Academic literature on the topic 'Philosophical intuition'

This dissertation examines the recent arguments against the “Centrality” thesis—the thesis that intuition plays central evidential roles in philosophical inquiry—and their implications for the negative program in experimental philosophy. Two types of objections to Centrality are discussed. First, there are some objections which turn out to only work against Centrality when it is taken as a potential form of philosophical exceptionalism. I respond by showing that negative experimental philosophy doesn’t need the assumption that philosophy is distinctive in its reliance on intuitions. Second, there are some objections which turn out to be related to some particular view concerning the nature of evidence. In response, I distinguish between several different versions of Centrality, and argue that the version of Centrality that experimentalists need remains innocuous. Though none of the arguments against Centrality works as intended, I agree with its opponents that negative experimental philosophers have mischaracterized philosophical practice in a way which has problematic consequences for at least some versions of their argument. Specifically, I contend that philosophical practice grants important evidential status to general intuitions and context-rich intuitions, but extant experimental studies have almost exclusively focused on case intuitions and context-poor intuitions. I conclude that those who work on the negative program of experimental philosophy need to more carefully examine how philosophers actually use intuition in their practice.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2008.<br>The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file (viewed on July 27, 2009) Includes bibliographical references.

This thesis is about the arguments and the methods that can sustain the epistemic support that comes from intuitions regarding hypothetical cases vis-à-vis theories of intuition. In the past twenty years, philosophical intuitions have received new attention, spurred by fashionable experimental philosophy that empirically tests philosophers’ intuition-engendering hypothetical cases with experimental methods. The results purportedly show that intuitions are unreliable, subject to demographic variation, and error-prone. In response, philosophers have presented various theories of philosophical intuition and explanations of how intuitions are situated in the justificatory apparatus of philosophical methodology. Three types of theories prevail in the literature, each a plausible option for the explanatory sustenance of intuitions’ epistemic efficacy. Selfevidence theories depend on the understanding of the intuited proposition. Intellectual seemings theories depend on the content of the intuited proposition. Judgment theories depend on our normal capacities for making judgments. Judgment theories divide further into disposition-to-believe theories and capacity theories. I argue that, beyond objections and unique epistemic burdens that each theory faces regarding the methodologies underpinning their conception and defense, no one theory of intuition can be reasonably accepted over the others. The centrality of intuitions’ use in philosophical methodology and in philosophers’ ways of thinking and reasoning, giving an argument that supports intuitions as conferrers of epistemic status, which does not itself appeal to intuitions, is a precarious endeavor. I consider various methods to avoid engaging question-begging premises and epistemic circularity. However, none are successful when the theory at hand is characteristically a priori and countenances only intuitions that confer epistemic status. In response to the ill-fated caricature of philosophical intuitions epistemic-statusconferrers, I present my own survey evidence concerning philosophers’ conception of intuition-use in philosophical method. Surprisingly, professional philosophers are more inclined to think that intuitions operate in the context of discovery more so than they are inclined to think that intuitions operate in the context of justification. The upshot of these survey results motivates my preferred account philosophical intuitions wherein philosophical intuitions are bifurcated into epistemic (justificatory intuitions) and epistemically-related (intuitions of discovery) roles. In the light of the objections I pose regarding the proper grounding of intuitions, revising the standard conception of philosophical intuitions requires two sorts of moves in the debate. First, one must offer a proviso for sources of justification that do not epistemically depend on intuitions for the ability to confer epistemic status. This allows one to justify a theory of intuition without appeal to intuition or epistemic regress. Second, one must give an explanation for and build on the recognition that intuitions are bifurcated into justificatory and discovery roles. The added clarity of filling out the nature of bifurcation allows for a more accurate characterisation of philosophical intuitions in the methods of philosophy. Furthermore, that intuitions operate in discovery roles offers an explanation for philosophical innovation and progress.

