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Journal articles on the topic 'Philosophical intuition'

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1

Vaidya, Anand. "Intuition and Inquiry." Essays in Philosophy 13, no. 1 (2012): 285–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eip201213116.

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Recent work in philosophical methodology by experimental philosophers has brought to light a certain kind of skepticism about the role of intuitions in a priori philosophical inquiry. In this paper I turn attention away from a priori philosophical inquiry and on to the role of intuition in experimental design. I argue that even if we have reason to be skeptical about the role of intuition in a priori philosophical inquiry, we cannot remove intuition from inquiry altogether, because appeals to intuition are essential for experimental design.
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2

Pailos, Federico Mathías. "Intuition as Philosophical Evidence." Essays in Philosophy 13, no. 1 (2012): 297–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eip201213117.

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Earlenbaugh and Molyneux’s argument against considering intuitions as evidence has an uncharitable consequence — a substantial part of philosophical practice is not justified. A possible solution to this problem is to defend that philosophy must be descriptive metaphysics. But if this statement is rejected, one can only argue (a) that experts’ intuition does constitute evidence, and (b) that philosophical practice is justified by the overall growth of philosophical knowledge it generates.
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3

Gasparatou, Renia. "Experimental Appeals to Intuition." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 42, no. 124 (2010): 31–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2010.894.

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Today, experimental philosophers challenge traditional appeals to intuition; they empirically collect folk intuitions and then use their findings to attack philosophers’ intuitions. However this movement is not uniform. Radical experimentalists criticize the use of intuitions in philosophy altogether and they have been mostly attacked. Contrariwise, moderate experimentalists imply that lay persons’ intuitions are somehow relevant to philosophical problems. Sometimes they even use folk intuitions in order to advance theoretical theses. In this paper I will try to challenge the so-called moderat
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4

Symons, John. "Intuition and Philosophical Methodology." Axiomathes 18, no. 1 (2007): 67–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10516-007-9019-7.

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5

Cath, Yuri. "EVIDENCE AND INTUITION." Episteme 9, no. 4 (2012): 311–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2012.21.

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AbstractMany philosophers accept a view – what I will call the intuition picture – according to which intuitions are crucial evidence in philosophy. Recently, Williamson (2004, 2007: ch. 1) has argued that such views are best abandoned because they lead to a psychologistic conception of philosophical evidence that encourages scepticism about the armchair judgements relied upon in philosophy. In this paper I respond to this criticism by showing how the intuition picture can be formulated in such a way that: (i) it is consistent with a wide range of views about not only philosophical evidence bu
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6

Textor, Mark. "Bolzano on conceptual and intuitive truth: the point and purpose of the distinction." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43, no. 1 (2013): 13–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2013.774839.

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Bolzano incorporated Kant's distinction between intuitions and concepts into the doctrine of propositions by distinguishing between conceptual (Begriffssätze an sich) and intuitive propositions (Anschauungssätze an sich). An intuitive proposition contains at least one objective intuition, that is, a simple idea that represents exactly one object; a conceptual proposition contains no objective intuition. After Bolzano, philosophers dispensed with the distinction between conceptual and intuitive propositions. So why did Bolzano attach philosophical importance to it? I will argue that, ultimately
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7

Weinberger, Ota. "Intuition as a Philosophical Argument." Grazer Philosophische Studien 52 (1996): 1–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/gps1996/97521.

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8

Kung, Peter. "Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90, no. 4 (2012): 806–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2012.717954.

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9

Weinberger, Ota. "INTUITION AS A PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENT." Grazer Philosophische studien 52, no. 1 (1996): 1–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-90000643.

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10

Kuntz, J. R., and J. R. C. Kuntz. "Surveying Philosophers About Philosophical Intuition." Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2, no. 4 (2011): 643–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-011-0047-2.

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11

Sosa, Ernest. "Experimental philosophy and philosophical intuition." Philosophical Studies 132, no. 1 (2006): 99–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9050-3.

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12

Goh, Esther. "The Argument from Variation against Using One’s Own Intuitions as Evidence." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 56, no. 2 (2019): 95–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps201956232.

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In philosophical methodology, intuitions are used as evidence to support philosophical theories. In this paper, I evaluate the skeptical argument that variation in intuitions is good evidence that our intuitions are unreliable, and so we should be skeptical about our theories. I argue that the skeptical argument is false. First, variation only shows that at least one disputant is wrong in the dispute, but each disputant lacks reason to determine who is wrong. Second, even though variation in intuitions shows that at least one disputant has the wrong intuition in the thought experiment, it is n
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13

Levin, Janet. "The evidential status of philosophical intuition." Philosophical Studies 121, no. 3 (2005): 193–224. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-4613-2.

