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Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Philosophic Life'
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1
Morgan, Alastair. "'Life does not live' : experience and life in the philosophies of Theodor W. Adorno and Giorgio Agamben." Thesis, Middlesex University, 2005. http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/11151/.
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This thesis provides a critical examination of the concepts of experience and life in the work of Theodor W. Adorno and Giorgio Agamben. The shared context of their thought consists in an examination of damaged life which reaches its apotheosis in "Auschwitz", an account of the destruction of experience in modernity, and an emphasis that the path to a form of life beyond damaged life can only be constructed immanently, through damaged life itself. The philosophical problem that this thesis addresses is the question of the possibility of a life beyond damaged life. Given the destruction of experience encapsulated in an idea of a life that does not live, how can a critical subjectivity found the possibility of a path beyond such a reified context ? Both Agamben and Adorno delineate such a path through a dissolution of subjectivity which can open itself to the possibility of a different experience of life. It is argued that Adorno's concept of negative dialectics gives the grounding for the possibility of a critical subjectivity that can found itself within its own dissolution through an experience of possibility produced by a deepening of the contradictions of damaged life. The first two chapters critically examine the accounts of bare life and damaged life through Adorno and Agamben's writings on Auschwitz and life as survival.C hapterst hree and four clarify the philosophical antecedents to the concept of life in Adorno's work and argue that a path beyond damaged life cannot be configured in terms of a re-enchantment of nature. Chapter five provides a bridge in the thesis between the analysis of concepts of life and experience, through a critical examination of the account of the decay of experience given in Agamben and Adorno's work. It is argued that both their accounts are too undifferentiated, as they miss the possibilities that arise in the decay of experience. However, Adorno's emphasis on dialectical experience rather than an authoritative concept of experience, gives his philosophy a resource with which to think the possibility of another form of life, even amidst the destruction of experience. In the final three chapters, I reconstruct three central and related concepts of experience beyond damaged life that Adorno outlines throughout his work; a concept of interpretation, a concept of a negative redemptive breakthrough, and finally the metaphysical experience of reconciliation. These experiences relate to a concept of life in terms of an embodied thought, but not as an experience of a naturalistic, unchangeable ground. The possibility of an experience of life remains in the experience of a dissolution of subjectivity that does not turn into total destruction.
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McConnell, Sean Lachlan. "Philosophical life in Cicero's letters." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.609113.
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Crothers, Galina I. "Heinrich Neuhaus : Life, philosophy and pedagogy." Thesis, Birmingham City University, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.526936.
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Bouchard, Gregory. "The philosophical publishing life of David Hume." Thesis, McGill University, 2014. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=121271.
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This dissertation undertakes a study of David Hume's philosophical publishing life with the intention of delineating his complex and inadequately understood intellectual output and asserting the cultural importance of his work after his first book, A Treatise of Human Nature. It uses a broad definition of the word "philosophical publication," taking into account Hume's books as well as his works in periodicals and newspapers and his contributions to convivial gatherings. It follows Hume's critical examination of his publishing style after the commercial and critical failure of the Treatise, showing how he developed a nuanced theory of how philosophical publications functioned in a large and open print marketplace. This hinged on striking a balance between popular and academical forms of writing, which were apt for polite and rigorous types of philosophy, respectively. Working without a university position or other traditional forms of patronage, he manipulated publishing conventions in the print marketplace in an attempt to create a medium for conveying a novel and complex system of philosophy in a language and format that appealed to a large readership. This entailed exerting a high degree of control over the printing and marketing of his books. This study treats his collection Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects as the culmination of this process, examining the ways in which Hume, in conjunction with his printers and booksellers, fashioned it as both a commodity and an intellectual work with the hope that it would sell widely and gain philosophical assent. The significance of his philosophical publishing life is assessed, revealing great success on the commercial print market, mixed success at gaining philosophical assent, and deep significance in the cultural sphere of Scottish Enlightenment literati. This study argues that even though Hume produced a work of philosophy that was widely purchased, his ambitions of effecting philosophical revolution were not achieved, and scope of his influence is more accurately observed in his critique of philosophical writing and his effect on Scottish Enlightenment literary culture. At the conclusion are included a critical bibliography of Hume's philosophical works and a list of questions debated in the Edinburgh Select Society.<br>Cette thèse examine les publications philosophiques de David Hume, dans l'intention de délinéer ses productions intellectuelles complexes et insuffisamment comprises, tout en affirmant l'importance culturelle de son œuvre après l'apparition de son premier livre « Traité de la nature humaine ». Dans cette dissertation, on utilise une définition assez vaste du terme « publications philosophiques». On prend en compte ses livres ainsi que ses périodiques, ses journaux et ses contributions aux réunions conviviales. On examine Hume et son analyse de son propre méthode de publication à la suite de l'échec commercial et critique de la «Traité». On démontre comment il a développé une théorie nuancé sur la fonctionnement des publications philosophiques dans un marché vaste et ouvert pour les livres. Selon Hume, ceci dépend de l'équilibre entre les formes populaire et académique de l'écriture, ce qui étaient respectivement appropriés pour la philosophie « polie » et rigoureuse. Travaillant sans aucun poste universitaire ou d'autre forme de parrainage, il a manipulé les conventions du marché d'imprimerie, dans une tentative de créer le moyen de communiquer son nouvel et complexe système de philosophie sous une forme qui attirerait un plus grand public. Ceci a nécessité du contrôle sur l'imprimerie et la mise en marché des œuvres. Dans cette étude, sa collection « Essais et traités sur plusieurs sujets » figure comme la culmination du processus sous mentionné; l'on examine comment cette collection était à la fois un produit et une œuvre intellectuelle pour Hume en conjonction avec ses imprimeurs et vendeurs, dans l'espoir que l'œuvre gagnerait un succès commercial et philosophique avec un grand importance dans le milieu culturel des lettrés de « Lumières Écossaises ». Bien que Hume ait produit une œuvre philosophique populaire, cette étude maintient qu'il n'a pas réussi d'atteindre son but de révolution philosophique et que son influence est plutôt marquée par son critique de l'écriture philosophique et par son effet sur la culture littéraire des « Lumières Écossaises ». La conclusion de la dissertation inclut une bibliographie analytique de son œuvre philosophique et une liste de questions discutées dans la « Société selecte d'Édimbourg ».
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Avalon, Jillian. "Life and Death: Spiritual Philosophy in Anna Karenina." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2013. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/772.
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This paper examines the structure, title, epigraph, and spiritual philosophy of Leo Tolstoy’s great novel, Anna Karenina. The intricate structure of the novel can leave more questions than it answers, and as the novel was written at such a critical, complex time of Tolstoy’s life, the ideas the characters struggle with in Anna Karenina are of both daily and cosmic importance. Considering influences and criticism of the novel, the method of Tolstoy’s vision of living well as shown in Anna Karenina leads to a very specific and intricate spiritual philosophy. It is also found that the novel’s structure and title are in conflict.
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Monteagudo, Valdez Cecilia. "Life-World' in Hans-Georg Gadamer's Hermeneutic Philosophy." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2013. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/112996.
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This paper examines the presence of the Husserlian operative concept of the lifeworldin Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutic philosophy. It is suggested that, regardless of Gadamer·s criticisms to the method and the foundational project of phenomenology, it is possible to highlight in his interpretation of Husserl's work relevant shared aspects for the clarification of his own position. These are concerned with the struggle against objectivism and its alienating effects against cultural and social praxis, as well as the rehabilitation of a pre-reflective space previous to logic and scientific research, which are regarded by both authors as the ground where all cultural products are rooted.<br>El artículo que presentamos se propone examinar la presencia operativa del concepto husserliana de mundo de la vida en la filosofía hermenéutica de Hans-Georg Gadamer, dentro del marco general de su recepción crítica de la filosofía de Edmund Husserl. Consideramos que, pese a las reservas críticas que tiene Gadamer respecto del método y el proyecto fundacional de la fénomenología, es posible destacar en la lectura que éste hace de laobra de Husserl puntos de encuentro de relevancia para la aclaración de sus propios planteamientos, referidos fundamentalmente a la lucha contra el objetivismo y sus efectos alienantes sobre la praxis social y cultural, así como a la rehabilitación de un ámbito pre-reflexivo previo a lógica de la investigación científica, considerado por ambos autores como el suelo donde estarían enraizadas todas las producciones culturales.
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Giglioni, Guido. "The genesis of Francis Glisson's philosophy of life." Available to US Hopkins community, 2002.
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James, Laurence A. "The meaningfulness of life." Related electronic resource:, 2007. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1342734071&sid=2&Fmt=2&clientId=3739&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
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Honenberger, Phillip. "Mediating Life: Animality, Artifactuality, and the Distinctiveness of the Human in the Philosophical Anthropologies of Scheler, Plessner, Gehlen, and Mead." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2013. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/214772.
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Philosophy<br>Ph.D.<br>What is a human being? In the early 20th century, the "philosophical anthropologists" Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner, and Arnold Gehlen approached this question through a comparison between human and non-human organisms' species-typical interaction with environments and an account of the conditions of the emergence of "higher" cognitive and agentive functions on this basis. In this text I offer a critical review of the central arguments of Scheler, Plessner, and Gehlen on these issues, as well as of their debates with figures such as Jakob von Uexküll, Martin Heidegger, and G. H. Mead. I take note of the consequences of various answers to this question for the interpretation of human beings' dually biological and cultural status and for the theory of the human self or person. I argue that the approaches of Plessner and Gehlen, despite objections raised by Hans Joas and others, have important advantages over those of Scheler, Uexküll, Heidegger, and Mead, as well as over recent suggestions by Korsgaard and Tomasello. I conclude by outlining a reconstructed philosophical anthropology that supports a new perspective on the question of human distinctiveness and on a number of related questions in the context of contemporary debates.<br>Temple University--Theses
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Bigé, Romain. "Le partage du mouvement : une philosophie des gestes avec le contact improvisation." Thesis, Paris Sciences et Lettres (ComUE), 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017PSLEE083.