Chaque activité humaine nécessite d’avoir sa propre méthode pour obtenir un résultat concret et satisfaisant. C’est ainsi le cas pour la philosophie, une discipline qui compte 2500 d’histoire et dont la méthode est alors délimitée par les philosophes et les autres personnes. Quelle est donc cette méthode philosophique? Il existe plusieurs réponses. Cette thèse va donc tenter de répondre à cette question en introduisant un projet de méthode philosophique dénommée « Conceptual Tuning » [l’accord conceptuel]. Les boxeurs ne se préoccupent généralement pas de la question conceptuelle « Qu’est-ce que la boxe? ». De même les biologistes se posent à peine la question de savoir « Qu’est-ce que la biologie ». Pour eux, ce genre de questions sont extérieures à leur discipline. Cependant pour la philosophie, la question de la nature de la philosophie est une question bien interne à cette discipline. La conscience de soi est une condition sine quo non pour « faire de la philosophie ».Puisque la philosophie possède une si longue histoire et tant de traditions diverses et variées, on présuppose donc qu’il existe de très nombreuses méthodes pour « faire de la philosophie ». Ma thèse tentera donc de contribuer à cette discussion portant sur la méthodologie philosophique en proposant une méthode que j’appellerai « Conceptual Tuning ». Cet accord conceptuel sera principalement développé à partir de la méthode « Conceptual Engineering » déjà utilisée dans la philosophie depuis, dont les défenseurs s’efforcent d’améliorer nos concepts tels que « personne », « libéral », « science ». Cette thèse présentera ainsi six versions de « Conceptual Engineering », à savoir le « Conceptual Engineering » de Cappelen, la Méthode d’Explication de Carnap, le Révisionnisme Moral de Zagzebski, la Guerre Lexique de Ludlow, la Négociation Métalinguistique de Plunkett et l’Approche d’Amélioration de Haslanger. Ces six approches estiment déjà que nos concepts pourraient être défectueux, et c’est la tâche du philosophe de les « réparer ». Alors que la plupart des approches de « Conceptual Engineering » ne font que se concentrer étroitement sur la perspective de « réparation », cette thèse soutiendra que l’accord conceptuel exige que l’attention soit plutôt portée sur une perspective « expressive ». En d’autres termes, il faudrait employer cette méthode dans un cadre général de la pratique consistant à demander et à donner des raisons. Cette thèse soutiendra également que d’autres méthodes philosophiques importantes telles que la méthode de Brandomian, la philosophie du langage ordinaire et l’analyse conceptuelle traditionnelle peuvent être bien incorporées dans le projet d’accord conceptuel. Ainsi, au lieu d’être en opposition, ces méthodes sont en fait conformes à l’accord conceptuel ces méthodes s’intègrent parfaitement à l’accord conceptuel<br>Different human practices require various methods to carry them out successfully. Philosophy, an activity with 2500 years of history, must also have its own method, which demarcates a philosopher from a lay person. This thesis embarks on a project of philosophical method—conceptual tuning. How to do philosophy belongs to the category of metaphilosophy or philosophy of philosophy. Boxers usually do not care about the conceptual question ‘What is boxing?’ and biologists barely ask ‘What is Biology?’. For them, this kind of question is a higher order question which concerns the nature of the thing in itself. It is an external question for most disciplines. But for philosophy, the question concerning the nature of philosophy is an internal question. Self-awareness is a sine qua non of doing philosophy.With such a long history and so many traditions, the method of doing philosophy must be miscellaneous. My thesis attempts to contribute to the discussion of philosophical methodology by proposing a method I shall call conceptual tuning. Conceptual tuning is grounded in the philosophical method of conceptual engineering, advocates of which endeavor to improve our concepts. According to the method of conceptual engineering, philosophical problems stem from defects in our understanding of concepts, and it is the philosopher’s task to fix them. While most conceptual engineering approaches only narrowly focus on the perspective of ‘repairing’ or ‘fixing’, conceptual tuning calls for attention to the ‘expressive’ perspective. In other words, we should put this method in the broad framework of the practice of asking for and giving reasons. In this thesis, I also attempt to explain some previous conceptual methods under the title of conceptual tuning, such as Brandomian method, ordinary language philosophy, and the traditional conceptual analyses

