Journal articles: 'Philosophical scepticism'

1

Sosa, Ernest, and Barry Stroud. "Philosophical Scepticism." Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 68, no. 1 (July 1, 1994): 263–307. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/68.1.263.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Hinton, J. M. "Scepticism—Philosophical and Everyday." Philosophy 64, no. 248 (April 1989): 219–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100044491.

Full text

Abstract:

Many years ago we often witnessed a testy insistence, on the part of some purist, that some very familiar philosophical ‘ism’ be defined before being discussed; when most people either thought that had been done already or were happy to wait for the discussion itself to identify the ‘ism’. The old new style, that featured those unexpected demands for definition, ended by trying people's patience in its turn. Today there is a widespread assumption that we know, well enough, what is meant in philosophy by Scepticism. Perhaps the majority view is something like this:The philosophical term Scepticism admittedly covers a number of different stances. The one that a given philosopher wants to discuss may or may not be the most like that of the original ancient Skeptics. Still the context normally makes it clear enough what is meant, and there is more point in discussing whatever thing is meant than in quarrelling about the name. As for the way, or ways, in which the word scepticism with a small s is used when people are not referring to any traditional philosophical position—we can safely disregard colloquial usage in this context. As a rule the main point is to see how, if at all, the Scepticism in question is best combated or refuted.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

Griffiths, A. Phillips. "Stroud on Philosophical scepticism." Inquiry 29, no. 1-4 (January 1986): 377–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00201748608602105.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Wong, Wai-hung. "The Problem of Insulation." Philosophy 77, no. 3 (July 2002): 349–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819102000347.

Full text

Abstract:

Insulation is a noticeable phenomenon in the case of most non-Pyrrhonian sceptics about human knowledge. A sceptic is experiencing insulation when his scepticism does not have any effect on his common sense beliefs, and his common sense beliefs do not have any effect on his scepticism. I try to show why this is a puzzling phenomenon, and how it can be explained. It is puzzling because insulation seems to require blindness to one's own epistemic irresponsibility and irrationality, while the sceptic presumably cares a lot about being epistemically responsible and rational. Insulation can be explained by means of a notion of philosophical detachment: to be detached from one's own beliefs about the world is to take an other-personal position towards those beliefs, treating them as if they are another person's beliefs. It is because of this that the sceptic's scepticism is insulated from his scepticism because he cannot be detached from his beliefs about the world when he is engaging in everyday, practical activities. I conclude the paper with a brief discussion of the generality of the problem of insulation.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

Sztajer, Sławomir. "Enlightenment philosophy and scepticism." Humaniora. Czasopismo Internetowe 29, no. 1 (March 15, 2020): 69–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/h.2020.1.6.

Full text

Abstract:

The article discusses the role of scepticism in the Enlightenment. For many historians of philosophy, Enlightenment was a hiatus in the history of scepticism. Ideas often attributed to the Enlightenment, such as the cult of reason, optimism and the belief in progress, seem to be contrary to scepticism. I argue that this simplistic view of the Enlightenment is far from reality. The Enlightenment not only brought forth such great followers of scepticism as Hume, but also influenced other thinkers in many different ways. The influence of scepticism is not always clearly visible in the philosophical works of that time. Moreover, few philosophers would describe themselves as sceptics. Nevertheless, if one considers different ways in which scepticism influenced Enlightenment philosophy, it becomes apparent that the assertion that scepticism was allegedly absent in the Enlightenment is untenable.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

6

Park, Thomas K. "Pyrrhonism in Anthropological and Historical Research." History in Africa 12 (1985): 225–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3171722.

Full text

Abstract:

