchkina, Ekaterin. "Issues in objectivity and mind-dependence." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/107329.
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Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2016.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 90-93).
Reality and objectivity are often characterized in terms of independence from the mind: the first-pass idea is that what it takes for any particular subject matter to be real and objective is for facts about it to obtain independently of beliefs, linguistic practices, conceptual schemes, and so on. But if we take seriously the possibility that significant realms of reality, including social kinds, judgment-dependent properties, and mental phenomena themselves, stand in various dependence relations to the mental, then this first-pass characterization needs to be significantly revised. In this set of papers, I consider the special questions that metaphysically mind-dependent entities raise for issues of objectivity and realism. In Part 1, 1 substantiate the notion of metaphysical mind-dependence with a taxonomy of the various ways in which entities can stand in metaphysical relations of dependence to mental phenomena. In Part II, I address the question of realism and mind-dependence: I argue that while certain entities stand in relations of significant, direct, and essential dependence on mental activity, they are nevertheless fully real. In making the argument, I elaborate a distinction between enactive and essential dependence on mental phenomena, arguing that both kinds of dependence may obtain without impinging on an entity's reality. In Part III, I address the question of objectivity and mind-dependence: I argue that certain kinds of mind-dependence, in particular, dependence on judgments, have the effect of undermining the objectivity of the relevant domain. One consequence of the view I develop is that the objectivity of a subject matter can come apart from the reality of its associated entities; another is that objectivity is a feature that is relative, rather than absolute, and depends crucially on which perspectives are brought to bear for the purposes of evaluation.
by Ekaterina Botchkina.
Ph. D.
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Pearlberg, Daniel. "Causation, Mechanism and Mind." The Ohio State University, 2015. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1430829433.
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Elton, Matthew. "Presence of mind : a study of consciousness." Thesis, University of Sussex, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.282591.
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DeWitt, Richard. "Vagueness, logic and the computational view of mind /." The Ohio State University, 1988. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1487588939086918.
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O'Neal, Mikayla L. "The Numerous Forms of Occam’s Razor and their Effect on Philosophy of Mind." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2016. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1379.
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In the first chapter of this paper I focus on the general overview of Occam's Razor, and develop several interpretations and adaptations of Occam's Razor as a principle of simplicity. In the second chapter I apply these different interpretations in the Physicalism/Dualism debate, and critically assess the validity of these implementations of Occam's Razor in philosophy of mind. In the final chapter I give an overview of my discussion thus far, and make assertions about what my paper means for the usage of Occam's Razor's as a whole.
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Kelly, Sean D. "The relevance of phenomenology to the philosophy of language and mind /." New York : Garland, 2001. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb37646436r.
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Kim, Byoungjae. "Sympathy and reflection in Hume's philosophy : mind, morals, art and politics." Thesis, Durham University, 2018. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/12958/.
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Hume, as an "anatomist" of human nature, believes that "the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences". The naturalistic and experimental analysis of human nature, as it informs his epistemology, is the basis for other areas. Thus, in order fully to understand his philosophy, we need to shed light on the connection between Hume's experimental analysis of human nature in epistemology, and his naturalistic account in ethics, aesthetics, and political philosophy. However, too often, writers on the latter are not always fully informed on his general philosophy and vice versa. A principal aim of this research is to bring together investigation of his naturalistic epistemology, and his ethics, aesthetics and political philosophy. This project brings close attention to bear on all of these areas, focusing on three key concepts: sympathy, general rule, and reflection. First, I examine the nature of sympathy. I argue against recent interpreters who use his concept of sympathy to construct a solution to the Problem of Other Minds. On my interpretation, Hume employs the concept of sympathy for his ethics, aesthetics and political philosophy, not for his epistemology. Second, I show that the concept of general rule plays an essential role in his philosophy. On my interpretation, Hume first establishes the general rules of human nature. He then establishes the general rules of his ethics, aesthetics and political philosophy. Third, I uncover the role of reflection in his philosophy. According to him, it is wrong to apply abstract reasoning to matters of fact; Instead, we should adopt the experimental reasoning that he terms "reflection" to observe and generalise matters of fact, thus establishing general rules in ethics, aesthetics and political philosophy. In this way, we can see the intimate connections between these diverse aspects of his philosophical writings.
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Steward, Helen. "Events, states and processes : the otology of mind." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.334885.
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Seok, Bongrae. "Modularity of mind, encapsulation by nature." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/289140.