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Comment les êtres, humains ou plus-qu’humains, en viennent-ils à partager leurs mouvements ? Qu’est-ce qui exauce, soutient ou empêche la confluence de leurs gestes ? Ces questions sont des questions métaphysiques (question de la comobilité des êtres), anthropologiques (question du vivre-ensemble) ou biologiques (question de la symbiose) : pour y répondre, il est de bonne méthode de lire des philosophes, des anthropologues, des biologistes. Nous avons décidé de les adresser à une pratique chorégraphique : le Contact Improvisation, une forme de danse initiée par le chorégraphe américain Steve Paxton en 1972, et où danseurs et danseuses se sautent les un-es sur les autres, entrent en contact les un-es avec les autres, roulent par terre et tombent dans les airs, considérant que la philosophie avait tout intérêt à reconnaître que danseurs et danseuses non seulement savent bouger ensemble, mais, plus important, savent s’apprendre et penser la manière dont ils bougent ensemble<br>How do human and more-than-human beings come to share movements? What supports, hinders or ignites the confluence of their gestures? These questions are metaphysical (how do things coexist?), anthropological (how to live together?), and biological (how do we merge and exist symbiotically?): to answer them, our anthropo-phenomenological “philosophy of gestures” offers a reading of contemporary philosophers, anthropologists and biologists. But next to those field specialists, the investigations also led us to ask our questions to dancers and to a dance practice—Contact Improvisation, a movement form that was initiated by North American choreographer in 1972, where dancers jump at each other, enter in contact, roll on the ground and fall in the air. Our hypothesis was simple: we are in urgent need to renew our understanding of movement and specifically of our ways of moving together (with other, humans or more-than-humans), who better than dancers to lead the inquiry with?
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Lester, Stuart. "Bringing play to life and life to play : different lines of enquiry." Thesis, University of Gloucestershire, 2016. http://eprints.glos.ac.uk/4328/.
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This doctoral submission draws on a range of published material to pursue meandering lines of enquiry into the study of children’s play. At its heart is a claim that playing is quintessentially the process of life going on in an affirmative manner (Lester, 2015a); not merely an outcome or activity but the grounding of life itself, a force productive of creative novelty that precedes its classification. In developing this account, the writings of Gilles Deleuze, including collaborations with Felix Guattari, and contemporary iterations of what might be termed ‘new materialisms’, take centre stage. it is a geo-philosophical quest that seeks to overcome the individualisation of life and its accompanying categorisation of playing as a subordinate state, something that can only be tolerated if it contributes to furthering the progress of a subject. The intention here is to go beyond such value, to re-position playing alongside life itself and by doing so to question the ways in which childhood, adulthood and space are constructed and practised. This it is not merely carried out at a level of abstraction: true to Deleuzian process philosophy this thesis is not concerned with the meaning of play but questions how does it work and how might it be worked differently? In response, it develops an ‘exemplary method’ (Massumi, 2002, p. 17) by drawing on a series of singular examples from playwork practice, everyday life, research projects and more remote sources. These are designed to be generative and bring forth new concepts rather than reducing things to more of the same. Above all it is an ethico-political manoeuvre, a tentative and modest experiment in (re)thinking and thinking anew what constitutes a ‘good life’ and how we might increase capacities to create a more just and equitable world.
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REIS, VANESSA FLORENTINO MARCONDES DOS. "EXPLORATORY PRACTICE AS A PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE: A CASE STUDY." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2012. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=21851@1.
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PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO<br>Motivada pelos relatos da professora Walewska Braga e de seus alunos nos
encontros do grupo da Prática Exploratória, decidi aprofundar meu entendimento
sobre as ideias centrais da Prática Exploratória (Allwright e Hanks, 2009) e sobre
como a professora consegue usar seus princípios e proposições para nortear sua
vida profissional e pessoal. Para isso, foram realizados dois encontros com a
professora Walewska: primeiro uma entrevista, transcrita e lida por ambas as
participantes, e após uma conversa sobre a entrevista anterior, que também foi
transcrita. Houve também a participação da autora desta dissertação em aulas
ministradas pela professora, com a co-construção de um diário dessas aulas, e
trocas de e-mails entre ambas durante esse período. A microanálise de trechos
selecionados da entrevista e da conversa foi realizada com base (a) no modelo de
tomada de turnos de Sacks, Schegloff e Jefferson (1974), (b) no conceito de
sobreposições cooperativas (Tannen (2010), e (c) da análise da narrativa como
estratégia de envolvimento (Tannen, 1984); e foi complementada com a reflexão
sobre trechos selecionados dos e-mails e do diário. A análise teve como foco o
meu processo de convencimento sobre a viabilidade da Prática Exploratória, que é
uma filosofia de ensino-aprendizagem que busca estimular o pensamento críticoreflexivo,
na medida em que integra o questionamento e o trabalho pedagógico,
através de atividades pedagógicas com potencial exploratório (APPE). Nesse
processo, a Prática Exploratória integra as pessoas nesse trabalho e na criação de
espaços para refletir sobre as relações entre colegas e sobre a relação entre os alunos e o professor. Com isso, espera-se que tornem-se cada vez mais autônomos
e reflexivos, ao mesmo tempo em que continuam se desenvolvendo
linguisticamente, através de comportamentos que incentivem o pensamento crítico, ao mesmo tempo que possibilitam que o professor cumpra o conteúdo
programático estipulado pelo colégio e pelo governo. Através de uma reflexão
analítica sobre as identidades projetadas por Walewska, juntamente com a
dinâmica de tomada de turnos, sobreposições cooperativas, e análise da narrativa
como estratégia de envolvimento, aliados aos Princípios e Proposições da Prática
Exploratória, busquei melhor compreender a sala de aula exploratória de
Walewska Braga, e como essa professora incorporava a Prática Exploratória em
todos os aspectos da sua vida em sala de aula e fora dela. A minha busca por um
melhor entendimento da Prática Exploratória como um modo de viver as
experiências do cotidiano, como uma filosofia de vida, resultou no presente
trabalho, que também se constituiu na realização de uma Atividade Pedagógica de
Potencial Exploratório.<br>Motivated by the various accounts given by teacher Walewska Braga and
her students in the meetings of the Exploratory Practice group, I decided to
deepen my understanding about the main ideas of Exploratory Practice (Allwright
and Hanks, 2009) and about how this teacher manages to use its Principles and
Propositions as guidance for her personal professional life. For that purpose, two
meetings were held: first an interview, transcribed and read by both participants,
and afterwards a conversation about the previous interview, which was also
transcribed. The author of this dissertation participated in classes given by the
teacher, wrote a journal of these classes, and exchanged e-mails with the teacher
during this period. The micro analysis of the selected passages of the interview
was done based on (a) the turn-taking model proposed by Sacks, Schegloff e
Jefferson (1974), (b) the concept of cooperative overlap (Tannen, 2010), and (c)
the analysis of narrative as involvement strategies (Tannen, 1984); and was
complemented with my reflection over excerpts selected from the e-mails and the
journal. The focus of the analysis was my process of gradual understanding and
growing conviction about the viability of the Exploratory Practice, which is a
teaching-learning philosophy that aims to stimulate critical-reflexive participation
by integrating questioning and pedagogic work, through Potentially Exploitable
Pedagogical Activities (PEPAs). In this process, Exploratory Practice integrates
people in this work and in the creation of opportunities to reflect about the
relationships between teacher and students as co-practitioners. With Exploratory
Practice, teachers and students are expected to become increasingly more
independent and reflexive, as they continue to develop linguistically, through
actions that prompt critical thinking, while enabling the teacher to carry out the
curriculum designed by the school or the government. Through an analytical reflection about the identities projected by Walewska Braga, together with the
dynamics of turn-taking, cooperative overlap and the analysis of narratives as
involvement strategies, together with the Principles and Propositions of the
Exploratory Practice, I looked for a better comprehension of Walewska’s
exploratory classroom, and how she incorporated Exploratory Practice in all
aspects of her life in and outside school. My search for a better understanding of
Exploratory Practice as a way of dealing with life, as a philosophy of life, resulted
in this paper, which also turned out to be a Potentially Exploitable Pedagogical Activity.
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McLaughlin, Paul E. "Raymond Crisara, A Trumpet Life: His Pedagogy, Philosophy and Legacy." Thesis, University of North Texas, 2018. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1248521/.
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In this project I identify the pedagogical techniques, philosophy and legacy of Raymond Crisara. I examine how his pedagogical philosophy led to Crisara's personal success as a teacher and to his students' success in their performing and teaching careers. In much the same way that Ernest Williams's legacy has been passed on to his students, Crisara's legacy is now being handed down. I have examined Crisara's pedagogical concepts and philosophy through the eyes of four former students: Dr. Todd Hastings (Professor, Pittsburg State University), Billy Hunter (Principal Trumpet, Metropolitan Opera Orchestra), Dr. Gary Mortenson (Dean of the School of Music, Baylor University) and Keith Winking (Professor, Texas State University) as well as from transcripts of interviews Crisara gave. Crisara extended and modified William's pedagogy through the use of a multitude of étude methods. This modification and Crisara's experience as a leading New York freelance musician greatly influenced the teaching and success of the four subjects I interviewed. While these teachers have adopted Crisara's pedagogy and philosophy largely unchanged, I found that they modified his pedagogy slightly through the use of added teaching materials never used in Crisara's career or teaching studio.