Scepticism has fairly consistently had a bad press from those in a position of authority. The usual reasons for its disrepute are not themselves particularly reputable. They generally include at least the following claims: scepticism is a negative philosophy and hence incapable of making positive contributions to humanity, science, or religion; sceptics are nihilists who wreak havoc on social structure, science, and religion; and, though scepticism can on occasion be beneficial, the idea that we do not know anything is preposterous. These attitudes are widespread in the general populace but less common in the scientific community, where various ideas such as Heisenberg's uncertainty principle or Einstein's theory of relativity have made scepticism more acceptable. Although the usual reasons listed above might be remotely accurate representations of dogmatic scepticism, they completely misrepresent Pyrrhonic scepticism, that form of scepticism which has had most influence on Western civilization.The position taken here is that Pyrrhonic scepticism need not be considered primarily a philosophical position. Historically, it was set forth as a philosophical position but only because philosophy once encompassed all of humanity's attempts to arrive at knowledge. Today, when science has primary claim to including under its roof most of our attempts to wrest knowledge from the world, Pyrrhonic scepticism is more approp-priately viewed as a scientific position having general implications for scientific research.It is ironic that negative attitudes towards scepticism continue, since the dramatic historical failures of social structure, ethical beliefs, and human progress have been due to dogmatic pretensions of one sort or another, not to scepticism. This is not by chance. Scepticism is, after all, difficult to use as the justification for authority, obedience, or power.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

7

Feldman, Richard, and Barry Stroud. "The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism." Philosophical Review 95, no. 2 (April 1986): 305. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2185609.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

8

Nathanson, Stephen. "The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism." International Philosophical Quarterly 25, no. 4 (1985): 431–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq198525439.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

9

Squires, Roger, and Barry Stroud. "The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism." Philosophical Quarterly 36, no. 145 (October 1986): 558. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2219883.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

10

Vander Veer, Garrett L. "The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism." International Studies in Philosophy 20, no. 3 (1988): 149–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/intstudphil1988203114.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

11

Heil, John, and Barry Stroud. "The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47, no. 2 (December 1986): 331. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2107446.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

12

Pierris, Graciela De, and Barry Stroud. "The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism." Noûs 23, no. 4 (September 1989): 531. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2215882.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

13

Platts, Mark, and Robert Black. "Philosophical Scepticism about Moral Obligation." Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 67, no. 1 (July 1, 1993): 175–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/67.1.175.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

14

Ballantyne, Nathan. "Verbal Disagreements and Philosophical Scepticism." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94, no. 4 (March 16, 2016): 752–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2016.1149200.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

15

Williams, Michael. "The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism." Teaching Philosophy 10, no. 1 (1987): 80–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/teachphil198710114.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

16

Heidemann, Dietmar H. "Hegel on the Nature of Scepticism." Hegel Bulletin 32, no. 1-2 (2011): 80–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200000173.

Full text

Abstract:

In the Encyclopaedia Logic, Hegel states that ‘philosophy … contains the sceptical as a moment within itself — specifically as the dialectical moment’ (§81, Addition 2), and that ‘scepticism’ as ‘the dialectical moment itself is an essential one in the affirmative Science’ (§78). On the one hand, the connection between scepticism and dialectic is obvious. Hegel claims that scepticism is a problem that cannot be just removed from the philosophical agenda by knock-down anti-sceptical arguments. Scepticism intrinsically belongs to philosophical thinking; that is to say, it plays a constructive role in philosophical thinking. On the other hand, scepticism has to be construed as the view according to which we cannot know whether our beliefs are true, i.e., scepticism plays a destructive role in philosophy no matter what. It is particularly this role that clashes with Hegel's claim of having established a philosophical system of true cognition of the entirety of reality. In the following I argue that for Hegel the constructive and the destructive role of scepticism are reconcilable. I specifically argue that it is dialectic that makes both consistent since scepticism is a constitutive element of dialectic.In order to show in what sense scepticism is an intrinsic feature of dialectic I begin by sketching Hegel's early view of scepticism specifically with respect to logic and metaphysics. The young Hegel construes logic as a philosophical method of human cognition that inevitably results in ‘sceptical’ consequences in that it illustrates the finiteness of human understanding. By doing so, logic not only nullifies finite understanding but also introduces to metaphysics, i.e., the true philosophical science of the absolute.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

17

Schürch, Franz-Emmanuel. "Heidegger et la destruction du scepticisme." Dialogue 46, no. 4 (2007): 683–708. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300002171.

Full text

Abstract:

ABSTRACTIn this article, I wish to shed a new light on Heidegger's philosophical position toward idealism and realism. This will be accomplished through an analysis of Heidegger's account of the problem of scepticism in §43 ofSein und Zeit.Heidegger's position toward scepticism has often been overlooked or treated candidly by scholars and, as a result, misunderstood in the larger philosophical world, who frequently equated Heidegger's philosophy with some form of scepticism. By highlighting some crucial ambiguities in the unfolding of §43, I show that inSein und ZeitHeidegger is elaborating a radical refutation of scepticism even though it will ultimately only be accomplished in theBeiträge zur Philosophie.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

18

Davidovic, Aleksandra. "Hume’s understanding of the relationship between scepticism and philosophy." Theoria, Beograd 61, no. 3 (2018): 93–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1803093d.