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Since the time of Plato and Aristotle, philosophers have studied functional structure of human mind. So called 'faculty psychology' is the study of innate structure of human cognition. However, it is Gall's theory of faculties that started the study of domain specific and autonomous units of human mind. This dissertation discusses modularity of mind, i.e., the idea that mind consists of such domain specific and autonomous units, i.e., cognitive modules. In the first of the dissertation, I discuss faculty psychology as a historical precursor of modularity and recent theories of modularity that are developed to capture different aspects of a cognitive system. In the second part of the dissertation, I discuss Fodorian modularity, a comprehensive and well developed theory of modularity. Two problems of Fodorian modularity are discussed. First, Fodorian modularity is problematic because it has a problematic element, i.e., neural specificity. Fodor explains informational encapsulation of a cognitive system in terms of specific neural structure of the system. However, I argue that neural specificity is not fully demonstrated in psychology. Second, Fodorian modularity is an internally specified property of a cognitive system. Modularity, however, can be understood as an external property, a property that is specified by a cognitive system's relation to other objects and properties in the world.
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Kallerstrup, Jesper. "On having meaning in mind." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/12911.
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There have traditionally been two views as to what makes it the case that a singular term has the prepositional content that it does. According to Descriptivism, the content of a term is descriptive since it is given by a cluster of descriptive properties commonly associated with it. According to Referentialism, the content of a term is singular since it is determined by the object it picks out. It follows that empty terms can have descriptive, but not singular, content. If narrow content is what intrinsic duplicates have in common, then descriptive content is arguably narrow. Singular content, however, is wide since intrinsic duplicates who inhabit different environments express different singular contents by the same terms. On the face of it, the arguments against Descriptivism and Semantic Internalism - the view that content is narrow - seem convincing, but a worry persists, namely how to reconcile Semantic Externalism - the view that content is wide - with the kind of Privileged Access speakers enjoy with respect to the contents of their occurrent attitudes. By thorough examination of those arguments I find space for an intermediate position. What we learn is not that reference cannot go by properties, but rather which properties mediate reference. Kripke's Modal Argument proves that we need rigidified descriptive properties, Putnam's Twin Earth Argument shows that we better include causal properties, and Burge's Arthritis Argument highlights that we frequently invoke properties involving reference to other speakers. What is more, considerations about the behaviour of singular terms in intentional contexts strongly suggest that their propositional contents cannot be exhausted by their referents. By deploying so-called Two-Dimensionalism, as developed by Stalnaker, Kaplan, Evans, Davies, and others, I argue that singular content is knowable only after relevant empirical information about the actual world is in, and so is not subject to Privileged Access. Descriptive content, however, is a priori knowable since it is independent of which possible world is actual. But if that is so, then descriptive content constrained by rigidity, causality and other-dependence must also be a priori. All it takes is knowledge of how to describe various thought experiments. Although the latter kind of content is not object-dependent, as is singular content, it is wide in that it fails to be shared by duplicates who are embedded in distinct physical or social environments. So, we should expect compatibility between Semantic Externalism and Privileged Access only if Rigidified Causal Descriptivism is adopted.
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Heinzel, Alexander. "Gibt es eine Erklärungslücke beim emotionalen Erleben? philosophische und empirische Argumente /." [S.l. : s.n.], 2002. http://deposit.ddb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?idn=965622797.
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Arico, Adam J. "The New Folk Psychology." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/293642.
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How do we recognize that someone is thinking that the train is running late, desiring another cookie, or intending to make coffee? What is the cognitive process by which we come to attribute to another individual the belief, for instance, that Barack Obama is President? For the past few decades, philosophers working on Folk Psychology--i.e., those involved in the study of how people typically form judgments about others’ mental states--have focused largely on questions involving everyday attributions of mentality in terms of intentional states, like beliefs and desires. What I dub ‘the New Folk Psychology’ expands on this tradition to include everyday attributions of phenomenal consciousness (i.e., feelings and experiences). How, that is, do we come to recognize something as being capable of and having phenomenal states, like feeling happy or experience pleasure? The project is organized around three core topics. The first component attempts to identify the process underlying everyday attributions of consciousness. This task is carried out with an eye towards addressing issues in the current folk psychology of consciousness debate, such as whether ordinary psychology incorporates something like the philosopher’s distinction between intentionality and phenomenology. My work (Arico 2010, Arico, et al. 2011) advocates a model of mind-attribution called the Agency Model. According to this model, whenever we represent an entity as having certain properties (for example, facial features), we automatically categorize that thing as an AGENT. This AGENT-categorization then activates a cascade of behavioral dispositions, including the disposition to attribute both intentionality and phenomenology. The second component concerns ways that the process underlying everyday attributions of consciousness might be related to psychological process involved in moral perception. My work to date has focused largely on the question of how it is that we come to see an entity as a moral being, as something that deserves moral consideration and/or is subject to moral evaluation. I argue that existing accounts of such moral perception are based on problematic experimental data (Arico, forthcoming). I then propose an amended Agency Model (Arico, under review), according to which seeing an entity as a moral being--like attributing it consciousness--is a consequence of categorizing that thing as an AGENT. I then utilize this cognitive picture in an attempt to explain the enduring normative ethical debate over which kind of mental capacity most fundamentally grounds moral standing.