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Burmeister, Jon Karl. "Hegel and the Language of Philosophy." Thesis, Boston College, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:104380.
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Thesis advisor: John Sallis<br>This dissertation attempts to give an account of philosophical language in Hegel, with particular emphasis on his claim that a philosophical exposition must be living and self-moving. Since Hegel did not provide an extended, thematized account of philosophical language, my primary approach is to take the resources of his thought in general and attempt to construct an account which is consistent with his philosophy as a whole. Thus, a large portion of this dissertation is not directly about philosophical language, but about other determinations such as becoming, indifference, contradiction, life, the understanding, reason, etc., which lay the groundwork for discussing philosophical language in the final chapter. As a preface to all of this, however, I devote Part I of the dissertation to an investigation of Hegel's view of how one should go about comprehending philosophical determinations, i.e., those things which are the subject matter of philosophy (e.g., the determination 'plant' but not 'poison ivy'; the determination 'art' but not 'Flemish Baroque painting'). Chapter 1 deals with his critique of the formalistic approach which attempts to comprehend things by 'applying' categories to them (e.g., applying 'thinking' and 'animal' to comprehend 'human being'). In Chapter 2 I discuss Hegel's alternate view of comprehension, describing this view in terms of the idea of 'expression': later categories in his encyclopedia are comprehended not by applying earlier ones to them, but by grasping the later ones as developmental expressions of the earlier ones. Thus, expression is not only a linguistic but also an ontological category, a point which is investigated in more concrete detail in Chapter 3 through a close reading of the statement "being and nothing are one and the same." As it turns out, this linguistic expression of being plays an essential role in being's ontological expression and development. In Part II, I explore the logical determinations of 'mechanism' and 'life' in the Science of Logic. To set the stage for this, Chapter 4 gives an account of the relation of 'indifference' (present between the 'parts' of a whole) and the relation of 'reciprocity' (present between the 'moments' of a whole). These two kinds of relations allow us in Chapter 5 to see more clearly why Hegel views the logical determination of mechanism as involving a movement of thought whose source is external to it, and the logical determination of life as involving self-movement and self-determination. To further clarify what Hegel means by calling philosophical thought 'living,' I discuss what he might mean by the word 'movement' in the Logic, along with his view of the relation between becoming, contradiction, and self-movement. In Part III I argue that, regarding the logical determinations of mechanism and life, the former finds particularly vivid expression in the operations of the understanding and its 'ordinary language' (Chapter 6), while the latter finds such expression in the operations of reason and its 'philosophical language' (Chapter 7). The faculty of the understanding, whose nature it is to have objects standing over against it (Gegenstände) and to operate according to the category of formal identity, is characterized by finitude and abstract thinking. As such, the ordinary language which it produces is characterized by these same qualities. This entails a.) that this language is incapable of expressing the interdependence of identity and difference, b.) that it thus views the copula ('is') as containing merely formal identity, and c.) that it tends to define its words in abstraction from each other. Another result of ordinary language being produced by the understanding is that it is incapable of providing a genuinely philosophical account of anything, insofar as such an account requires a level of self-reflexivity which the faculty of the understanding, in isolation, renders impossible. The faculty of reason, on the other hand, both includes the understanding (with its abstracting powers) and goes beyond it, particularly in its rejection of identity as merely formal (i.e., identity as independent of difference). Crucially, it is this rejection which allows reason to comprehend the dissolutions of the contradictory logical determinations which move thinking forward. Directed not toward 'objects' but toward its own self, the goal of reason is self-knowledge via the concrete experience of thinking through its own thinking, a 'thinking through' which is necessary and self-moving insofar as its internal contradictions propel it down one (and only one) logical path. The language of reason - philosophical language - is an essential part of this process. Philosophical language, qua language, possesses a contingent dimension, e.g., the way the words sound and the letters are shaped. But this contingency, I argue, does not compromise philosophical language's ability to mediate the non-contingent nature of philosophical thought; for, the nature of logic is that it can reach its full expression only through the determinations of spirit, and all such determinations (with the exception of philosophy itself) necessarily contain contingencies. Philosophical language belongs not to the logical sphere (i.e., the sphere which is wholly 'within itself' and thus wholly necessary), but rather to the spiritual one (i.e., the human realm). As a result, this language must possess contingent dimensions, for it is precisely its 'not-being-within-itself' which allows it to be other to the realm of logic, and thus to be its expression. In contrast to ordinary language, philosophical language is able to give expression to the interdependence of identity and difference, and to create the meaning of its words not as isolated 'parts' but rather as 'moments' which depend on the meanings of all the other words which it has generated. Because of this, philosophical language engages in a continual diaeresis (division) and synagoge (collection) of its meanings, splitting the meaning of a term into an opposed meaning which contradicts the previous one and leads to a new word with a new meaning, containing the remnants of the previous ones. This dialectical process is a living one insofar as the oppositions and contradictions which move the exposition forward are immanent to the exposition itself. Operating throughout the entire encyclopedia (Science of Logic, Philosophy of Nature, Philosophy of Spirit), the self-moving linguistic diaeresis and synagoge reaches its conclusion in the final definition, that of the term 'philosophy,' thereby bringing together in one word the living remains of the meanings of all prior determinations. Because philosophy and philosophical language constitutively determine one another, neither can be, or be comprehended, apart from the other. In Hegel's view, although one is doing philosophy from the very first words of the Science of Logic, one can only account for philosophy at the 1,500-page encyclopedia's very end; my claim is that, in the same way, although one is using philosophical language from the very beginning, one can only account for this language at the very end. Philosophical language receives its determinateness from philosophy, and vice versa. As a result, only at the encyclopedia's end can one fully comprehend what one has been doing and saying for the last 1,500 pages<br>Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2011<br>Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences<br>Discipline: Philosophy
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Nikolaeva, Liudmila Ph D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "The secret life of pronouns." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/87500.
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Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2014.<br>Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.<br>Includes bibliographical references (pages 140-145).<br>This thesis explores the relationship between anaphora and movement on a wide array of data primarily from Russian. I argue that anaphors and pronominals are underlyingly the same syntactic entity, an index, whereas conditions A and B of binding theory should be substituted by principles regulating the spell-out of an anaphoric element as a reflexive or a pronominal. Through cyclic covert movement of an index, accompanied by cyclic evaluation of its phonological form, I account for the constraints against backward anaphora, or cataphora, found in Russian, as well as subject-orientation of anaphors and anti-subject orientation of the pronominals. The proposal derives the systematic complementarity of distribution of anaphors and pronominals in some contexts, as well as systematic lack thereof in others. Finally, I explore the interaction of anaphora with overt movement, scrambling in particular. I conclude that reconstruction effects correlate with case assignment in the way predicted by Wholesale Late Merger theory. Using this conclusion, I provide an argument in favor of existence of Determiners in Russian.<br>by Liudmila Nikolaeva.<br>Ph. D.
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Pates, Rebecca. "A philosophical investigation of punishment /." Thesis, McGill University, 2002. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=82943.
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Neither currently prevalent justifications of punishment, nor a modified, contractarian version of a justification that I develop here, can be used to justify actual state punishment, even if some forms of punishment may remain legitimate. I argue in this thesis that alternative punitive practices such as developed by some Canadian aboriginal communities are more likely to conform to the criteria of punitive justice developed by standard justifications, as well as being more likely to conform to criteria developed in feminist ethics.
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Cassidy, Pierre. "Will to Power: The Philosophical Expression of Nietzsche's Love of Life." Thèse, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/19945.
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Any adequate interpretation of the concept of the will to power, given the radical break with the history of philosophy it presupposes, requires a preceding analysis of Nietzsche’s critique of the history of philosophy as a critique of metaphysics. Only once Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics is properly understood as a critique of, in the broadest sense, any correspondence conception of truth, can the philosophical concept of the will to power, as a product of that critique, be understood as well. Each of the three typical types of interpretative approaches to the will to power (i.e. as a metaphysical concept, as an empirical concept, as an object of interpretive play) will provide a critically constructive opportunity to narrow an acceptable definition of Nietzsche’s positive conception of philosophy as a distinctive and unorthodox type of history, according to which any interpretation rests, not on truths, but on its author’s prejudices or fundamental values. Moreover, using Gilles Deleuze’s largely ignored or otherwise grossly misunderstood Nietzsche et la philosophie, a non-normative, post-metaphysical justification consistent with that critique can then be provided for Nietzsche’s radical reform to the philosophical method. According to Nietzsche, philosophy as a will to power is preferable to philosophy as a will to truth because it is consistent with his profound and unjustified love of life. In fact, the will to power it is the philosophical expression of that love.
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Bradley, Stephanie. "Philosophical tensions in the liberal tradition, constraints on the good life." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp01/MQ53094.pdf.
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Spat, William. "Themes of action and life in four philosophical theories of mind." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1992. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/1728.