Full text

Abstract:

In this article I explore how Hume?s views on the relationship between scepticism and philosophy developed and matured throughout his philosophical career. Hume?s first work, A Treatise of Human Nature, leaves open the question of why would anyone pursue philosophy in light of the discovery that sceptical arguments are irrefutable. What I aim to show is that, although Hume?s attitude to scepticism and his own sceptical position remain essentially unchanged over the years, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, along with a couple of his minor writings, contain interesting changes, additions and improvements to his thinking about the way scepticism can inform our philosophical enquiries. Only in his last work Hume unambiguously claims that scepticism does have a positive and lasting influence on our philosophising, and this influence consists in intelectual modesty and subject-matter limitations whithin philosophical investigations.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

19

Reinoso, Guadalupe. "Neopyrrhonism as Metaphilosophy: A Non-Quietist Proposal." Praxis Filosófica, no. 54 (April 22, 2022): 11–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i54.11935.

Full text

Abstract:

Fogelin (2002 [1976]; 1992 [1981]; 1994) was the first one to speak about “Neopyrrhonism” to link Wittgenstein and Sextus Empiricus. To him, Pyrrhonism “combines philosophical scepticism with scepticism about philosophy, that is, to have doubts about philosophy on the basis of philosophical arguments” (1994, p. 3). Following this interpretation, Neopyrrhonism can be understood as a kind of scepticism that cancels philosophy using self-destructive arguments (peritrope). Both Sextus -with his proposal of suspension of judgment- and Wittgenstein -with his idea of the dissolution of philosophical problems- are representatives of quietism. Neopyrrhonism as quietism can be conceived of as a therapeutic proposal mainly based on not postulating an argumentative-constructive philosophical theory. Against this perspective, I propose interpreting Neopyrrhonism as Metaphilosophy, from which a performative proposal emerges. In this approach, Neopyrrhonism is an open-ended inquiry that implies the ability of using different philosophical argumentative strategies in a performative sense to encourage a new way of exercising philosophy.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

20

Hansson, Sven Ove. "The Uses and Misuses of Philosophical Scepticism." Theoria 83, no. 3 (August 2, 2017): 169–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/theo.12123.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

21

Alweiss, Lilian. "Is there an ‘End’ to Philosophical Scepticism?" Philosophy 80, no. 3 (July 2005): 395–411. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819105000367.

Full text

Abstract:

P F Strawson advocates a descriptive metaphysics. Contrary to Kant, he believes that metaphysics should be ‘content to describe the actual structure of thought about the world’, there is no need of postulating a world that lies beyond our grasp. We neither need to refute nor accept scepticism since we can ignore it with good reasons. Yet this paper argues that Strawson fails to provide us with good reasons. He fails to realise that one cannot do metaphysics by construing its claims as being merely descriptive of a conceptual scheme we find ourselves to possess without even purporting to establish the legitimacy of that scheme. The paper shows that it is possible to overcome this impasse if we endorse Kant's transcendental idealist position. The significance of Kant' position is that it not only allows us to describe our conceptual scheme but moreover that it acknowledges that the world may be (radically) otherwise without however instantiating the truth of scepticism

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

22

Kennedy, Leonard A. "Late-Fourteenth-Century Philosophical Scepticism at Oxford." Vivarium 23, no. 2 (1985): 124–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853485x00078.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

23

Thomas, Alan. "McDowell on Transcendental Arguments, Scepticism and “Error Theory”." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4, no. 2 (May 28, 2014): 109–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-03031108.

Full text

Abstract:

John McDowell has recently changed his line of response to philosophical scepticism about the external world. He now claims to be in a position to use the strategy of transcendental argumentation in order to show the falsity of the sceptic’s misrepresentation of our ordinary epistemic standpoint. Since this transcendental argument begins from a weak and widely shared assumption shared with the sceptic herself the falsity of external world scepticism is now demonstrable even to her. Building on the account of perceptual intentionality defended in the Woodbridge lectures, McDowell argues that the idea of narrow perceptual content is unavailable to anyone, including the sceptic. This argument is assessed by drawing out an analogy with parallel responses to error theories in ethics.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

24

Raff, Charles. "Moore's Arguments and Scepticism." Dialogue 31, no. 4 (1992): 691–700. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300016206.