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14

Gasparatou, Renia. "Folk Intuitions, Science Fiction and Philosophy: Comment on Experimental Philosophy." Journal of Cognition and Culture 10, no. 3-4 (2010): 377–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853710x531230.

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AbstractSome experimental philosophers imply that philosophers should endorse folk intuitions and even use them to advance philosophical theses. In this paper I will try to contrast experimental appeals to intuition with J. L. Austin’s, whom some experimentalists cite as a precursor of their method. I will suggest that Austin evokes ordinary intuitions in order to dismantle philosophical quests. He even suggests (a) that the appeal to ordinary intuitions of the folk can hardly prescribe answers to extraordinary circumstances and (b) that philosophical quests themselves are extraordinary. There
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15

Al Sheikh, Hanan Muneer. "The artistic intuition and its impact in developing the leadership potentials of the academic women in the specializations of art and design." Global Journal of Arts Education 11, no. 1 (2021): 13–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.18844/gjae.v11i1.5459.

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The artwork towards which academic women are going in the specializations of art and design is considered as a comprehensive philosophical intellectual system; as the academic woman while understanding art is unifying psychological elements with the philosophical, intuitive, and spiritual elements. This research tackles the analysis of the concept of artistic intuition as a compositional activity that reflects to all practical life fields but under specific humanitarian conditions that distinguish leading women particularly in the specializations of art and design. Such analysis leads to being
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16

Shaffer, Michael J. "“FILLING IN”, THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS AND INTUITIONS." Episteme 14, no. 2 (2016): 255–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2016.15.

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AbstractRecently Timothy Williamson has argued that characterizations of the standard (i.e. intuition-based) philosophical practice of philosophical analysis are misguided because of the erroneous manner in which this practice has been understood. In doing so he implies that experimental critiques of the reliability of intuition are based on this misunderstanding of philosophical methodology and so have little or no bearing on actual philosophical practice or results. His main point is that the orthodox understanding of philosophical methodology is incorrect in that it treats philosophical tho
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17

Ten Elshof, Gregg. "Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition & Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry." Philosophia Christi 3, no. 2 (2001): 586–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/pc20013262.

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18

Ten Elshof, Gregg. "Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry." Philosophia Christi 4, no. 2 (2002): 582–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/pc20024266.

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19

Shulga, Elena, and Anastasiya Maslova. "Intuition and Pre-Understanding in Philosophical Discourse." Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Serija 7. Filosofiya. Sociologiya i socialnye tehnologii, no. 1 (May 2016): 28–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.15688/jvolsu7.2016.1.4.

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20

GREENMAN, MARTIN A. "INTUITION AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHICAL INSIGHT." Metaphilosophy 18, no. 2 (1987): 125–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.1987.tb00193.x.

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21

Cokely, Edward T., and Adam Feltz. "Adaptive variation in judgment and philosophical intuition." Consciousness and Cognition 18, no. 1 (2009): 356–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2009.01.001.

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22

Bakhmetyev, Arthur, and Alexander Nesterov. "Ontognoseological limites of intuition in the structure of cognitive and creative activity." SHS Web of Conferences 72 (2019): 01015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/20197201015.

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The article analyzes ontological and epistemological limits of intuitive cognition in the structure of cognitive and creative activity. To conduct a philosophical analysis of the concept of intuition, dialectic, descriptive and comparative methods are used. This analysis is necessary to identify ontological and epistemological aspects of intuitive cognition. The study of ontognoseological limits of intuitive knowledge is of particular interest for understanding the specifics of the invention problem, as well as the essence of the thinking process as such. Intuition, having ontognoseological li
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23

Werner, Konrad. "Philosophical Intuition Is the Capacity to Recognize one’s Epistemic Position. An Old-Fashion Approach Based on Russell, Carnap, Wittgenstein, and Husserl." Philosophia 48, no. 5 (2020): 1725–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00195-5.