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The thesis makes use of the framework of action and life to consider four philosophical theories of mind, enunciated in the writings of Rene Descartes, David Hume, William James, and Thomas Nagel. Showing how each theory makes an appeal to action or life in order to attempt to provide a characterization of mind that is not too restrictive nor too lax is the concern of the extensive historical portion of the thesis. It is on the basis of the success or failure of these appeals to the mind's living experience of its own activity that the four theories are evaluated. By way of conclusion, the reprecussions of these successes and failures for the contemporary activity of philosophizing about mind are briefly examined.
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McDonald, Matthew G. "Epiphanies : an existential philosophical and psychological inquiry /." Electronic version, 2005. http://adt.lib.uts.edu.au/public/adt-NTSM20060822.141207/index.html.
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Kramer, Eli Orner. "The Principles of Philosophical Community." OpenSIUC, 2018. https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/dissertations/1552.
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There are three central orientations, or modes, forming a “tripod” as it were, that grounds philosophy as a cultural activity. The two commonly known modes are, first philosophical geniuses who make models of reality in their “solitary burrows” (such as a Kant and Peirce); and, second, philosophical wanderers who have an embodied praxis, performing wisdom wherever they travel (such as Diogenes of Sinope and Takuan Soho). There is however another primary and largely neglected mode of philosophy which is mutually reinforced ethical praxis rooting in a shared cosmopolitan place. In this dissertation, I characterize and defend the neglected mode of philosophy, that I call “philosophical community,” by describing the constellation of metaethical principles — general, axiological, cultural, and dialectical — that articulate and promote its values. My philosophical methodology is radically empirical philosophy of culture. The principles will be drawn from an interpretation of the whole of philosophical communal experience, considered diachronically, or globally and historically. These principles are then organized as a synchronic (present focused) coordinate whole. By “principle,” at the very least, I mean a hypothetical ground presupposed in successful inquiry. I take “community” in the broad, Roycean spirit of those relationships that build an increasing determinacy of meaning in the universe, (i.e. a community of interpretation). A philosophical community, then, is not reducible to a collection of people but can be thought of as made of a special kind of community of interpretation, as it shares some sort of place. Taken together, this constellation of principles can help us refine for ourselves a vision of the best of philosophical community life, which should also help us frame a new “brocard” for this mode of philosophy in the twenty-first century.
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Holmberg, Martin. "Narrative, transcendence & meaning : an essay on the question about the meaning of life /." Uppsala : Stockholm : Uppsala univ. ; Almqvist & Wiksell [distributör], 1994. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb37608567z.
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Layzelle, Luke George. "Topologies of abandon : locating life in the philosophy of Giorgio Agamben." Thesis, University of Sussex, 2017. http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/70408/.
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In the forty years separating Stanzas and the recently published final instalment of the Homo Sacer series, The Use of Bodies, Agamben has regularly turned to topological figures in pursuing his critical analyses of the biopolitical horizon of modernity. Topologies of Abandon provides the first sustained analysis of the topological orientation of Agamben's work, developing an alternative spatial genealogy of a series of key concepts and figures in Agamben's thinking. The thesis considers a series of conceptual topoi explored by Agamben and argues that his theoretical project consists of a series of interrelated investigations into the configuration of place and localisation: the ontological space of the exception, the location of the subject within language, and the place of life in contemporary configurations of power. In my analysis of each of these topologies I argue against the common conception of Agamben's work as providing a pessimistic and negative diagnosis of contemporary forms of biopolitical governance from which there exists little hope of emancipation. Paradoxically, the potentiality that marks Agamben's utopic topos of life is found in the place of an abandonment, and it is by exploring the negative and privative topologies of abandon in Agamben's work that the thesis seeks to re-orient future readings of the largely misunderstood affirmative dimension of this philosophical project. The thesis provides a comprehensive overview and analysis of Agamben's use of topological figures throughout his body of work. Considering Agamben's methodological use of paradigms, signatures, and archaeology from a topological perspective, the thesis reconsiders the relationship between the biopolitical studies of Agamben and Foucault on this basis. The project situates Agamben's topological interest within the context of a wider critical-philosophical turn to the field in the twentieth-century, showing that Agamben's work is influenced by the topological current informing philosophies of the lifeworld and the metalogical inquiries of structuralism. The thesis also reconsiders Agamben's relationship with the thought of his former teacher Heidegger in terms of the two thinkers' shared interest in a ‘topology of being'. Following the topological thread running throughout Agamben's oeuvre, I demonstrate how from his earliest works Agamben seeks to map out an affirmative topos of life that perforates the surfaces and limits of its philosophical, juridical, and political determinations.
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Brower-Latz, Andrew Phillip. "The social philosophy of Gillian Rose : speculative diremptions, absolute ethical life." Thesis, Durham University, 2015. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/11302/.
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This thesis provides an original reconstruction of Gillian Rose’s work as a distinctive social philosophy within the Frankfurt School tradition that holds together the methodological, logical, descriptive, metaphysical and normative moments of social theory; provides a critical theory of modern society; and offers distinctive versions of ideology critique based on the history of jurisprudence, and mutual recognition based on a Hegelian view of appropriation. Rose’s philosophy integrates three key moments of the Frankfurt tradition: a view of the social totality as both an epistemological necessity and normative ideal; a philosophy that is its own metaphilosophy because it integrates its own logical and social preconditions within itself; and a critical analysis of modern society that is simultaneously a critique of social theory. Rose’s work is original in the way it organises these three moments around absolute ethical life as the social totality, its Hegelian basis, and its metaphysical focus on law and jurisprudence. Rose’s Hegelian philosophy includes an account of reason that is both social and logical without reducing philosophy to the sociology of knowledge, thereby steering between dogmatism and relativism. Central to this position are the historically developing nature of rationality and knowing, and an account of the nature of explanation as depending on a necessarily and necessarily imperfectly posited totality. No totality is ever fully attained but is brought to view through the Hegelian-speculative exposition of history, dirempted experience, and the tensions immanent to social theories. Rose explored one main social totality within her social philosophy – absolute ethical life – as the implied unity of law and ethics, and of finite and infinite. This enables a critique simultaneously and immanently of society and social philosophy in three ways. First, of both the social form of bourgeois property law and social contract theories reflective of it. Second, of social theorising that insufficiently appreciates its jurisprudential determinations and/or attempts to eliminate metaphysics. Third, the broken middle shows the state-civil society and the law-ethics diremptions as two fundamental features of modern society and as frequently unacknowledged influences on social theorising.
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Leung, King-Ho. "Being, living, thinking : metaphysics and philosophy as a way of life." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2018. http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/52574/.
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This thesis examines the relationship between metaphysical theorisation and the practice of philosophy as a way of life. The thesis begins by highlighting the parallels between the Cartesian shift away from the premodern practice of philosophy as a way of life (what Foucault terms ‘the Cartesian moment’) and the ontological suspension of ‘life’ in Descartes’ influential re-conception of the soul as the principle of thinking instead of life and in his mechanistic understanding of living beings as automata. After this, it examines the works of Martin Heidegger, Heidegger’s former students Hannah Arendt and Giorgio Agamben, as well as Gilles Deleuze (and via Deleuze, Henri Bergson) and considers how the metaphysical theoretical conception of ‘being’, ‘living’ and ‘thinking’ informs and affects the practice of philosophy. The thesis concludes with a re-reading of Augustine’s philosophy of life in light of these contemporary philosophical developments. By underscoring the connections between Augustine’s metaphysical conception of God as ‘Life itself’ and his philosophical practice of introspection as notably found in his Confessions—one of the most important texts of Western metaphysics and spiritual practice, this thesis argues that metaphysical theorisation is in fact not incompatible with the premodern practice of philosophy as a way of life or spiritual exercise (as suggested by Foucault and to some extent Heidegger). Instead, Augustine’s Christian appropriation of the Platonic metaphysics of participation in light of his philosophical interpretation of the Christian doctrine of the incarnation not only shows us how speculative metaphysics can provide a powerful theoretical incentive to lead a philosophical life, but also how a ‘religious’ approach to philosophising can help recover the understanding of philosophy as way of life and furthermore reconcile the supposed division between metaphysical theorisation and the practice of philosophy as a way of living.
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Eells, Jennifer Emilia. "Implications of writing about philosophy of life for health and mood /." free to MU campus, to others for purchase, 2003. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/mo/fullcit?p1418015.
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Polemēs, I. "Theophanes of Nicaea : his life and works." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1990. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.357764.
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Friskics, Scott. "Wilderness and Everyday Life." Thesis, University of North Texas, 2011. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc84205/.
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I challenge the dualistic view of wilderness that has influenced wilderness philosophy, politics and experience in recent years. In its place, I offer an alternative vision that recognizes wilderness areas and working landscapes as complementary elements of a larger, inhabited landscape characterized by a heterogeneous mixture of human-land relational patterns representing various points along an urban-wilderness continuum. In chapters 2 through 4, I explore the philosophical, political and experiential implications of this wilderness-in-context vision. Experienced and understood as part of the landscape we call home, wilderness may engender, renew, and sustain an engaged and integrated wilderness practice involving regular contact with wilderness places, committed activism on behalf of wild lands and their inhabitants, and grounded reflection on the meaning and value of wilderness in our everyday lives.
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Rzechorzek, Peter, and mikewood@deakin edu au. "The ways of the philosopher: What Plato dodn't say." Deakin University. School of Humanities, 1989. http://tux.lib.deakin.edu.au./adt-VDU/public/adt-VDU20051017.112729.