Full text

Abstract:

Once, G. E. Moore scorned the “common point of view which takes the world of experience as ultimately real.” The argument Moore followed to this sceptical conclusion in his fledgling 1897 fellowship dissertation was a legacy from Kant's Antinomies. By 1899 Moore had renounced idealist conclusions; he set out both to disengage from Kantian arguments and to reconcile with “the world of experience.” Moore's work for a stable realist basis for knowledge to fulfil both aims occupied his most famous argument, in his 1939 lecture “Proof of an External World.” Moore himself is sometimes supposed to have thought the argument of this masterwork unsatisfactory where it treats a traditional sceptical puzzle posed by dreaming. Critics, including Wittgenstein, have portrayed Moore's best reply to philosophical scepticism as dogmatic mere assertion, unresponsive or as ineffectual as sheer handwaving. However, these critics rate Moore's success against scepticism based on interpretations of “Proof of an External World” that neglect its part in Moore's campaign against Kant. Consequently, some potentially pivotal questions — which in this study I merely broach — remain wide open; for example, why in presenting his famous 1939 proof did Moore state that its purpose was to refute what “Kant declares to be his opinion, that there is only one possible proof of the existence of things outside of us” (PXW, p. 145)? And why did Moore explicitly reject the formula for posing philosophical scepticism in which Kant famously proclaimed this problem “a scandal to philosophy”?

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

25

Hill, Jonathan. "Does Scepticism Presuppose Voluntarism?" International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8, no. 1 (March 5, 2018): 31–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-00001226.

Full text

Abstract:

Philosophical scepticism is sometimes thought to presuppose doxastic voluntarism, the claim that we are able to believe or disbelieve propositions at will. This is problematic given that doxastic voluntarism itself is a controversial position. I examine two arguments for the view that scepticism presupposes voluntarism. I show that they rely on different versions of a depiction of scepticism as a conversion narrative. I argue that one version of this narrative does presuppose voluntarism, but the other does not. Moreover, alternative versions of the narrative are available. I conclude that scepticism does not presuppose voluntarism.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

26

Larmore, Charles. "The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism by Barry Stroud." Journal of Philosophy 84, no. 7 (1987): 384–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil198784745.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

27

Henle, R. J. "The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. By Barry Stroud." Modern Schoolman 64, no. 2 (1987): 148–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/schoolman198764236.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

28

James, Trevor. "'Errors And Omissions Excepted': Allen Gurnow's Philosophical Scepticism." Journal of Commonwealth Literature 22, no. 1 (March 1987): 55–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002198948702200106.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

29

GRAHAM, ANDREW. "On the Very Idea of a Verbal Dispute." Dialogue 53, no. 2 (December 20, 2013): 299–314. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217313001133.

Full text

Abstract:

I argue that Quineans who are sceptical about the analytic/synthetic distinction should be equally sceptical about the distinction between verbal and factual disputes. I develop an objection to the distinction between verbal and factual disputes, derived from objections to the analytic/synthetic distinction. I then explain what the resulting scepticism consists in. Ultimately, such sceptics should agree that there is a distinction between verbal and factual disputes, but think that it cannot perform certain philosophical tasks.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

30

Guyer, Paul. "Kant on Common Sense and Scepticism." Kantian Review 7 (March 2003): 1–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415400001722.

Full text

Abstract:

Is the refutation of scepticism a central objective for Kant? Some commentators have denied that the refutation of either theoretical or moral scepticism was central to Kant's concerns. Thus, in his recent book Kant and the Fate of Autonomy, Karl Ameriks rejects 'taking Kant to be basically a respondent to the skeptic'. According to Ameriks, who here has Kant's theoretical philosophy in mind,What Kant goes on to propose is that, instead of focusing on trying to establish with certainty – against skepticism – that the objects of common sense exist, let alone that they have philosophical dominance, or, in contrast, on explaining that it is only the theoretical discoveries of science that determine what is objective, one can rather work primarily to determine a positive and balanced philosophical relation between the distinct frameworks of our manifest and scientific images.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

31

Djuric, Drago. "Kant: Dogmatism, scepticism, criticism." Theoria, Beograd 47, no. 3-4 (2004): 17–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo0404017d.