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White, Benjamin G. "Mind-Body Dualism and Mental Causation." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2016. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/390365.
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PhilosophyPh.D.
The Exclusion Argument for physicalism maintains that since every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause, and cases of causal overdetermination (wherein a single effect has more than one sufficient cause) are rare, it follows that if minds cause physical effects as frequently as they seem to, then minds must themselves be physical in nature. I contend that the Exclusion Argument fails to justify the rejection of interactionist dualism (the view that the mind is non-physical but causes physical effects). In support of this contention, I argue that the multiple realizability of mental properties and the phenomenal and intentional features of mental events give us reason to believe that mental properties and their instances are non-physical. I also maintain (a) that depending on how overdetermination is defined, the thesis that causal overdetermination is rare is either dubious or else consistent with interactionist dualism and the claim that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause, and (b) that the claim that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause is not clearly supported by current science. The premises of the Exclusion Argument are therefore too weak to justify the view that minds must be physical in order to cause physical effects as frequently as they seem to.
Temple University--Theses
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Nam, Sai Lok. "The conception of "heart-mind" in the Zhuangzi /." View abstract or full-text, 2009. http://library.ust.hk/cgi/db/thesis.pl?HUMA%202009%20NAM.
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Walker, Ruth Marianne Donovan. "The religious mind: An evolutionary argument for theological non-realism." Thesis, University of Auckland, 2004. http://wwwlib.umi.com/dissertations/fullcit/3135504.
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The debate between theological realists and non-realists has so far resisted resolution. In this thesis I apply the insights of current best theory in evolutionary psychology to the problem of deciding between theological realism, which holds that religious beliefs are about some aspect of mind-independent reality, and theological non-realism, which holds that religious beliefs are mind-dependent only. The most well-known exponent of theological non-realism is Don Cupitt who bases his approach to the problem on a combination of biological naturalism and culturalism. In the first part of this thesis I show that biological naturalism and culturalism are incompatible and that culturalism should be rejected in favor of biological naturalism. Cupitt's biological naturalism is the forerunner of an evolutionary psychological approach to religious beliefs that holds great promise for determining their correct interpretation. In the second part of this thesis I critically examine the foundations of evolutionary psychology and its subsequent development into an approach to religious belief in particular. Current evolutionary theories of culture, including religious belief, use Meme theory, which seems, on the face of it, to be a theory analogous to that of natural selection. I show that the memetic approach to religious belief is mistaken but that there is a sound alternative in the work of Pascal Boyer. Boyer draws on evolutionary psychology, anthropology and cognitive science to develop an account of the origin in the mind of religious beliefs and their spread through the population. My evolutionary argument is that religious beliefs are the result of the current but not proper function of cognitive modules. Only if beliefs are the result of the proper function of cognitive modules are we justified in holding them to be about some aspect of mind-independent reality. Theological realism is blocked because all versions of realism in the literature depend to some degree on the fact of religious experience, which is covered by the evolutionary argument. Theological non-realism is supported, in principle, by the evolutionary argument but, in practice, is not a genuine alternative to realism because religious beliefs are automatically given a realist interpretation that competes with explicit nonrealist interpretations.Subscription resource available via Digital Dissertations only.
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LOCKWOOD, KIMBERLY MOSHER. "METAPHOR, MUSIC AND MIND: UNDERSTANDING METAPHOR AND ITS COGNITIVE EFFECT." University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2005. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1116947187.
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Chavez-Arvizo, Enrique. "Descartes on the substantial union of mind and body." Thesis, University of Reading, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.240306.
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Ross, Amber. "Inconceivable Minds." Thesis, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2013. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3562947.
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The current debate over the metaphysical nature of the mind is dominated by two major philosophical views: property dualism and physicalism. According to property dualism, mental properties are of metaphysically distinct types. There are "phenomenal properties", or "qualia", the properties that constitute conscious experience, and there are the cognitive or functional properties of the mind. According to physicalism, there is one metaphysical type of mental property, though there may be a deep conceptual divide between experience and cognition.