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Abstract Philosophical intuition has become one of the most debated problems in recent years, largely due to the rise of the movement called experimental philosophy which challenged the conviction that philosophers have some special insight into abstract ideas such as being, knowledge, good and evil, intentional action, etc. In response to the challenge, some authors claim that there is a special cognitive faculty called philosophical intuition which delivers justification to philosophical theses, while some others deny it based on experimental results. A relatively smaller group of researcher
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24

Stich, Stephen. "Philosophy and WEIRD intuition." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33, no. 2-3 (2010): 110–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x10000257.

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AbstractFrom Plato to the present, philosophers have relied on intuitive judgments as evidence for or against philosophical theories. Most philosophers are WEIRD, highly educated, and male. The literature reviewed in the target article suggests that such people might have intuitions that differ from those of people in other groups. There is a growing body of evidence suggesting that they do.
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25

Zhakhina, T. S. "Correlation of logical and intuitive knowledge in cognition." BULLETIN of the L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University. Historical sciences. Philosophy. Religion Series 133, no. 4 (2020): 71–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.32523/2616-7255-2020-133-4-71-76.

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The article examines the philosophical problems of classical logic and intuition, which is a necessary tool for the cognitive process. The role and significance of logic in the history of philosophy, the relationship between logic and intuition, their role in cognitive activity. The significance, role and stages of creativity in the aspect of modern problems of cognition, as well as the relationship between creativity and intuition are considered. The insufficiency of discursive thinking in scientific problems is proved, and intuitive thinking is considered as heuristic knowledge that generate
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26

Weinberg, Jonathan M., Stephen Crowley, Chad Gonnerman, Ian Vandewalker, and Stacey Swain. "Intuition & Calibration." Essays in Philosophy 13, no. 1 (2012): 257–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eip201213115.

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The practice of appealing to intuitive judgments concerning esoteric cases, long standard in analytic philosophy, has recently fallen on hard times. Various recent empirical results have suggested that philosophers are not currently able to distinguish good intuitions from bad. This paper evaluates one possible type of approach to this problematic methodological situation: calibration. Both critiquing and building on an argument from Robert Cummins, the paper explores what possible avenues may exist for the calibration of philosophical intuitions. It is argued that no good options are currentl
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27

Blauberg, Irina. "Henri Bergson’s Philosophical Intuition as reflexions on the nature of philosophical creativity." Philosophy Journal 9, no. 2 (2016): 24–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2016-9-2-24-36.

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28

Effken, Judith A. "The informational basis for nursing intuition: philosophical underpinnings." Nursing Philosophy 8, no. 3 (2007): 187–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1466-769x.2007.00315.x.

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29

Boynton, David M. "Review of Rational intuition: Philosophical roots, scientific investigations." Humanistic Psychologist 45, no. 2 (2017): 186–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/hum0000063.

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30

Hongladarom, Soraj. "Tamar Szabó Gendler: Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology." Minds and Machines 23, no. 4 (2013): 509–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11023-013-9316-4.

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31

Johanssen, Jacob, and Xin Wang. "Artificial Intuition in Tech Journalism on AI: Imagining the Human Subject." Human-Machine Communication 2 (January 15, 2021): 173–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.30658/hmc.2.9.

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Artificial intuition (AI acting intuitively) is one trend in artificial intelligence. This article analyzes how it is discussed by technology journalism on the internet. The journalistic narratives that were analyzed claim that intuition can make AI more efficient, autonomous, and human. Some commentators also write that intuitive AI could execute tasks better than humans themselves ever could (e.g., in digital games); therefore, it could ultimately surpass human intuition. Such views do not pay enough attention to biases as well as transparency and explainability of AI. We contrast the journa
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32

Knobe, Joshua. "Philosophical Intuitions Are Surprisingly Robust Across Demographic Differences." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 56, no. 2 (2019): 29–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps201956225.

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Within the existing metaphilosophical literature on experimental philosophy, a great deal of attention has been devoted to the claim that there are large differences in philosophical intuitions between people of different demographic groups. Some philosophers argue that this claim has important metaphilosophical implications; others argue that it does not. However, the actual empirical work within experimental philosophy seems to point to a very different sort of metaphilosophical question. Specifically, what the actual empirical work suggests is that intuitions are surprisingly robust across
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33

Brink, David O. "Impartiality and Associative Duties." Utilitas 13, no. 2 (2001): 152–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820800003113.