Full text

Abstract:

In this article the author tries to present the place and significance of Kant's critical philosophy, starting from the relationship set in his claim that there are "three phases that which philosophy should run through in the purpose of metaphysics", and they are dogmatism, skepticism and criticism. Then he stresses the importance of Kant's claim that the relation is not only systemic but also "temporal sequence grounded in the nature of human cognitive ability". In the article, furthermore, the attention is devoted to the relation of Hume to the ancient skepticism, as well as to the relation of Kant to the ancient and Hume's skepticism. Finally, the author considers the significance of the influence of Hume's skepticism on Kant's criticism and transcendentalism, and tries to indicate some differences of principle between these philosophical standpoints.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

32

Uzoigwe, Elias Ifeanyi E. "SCEPTICISM IN AFRICA: AN EPISTEMIC CUM AFRICAN PHILOSOPHICAL TRAJECTORY." Jurnal Sosialisasi: Jurnal Hasil Pemikiran, Penelitian dan Pengembangan Keilmuan Sosiologi Pendidikan, no. 2 (November 9, 2020): 38. http://dx.doi.org/10.26858/sosialisasi.v0i2.15844.

Full text

Abstract:

In this work, I will be exploring the possibility of African skepticism in the philosophical milieu, and also in advancing the course of African philosophical discourse. This will be the underlying focus of this study. Employing the terms epistemic and trajectory is a way of trying to show that though skepticism is the fulcrum or pedestal upon which epistemology springs up as a branch of philosophy, however, the fact remains that African scepticism is not wishful thinking but a reality. Some of the philosophers of African descent whose works prove the existence of African scepticism like Hountondji, Asouzu, Wiredu, Oruka, and a host of others deserve grateful acknowledgment. It is in the process of other African philosophers’ objective reactions, critiques, criticisms and counter criticisms to their sceptical views that African philosophy, African philosophers and African skepticism are powerfully made more evident as realities in the philosophical enterprise. This work strongly holds that the attitude of undermining the efforts of African philosophers by fellow African scholars should be discouraged, rather the mindset should be that of African philosophical ecumenism where each scholar and school collaborate and corroborate with others to synergise for the advancement of thoughts and ideas that are indigenous to Africa, enrich and employ them in tackling the problems that are facing African and still extend generous hands of assistance in tackling the global challenge.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

33

Rodríguez Tirado, Álvaro. "B. Stroud, The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism." Revista de filosofía DIÁNOIA 31, no. 31 (September 9, 1985): 304. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704913e.1985.31.741.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

34

Parusniková, Zuzana. "Hume's Scepticism Revisited." Philosophy 89, no. 4 (July 15, 2014): 581–602. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819114000254.

Full text

Abstract:

AbstractI shall situate Hume's scepticism within a broader philosophical and historical context. Firstly, I shall consider the place of Hume's thought within the early modern break with the almost millennium long metaphysical tradition, a break initiated by Descartes. The framework of being structured by a universal order was replaced by the individual human mind that broke free from any higher authority and became an autonomous cognitive agent. Subsequently, the ontological self-evidence of the world or the possibility of adequate knowledge came under sceptical attack. Hume firmly belongs to this discourse and can be seen as the most consistent exponent of this early modern sceptical line. In this light, the ‘New Hume’ claim that Hume was an ontological realist will be shown to be misplaced in principle. Secondly, the strong influence of Pyrrhonism on Hume's philosophy will be considered, together with his concept of mitigated scepticism. The Pyrrhonian legacy is especially noticeable in Hume's acceptance of the weakness of reason and in his emphasis on the instructive role of philosophy – instead of attempting to make it the foundation of science it becomes a guide to a balanced, happy life. In this respect, Hume stands outside the early modern mainstream in philosophy.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

35

Gutschmidt, Rico. "Grenze und Transformation." Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 70, no. 5 (October 1, 2022): 781–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2022-0053.