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Socrates' search is for direction in life, for how one should live. For him, an unexamined life is not worth living. The suggestion in this thesis is that Plato follows Socrates in asking the extremely relevant and practical question that seeks to discover the sort of life worthy of the human individual. For Plato, the answer involves the pursuit of knowledge and wisdom, it is, in short, to do philosophy. Socrates regards genuine philosophy as active and dialectical. Plato accepts the challenge of conveying this through the written word. Implicit in his dialogues is the idea that human wisdom is a fusion of the spiritual and the rational. The philosophic life is realised in practice by following the three interdependent ways of the philosopher, these are the ways of dialectics, death and love. These identify the philosophic life with a critically detached, yet passionate attitude to the world. However, this practical teaching is guided and informed by Plato's metaphysics, in particular his idea of the Good. A major task of this thesis is to show how the idea of the Good is relevant to ordinary human conduct.
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Nicholls, David John. "The phenomenology of the near-death experience : a philosophical enquiry." Thesis, University of Kent, 2000. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.327437.
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Lepadatu, Gilbert Vasile. "EARLY HEIDEGGER'S TRANSITION FROM LIFE TO BEING." UKnowledge, 2009. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/gradschool_diss/725.
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Heidegger was not always preoccupied, as he himself would later come to believe, with the question regarding the sense of being. Eight years before he published his magnum opus, Sein und Zeit, in 1927 he was totally devoted to finding a systematic way to bringing “life” as the ultimate source of meaning to explicate itself. In the years between 1919-1923, “life”, and not “being”, is the matter of philosophy par excellence, only to be disregarded, even refuted as a “proper” matter of philosophy in the subsequent years. In this paper I examine the philosophical motives that led Heidegger from life to being. The purpose of this project isto trace the emergence of the “thinking of being” in “life philosophy.” I will show that the transition from “life” to “being” is not at all as radical as Heidegger wants it to be whenever he voices his concerns about the metaphysical grounds of life philosophy. When “life” is understood in the exact terms in which Heidegger himself understands it in the years between 1919-1923 then, I argue, the transition to being is more a radicalization, and by no means an abandonment, of life philosophy. In the process of elaborating an understanding of life so fundamentally sympathetic to life that it can claim itself to be life’s own self-understanding, Heidegger comes gradually to realize the importance of life’s own way of living understandingly, the performative sense in which it [life] itself understands itself to be, for the very effort to understand life. Life is now interpreted as a way of being for which this very being, its way of being, is an issue for itself.
In the first chapter I go back to the original motives that led Heidegger to choose life, lived experience, as the proper topic of philosophy. It is here that Heidegger discovers that philosophy is ultimately about an entity that is somehow concerned with itself already in being-engaged to “something” other than itself. Intentionality is interpreted as the manner in which an entity is playing itself out, as it were, in engaging a world. In the second chapter, I follow his elaborations of this newly discovered topic, the “personal” character of experience, with a focus on the unique way in which he develops it by both rejecting the Neokantian approach to life and by critically appropriating Dilthey’s conception of lived experience. The third chapter presents Heidegger’s “insights” into life – which will remain unchanged, only put to different uses when the topic changes from life to being. The fourth chapter takes up the issue of how life is (and is itself)in being referred to its own past. Here I show how life is found to be “in need” to appropriate what it has been as the way in which it can be itself. Chapters five and six delve into the proper relation between living and philosophizing by focusing on how life is living-in-understanding. It is shown here how Heidegger elaborates, unfortunately insufficiently, his method of “formal indicators” which will enable him to interpret life as a “way of being.” Such interpretation leaves open the possibility, however, of either interpreting life as the manner in which being itself can be experienced or, as Heidegger does in the first early years, or interpreting being as the manner in which life can come to itself. Early Heidegger can only justify the former interpretation: in developing for itself a sense of being which can only be performed as a way in which life lives, life develops a genuine self-understanding.
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Coleman, Nicholas Glynn. "The spirit of the interstices : on the plastick life of nature, the spiritual life of man, and the intellectual life of God, with reference to the Cambridge Platonists, especially Ralph Cudworth." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1989. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.335024.
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Urbaniak, Jakub. "Why isn’t it like it should be? : Buddhist and Christian intuition of the wretchedness of the human condition in the life and writings of Emile Cioran." Brest, 2009. http://www.theses.fr/2009BRES1010.
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According to the main thesis which I try to prove within the framework of my analysis, the life and work of Emile Cioran constitutes a space in which the universal intuition of the wretchedness of the human condition, in the shape given to it by Buddhism and Christianity, expresses itself in a unique and unusually intensive way. The tension between the Buddhist and the Christian temptation seems constitutive of all the Romanian’s thought, and it reaches its apogee at the intersection of the Buddhist and the Christian vision of suffering. Cioran’s reflection on the situation of man “fallen into time” corresponds with the Buddhist experience of emptiness and the devilish vision of history, specific for Gnosticism; the doctrine of ignorance and desire as the sources of suffering and the conception of the original sin as the determinant of the condition of worldly man; the notion of nirvana as the extinction of suffering and the idea of the Last Judgement as settling accounts with history<br>La thèse de notre recherche pose comme objectif la démonstration que la vie et la création philosophique d’Émile Cioran sont une manifestation, unique et d’intensité extrême, de l’intuition universelle de l’infortune de la condition humaine comprise dans la forme qui lui est imposée par le bouddhisme et le christianisme. La tension entre ces traditions semble être constitutive de toute réflexion de Cioran, atteignant son apogée dans l’approche que chacun de ces systèmes fait de la question de la souffrance. L’approche cioranienne se rapporte à l’expérience bouddhiste de la vacuité ainsi qu’à une vision démoniaque de l’histoire propre au gnosticisme; à l’enseignement sur l’ignorance et le désir, considérés comme sources de la souffrance, tout aussi bien qu’au concept du péché originel, considéré comme déterminant de la condition humaine; à la notion du nirvana, compris en tant que cessation de la souffrance, ainsi qu’à l’idée du Jugement dernier en tant que récapitulation de l’histoire
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Pérez, Valérie. "(Se) gouverner selon la nature et la vérité : lire "Emile ou de l'éducation" de Jean-Jacques Rousseau avec Foucault et Deleuze." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Paris 8, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015PA080133.
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Ce travail parie sur la possibilité de reposer les problèmes éducatifs de Rous-seau à la lumière de certains concepts de la philosophie française contempo-raine. Ainsi, en partant des analyses de Foucault, l’on ne peut manquer d’être frappé par la figure du gouverneur dans Émile ou de l’éducation qui apparaît, stricto sensu, comme la condition de l’émergence de la vérité de la nature, de la vérité de ce qui convient aux hommes, de la vérité de ce que doit être leur éducation. Mais en quel sens peut-on dire que, dans l’Émile, l’éducation est une manifestation de la vérité ? Le problème de la vérité et du pouvoir est an-cien. Michel Foucault le qualifie de lieu commun depuis la pensée politique du XVIIe siècle. Dans ses cours au Collège de France publiés en 2012 sous le titre Le gouvernement des vivants, il s’est efforcé « d’élaborer la notion de gouvernement par la vérité » en étudiant notamment la tragédie d’Œdipe qui lui permet de poser le problème de la conjonction entre le pouvoir et le savoir, entre le gouvernement et la vérité que l’on sait. Le problème du gouvernement de l’enfance peut également être éclairé par le concept deleuzien de devenir. Le devenir a quelque chose à nous dire sur l’enfance, sur l’émancipation de l’individu et sur le projet d’une éducation tout au long de sa vie<br>This work is attempt to discuss Rousseau's problematisation of education, using concepts drawn from contem-porary French philosophy. However, if one examines the relation between Foucault and Emile by em-ploying the concept of alèthurgie, one cannot but be struck by the figure of the governor in Emile, who appears in the text to be the guarantor and the condition for the emergence of an idea of truth within the narrative- a truth which is natural, which governs the activities of men, and which is deeply in-volved in the process of education. In his 2012 lectures at the College de France, published under the title ‘The government of the living,’ Michel Fou-cault strove "to develop the concept of government by the truth" through an analysis of the power relations within Oedipus. In particular, Foucault ana-lysed the relation between truth, knowledge, and the exercise of governmen-tal power. In this work, I examine the relation between Foucault’s analysis and Emile Rousseau’s novel Emile. The relation between them may seem paradoxical: after all, Foucault is concerned with truth, and Emile is a work of fiction. The government of childhood can also be illuminated by the Deleuzian concept of Becoming. The Becoming does have something to tell us about childhood, the emancipation of the individual, and about education as a life-long project
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Pelletier-Hibbert, Maryse L. "Husbands living with women on dialysis: embracing their transformed life." Thesis, McGill University, 2013. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=116844.