I challenge both these assumptions. Focusing on two of the most popular anti-physicalist arguments—the Conceivability Argument and the Knowledge Argument—I argue that the property dualist's account of the relationship between consciousness and behavior—the "explanatory irrelevance" of consciousness to sufficient explanations our behavior and how we make judgment about our conscious experience—make the first argument untenable and the second irrelevant to the metaphysical debate.
I also present a case against a physicalist conceptual separation between cognition and consciousness by challenging the "Phenomenal Concept Strategy", the most popular argument supporting such a separation. This conceptual separation supposedly allows us to conceive of "philosophical zombies", creature physically identical to human beings but who lack conscious experience. The phenomenal concept strategy aims to explain how we can conceive of zombies while maintaining a physicalist account of the metaphysics of mind.
For this strategy to succeed, the physicalist must show that we share our epistemic situation regarding consciousness with our "zombie-twins". Zombies make claims about their own phenomenal experience, just as we do, but by definition they have none. I examine the most common physicalist interpretation of the zombies' beliefs about their own conscious experiences and show that this leads to the creation of "inconceivable minds"—creatures whose mental features would be incompatible with the very interpretation of zombie "phenomenal" belief on which this strategy is based.
My dissertation has two overarching goals. First, to undermine the plausibility of the two most popular arguments for property dualism, and second, to force physicalists to reconsider both the phenomenal concept strategy and their commitment to the genuine conceivability of zombies.
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Harbecke, Jens. "Mental causation : investigating the mind's powers in a natural world /." Frankfurt, M. [i.e.] Heusenstamm ;Paris ;Ebikon ;Lancaster ;New Brunswick, NJ : Ontos-Verl, 2008. http://d-nb.info/988122790/04.
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Thrower, Michael F. A. "The Hegelian objective mind in education." Thesis, University of Sussex, 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.285133.
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De, Gaynesford R. M. "First-personal thinking : an essay in the philosophy of mind and language." Thesis, University of Reading, 1997. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.387773.
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Turski, W. George. "Towards a rationality of emotions: An essay in the philosophy of mind." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/5634.
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The recent reemergence of theories that emphasize the semantic and conceptual aspects of emotions has also brought to attention questions about their rationality. There are essentially two standard senses in which emotions can be assessed for their rationality. First, emotions can be said to be categorically rational (i.e., not intrinsically a-rational) insofar as they presuppose our psychological capacities to be clearly conscious of distinctions, to engage and manipulate concepts, and hence to provide intentional (in the technical sense) descriptions as reasons for what we feel and are moved to do. For this "cognitive" rationality we can apply the usual standards intrinsic to the processes of belief formation such as coherence, consistency, inferential validity, and appropriateness of evidence. Secondly, and derivatively of "rationality" as a teleological or strategic notion, emotions can be thought of as rational or irrational depending upon their function (i.e., their success or lack of it) in fulfilling certain specified human purposes. While neither adhering to nor dismissing what these two mainstream perspectives afford, the following thesis is an alternative, yet complementary, project. Its aim is to "rationalize" emotions through insights obtained in programmatic examinations of their relationship to a number of critical features of being human: intentionality, expression and language, sense of self, responsibility, self-deception, and value cognition and moral agency. The idea is less to fit emotions within some formulaic description of rationality and more to let its potential definition emerge subsequently to these investigations. This reflects a conviction that rationality is not a unitary property of our minds but a complex stance towards the world. It also exhibits an awareness that, as evidenced by current debates, "rationality" is very much a contested notion.
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Beach, Francesca Karin. "Higher-Order Thought and Borderline Cases of Consciousness: An Objection to HOT." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2019. https://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/1391.
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David Rosenthal, in his Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, argues that it is a higher-order thought to the effect that the subject is in a conscious state that makes one conscious of his or her own mental states. In this paper, I argue that since phenomenal consciousness can be vague and Rosenthal’s HOT cannot, HOT is not a necessary condition of phenomenal consciousness. I use primarily Ned Blocks’ refrigerator hum case and Sartre’s example of non-positional awareness to argue that the threshold which determines the degree of first-person awareness necessary for a mental state to be conscious is vague itself, therefore consciousness is a vague concept. HOT cannot accommodate for borderline cases of phenomenal consciousness, therefore it cannot be a necessary condition of all conscious mental states. This is especially relevant in the discussion of non-human animal consciousness, as HOT theories such as Carruthers have been used to deny non-human animal consciousness on the basis of the on/off feature of such representational theories.