Full text

Abstract:

Abstract Since antiquity, philosophy has aimed not only at theoretical insight, but also at personal development and transformation. This implies a new relationship to the self and the world, which can result, for example, from existential experiences triggered by the engagement with philosophical problems. Drawing on the examples of facticity and scepticism, this paper develops the thesis that transformative philosophical experience and a corresponding new view of the world can be accompanied by a new understanding of the philosophical problem that triggered the experience. This would involve a non-propositional form of knowledge that is more than practical or phenomenal knowledge. A precise model of such a form of non-propositional insight could shed new light on the transformative dimension of philosophy and, with respect to, e. g., facticity and scepticism, provide a better understanding of limits of knowledge.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

36

Barel, Frank. "Perceptual Entitlement, Reliabilism, and Scepticism." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2, no. 1 (2012): 21–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/221057012x630696.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper explores the bearing of Tyler Burge’s notion of perceptual entitlement on the problem of scepticism. Perceptual entitlement is an external form of warrant, connected with his perceptual anti-individualism. According to his view, an individual can be entitled to a perceptual belief without having reasons warranting the belief. On the face of it, this suggests that the view may have anti-sceptical resources. In short, the question is whether Burge’s notion of perceptual entitlement allows us to outright deny that we in our philosophical theory need a reason to reject the sceptical scenario. The answer to this question is ‘no’. However, as I go on to show, Burge’s position includes further resources that allow for an anti-sceptical argument.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

37

Fitch, Richard. "Le Dœuff, Pyrrhonism and the Rational Solidarity of ‘People fed up with Oppressive Relationships’." Paragraph 37, no. 3 (November 2014): 326–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/para.2014.0132.

Full text

Abstract:

The discourse that calls itself philosophy has long had problems with both women and Pyrrhonian Sceptics. This article explores how both Pyrrhonism and Michèle Le Dœuff's feminist philosophizing threaten this discourse by revealing its lack of philosophical rigour, to the extent that it should be relabelled philosophism. This exploration will also reveal how anti-feminism relates to anti-scepticism in the masculinist and philosophist imaginaries. Using Pascal as an initial point of contact, the article then suggests how feminist philosophy and Pyrrhonism might develop a rational solidarity in the practice of philosophizing and in undoing, and keeping undone, oppressive relationships.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

38

Bufacchi, Vittorio. "Sceptical Democracy." Politics 21, no. 1 (February 2001): 23–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9256.00131.

Full text

Abstract:

Two extreme philosophical positions pose a constant threat to democracy. Those who believe in the certainty of their beliefs (totalitarianism) and those who deny the existence of any truth (nihilism and post-modernity) uphold these anti-democratic positions. Squeezed between these two polarities we find liberal democracy. One of the distinctive properties of liberal democracy is its endorsement of a political definition of scepticism. The aim of this article is to explore the relationship between liberal democracy and scepticism.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

39

Gutschmidt, Rico. "Skeptizismus und negative Theologie." Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 67, no. 1 (March 5, 2019): 23–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2019-0002.

Full text

Abstract:

Abstract Scepticism and negative theology are best understood not as theoretical positions, but rather as forms of philosophical practice that performatively undermine our knowledge claims or our seeming understanding of God. In particular, I am arguing that both scepticism and negative theology invoke the failure of the attempt to understand the absolute, be it God or the notion of absolute objectivity. However, with reference to L. A. Paul’s notion of epistemically transformative experience, I am arguing that we still understand something about the absolute through the experience of failing to think it. This, of course, is a non-propositional form of understanding, and I am arguing that there is something about the finitude of the human condition that can only be understood through a transformative philosophical experience with respect to the absolute.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

40

Ferrer, Diogo. "O ceticismo, entre Maimon, Fichte e Hegel." Problemata 11, no. 4 (November 2020): 10–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.7443/problemata.v11i4.56363.

Full text

Abstract:

This article provides an overview of some significant responses to scepticism in German classical philosophy. I start with the exposition of S. Maimon’s criticism to Kant about the applicability of pure concepts to the empirical reality and the influence of this problem on J. G. Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre. I expose the main theses of Fichte’s 1794/1795 Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre, from the point of view of the possibility of a systematic philosophy built upon first principles. Next, I consider Hegel’s 1802 discussion of the meaning and relationship of ancient and modern scepticism. This will allow me to introduce Hegel’s response to scepticism in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the question about the grounds of knowledge in the Science of Logic. In addition to showing the relevance of Maimon for the development of classical German philosophy, three theses are defended in the article: first, that both the Fichtean and the Hegelian answers accept the terms of discussion set by scepticism; second, that both present internal refutations of scepticism; and finally, that scepticism and its internal refutation can be understood as a thread connecting different philosophical positions in German classical philosophy.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

41

Mulhall, Stephen. "“Loopings Among the Parts”." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5, no. 1 (December 18, 2015): 3–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-03031126.