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Husbands Living with Women on Dialysis: Embracing Their Transformed LifeThe purpose of this qualitative study was to explore the adjustment process of husbands living with women on dialysis. Using Glaser's (1978) grounded theory methodology, data were collected from 18 husbands through semi-structured face-to-face or telephone tape-recorded interviews. In using the constant comparative method of data analysis, the most central issue for these husbands was dealing with multiple changes imposed by the demands and impact of kidney failure and its treatment regimens on various dimensions of their lives. The changes impacted roles and responsibilities at home and work, social and recreational activities, finances, relationships with their spouse and others, home environment, daily routines, and future plans, as well as health and/or sleep patterns. Although the impact of these changes created many hardships for husbands, witnessing their wives' suffering was more distressing. In response, these men involved themselves in supporting their wives and engaging in the basic social process of embracing their transformed life. The four stages of embracing a transformed life are becoming aware, involving themselves, centering life on their wives, and striving to achieve balance. The marital relationship, the women's health status, as well as the presence of informal support and formal support are conditions which significantly influenced the process. The theory of embracing a transformed life provides a framework for understanding and explaining the complex interplay of strategies undertaken by these husbands to respond to, adjust to, and integrate changes in their daily and future lives. Moreover, the focus on husbands living with women on dialysis contributes towards closing an existing gap in knowledge and the findings underscore the husbands' abilities to learn and carry out complex roles, responsibilities, and routines that require sophisticated observation, decision making, and technical and problem-solving skills. The discrete stages of the theory guide nurses to better understand the various changes dialysis-caregivers may experience during different phases of the patients' illness trajectory and to implement supportive care to enhance their adjustment and sustain their efforts.Keywords: dialysis, spousal caregiver, dialysis-caregiver, adjustment, change, chronic kidney disease, end-stage renal disease.<br>Les hommes habitant avec une femme dialysée: Accepter la transformation qui s'effectue dans sa vieLe but de cette étude qualitative était d'examiner le processus d'adaptation des hommes habitant avec une femme qui subit des traitements de dialyse. Les données ont été recueillies au cours d'entretiens semi-structurés enregistrés, réalisés en personne ou au téléphone, auprès de 18 hommes mariés, conformément à la méthode de la théorie ancrée décrite par Glaser en 1978. Selon la méthode comparative constante d'analyse de données, il s'est avéré que la préoccupation centrale de ces hommes était de composer avec les multiples changements, aux différents aspects de leur vie, qu'imposaient les demandes et les répercussions de l'insuffisance rénale et du schéma thérapeutique correspondant. Les changements ont en effet une incidence sur divers aspects de leur vie, notamment les rôles et les responsabilités à la maison et au travail, les activités sociales et récréatives, la situation financière, les relations de couple et les relations amicales, l'ambiance à la maison, les activités quotidiennes, les projets futurs, la santé et la structure du sommeil. Bien que ces changements aient occasionné maintes difficultés pour ces hommes, il leur était encore plus difficile de voir leur femme souffrir. Ils se sont donc appliqués à leur apporter du soutien et à entamer le processus social fondamental qui consiste à accepter volontiers la transformation qui s'effectue dans leur vie. Les quatre étapes à suivre pour accepter la transformation d'une vie sont la prise de conscience, la participation, la centralisation de la vie sur la conjointe, et la recherche d'équilibre. La relation de couple, la santé de la femme et la présence d'un soutien formel et informel sont tous des facteurs qui ont une grande incidence sur le processus. La théorie qui consiste à accepter la transformation d'une vie propose un cadre qui permet de comprendre et d'expliquer l'ensemble complexe de stratégies qu'emploient ces hommes pour répondre aux changements, s'y adapter et les intégrer à leurs activités quotidiennes et à leur avenir. En outre, le fait de diriger le regard sur les hommes habitant avec une femme dialysée contribue à combler une lacune existante sur le plan des connaissances, et les constatations soulignent la capacité de ces hommes à apprendre et à mettre en pratique des rôles, des responsabilités et des routines complexes qui demandent des compétences avancées en observation, en prise de décision et en résolution de problème de même que sur le plan technique. Les étapes subtiles de la théorie guident les infirmières vers une meilleure compréhension des différents changements que les fournisseurs de soins de dialyse peuvent observer durant les différentes phases de la maladie de la patiente et leur permettent d'adopter des méthodes de soins de soutien qui facilitent leur adaptation et les poussent à poursuivre leurs efforts.Mots clés: dialyse, époux/épouse aidant, aidant en dialyse, adaptation, changement, insuffisance rénale chronique, maladie rénale terminale.
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Sharma, Shital. "Restoring Ānanda : philosophy, aesthetic, experience, and ritual in Puṣṭimārga Vaiṣṇavism". Thesis, McGill University, 2006. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=99603.
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This thesis examines the interrelation between ritual (seva), aesthetic experience, and philosophy in the Puṣṭimarga Vaiṣṇava bhakti tradition of Vallabha (ca.1479-1531). In Vallabha's Suddhadvaita ("pure non-dual") philosophy, Kṛṣṇa is described as the embodiment of bliss or ananda. At the moment of creation, Kṛṣṇa manifests the world and individual souls (jivas) out of himself, but conceals the ananda within the jivas, and subjects them to his power of ignorance (avidya). Thus, jivas are in the search for restoring their ananda, which can only occur as a result of being in Kṛṣṇa's presence. I argue that it is by performing ritual that Puṣṭimarga devotees experience Kṛṣṇa's eternal lila ("play" or "sport"), transcend their states of avidya, and permanently restore their ananda. In Puṣṭimarga, emotion (bhava) is both the path to experiencing Kṛṣṇa and the goal of this path in and of itself. Puṣṭimarga theologians validate the salvific role of emotion by invoking Sanskrit aesthetic theory. I argue that aesthetic experience is central to Puṣṭimarga ritual (including offerings of music, food and ornamentation) on the one hand, and also qualifies liberation itself on the other.
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Levall, Michael, and Carl Boström. "Understanding through games : Life Philosophies and Socratic Dialogue in an unusual Medium." Thesis, Blekinge Tekniska Högskola, Institutionen för teknik och estetik, 2014. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:bth-4558.
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Games as a medium is about to change, and with this change comes a search for themes outside the normal range of what is seen as acceptable in the medium. In this paper we, Michael Levall and Carl Boström, use debate and Socratic dialogue to portray the value of looking at a topic from several different angles, with the topic of choice for this project being life philosophies. During production, we create a game which sets out to affect its player even after he or she has finished playing it, possibly teaching the player the value of looking at a problem from different perspectives. Playtests conclude that in order to affect the player, the game should be catered to the player’s skill in interpreting games, and interpretable design can be used to affect how influenced the player is by the game.<br>Spel som ett medium håller på att förändras, och med dess ändringar kommer sökandet efter nya teman utanför det som idag ses som acceptabelt inom mediet. I detta arbete använder vi, Michael Levall och Carl Boström, debatt och Sokratisk dialog för att porträttera värdet av olika synvinklar, med livsåskådningar som tema. Under produktionen skapar vi ett spel som syftar till att påverka dess spelare även efter det att han eller hon har spelat klart det, med möjligheten att lära spelaren värdet av att se ett problem från olika vinklar. Speltester visar att för att påverka spelaren bör spelet möta spelarens skicklighet att tolka spel, och hur tolkningsbar design kan användas för att påverka hur påverkad spelaren blir av spelet.<br>Detta är en reflektionsdel till en digital medieproduktion.
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Thomas, Jennifer M. "A 'philosophical storehouse' : the life and afterlife of the Royal Society's repository." Thesis, Queen Mary, University of London, 2009. http://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/403.
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In June 1781, the Royal Society’s repository was transferred to the British Museum. Though ostensibly as a result of the limited space in the Royal Society’s purpose-built accommodation at Somerset House, the Society were perhaps also a little relieved to relinquish a collection that had proved to be somewhat burdensome during its residence at the Society and which was frequently criticised for its decaying specimens, broken items and missing, possibly stolen, objects. However this seems to be only part of the story. Drawing upon manuscript material in the Royal Society and the British Library, this study will examine the repository’s pattern of usage, collecting strategies and intellectual output throughout its life, in addition to exploring its afterlife at the British Museum using the British Museum’s, Royal College of Surgeon’s and Natural History Museum’s extensive archives. This thesis will seek to reveal an alternative account of the Royal Society’s repository arguing that it was comprised of a substantial and significant collection that the British Museum, at least initially, appears to have been grateful to receive and which, periodically, played a central role in the Society’s and naturalists' work.
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Murray, Chris M. "The tragic Coleridge : the philosophy of sacrifice in the life and works." Thesis, University of Warwick, 2009. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/3774/.
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I identify Coleridge‘s tragic vision as his engagement with catastrophe in search of a redemptive meaning. I examine Coleridge‘s plays, critical lectures, and commentaries on Greek and Shakespearean tragedy, and I reinvestigate some of his most famous works, such as 'The Ancient Mariner' and 'Christabel'. Chapters: 1). Introduction: Romantic Tragedy and Tragic Romanticism: I establish my interpretation amidst other theorists. I assess the presence of Classical tragedy in Coleridge‘s education, and the important changes that occurred in scholarship on Greek tragedy in Britain during the Romantic period. I acknowledge the important influences of Greek, English and German tragedians. 2). Transgression and Suffering: I suggest that Coleridge intends his reader to experience suffering vicariously for the purpose of moral benefit, fulfilling the same function that he identifies in Greek tragedy. 3). Real-Life Tragedy: Coleridge interprets events around him as tragic cycles of suffering and catharsis for political purposes, suggesting that the hardships of the French Revolution, and even the deceit of an innkeeper, are exemplary misfortunes. 4). The Tragic ‘Impulse’ and Coleridge’s Forms of Incompletion: Analysing Coleridge‘s use of the excerpts from his rejected play Osorio to form new poems, I argue that this instigates lifelong patterns of reinventing doomed literary projects, with reference to such concepts as synecdoche and the fragment. 5). The Lear Vocation: Coleridge’s Tragic Stage: I challenge a popular notion that Coleridge was prejudiced against theatre by demonstrating that, in his staged dramas, Coleridge exploits as well as criticizing the conventions of the contemporary stage and calls for reform in theatres. 6). The Tragic Sage. I claim that Coleridge made lifelong efforts to establish himself as a sage, dramatizing his own hardships to enhance his authority as an advisor. From youth Coleridge depicts himself as an embattled, prophetic figure, likening himself to Cassandra. Drawing on W.B. Yeats‘s comparison to Oedipus, I examine the various techniques Coleridge employs to establish himself as a survivor of and commentator on catastrophe. 7). Failed Sacrifices and the Un-Tragic Coleridge: Finally I argue that Coleridge, having settled into orthodox Christianity, abandons the tragic philosophy, expressing fears that suffering might be in vain, and therefore that catastrophe should be avoided in reality and as a literary theme. Ironically, this point is clarified in a lecture on Aeschylus.