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Consequentialism is often criticized for failing to accommodate impersonal constraints and personal options. A common consequentialist response is to acknowledge the anticonsequentialist intuitions but to argue either that the consequentialist can, after all, accommodate the allegedly recalcitrant intuitions or that, where accommodation is impossible, the recalcitrant intuition can be dismissed for want of an adequate philosophical rationale. Whereas these consequentialist responses have some plausibility, associational duties represent a somewhat different challenge to consequentialism, inasm
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34

Buckwalter, Wesley. "Intuition Fail: Philosophical Activity and the Limits of Expertise." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92, no. 2 (2014): 378–410. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12147.

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35

Cotlove, Elaine W. "Intuition in Medicine: A Philosophical Defense of Clinical Reasoning." JAMA 308, no. 19 (2012): 2038. http://dx.doi.org/10.1001/jama.308.19.2038-a.

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36

Egler, Miguel. "Testing for the phenomenal: Intuition, metacognition, and philosophical methodology." Mind & Language 35, no. 1 (2019): 48–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/mila.12229.

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37

Van-Quynh, Alexandra. "Intuition in Mathematics: a Perceptive Experience." Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 48, no. 1 (2017): 1–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15691624-12341320.

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This study applied a method of assisted introspection to investigate the phenomenology of mathematical intuition arousal. The aim was to propose an essential structure for the intuitive experience of mathematics. To achieve an intersubjective comparison of different experiences, several contemporary mathematicians were interviewed in accordance with the elicitation interview method in order to collect pinpoint experiential descriptions. Data collection and analysis was then performed using steps similar to those outlined in the descriptive phenomenological method that led to a generic structur
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38

Ribeiro, Cláudia. "É o método filosófico baseado na intuição?" Principia: an international journal of epistemology 21, no. 3 (2018): 411–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2017v21n3p411.

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There is a current and lively debate that opposes naturalistic philosophers to non-naturalistic philosophers about intuition. I start with a critical analysis of that debate, presenting the arguments that naturalistic philosophers make use of in order to debunk the alleged method based on intuitions of non-naturalistic philosophers. Then I introduce the solution that consists in trying to reduce metaphysics to a merely descriptive task, concluding, however, that this move is not satisfactory. I therefore describe ‘stylistic’ solutions whereby it is argued that the term “intuition” and its deri
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39

Wünsche, Isabel. "Creative Intuition." Experiment 23, no. 1 (2017): 215–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2211730x-12341312.

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Abstract Among the artists of the Russian avant-garde, there was general agreement that the new art forms they were seeking were not to be found in the visible world but rather the artist’s own creative intuition. The true artist created freely and independently, without regard for the appearance of the objective world or conventional approaches to its depiction. In their explorations of the artistic process and the creative endeavor, the artists found inspiration in Henri Bergson’s concept of intuition as a philosophical method, which the French philosopher had formulated in his 1903 essay “I
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40

Kauppinen, Antti. "A Humean theory of moral intuition." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43, no. 3 (2013): 360–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2013.857136.

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According to the quasi-perceptualist account of philosophical intuitions, they are intellectual appearances that are psychologically and epistemically analogous to perceptual appearances. Moral intuitions share the key characteristics of other intuitions, but can also have a distinctive phenomenology and motivational role. This paper develops the Humean claim that the shared and distinctive features of substantive moral intuitions are best explained by their being constituted by moral emotions. This is supported by an independently plausible non-Humean, quasi-perceptualist theory of emotion, a
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41

Schwartzman, Lisa H. "Intuition, Thought Experiments, and Philosophical Method: Feminism and Experimental Philosophy." Journal of Social Philosophy 43, no. 3 (2012): 307–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.2012.01566.x.

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42

Levit, Svetlana. "Poetic intuition and philosophical motifs of the poetry of thought." Herald of Culturology, no. 1 (2021): 185–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.31249/hoc/2021.01.08.

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The article reflects the experience of analyzing the connection of Russian philosophy with the poetry of thought, philosophical poetry, presented by the works of Yu. Aichenwald, V. Zenkovsky, B. Nikolsky, V. Solovyov, S. Frank.
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43

Maltsev, Oleg. "ABOUT INTUITION MECHANISMS IN THE CONTEXT OF HUMAN ACTIVITY." Educational Discourse: collection of scientific papers, no. 22(4) (May 14, 2020): 79–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.33930/ed.2019.5007.22(4)-7.