This study analyses the methodology of computational cognitive modeling as one of the ways of conducting research in cognitive science. The aim of the study is to provide an understanding of the place of computational cognitive models in understanding human cognition. Considering the vast number of computational cognitive models which have been just given to account for some cognitive phenomenon by solely simulating some experimental study and fitting to empirical data, a practice-oriented approach is adopted in this study to understand the work of the modeler, and accordingly to discover the potential of computational cognitive models, apart from their being simulation tools. In pursuit of this aim, a framework with a practice-oriented approach from the philosophy of science literature, which is Morgan &amp<br>Morrison (1999)&rsquo<br>s account, is employed on a case study. The framework emphasizes four key elements to understand the place of models in science, which are the construction of models, the function of models, the representation they provide, and the ways we learn from models. The case study Q-Soar (Simon, Newell &amp<br>Klahr, 1991), is a model built with Soar cognitive architecture (Laird, Newell &amp<br>Rosenbloom, 1987) which is representative of a class of computational cognitive models. Discussions are included for how to make generalizations for computational cognitive models out of this class, i.e. for models that are built with other modeling paradigms.

The main objective of this study is to make a comprehensive analysis of the question &ldquo<br>Why is there something rather than nothing?&rdquo<br>, which is one of the major questions of metaphysics, and to find a plausible answer at the end, if it is possible. To begin this analysis, a clarification of what we understand by this question is needed first. For the clarification, a definition of &lsquo<br>nothingness&rsquo<br>will be sought. Afterwards, the motivation for us to ask this question, the significance of it, and the content of it will be investigated. This investigation will help us concentrate on and discuss within the framework of causation and necessity our understanding of &ldquo<br>contingent beings&rdquo<br>and &ldquo<br>nothingness&rdquo<br>. Two main approaches sought to answer this question till now are by theists and physicists. Those approaches will be discussed and compared. And at the end of the comparative analysis of these two approaches, a metaphysical approach which will be a layer of them will be sought.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, Dept. of Philosophy, 2008.<br>Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on Jul 22, 2009). Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-10, Section: A, page: 3975. Adviser: Joan Weiner.

The emphasis of the inquiry is on the domain of education and the relationship present between the teacher and student more specifically. Essentially, the first part of the thesis outlines how the larger social-political system impacts the domain of public education, with the predominant issues of adversity becoming manifest at the level of the relationship that exists between teacher and student. The second part of the work utilizes the problems discovered and their impact on human experience to propose a virtue/care based method for approaching the relationship with the student in a way that both aligns more closely with the movement of experience, while also functioning to assist the student in shaping their own moral character. Essentially, the method being proposed is something that is meant to assist the teacher in her attempts to communicate with the student in a more personal sort of way, thus allowing for a higher degree of understanding of the unique personality of each student, with this understanding leading the teacher to form a more flexible approach that takes into account the various personalities of the students. In so doing the teacher is working to bring the experience of the student into the educative process, which should thereby increase student performance through their feeling more involved in the education being received.

In Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle makes the assumption that there are five states of the soul through which we interact with truth. He continues Book VI with a discussion of his intended meaning of each of these states of the soul. In this study the relevant discussions on each state are extracted from the text to enable a clearer understanding of these states, as Aristotle presents them. Subsequently, the role of each state is studied in the context of the entire Nicomachean Ethics. The primary focus is directed at a clearer understanding of Aristotle’s proposed intellectual virtues, and on their respective roles in the ethical life. Simultaneously, the ethical life that Aristotle presents, and its ultimate end eudaimonia, or happiness, are approached from this perspective. Aristotle argues that reason is the distinguishing feature of humans, and that man’s excellence must include the excellent use of this capacity. This study investigates how Aristotle proposes that the rational intellect should reach its completion, and comes to the conclusion that true mastery of the intellect can only result from the cooperation of the five states of the rational soul. It becomes evident that each state of the soul has a different nature and function, and that through directed cooperation they do not compete with one another, but are mutually enhanced. However, Aristotle repeatedly emphasises the importance of extending thought into action. This makes Aristotle’s ethical theory so attractive: he manages to consolidate his theorizing with the value of experienced reality. This is his essential key to happiness, which is experienced both in perception and in action. By approaching the Nicomachean Ethics from the perspective of the five states of the rational soul, an appreciation is acquired for the fine balance by which action and reason may combine to result in man’s fulfilment of his highest potential. It is in this balance that one finds the secret to eudaimonia.<br>Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 2011.<br>Ancient Languages<br>unrestricted