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del, Nido Daniel Manfred. "Just like Nature: Habit and the Art of Life." Thesis, 2017. https://doi.org/10.7916/D8VH615W.
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In this dissertation, I will examine the conceptions of philosophy of the 19th and 20th Century thinkers Félix Ravaisson, Henri Bergson, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and their implications for contemporary theories of religious ethics and philosophical practice, especially that of Pierre Hadot. In doing so, I will elucidate their understanding of both the goals of philosophical practice and the means by which they are achieved, focusing in particular on the importance of the body in their respective theories of philosophical practice. Specifically, I argue that Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty’s theories of philosophical practice are grounded in an understanding of habit as a dynamic process of producing and transforming bodily dispositions that problematizes distinctions between self and world and limits attempts to achieve conscious self-mastery. As a result, their work calls into question the extent to which self-conscious cultivation of intellectual and bodily habits that conform to an ideal self-conception is either possible or desirable, and instead affirms a conception of philosophical practice as what I term “indefinite self-cultivation.”
In chapter one, I examine Félix Ravaisson’s conception of philosophical practice in relationship to his theory of habit, which he claims originates as a principle of desire that gives rise to bodily spontaneity. This theory of habit underlies a conception of philosophical practice as imitation of models of ideal conduct through which habits of inventive conduct that outstrip capacities for rational deliberation are produced. In chapter two, I contrast Ravaisson’s conception of habit with Henri Bergson’s, who regards habit as a form of bodily memory that produces automaticity. Philosophical practice for Bergson resists the effects of habit on thought and action by engaging in philosophical intuition, an application of mental effort to processes of change and movement that generates new ideas and new forms of life. In chapter three, I examine Merleau-Ponty’s intermediate position between these theories of habit, and his argument that the fluid nature of habituation as a process of social interaction makes living according to a determinate way of life possible only at the risk of doing violence to oneself. For Merleau-Ponty, philosophy entails critical practice of interrogating and expressing affects and immediate responses to events that serves as a way to question consciously-held values and uncover new personal and social possibilities. Finally, in chapter four, I conceptualize Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty’s theories of philosophical practice as forms of indefinite self-transformation by putting their work in critical conversation with Pierre Hadot’s theory of philosophy as a way of life.
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HUI, YANG CHIH, and 楊智惠. "Zhuangzi’s Philosophy of Life and Education of Life." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/3q9ty2.
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博士<br>中國文化大學<br>哲學系<br>104<br>This thesis essays to argue that the essence of Zhuangzi’s Philosophy of Life is Xiaoyao(The Absolute Freedom) and that this philosophy can be practically applied to the Education of Life. In the beginning, with the realm of research concentrated on the Text of Zhuangzi, and the use of the traditional Chinese hermeneutics, our thesis proves via the free interpretation of Zhuxi upon Zhuangzi that the common misunderstanding of the philosophy of Zhuangzi as a kind of selfish escapism is unfounded. In contrast to such kind of misunderstanding, Zhuangzi has positive meaning in the achievement of individual freedom in the visages of Perfect Man, Spirit-like Man, and Sage, via the Dao of Laozi.
Xiaoyao is not external determined, but inner freedom: acquiescence to the occasion and let nature take its course, in order to solve the natural difficulty of life and death; take what is doomed to be what is natural, in order to solve the social difficulty of conflicting public duty and private security; to settle the spiritual nature in tranquility, in order to solve the subjective difficulty of internal affection and desire, restoring the internal peace and harmony, further toward the heavenly peace and harmony. These self-cultivations fulfill the value and meaning of individual life, let individuals attain the harmony in nature and in human world, till he reaches to the absolute freedom beyond the internal and the external plight, arriving at the ideal realm of man: the Sage enjoys his freedom within heaven and earth; the Spirit-like Man enjoys his freedom beyond the world; the Perfect Man enjoys his freedom in the action of non-action. The philosophy of life for absolute freedom comes from the moral cultivation of non-action, with the spiritual freedom as its ideal.
The Daoist vision of life emphasizes the inner original power of lifeexerting itsvitalityin the not-yet-formed non-teleological free action. As for education: spiritual education nourishes the vitality for the growth, accomplishment and fulfillment of life, avoiding the implementation of reward and punishment that damages the vitality, instead by non-action to restore them back to the source of life-Tao; the adaptive physical education to help each child to find her or his own spiritual endowment, allowing each unique life to fulfill, achieving heavenly peace and harmony in harmonious life; the environmental education to help them to use their own endowment to treat every sentient being without discrimination; the education of life and death to help them to face life and death as naturally equal; the Daoist moral education to let their nature develop freely without depression or pretension, but staying in the harmonious balance or degree zero; the crafts education that bring them to the direct experience of Dao through the concentration in bodily practice.
All these are proper ways to respect the spiritual freedom of life, and none of these can work without the cultivation of non-action by the teachers. Only the non-action in education can let the free nature of each one involved in it blossom. the education of freedom of life not only raise individuals with their freedom, but on the foundation of that, it prepares for the modern democratic society the internal way of the sage and the external way of the kingship toward the truly equal and peaceful world.
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Lin, Chao-Chin, and 林朝卿. "On Laozi's philosophy of life." Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/83978331189158915814.
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碩士<br>華梵大學<br>哲學系碩士班<br>96<br>The material environment of human has improved drastically due to the advances in science and technology; however, the more people indulge in the luxurious and expensive material world, their wills and feelings become more and more materialistic. Even as human desires continually being satisfied by the material world, more and more desires evolve. Such infinite pursuits of materialistic satisfaction seem to be a bottomless abyss. It is like rootless duckweed that drifts without destination. How often do we search our hearts and make self-reflections that would let us realize that the more developed and convenient our material life is, the more we rely on the material world; our body and minds cling totally on materials. Instead of considering that we, as humans, to have achieved convenience of living through the mastery of the material world; rather, the material world has corroded our hearts and minds. People could not live without pursuing materials, as if they were bewitched; they manipulate and intrigue with strategies with one another and snatch whatever they desired by forces if necessary; they act as if they have lost the good and honest nature completely. Therefore, whether we can retrieve people’s natural disposition from Laozi’s Dao De Jing and to liberate people from such endless materialistic pursuit in life again is quite a challenge. As the conflicts of interests had created too many fighting and disputes by the deception and tricks among one another in the society nowadays, the chaotic values of the time is not inferior to the Spring and Autumn and the Warring States Periods; it reflects amply the necessity to reconcile and to reorganize one’s spirit and mind .
This article attempts to search the solutions for the crisis of human life based on the thoughts discussed in the philosophy of Laozi regarding the relations between Dao and the heaven, the earth and the human beings. Meanwhile, it is to follow the metaphysical Daoism in the philosophical thinking of Nature which implied in Laozi’s thoughts on the origin of life; and to see and experience the universe from the eyes of Laozi, which act as a series of ontological creative forces that kept returning to one’s origin and circulating within the universe. It also uses metaphors to describe the ways that cultivate one’s moral character (heart), in order to settle oneself physically and spiritually. In searching for the meanings of life, firstly, it is to enhance the containment of life and to be positive of the values for the existence of all creatures; secondly, to affirm the transcendence of life; and thirdly, to establish a calm and natural viewpoint towards life and death; further, to face the limitation of life with composure, in order to experience profoundly of what Laozi meant by tasting the plain food as gourmet, wearing the ordinary clothes as magnificent garments, and living with peace and enjoyment in secular and happy life.
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WANG, LI-HUA, and 王麗華. "The Inspiration of Zhuangzi's Life Philosophy to Modern Life Education." Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/pr7y44.
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碩士<br>嘉南藥理大學<br>儒學研究所<br>105<br>In the history of Chinese philosophy, Zhuangzi occupies a pivotal position. Zhuangzi conveys the concept of eclecticism through unbridled text, provides a unique Taoist philosophy for modern people, influences the philosophical form of thought for thousands of years in China, and injects a new vitality into modern life education.
In the first chapter: Introduction, this paper describes the research motives, the scope of the research, the research methods and the literature review, and the first part of the thesis, which is divided into five chapters. Five chapters of the conclusion, the rest of the chapters are summarized below
The second chapter is based on the philosophy of life of Zhuangzi. It is divided into three sections. The first section conveys the wisdom of "harmony with the days", "because of the two lines" and " Freedom of thought, the second section with "no self", "big useless", "safe life" philosophy into the free life of the realm, the third quarter to "Xin Zhai sit", "quiet and tranquil" "Look at me" attitude, to show the cultivation of natural inaction.
The third chapter is based on "modern life education", which is divided into three sections. The first section describes the five processes of modern life education, the second section from the understanding of the connotation of modern life education to explain "people and their own", "people and others", "people and the environment", "people and the universe" education, In the third section, the value of modern life education is illustrated by "inspiring life care", "harmonious relationship with natural person" and "establishing the value of life".