Full text

Abstract:

This short essay takes guidance from the preface Cavell supplied for the 1999 edition of The Claim of Reason, in order to consider the ways its first three parts interact with one another, just as much as with its fourth and final part. It argues that the book’s account of human action invites us to explore a particular reflexive dimension of its author’s sense of the inter-relatedness of scepticism about the external world and scepticism about other minds; for it suggests that traditional Wittgensteinian responses to the external world sceptic subject him to a form of other minds scepticism, and thereby subvert the extent to which Wittgensteinian philosophical practice (properly understood) constitutes a proof of the reality and accessibility of other minds.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

42

Bernstein, Jay. "Adorno on Disenchantment: The Scepticism of Enlightened Reason." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 44 (March 1999): 305–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100006780.

Full text

Abstract:

T. W. Adorno's and Max Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment is fifty years old. Its disconcerting darkness now seems so bound to the time of its writing, one may well wonder if we have anything to learn from it. Are its main lines of argument relevant to our social and philosophical world? Are the losses it records losses we can still recognise as our own?

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

43

Wright, John P. "Scepticism, Causal Science and ‘The Old Hume’." Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10, no. 2 (September 2012): 123–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2012.0034.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper replies to Peter Millican (Mind, 2009), who argues that Hume denies the possible existence of causal powers which underlie the regularities that we observe in nature. I argue that Hume's own philosophical views on causal power cannot be considered apart from his mitigated skepticism. His account of the origin of the idea of causal power, which traces it to a subjective impression, only leads to what he calls ‘Pyrrhonian scepticism’. He holds that we can only escape such excessive skepticism by way of a natural judgment based on the association of ideas, which forms the basis of what he calls ‘a legitimate ground of Assent’.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

44

Paipais, Vassilios. "Between faith and scepticism: Nicholas Rengger’s reflections on the ‘hybridity’ of modernity." International Relations 34, no. 4 (October 23, 2020): 627–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0047117820968624.

Full text

Abstract:

In this essay, I offer a brief assessment of Nicholas Rengger’s engagement with arguments arising from the theological critique of modern politics and of his take on the relationship between faith and philosophy in modernity. Rengger’s scepticism, a peculiar mix of naturalism and philosophical idealism, combining insights from Oakeshott, Santayana and Augustine, did not cordon off faith but sought to work out its tensive relationship with practical forms of reasoning in modernity, a condition he described as a ‘hybrid’. Rengger’s critique of the hybridity of modernity rests on assumptions that expose some of the unresolved tensions of his anti-Pelagian scepticism.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

45

Brooks, Thom. "A Defence of Sceptical Authoritarianism." Politics 22, no. 3 (September 2002): 152–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9256.00170.

Full text

Abstract:

Vittorio Bufacchi argued in this journal that democracy was under threat from two extreme philosophical positions: totalitarianism and nihilism. Sandwiched between these polarities is liberal democracy. Bufacchi believes that one of liberal democracy's distinctive properties is an endorsement of scepticism, which he then attempts to illuminate. In contrast, this article will argue that an authoritarian government bound by a constitution permitting civil liberties might also adopt political scepticism. This removes the aforementioned distinctiveness of liberal democracy in this regard and, in addition, leads us toward a rethinking of the possibility of a more plausible consideration of democracy.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

46

Brenner, William H. "Wittgenstein and Scepticism Wittgenstein at Work: Method in the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS." Philosophical Investigations 28, no. 4 (October 2005): 375–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9205.2005.00265.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

47

Cath, Yuri. "EVIDENCE AND INTUITION." Episteme 9, no. 4 (December 2012): 311–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2012.21.