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The human activity is the object of the conducted research, the mechanisms of intuition is its subject. Therefore, the purpose of this article is statements of a philosophical comprehension of intuition mechanisms functioning in human activity. The main ideas of the author experienced the corresponding approbation in scientific and field researches of 2015-2020. They are systemically stated and presented in this article for the first time, as well. The innovation of the following article consists of the conducted research issues that reflect the systematization of knowledge of the mechanisms o
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44

Carson, Emily. "Kant on Intuition in Geometry." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27, no. 4 (1997): 489–512. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1997.10717483.

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It's well-known that Kant believed that intuition was central to an account of mathematical knowledge. What that role is and how Kant argues for it are, however, still open to debate. There are, broadly speaking, two tendencies in interpreting Kant's account of intuition in mathematics, each emphasizing different aspects of Kant's general doctrine of intuition. On one view, most recently put forward by Michael Friedman, this central role for intuition is a direct result of the limitations of the syllogistic logic available to Kant. On this view, Kant's reasons for introducing intuition are tak
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45

Ag Almouloud, Saddo. "Demonstration in geometry: historical and philosophical perspectives." Revista Pesquisa Qualitativa 8, no. 18 (2020): 540–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.33361/rpq.2020.v.8.n.18.344.

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In this article, we weave historical-philosophical reflections about demonstration in mathematics, based on works of researchers that discuss the different philosophical perspectives on the topic, more specifically on geometry. We focus first on demonstration and its relationship with intuition and figural representations. Second, we criticize Poincaré’s conception of mathematical demonstration. Third, we reflect, in a non-exhaustive way, on the philosophy of demonstration in geometry, confronting Kant’s conceptions with the axiomatizations of the non-Euclidean geometries. In this text, we do
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46

Lang, Stefan. "Fichtes Deduktion praktischer Spontaneität." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 95, no. 1 (2013): 65–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/agph-2013-0003.

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Abstract: In this essay I make an attempt at sketching the outlines of Fichte’s method of philosophical construction in intuition and try to explore the rationality of his concept of deduction. I discuss the relationship between Fichte’s method of philosophical construction and Kant’s concept of construction of geometrical figures in pure intuition. I offer in-depth analysis of Fichte’s deduction of concepts in his Foundations of Natural Rights and in the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo. However, I argue that Fichte’s deduction of practical spontaneity is not successful. Finally, I consider an
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47

Cuypers, Stefaan E. "Autonomy beyond Voluntarism: In Defense of Hierarchy." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30, no. 2 (2000): 225–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2000.10717532.

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We haveconflictingpre-philosophical intuitions about what it means ‘to be true to ourselves.’ On the one hand, autonomy and authenticity seem closely connected to the lucidity of reflectiveness; on the other, they seem tightly interwoven with the immediacy of unreflectiveness. As opposed to a ‘Platonic’ intuition about the inferiority of the unexamined life, we have an equally strong ‘Nietzschean’ intuition about the corrosiveness of the examined life. Broadly speaking, the first intuition is more akin to the tradition of the Enlightenment, and the second, more to that of Romanticism; the one
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48

Deslandes, Ghislain, and Kenneth Casler. "Managerial and Philosophical Intuition in the Thinking of Bergson and Mintzberg." Philosophy of Management 9, no. 1 (2010): 85–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/pom20109119.

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49

Huber, Jakob. "Zum Status von Intuitionen in Gedankenexperimenten." Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 68, no. 5 (2020): 689–704. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2020-0047.

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Abstract Intuition-based argumentation is ubiquitous across most philosophical subfields. Moral and political philosophers in particular frequently justify normative principles on the basis of thought experiments that evoke judgments about specific (hypothetical) cases. Lately, however, intuitions have come under attack and their justificatory force is being questioned. This essay asks whether we can acknowledge the epistemic fallibility of intuitions, while nevertheless reaching reliable normative conclusions. To that effect I investigate three different strategies of relating specific intuit
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50

Aliaiev, G. E., and A. S. Tsygankov. "SIMON L. FRANK: LIFE AND DOCTRINE." RUDN Journal of Philosophy 23, no. 2 (2019): 172–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2313-2302-2019-23-2-172-191.

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The article discusses major biographical milestones and provides a general evolution of philosophical views of the Russian philosopher Simon L. Frank. At the initial stage of the creative way, Frank is an economist and critical Marxist. Appeal to philosophy in the 1900s characterized by the influence of neo-Kantianism, the immanent philosophy and philosophy of life. Around 1908-12 Frank’s transition to the position of metaphysics begins to take shape his own philosophical system, absolute realism. One of the main features of the work of Frank is consistency. Throughout his creative career, the
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