The fourth chapter is based on the inspiration of "Zhuangzi's philosophy of life on modern life education". It is divided into three sections. The first section transforms life thinking through "transcending the concept of life and death", "establishing life meaning", the second section conveys the relationship between the "knowledge and contentment" and the "natural inaction", the third section takes the attitude of "not sending right and wrong" and " vain travel to the world ".
Whereever you pass, you will leave traces. People's life as the ups and downs of the ups and downs, there are high-spirited, lonely frustration, these are our life must go through the process. The essence of life is that we can personal experience and experience, and these processes to nourish the growth of our lives and nutrients, through the study and quenching again and again, let us know more about things in front of things, are to Highlighting the uniqueness of our lives in order to lift the shackles of people's minds and to make people's minds free and free. This is the "Zhuangzi" philosophy of life to convey the idea, when people 's minds are free and happy, and get rid of all kinds of my execution and restraint, the pursuit of inner spirit without waiting, can only prove the richness of life and complete.
keywords : Zhuangzi, life education, philosophy of life, natural inaction
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Hunter, Andrew Jonathan. "The conclamation to life : a reading of Jacques Derrida's life-philosophy." 1997. http://hdl.handle.net/1993/22650.
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Kuo-Pin, Chang, and 張國濱. "The life philosophy in Chuang-tzu's thought." Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/9ym58f.
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Williams, David Allan. "The theme of life in Nietzsche's philosophy /." 2003. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:3108126.
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Deng, Sin-Gong, and 鄧新恭. "The philosophy of life in Zhuangzi’s parables." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/19613519190244159810.
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碩士<br>華梵大學<br>哲學系碩士班<br>99<br>Abstract
The present thesis, taking “The philosophy of life in Zhuangzi’s parables” as the topic, discusses philosophy of life relating to Zhuangzi parables. Most of the stories in Zhuangzi are allegorical stories composed of fictional elements. Because the philosophy of life is quite close to the real life, it becomes the thought core of Zhuangzi. The surreal temperament, wonderful but weird artistic conception of Zhuangzi accomplished the parables which make us find them fresh and new. The implied meanings are so profound that they really can make us examine our own feelings and motives, even open a new outlet for our distress.
Chapter I is the introduction stating my research motives, questions, study methods and documents. In this chapter, I briefly introduce Zhuangzi himself, the book and parables he wrote. I summarize Dao and virtue, heaven and humanity, matters and I, groups and self, spirit and the body from an angle of philosophy as well.
Chapter II is about the philosophy of life making a voyage across Dao and virtue. “Dao” means the highest principle of the universe; “virtue” is the good deeds that humans should perform. The good deeds performed by humans must be base on the highest principle of the universe; the highest principle of the universe relys on people’s good deeds to show its merit. The Dao which Zhuangzi wants to expound is a ideal condition of life training or the expression of personality. The life relies on this process to realize Dao and obtain Dao; then virtue would fill up inside, and the signs of virtue should appear in our behavior.
Chapter III is about the philosophy of life in which humans and Heaven are combined as one. The true meaning of Heaven is based on Nature. The so-called Nature is the existence of self; as to nonego, it complies one should adjust to the condition, not add any affairs to it. “Human” refers to artificial; human beings lose their real nature, and forget the directions of their life, therefore the world ends up in chaos. Zhuangzi advocated that human affairs emphasize the importance of inactivity. It is obvious that he intended to transform the opposition of heaven and humans into the ideal combination of heaven and humans.
Chapter IV talks about the philosophy of combination matters and I into one. “I” am the self, also called the subject ; “ matters”, which imply objects, are things outside me. Just look all around, there is nothing that I don’t need or enjoy; my mind often tilt outward because of the nonego’s hauling. As a result, “galloping ahead one’s shape and mind, diving into the myriads of things, and not returning throughout one’s life” is what Zhuangzi cared about.
Chapter V is about the philosophy of emptying out oneself to tour around the world. Here, “self” is each individual that regards one as the center. “Group” means others except for me. Because the relationship between “group” and “self” is so close that it is easy to result in conflicts and unavoidable grudges. According to Zhuangzi’s thought, if one wants to be far away from being harmed and make sure of one’s safety, one should be humble, unintended and get along with all things peacefully. In this way, one will surely roam through the world leisurely and cheerfully.
Chapter VI is the philosophy of abandoning one’s figure and spirit. “Figure” is form and structure of self; “spirit” is the feelings that dominate a person’s physique. Zhuangzi intended to emphasize that keeping fit must be based on spirit and figure by parables. If humans could surmount the restriction of the physique and develop ideal circumstances for the spirit, it may enrich significance of life and at the same time enhance the values of life. Afterwards, the final and ideal realm is “abandoning one’s figure and spirit.”
Chapter VII, the last chapter, is the conclusion. Although Zhuangzi often talked the universe and Nature, his point of view eventually carried out in real life. There are so many questions in one’s life solved since one settles down; therefore, it is self, from inner to outer, that not only the thought of Zhuangzi’s philosophy of life focused on, but also this article pays close attention to.
Keyword: Zhuangzi, parables, philosophy of life
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Lu, Chien Chian, and 盧建潤. "The Idea of Life-Cultivation in Chuang Tzu''s Philosophy of Life." Thesis, 1996. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/75062873202180939111.
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Ting, Tseng Yu, and 曾鈺婷. "Zhuangzi’s Philosophy of Life Inspired by the Life Education of Elementary School." Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/89233127966464534371.
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碩士<br>華梵大學<br>哲學系碩士班<br>101<br>In the history of Chinese philosophy, the thinking of Zhuangzi affect far-reaching , with willful writing and liberal concept in the content, Zhuangzi providing people an unique philosophy of life, and lot of people focus on is his point of view for the "life and death". Nowaday, Taiwan is utilitarian in command of the era, makes it easier to lose yourself, people do not know the way of life in the multicultural society, where to go, so that deviate from the values of human life. Life education is one of the major educational decisions in recent years, because of the violence, suicide cases happened frequently in campus, and it reflects students do not respect their life, highlighting the urgency of life education.The growth of the students just once, an the opportunity to learn a littlevertical disappearing.The paper is to explain the theory from Zhuangzi’s view of life, inspired by the life education of elementary.
First of all, the study focus on the core content and insights of Zhuangzi’s view of life , divided to Zhuangzi's Tao, life and death as one, in harmony with nature, to discuss security at the cis and view of life beyond life and death; Secondly, the study links life education and Zhuangzi philosophy of life, starting with the origin and meaning of life education, frome the points of Chinese and foreign, at the same time refer to others’ statement. And then descripe life education and philosophy of life can not be sepatatedt. This paper focuses on the analysis of Zhuangzi view of life.
Finally, the Zhuangzi life in accordance with the aforementioned concept proposed for Elementary Life Education to implement inspired further design life education program, the practical application in the teaching, look forward to be helpful in the teaching of life education in the future.
In short, the research found that the Zhuangzi philosophy of life can inspire teachers teaching and students correct understanding of the value of life and care of the situation, and thus to respect life, cherish life and self-realization value of life. The main purpose of the "life education" is to help students self-awareness and explore the meaning of life, the highest value in life is to push self-care and the care of the heavens and the earth, and according to the philosophy of Zhuangzi, confirms it in the current life important value and impact of education.
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Wang, Pin-Lun, and 王秉倫. "Monk Yinshun’s Philosophy of Life and It’s Implications for Taiwan’s Life Education." Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/56656644630224123761.
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博士<br>國立臺灣師範大學<br>教育學系<br>95<br>Due to the influence of internal and external factors, the quality and meaning of life in Taiwan are still low and indigent since World War II. Consequently, it is extensively appealed for popularizing life education.
After a long period of time in research, the dissertation eventually gets back to what Mr. Liang Shu-Ming said, “this moment, this place, this person,” and focuses on the thought of Yinshun, a Buddhist monk who has had deep relationship with Taiwan since 1949.
Based on Monk Yinshun’s core thinking on Buddhism and viewpoint of life, five major conclusions have been drawn to probe into the meaning of life education in Taiwan.
1. According to Monk Yinshun’s outlook, “yuan qi xing kong”（緣起性空） is the basis of “Jen-chien Fo-chiao”（人間佛教）, while “Jen-chien Fo-chiao” is the practice of “yuan qi xing kong.”
2. Yinshun’s viewpoint of life makes use of “yuan qi xing kong” to analyze life; meanwhile, life is actualized by means of “Jen-chien Fo-chiao.”
3. In Taiwan, there have been many sage educational workers, significant programs and bounteous results during the development of life education.
4. Concerning about the continuous shaping and practicing on the connotation of life education in Taiwan over the last decade, this thesis probes into：(1) the processes of the development of life education in Taiwan; (2)the discrimination of the significance of life education in Taiwan; (3)the rationalities of the connotation of life education in Taiwan; (4) the comments on several approaches of life education in Taiwan.
5. Yinshun’s Philosophy of life is abundant in implications that deepen the ideas and widen the contents of life education in Taiwan. These implications comprehend：(1) confirming the Objectives of life education; (2) affirming an attitude toward ‘Unity of knowing and doing’ ; (3) providing source material of ‘ultimate wisdom’; (4) supplying life education with ‘a wisdom-based new view of life’, ‘a religious view with independence and reason’ and ‘a view of life and death with neither disliking of birth and death nor liking nirvana’.