Full text

Abstract:

AbstractMany philosophers accept a view – what I will call the intuition picture – according to which intuitions are crucial evidence in philosophy. Recently, Williamson (2004, 2007: ch. 1) has argued that such views are best abandoned because they lead to a psychologistic conception of philosophical evidence that encourages scepticism about the armchair judgements relied upon in philosophy. In this paper I respond to this criticism by showing how the intuition picture can be formulated in such a way that: (i) it is consistent with a wide range of views about not only philosophical evidence but also the nature of evidence in general, including Williamson's famous view that E = K; (ii) it can maintain the central claims about the nature and role of intuitions in philosophy made by proponents of the intuition picture; (iii) it does not collapse into Williamson's own deflationary view of the nature and role of intuitions in philosophy; and (iv) it does not lead to scepticism.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

48

Nauta, Lodi. "Lorenzo Valla and Quattrocento Scepticism." Vivarium 44, no. 2 (2006): 375–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853406779159473.

Full text

Abstract:

AbstractLorenzo Valla (1406-1457) has often been considered to be a sceptic. Equipped with an extremely polemical and critical mind, his whole oeuvre seemed to aim at undermining received philosophical and theological dogmas. More specifically he has been associated with the burgeoning interests in ancient scepticism in the fifteenth century. In this article the arguments in support of this interpretation will be critically examined and evaluated. Based on a discussion of two of his major works, De vero bono and the Dialectica, it will be shown that Valla was not a sceptic. Even though the first work betrays the techniques of the Academy as employed by Cicero, the appropriation of these strategies served an agenda which can hardly be called 'sceptical'. The second work contains his reform of Aristotelian dialectic, which seems to testify to a sceptical interest in arguments which rely on verisimilitude and dubious validity such as sorites and paradox. But rather than reflecting an endorsement of Academic scepticism, this work, on closer reading, shows Valla to be highly critical on such arguments. This raises the question of how scepticism is related to rhetoric. Their similarities and differences will be discussed in the final section: Valla the Christian orator was no proponent of doubt, uncertainty and a suspension of judgement, even though at times he used strategies derived from Academic scepticism.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

49

Searle, John R. "The future of philosophy." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences 354, no. 1392 (December 29, 1999): 2069–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.1999.0544.

Full text

Abstract:

There is no sharp dividing line between science and philosophy, but philosophical problems tend to have three special features. First, they tend to concern large frameworks rather than specific questions within the framework. Second, they are questions for which there is no generally accepted method of solution. And third they tend to involve conceptual issues. For these reasons a philosophical problem such as the nature of life can become a scientific problem if it is put into a shape where it admits of scientific resolution. Philosophy in the 20th century was characterized by a concern with logic and language, which is markedly different from the concerns of earlier centuries of philosophy. However, it shared with the European philosophical tradition since the 17th century an excessive concern with issues in the theory of knowledge and with scepticism. As the century ends, we can see that scepticism no longer occupies centre stage, and this enables us to have a more constructive approach to philosophical problems than was possible for earlier generations. This situation is somewhat analogous to the shift from the sceptical concerns of Socrates and Plato to the constructive philosophical enterprise of Aristotle. With that in mind, we can discuss the prospects for the following six philosophical areas: (i) the traditional mind–body problem; (ii) the philosophy of mind and cognitive science; (iii) the philosophy of language; (iv) the philosophy of society; (v) ethics and practical reason; (vi) the philosophy of science. The general theme of these investigations, I believe, is that the appraisal of the true significance of issues in the philosophy of knowledge enables us to have a more constructive account of various other philosophical problems than has typically been possible for the past three centuries.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

50

Holden, Thomas. "‘The Modern Disciple of the Academy’: Hume, Shelley, and Sir William Drummond." Journal of Scottish Philosophy 9, no. 2 (September 2011): 161–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2011.0014.

Full text

Abstract:

Sir William Drummond ( 1770?-1828 ) enjoyed considerable notoriety in the early nineteenth century as the author of the Academical Questions ( 1805 ), a manifesto for immaterialism that is at the same time a creative synthesis of ancient and modern forms of scepticism. In this paper I advance an interpretation of Drummond's work that emphasises his extensive employment and adaptation of Hume's own ‘Academical or Sceptical Philosophy’. I also document the impact of the Academical Questions on the contemporary philosophical scene, including its decisive influence on Shelley's philosophical development.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Journal articles on the topic 'Philosophical scepticism'

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles